BA.LLB 4th YEAR

ASSIGNMENT ON INTERPRETATION OF STATUES

INTRODUCTION

THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

Constitutional Law is the body of those legal rules which determine the constitution of our

country and provides for the working and detailing of how the executive, legislature and

judiciary are to function and allocates power to them. It also delineates the rights, liberties and

duties of the citizens. It is the epitome of the national aspirations of a free political society.

The basic features of the Indian constitution are Democratic form of Government, federal

structure, unity and integrity of the nation, secularism, socialism, social justice and judicial

review1.

For an effective functioning of democracy where, the will of the people is the supreme, the

power should not be allowed to be concentrated in one place. Thus, the Constitution allocates

power for each its pillars - The function of the legislature is to produce laws. It is the duty of the

executive, namely the government to administer the laws and it is the judiciary which is

entrusted with interpretation of laws. Though often, for the prosperity of the nation and also for

upholding the rule of law, the judiciary proactively interprets the constitution for protecting the

basic structure.

ARTICLE 21 UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

Article 21 of the Indian Constitution says that:

"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal except according to procedure established

by law"

Prior to Maneka Gandhi's Decision, Article 21 guaranteed the right to life and personal liberty to

citizens only against the arbitrary action of the executive and not from legislative action. The

state could interfere with the liberty of citizens if it could support its action by a valid law.

1 SR Bommai Vs. UOI, SCC 1918

But after Maneka Gandhi’s decision Article 21 now protects the right to life and personal liberty

of citizen not only from the Executive action but from Legislative action also. A person can be

deprived of his life and personal liberty if two condition are complied with:

There must be a law

There must a procedure prescribed by that law, provided that the procedure is just, fair

and reasonable.

The Supreme Court proactively has constructed and laid down several wonderful legal principles

such as fair procedure, natural justice, death sentence, delay in execution, minimum punishment,

preventive detention, wrongful detention of prisoners, handcuffs on prisoners, public hanging,

delay in bringing to trial, Compensation, environment protection, forests, housing , insane

persons, legal aid, passport, livelihood, suicide, radiation, roads, under trial prisoners, public

interest litigation, minimum wages, drugs, etc., etc. It is the Apex court which interpreted right to

information as a fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution, when the same was not

specifically mentioned in the Article, only to prevent corruption and white collar crimes

perpetuated by the people covering under the shield of public authority.

Interpretation not only means giving wider scope for the law it can also include striking down the

unwanted/unconstitutional laws, to serve the fast changing needs of the society ultimately, it is

the public good – maximum good for maximum number of people and achieve stability of the

society, the government, the judiciary and politics.

"RIGHT TO LIFE" UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.’ The right to life is undoubtedly

the most fundamental of all rights. All other rights add quality to the life in question and depend

on the pre-existence of life itself for their operation. As human rights can only attach to living

beings, one might expect the right to life itself to be in some sense primary, since none of the

other rights would have any value or utility without it. There would have been no Fundamental

Rights worth mentioning if Article 21 had been interpreted in its original sense.

'Life’ in Article 21 of the Constitution is not merely the physical act of breathing. It does not

connote mere animal existence or continued drudgery through life.

It has a much wider meaning which includes right to live with human dignity, right to livelihood,

right to health, right to pollution free air,etc. Right to life is fundamental to our very existence

without which we cannot live as human being and includes all those aspects of life which go to

make a man's life meaningful, complete and worth living. It is the only article in the Constitution

which has received the widest possible interpretation.

Under the canopy of Article 21 so many rights have found shelter, growth and nourishment.

Thus, the bare necessities, the minimum and basic requirements which are essential and

unavoidable for a person is the core concept of right to life.

RIGHT TO LIVE WITH HUMAN DIGNITY

In Maneka Gandhi's case2 the court give a new dimension to article 21, it held that the right to

'live' is not merely confined to physical existence but it includes within its ambit the right to live

with human dignity. Elaborating the same view the Court in Francis Coralie V. Union Territory

of Delhi3, said that the right to live is not restricted to mere animal existence. It means something

more than just physical survival. The right to 'live' is not confined to the protection of any faculty

or limb through which life is enjoyed or the soul communicates with the outside world but it also

includes "the right to live with human dignity", and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare

necessities of life such as, adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading,

writing and expressing ourselves in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and

commingling with fellow human being.

