Assessment of the RAH-66 Comanche Pilot-Crew Station Interface for the Force

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ARMY RESEARCH

LABORATORY

Assessment

of

the

RAH-66

Comanche Pilot-Crew

Station Interface

for

the

Force

Development

Test

and

Experimentation

I

(FDTE

I)

David

B.

Durbin, Thomas

J.

Havir,

Joshua

S .

Kennedy,

and Regina A. Pomranky

ARL-TR-3027

September

2003

2 0 0 3 1 1 0 3

0 6 0

Approved

fo r public release; distribution

is

unlimited.



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Army

Research Laboratory

Aberdeen

Proving Ground, M D 1005-5425

ARL-TR-3027

eptember

2003

Assessment

of

the RAH-66 Comanche

Pilot-Crew

Station

Interface

for

the

Force

Development

Test

and

Experimentation

I

(FDTE

I)

David B.

Durbin, Thomas J.

Havir, Joshua

S .

Kennedy,

and Regina A.

Pomranky

H u m a n Research & Engineering

Directorate

Approved

fo r public

release; distribution is

unlimited.



REPORT DOCUMENTATION

PAGE

Form Approved

TT T r T T MB No.

7 4 188

Public reporting burden f« this collection

of

information

is estimated to average hour per response, including the linw for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources Mtherim; and

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PLEA SE DO N O T RmiRN Y O U R FORM T O

TH E

A B O V E A D D RESS.

1.

E POR T

DATE CDD-MM-VYVV^

September

2003

R E P O R T

DATE

Final

4. ITLE

AN D SUBTITLE

A sse ssm e n t

of

th e RA H-6 6

Co m an c h e

Pilot-Crew Station Interface

fo r

th e

Force

Development

T es t

an d Experimentat ion

I

(FDTE

I)

6.

UTHOR(S)

Durbin ,

D.B.;

Havir, T.J.;

Kennedy,

J.S.;

Po m ran ky ,

R.A. (all of A R L )

7. ERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AN D A D D R ES S (ES )

U.S.

A rm y Research

Laboratory

H u m a n Research & Engineering

Directorate

Aberdeen Proving

Ground,

M D

1005-5425

9.

PONSORING/MONITORING A GE N C Y

NAME(S)

AN D

ADDRESS(ES)

12 . DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY

STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution

is

unlimited.

3. ATES COVERED (From -

To )

5a .

C O N T RAC T NUMBER

5b .

RAN T N U M B E R

5c.

R O GR A M ELEMENT

NUMBER

5d. PROJECT N U M B E R

62716AH70

5e. T AS K

NUMBER

5 f. W O RK UNIT N U M B E R

8. ERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT

NUMBER

A RL -TR-30 2 7

10 .

SPONSOR/MONr rOR'S

ACRONYM(S)

11.

SPONSOR/MONr rOR'S

REPORT

NUMBER(S)

13 . SUPPLEMENTARY OTES

14 . ABSTRACT

Crew workload, crew situational awareness , usability characteristics of th e crew station controls, displays , and subsys tem interface,

an d

s imulator

sickness

w e re

assessed during

th e

RAH-66

C o m a n c h e

Force

D e v e lo p m e n t

T es t

and

Experimentat ion

I (FDTE

I) .

Pilots

w ho

participated

in

F D TE I reported

that

they

typical ly

experienced

moderate

levels

of

workload

and situational awareness

during missions .

h ey

noted several problems

with

usability

of

th e controls, displays ,

and

subsystem

interface,

whi ch

should

be

resolved.

ilots experienced

very

mild

to

moderate

s imulator

sickness sym p to m s during missions . he

discomfort

they

felt

di d

not

significantly affect their performance . A

panel

of

subjec t matter experts observed each mission and reported that th e pilots

typically experienced moderate levels

of

workload an d lo w

to

moderate levels

of

situational aw are n e ss during missions .

15 . SUBJECT TERMS

pi lo t workload RAH-66 Co m an c h e s imulator sickness

situation awareness

6.

ECURITY

CLASSIFICATION

O F

a. EPORT

b.

ABSTRACT

Unclassified

c.

THIS PAGE

Unclassified

17 . LIMITATION

O F ABSTRACT

U L

18 .

UMBER

OF

PAGES

1 3

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

David B.

Durbin

19b . TELEPHONE NUMBER Include area code)

3 3 4 - 255 - 20 6 9

standard

Form

29 8

(Rev.

8/98)

Prescr ibed

b y

ANSI

Std. Z39 .18



Contents

List

of

Figures

i

List of Tables i

Acknowledgments ii

Executive Summary

1 . ntroduction

1.1 urpose

1.2

s s e s s m e n t

of

th e

Pilot -Crew

Station Interface

1.3 s s e s s m e n t

of C r e w

Workloa d

1.3.1

Bedford Workload

Rating Scale

(BWRS)

1.4

s s e s s m e n t

of

Crew

Situat ion

A w a r e n e s s

1.4.1 Situation

Awareness Rating Technique

(SART)

1.5

ssessmen t

of

Crew

Station

Controls ,

Disp la ys ,

a n d

Subsys t em Interface

1.6

s sessment of Simula t or

Sickness

1.6.1

Simulator

Sickness

Questionnaire

(SSQ)

1.7 DTEI

Simula t ion Overv iew

1.7.1 Tactical

teering

Commit tee

1. 8

A H - 6 6 C o m a n c h e

System

Descr ip t ion 0

1.9

o m a n c h e

Portable

Cockpit

(CP C)

and

Engineering

D e v e l o p m e n t

Simulator (EDS) 0

1.9.1

ystem

Man agemen t

Display

( SMD)

and

Tactical

Situation Display

(TSD) 0

1.9.2

eft and

Right

Multipurpose

Displays

(MPDs) 1

1.9.3

ollective

and Side-arm Controller

(SAC) I

1.9.4

ockpit

Interactive Keyboard (CIK) 2

1.9.5 elmet-Mounted Display

( HMD)

2

1.9.6

nvironmental

Conditions in th e

CPC

and

EDS

Simulators

3

1.9.7

EP Software 3

2.

ethod

4

2.1

i lots

4

2.1.1

Pilots'

Anthropometr ic Measurements 4

2 .2 a ta

Collect ion

F o r m s

and

Procedures

4

2 .3

a ta Ana lys is 5

2.4 imita t ions

of

A s s e s s m e n t 5

11 1



3.

Results

^

3.1

rew

Workload 5

3.1.1 ea n Workload Ratings

fo r A TM

Tasks 5

3.1.2 ea n Workload Ratings

fo r

Flying tlie

Aircraft

7

3.1.3

ea n

Workload

Ratings

fo r

Operating

th e

M EP

7

3.1 .4

eak Workload Ratings

fo r

A TM

Tasks

8

3.1.5

ean Peak

Workload Ratings

When

Pilots

Flew

th e

Aircraft

9

3.1 .6 ean Peak Workload

Ratings

When

Pilots

Operated

th e M EP

9

3.1 .7

orkload Ratings fo r

Performing

Multiple

A TM

Tasks Concurrently

9

3.1.8

SC

Workload

Ratings

0

3.1 .9 ransfer of A TM

Tasks

to th e

Other

Pilot

Because

of

High

Workload

1

3.1 .10

Comparison

of

Crew

Workload

Ratings

fo r

FD E

1 ,

FM S

,

and

FDTE

I 1

3.2

rew

Situat ion

A w a r e n e s s 2

3.2.1

A

Ratings

fo r Flying th e

Aircraft

Versus

Operating th e

M EP

4

3.2.2

roblems

With SA When

Pilots

Flew

th e

Aircraft

5

3.2.3

roblems

With

SA

When

Pilots

Operated

th e

M EP

5

3.2.4

SC

Ratings

of

SA 6

3.2.5

SC

Mission

Success

Ratings

an d Crew SA

6

3.3

sability

of Crew

Station

Controls , Disp la ys ,

a nd

Subsys t em

Interface ...

7

3.3.1

ositive

Aspects

of

th e

Crew Station

Controls,

Displays,

and

Subsystem Interface 7

3.3.2

roblems

With

th e

Crew

Station

Controls,

Displays,

and Sub-

system

Interface 7

3.3.3 nthropometric Accommodat ion of

Pilots

1

3.3.4 O PP Gloves 2

3.4

A N P R I N T

M e a s u r e s

of

P e r f o r m a n c e

( M O P s )

3

3.4.1

Switch

Actuations

by

Crew Members

During

FDTE

4

3.5

imulator

Sickness 7

3.5.1

omparison

of SSQ

Scores

fo r th e

CPC

Versus

EDS Simulators

8

3.5.2 omparison of CPC

and

EDS SS Q

Scores

to Other

Helicopter

Simulators 8

4. ummary g

4. 1

re w

Workload 9

4.2 re w

SA

0

4 .3

sability

of th e Crew

Stat ion

Controls ,

Displays ,

a nd

Subsys t em

Interface 0

4 .4 A N P R I N T

M e a s u r e s

of Performa nce

( M O P s )

1

4 .5

imulator

Sickness 2

5.

ecommendat ions

2

6.

eferences

4

IV



Appendix A.

Bedford Workload Rating Scale (BWRS) 7

Appendix

B.

RAH-66 Comanche

Aircrew Training

M anual (A T M ) Tasks

9

Appendix C. ituation

Awareness

Rating

Technique

(SART)

1

Appendix D.

re w Station Controls, Displays, and Subsystem Interface

Questionnaire 3

Appendix E.

Simulator

Sickness

Questionnaire

(SSQ) 3

Appendix F. ummary of Pilot Anthropometric

M easurements

5

Appendix

G .

edford Workload Rating Scale (BWRS) Questionnaire

7

Appendix H. ummary of Crew Workload Comments

9

Appendix I.

ummary

of

Pilot Ratings

and

Comments

About Usability

of

th e

Crew

Station

Controls,

Displays, and

Subsystem

Interface

7

Appendix

J .

ummary of

Switch Actuations 07

Appendix

K .

ummary

of Crew Situation

Awareness

Comments

09

List of

Acronyms 12

Distribution List 15



List

of Figures

Figure 1 . omanche

portable ockpit

Figure 2.

ngineer ing development

simulator

Figure 3.

PC

and

E D S

crew

stat ion

conf igura t ion

Figure 4. A H-66

ollective 2

Figure

5.

A H - 6 6

side-arm

controller ( S A C ) 2

Figure 6.

aiser ProView

50 3

Figure 7.

veral l

S A R T

rat ings

fo r all

miss ions

3

Figure

8.

SC

rat ings of

mission

success 6

Figure 9 .

is tr ibution of swi tch ac tuat ions

by

pi lot

funct ion 5

Figure 0. ercen tage of swi tch ctuations y system

unct ion

5

Figure

1. requency

of

switch

actua t ions

during

missions

6

List o f

Tables

Table

.

Table

2.

Table

3.

Table

4.

Table

.

Table

6.

Table

.

Tabl e .

Table

9 .

Table

0.

Tabl e 1.

Table

2.

Tabl e 3.

Tabl e 4.

Tabl e

5.

T a b l e

6.

Tabl e

7.

M A N P R I N T me as ur e s

of

performance

F D T E

missions

F D T E

actors ,

ontrols , nd onditions

C P C

and

E D S

ambi e n t

noise , light,

an d

temperature levels 3

Pilot demographics 4

M e a n

workload

rat ings fo r

A T M

tasks

6

S u m m a r y

of

multi-tasking workload

rat ings 0

S u m m a r y of

crew

and T SC

m ea n

workload

rat ings fo r all

miss ions

1

M e a n

workload

rat ings fo r

FD E

, FM S

, and

F D T E

2

S A R T

subsca le

rat ings 3

S A R T

subsca le

rat ings

for

a ll

missions

4

S A R T

subsca le

rat ings

fo r missions

nd

2

a nd

missions

3

an d

4

5

T SC

rat ings

of

SA 6

M o s t

important

crew

stat ion

des ign

changes

r e c omme n de d

by

pilots

8

Pi lot c omme n t s a b o u t usabil i ty

problems w h en

they

w o r e

M O P P

gloves

2

Simula tor

sickness

quest ionna i re

(S S Q )

rat ings

7

C o m p a r i so n

of C P C and E D S

SSQ

rat ings

with

SSQ

rat ings

from other

helicopter imulators 3

V I



Ack n owledgmen ts

The

authors

express

their appreciation

to

Dr.

David

Johnson

(U.S.

Ar m y

Research

Institute

fo r

th e

Behavioral

and

Social

Sciences,

Fort

Rucker,

Alabama)

fo r

providing

helpful

information

and

data

about

simulator

sickness.

Vll



IN TEN TIO N ALLY

LEFT B L A N K

VUI



Executive S u m m a r y

Crew

workload,

crew

situational

awareness ,

usability

characteristics

of

th e

crew

station

controls,

displays, and

subsystem

interface, and

s imulator

sickness

were

assessed during th e RAH-66

Comanche Force

Development

Test

and

Experimentation

I

(FDTE

I).

ilots

w ho

participated

in

F D T E I

reported

that

they

typically

experienced

moderate levels ofworkload

and

situational

awareness

during

missions. hey

noted

several

problems

with

usability

of th e

controls, displays,

and

subsystem

interface, which

should

be

resolved. ilots experienced

very

mild

to

moderate

simulator

sickness symptoms

during

missions.

he discomfort they

felt

did

not

significantly

affect their performance.

A

panel

of subject matter

experts

observed

each mission

and

reported

that

th e

pilots

typically

experienced

moderate

levels

ofworkload

and

lo w to

moderate levels

of

situational awareness

during

missions.



IN TEN TIO N ALLY LEFT

B L A N K



Table

1 . MAN PRI N T

measures

of

performance

M OP

2-5-1. ercent

of

crew errors

attributable

to induced fatigue

or workload.

^T. il ^'-cent of crew

ratings

that

assessed

th e

CP C interface

as

contributing to

excessive

workload

durmg

flight

an d

mission tasks.

San d

mis^sionTalks. ' ' '"

' ''

'

'' '' ' ' '''''

' ''

^''^

'' ''' ^^"

^^^"^^^

f° ^

P ^ ^ «

' g

M OP 2-5-4. ercent of crew ratings

that assessed th e

CP C interface as

inhibiting th e

decision-making

process

during

flight an d

mission tasks.

M OP

2-5-5.

ercent

of crew

ratings that

assessed

th e

CP C

interface

as

inhibiting

crew

an d team

situation

awareness.

MO P 2-5-6 .

ercent

of crew

ratings

that

assessed

th e

CP C interface

as

inhibiting

crew

an d

team

coordination

tasks.

^ l "^"^'

Percent

of

ratings

by

th e

Tactical

Steering

Committee

(TSC)

that

assessed the

CPC

as

inhibiting mission accomplishment.

M O P

2-5-8.

ercent

of design

differences

between th e CP C

an d

ED S

that

substantially impacted the

performance

offlight

an d mission tasks.

