Asso. of Small Landowners in the Phils vs Sec of Dar 175 Scra 343 (1989)

5/27/2018 Asso. of Small Landowners in the Phils vs Sec of Dar 175 Scra 343 (1989)

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN TE PILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D.GOME!, GERARDO ". ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., "ERNARDO M. ALMONTE,CANUTO RAMIR ". CA"RITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J.SAL#A, RE$NALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. "AUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CA"E,TEODORO ". MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMAC. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, "ENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A.JOSE % NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,vs.ONORA"LE SECRETAR$ OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 79&1' July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, #ICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JERE!A,ERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO ()* PLANTERS+ COMMITTEE,INC., #-o/(0 Mll D0/-, #-o/(0, N/o0 O--*)(l, petitioners,vs.JO3ER ARRO$O, PILIP E. JUICO ()* PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORMCOUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PA"ICO, petitioner,

vs.ON. PILIP E. JUICO, SECRETAR$ OF TE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,ON. JO3ER ARRO$O, EECUTI#E SECRETAR$ OF TE OFFICE OF TEPRESIDENT, ()* M00/0. SAL#ADOR TALENTO, JAIME A"OGADO, CONRADOA#ANCENA ()* RO"ERTO TAA$, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAA$ ()* AGUSTIN ERMANO, JR., petitioners,vs.ON. PILIP ELLA JUICO, (0 S-/(/y o5 A/(/() R5o/6, ()* LAND "AN3 OF TEPILIPPINES, respondents.

CRU!,J.:

In ancient mytholoy, Antaeus !as a terrible iant !ho bloc"ed and challened #ercules forhis life on his !ay to Mycenae after performin his eleventh labor. $he t!o !restled mihtilyand #ercules flun his adversary to the round thin"in him dead, but Antaeus rose evenstroner to resume their strule. $his happened several times to #ercules% increasin



ama&ement. 'inally, as they continued rapplin, it da!ned on #ercules that Antaeus !asthe son of (aea and could never die as lon as any part of his body !as touchin his MotherEarth. $hus fore!arned, #ercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of thesustainin soil, and crushed him to death.

Mother Earth. $he sustainin soil. $he iver of life, !ithout !hose invioratin touch even

the po!erful Antaeus !ea"ened and died.

$he cases before us are not as fanciful as the foreoin tale. But they also tell of theelemental forces of life and death, of men and !omen !ho, li"e Antaeus need the sustaininstrenth of the precious earth to stay alive.

)*and for the *andless) is a sloan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distributionof this precious resource amon our people. But it is more than a sloan. $hrouh thebroodin centuries, it has become a battle+cry dramati&in the increasinly urent demand ofthe dispossessed amon us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.

Reconi&in this need, the Constitution in -/ mandated the policy of social 0ustice to

)insure the !ell+bein and economic security of all the people,) 1especially the lessprivileed. In -1, the ne! Constitution affirmed this oal addin specifically that )the 2tateshall reulate the ac3uisition, o!nership, use, en0oyment and disposition of private propertyand e3uitably diffuse property o!nership and profits.) 22inificantly, there !as also thespecific in0unction to )formulate and implement an ararian reform proram aimed atemancipatin the tenant from the bondae of the soil.) &

$he Constitution of -41 !as not to be outdone. Besides echoin these sentiments, it alsoadopted one !hole and separate Article 5III on 2ocial 6ustice and #uman Rihts, containinrandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. $heseinclude a call in the follo!in !ords for the adoption by the 2tate of an ararian reformproram7

2EC. 8. $he 2tate shall, by la!, underta"e an ararian reform proramfounded on the riht of farmers and reular farm!or"ers, !ho are landless, too!n directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of otherfarm!or"ers, to receive a 0ust share of the fruits thereof. $o this end, the2tate shall encourae and underta"e the 0ust distribution of all ariculturallands, sub0ect to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as theConress may prescribe, ta"in into account ecoloical, developmental, ore3uity considerations and sub0ect to the payment of 0ust compensation. Indeterminin retention limits, the 2tate shall respect the riht of smalllando!ners. $he 2tate shall further provide incentives for voluntary land+sharin.

Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 488, other!ise "no!n as the Aricultural *and Reform Code, hadalready been enacted by the Conress of the Philippines on Auust 4, -9, in line !ith theabove+stated principles. $his !as substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.:.No. ;1, !hich !as promulated on



;;4, declarin full land o!nership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.:. No. ;1 and providinfor the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as !ell as the manner of theirpayment. $his !as follo!ed on 6uly ;;, -41 by Presidential Proclamation No. ,institutin a comprehensive ararian reform proram >CARP?, and E.



$he petitioners also maintain that in declarin the beneficiaries under P.:. No. ;1 to be theo!ners of the lands occupied by them, E.



$hey also arue that under 2ection ; of Proc. No. !hich provides7

Ararian Reform 'und.+$here is hereby created a special fund, to be "no!n as the ArarianReform 'und, an initial amount of 'I'$ BI**INA2P? !hich claims a membership of at least ;@,@@@ individual suarplanters all over the country.



is un0ustly re3uired to immediately pay the correspondin ta=es on the land, in violation ofthe uniformity rule.