Following Maneka Gandhi and Francis Coralie cases the Supreme Court in Peoples Union for

Democratic Rights v. Union of India4, held that non-payment of minimum wages to the workers

employed in various Asiad Projects in Delhi was a denial to them of their right to live with basic

human dignity and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.

2 AIR 1981 SC 7463 AIR 1978 SC 5974 AIR 1982 SC 1473

Bhagwati, J., speaking for the majority held that the rights and benefits conferred on the

workmen employed by a contractor under various labour laws are "Clearly intended to ensure

basic human dignity to workmen and if the workmen are deprived of any of these rights and

benefits, that would clearly be a violation of Article 21. He held that the non-implementation by

the private contractors and non-enforcement by the State Authorities of the provisions of various

labour laws violated the fundamental 'right of workers "to live with human dignity'."

”This decision has heralded a new legal revolution. It has clothed millions of workers in

factories, fields, mines and projects sites with human dignity. They had fundamental right to

maximum wages, drinking water, shelter creches, medical aid and safety in respective

occupations covered by the various welfare legislations.”

In Chandra Raja Kumari v. Police Commissioner Hyderabad5, It has been held that the right to

live includes right to live with human dignity or decency and, therefore, holding of beauty

contest is repugnant to dignity or decency of women and offends Art. 21 of the Constitution. The

government is empowered to prohibit the contest as objectionable performance under Section 3

of the Andhra Pradesh Objectionable Performances Prohibition Act, 1956. If it is grossly

indecent scurrilous or obscene or intended for blackmailing.

RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD

In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation6, popularly known as the 'pavement dwellers

case' a five judge bench of the Court has finally ruled that the word 'life' in Article 21 includes

the 'right to livelihood' also.

The court said "It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for

example, by the imposition and execution of death sentence, except according to procedure

established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that

right is the right to livelihood because no person can live without the means of livelihood. If the

right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest ways of

depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood.

5 AIR 1998 AP 3026 AIR 1986 SC 180

In view of the fact that Articles 39(a) and 41 require the State to secure to the citizen an adequate

means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pendentary to exclude the right to

livelihood from the content of the right to life."

In that case the petitioners had challenged the validity of Sections 313, 313-A, 314 and 497 of

the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 which empowered the Municipal Authorities to

remove their huts from pavement and public places on the grounded that their removal amounted

to depriving them of their right to livelihood and hence it was violative of Article 21. While

agreeing that the right to livelihood is included in Article 21 the Court held that it can be curbed

or curtailed by following just and fair procedure.

It was held that the above sections of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act were

Constitutional since they imposed reasonable restrictions on the right of livelihood of pavement

and slum dwellers in the interest of the general public. Public streets are not meant for carrying

on trade or business. However, the Court took a humanistic view and in order to minimize their

hardships involved in the eviction it directed the Municipal Authorities to remove them only

after the end of the current monsoon season. The Court also directed the Corporation to frame a

scheme for demarcating hawking and non-hawking zones and give them licenses for selling their

goods in hawking zones. License in hawking zones cannot be refused except for good reasons.

RIGHT TO DIE

Right to die - Not a fundamental Right under Art. 21.—the question whether the right to die is

included in Art. 21 of the Constitution came for consideration for the first time before the

Bombay High Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maruty Sripati Dubal7.

The Bombay High Court held that the right to life guaranteed by Art. 21 includes a right to die,

and consequently the court struck down Section 309, IPC which provides punishment for attempt

to commit suicide by a person as unconstitutional. The Judges felt that the desire to die is not

unnatural but merely abnormal and uncommon. They listed several circumstances in which

people may wish to end their lives, including disease, cruel or unbearable condition of life, a

sense of shame or disenchantment with life.

7 (1987) Cr.LJ 549

They held that everyone should have the freedom to dispose of his life as and when he desires. In

this case a Bombay Police Constable who was mentally deranged was refused permission to set

up a shop and earn a living. Out of frustration he tried to set himself afire in the corporation's

office room.

On the other hand, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chenna Jagadeeswar v. State of A.P8., held

that the right to die is not a fundamental right within the meaning of Art. 21 and hence Section

309, I.P.C. is not unconstitutional.

