Assurance Cases for Software R eleases in ISS Sustaining P hase of Development

25
NASA IV&V Facili ty Assurance Cases for Software Releases in ISS Sustaining Phase of Development Sarma Susarla IV&V Team Lead [email protected] 9/10/2013

description

Assurance Cases for Software R eleases in ISS Sustaining P hase of Development. Sarma Susarla IV&V Team L ead [email protected] 9/10/2013. Introduction. IV&V has been performing ISS IV&V for the past 18 years Software architecture and design is mature - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of Assurance Cases for Software R eleases in ISS Sustaining P hase of Development

Page 1: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

Facility

Assurance Cases for Software Releases in ISS Sustaining Phase of Development

Sarma SusarlaIV&V Team Lead

[email protected]/10/2013

Page 2: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityIntroduction

• IV&V has been performing ISS IV&V for the past 18 years• Software architecture and design is mature• However new releases are being developed to add new functionality

and product improvements in the existing architecture.• IV&V had been generating technical reports at the end of each

milestone event such as :– Technical Design Review (TDR)– Test Readiness Review (TRR)– Software Transition Readiness Review (STRR)

• These reports document software assurance stating that the CSCI is ready for next stage in life cycle development.

• This presentation provides a framework for an integrated software assurance approach:– To assert that CSCI is ready for on-orbit deployment– Using existing IV&V processes and analyses.

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

2

Page 3: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

Facility

Evidence Based Assurance (EBA) Implementation Approach

• Use ISS life cycle development model • Use life cycle development milestones as individual claims

into EBA network model– Requirements development completion– Code development completion etc.

• Use Biwar report as a mechanism to report evidence as it becomes available during life cycle development support activity

• Maximize usage of existing evidence data from technical reports

• Minimize new documentation work• Existing analyses remain same but may become deeper and

more rigorous to support each claim

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

3

Page 4: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityISS CSCI Life Cycle

• In normal waterfall mode, the life cycle Sequence is SRR, PDR, CDR, TRR, and FQT.

• In ISS above model is used for CSCI first release.• Subsequent CSCI releases every 15 months to

« Enhance functionality of existing functions« Add new mission requirements such as Visiting Vehicle support« Fix existing critical software problems« Implement code changes to avoid operator workarounds (SPNs) for code problems

• In sustaining phase , each release is an incremental change to the previous release

• Only changes to the review artifacts are subject to formal reviews• To cut down development time, parallel development activity for:

– Requirements development– Design/Code development– FQT test development

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

4

Page 5: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityLife cycle Timeline

RCS Review Process

Test design development

Design Test Review Process

Test Implementation- Test Script Development

Implementation Test Review Process

Software design/code developmentPeer Review Process

Requirements Development 6 months 6 months

Content Review

TDR TRR

2 months

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

StageTRRs

FQT end Stage

End STRR

CSCI ready fo

r

on-orbit

transitio

n

LegendTDR: Technical Design ReviewTRR: Test Readiness ReviewFQT : Formal Qualification TestingSTRR: Software Transition Readiness ReviewRCS: Requirement Change Sheet

4 months

5

Susarla, Sarma V. (JSC-OD)[TASC]
Add stage testing, Transition readiness review
Page 6: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityCSCI Life Cycle Reviews

• Sustaining engineering CSCI development life cycle– Content review

« SCR (Software Change Request) database contains desired new functionality, existing problems, and product improvement suggestions

« SCR Content is selected based on community high priority selections« IV&V selects open SCRs from the database

‹ To meet mission requirements‹ To fix critical problems

– Requirement Change Reviews« On going, held after requirement changes for each SCR are worked« IV&V evaluates changes for Q1, Q2, Q3 and provides issue feedback

– Technical Design Review (TDR)« Held after all requirement changes and new designs are complete« Combines SRR, PDR, and CDR in waterfall model« IV&V evaluates design changes for Q1, Q2, Q3 and provides issue feedback

– Code Reviews« On going, held after code developed for each SCR triggered change« IV&V evaluates changes for Q1, Q2, Q3 and provides issue feedback

– Test Design Reviews« On going, held after test case designs to verify new requirements are developed« IV&V evaluates design to ensure that the tests verify the requirements correctly and

completely.« Q2 and Q3 considered as applicable

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

6

Page 7: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityCSCI Life Cycle Reviews

• Test Implementation Reviews– On going, review held after a test script for an FQT test is developed and dryrun on FQT platform– IV&V verifies from test log and script that the test is implemented as per test design and test cases

ran in the expected sequence and order– IV&V also verifies that test failures are captured in SCRs.