In his consolidated Comment, the 2olicitor (eneral first invo"es the presumption ofconstitutionality in favor of Proc. No. and E.



!ere issued. $hese orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directlyeffected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.

$he petitioner no! arues that7

>? E.;? $he said e=ecutive orders are violative of the constitutional provision thatno private property shall be ta"en !ithout due process or 0ust compensation.

>? $he petitioner is denied the riht of ma=imum retention provided for underthe -41 Constitution.

$he petitioner contends that the issuance of E.@. Nos. ;;4 and ;;- shortly before Conressconvened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violatin the doctrine of separation of po!ers.$he leislative po!er ranted to the President under the $ransitory Provisions refers only toemerency measures that may be promulated in the proper e=ercise of the police po!er.

$he petitioner also invo"es his rihts not to be deprived of his property !ithout due processof la! and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholdin as uaranteed under Article5III, 2ection 8 of the Constitution. #e li"e!ise arues that, besides denyin him 0ustcompensation for his land, the provisions of E.



$he petitioners in this case invo"e the riht of retention ranted by P.:. No. ;1 to o!ners ofrice and corn lands not e=ceedin seven hectares as lon as they are cultivatin or intend tocultivate the same. $heir respective lands do not e=ceed the statutory limit but are occupiedby tenants !ho are actually cultivatin such lands.

Accordin to P.:. No. 9, !hich !as promulated in implementation of P.:. No. ;17

No tenant+farmer in aricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shallbe e0ected or removed from his farmholdin until such time as the respectiverihts of the tenant+ farmers and the lando!ner shall have been determinedin accordance !ith the rules and reulations implementin P.:. No. ;1.

$he petitioners claim they cannot e0ect their tenants and so are unable to en0oy their riht ofretention because the :epartment of Ararian Reform has so far not issued theimplementin rules re3uired under the above+3uoted decree. $hey therefore as" the Courtfor a !rit of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

In his Comment, the public respondent arues that P.:. No. ;1 has been amended by *Interim (uidelines onRetention by 2mall *ando!ners, !ith an accompanyin Retention (uide $able?,Memorandum Circular No. dated April ;, -14, >Implementation (uidelines of *Clarificatory (uidelines onCoverae of P.:. No. ;1 and Retention by 2mall *ando!ners?, and :AR AdministrativeProvidin for a Cut+off :ate for *ando!ners to Apply forRetention andor to Protest the Coverae of their *andholdins under



fundamental la!. $his is the reason for !hat some 3uarters call the doctrine of 0udicialsupremacy. Even so, this po!er is not lihtly assumed or readily e=ercised. $he doctrine ofseparation of po!ers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of theirfunctions and of their respect for the other departments, in stri"in do!n the acts of theleislative and the e=ecutive as unconstitutional. $he policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesyand caution. $o doubt is to sustain. $he theory is that before the act !as done or the la!

!as enacted, earnest studies !ere made by Conress or the President, or both, to insurethat the Constitution !ould not be breached.

In addition, the Constitution itself lays do!n strinent conditions for a declaration ofunconstitutionality, re3uirin therefor the concurrence of a ma0ority of the members of the2upreme Court !ho too" part in the deliberations and voted on the issue durin their sessionen banc.11And as established by 0ude made doctrine, the Court !ill assume 0urisdictionover a constitutional 3uestion only if it is sho!n that the essential re3uisites of a 0udicialin3uiry into such a 3uestion are first satisfied. $hus, there must be an actual case orcontroversy involvin a conflict of leal rihts susceptible of 0udicial determination, theconstitutional 3uestion must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and theresolution of the 3uestion is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12

ith particular reard to the re3uirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us,!e hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of themhas sustained or is in daner of sustainin an immediate in0ury as a result of the acts ormeasures complained of. 1&And even if, strictly spea"in, they are not covered by thedefinition, it is still !ithin the !ide discretion of the Court to !aive the re3uirement and soremove the impediment to its addressin and resolvin the serious constitutional 3uestionsraised.

In the first Emerency Po!ers Cases, 14ordinary citi&ens and ta=payers !ere allo!ed to3uestion the constitutionality of several e=ecutive orders issued by President Fuirinoalthouh they !ere invo"in only an indirect and eneral interest shared in common !ith thepublic. $he Court dismissed the ob0ection that they !ere not proper parties and ruled that

)the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settledpromptly and definitely, brushin aside, if !e must, technicalities of procedure.) e havesince then applied this e=ception in many other cases. 1

$he other above+mentioned re3uisites have also been met in the present petitions.

In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressin upon the Court !hen confronted!ith constitutional issues li"e the ones no! before it, it !ill not hesitate to declare a la! or actinvalid !hen it is convinced that this must be done. In arrivin at this conclusion, its onlycriterion !ill be the Constitution as (od and its conscience ive it the liht to probe itsmeanin and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations areirrelevancies that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.