M OP

2-5-9.

requency

distribution of using switches

in th e Comanche cockpit,

by

mission.

1.3.1

Bedford

Workload

Rating

Scale ( B W R S )

T h e

Bedford

Workload

Rating

Scale

( B W R S )

(see

Appendix

A )

w as

used

to

est imate

cognit ive

work loa d .

he

pilots

comple t ed th e

B W R S immediate ly

after each

mission.

hey

used

th e

B W R S to rate

th e

level

of

work loa d

im p o sed by each of

th e

41

R A H - 6 6

C o m a n c h e

Aircrew

Training

M a n u a l

( A T M )

tasks

(see

Appendix

B ). he A T M

tasks

were performed

to

suppor t

reconnaissance, securi ty, and

at tack operat ions;

target m a n a g e m e n t

and

fire

distribution

and

coordma t ion

m iss io ns ; and

m o v e m e n t

and

communica t ion

ftinctions.

orty-one

A T M

tasks

were

se lec ted

from

th e

complete

list of 52 A T M tasks because they were

est imated

to

ha ve

th e

m o s t

potent ia l impa c t

on pilot wo rklo ad .

T h e B W R S has

been

extensively

used

by

th e

mili tary,

civil, and

commerc ia l avia t ion

c o m m u n i t i e s

to

est imate

pilo t

work loa d

(Roscoe

and

Ellis,

1990) .

t

requires

pilots

to

rate

th e

level of

work loa d

associated

with a

task, based on

th e

a m o u n t of spare

cognit ive

capacity

they

feel

they

possess

to

perform

addit ional

tasks.

pare

cognitive

capaci ty is

an

impor t a n t

c o m m o d i t y

for

pilots b ecau se

they

are

often

required

to

perform

several

tasks

concurrent ly . or

exa mple ,

pilots

m u s t

often perform

f l ight

tasks

and

navigat ion tasks

and

moni t or radios

during

th e s a m e

t ime

period. ission performa nce

is

reduced

if

pilots

are task saturated

and

hav e little

or

no spare

capaci ty

to

perform

other

tasks. esign

of

th e C o m a n c h e

pilot -crew

stat ion

interface



should

help

ensure

tha t

pilots

can

mainta in adequate

spare

work loa d

capacity

w h e n

performing

f l ight

a nd miss ion tasks.

1 .4

ssessment of Crew

Situation

Awareness

Situation a w a r e n e s s

(SA)

can

be

defined

as

th e pilot's

m enta l

m o d e l

of th e

curren t

state

of th e

f l ight

a n d

miss ion

environment .

fo rma l

definit ion

is "the

percept ion

of

th e

e lement s

in

th e

e n v i r o n m e n t within a v o l u m e

of

t ime

a nd

space ,

th e

comprehens ion of their mea ning , a nd th e

projection

of their status

in the

nea r

future" (Endsley,

1988) .

t

is

impor t a n t to

assess

SA

beca use

it ha s

a direct impa c t

on pilot performa nce . high

level

of

SA

increases th e probabil i ty

of t imely

and

accura te

decis ions

by

pilots. esign

of

th e

C o m a n c h e

pilot-crew

stat ion

interface

should

ensure

that th e pilots

are

able

to

ma int a in consistently

high

levels

of

SA .

1.4.1

Situation

Awareness

Rating

Technique

(S A RT)

T he

Situat ion A w a r e n e s s

Rat ing

Technique

( S A R T ) scale

(see

Appendix

C) w a s

used

to

est imate

th e

level

of

SA

tha t

pilots

experienced

during

missions.

he

pilots

comple t ed

th e

S A R T

immedia t e ly

after ea ch

mission.

h e

S A R T

w as

developed

as an

evaluat ion tool

fo r

des ign of

aircrew sys t ems

(Taylor ,

198 9) .

he

S A R T is

composed

of

three

subscales:

unders t a nd ing

(U) ,

d e m a n d

(D),

a n d

supply

(S).

a y lor

stated

tha t

SA

depends

o n

th e

pilots'

imders t a nd ing

(U )

(e.g., quali ty of in forma t ion

they

receive) ,

an d

th e

difference

bet ween

th e d e m a n d (D ) (e.g.,

complex i t y

of

miss ion)

o n

th e

pilots'

resources

and

supply

(S )

(e.g.,

ability

to

concentra te) .

W h e n

d e m a n d

exceeds

su p p ly ,

there

is

a negat ive

effect

o n

unders tanding

a n d

an overa ll

reduc t ion of

SA .

he

fo rmula

SA =

U

-

(D

-

S)

is

used

to

derive

th e

overa ll

S A R T

score. h e

S A R T

is

one

of

th e

m o s t thoroughly tested

rat ing

scales fo r

est imat ing

S A

(Endsley,

2000) .

1 .5

ssessment

of

th e

Crew

Station

Controls ,

Displays,

and

Subsystem

Interface

T h e crew

stat ion

controls ,

displays,

and

subsystem interface

directly

impa c t

crew w o r k l o a d and

S A

during

a miss ion .

ontrols

and

displays tha t

are

designed

to

a u g m e n t th e

cognit ive

an d

phys ica l

abilit ies

of c rews wil l

minimize

work loa d ,

enhance

SA ,

and

contribute

to

successful

miss ion performa nce . t

is

impor t a n t t o

assess

th e

crew

station

interface to

identify p r o b l e m s

tha t

should b e

resolved.

T o

ident ify

any prob lems

wit h usability

of

th e

crew

stat ion

contro ls ,

displays , or

subsys t em

interface,

th e

pilots

comple t ed

a lengthy

quest ionnaire

(see

Appendix

D )

a t th e

end

of

ea ch week.

T h e

pilots also

assessed

th e

M A N P R I N T

M O P s (see Tab le 1)

deve loped

by

A R L

and

U S A O T C

( Depa r t ment

of

th e

A r m y ,

2001) .

he

M O P s assessed

th e

suitability

of

th e

C P C crew

stat ion

interface fo r

use

during

FDTEII.

1 .6

ssessment of Simulator Sickness

Simula t or s ickness

has been

defined

as

a

condit ion

in w h i c h pilots suffer

phys io log ica l

discomfor t in

th e

simulator , w h i c h

is

not

experienced

whi le

they

are

f ly ing th e

actual

aircraft



( Kennedy , Lilienthal ,

Berb au m ,

Baltzley,

and M c C a u l e y ,

1989) . t

is

genera lly

believed

tha t

s imula t or

s ickness

is

caused

by a

misma t ch

b e tween

th e

sensory

informat ion

(e.g.,

accelera t ion

cues)

presented

by

th e

simulator , and

th e

sensory

informat ion presented

by

th e

pr ima ry

aircraft

tha t th e

pilot operates.

When

th e

sensory

informat ion presented

by th e

s imula tor does

n o t

ma t ch

th e

aircraft ,

th e

pilot's

nervous

system

reacts

adversely

to

th e

sensory

m i s m a t c h

and

th e

pilot

begins to

experience

discomfort .

imula tor

sickness s y m p t o m s inc lude

nau sea ,

dizziness

drows iness , and

several other

s y m p t o m s

(Kemiedy

et

al.,

1989 ) . t

is

impor t a n t

to

assess

s imula t or

s ickness

b ecau se

th e

discomfor t

felt by

pilots

can

be distracting during

missions .

ilot

dis t ract ion

is

one of th e operat ional

consequences

of simulator sickness listed by

Crowley

(1987) .

ddit ionally ,

th e

discomfor t

could influence th e levels of

work loa d

and

S A

tha t

th e

pilots perce ived

they

experienced

during a mission.

1.6.1

imulator

Sickness

Quest ionnaire

(SSQ)

T he

Simula t or

Sickness Quest iomiaire

(SSQ)

(see Ap p end ix

E)

w as

adminis tered

to

th e

pilots

to

est imate

th e

severity

of

physiologica l discomfor t

tha t

they

experienced

during

miss ions

and

to

help

det e rmine

whet her

they were

being

distracted

by

th e discomfort . he SSQ (Kennedy ane

B e r b a u m , and

Lil ienthal ,

1993 )

is a

checklis t

of

16

s y m p t o m s .

hese

s y m p t o m s

are

categorized'

into three subscales: cu lomot or (e.g., ey e strain,

difficulty

focusing,

blurred vision) ;

disorienta t ion (e.g., dizz iness, vert igo) ; and na usea

(e.g.,

nau sea ,

increased

salivation, ' burping) .

T h e

pilots' responses

on

th e

three subscales

are

co m b ined

to

produce

a to tal severity score ,

w h i c h

is

an

indica tor

of th e

overall degree

of

discomfort

that th e

pilots

experienced during ' the

m iss io n .

1 .7

FDTEI

Simulation Overview

T he C P C

(see

Figure

1)

and

th e

engineering

deve lopment

s imula tor

(EDS) (see

Figure

2 )

were

th e

s imula t ion

devices used to

conduc t

F D T E I. ilots received

four

w e e k s of

intensive

t raining

before th e

F D T E I

began. he

t raining

consisted of classroom

instruction

and "hands-on" flight

t raining

in

th e

C P C

and th e E DS .

he

pilots

flew

th e

s a m e

missions

(e.g.,

route

recomiaissance)

during

t raming

that

they later

flew

during

th e

record

trials.

he

miss ion

scenario w as

based

on

batt lefield

envi romnent s simulat ing

those

depic ted in

th e

C o m a n c h e

opera t ional

m o d e

s u m m a r y

and

miss ion profile ( O M S - M P ) . he scenario

w as

conducted

with

four types

of miss ions

(see

Ta ble

2). ach

successive

mission

increased in difficulty

in

order

to

impose

progress ively

greater

work loa d

on

th e pilots.

issions

and 2 typical ly

required

modera t e

levels of

work loa d

to

perform,

and

missions

3

and

4

required

higher

levels

of

wo rklo ad .

ach

of

th e

four

miss ions

w a s

conducted

nine

or te n

t imes during F D T E I.

he pilots

performed

specific

A T M tasks

during

each

mission.

ach A T M task had

prescribed

condit ions and

s tandards

tha t both

crew

m e m b e r s

had

to m e e t to help ensure m iss io n acco m p l i shm en t .



Figure

1 .

o m a n ch e

portable

cockpit.

Figure

2.

ngineering

development

simulator .



Table 2. DTE

I missions

Missions

Description

Conduct

ground

route

reconnaissance

Report

enemy elements

Conduct route

reconnaissance

Conduct

area

reconnaissance

Provide security

(screen)

Engage

enemy

with

artillery

Conduct security operations

(screen)

Conduct

deep

reconnaissance

Attack theater ballistic

missiles

React to mission

change

React

to

inclement weather

Conduct

zone

reconnaissance

React to

mission

change

Encounter

weather

React

to aircraft

malftinctions

Objectives

Navigation,

basic

mission

equipment

manipulation,

an d aircraft

control.

Complete

mission

undetected.

Report

al l

enemy

forces.

Navigation,

advanced mission

equipment

manipulation,

digital

communicat ions,

an d

call fo r

fire.

All

the above

plus

react

to

mission changes,

an d

execute procedures

fo r inadvertent

entry

into instrument

meteorological

conditions.

All

th e

above

plus

react

to

mission

changes

A

sou t hwes t

Asia

topographica l

d a tab ase

w as

used

for the

area

of

operat ions. fragmentary

order

( F R A G O )

w as issued to initiate each

mission. he

F R A G O s

w e r e

ba sed

on th e

C o m a n c h e

O M S - M P

and

empha s ized

crew

duties and team

tactical e m p l o y m e n t techniques .

h e

a dva nced

tactical

c o m b a t

( A T C O M ) sof tware

m o d u les

generated

threat

forces.

T he

pilots

comple t ed

39

missions

during

F D T E

I.

o r

all

missions,

th e

pilot

w ho

f lew

th e

air-

craft

w a s

ass igned

to

th e

f ront

seat

and

th e pilot

w ho

operated

th e

miss ion

equipment pa cka ge

( M E P )

w a s

ass igned

to

th e

ba ck

seat .

uring th e

39 missions,

th e

pilots'

seat

a ss ignment s

w e r e

varied

so tha t (a )

every pilo t flew

with every

other pilot

and (b ) every

pilot

occupied

th e

f ront

and

rear

seats in

th e

C PC

and

E DS .

he

factors,

contro ls ,

and

condit ions

fo r

F D T E

I

are l isted

in

Ta ble 3.

T h e

pilots

used

C o m a n c h e

opera t ional

concepts b ased

on

th e draf t T T P s .

m p h a s i s w as

on

individual

and

crew

T T P s

within

th e

crew stations as

wel l

as

team

coordinat ion

efforts

bet ween

crew

m e m b e r s

opera t ing

in

tw o separate

aircraft. he

T T P s

addressed

th e

genera l

categories

of

team

m o v e m e n t ,

ta rget

m a n a g e m e n t ,

fire

distribution,

coordinat ion,

and

communica t ion

techniques .



Table 3 .

D T E I

factors,

controls,

an d conditions

Factor

Control

Conditions

Mission

Systemat ical ly varied

Route reconnaissance, area reconnaissance, deep

reconnaissance

and

attack,

security,

zone reconna i ssance

Flight

profile Tactically varied

N ap

of

th e earth, contour

Crew

response

Tactically

varied

Report ,

engage

Sensor

Tact ical ly

varied

C o m a n c he

radar , infrared

Scanner

Tactical ly varied

Continuous,

m a n u a l

Targets

Tactical ly

varied

B M P , B R D M , T-72, B T R , 2S6,

2S1 ,

SA13, cargo t ruck,

individual

soldiers

Friendly forces Tactical ly

varied

U A V ,

MlAl,

M 2 - M 3 ,

M 1 1 3 ,

cargo

truck,

re-fuel

H E M T T

Light condit ions

Constant

N i g h t

Scenario

Constan t

Southwes t Asia

Crew


Maximize pilot combinat ions

Simulators Systemat ical ly varied

EDS, C PC

Sea t

posi t ion


Front,

rear

Doctrine and Constan t

In accordance with doctrine

support package,

T R A D O C

tact ics

support

package,

or

HO C

C o m a n c he

T A C

SO P

T ea m

Constant

T w o

R A H - 6 6

C o m a n c he s

organizat ion

B M P

= B o y e v a y a M a s h i n a Pehoti , a

Soviet

mechani zed

infantry

vehicle

B R D M = B o y e v a y a Razuedy ua t ae l ' nay a D o z o n n a y a M es h ina, a

Soviet

ehicle

U A V =

unmanned

aeria l vehicle

H E M T T = heavy expandabl e

mobili ty

tactical

t ruck

E O C

= emer gency

operat ions

center

T A C

SO P

=

tactical standing operat ing

procedure

1.7.1 Tactical Steering Committee

A

T S C

of

subject ma t t e r experts

( S M E s )

observed each miss ion

to

(a )

deve lop

and refine

T T P s

a nd

(b )

rate crew

work loa d ,

crew

SA ,

a nd

miss ion

success.

he

T SC

provided

an

independent

a ssessment

of th e

work loa d a nd

S A

levels

experienced by th e

crew

m e m b e r s .

hey

also

helped

ident ify

ins tances

in

w h i c h excess ive

work loa d

and

inadequate

S A

degraded miss ion

effect iveness . h e

T S C

included representa t ives

from th e

following

A r m y

agencies:

•

A H - 6 6 T S M - C ,

Fort Ru cker ,

A l a b a m a ( two pilots)

•

S A O T C ,

Fort

Ho o d , Tex as

( two

pilots)

• i rectora te

of

Training,

Doctrine

and Simulat ion,

Fort Rucker

(one

pilot and

one civilian)

•

i rectora te

of C o m b a t

Development s ,

Threa t Branch,

Fort

Rucker

(one

civilian)

• 1 S t

Cavalry

Brigade,

Fort

H o o d

(one

civilian

instructor

pilot)

T SC m e m b e r s

observed

each

miss ion

using

a suite

of

monitors

tha t

s h o w e d

all

crew stat ion

disp la ys in th e C P C

and

E D S . SC

m e m b e r s

also

listened

t o all audio communica t ions bet ween

crew m e m b e r s ,

aircraft,

and

th e

s imula ted tactical

operat ions

center

during

th e

missions .

large

project ion

m a p provided th e

T S C

with

a

rea l- t ime

indication

of

th e

loca t ion

of

th e

aircraft ,

fr iendly

forces , and

e n e m y

forces. h e

T S C

conducted

an

after-action

review ( A A R )

wit h th e

pilots at

th e

end of

each

mission.

uring th e

A A R ,

th e

T SC rev iewed

th e

posit ive

and negat ive

aspects

of

th e

miss ion t o

(a )

provide instruction

to

th e

pilots

and

(b ) develop

and

re fme

TTP s.