In P. Rathinam v. Union of India9 a Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Mr. Justice

R. M. Sahai and Mr. Justice Hansaria agreeing with the view of the Bombay High Court in

Maruti Sripati Dubal case10 held that a person has a "right to die" and declared Section 309 of the

Indian Penal Code unconstitutional which makes "attempt to commit suicide" a penal offence.

The "right to live" in Art. 21 of the Constitution includes the "right not to live", i.e., right to die

or to terminate one's life. In the present case the petitioners had challenged the validity of Section

309 on the ground that it was violative of Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution and prayed for

quashing the proceedings initiated against the petitioner (Nagbhushan) under Section 309

pending in the Court Sub-Judge, Gunpur in the District of Koraput, Orissa for attempting to

commit suicide.

The Court held that Section 309 of the IPC was violative of Art. 21 and hence it is void. A

person cannot be forced to enjoy right to life to his detriment, disadvantage or disliking. The

Court held that Section 309 of the I.P.C. was "a cruel and irrational provision". The Court held

that "right to life of which Art. 21 of the Constitution speaks of can be said to bring in its trial the

right not to live a forced life". Explaining the reason for its decision the Court said that "Section

309 I.P.C., deserves to be effaced from the Statute Book to humanize our penal laws. It is a cruel

and irrational provision and may result in punishing a person again (Doubly) who has suffered

agony and would be undergoing ignominy because of his failure to commit suicide."

8 (1988) CR. LJ 5499 (1994) 3 SCC 39410 (1987) Cr.LJ 549

However, the Court rejected the plea that "euthanasia (mercy killing) should be permitted by

law. The Judges said that they would not decide this point as firstly it is beyond the scope of the

present petition and secondly also because in euthanasia a third person is either actively or

passively involved about whom it may be said that he aids or abets the killing of another person.

There is a distinction between an attempt of a person to take his life and action of some others to

bring to an end the life of a third person such a distinction can be made on principle and is

conceptually permissible.

The court who rejected the contention that Section 309, I.P.C. was violative of Art. 14 on the

ground that attempt to commit suicide is undefined and unguided.

Attempt to commit suicide has ceased to be legal offence in most countries. The Court approved

the decision of the Bombay High Court in Maruti Shripati Dubal v. State of Maharashtra.

This Judgment may have come as a hope of liberation to some who are in a very depressed and

irreversible state of mind or body, without fear of any punishment should their attempt fail but

what about its effect on the young immature minds which tend to act or react in desperate haste?

In this respect the author's criticism of Shripati Dubal's decision is still justified particularly in

dowry cases in India. In most of the dowry deaths accused takes the plea that the deceased has

committed suicide while it is generally otherwise. How such cases could be tackled in view of

this judgment? Again suicide owing to frustration in love, failure in examinations and failure to

get a job or even a job or promotions in service would raise many social problems.

Is individual capable of taking a decision to end his life in such conditions? Does he not owe a

responsibility towards the society to overcome these human frailties and live for it? In Indian

tradition escapism has never been approved as the philosophy of life.

In Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab11 a five judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has now

overruled the P. Rathinam's case and, rightly, held that "right to life" under Art. 21 of the

Constitution does not include "right to die" or "right to be killed" "The right to die", is inherently

inconsistent with the "right to life" as is "death with life"

Delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court Mr. Justice J.S. Verma, observed:—11 1996 2 SCC 648

"Any aspect of life which makes it dignified may be read into Art. 21 of the Constitution

but not that which extinguishes it and is, therefore inconsistent with the continued

existence of life resulting in effacing the right itself-.

"Right to life" is a natural right embodied in Art. 21 but suicide is an unnatural

termination or extinction of life and, incompatible and inconsistent with the concept of

"right to life".

Referring to protagonists of euthanasia's view that existence in persistent vegetative state

was not a benefit to the patient of terminal illness being unrelated to principle of "sanctity

of life" or the "right to live with dignity" the Court said that this argument was of no

assistance to determine the scope of Art. 21 of the Constitution for deciding whether the

guarantee of "right to life" therein includes the "right to die".

The Court made it clear that the "right to life" including the right to live with human dignity

would mean the existence of such a right upto the end of natural life. This also includes the right

to a dignified life upto the point of death including a dignified procedure of death.