'or all the a!esome po!er of the Conress and the E=ecutive, the Court !ill not hesitate to)ma"e the hammer fall, and heavily,) to use 6ustice *aurel%s pithy lanuae, !here the actsof these departments, or of any public official, betray the people%s !ill as e=pressed in theConstitution.

It need only be added, to borro! aain the !ords of 6ustice *aurel, that G



... !hen the 0udiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it doesnot assert any superiority over the other departmentsD it does not in realitynullify or invalidate an act of the *eislature, but only asserts the solemn andsacred obliation assined to it by the Constitution to determine conflictinclaims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in anactual controversy the rihts !hich that instrument secures and uarantees

to them. $his is in truth all that is involved in !hat is termed )0udicialsupremacy) !hich properly is the po!er of 0udicial revie! under theConstitution. 1

$he cases before us cateorically raise constitutional 3uestions that this Court mustcateorically resolve. And so !e shall.

II

e proceed first to the e=amination of the preliminary issues before resolvin the moreserious challenes to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in thesepetitions.

$he promulation of P.:. No. ;1 by President Marcos in the e=ercise of his po!ers undermartial la! has already been sustained inGonzales v. Estrellaand !e find no reason tomodify or reverse it on that issue. As for the po!er of President A3uino to promulate Proc.No. and E.



It should follo! that the specific constitutional provisions invo"ed, to !it, 2ection ;8 and2ection ;/>8? of Article I, are not applicable. ith particular reference to 2ection ;8, thisobviously could not have been complied !ith for the simple reason that the #ouse ofRepresentatives, !hich no! has the e=clusive po!er to initiate appropriation measures, hadnot yet been convened !hen the proclamation !as issued. $he leislative po!er !as thensolely vested in the President of the Philippines, !ho embodied, as it !ere, both houses of

Conress.

$he arument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. and E.PARC? createdhereunder, but in no case shall retention by the lando!ner e=ceed five >/?hectares. $hree >? hectares may be a!arded to each child of the lando!ner,sub0ect to the follo!in 3ualifications7 >? that he is at least fifteen >/? yearsof aeD and >;? that he is actually tillin the land or directly manain thefarmD Provided, $hat lando!ners !hose lands have been covered byPresidential :ecree No. ;1 shall be allo!ed to "eep the area oriinallyretained by them thereunder, further, $hat oriinal homestead rantees ordirect compulsory heirs !ho still o!n the oriinal homestead at the time ofthe approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as lon as they continueto cultivate said homestead.

$he arument that E.



one important 3ualification. Correctly and cateorically stated, the rule is that mandamus !illlie to compel the dischare of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion tobe e=ercised. In other !ords, mandamus can issue to re3uire action only but not specificaction.

henever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and

unreasonable delay in the e=ercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear dutyimposed by la!, the courts !ill intervene by the e=traordinary leal remedy ofmandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts !illre3uire specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by&anda&us!ill re3uire action only. 'or e=ample, if an inferior court, publicofficial, or board should, for an unreasonable lenth of time, fail to decide aparticular 3uestion to the reat detriment of all parties concerned, or a courtshould refuse to ta"e 0urisdiction of a cause !hen the la! clearly ave it

0urisdiction mandamus !ill issue, in the first case to re3uire a decision, and inthe second to re3uire that 0urisdiction be ta"en of the cause. 22

And !hile it is true that as a rule the !rit !ill not be proper as lon as there is still a plain,

speedy and ade3uate remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to thecourts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a 3uestion of la!. 2&

III

$here are traditional distinctions bet!een the police po!er and the po!er of eminent domainthat loically preclude the application of both po!ers at the same time on the same sub0ect.In the case of City o 'a(uio v. NA)A*A, 24for e=ample, !here a la! re3uired the transfer ofall municipal !ater!or"s systems to the NAA2A in e=chane for its assets of e3uivalentvalue, the Court held that the po!er bein e=ercised !as eminent domain because theproperty involved !as !holesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned underthe police po!er is no=ious or intended for a no=ious purpose, such as a buildin on thevere of collapse, !hich should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials,!hich should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. $he confiscation of such propertyis not compensable, unli"e the ta"in of property under the po!er of e=propriation, !hichre3uires the payment of 0ust compensation to the o!ner.

In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 26ustice #olmes laid do!n the limits of thepolice po!er in a famous aphorism7 )$he eneral rule at least is that !hile property may bereulated to a certain e=tent, if reulation oes too far it !ill be reconi&ed as a ta"in.) $hereulation that !ent )too far) !as a la! prohibitin minin !hich miht cause the subsidenceof structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. $his !as resisted by acoal company !hich had earlier ranted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved allminin rihts thereunder, !ith the rantee assumin all ris"s and !aivin any damae claim.$he Court held the la! could not be sustained !ithout compensatin the rantor. 6ustice

Brandeis filed a lone dissent in !hich he arued that there !as a valid e=ercise of the policepo!er. #e said7

Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the e=ercise of thepolice po!er deprives the o!ner of some riht theretofore en0oyed, and is, inthat sense, an abridment by the 2tate of rihts in property !ithout ma"incompensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety ormorals from daners threatened is not a ta"in. $he restriction here in3uestion is merely the prohibition of a no=ious use. $he property so restricted



remains in the possession of its o!ner. $he state does not appropriate it orma"e any use of it. $he state merely prevents the o!ner from ma"in a use!hich interferes !ith paramount rihts of the public. henever the useprohibited ceases to be no=ious G as it may because of further chanes inlocal or social conditions G the restriction !ill have to be removed and theo!ner !ill aain be free to en0oy his property as heretofore.