• Test Readiness Review (TRR)– Held after all tests completed test implementation reviews, review issues were incorporated, and

tests were dryrun on flight release.– IV&V verifies that there are no open issues on any test cleared for FQT run

• Formal Qualification Test Results Review‹ IV&V reviews test logs to verify that tests ran as expected and test failures are properly described in

referenced SCRs. • Stage Test Reviews

• IV&V reviews integrated tests that verify the CSCI performance in the on-orbit CSCIs integrated environment

• IV&V ensures that test procedures match test objectives and test failures are correctly reported in SCRs

• Software Transition Readiness Review• IV&V evaluates open SCRs/Issues to ensure that the corresponding problem does not impact on-

orbit CSCI transition to new release or immediate operation with new release• If such SCRs/Issues are found, IV&V would articulate to the Program to address the problem before

the transition.

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

7

Page 8: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityProposed CSCI Assurance Model

Components– A Generic assurance claim network– The Generic model is instantiated for each CSCI to suit the CSCI’s specific life cycle

specifics.« Sub-claims may be added to suite « Listed evidence in the model may be substituted with different evidence

applicable evidence« TBDs in the model will be replaced with actual numbers

– A Generic evidence reporting mechanism• Analysis Drivers

– Technical Reference for Adverse Conditions– Technical Reference for undocumented CSCI behaviors as needed– PAL assets as extensions to Catalog of Methods for ISS specific artifacts analysis

for:« Requirements« Software design« Flight code« Test design and implementation

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

8

Page 9: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityAssurance Model Concept

• Inverted Tree structure of various claims each claim representing completion of a life cycle development event

• Top most claim represents final assurance claim for Software on-orbit deploymentFor each Sub-Claim

Claim Statement– Second level claims representing each major milestone in software development at Process level

E.g.« Requirements development complete« Code development complete etc.

– Third level claim represents sub-claims if second level claim is made up of several distinguishable life cycle events

– The last level claim represents analysis activity requiring certain rigor such as IV&V 3 Questions Evidence– Most of the data is what is generated for existing technical reports

« TDR Report« TRR report« STRR report

– List of developer products such as SCRs, RCSs and Tests reviewed and IV&V issues– Life cycle analysis activity and results reported in Biwar– For activity which is outside the scope of IV&V (such as simulation, unit tests etc), use developer’s

status reports as supporting evidenceArgument– Description of life cycle analysis activity pertinent to realizing the claim– Contains reference to PAL assets and technical reference as appropriate

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

9

Page 10: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

Facility

Assurance Case Claim NetworkMost Claims supported by IV&V Life cycle review activity

Code behavior verified by unit and integration tests

All CSCI issues that impact on-orbit transition have been addressed

FQT tests Verified CSCI behavior

CSCI behavior verified in integrated on-orbit configuration

1.5 1.71.8All tests completed dry

runs using flight software on FQT platform

TRR established CSCI, SIM and test rig readiness for formal testing

CSCI behavior verified through formal testing

1.6.4

1.6.5

1.6.6

Test designs are adequate to verify requirement changes

Test scripts and procedures implemented the designs accurately

Regression tests were adequate

Test designs verified as per IV&V 3 questions

1.6.1.1

1.0

SCR content represents mission concept

Design adequately represents requirements functionality

Code developed to match requirements and

SCRs

Requirements developed per SCR content

1.11.2

1.4

Requirements evaluated per IV&V 3 Questions

Design evaluated per IV&V 3 Questions

Code evaluated per IV&V 3 Questions 1.4.1

1.2.1 1.3.1

Final claim at STRR

1.3

1.6

1.6.1

1..6.3

1.6.2

Each Box is a claim

CSCI ready for on-orbit transition

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

10

Entire claim network is a word document containing for each claim: Claim statement; Evidence, Argument , Caveats , Supplemental info

Page 11: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityAnalysis Rigor

Methods• Analysis methods expanded from COM methods to detailed ISS specific guidelines.• Separate PAL asset each for Requirements, Design, Code and Test.Adverse conditions• Full list of adverse conditions captured in TR folder in ECM, next slide shows a shortened

list• These conditions are evaluated as applicable to Requirements, Design, Code, and Test

reviews with respect to Q2, Q3.• If an adverse condition is integrated into a requirement, then further life cycle analysis for

that will be under Q1.• There will be several adverse conditions in code that will not be captured in

requirements. Code will be reviewed against such adverse conditions• Very few adverse conditions for test analysis because FQT will not test behaviors not

captured in requirements• Adverse conditions not captured in requirements will be topics for Independent

Analysis(IA).