M e m b e r s

of

th e

T S C also discussed

wit h

pilots

th e

causes and

consequences

of

work loa d

prob lems ,

S A

prob lems , and prob lems

with

th e

pilot-crew

station

interface.

1 .8

AH -66 Comanche System

Description

T he

R A H - 6 6

C o m a n c h e

will

be

a

fully

in tegrated ,

l ightweight ,

twin

engine ,

two-pilot , a dva nced

t echnology

helicopter

w e a p o n s

sys tem

designed

to project, protect,

and

sustain

th e

force; to

gain

informat ion

d o m inance ;

to shap e

th e

battle

space;

and

to

conduc t

decisive

operat ions.

ystem

features

include

l igh t weigh t compos i t e

airframe structures,

protected

ant i- torque

sys t ems , lo w

vibra t ion,

high

reliability

rotor

sys tem s, reduced

radar

cross sect ion (RCS)

a nd

infrared

(IR)

s ignatures ,

built-in

diagnost ics

and

or

prognost ics ,

second

generat ion

ta rget

acquis i t ion,

nigh t

vision

sensors,

and

a

radar

sys tem .

1 .9

omanche

Portable

Cockpit (CP C) and Engineering Development Simulator (EDS)

T he

C P C

(see

Figure 1)

and

E D S (see

Figure

2)

each consisted

of tw o

crew stat ions arranged in a

tandem

sea t ing

configurat ion.

h e

f ront

and

rear

crew

station

configura t ions

w e r e

ident ical

(see

Figure

3),

enabling

each

pilo t to

perform

all

A T M

tasks.

he

simulators

conta ined

th e

ha rdwa re ,

M E P ,

a nd

software tha t

emula ted

th e

controls,

flight character ist ics ,

and

m o s t

of

th e

fiinctionality

of th e

proposed

C o m a n c h e

product ion

aircraft. h e pr ima ry

crew

stat ion

contro ls

and

displays

were

th e

sys tem

m a n a g e m e n t

display

( S M D ) , tactical situation display (TSD) , cockpit

interactive

keyboa rd (CIK) ,

side-arm

controller

(SAC) , collective, and

th e

Kaiser

ProView 50*

head -

m o u n t e d

display (HMD) .

he

ED S

w as a

fiall m o t io n

s imula tor

and

th e C P C

w as

a f ixed

b ase

s imula tor .

he

mot ion

capability

w as

th e

only

s ignif icant difference

bet ween th e

simulators .

1.9.1

System M a n ag em e n t

Display

(S M D ) and

Tactical

Situation Display

(TS D )

T h e S M D

is

a mult i-funct ion

color display.

n

one

m o d e , it provides

sensor

ima gery

from

th e

ta rget acquis i t ion system (TAS) . n

other

m o d e s , it

provides aircraft

subsystem

control

and

status

informat ion.

he T S D

is also a

multi-fiinction

display. t

provides

a

co lor m ap

display

wit h

super imposed

navigat ional informat ion

and s y m b o l o g y depic t ing

th e location

of threa t

and

fi-iendly

forces. o th

th e SM D

and

T S D

hav e

a

bezel

incorpora t ing 12 dedica ted swi tches

(called

m o d e

select

keys)

in

tw o

horizonta l

r o w s above and

below

th e

display

areas. he

six

m o d e select

keys

on

th e

upper bezel of th e SM D

are

used

to

select

communica t ion

f imctions,

whi le

th e

six

m o d e

select

keys

on th e lower

bezel al low selection

of th e

m a i n m e n u

of

th e S M D

or

aircraft

and

mission

su b sys tem s. he s ix m o d e select

keys on

th e

upper

row

of

th e

T SD

bezel

are

used

to

select

HM D

fimctions.

h e

six

m o d e

select

keys

on the

l o w e r

T S D

beze l

allow

ma nipu la t ion

of

m ap m o d e s

and

display characteristics.

witches

in

th e

comers

of

th e

bezels

are

used

to

adjust

screen brightness,

s y m b o l brightness,

and

contrast.

here

are te n

switches

in

tw o

c o l u m n s

on

th e

r ight

and

left

of th e SM D

and T S D .

he

funct ion

and

use

of

these

keys

v ary ,

depending

on

th e m o d e that

h as

been

selected with

th e m o d e

selector keys.

ProView

SO^M

is

a

t rademark

of

Kaiser Electro-optics,

Inc.

10



Figure

6 . Kaiser

ProView

5 0 .

1.9.6

Environmental

Conditions in

tlie

CPC

and

ED S Simulators

Ambient

noise,

light,

and

temperature

levels

were

recorded

during

a sample of

missions

(see

Table

4)

to

identify

whether th e

environmental

conditions

interfered

with

pilot

performance

during

missions. Noise

and temperature levels

in th e CPC and

EDS

were

moderate. ight

levels

in

both

simulators were

lo w

to

aid

in

th e

use

of th e Kaiser

ProView

50

HM D . he pilots

reported

that

th e

noise,

temperature, and

light

levels

did not distract

them,

make them

xmcomfortable, or interfere with th e

performance

of tiieir

tasks

during missions.

Ambient noise

w as

recorded

with

a

407764 sound level meter

m a d e

by

Extech

Instruments

Corporation.

Ambient

light w as

measured

with

a

Gossen

Ultra

P ro

light

meter. Ambient temperature

w as

recorded

with a WiBGeT

w et

bulb

globe temperature

(WBGT)

monitor m a d e

by

th e

Imaging

and

Sensing

Technology

Corporation.

Table

4 .

CP C and ED S

ambient

noise,

light,

and

temperature

levels

Simulator

Noise Levels

Light

Levels

Temperature Levels

CPC

63 to

67

dBa

O L u x

68 °

to

73°

F

ED S 72

to

78 dBa

0

to

1 1

L ux

70°

to

74°

F

1.9.7

M EP Software

The

M EP

software

used

during

F D T E I

w as

version

1030.

he

Flight

Director-Autopilot,

Navigation Update, and System

Status M EP

functions

were

not

modeled i n software

version

10.3

and

therefore

were

not

used

during

FDTE

I.

1 3



2.

Method

2.1 Pilots

Pilots

w e r e

eight

m ale

A r m y

soldiers

from

th e

fo l lowing

units: -lOlst

and

3-lOlst

Aviat ion

Regiment ,

Fort Cam p b e l l ,

Kentucky

(five pilots) , 1-17th Cavalry and l-82nd Avia t ion

Regiment ,

Fort

Bragg ,

Nort h

Carol ina

(three

pilots) .

hree soldiers

were O H - 5 8 D

pilots

w ho

held th e

rank'

of Chief Wa rra nt

Officer

(CW2).

hree

soldiers

w e r e AH-6 4D

pilots

w h o

held th e

rank

of CW2.

O ne soldier

w as

an

AH-6 4D

pilot

w ho

held

th e

rank

of First

Lieutenant

and

one soldier

w as

an

A H - 6 4 A pilot

w h o

held

th e rank of C W2. h ey

represented

a group

of

lo w

to

modera t e ly

experienced

pilots

with

total f l ight

ho u rs

tha t ranged

from 160 to 65 0 hours. ne of

th e pilots

h a d

part ic ipa ted in

th e R A H - 6 6 Force

Development

Ex p er im en t (FDE 1) (June

2000)

and

therefore

had

prev ious

experience

operat ing

a

C o m a n c h e

simulator .

n ly

o ne

of

th e

pilots

w o r e

correct ive

e y e w e a r

during

missions.

h e

relevant

d em o grap hic

characterist ics

of th e

pilots

are

listed

in

Ta ble

5.

Table

5 . ilot demographics

Mean

Median

Range

Age

(years)

3 1

3 1

24

to

34

*Excludes

initial entry

training

Demographic

Characteristics

Flight

hours in

pr ima ry

aircraft

27 9

228

1 0 to

60 0

Tota l flight

hours

in A r m y

aircraft*

41 5

415

160

to

65 0

Flight

hours

with

night vision

devices

19 8

13 8

30 to

55 0

2.1.1 Pilots'

Anthropometric M easurements

Fifteen

a nt hropomet r ic

mea surement s

were obtained fo r

each

pilot

(see

Appendix

F) .

he

m e a s u r e m e n t s were obtained

in

accordance

wit h published procedures

fo r mea sur ing

A r m y

personne l ( Gordon

et

al.,

1989 ) .

h e

upper percentile

ranks

fo r m ale

avia tors

w e r e

wel l

represented fo r

10 of th e 15

anthropometric

m easu rem en ts . he

mea surement s

were

used

to

assess

w h e t h e r

any

prob lems

tha t

th e

pilots

experienced

w h e n

using

th e

crew

stat ion

controls

and

displays

w e r e

related

to

their body

size.

2.2 Data Collection Forms

and

Procedures

T h e

B W R S ,

S A R T ,

SSQ and controls,

displays, and subsystem

interface

quest ionnaires

(see

A p p e n d i c e s

C,

D ,

E, and

G )

w e r e

developed

in

accordance

with published

guidelines

for proper

fo rma t

and

content

(O'Brien

and

Charl ton,

1996) .

pre-test

w as

conducted

to

refine

th e

1 4



quest ionnaires

a nd

to ensure

that they

could

be

easily unders tood

and

comple t ed

b y

pilots

a nd

T S C

m e m b e r s .

T h e

pilots

a n d

T SC

m e m b e r s

comple t ed

th e

work loa d

and

situation

a wa reness

quest ioimaires

immedia t e ly

after

each

mission. he

pilots

comple t ed the

SSQ

before

and

after

every

ot her

mission.

t

th e

end

of

each

w e e k

of

missions ,

th e

pilots

comple t ed

th e

controls ,

displays ,

a nd

subsys t em

interface

quest io imaire . ddit ional

d a ta were obtained

from

t h e

pilots and T S C

m e m b e r s

during

post -miss ion

discuss ions

and th e

A A R conducted

after

each

miss ion .

Quest ioimaire

results

w e r e

clarified

wit h

informat ion

obta ined

during

pos t -miss ion

discuss ions

a nd th e

daily

A A R s .

2 .3

ata Analysis

Pi lo t

responses

to

th e

B W R S , S A R T , S S Q,

an d

controls, displays, and

subsystem

interface

quest ioimaires

w e r e

a na lyzed

wit h

m e a n s

and

percentages.

heir responses

to th e

B W R S ,

S A R T ,

and

SS Q were

further

ana lyz ed

wit h

th e

Wilcoxon

Signed R a n k s

Tes t ( WSRT)

to

c o m p a r e

ra t ings

b e t w e e n

th e

pilots

w h e n

they

flew

th e aircraft

versus

w h e n they

opera ted

th e

M E P .

h e

W S R T w as

also

used

to ana lyz e

pilot SSQ

rat ings

w h e n they

flew in th e

E D S

versus

w h e n

they flew

in

th e C P C .

ecause

of th e sm al l sam p le size (n

=

8)

of

pilots

w ho

part ic ipa ted

in

F D T E I,

probabil i ty

values

w e r e

comput ed

wit h

Fisher's Ex ac t Test .

2.4 imitations

of

Assessment

Limita t ions

included

th e sm al l

sam p le size of pilots

(n

=

8)

w ho part ic ipa ted

in

F D T E

I,

their

l imited

experience operat ing

th e

C o m a n c h e

simulators , their lack of

substant ia l

experience

opera t ing

A r m y

aircraft

and

th e

lack

of

100% fidelity

bet ween th e

simulators and

th e

produc t ion

design

of

th e C o m a n c h e

aircraft.

ddit ionally ,

th e

Flight

Director-Autopilot ,

Navigat ion

Upda t e ,

and

System

Status M E P f imctions were

n o t

modeled

in

th e

F D T E

I

software

and

therefore w e r e

not

avai lable

fo r

th e

pilots

to use during

missions. nforma t ion and data

listed

in

th e Results and S u m m a r y sect ions of this

repor t should

be

interpreted

on

th e

basis of

these

limitat ions. ddit ional

data should be

collected

during future simulat ions and

tests to

a u g m e n t

th e f indings

listed in this

report.

3. Results

3.1 Crew Workload

3.1.1 M ea n Workload Ratings fo r A T M Tasks

T he

mean

work loa d

rat ings

listed

in

Tab le 6

w e r e

derived from

th e

work loa d

ra t ings

provided

by

th e

pilots

fo r ea ch A T M task

af ter

every mission.

he

overal l

m e a n work loa d rat ing provided by

th e

pilots

w h e n they

flew

th e

aircraft

(front

seat)

w as

2.90.