Recent trends, ho!ever, !ould indicate not a polari&ation but a minlin of the police po!erand the po!er of eminent domain, !ith the latter bein used as an implement of the formerli"e the po!er of ta=ation. $he employment of the ta=in po!er to achieve a police purposehas lon been accepted. 2As for the po!er of e=propriation, Prof. 6ohn 6. Costonis of theHniversity of Illinois Collee of *a! >referrin to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler RealtyCo., ;1; H2 9/, !hich sustained a &onin la! under the police po!er? ma"es the follo!insinificant remar"s7

Euclid, moreover, !as decided in an era !hen 0udes located the Police andeminent domain po!ers on different planets. (enerally spea"in, theyvie!ed eminent domain as encompassin public ac3uisition of private

property for improvements that !ould be available for public use,) literallyconstrued. $o the police po!er, on the other hand, they assined the lessintrusive tas" of preventin harmful e=ternalities a point reflected in the Euclidopinion%s reliance on an analoy to nuisance la! to bolster its support of&onin. 2o lon as suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausiblerelation to some leitimate )public purpose,) the pertinent measure needhave afforded no compensation !hatever. ith the proressive ro!th ofovernment%s involvement in land use, the distance bet!een the t!o po!ershas contracted considerably. $oday overnment often employs eminentdomain interchaneably !ith or as a useful complement to the police po!er++a trend e=pressly approved in the 2upreme Court%s -/8 decision in Bermanv. Par"er, !hich broadened the reach of eminent domain%s )public use) testto match that of the police po!er%s standard of )public purpose.) 27

$he Berman case sustained a redevelopment pro0ect and the improvement of blihted areasin the :istrict of Columbia as a proper e=ercise of the police po!er.



properties. hile insistin that there !as here no ta"in, the Court nonetheless reconi&edcertain compensatory rihts accruin to (rand Central $erminal !hich it said !ould)undoubtedly mitiate) the loss caused by the reulation. $his )fair compensation,) as hecalled it, !as e=plained by Prof. Costonis in this !ise7

In return for retainin the $erminal site in its pristine landmar" status, Penn Central !as

authori&ed to transfer to neihborin properties the authori&ed but unused rihts accruin tothe site prior to the $erminal%s desination as a landmar" G the rihts !hich !ould havebeen e=hausted by the /-+story buildin that the city refused to countenance atop the$erminal. Prevailin bul" restrictions on neihborin sites !ere proportionately rela=ed,theoretically enablin Penn Central to recoup its losses at the $erminal site by constructinor sellin to others the riht to construct larer, hence more profitable buildins on thetransferee sites. &'

$he cases before us present no "notty complication insofar as the 3uestion of compensableta"in is concerned. $o the e=tent that the measures under challene merely prescriberetention limits for lando!ners, there is an e=ercise of the police po!er for the reulation ofprivate property in accordance !ith the Constitution. But !here, to carry out such reulation,

it becomes necessary to deprive such o!ners of !hatever lands they may o!n in e=cess ofthe ma=imum area allo!ed, there is definitely a ta"in under the po!er of eminent domainfor !hich payment of 0ust compensation is imperative. $he ta"in contemplated is not a merelimitation of the use of the land. hat is re3uired is the surrender of the title to and thephysical possession of the said e=cess and all beneficial rihts accruin to the o!ner in favorof the farmer+beneficiary. $his is definitely an e=ercise not of the police po!er but of thepo!er of eminent domain.

hether as an e=ercise of the police po!er or of the po!er of eminent domain, the severalmeasures before us are challened as violative of the due process and e3ual protectionclauses.

$he challene to Proc. No. and E.? it must be based on substantial distinctionsD>;? it must be ermane to the purposes of the la!D >? it must not be limited to e=istinconditions onlyD and >8? it must apply e3ually to all the members of the class. &2$he Court



finds that all these re3uisites have been met by the measures here challened as arbitraryand discriminatory.

E3ual protection simply means that all persons or thins similarly situated must be treatedali"e both as to the rihts conferred and the liabilities imposed. &&$he petitioners have notsho!n that they belon to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. $he

arument that not only lando!ners but also o!ners of other properties must be made toshare the burden of implementin land reform must be re0ected. $here is a substantialdistinction bet!een these t!o classes of o!ners that is clearly visible e=cept to those !ho!ill not see. $here is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Conress isallo!ed a !ide lee!ay in providin for a valid classification. Its decision is accordedreconition and respect by the courts of 0ustice e=cept only !here its discretion is abused tothe detriment of the Bill of Rihts.