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

11

Page 12: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityISS Adverse Conditions (Partial list)

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

Adverse condition Comment Req Design/Code Test

Recoverable 1553 error (including channel switch) Potential problem in meeting real time response requirements due to additional recovery time X X

Un recoverable 1553 com error (RT fail)

Potential functional problem to high level software which is communicating to RT and not monitoring for this error X X

LOC with ground This can happen up to 15 minutes every orbit; Software should be analyzed for ground controlled hazards for consequences when LOC could happen in the middle of manual control. Also ground initiated command sequences like arm and fire. If fire is missed the arm should be cleared.

x x

MDM in BC role going to diagnostics

Autonomous software responses interrupted due to this condition must be recoverable by the backup MDM and still meet time to effect requirements for potential hazards

X X

MDM in RT role going to diagnotics

A BC MDM sending autonomous responses to this MDM or through this MDM must be able to detect this condition, re-attempt the response after MDM recovery or generate C&W

x x

Hardware errors

when software is acquiring data through an interfaces, the interface may provide some error information along with data. The software must check the error information and accept data only under no error condition

x

No heartbeat from RTThe data acquired from RT would be stale. Software that uses this data must have smarts to detect that the data is stale

x x

Transient sensor data changes due to hardware problems

Potential to trigger un-intended software functionality. To prevent this, data persistency checks must be made

x x x

Out of range sensor data Potential that software can crash without any proper diagnostic information x x x

Multiple adverse condition occurrence

It is possible that occurrence of multiple adverse conditions in a narrow time window could result in unacceptable system failure like losing a catastrophic hazard control. System should be analyzed for at least 2 fault occurrence.

x x

Task overrunsA task overrun can impact the execution time line of other tasks and cause function failures in other tasks

x x

Memory corruption Defective software corrupting memory used by another software function x x x

Operator errorThis can be sending wrong command or wrong command parameter. The software should reject the command and provide such indication x x

12

Page 13: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityEvidence Reporting

• Next set of slides contain reporting samples for some assurance claims in the claim network

• Reported as part of Biwar as claims are realized during the life cycle development

• At the end of the life cycle, a technical report is prepared containing:– claim network– IV&V activity and evidence that supports each claim

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

13

Page 14: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityRequirements Claim (1.2)

Claim• Requirements are developed as per CSCI SCR content and completed development prior

to design and code developmentEvidence• List of RCSs developed, and reviewed by IV&V and others• Biwar report confirming that Review issues were incorporated into the requirements and

requirements development is completed• IV&V RCS review status reported in Biwar• RCS status reported at TDR• (SUB-CLAIM) REQUIREMENT EVALUATION PER IV&V 3 QUESTIONSArgument• Each RCS is reviewed against the corresponding SCR to ensure that the requirement

adequately captures the SCR intent• Review issues were submitted and dispositioned with reviewer’s concurrence• Requirements development is completed by TDR except for post-TDR SCR content

changes where the requirements development is completed before their design/code implementation.

 

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

14

Page 15: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityRequirements Analysis Sub-claim (1.2.1)

Claim• The requirements adequately capture what the system is supposed to do, what it is not supposed to do

and how the system should behave under adverse conditions for defined conditions Evidence• List of RCSs and the SCRs driving changes to requirements• List of accepted issues submitted by IV&V• Usage of PAL asset “ ISS Requirements Review and Analysis Guidelines” for analyzing the

requirements Argument• IV&V analyst is instructed to use the guidelines in the PAL asset for requirements analysis.• Each requirement is analyzed to match the concept in the SCR that drives the new requirement or

change to the existing requirement.• Issues were submitted to the developer where the requirement is deficient from IV&V three questions

perspective.• The analysis will cover all aspects for IV&V Q1 and practical situations for IV&V Q2 and Q3. Supplemental information• Adverse conditions to be evaluated for are listed in ISS Technical Reference folder. The PAL asset

contains specific guidelines designed for ISS development context. These guidelines provide instructions on how to verify for IV&V Q1, Q2, and Q3. 

Caveats• For IV&V Q2, it is not possible to specify what the software is not supposed to do (negative

specifications) for all cases and hence this specification is limited. During requirements analysis, IV&V will ensure that negative specifications are provided where practical.