15



Table 6. Mean workload

ratings

for ATM tasks

ATM

Tasks

Run-up,

h o v e r

an d before

take-of f

checks

Maintain

a ir

space

surveillance

Radio communicat ions

Rolling take-off

Visual meteorological conditions ( V M C ) flight

m an e u v e rs

Electronically aided navigation

Terrain flight

navigation

Fuel m an ag e m e n t procedures

Terrain

flight

M askin g an d unmasking

Evasive maneuvers

Actions on contac t

V M C approach

Roll-on

landing

Inadvertent

ins t rument

meteorological

conditions

( I M C) procedures

Un u su a l attitude recovery

E m e rg e n c y procedures

T SD operations

Firing

techniques

Firing position operations

Helmet- in tegrated displaying sighting

system

(HIDSS) operat ions

Electro-optic

target

acquisition

and

designation

sys tem

( E O T A D S ) sensor operations

Digital communicat ions

Fire

control

radar (FCR) operations

Data

entry procedures

Data m an ag e m e n t procedures

Engage target

with Point

Target

Weapon Sys tem

(PTW S ) (Hellfire)

Engage targe t

with

th e A WS

(2 0

m m )

Mult i -sh ip

operations

Security mission

Aerial observation

Area reconnaissance

Route reconnaissance

Zone

reconnaissance

Digital

artil lery mission

Digital

remote semi-active laser

( SAL)

missile

mission

Tran sm i t

tactical

reports

Identify m ajo r U.S.-Allied equipment

Identify m ajo r

threat equipment

Operate aircraft survivability equipment

Operate night

vision

pilotage

system

Overal l Workload

Rat ings

SD

Mean

Workload

Fly

aircraft

2.29

2.62

2.72

2 .74

2.87

2.87

3.04

2.95

2.80

3.56

3.21

2.61

2.66

2.90

3.36

2.95

2.91

2.85

2.77

2.90

2.96

2.93

4.05

3.00

2.98

3.16

2.71

2.85

2.90

2.89

3.01

2.95

2.71

3.00

2.71

2.51

2.58

2.60

2.71

2.90

0.29

Operate

MEP

2.38

5.18

2.94

2.91

2.89

3.15

3.06

3.20

3.07

3.40

3.18

3.38

2.89

3.19

3.07

3.03

2.97

3 . 27

3.18

2.91

4.24

2.83

2.96

3.81

2.91

2.89

3.00

3.02

3.15

3.06

2.67

3.25

2.79

2.48

2.58

2.58

2.64

3.08

0.49

Peak Workload

Fly

aircraft

2.40

3.36

3.36

3.46

3.68

3.54

3.76

3.98

3.31

5.09

4.12

3.27

3.00

3.98

4.07

3.79

3.57

3.42

3.48

3.93

Operate

MEP

2.48

7.32

4.06

3.52

3.60

3.79

3.92

3.80

3.66

4.41

3.95

4 .3 3

3.41

4.29

3.85

3.79

3.41

4.59

3.67

4.75

3.40

4.01

6.56

6.41

3.68

3.82

3.40

3.92

3.89

4.52

3.58

3.64

3.36

3.52

3.58

3.78

3.60

3.73

3.89

3.75

3.88

4.02

3.04

3.19

4.80

5.50

3.36

3.66

2.72

2.72

3.06

3.04

3.01

2.76

3.29

2.87

3.65

3.92

0.68

0.92

16



T h e ra nge

of m e a n work loa d

rat ings

fo r

th e A T M tasks

w as 2.29 to 4.05. h e overa ll m e a n

work loa d

rat ing

provided

b y

th e

pilots

w h e n they

opera ted

th e M E P (back seat)

w as

3.08.

h e

ra nge of mean

work loa d

rat ings for the

A T M

tasks w as 2.38 to

5.18. he difference in

overa ll

m e a n work loa d ra t ings

bet ween f lying

th e

aircraft an d operat ing th e

M E P

w as

stat ist ically

s ignif icant

( WSRT,

z

=

-2.36,

j t ?

< .01).

l though

th e difference w as

stat ist ically

s ignif icant ,

it

l ikely d o es not reflect an

operationally

s ignif icant

difference in spare

cognit ive

capacity beca use

both

ra t ings

w e r e

close to

3

o n

th e

Bedford

scale.

n

s u m m a r y , th e

pilots

reported tha t they

• xper ienced tolerable

work loa d

levels

w h e n they

performed

ea ch A T M

task;

• id

no t

experience

a reduct ion

in

spare

work loa d

capaci ty

w h e n they

performed

m o s t

A T M

tasks

3.1.2 M e a n W ork load Ratings

fo r

Flying th e

Aircraft

W h e n they

flew t h e

aircraft,

th e

pilots reported

tha t they

typica lly

did

n o t

experience

a reduct ion

in

spare

work loa d

capacity w h e n they performed

37

of

39 A T M

tasks

(the

pilots

did n o t perform

2

of

th e

41

A T M

tasks

w h e n

they

flew

th e

aircraft

during

F D T E

I) .

he

tw o

tasks

fo r

w h i c h

they

reported

a

reduct ion

in spare

work loa d

capaci ty

w e r e

•

vasive M a n e u v e r s (m ean

rat ing

= 3.56)

•

ata Entry

Procedures

(m ean

rat ing

=

4.05)

T h e

task

of

performing

"evasive

ma neuvers"

received higher ra t ings beca use

all

of th e

pilot's

effort

w as

required

to evade

a

threa t

o r

obstac le . Addit ional ly, th e

O T W

view

and crew

stat ion

displays

w e r e

moment a r i ly

blanked

(1

to 2

seconds)

w h e n

th e

aircraft

w as

h it

by gro im d fire.

Blanking

of

th e

O T W

view

and

th e

crew

station displays

w as

a s imula t or art ifact that

indica ted

to th e crew

m e m b e r s that they w e r e

being engaged

b y

th e

threat. omentari ly

losing

th e

O T W

view

a nd

th e

crew

station

displays

increased

the

pilots'

level

of

frustrat ion

a n d

their

perce ived

work loa d beca use they

ha d t o

spend

addit ional

t ime

regaining

S A

w h e n their

O T W view and

th e

displays

reappeared. he

task of

"data

ent ry"

received higher

ra t ings

beca use

of usability

prob lems

wi th

th e

C IK (see Table

14).

3.1.3

M ea n

Workload

Ratings

fo r

Operating th e

M EP

W h e n opera t ing

th e M E P , th e

pilots

reported that they typica lly

did not

experience

a reduct ion in

spare

work loa d

capaci ty

w h e n they performed

34

of 37

A T M tasks

(the pilots

did not

perform

4

of

th e

41

A T M

tasks

w h e n they

opera ted

th e

M E P

during

F D T E I) .

h e

three

tasks

fo r

w h i c h

they

reported

a

reduct ion

in

spare

work loa d

capaci ty

w e r e

•

nga g ing

Targets

wit h

th e

A r e a

Wea pon

System

(AWS)

(m ean

rat ing

=

3 .81)

•

a ta

Entry

Procedures

(m ean

rating = 4.24)

•

ainta ining

A ir

Sp ace Survei l lance

(m ean

rating

=

5.18)

T he

task of "enga g ing targets with th e A W S "

received

higher ra t ings

beca use

w h e n th e

pilots

fired

th e

gu n , it

often

h ad

no

effec t o n

th e

targets .

his

problem w as

usually ca used b y

a

s imula t or

ma lfunc t ion

and

increased

th e

pilots' frustration

and

their

perceived

level

of wo rklo ad .

1 7



T he

task

of

"data entry

procedures" received

higher

rat ings

because

of

usability prob lems

wit h

th e

CIK.

h e

pilots stated

that

th e

C IK

w as

difficult and t ime co nsu m ing to

use ,

kept

their hea ds

d o w n

in th e

crew

station

fo r

extended

periods

of t ime,

and forced

them to

lose

SA .

h e

task of

"mainta ining

air

space

surveil lance" received

higher

rat ings b ecau se th e pilots

opera t ing

th e

M E P

did

not

ha ve

a

n ight

vision

device

that

enabled

them

to

see

outside

th e

crew

stat ion

a t

nigh t

whi le

conduct ing

a

scan

with

th e

T A S .

ilots

often

conducted

continuous

scans

wit h

th e

T A S ,

w h i c h prevent ed them

from

seeing

outside th e

crew

station fo r

extended

periods

of

t ime.

his '

task

w as

rated

as

a 10

(o n

th e

Bedford

Scale)

20

t imes by th e pilots

because

they

simply could

n ot

perform

th e

task

during long

periods

of th e mission.

hus,

th e

m e a n work loa d

rat ing fo r

this

task is

not

a valid

m easu re of

wo rklo ad

that

th e

pilots

experienced. ather ,

th e

m e a n

work loa d

rat ing

represents

th e pilots'

intent to em p has iz e

tha t they

were

frustrated by

th e

lack of

e q u i p m e n t

needed

to

perform

this task. he

product ion

design of th e

C o m a n c h e

does n o t

include

provis ions

fo r

a

n ight vision

device

to

allow

pilots to

see

outside

th e

crew

station

a t

n ight whi le

they

are

conduct ing

a scan with

th e T A S .

T h e

pilot w h o

opera ted

th e M E P in

th e back seat of th e E D S w as also

designated

as th e

A ir

Miss ion C o m m a n d e r ( A M C ) fo r all except one m iss io n during F D T E

I.

he A M C performed

addit ional

tasks

(e.g., provided

miss ion

revisions to th e tactical

operat ions center)

besides

opera t ing

th e

M E P . o wev er ,

there

w as

no

difference

in

overall

m e a n work loa d ra t ings

provided

by

th e

pilots

w h e n

they

operated

th e M EP

and

performed

A M C

tasks

in

th e

E D S

versus

w h e n they

opera ted

th e M EP

in

th e C PC . he overal l m e a n

work loa d

rating for pilots w h e n

they

opera ted

th e M E P and

performed

A M C tasks in

th e

EDS

w as 3.07. he overal l

m e a n work loa d

rat ing fo r pilots

w h e n they operated th e M E P

in

th e

C P C w as 3.09. h is

difference

in work loa d

ra t ings

w a s

not

statistically signif icant

(WSRT,

z

=

-.650,

p>

.05).

h is

w as

surpr ising

because

T SC

and

A R L

personnel

observed

that

th e

A M C

usual ly

experienced

higher

work loa d

and

h ad

less spare work loa d capacity

during

m iss io ns

than

th e

pilot

w ho operated th e

M E P

m

th e C PC .

When

th e

pilots

were

asked

to

explain w h y

they

did

not rate

wo rklo ad

higher fo r

th e A M C ,

m o s t

stated

tha t

there

w as

not

a

signif icant

difference

in

wo rklo ad

w h e n

they

performed indiv idual

A T M

tasks

and A M C tasks in

th e

E D S

versus w h e n

they

performed

indiv idual

A T M

tasks

in

th e

C P C . owever ,

th e

pilots

noted

that they

typical ly experienced

higher

overal l levels

of

work loa d

w h e n they

were

th e

A M C

b ecau se

they

had

to perform

m o re

A T M tasks concurrent ly.

Beca use

th e

pilots

provided wo rklo ad rat ings fo r

individual A T M

tasks, th e ra t ings

did

not

reflect

th e

higher

overal l wo rklo ad

tha t th e

pilots experienced w h e n

they

were th e A M C

and

performed

several A T M tasks concurrent ly. o assess th e wo rklo ad

that

th e

pilots

experienced

w h e n

they

performed

several

A T M tasks concurrent ly,

they provided th e

work loa d ra t ings

listed

in

Sect ion

3.1.7.

3.1.4

Peak

Workload

Ratings

fo r A T M

Tasks

T he

pilots

provided peak

wo rklo ad rat ings to identify any A T M tasks that

required

a

peak

work loa d rating of 6.5

or

higher (o n

th e B W R S ) to perform.

pea k

wo rklo ad rating of

6. 5

or

higher o n

th e B W R S

indicated

that

th e pilots experienced instances

w h e n

th e

work loa d

for the

18



task

w as

not tolerable".

asks that

ha d

m e a n pea k

work loa d

rat ings

of 6.5

o r higher provide

further justification for

improvement s

tha t should

be m a d e in th e crew

stat ion

des ign

a n d

o r

aircraft opera t ing procedures

to

decrease

work loa d

for the tasks.

s

listed in Ta ble 6,

th e

overa ll

m e a n peak work loa d rat ing

provided

b y

th e

pilots

w h e n

they

flew

th e

aircraft w a s

3.65.

h e

ra nge

of

m e a n

peak work loa d ra t ings

w as 2.40 to

6.56.

he

overal l

m e a n

peak

work loa d

rat ing

provided

b y

th e

pilots

w h e n they

opera ted th e

M E P

w as

3.92.

h e

range

of m e a n peak work loa d

ra t ings

w as

2.48

to

7.32.

he

difference

in

m e a n

pea k work loa d ra t ings

bet ween f ly ing th e

aircraft

and

opera t ing th e

M E P

w as

statistically

s ignif icant

(WSRT,

z

=

-2.10,

p < .05).

H o w e v e r ,

th e

pract ica l

difference

bet ween

th e rat ings is

m i n i m a l beca use

both

ra t ings are

clus tered

a round

4

o n

th e

Bedford

scale.

n s u m m a r y ,

th e

pilots reported that they

experienced

several

ins tances

of high work loa d that

were "not

tolerable"

fo r one

A T M task w h e n they

flew

th e

aircraft

an d fo r one A T M task

w h e n

they

operated

th e M E P .

3.1.5 M e a n Peak Workload

Ratings

W h e n

Pilots

Flew

th e Aircraft

T he

pilots

reported

that

they

experienced

several

instances

of

work loa d

tha t

w e r e

"not

tolerable"

w h e n they

performed

•

a ta Entry

Procedures

( mea n

pea k rat ing

=

6.56)

T h e

pilots

ra ted

this

task

as

not tolerable"

because

of

usability

prob lems

wi th

th e

C IK

(see

Ta ble

14).

3.1.6 M ea n Peak Workload Ratings

W h e n

Pilots Operated th e M E P

T h e

pilots

reported that they

experienced

several instances

of work loa d that w e r e

not

tolerable"

w h e n

they

performed

•

ainta ining

Airspace

Survei l lance (m ean pea k rating = 7.32)

T h e

pilots reported

that

they

experienced

several instances during

miss ions

w h e n they

could not

maintain air

sp ace

surveil lance

beca use

there

w as no

nigh t vis ion device

in th e

ba ck

seat.

s

previously stated,

this task w as

rated

as

a "10"

20 t imes by

th e

pilots

because

they simply

could

n o t

perform

th e

task

fo r long

per iods

during

th e mission.

Not e

that th e

m e a n pea k work loa d rat ing

fo r

"data

entry

procedures"

(m ean

pea k ra t ing

=

6.41)

w as

very

close to

being rated

"not

tolerable".

rat ing

of

6.41 indicated that th e pilots

exper ienced several

instances

w h e n

th e

work loa d

for

performing

this

task

w as n o t

tolerable

beca use

of usability

prob lems wit h

th e CIK.