It is !orth remar"in at this 0uncture that a statute may be sustained under the police po!eronly if there is a concurrence of the la!ful sub0ect and the la!ful method. Put other!ise, theinterests of the public enerally as distinuished from those of a particular class re3uire theinterference of the 2tate and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably

necessary for the attainment of the purpose souht to be achieved and not undulyoppressive upon individuals. &4As the sub0ect and purpose of ararian reform have been laiddo!n by the Constitution itself, !e may say that the first re3uirement has been satisfied.hat remains to be e=amined is the validity of the method employed to achieve theconstitutional oal.



public interest on the time+honored 0ustification, as in the case of the policepo!er, that the !elfare of the people is the supreme la!.

But for all its primacy and urency, the po!er of e=propriation is by no means absolute >asindeed no po!er is absolute?. $he limitation is found in the constitutional in0unction that)private property shall not be ta"en for public use !ithout 0ust compensation) and in the

abundant 0urisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically,the re3uirements for a proper e=ercise of the po!er are7 >? public use and >;? 0ustcompensation.

*et us dispose first of the arument raised by the petitioners in (.R. No. 1-@ that the 2tateshould first distribute public aricultural lands in the pursuit of ararian reform instead ofimmediately disturbin property rihts by forcibly ac3uirin private aricultural lands.Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public aricultural lands may be covered bythe CARP as the Constitution calls for )the 0ust distribution of all aricultural lands.) In anyevent, the decision to redistribute private aricultural lands in the manner prescribed by theCARP !as made by the leislative and e=ecutive departments in the e=ercise of theirdiscretion. e are not 0ustified in revie!in that discretion in the absence of a clear sho!inthat it has been abused.

A becomin courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments!hen they decide !hat is "no!n as the political 3uestion. As e=plained by Chief 6usticeConcepcion in the case of $a-ada v. Cuenco7 &

$he term )political 3uestion) connotes !hat it means in ordinary parlance,namely, a 3uestion of policy. It refers to )those 3uestions !hich, under theConstitution, are to be decided by the people in their soverein capacityD or inreard to !hich full discretionary authority has been deleated to theleislative or e=ecutive branch of the overnment.) It is concerned !ithissues dependent upon the !isdom, not leality, of a particular measure.

It is true that the concept of the political 3uestion has been constricted !ith the enlarementof 0udicial po!er, !hich no! includes the authority of the courts )to determine !hether or notthere has been a rave abuse of discretion amountin to lac" or e=cess of 0urisdiction on thepart of any branch or instrumentality of the (overnment.) &7Even so, this should not beconstrued as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their vie!smay not coincide !ith ours.

$he leislature and the e=ecutive have been seen fit, in their !isdom, to include in the CARPthe redistribution of private landholdins >even as the distribution of public aricultural landsis first provided for, !hile also continuin apace under the Public *and Act and other conatela!s?. $he Court sees no 0ustification to interpose its authority, !hich !e may assert only if!e believe that the political decision is not un!ise, but illeal. e do not find it to be so.

In .*. v. Chandler/Dunbar )ater Po+er Co&"any,&8it !as held7

Conress havin determined, as it did by the Act of March ,-@- that theentire 2t. Mary%s river bet!een the American ban" and the international line,as !ell as all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throuhout itsentire lenth, !as )necessary for the purpose of naviation of said !aters,and the !aters connected there!ith,) that determination is conclusive in



condemnation proceedins instituted by the Hnited 2tates under that Act,and there is no room for 0udicial revie! of the 0udment of Conress ... .

As earlier observed, the re3uirement for public use has already been settled for us by theConstitution itself No less than the -41 Charter calls for ararian reform, !hich is thereason !hy private aricultural lands are to be ta"en from their o!ners, sub0ect to the

prescribed ma=imum retention limits. $he purposes specified in P.:. No. ;1, Proc. No. and R.A. No. 99/1 are only an elaboration of the constitutional in0unction that the 2tate adoptthe necessary measures )to encourae and underta"e the 0ust distribution of all ariculturallands to enable farmers !ho are landless to o!n directly or collectively the lands they till.)$hat public use, as pronounced by the fundamental la! itself, must be bindin on us.

$he second re3uirement, i.e., the payment of 0ust compensation, needs a loner and morethouhtful e=amination.

6ust compensation is defined as the full and fair e3uivalent of the property ta"en from itso!ner by the e=propriator. &9It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measureis not the ta"er%s ain but the o!ner%s loss. 4'$he !ord )0ust) is used to intensify the meanin

of the !ord )compensation) to convey the idea that the e3uivalent to be rendered for theproperty to be ta"en shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41

It bears repeatin that the measures challened in these petitions contemplate more than amere reulation of the use of private lands under the police po!er. e deal here !ith anactual ta"in of private aricultural lands that has dispossessed the o!ners of their propertyand deprived them of all its beneficial use and en0oyment, to entitle them to the 0ustcompensation mandated by the Constitution.