This may include the right of a dying man to also die with dignity when his life is ebbing out.

But the "right to die", with dignity at the end of life is not to be confused with the "right to die"

an unnatural death curtailing the natural span of life. The Court reiterated that the argument to

support the views of permitting termination of life in such cases (dying man who is terminally ill

or in a vegetative state) by accelerating the process of natural death when it was certain and

imminent was not available to interpret Art. 21 to include therein the right to curtail the natural

span of life.

The Court, accordingly held that Section 309 of IPC is not violative of Art. 21 of the

Constitution. The Court also rejected the contention. that Section 309 of IPC is violative of Art.

14 and said that the debate on the desirability of retaining such a penal provision of punishing

attempted suicide (Section 309), including the recommendation for its delegation by the Law

Commission is not sufficient to indicate that the provision is constitutional being violative of Art.

14.

The Court said that the desirability of bringing about such a change is the function of the

legislature which may by enacting suitable law providing adequate safeguards to prevent any

possible abuse.

The Court set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Maruti Sripati Dubal v. State of

Maharashtra and the decision of the Supreme Court in P. Rathincim v. Union of India cases

wherein Section 309 IPC was held to be constitutional and upheld the judgment of the Andhra

Pradesh High Court holding that Section 309 of the IPC was not violative of Arts. 14 and 21 of

the Constitution.

EUTHANASIA

In Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaugh v. Union of India12, a writ petition was filed by Ms. Pinki

Virani of Mumbai claiming to be the next friend of Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaugh with a prayer

for direction to the respondent to stop feeding and let Aruna die peacefully.

The facts were that Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaugh who was a staff nurse in King Edward

Memorial Hospital, Parel, Mumbai, was attacked on 27th Nov. 1973 by a sweeper in the hospital

by wrapping a dog chain around her neck and yanking her back with it. He tried to rape her but

find her menstruating sodomised her. To immobilize her during it, he twisted the chain around

her neck.

Next day, a cleaner found her lying on the floor with blood all over in an unconscious state. It

was alleged that due to strangulation by the dog chain, the supply of oxygen to the brain stopped

and her brain got damaged. There was damage to cortex or some other part of the brain and brain

stem contusion injury with associated cervical cord injury. The incident had occurred about 36

years of her age and she was at the time of the judgment of Court 60 years' of age. Her physical

condition was alleged to be very weak. She was reduced to a skeleton and was of feather weight.

She had bed sores and was in a persistent vegetative state. Her brain was virtually dead. She

could be given only smashed food by putting it in her mouth.

On the basis of the report submitted by a Committee of Doctors constituted by the Supreme

Court, it was found that Aruna Shanbaugh had some brain activity, though very little. She 12 AIR 2011 SC 1290

recognized the persons around her and expressed her like or dislike by making some vocal sound

and waving her hand by certain movements. She smiled if she received her favorite food, fish

and chicken soup. She breathed normally. Her pulse rate and respiratory rate and blood pressure

were normal. She did not need a heart lung machine. She was able to blink well and could see

her doctors.

In an attempt to feed her through mouth, she accepted a spoonful of water, some sugar, and

smashed banana. She also licked the sugar and banana paste sticking on her upper lips and

swallowed it. She would get disturbed when many people entered her room but she offered to

calm down when touched or caressed gently. She digested food and her body performed other

involuntary functions without any help. She, in all probability, was to continue in the state in

which she was in till her death. She met most of the criteria for being in a permanent vegetative

stage of 37 years. Her dementia did not progress and remained stable for many years. Her parents

were dead and her close relatives had no interest in her since she had unfortunate assault on her.

Regarding the withdrawal of life support to a person in PVS or who was otherwise incompetent

to take a decision in this connection, the Supreme Court in a two Judges Bench decision, Justice

Markandey Katju and Justice Gyan Sudha Misra, laid down the law of passive euthanasia to

continue till the law made by Parliament on the subject, as follows:

A decision has to be taken to discontinue life support either by parents or the spouse or

other close relatives, or in the absence of any of them, such a decision can be taken even

by a person or a body of persons acting as a next friend. It can also be taken by the

doctors attending the patient. However, the decision should be taken bona fide in the best

interest of the patient.