3.1.7 W ork load

Ratings

fo r

Performing

M ultiple

A T M

Tasks Concurrently

T h e

work loa d ra t ings provided

by

th e pilots

helped

to

identify

ins tances

of high work loa d w h e n

they

performed indiv idual A T M

tasks.

o

help

assess

th e levels of

work loa d

that

they

experienced

w h e n

they

performed

several

A T M

tasks concurrent ly, th e

pilots

provided

B W R S

19



rat ings

fo r

periods

w h e n they had to "muhi- t a sk" (see Table

7) . he

definit ion

of

mult i- tasking

provided

to

th e

pilots

by

A R L

w as

"periods

w h e n

y o u

p er fo rm ed

several A T M

tasks

concurrent ly

during

missions".

he pilots

often experienced

periods

w h e n

they h ad to

perform

several

tasks

concurrent ly

within

a

brief

t ime

interval.

h ey

provided

B W R S

ra t ings

fo r

each

of

th e

four

miss ion

types

to

help

assess

mult i - tasking

for m o d era te

and

high

intensity

missions .

he

difference

in

m e a n

rat ings b e tween

flying

th e aircraft and operat ing

th e M E P w as stat ist ically

s ignif icant

fo r all m iss io ns

(WSRT, z

=

-4.31,/;

<

.01). he

difference

in

mult i- tasking rat ings

bet ween miss ions and 2

and

m iss io ns 3

and 4 w as

statistically

s ignif icant

for pilots

w h e n they

flew

th e aircraft

( W S R T ,

z

=

-3.33, p

< .01).

ifferences

in

multi-tasking

ra t ings

bet ween

missions

and 2 and missions 3

and 4 were also statistically

s ignif icant

for the

pilots

w h e n

they

opera ted

th e M E P (WSRT, z

=

-3.49,

p <

.01).

Table

7 .

ummary o f

multi-tasking

workload

ratings

Missions

All

Missions

Missions an d

2

Missions

3

an d

4

Mean

Rating

When

Pilots

Flew Aircraft

3.65

2.93

4.36

SD

1.12

0.73

1 . 0 1

Mean

Rating

When

Pilots

Operated

M E P

4.67

3.79

5.54

SD

1.37

1.06

1.04

W h e n

they

flew

th e

aircraft

and

had

to

perform

several

tasks

concurrent ly,

th e

pilots

reported

that

they

typica lly

h ad

"enough

spare capacity for

performing

addit ional A T M tasks during

modera t e

intensity

miss ions"

(missions

and

2). o r

high intensity missions

(miss ions 3

and

4),

th e pilots reported that they

usual ly h ad

"insufficient

spare

capacity for

easy

attention

to

addit ional A T M

tasks".

When

they

operated

th e M EP

and

had

to

perform

several

tasks

concurrent ly ,

th e pilots reported

that they

typical ly had

"insufficient

spare

capaci ty

for

easy

attention

to addit ional

A T M

tasks"

during

m o d era te

intensity

missions.

uring

high

intensity

miss ions ,

they

reported

that

they

usual ly

had

"little

spare

capacity"

for

performing

addit ional

A T M

tasks.

3.1 .8

TSC

Workload Ratings

T h e T SC

rated

overal l

m e a n

wo rklo ad fo r

flying th e aircraft as

3.79

(see Tab le

8).

h ey rated

overal l

m e a n

work loa d

fo r

operat ing

th e

M EP

as 4.19.

h e

difference in wo rklo ad

ra t ings

w as

stat ist ically

s ignif icant

(WSRT,

z

=

-2.10,;?

<

.05).

l though

th e

difference

w as

statistically

signif icant ,

it

likely

does

not

reflect

an

operat ional ly signif icant

difference in

spare

cognit ive

capaci ty

because both

rat ings

were close

to

"4 "

on th e

Bedford scale. he

m e a n

work loa d

rat ings

provided

by

T S C m e m b e r s

were

higher than

those

provided

by

th e

pilots.

h e

T SC

m e m b e r s

perceived

that th e

pilots

h ad

less

spare

wo rklo ad capacity

during

miss ions

than

th e

pilots perceived they had during missions. SC m e m b e r s m a d e th e

observat ion

that

th e pilots

d id

not

experience

excessive

wo rklo ad

w h e n

performing

individual

A T M

tasks, but they

were

20



increased

and m ay approximate th e wo rklo ad

that

pilots will experience

w h e n

opera t ing th e

aircraft

in

th e

field.

M e a n

overa ll

work loa d

rat ings

from

th e

Force

Dev e lo p m en t

Exper iment

(FDE 1) (Durbin ,

2001) , th e Sikorsky Full Miss io n Study (FMS 1)

(Cross ,

2001) and th e FDTEI w e r e compa red

(see Tab le

9 ).

h e

m e a n

overal l wo rklo ad rat ings

were obtained fo r

35 A T M tasks

during

FD E

1,41 A T M tasks

during F D T E I,

and

5 miss ion

tasks during FM S

1 .

s Tab le

9 depic ts , th e

m e a n

overal l

work loa d

rat ings for

pilots

w h e n

they flew

t he

aircraft were

s imilar

across

s im u -

lat ion

exercises.

h e

m e a n

overal l wo rklo ad rat ings for

pilots w h e n

they opera ted

th e M E P were

also

s imi la r

across

simulat ions. he rat ings were

similar even

t hough there

w e r e

s ignif icant

differences

in

th e operat ional experience

levels

of th e

pilots

w ho

participated

in

th e

simulat ions.

A s

a

gro u p , th e eight

pilots w ho

participated

in

F D T E I had relatively

lo w opera t ional

experi-

ence, th e six

pilots

w ho participated in FD E h ad moderate operat ional

experience,

and th e five

pilots

w h o

part ic ipa ted

in FM S

h ad

high

levels

of

operat ional

experience

and

substantial

familiarity

with

th e

design

of

th e

C o m a n c h e

crew

stations.

here

were

also

differences

in

th e

met hod by w h i c h

th e data were collected and differences

in

th e

t ypes

of

missions

tha t were

conduc t ed

during

FD E and

F D T E I versus

FM S

1 . he wo rklo ad rat ings fo r

FD E and

F D T E I

were

obta ined

immediate ly af ter each mission. he wo rklo ad rat ings

fo r

FM S

were

obta ined

a t several

"stop"

points

during each

mission.

ddit ional ly,

th e

design

of th e

C o m a n c h e

crew

stat ion

interface evolved

from

FD E

to F D T E I.

In

spite

of th e

differences in

crew experience ,

data

collection

m etho d o lo gy ,

t ypes

of missions ,

and

maturi ty

of

th e

crew

station

design,

th e

m e a n

wo rklo ad rat ings were

s imilar

across

s imula t ions .

h e m e a n

work loa d

rat ings fo r

th e

simulat ions were clustered

around

3

on

th e

B W R S .

rat ing

of

3

indicates

that

th e

pilots

perceived

that

they

typica lly

experienced

modera t e

work loa d levels

during

th e simulat ions

in

w h i c h

they

participated.

uring

fiiture

s imula t ions and tests, wo rklo ad data should

be collected and co m p ared

to FD E M S nd

F D T E

I.

Table

9.

Mean

workload

ratings

fo r FDE

1 ,

FM S 1 ,

an d FDTE

I

Simulation Event

Force

Development

Experiment

Full

Mission

Study

Force

Development Test an d

Experimentation

Mean Workload

Rating

When

Pilots

Flew

Aircraft

3.18

2.48

2.90

M e a n Workload

Rating

When Pilots

Operated M E P

3.43

2.98

3.08

3.2

Crew Situation Awareness

T he

overal l S A R T

rat ings (see Figure 7)

indicated

tha t

th e

pilots

perceived

tha t

they experienced

modera t e

levels

of

SA

w h e n

they flew the

aircraft

and

w h e n

they

operated

th e

M E P .

22



Overall

SART

Ratings

Flying

T he Aircraft

21.86

Operat ing

T he

M E P

Figure 7.

Overa l l S A R T ratings for all missions.

Table 10 . A R T

subscale

rat ings

High

S A

LowSA

'Demand' During

Miss ions

M e a n

Rating

When

Flying

Aircraf t

14.03

L ow 1 1 3 5-^—17 9 1

High

M e a n

Rating

When

Operat ing

M EP

14.62

'Supply'

During

M iss ions

M e a n

Rating

When

Flying

Aircraf t

20 .99

Low

1

0 3 6 9 1—^ -24

7

High

M e a n Rating When

Operat ing M EP

20.43

'Unders tanding '

During

M iss ions

L ow 1

1-

M e a n

Rating

Wh en

Flying Aircraf t

15.44

3

5

17—-A--19

1 High

M e a n

Rating When

Operat ing

M E P

16.05

23



Corresponding ly ,

th e

subscale

rat ings (see

Tab le 10 ) indicated

that th e pilots typica lly

experienced

modera t e

to

high

levels

of

"dema nd,"

"supply ,"

and

"unders tanding"

w h e n they

flew

th e

aircraft

and w h e n

they operated th e

M E P .

n general , th e rat ings

su gges t

tha t

th e

pilots

feh

tha t

they

h ad an adequate supply of cognit ive resources to

perform

th e

A T M

tasks, th e

cognit ive

d e m a n d s

o n

them

were

not

o v erwhe lm ing ,

and

they

had

adequate

unders tanding

of

batt lefield

e lement s

(e.g.,

location of threat, status of "ownsh ip") during missions.

3.2.1

SA

Ratings

fo r

Flying

th e

Aircraft

Versus Operating

th e

M EP

T he

difference

in

th e

overal l S A R T

rat ings

b e tween

flying

th e

aircraft

and

operat ing

th e

M E P

fo r

all

miss ions

w as

n ot

statistically

significantly

(WSRT,

z

= -.700,p

> .05)

(see

Tab le

11). h e

differences

in

overal l

S A R T

rat ings

for the pilots

w h e n

they f lew the

aircraft

versus

w h e n

they

opera ted

th e

M E P (see

Tab le 12)

fo r

moderate

intensity

m iss io ns (missions

and

2)

and

higher

intensity

miss ions

(missions

3

and 4) were not statistically

significantly

(miss ions

and 2,

W S R T ,

z

=

-.720,

p> .05, m iss io ns

3 and

4, W S R T ,

z

=

-.280,/?

>

.05).

owever ,

th e

difference

in ra t ings

fo r th e

pilots

w h e n they f lew the

aircraft

during

m o d era te

intensity

miss ions

versus

higher intensity

miss ions

w as

statistically signif icant (WSRT, z

=

-2.52,

p< .01).

he

difference

in

ra t ings

fo r t h e

pilots

w h e n

they operated th e M E P during m o d era te intensity miss ions

versus

higher

intensity

m iss io ns

w as

also

statistically

signif icant (WSRT,

z

=

-2 .24, ;?

< .05). h e

stat ist ically s ignif icant

differences

in

rat ings

b e tween

th e m o d era te

intensity

miss ions

and higher

intensity

miss ions

were because of

higher

rat ings

on

th e " d e m a n d " subscale fo r

th e higher

intensity

missions .

Table 1 1 .

ART

subscale

ratings fo r

al l

missions

M issions

1

through

4

SAR T Subscales

Flying

Aircraft

Operating M E P

emand

14.03

14.62

Instabili ty

of Situation

4.85

5.02

Variabili ty of Situation

4.81

4.85

Complexi ty

of Situation

4.37

4.75

Supply

20.99

20.43

rousal

5.32

5.34

Spare Menta l Capaci ty

5.23

4.92

Concentra t ion

5.36

5.21

Division of Attention

5.08

4.96

Understanding

15.44

16.05

Informat ion Quant i ty

4.99

5.32

Informat ion

Quality

5.01

5.16

Familiarity

5.44

5.57

M e a n S A R T

Scores

22.40

21.86

SD

3.70

3.73

24



3.2.4

T SC

Ratings

of

SA

T h e m e a n SA rat ing

provided

b y T SC

m e m b e r s (see

Ta ble

13) indica ted that SA

fo r

crew

m e m b e r s

"needed

improvement "

and

"lack

of SA had

s o m e

negat ive

effect

o n th e

success

of

th e

miss ion ." During

discuss ions ,

T SC m e m b e r s

stated

tha t th e

l imited opera t ional experience of

th e

pilots

w as

th e

pr ima ry

reason

that

th e

pilots

w e r e

una ble

to

ma int a m

high

levels

of

SA .

SC

m e m b e r s

also

stated

tha t

th e

pilots'

l imited opera t ional

experience

often

le d

to

lack

of

coordinat ion

be tween

aircraft

a nd

lack of

contro l

of

th e

miss ion

b y

th e

A M C .

Table

1 3 .

SC ratings

of SA

1

2

TSC SA

Ratings

Team w as totally aware

of al l entities

on

th e

battlefield.

Team w as

aware

of

the battlefield

with

minor

or

insignificant

variation

between perception an d

reality.

Team w as

aware of th e battlefield.

Variation between

reality

an d

perception

did

not

significantly

impact

mission

success.

4

A

needs

improvement.

ack

of SA

had some negative effect

on th e

success

of

the

mission.

5

ac k

of

SA caused

mission

failure.

M e a n

Rat ing

3 . 64

(S D

=

1 .06)

3.2.5

T SC

M iss ion Success Ratings

and

Crew

SA

A t th e

en d of

each

miss ion ,

T SC

m e m b e r s

ra ted

w h e t h e r th e

miss ion

w as

a

success

o r

failure.

T h e criteria

tha t

th e

T S C

used

to

rate miss ion

success

or failure

w a s

whether

th e

team

comple t ed

th e

miss ion requ i rement s

and

d id

n ot

get

sho t

d o w n

or

crash. he

T S C

rated

30

of

th e

39

( 7 7 % )

miss ions

as

"successful"

(see

Figure

8).

hey

rated

9 of

th e

39

( 2 3 % )

miss ions

as

"fa i led."

La ck

of adequate SA

w as

cited as

one of th e rea sons

for

fa i lure

of

m o s t

of the nine

m iss io ns .

TSC

Ratings of

Successful vs Failed

Missions

Successfu l

Missions

Failed

Missions

Figure

8 .

SC

ratings

of

mission

success.

26



3.3 Usability

of

Crew

Station

Controls ,

Displays,

and

Subsystem

Interface

3.3.1 Positive

Aspects

of th e Crew Station

Controls ,

Displays, and Subsystem

Interface

T h e pilots

reported th e

following posit ive

aspects

about

th e

usability

of

th e

crew

stat ion controls ,

displays ,

a nd

subsystem

interface

(see

Appendix

I) :

•

hey could typica lly use th e T S D ,

S M D , FLIR a nd day te levis ion ( D T V ) in

a

quick

a n d

efficient m anner .

•

hey

could

quickly navigate

t h rough

th e

T S D , S M D ,

mult i-purpose

display,

and T I A P

m e n u

screens.

•

hey rarely

forgot h o w to

navigate

t h rough th e m e n u structure

on the

T S D ,

S M D ,

mult i-

purpose

displays,

and TIAP .

•

hey

did n o t ha ve prob lems using th e

switches o n

th e side-arm

controller whi le

wea r ing

s tandard

flight

gloves.

3.3.2

Problems

With

th e Crew Station Controls ,

Displays, and Subsystem Interface

T h e

pr imary

prob lems

reported

b y

th e

pilots

with

th e

crew

station interface are now

summa r ized

and listed in

Tab le 14 .