As held in !e"ublic o the Phili""ines v. Castellvi, 42there is compensable ta"in !hen thefollo!in conditions concur7 >? the e=propriator must enter a private propertyD >;? the entrymust be for more than a momentary periodD >? the entry must be under !arrant or color ofleal authorityD >8? the property must be devoted to public use or other!ise informallyappropriated or in0uriously affectedD and >/? the utili&ation of the property for public use mustbe in such a !ay as to oust the o!ner and deprive him of beneficial en0oyment of theproperty. All these re3uisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

here the 2tate itself is the e=propriator, it is not necessary for it to ma"e a deposit upon itsta"in possession of the condemned property, as )the compensation is a public chare, theood faith of the public is pleded for its payment, and all the resources of ta=ation may beemployed in raisin the amount.) 4&Nevertheless, 2ection 9>e? of the CARP *a! providesthat7

Hpon receipt by the lando!ner of the correspondin payment or, in case ofre0ection or no response from the lando!ner, upon the deposit !ith an

accessible ban" desinated by the :AR of the compensation in cash or in*BP bonds in accordance !ith this Act, the :AR shall ta"e immediatepossession of the land and shall re3uest the proper Reister of :eeds toissue a $ransfer Certificate of $itle >$C$? in the name of the Republic of thePhilippines. $he :AR shall thereafter proceed !ith the redistribution of theland to the 3ualified beneficiaries.



2pecific reference is made to 2ection 9>d?, !hich provides that in case of the re0ection ordisreard by the o!ner of the offer of the overnment to buy his land+

... the :AR shall conduct summary administrative proceedins to determinethe compensation for the land by re3uirin the lando!ner, the *BP and otherinterested parties to submit evidence as to the 0ust compensation for the

land, !ithin fifteen >/? days from the receipt of the notice. After thee=piration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision.$he :AR shall decide the case !ithin thirty >@? days after it is submitted fordecision.

$o be sure, the determination of 0ust compensation is a function addressed to the courts of0ustice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the overnment. EPZA v.Dulay44resolved a challene to several decrees promulated by President Marcos providinthat the 0ust compensation for property under e=propriation should be either the assessmentof the property by the overnment or the s!orn valuation thereof by the o!ner, !hichever!as lo!er. In declarin these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held throuh Mr. 6ustice#uo E. (utierre&, 6r.7

$he method of ascertainin 0ust compensation under the aforecited decreesconstitutes impermissible encroachment on 0udicial preroatives. It tends torender this Court inutile in a matter !hich under this Constitution is reservedto it for final determination.

$hus, althouh in an e=propriation proceedin the court technically !ould stillhave the po!er to determine the 0ust compensation for the property, follo!inthe applicable decrees, its tas" !ould be releated to simply statin the lo!ervalue of the property as declared either by the o!ner or the assessor. As anecessary conse3uence, it !ould be useless for the court to appointcommissioners under Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need tosatisfy the due process clause in the ta"in of private property is seeminlyfulfilled since it cannot be said that a 0udicial proceedin !as not had beforethe actual ta"in. #o!ever, the strict application of the decrees durin theproceedins !ould be nothin short of a mere formality or charade as thecourt has only to choose bet!een the valuation of the o!ner and that of theassessor, and its choice is al!ays limited to the lo!er of the t!o. $he courtcannot e=ercise its discretion or independence in determinin !hat is 0ust orfair. Even a rade school pupil could substitute for the 0ude insofar as thedetermination of constitutional 0ust compensation is concerned.

= = =

In the present petition, !e are once aain confronted !ith the same 3uestion

of !hether the courts under P.:. No. /, !hich contains the sameprovision on 0ust compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have thepo!er and authority to determine 0ust compensation, independent of !hat isstated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for suchpurpose.

$his time, !e ans!er in the affirmative.

= = =



It is violative of due process to deny the o!ner the opportunity to prove thatthe valuation in the ta= documents is unfair or !ron. And it is repulsive tothe basic concepts of 0ustice and fairness to allo! the hapha&ard !or" of aminor bureaucrat or cler" to absolutely prevail over the 0udment of a courtpromulated only after e=pert commissioners have actually vie!ed theproperty, after evidence and aruments pro and con have been presented,

and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and 0ustdetermination have been 0udiciously evaluated.

A readin of the aforecited 2ection 9>d? !ill readily sho! that it does not suffer from thearbitrariness that rendered the challened decrees constitutionally ob0ectionable. Althouhthe proceedins are described as summary, the lando!ner and other interested parties arenevertheless allo!ed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. Butmore importantly, the determination of the 0ust compensation by the :AR is not by anymeans final and conclusive upon the lando!ner or any other interested party, for 2ection9>f? clearly provides7

Any party !ho disarees !ith the decision may brin the matter to the court

of proper 0urisdiction for final determination of 0ust compensation.

$he determination made by the :AR is only preliminary unless accepted by all partiesconcerned. ? Cash payment, under the follo!in terms and conditions7

>a? 'or lands above fifty >/@? hectares, insofar

as the e=cess hectarae is concerned G$!enty+five percent >;/? cash, the balanceto be paid in overnment financial instrumentsneotiable at any time.