It was hospital staff taking care of Aruna for a long, they were really her friends who

could take such a decision but they clearly expressed their wish of Aruna to be allowed to

live. If the hospital staff at some future time changes its mind, it would have to apply to

the Bombay High Court for approval of decision to withdraw life-support.

Even if a decision is taken by the near relatives or doctors or next friend to withdraw life

support, such a decision requires approval from the High Court concerned as there is

always a risk that the provision may be misused by some unscrupulous persons with the

help of some unscrupulous doctors by fabricating material to show that it was a terminal

case with no chance of recovery.

This is in the interest of the protection of the patient, protection of the doctors, relative

and next friend, and for reassurance of the patient's family as well as the public. This is

also in consonance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae (55-IMPT) which is a well-known

principle of law. The High Court under Article 226 of Constitution can grant approval for

withdrawal of life support to such an incompetent person.

A petition can be made to the High Court to pass suitable orders under Article 226 of the

Constitution praying for an order or direction and not for any writ. Hence, Article 226

gives abundant power to the High Court to pass suitable orders on the application filed by

the near relatives or next friend or the doctors/hospital staff praying for permission to

withdraw the life-support to an incompetent person of the kind above-mentioned.

RIGHT TO GET POLLUTION FREE WATER AND AIR

In Subhas Kumar v. State of Bihar13, it has been held that public interest litigation is

maintainable for ensuring enjoyment of pollution free water and air which is included in the

"right to live" under Art. 21 of the Constitution.

PROTECTION OF ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION

In Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P14., the Court ordered the closure of

certain lime stone quarries on the ground that there were serious deficiencies regarding safety

and hazards in them. The Court had appointed a committee for the purpose of inspecting certain

lime stone-quarries. The Committee had suggested the closure of certain categories of stone

quarries having regard to adverse impact of mining operations therein. A large scale pollution

was caused by lime stone quarries adversely affecting the safety and health of the people living

in the area.

In Shiram,' Food and Fertilizer case15 the Supreme Court directed the company manufacturing

hazardous and lethal chemicals and gases posing danger to health and life of workmen and

people living in its neighborhood, to take all necessary safety measures before reopening the

13 AIR 1991 SC 42014 1985 2 SCC 43115 M.C Mehta Vs. Union Of India

plant. There was a leakage of Chlorine gas from the plant resulting in death of one person and

causing hardships to workers and residents of the locality. This was due to the negligence of the

management in maintenance and operation of the caustic chlorine plant of the Company.

The matter was brought, before the Court through a public interest litigation. The management

was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 20 lacs by way of security for payment of compensation

claims of the victims of Oleum gas leak with the Registrar of the Court. In addition, a bank

guarantee for a sum of Rs. 15 lacs was also directed to be deposited which shall be encashed in

case of any escape of Chlorine, gas within a period of three years from the date of the judgment

resulting in death or injury to any workman or any person living in the vicinity. Subject of these

conditions the Court allowed the partial reopening of the plant.

The efforts of the highest Court in environment pollution control through public interest

litigation is indeed laudable particularly when the Legislature is lagging behind in bridging the

lacuna in the existing legal system and administration is not well equipped to meet the challenge.

CONCLUSION

Right to life is a fundamental right. No doubt this right, like all fundamental rights, is subject to

reasonable restrictions, but the reasonability of the restriction must be judged from the point of

view of the prevailing social conditions, and not in the abstract. Hence what may have been

reasonable earlier may no longer be reasonable today. The social conditions existing at the time

when the constitution was made may be very different from the present conditions, and hence if

we interpret the constitution from the angle of the constitution-makers, we may arrive at a

completely outdated and unrealistic view. One has necessarily to make the broad factual

situations contemplated by the particular national interest whose advancement is proposed by the

legislation. Traditional norms of statutory interpretation must yield to broader notions of the

national interest.

BIBLOGRAPHY

BOOKS:

1. Dr. J.N. PANDEY, THE CONSTITUTION LAW OF INDIA, 248 (CENTRAL LAW AGENCY, ALLAHABAD, 50th EDITION 2013).

WEBSITES:

1. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION AVAILABLE AT : http://guide2lawyers.blogspot.in/2012/06/judicial-interpretation-of-article-21.html(Last Visited on 23rd September 23, 2015)