A ll th e pilots

reported tha t

th e

usability

characterist ics

of

th e

C IK were

very

poor .

hey stated

tha t they

experienced high work loa d w h e n using th e

CIK;

it took them

an

excess ive

a m o i m t

of

t ime

to

perform several

tasks

(e.g.,

sending

free

text

m essages) ,

and it

decreased their

SA .

s ing

th e C IK decrea sed

theh SA

beca use

it w as

labor in tensive

to operate a nd

forced

them

to

stay

"hea ds

d o w n "

in the crew

stat ion

fo r

extended

periods of

t ime.

A ll

th e

pilots

emphat ica l ly

stated tha t

th e M E P operator

need s

a nigh t vis ion device

so

tha t

he

could

see

outs ide

th e

aircraft

at

night .

uring

F D T E

I,

th e

air

c rews

frequent ly

conduc t ed

cont inuous scans wit h t he T A S , w h i c h prevented

th e M E P

opera tor from

ha ving

a

sensor to see

outs ide

th e

aircraft

at

nigh t

fo r long

periods

of t ime. herefore , th e M E P

opera tor could

n o t

help

maintain

a ir space

surveil lance

and local

security around

th e aircraft. he pilots reported during

post mission

discuss ions

that

lack

of

a nigh t vis ion

device for

th e M E P opera tor

w o u l d

reduce

th e

probabil i ty of

aircraft

survivability

during

t raining

and

c o m b a t missions

beca use th e

M E P

opera t or

could

n o t

help mainta in

air

space survei l lance .

A ll

th e pilots

reported

that t he

heading

tape on

th e H M D should

be

screen

stabilized

and

should

n o t

m o v e ,

ba sed o n

aircraft

m o v e m e n t . h ey

reported

tha t

th e

hea ding

tape

w as

unreadable

and

distracting

when

it

m o v e d

in

their

F O V .

hree

pilots

also

reported

tha t

they

occasionally

exper ienced

spat ia l

disorientation beca use

of

th e

m o v ing

heading

tape.

27



T S D

during t he recon mission.

•

o

decrease

th e

t ime

required

to

plan a

route

with

grids

sent

via a

digi ta l

message ,

th e

pilot

needs

to

be

able

to

view

a

digital

m e s s a g e

and

th e

T SD

"Locate"

funct ion a t

th e

s a m e t ime.

N ot

being able to

view

a

digital

m e s s a g e

and

th e T SD "Locate" funct ion at

th e

same

t ime

forces

th e pilot

to write d o w n th e

grid

coordinates

he

receives via th e

digital

message , close

th e digital m e s s a g e ,

open the

T SD

"Locate"

screen

and then

enter

th e

grids

into

T SD

"Locate".

•

eed

to

have a set

of

preset messages

to

choose from on the T SD (e.g., spo t

reports).

his would decrease th e t ime required to construct messages .

Scan

Information

• T o

help

identify

areas

that another

Comanche

has scanned and thereby reduce th e

t ime required for reconnaissance, th e aircraft need to be able to sha re scan

informat ion.

or

example,

pilots

need

to

be able

to

t ransmi t "Retain Scan"

informat ion

t o

other aircraft.

A SE

• A S E auditory warning should

give

clock position of threat instead

of

magnet ic

degrees heading. his would help pilots to react quicker to

th rea t

if A SE

warning

w as

clock

position

(i.e.,

"laser

2

o"clock").

till

need to

have

th e

magnet i c

heading visually

displayed

on

th e

T S D .

Rem o t e

Hellfire

Function

• T he "show-on-map" funct ion should slew the T A S onto th e target . h is would

reduce th e t ime required to engage

a target

wi th a Hellfire missile. l so , th e 30°

and 60 °

safety

fans should

be

dynamic and m o v e with the aircraft .

A T D - C

•

N eed

capability to change a

label

that has been incorrectly assigned by

th e

A T D -

C.

Weapon 's

B ay

Doors

•

N eed

a

visual

indicat ion that t he weapons

bay

doors

a re

open. h is wil l help

prevent t he pilot

from

inadvertently leaving the w e a p o n s

bay

doors

open.

T A S

•

eed a

switch

on

th e

sidearm

controller

t o

bring

up

T A S

B U P S

with

only

one

button push in case of an emergency .

•

he radar

a nd

T A S

funct ions

should

be

separate so that

th e pilots can operate th e

sensors independent ly .

Battle D a m a g e

A ssessm en t

• When a target is destroyed, a

symbol

needs

to

appea r next to th e

target

icon to

s ho w that it is destroyed.

EOTADS

• T he pilots reported

that

it w as very difficuU t o manua l ly t rack objects with th e

E O T A D S w he n th e aircraft was moving because th e rate of th e

slew

hook

switch w as to o sensitive. hey requested that the rate sensitivity

of

th e slew

hook be decreased.

Several

t imes during

FDTE

I,

th e

pilots accidentally "n o

targeted"

icons

(e.g.,

wingman) on their

displays.

Because

there

w as

no capability fo r pilots

to

reacquire

icons

that

they

"n o

targeted,"

they

lost

SA of where

th e

icon (e.g.,

wingman)

w as

situated.

When

actuating

th e

radio select switch

on

th e

collective,

th e

pilots

could

not

easily

determine

whether

they

selected

a

different

radio

or

selected

a pre-set

radio frequency.

he

problem

w as

29



T o allow pilots

to rea c t

m o r e quickly to

aircraft

survivability

equipment

(ASE)

auditory

threa t

wa rnings ,

th e

pilots

r e c o m m e n d e d that th e

clock posit ion

(e.g., 2

o'clock)

of

th e

threat b e

a nnounced

to

th e

a ir

crew

instead of

ma gnet ic

degrees heading.

T o

reduce

th e

t ime

required

to

engage a threa t wit h

a

missi le ,

th e

pilots

r e c o m m e n d e d that th e

show-on-map

funct ion

should

slew

th e

T A S

onto

th e

target.

o

reduce

th e

probabil i ty

of

fratricide

o r

colla tera l

d am age , th e

pilots

r e c o m m e n d e d

tha t

th e 30°

and 60°

safety

fans

should

m o v e wi th

th e aircraft.

T he

aided

ta rget

detect ion-class if ica t ion

( A T D - C )

system occasional ly

ass igned

an

incorrect

label

to

a

target .

h e

pilots stated that

they

needed

th e capability

to change

labels

that are

incorrect ly

ass igned

b y

th e A T D - C .

During

F D T E

I,

th e

pilots

inadvertent ly

left the

weapon's

b ay

doors

in the

open posi t ion

severa l

t imes.

eaving

th e

weapon's

b ay

doors

"open"

increased

th e

ra da r

cross

sect ion a nd

drag

of

th e aircraft.

he pilots


that

a

v isual

indica t ion

b e

provided on

th e

HIDSS

to cu e

th e

pilots

that

th e weapon's bay

door

is

in

th e "open"

posi t ion .

T h e

pilots

r e c o m m e n d e d that a swi t ch

b e

provided

in

th e

crew

stations

w h i c h enables them

to

quickly

display th e

T A S

back-up pilotage

sys tem

(BUP S)

wit h

only

one

but ton

push

during

an

emergency .

T h e

pilots

reported

tha t

i t w as

very

difficult t o

m anu al ly

t rack wit h t h e

electro-optic

ta rget

acquis i t ion

and

designat ion

system ( E O T A D S )

w h e n

th e aircraft

w as

moving

beca use th e

rate

of

th e slew

h o o k switch w as to o sensitive. h ey

r e c o m m e n d e d tha t t he rate sensit ivity of th e

slew

h o o k

swi t ch be

reduced.

T o

enha nce

crew

SA

and

help

them perform batt le d a m a g e

assessm en t , th e

pilots


that

a

s y m b o l

a ppea r

next to th e

target ,

indicat ing

tha t

i t has been destroyed.

3.3.3 Anthropometric

Accommodat ion

of Pilots

O ne

problem

wit h

anthropometric

a ccommoda t ion

of th e

pilots

in the

C P C

and

E D S crew

stat ions

w as

noted

during

F D T E

I. h e

pilot wit h the largest

but tock-knee

length

(83rd

percent i le

ma le

soldier) and

la rgest

crotch

heigh t (90th percent i le

m ale sold ier) mea surement s

reported that h is

r ight knee

occasionally

b u m p e d

th e

side-arm

controller during

flight. W h e n he

b u m p e d

th e

s ide-arm

controller,

it

ca used

inadvertent

contro l

input.

h e

prob lem

occurred w h e n

th e

pilot

placed

his

feet

flat

o n th e

f loor

of

th e

crew

station

with

h is

l o w e r

le g

a t

an

approximate

9 0°

angle

to th e floor.

e

did

n ot

experience

a problem

w h e n

h is

feet

were

pla ced on th e

footrests.

h e prob lem

w as w o r s e

w h e n

th e

avia tor

wo re

a

kneeboa rd

on

h is r ight

knee.

ven

though

th e

dimens ions

of th e C P C and

E D S

crew

stations were

not

ident ical to th e ant icipa ted

design of th e product ion

C o m a n c h e

aircraft, this issue should

be

evaluated

via h u m a n

f igure

model ing to

determine

if it

wil l

be a prob lem

with large aviators in the

produc t ion

aircraft.

3 1



Not e tha t

th e

pilots

experienced

th e

s a m e

prob lems

with

th e

C IK and

lack

of a n

1 2

device

in

th e

E D S .

MOP

2-5-6.

Percent

of

crew ratings that

assessed

the

CPC interface

as inhibiting

crew and

team coordination tasks

T he

pilots

reported

that

th e

C PC

interface

inhibited

crew

and

team

coordinat ion

tasks

a pproxima t e ly

2 0% to

30%

of

th e

t ime during missions. he

pilots

stated

tha t th e pr ima ry

rea sons

w e r e

lack

of an 1 2 device to

moni t or

th e a ir space aro u nd

th e

aircraft

w h e n

they

opera ted

th e

M E P

and

usability

prob lems

with

th e CIK. h e

C IK l imited their

crew

and team

coordinat ion

beca use

h

caused

excessive

wo rklo ad ,

which

decreased

th e

t im e

available

to

perform

crew and

team

coordinat ion tasks. ote

that th e

pilots

experienced

th e

s a m e prob lems

wit h

th e C IK

a nd

lack

of

an

1 2

device in

th e

E DS .

MOP

-5-7. ercent

of

ratings

y

he

SC

hat

assessed th e CPC as nhibiting

mission

accomplishment

T he

pilots

reported

tha t

th e

C PC did

not

significantly

inhib i t

mission

a ccompl ishment .

owever ,

they stated

tha t

all

th e

c o m p o n e n t

and

function

design

changes

they


(see

Ta ble

14)

need

to be m a d e to

increase

th e

effect iveness

of th e C P C and

product ion

aircraft.

MOP

-5-8.

ercent of design

differences

between

he

CPC

and EDS

hat

substantially

impacted

the

performance

of flight and

mission

tasks

T he

pilots

reported

that th e design differences b e tween

th e

C PC and

E D S

were

m i n i m a l

and

d id

no t

substantially impa c t th e

performa nce

of

flight

and

mission

tasks. he

only

s ignif icant

difference

that

th e

pilots

reported

bet ween

th e C P C and E D S w as th e actuat ion of

th e

radio

select

swi tch o n

th e

collective. he

radio se lec t

switch

w as

oriented

differently

on th e

C P C

versus

ED S

collective.

he

pilots

often

had t rouble

remember ing

which

direction

to actuate

th e

swi tch

w h e n

rotat ing

from

one

s imula tor

to

th e

other.

MOP 2-5-9.

requency

distribution

of

using

switches

in

the Comanche cockpit, by mission

T he

frequency distribution

of

switch

actuat ions

are

su m m ar iz ed

in

Section

3.3.5

and

depicted

in

Figures

9 t h rough 1 1 and

Appendix

J.

3.4.1 Switch

Actuations

by Crew M e m b er s

During

FDTEI

Before F D T E

I,

th e

C PC

and

E D S

were

instrumented to

record

all

crew

stat ion

swi tch

actuat ions

m a d e

by

each

pilot

during

each

mission.

total

of

254,981

switch

actuat ions

were

m a d e

during

th e

39

miss ions

(see

Appendix

J) .

ixty-three

percent

(6 3%)

of th e

switch

actuat ions

were m a d e

by

th e

pilots

w h e n

they operated

th e

M E P , and

37%

of

th e

switch

actuat ions

w e r e

m a d e

by

th e

pilots

w h e n

they

flew

the aircraft

(see

Figure 9).

ighty-e ight

percent

( 8 8 % )

of th e

switches

tha t

w e r e

actuated

were associated

with

th e

communica t ion

su b sys tem

(6 6 %)

and

th e

T A S ( 2 2 % )

(see Figure 10). h e

pilots

actuated

th e

" X M I T "

(Transmit)

m u c h m o re frequent ly

than

any

ot her

switch. he

X M I T

switch

w as

actuated 124,055 t imes

which

accounted

fo r

4 9 %

of all

34



swi t ch actuat ions . h e X M I T

swi t ch w as

situated o n

the f loor of th e

s imula tors

( foot swi tch)

a nd w a s used for talking

wit h th e

ot her

pilot

in th e

aircraft ,

the

crew

in

th e ot her

C o m a n c h e , th e

T O C ,

a nd the

ground forces

c o m m a n d e r .

Distribution

o f

Switch Actuations

by

Pilot Function

Flying

the

Aircraft

Operating the

MEP

Figure 9 .

istribution

of switch

actuat ions

by

pilot

funct ion.

Percentage

o f

Switch

Actuations

B y

System

Function

.Weapons

2

Other

2

Communica t ion

System

66 %

Figure

10 .

ercentage of switch actuat ions by system function.

3 5



T o

accura tely

identify

how

m a n y

swi t ch actuat ions

w e r e

m a d e by

ea ch

pilot during

ea ch

miss ion ,

it

w as

necessary

to

reduce

b y

50%

th e n u m b e r of switch actuat ions

fo r t ransmit

on-off,

slave on-off , laser

on-off

and

h e l m e t

t racking

sys tem

(HTS) slave on-off W h e n th e pilot

depressed

these

swi tches to

act ivate

a

funct ion,

one

switch

actuat ion

w a s

recorded.

When

th e

pilot

lifted

h is

f inger

off

th e

swi tch ,

a not her

switch

actuat ion

w as

recorded

even

though

he

released

it wit h in

a

very short

period

of t ime.

o r th e purpose

of ident ifying how m a n y

switch

actuat ions

th e pilots

m a d e t o

activate

a funct ion,

th e total

n u m b e r of switch

actuat ions

w a s

190,372,

not

2 5 4 , 9 8 1 .