>b? 'or lands above t!enty+four >;8? hectaresand up to fifty >/@? hectares G $hirty percent>@? cash, the balance to be paid in



overnment financial instruments neotiableat any time.

>c? 'or lands t!enty+four >;8? hectares andbelo! G $hirty+five percent >/? cash, thebalance to be paid in overnment financial

instruments neotiable at any time.

>;? 2hares of stoc" in overnment+o!ned or controlled corporations, *BPpreferred shares, physical assets or other 3ualified investments inaccordance !ith uidelines set by the PARCD

>? $a= credits !hich can be used aainst any ta= liabilityD

>8? *BP bonds, !hich shall have the follo!in features7

>a? Mar"et interest rates alined !ith -+daytreasury bill rates. $en percent >@? of the

face value of the bonds shall mature everyyear from the date of issuance until the tenth>@th? year7 Provided, $hat should thelando!ner choose to foreo the cash portion,!hether in full or in part, he shall be paidcorrespondinly in *BP bondsD

>b? $ransferability and neotiability. 2uch *BPbonds may be used by the lando!ner, hissuccessors+in+ interest or his assins, up tothe amount of their face value, for any of thefollo!in7

>i? Ac3uisition of land or other real propertiesof the overnment, includin assets under the

Asset Privati&ation Proram and other assetsforeclosed by overnment financial institutionsin the same province or reion !here thelands for !hich the bonds !ere paid aresituatedD

>ii? Ac3uisition of shares of stoc" ofovernment+o!ned or controlled corporationsor shares of stoc" o!ned by the overnmentin private corporationsD

>iii? 2ubstitution for surety or bail bonds for theprovisional release of accused persons, or forperformance bondsD

>iv? 2ecurity for loans !ith any overnmentfinancial institution, provided the proceeds ofthe loans shall be invested in an economic



enterprise, preferably in a small and medium+scale industry, in the same province or reionas the land for !hich the bonds are paidD

>v? Payment for various ta=es and fees toovernment7 Provided, $hat the use of these

bonds for these purposes !ill be limited to acertain percentae of the outstandin balanceof the financial instrumentsD Provided, further,$hat the PARC shall determine thepercentaes mentioned aboveD

>vi? Payment for tuition fees of the immediatefamily of the oriinal bondholder inovernment universities, collees, tradeschools, and other institutionsD

>vii? Payment for fees of the immediate family

of the oriinal bondholder in overnmenthospitalsD and

>viii? 2uch other uses as the PARC may fromtime to time allo!.

$he contention of the petitioners in (.R. No. 1-111 is that the above provision isunconstitutional insofar as it re3uires the o!ners of the e=propriated properties to accept 0ustcompensation therefor in less than money, !hich is the only medium of payment allo!ed. Insupport of this contention, they cite 0urisprudence holdin that7

$he fundamental rule in e=propriation matters is that the o!ner of the

property e=propriated is entitled to a 0ust compensation, !hich should beneither more nor less, !henever it is possible to ma"e the assessment, thanthe money e3uivalent of said property. 6ust compensation has al!ays beenunderstood to be the 0ust and complete e3uivalent of the loss !hich theo!ner of the thin e=propriated has to suffer by reason of the e=propriation .4>Emphasis supplied.?

In 6.M. $ua&on Co. v. *and $enure Administration, 4this Court held7

It is !ell+settled that 0ust compensation means the e3uivalent for the value ofthe property at the time of its ta"in. Anythin beyond that is more, andanythin short of that is less, than 0ust compensation. It means a fair and fulle3uivalent for the loss sustained, !hich is the measure of the indemnity, not!hatever ain !ould accrue to the e=propriatin entity. $he mar"et value ofthe land ta"en is the 0ust compensation to !hich the o!ner of condemnedproperty is entitled, the mar"et value bein that sum of money !hich aperson desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an o!ner, !illin, but notcompelled to sell, !ould aree on as a price to be iven and received forsuch property. >Emphasis supplied.?



In the Hnited 2tates, !here much of our 0urisprudence on the sub0ect has been derived, the!eiht of authority is also to the effect that 0ust compensation for property e=propriated ispayable only in money and not other!ise. $hus G

$he medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. $hecondemnor cannot compel the o!ner to accept anythin but money, nor can

the o!ner compel or re3uire the condemnor to pay him on any other basisthan the value of the property in money at the time and in the mannerprescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. hen the po!er of eminentdomain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, bindinupon both parties, and the la! has fi=ed that standard as money in cash. 47>Emphasis supplied.?

Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of thins,be rearded as a reliable and constant standard of compensation. 48

)6ust compensation) for property ta"en by condemnation means a faire3uivalent in money, !hich must be paid at least !ithin a reasonable time

after the ta"in, and it is not !ithin the po!er of the *eislature to substitutefor such payment future obliations, bonds, or other valuable advantae. 49>Emphasis supplied.?

It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of 0ustcompensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has 0ust compensation beenpaid in the past solely in that medium. #o!ever, !e do not deal here !ith the traditionale=cercise of the po!er of eminent domain. $his is not an ordinary e=propriation !here only aspecific property of relatively limited area is souht to be ta"en by the 2tate from its o!nerfor a specific and perhaps local purpose.

hat !e deal !ith here is a revolutionary "ind of e=propriation.