• For IV&V Q3, it is not possible to specify software actions for all possible adverse conditions However, certain adverse conditions (such as communication error, stale data, data exceeding a threshold, software timeout etc. can be integrated into requirement specifications .

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

15

Page 16: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityRequirements Claim Reporting

• Reported after SRS incorporated all requirement changes as specified in content SCRs, usually after TDR (combines 1.2 and 1.2.1)

– CSCI requirements development is completed and the new requirements are captured in SRS version <tbd>, in time for design and coding to proceed. Requirements were developed through <tbd> RCS reviews. IV&V evaluated the requirements to ensure that they capture what the software is supposed to do as indicated in the respective SCRs. IV&V also evaluated the requirements to ensure that as specified, the software does not do what it is not supposed to do and behaves adequately under applicable adverse conditions as indicated in ISS Technical reference “adverse conditions”. All accepted review issues were incorporated correctly into the SRS.

• Evidence attachments to Technical report– Table showing SCR #, RCS number, review date– List of IV&V’s accepted issues– Table showing for each SRS function, # of new/changed requirements

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

16

Page 17: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityCode Development Claim (1.4)

Claim• Code development required by the SCR content is completedEvidence• Status report in Biwar of IV&V Code reviews, either in developer’s peer reviews or separately and

incorporation of review issues. • List of accepted IV&V issues/ or SCRs generated during code reviews• (SUB-CLAIM) CODE EVALUATION PER IV&V 3 QUESTIONSArgument• IV&V reviewed code in code peer reviews and provided issue feedback.• If peer reviews were not held or missed, IV&V reviewed code changes after the new release code is

available• Peer review issues were submitted to the developer during peer reviews and the accepted issues were

incorporated into the final code.• If code review is done after the code is formally released, any issues found during the review are

reported as SCRs and the SCR process ensures that the issue is appropriately addressed via seal-break process if the problem warrants such action; otherwise the issue will be fixed in a future release.

Supplemental information• Tools used to perform code analysis included Understand Ada, Understand C, and Textpad.

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

17

Page 18: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityCode Evaluation Sub-claim(1.4.1)

Claim• Code implemented correctly to produce behavior desired by the requirements and/or SCR on what it is

supposed to do, what it is not supposed to do and perform adequately under applicable adverse conditions.

Evidence• Biwar report indicating code review completion by IV&V for all code changing SCRs in the release• Usage of PAL asset “ISS Code Analysis Guidelines” for code reviewArgument• IV&V analyst is instructed to use the guidelines in the PAL asset for code analysis.• The code is evaluated to ensure that it implements the design documented in the design document

and/or documented in requirements • For those code change SCRs that do not have a corresponding requirement change, the code is

evaluated to ensure that it implements the behavior or code correction as specified in the SCR analysis recommendation.

• Issues were submitted to the developer where the design does not match functionality desired from the requirement.

• The code analysis will cover all aspects for IV&V Q1, Q2, Q3 where formal requirements exist. For those cases where formal requirements do not exist, IV&V will evaluate the code for all practical and credible aspects of Q2 and Q3 code scenarios that can take place during code execution; these practical scenarios are specified in the code analysis guidelines.

Supplemental information• Understand ADA/C, Textpad tools are used to navigate through the code and perform code analysis

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

18

Page 19: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityCode Development Claim Reporting

• Reported after new flight code is released and IV&V has completed code review (combines 1.4 and 1.4.1)– IV&V reviewed code changes made for this release and confirmed that

the code implements what is required as per the SCRs, respective requirements and the design documents TLDD, DBDD, and SUM. IV&V also evaluated the code changes to ensure that the code performs adequately under applicable adverse conditions as listed in ISS technical reference “ISS adverse conditions” and does not cause any unwanted behavior. All accepted code issues were implemented in the code.

• Evidence attachments to technical report– List of code change SCRs, corresponding review date– List of accepted IV&V issues

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

19

Page 20: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityFQT Completion Claim (1.6.6)

Claim• Required CSCI behavior is verified though formal tests and test anomalies were reported

correctly in SCRsEvidence• List of FQT tests, pass/fail status, corresponding SCR for failed tests• Biwar report indicating IV&V evaluation of FQT resultsArgument• IV&V evaluated test logs from formal testing to ensure all defined FQT tests were

executed• IV&V examined the test failures and evaluated the corresponding SCR that reported the

failure to make sure that the SCR correctly describes the failure.Supplemental information• Program board, SCSRP, evaluates the impact of each SCR on ISS on-orbit operation and

authorizes software changes via PPLs or patches to supplement the flight software for on-orbit usage.