During

ea ch miss ion , th e

pilot

opera t ing th e

M E P m a d e

a n

a vera ge

of

1,538

swi t ch ac tuat ions,

and

th e pilot

f lying

th e

aircraft m a d e

an

average

9 03

switch actuat ions.

ince

most

miss ions

lasted approximately

9 0 minutes ,

th e pilot opera t ing th e

M EP typica lly

m a d e

17 switch

actuat ions

per

minut e

or o ne

switch

actuat ion

every

3.5

seconds. h e

pilot

f lying

th e aircraft

m a d e 10

swi t ch actuat ions per minut e

or

o ne

switch

actuat ion every

6

seconds. h e

frequency

of

switch

actuat ions

s tayed

fairly

constant

until

near

th e

end

of

th e

miss ions

(see

Figure

11).

N e a r

th e

end

of th e

miss ions ,

th e

n u m b e r

of

switch

actuat ions

decreased

beca use

the pilots

h a d

typica lly comple t ed

their

object ives

and w e r e returning

to an

a ssembly

area

or

F A R P .

N o t e tha t

th e

average n u m b e r of switch actuat ions

m a d e

b y

th e pilots

every

minut e provides

a genera l

est imate

of

th e

frequency

of

how often

they

pressed

a switch

to

perform

a

f imction. h e switch

actuat ions

w e r e

often clus tered

wit h in

short t ime

intervals

(e.g.,

30

seconds )

a nd

w e r e not evenly

spaced o v er

th e course

of

a

mission.

Frequency of Swi tch

Actua t ions During

Missions

4 5 0 0 0

4

I

5

o

£

0000

S - 25 000

c

2

O

I 5 0 0 0

•g

0000

5000

0

4 0 3 2 0

41395

39392

38394

345B3

23016

25603

^^Sgr

24288

29355

14717 5135

-ns4rr~

15104

10908

-♦

— B ack

Sea t

-H—Front Sea t

Tota l

0 -15

16 - 30

1 -45

6 - 60

1 -75

15-Minute Time

Increments

76-90

Figure

1 1 .

requency

of

switch actuations

during

missions.

3 6



M o s t

of th e

CIK keypad actuations were

not

recorded because there

w as

no

adequate

interface

fo r recording th e actuations.

he

only keypad

actuation

that w as recorded

w as

when

pilots

pressed

the

"enter" switch on

th e

CIK. he

alphanumeric

ke y presses

on

th e

CIK were

not

recorded.

Had they

been recorded,

th e total

number of recorded

switch actuations

would have

increased

significantly.

T he

pilots

stated

that

th e

number

of

switch actuations

they

made

wh en

they

flew th e

aircraft w as

typically

not

excessive

and d id

not

induce

periods

ofhigh

workload.

When

they

operated th e

M E P , the pilots stated

tiiat

th e number

of

switch

actuations typically induced

periods

ofhigh

workload, especially w hen

they had

to

perform

several tasks concurrently.

hey

stated

that

th e

num ber of switch

actuations

often contributed

to

keeping

them

"inside th e

cockpit"

and

hindered

their

ability to

maintain

awareness

of

wh a t

w as

happening

in th e

area

around

th e

aircraft.

3.5

Simulator Sickness

T he

pilots reported

that

they

experienced

very

mild

to

moderate

simulator

sickness

symptoms

during missions. he

overall

m ean total

severity score

(post

mission)

fo r

th e

pilots

w as

12.62

(see

Table

16).

he

range

of m e a n

total

severity

scores

w as

2.13

to

32.41. One pilot

consistently

reported

higher

SSQ scores than

th e

other

pilots.

he

difference

i n overall

discomfort levels

reported by

th e pilots at

th e

end

of th e missions

compared to

th e

beginning

of

th e

missions

(pre

versus

post

mission)

w as

statistically

significant

(WSRT,

z =

-2.52,/>

<

.01).

However ,

all th e

pilots

reported

during post-mission discussions that th e

simulator

sickness

symptoms

they

experienced

did

not distract

them

during missions.

While listening

to

th e

pilots'

conversation during th e missions,

ARL

personnel

heard only

one

discomfort problem

occasionally mentioned by th e pilots

during

th e 39 missions that

they

conducted. he

discomfort

problem

w as a

hot spot

on

th e

to p

of

their

head

fi-om

th e

weight

and

fiiction

of

th e

Kaiser

Pro V i ew

50 headset

and

cable.

Table 1 6 .

imulator sickness

questionnaire

(SSQ)

ratings

Condit ion

Nausea

Subscale

Oculomotor

Subscale

Disorientation

Subscale

Total

Severity Score

( M e an )

SD

Pre

Miss ion

P o s t Mission

2.29

9.54

5.83

15.49

.9 0

4.61

4.02

12.62

3.94

9 .66

E D S

C P C

11.84

6.73

14.98

15.40

4.54

4.32

13.25

11.40

10.74

9 .74

Flying Aircraft

Operat ing M EP

8.79

10.49

15.94

15.13

6.38

3.20

13.03

12.44

10.84

9 .15

37



3.5.1 Comparison of

SSQ

Scores fo r th e CPC Versus EDS Simulators

The

difference

in

overall

discomfort

levels

that

th e

pilots feh

w h e n

operating th e

EDS versus th e

CPC

w as

not

statistically

significant (WSRT, z = -.701,;?

>

.10, ns).

However,

th e mean

nausea

subscale

score

w as

notably

higher

fo r pilots

when

they

operated

th e EDS

versus

CPC. his w as

probably

because

of

th e motion

of

th e

EDS s imulator

during

missions

versus

no

motion

i n

th e

CPC sunulator.

he difference

in

overall discomfort levels that

th e pilots felt

when

they flew

th e

aircraft versus when they operated th e

M EP

w as

not statistically significant (WSRT, z = -.140,

p>.10,ns).

3.5.2 Comparison of

CPC

an d EDS SSQ Scores

to

Other

H eUcopter Simulators

To

assess

whether

th e

SSQ

ratings

provided

by

th e

pilots during

F D T E I

were similar or

different

to

ratings

obtained

in

other

helicopter simulators,

th e

mean

total

severity

scores fo r

th e ED S

and

CPC

were

compared

to th e mean total severity scores

fo r five

other helicopter

simulators

(see

Table

17). he

five

helicopter

simulators

were

th e

AH-64A, SH-3H, CH-46E,

CH-53D,

and

CH-56F. hese

simulators

typically induced lo w

to moderate

levels

of

s imulator

sickness

symptoms in pilots.

Table 17 .

Compari son

of C PC

and

ED S

SSQ

rat ings

with

SSQ

rat ings

from

other

helicopter

simulators

Simolator

Nausea

Oculomotor

Disorientation

Total Severity Score

Subscale

Subscale

Subscale

(M ean)

AH-64A*

25.81

SH-3H

14.70

20 .00

12.40

18.80

EDS

11.84

14.98

4.54

13.25

CPC

6.73

15.40

4.32

11.40

CH-53F

7.50

10.50

7.40

10.00

CH-53D

7.20

7.20

4.00

7.50

CH-46E

5.40

7.80

4.50

7.00

• S S Q

subscale

data

no t

s

vailable.

The

SSQ

scores

fo r th e SH-3H,

CH-46E,

CH-53D,

and

CH-53F

heUcopter

simulators

were

obtamed fi-om a

report

by Kennedy, Lane, Berbaum, and Lilienthal (1993). he SS Q scores f or

th e

AH-64A

simulator

were

obtained

fi-om a report written

by Johnson (1997). he

SH-3H, CH-

46E,

CH-53D,

and CH-53F helicopter simulators were

motion

(six degrees of fi«edom) base

simulators with CRT displays that presented th e OTW scene

to

pilots. he AH-64A

simulator

used hydraulically actuated pneumatic seats to simulate motion. he OTW scene was

presented

to

th e

AH-64A

pilots

on a 40-degree horizontal by 30-degree vertical HMD.

he

physical

characteristics

of

th e

AH-64A

simulator more

closely resembled

th e CPC

and

EDS than

did

th e

physical characteristics ofth e other simulators listed

in

Table 17 .

The mean total severity score

fo r

th e

five

helicopter

simulators

w as

13.82.

he

mean total

severity score fo r

th e EDS and CPC w as 12.33. herefore, it

can

be concluded that th e total

38



severity scores

fo r th e

EDS

and

CPC

were similar to th e

total severity

scores

obtained

from m ost

of th e

other helicopters simulators. Based

on pilot feedback,

their

SSQ ratings,

and comparison

of their

SSQ

ratings

with

ratings

from

other

helicopter

simulators,

it

is reasonable to

assume that

th e

simulator

sickness symptoms

they

experienced were

mild, did

not

cause

them

significant

discomfort,

and

did

not distract

them

during

missions.

4. Summary

Following

is a summary

of

th e results

of

th e assessment

of

crew workload, crew

SA ,

usability

characteristics

of

th e

crew

station

controls,

displays,

and

subsystem interface,

M AN P R I N T

M OP s , and

s imulator

sickness

data obtained during

FDTE I.

4.1

Crew

Workload

When

they flew

th e

aircraft

or

operated

th e

M E P , th e pilots reported

that

th e

workload

levels

they typically

experienced

were tolerable

w h e n

they

performed

all

individual

A T M tasks.

hey

reported that they did not experience

a reduction in spare workload capacity w h e n they

performed m ost

A TM tasks.

he

pilots

reported

that

th e peak workload levels that

they typically

experienced

were

tolerable

fo r

all but one task wh en

they

flew th e

aircraft

and

fo r all

but one

task

w h e n

tiiey operated

the

M E P .

The

differences

in

overall

mean

and

peak

workload

ratings

(for

individual

A T M tasks)

provided

by th e

pilots

w h e n

they

flew

th e

aircraft versus when they

operated th e

M EP

were

statistically

significant.

he

pilots

perceived

that

th e

level

of

workload

required

to

perform

individual A T M

tasks w as

higher w h e n

they

operated th e

M E P .

However,

th e

overall

mean and overall peak

workload ratings were

clustered

around th e

same

numerical

anchor o n

th e

BWRS. his

indicated

that

th e

pilots

did

not

believe

that

there

w as

a

large

disparity

in

th e

amoimt

of

workload

required f or performing

individual A TM tasks when

they

flew th e aircraft versus w hen

they

operated th e

M E P .

Usability

problems

with th e

CIK and th e

radio

select

switch on

th e collective were th e main crew

station

interface

problems

that

contributed to

periods of

high

workload

levels

fo r th e

pilots.

The

differences

in

m e a n multi-tasking workload

ratings

provided

by

th e

pilots when they flew

th e aircraft

versus

w h e n

they operated th e M EP were statistically significant.

he

pilots

perceived

that

th e level ofworkload required

to

perform several

tasks

concurrently

w as

higher

w hen

they

operated the MEP.

he

pilot

operating th e M EP typically had

to

perform more tasks

concurrently than th e

pilot

flying th e

aircraft. he pilots reported

statistically

significant

higher

workload ratings

fo r high

intensity

missions

versus moderate

intensity

missions.

39



The m ean overall workload

ratings

provided

by th e TSC indicated that they perceived that th e

pilots

typically

experienced

moderate workload levels

during

missions. SC members observed

that

th e pilots were

not

able to consistently

perform

several

tasks

concurrently

during

missions.

When they operated th e

M E P ,

pilots

transferred

5%

to

25% of

their

tasks

to

th e

pilot w ho

flew

th e

aircraft

during

periods

of

high

workload.

M o s t

tasks

that

were

transferred

were

communication

and

sensor

operation tasks.

M ea n

workload

ratings provided

by

th e

different

pilots w ho

participated

in

th e

FDE 1 ,

th e

Sikorsky FM S

and th e F D T E I simulations

were

similar. he ratings

indicated

that th e pilots

perceived that

they

typically

experienced moderate

workload

levels

during th e

simulations.

4.2

CrewSA

The

S

A R T

ratings

provided by th e pilots

indicated

that they typically

experienced

moderate

levels of SA

during

missions

when

they flew

th e

aircraft a nd wh en

they

operated th e

M E P .

he

ratings

suggest

that

th e pilots

fe h

that

they

had

an

adequate

supply

of

cognitive

resources

to

perform

the

A TM tasks,

th e

cognitive

demands on

them were

not

overwhehnmg,

and they had

adequate understanding of

battlefield

elements

(e.g.,

location

of threat,

status

of

ownship)

during

missions.

The

pilots

reported

that

th e

poor

usabUity of

th e

CIK,

th e

limited

area of coverage

when

they

used th e

7.2 m ap scale on th e TSD,

and lack of an

1 2

device

to

monitor th e a ir space around the

aircraft w h e n

conducting

scans with th e TA S limited their SA when

they

operated th e M E P .

When

flying th e

aircraft, t he pilots reported that

th e limited

FO V

of th e Kaiser

ProView

50

HM D ,

th e lack of high resolution topography

(when

viewed

through th e

HMD),

th e

lunited

area

of

coverage

wh en

th e

7.2

m ap

scale

w as

used

on

th e

TSD,

and

reduced

SA

when

th e

pUots

were

being

engaged

by

th e threat were

th e

primary

factors that

limited

then-

SA.

The

overall

mean

SA

rating

provided

by

TSC

members

indicated

that SA fo r crew

members

"needed

improvement"

and

"lack

of SA

had

some negative effect on th e success of th e mission."

The T SC

reported that

inadequate

SA by th e

air crews w as one reason that 23%

of th e

missions

failed

during

FDTE I. SC

members stated

that

th e

limited operational experience of

th e

pilots

w as th e primary

reason

w hy

they occasionally

had

lo w SA .

4

Usability of th e Crew

Station

Controls, Displays, an d Subsystem Interface

The

pilots

reported

that

they

were

typically

able

to

u se

th e

TSD,

SMD,

FLIR,

and

DTV

in

a

quick

and

efficient manner , quickly

navigate through

th e TSD,

SMD,

multi-purpose

displays,

and TIAP

menu

screens,

rarely

forgot

how

to

navigate through th e

menu

structure

on

th e TSD,

S M D, multi-purpose

displays,

and TIAP, and

did

not

have

problems

using

th e

switches

on

th e

side-arm controller

while

wearing standard

flight

gloves.

The

pilots

experienced

usability problems

with

specific

features

of th e

CIK,

HM D symbology,

"n o

target

fimction,"

switches

on

th e

collective,

POIs,

TIAP,

fiiel

system,

TSD,

A SE

auditory'

40



warning,

remote

Hellfire

function, ATD-C

labeling,

lack

of

a visual

indicator fo r th e status of th e

weapons

bay

doors,

TAS,

battle

damage assessment (BDA), and

E OTA D S .

The pilots

experienced

significant

difficulty

wh en

actuating

crew

station

switches and buttons

and

th e tr igger

guard

on

th e

SAC with

M O P P gloves.

he

bulkiness

of

th e gloves

and

lack

of

adequate

tactility

ma de

it

difficult

fo r

th e

pilots

to

actuate

the crew station

switches

and

buttons

and th e tr igger guard on th e

SAC

during missions.

One pilot

reported

that

his

right

knee inadvertently

bumped

th e

side-arm

controller

during

flight.

4.4

M A N PRIN T M easures of

Performance (MOPs)

No

crew errors

were

attributed

to

fatigue, and

approximately

30%

of

crew

errors

were

attributed

to

high

workload.