$he e=propriation before us affects all private aricultural lands !henever found and of!hatever "ind as lon as they are in e=cess of the ma=imum retention limits allo!ed theiro!ners. $his "ind of e=propriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particularcommunity or of a small sement of the population but of the entire 'ilipino nation, from alllevels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land+lutted o!ner. Its purposedoes not cover only the !hole territory of this country but oes beyond in time to theforeseeable future, !hich it hopes to secure and edify !ith the vision and the sacrifice of thepresent eneration of 'ilipinos. (enerations yet to come are as involved in this proram as!e are today, althouh hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfillin life !e!ill uarantee to them tomorro! throuh our thouhtfulness today. And, finally, let it not beforotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in thefarms, callin for )a 0ust distribution) amon the farmers of lands that have heretofore been

the prison of their dreams but can no! become the "ey at least to their deliverance.

2uch a proram !ill involve not mere millions of pesos. $he cost !ill be tremendous.Considerin the vast areas of land sub0ect to e=propriation under the la!s before us, !eestimate that hundreds of billions of pesos !ill be needed, far more indeed than the amountof P/@ billion initially appropriated, !hich is already staerin as it is by our presentstandards. 2uch amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.



e assume that the framers of the Constitution !ere a!are of this difficulty !hen they calledfor ararian reform as a top priority pro0ect of the overnment. It is a part of this assumptionthat !hen they envisioned the e=propriation that !ould be needed, they also intended thatthe 0ust compensation !ould have to be paid not in the orthodo= !ay but a less conventionalif more practical method. $here can be no doubt that they !ere a!are of the financiallimitations of the overnment and had no illusions that there !ould be enouh money to pay

in cash and in full for the lands they !anted to be distributed amon the farmers. e maytherefore assume that their intention !as to allo! such manner of payment as is no!provided for by the CARP *a!, particularly the payment of the balance >if the o!ner cannotbe paid fully !ith money?, or indeed of the entire amount of the 0ust compensation, !ith otherthins of value. e may also suppose that !hat they had in mind !as a similar scheme ofpayment as that prescribed in P.:. No. ;1, !hich !as the la! in force at the time theydeliberated on the ne! Charter and !ith !hich they presumably areed in principle.

$he Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any cateoricalareement amon the members reardin the meanin to be iven the concept of 0ustcompensation as applied to the comprehensive ararian reform proram beincontemplated. $here !as the suestion to )fine tune) the re3uirement to suit the demandsof the pro0ect even as it !as also felt that they should )leave it to Conress) to determineho! payment should be made to the lando!ner and reimbursement re3uired from thefarmer+beneficiaries. 2uch innovations as )proressive compensation) and )2tate+subsidi&edcompensation) !ere also proposed. In the end, ho!ever, no special definition of the 0ustcompensation for the lands to be e=propriated !as reached by the Commission. '



payment is made in shares of stoc", *BP bonds, other properties or assets, ta= credits, andother thins of value e3uivalent to the amount of 0ust compensation.

Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the la! !ill cause the lando!ners, bi andsmall, not a little inconvenience. As already remar"ed, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless,it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as !e "no! they are of the

need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, !ill not berude us their indispensableshare in the attainment of the ideal of ararian reform. Emphasis supplied.?

In Jennedy v. Indianapolis, &the H2 2upreme Court cited several cases holdin that title toproperty does not pass to the condemnor until 0ust compensation had actually been made. Infact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 44, in !ubotto& v.Mc%ure, 4it !as held that )actual payment to the o!ner of the condemned property !as acondition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the 2tate) albeit )not to theappropriation of it to public use.) In!e0ord v. 1ni(ht,the Court of Appeals of Ne! or"said that the construction upon the statutes !as that the fee did not vest in the 2tate until the

payment of the compensation althouh the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land!as complete prior to the payment. Jennedy further said that )both on principle and authoritythe rule is ... that the riht to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as theproperty is actually appropriated under the authority of la! for a public use, but that the titledoes not "ass ro& the o+ner +ithout his consent, until 2ust co&"ensation has been &ade tohi&.3



If the la!s !hich !e have e=hibited or cited in the precedin discussion areattentively e=amined it !ill be apparent that the method of e=propriationadopted in this 0urisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no

"iece o land can be inally and irrevocably taken ro& an un+illin( o+neruntil co&"ensation is "aid ... .>Emphasis supplied.?

It is true that P.:. No. ;1 e=pressly ordered the emancipation of tenant+farmer as



Fernan, 5C.6.7, Narvasa, Melencio/8errera, Gutierrez, 6r., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,Padilla, 'idin, *ar&iento, Cortes, Gri-o/A9uino, Medialdea and !e(alado, 66., concur.

Asso. of Small Landowners in the Phils vs Sec of Dar 175 Scra 343 (1989)

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Transcript of Asso. of Small Landowners in the Phils vs Sec of Dar 175 Scra 343 (1989)