• IV&V provides feedback to the Program in the SCR dispositioning process

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

20

Page 21: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityFQT completion reporting

• Reported after IV&V completed evaluation of all FQT test results (for 1.6.6)– CSCI Formal Qualification Testing completed. From the test report IV&V verified, that all planned FQT

tests were run. <tbd1> of a total of <tbd2>, tests passed confirming that the software is performing as per the mission requirements except for the requirements listed below. For the failed tests IV&V verified that the test failure is correctly reported in the referenced SCR. The CSCI life cycle development is completed and the CSCI is verified to perform as required for the mission, with the exception of the following requirements. These failures will be assessed by the Program through the SCSRP process and appropriate changes will be made to the CSCI via PPL/Patch as needed for on-orbit operation

• Evidence attachments to technical report– List of FQT tests with pass/fail status and associated SCR info for failed tests

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

Failed SRS Requirement SCR Describing the ProblemReq#, req text SCR #, SCR title

Req#, req text SCR #, SCR titleReq#, req text SCR #, SCR title

21

Page 22: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityCSCI Transition Readiness Claim (1.8)

Claim• All software issues that affect on-orbit transition of the new release have been fixedEvidence• List of undispositioned SCRs on the CSCI along with IV&V assessment as reported in Biwar• List of dispositioned SCRs that are targeted for fix in a future release along with IV&V assessment as

reported in Biwar• IV&V’s assessment of work status of all review issues and SCRs targeted for fix in the current release as

reported in Biwar• IV&V’s assessment of completion of SPNs targeted for this release as reported in Biwar Argument• IV&V evaluates all undispositoned SCRs on this release to determine their impact on software behavior

for software transition or immediately following transition• IV&V evaluates all SCRs that are targeted for fix in a future release to determine their impact on software

behavior for software transition or immediately following transition• If any of those SCRs affect safety critical on-orbit operation, IV&V will request the SCSRP board to

evaluate those SCRs prior to on-orbit software transition to determine if any patches or PPLs need to be developed.

• IV&V evaluates any open issues from the CSCI reviews or SCRs targeted for fix in the current release to determine their impact on on-orbit transition and immediate software.

• IV&V reviews SPNs developed for the release to make sure that operational workaround is documented

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

22

Susarla, Sarma V. (JSC-OD)[TASC]
Diagram showing life cycle review, COM method/asset, Activity, evidence data, and biwar report.
Page 23: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityTransition readiness reporting

• Report this after the CSCI readiness is evaluated for on-orbit transition (1.8)– IV&V completed on-orbit transition readiness review and no exceptions have been

uncovered. IV&V evaluated <tbd1> undispositoned SCRs on the current and previous releases and <tbd2> dispositioned but targeted for fix in a future CSCI release. IV&V analyzed these SCRs and determined that they do not impact the software operation for successful on-orbit transition from the previous release and immediate on-orbit operation with the new release. All work targeted for fix on this release from SCRs and milestone review issues is completed. IV&V verified that all SPNs, numbering <tbd>, triggered by the new release have been developed. IV&V’s analysis concludes that the CSCI is ready for on-orbit transition.

• Evidence attachments to technical report– List of undispositioned SCRs showing SCR #, Title, CSCI Status, IV&V evaluation comment– List of SCRs approved for future work showing SCR #, Title, CSCI. Status, IV&V evaluation

comment

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

23

Page 24: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

FacilityCSCI Technical report

• Final Technical Report is prepared and will be delivered at Transition Readiness Review

• Report will focus on the EBA network model and realization of claims

• For data, report relies heavily on using what is reported in biwar and internal worksheets currently generated during IV&V life cycle work.

Report Format– Overall claim tree chart Plus for each major claim in the overall claim

chart, the following:« Claim statement, Evidence, Argument, Caveats, supplemental information

(as given in previous slides)« IV&V statement on claim realization as reported in Biwar (as given in

previous slides)« Evidence data attachments

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

24

Page 25: Assurance  Cases  for  Software  R eleases  in ISS  Sustaining  P hase  of  Development

NASAIV&V

Facility

Assurance cases for software releases in ISS sustaining phase of development

Questions/Comments

Sarma Susarla IV&V Workshop 9/10/2013

25