M o s t crew errors

caused by

high workload

occurred w h e n

th e pilots

engaged

or unexpectedly

encountered a

threat

vehicle. Usability

problems

with th e

CIK

and

the

radio

select

switch on

th e

collective

were

th e

biggest contributors to

periods

of excessive

workload

in

th e

CPC.

Note that

th e

pilots

experienced

th e

same

usability

problems with

th e

CIK

and

radio

select

switch

on

th e

collective

in

th e EDS.

The

overall

CPC

interface

w as

adequate fo r performing

flight

and mission tasks. he pilots

stated

that

all th e

component and function

design changes they

recommended

(Table 14) should

be m a d e

to

increase the effectiveness of th e CPC interface and production aircraft.

The

overall CPC

interface

did not

significantly

inhibit

th e pilots'

decision-makmg process

during

flight and mission

tasks.

T he

CPC

interface

moderately

mhibited crew a nd team

SA

approximately

30%

to

50%

of th e

t ime

during

missions.

he

pilots

stated

that

th e

primary

reasons

were

lack

of

an

1 2

device

to

monitor

th e

a ir

space

around

th e

aircraft

when

they operated

th e

M EP

and

th e

usability

problems

with th e

CIK.

he

pilots

experienced th e

same

problems with th e

C IK and lack of an

1 2

device

in

th e

EDS.

The C P C interface inhibited crew a nd

team

coordination

tasks

f or 20% to 30% ofmissions.

he

pilots

stated

that th e primary reasons were lack of an 1 2 device to monitor th e

ak

space

around

th e

aircraft

w h e n

they

operated

th e

M EP

and

usability

problems

with

th e

CIK.

he

pilots

experienced

th e

same

problems

with

th e

CIK

and

lack

of

an 1 2 device

in th e

EDS.

The

C P C

interface

did not significantly

inhibit

mission accomplishment.

T he

design differences between th e

CPC and EDS

were

minimal

and

did

not

substantially

impact

th e performance

of

flight

and

mission tasks. The

only

significant

difference that th e

pilots

reported between

th e CPC and

EDS

w as th e

orientation

and

actuation of

th e

radio

select

switch

on th e

collective.

During each mission, th e pilot operating th e M EP made an average of 1,538 switch actuations,

and the pilot flying th e aircraft made an average of 903 switch actuations. m ce

most

missions

4 1



lasted

approximately 9 0

minutes ,

th e

pilot

operating

th e

M EP

made 17 switch

actuations

per

minute

or one

switch

actuation every

3.5

seconds. he pilot flying th e

aircraft

ma de 10 switch

actuations

per

minute

or

one

switch actuation

every

6 seconds.

he

pilots stated

that

th e

number

of

switch

actuations

they

made

while

flying th e

aircraft w as

typically

not

excessive

and

did

not

induce

periods

of

high

workload.

However,

they

reported

that

th e

number

of

switch

actuations

they

m a d e

w h e n

operatmg

th e

M EP

occasionally

induced periods of

high

workload

and

frequently

kept them

"inside

th e

aircraft."

M os t

of th e CIK keypad

actuations

were

not recorded.

Based

on

th e

data

collected during FDTE I,

th e

CPC

appears

to b e adequate

fo r collecting

crew

station interface

data during

FDTE

H.

4.5 Simulator Sickness

T he

pilots

reported that they experienced

very mild

to

moderate simulator

sickness

symptoms

during

missions.

hey

stated

that th e

discomfort they

feU did not

distract them

during

missions.

T he

differences

in

overall

discomfort

levels

that

th e

pilots

felt

when

they

operated

th e

CPC

versus

th e

EDS were

not

statistically significant. he

differences

in

overall

discomfort

levels

that

th e

pilots

feh

wh en

they

flew

th e

aircraft

versus when

they

operated th e

M EP

were

also

not

statistically

significant. he SS Q ra tmgs provided by th e pilots were similar

to

ratings obtained

from

other helicopter

simulators.

5.

Recommendations

T o

enhance

th e pilot-crew

station

interface

and

help

ensure

successfiil

evaluations

during

fiiture

simulations

and

tests, th e following recommendations are made:

• ddress and

resolve

th e usability problems that the pilots

reported

with th e

controls,

displays,

and subsystem interface.

•

rovide

a night vision device

to

th e

pilot

operating

th e

M EP

so

that

he

or

she

can

see

outside

th e

cockpit

at

night

when

a

scan is

being

conducted

with

th e

TAS.

•

nvestigate

methods

(e.g.,

cognitive decision-aiding system)

to

reduce

th e

number

of

switch

actuations that

pilots are

required to

perform.

his would reduce

workload fo r pilots,

especially

w h e n

they

have

to

perform

several

tasks

concurrently.

•

ontmue

to

refine

th e

crew station

interface

to

minimize

pilot

workload

and

enhance

pilot SA .

• ontinue

to

assess th e

crew

station

interface

during

fiiture

simulations

and tests to

evaluate pilot

and

system performance

and

assess new fimctionality that is

integrated

into

th e

Comanche

crew

station

design.

42



• f possible,

th e

pilots

and

TSC

members should

assess

SA using

th e same

scale

during future simulations

and tests.

• nsure

that pilots

w ho

participate

in future

Comanche

simulations

a nd

tests possess

a

wide

range

of operational experience.

43



Roscoe,

A.H.;

Ellis, G.A.

A Subjective

Rating

Scale

For

Assessing

Pilot

Workload

In Flight: A

Decade

Of

Practical

Use. oyal

Aerospace

Establishment: Bedford,

UK,

1990.

Taylor,

R.M.

Situational

Awareness

Rating

Technique (SART): he

Development of a Tool

For

Aircrew

Systems

Design.

Proceedings

of

the AGARDAMP Symposium

on

Situational

Awareness

in

Aerospace

Operations,

Copenhagen,

DK,

1989.

45



IN TEN TIO N ALLY

LEFT

B L A N K

46



Appendix A.

Bedford Workload

Rating

Scale

(BWRS)

Was

workload

satisfactory

without

reduction in

spare (workload) capacity?

NO

Wa s

workload

tolerable

fo r th e task?

N O

Wa s it

possible

to

complete th e

task?

Pilot

Decis ions

Workload Description

Workload

insignificant

Workload lo w

Enough spare

capacity

fo r

al l

desirable additional tasks

Insufficient spare capacity fo r easy

attention to

additional

tasks

Reduced

spare

capacity. Additional

tasks cannot be

given

th e

desired

amount

of attention

Little spare capacity:

level o f effort

allows little

attention to additional

tasks

Very

little

spare

capacity,

but

maintenance

o f

effort

in

th e

primary

tasks not in question

Very high

workload with almost no

spare capacity. Difficulty

in

maintaining

level

o f effort

'Rating

Extremely high workload.

N o

spare

capacity.

erious

doubts

as

to ability

to

maintain level

of

effort

Task abandoned. ilot unable to

apply

sufficient

effort

2

3

8

10

47



IN TEN TIO N ALLY

LEFT

B L A N K

48



IN TEN TIO N ALLY

LEFT

B L A N K

50



Appendix C. ituation Awareness Rating Technique (SART)

Pin#

Date:

Dev ice :

E D S

/ C P C

(Circle

one)

Front

Sea t

B a ck

Sea t

( Check

one)

Situation

Awareness

SAl. ituation

A w a r e n e s s

is

defined a s

"t imely

k n o w l e d g e

of w h a t is ha ppening

a s you perform

your

f ron t

o r

back

sea t tasks dur ing

th e

miss ion

and

unders t a ndmg

of

batt lefield

e lement s

(e.g.,

loca t ion

of

threa t , o w n s h i p

s ta tus) ."

Situat ion A w a r e n e s s

Rating Technique ( S A R T )

D EMAN D

Instability

of

Situation

Variability

of

Situation

Complexity

of

Situation

Likeliness

o f situation to

change

suddenly

N u mb er

o f variables which

require

your attention

Degree o f complication (number of closely connected parts) o f th e

situation

SUPPLY

Arousal

Spare

Mental

Capacity

Concentration

Division ofAttention

Degree to which y ou

ar e

ready fo r activity

Am ount ofmental ability available to apply

to

new

tasks

Degree to

which

your thoughts

are

brought

to

bear on

th e situation

Am ount o f division o f

your

attention

in

th e

situation

UNDERSTANDING

Information Quantity

Information Quality

Familiarity

Amount

ofknowledge received and understood

Degree

o f

goodness

or

value

of

knowledge communicated

Degree o f acquaintance with

th e

situation

5 1



Rate

th e

level

of

each

component

of

situation awareness

that

y ou

had

w h e n

y ou

performed

pilotage

tasks in th e front seat

-or- M EP tasks

in

th e back seat during th e

mission

that y ou just

completed.

Circle

th e

appropriate

number fo r each component of situation

awareness (e

g

complexity

of

situation).

D E M A ND

Instability

of situation: Low

1

ig h

Variability

of

situation: Low 1 ig h

Complexity

of situation:

ow 1 ig h

SUPPLY

Arousal:

Low 1

-

ig h

Spare mental

capacity: Low 1

ig h

Concentration: L ow

1

ig h

Division

of attention:

Low

1

ig h

UNDERSTANDING

Informat ion

quantity:

L ow 1

ig h

Information quality: L ow 1

ig h

FamiUarity:

ow

1

ig h

52



T S D Funct ional Componen t s

SM D

Functional

Componen t s

T SD

TCXDLBAR

Y es

N o

NotllsftH

X P N D R

Y es

No

N ot

U sed

T SD

H O M E

Y es

N o NotTkftH

FLTINST

Y es

No N ot U s e d

N A V

P L A N

Y es

N o

N ot

Used

ENGINST

Y es

No

N ot

U s e d

NAVCURR

Yes No

NotTIseH

T A S

Y es

No N ot

Used

H M D M O D E

Yes

N o

N o t

Used

W C A

Y es

No Not U s e d

I M A G CONHG

Y es

_ _ .

N o

N ot

Used

1

*

If y ou

answered

"Yes"

to

any

of th e

questions,

describe

1 )

th e problems

y ou experienced,

2) how

much th e

problems

degraded your performance

during

missions, and

3)

any

recommendat ions

y ou

have

fo r improving

th e

design of

th e

TSD

and SM D

functional

components

to

correct

th e

problems

that y ou

experienced:

54



CI2.

ndicate whether

or

not y ou experienced a

problem

usmg th e E OTA D S Sensor

functionality

in a quick

and

efficient manner during

th e

Phase

vou

just

completed.

Check

"Yes"

if y ou experienced one

or more problems. Check "No" ify ou did not

experience

any problems.

Check "Not Used"

if y ou did not use

tiie

functional

component

during

th e

Phase y ou

just

completed.

FLIR Operat ions Yes

D TV

Operations

Yes

Tracking Operation Yes

N o

N ot

Used

N o

N ot Used

No

N ot Used

If

y ou answered

'Yes'

to

any

of

th e

questions,

describe 1)

th e

problems y ou

experienced,

2 ) how

m u c h

th e

problems

degraded

your

performance during missions, and 3)

any

recommendat ions

y o u

have

fo r

improving

th e

design

of

th e

E OTA D S Sensor

functionality

to

correct

th e problems

that y ou experienced:

55



CI3.

is t and describe any other

crew

station functions that y ou were not able to

complete

in

a

quick

and

efficient manner during

th e

Phase

y ou just

completed:

CI4.

O n

average,

how

quickly

were

y ou

able

to

navigate

through th e m e n u screens

on the:

Tactical Situation Display (TSD) (Circle

one)

2

Very

omewhat orderline

omewhat

ery

Quickly

uickly

lowly

lowly

Systems

Management

Display

(SMD)

(Circle

one)

2

Very

omewhat

orderiine

omewhat

ery

Quickly

uickly

lowly

lowly

Multipurpose

Displays

(MPDs)

(Circle

one)

2

Very omewh a t

orderline

omewhat ery

Quickly uickly lowly lowly

56



Tactical

Interface

Annunciator

Panel

(TIAP)

(Circle one)

2

Very omewh a t Borderline omewhat ery

Quickly

uickly

lowly

lowly

If

y ou

answered

"Somewhat

Slowly"

or

"Very

Slowly"

to any of th e questions,

list

th e

di^lay,

th e seat

in

which

y ou

primarily

used

th e display,

and w hy navigation

w as

slow

(e.g.,

navigat ing

th e

m enu system on

th e TSD

w as

a slow

process due

to

having

to

page

through several

display

screens

-primarily

used

th e

T SD

while flying in

th e

front

seat").

CIS. How often did y ou

forget

th e steps required fo r navigatmg through th e menu

screens

to

accomplish a

task?

Tactical Situation

Display

(TSD)

(Circle one)

Never

eldom

ften

requentiy

Systems

Management

Display

(SMD)

(Curcle

one)

Never

eldom

ften

requentiy

Multipurpose

Displays (MPDs)

(Circle

one)

1

Never

eldom

ften requently

Tactical Interface

Annimciator

Panel (TIAP) (Circle one)

Never

eldom

ften

requently

57



If

y ou

answered

"Often"

or "Frequently" to

any

of

th e

questions, Ust th e display,

th e

seat

in

w4iich

y ou

primarily

used

th e

display,

and

th e

tasks

fo r

which y ou

forgot h ow

to

navigate

through th e m e n u screens (e.g., "I often

forgot

th e steps fo r navigating through th e menu screens

on th e

TSD

to

perform

TSD

Toolbar tasks because there

are

to o

many steps

-

primarily

used th e

TSD Toolbar in th e back seat").

CI6.

D id

y ou have difficulty using any of th e

switches

on

th e collective

grip (e.g.,

left

slew

hook)

or

sidearm

controller (e.g.,

weapon

select)?

Collective

Grip

Yes

N o

Sidearm

Controller

Yes

N o

If

y ou answered

'Yes'

to

any

question,

list th e

switch(es),

th e

seat

in

which y ou

primarily

used

th e switch(es), and th e problem(s) y ou

experienced

(e.g.,

"the

right and left slew hook switches

on

th e

collective

are

confiising

and

tune-consuming

to use because

their

shape is

identical

-

primarily

used

th e

slew

hook

switches

m

th e

back

seat").

CI7.

Was

there any

symbology

depicted

on

th e

following

displays

that

w as

difficult

to

quickly

and

easily

understand?

Head

Mounted

Display

(HMD)

Yes

N o

Systems

Management

Display

(SMD)

Yes

N o

58



Tactical

Situation Display

(TSD)

Yes N o

Ifyes,

explain

which symbology

w as

difficuh

to

understand

and

wh y :

CIS.

D id

y ou e3q)erience

any

problem with dizziness

that

y ou think

w as

caused by th e

mot ion

of

th e

heading

tape

on

th e

HM D ?

Yes o

If

yes,

describe

how severe

tiie

problem w as

and

how

m uch

it degraded

y o u r

performance:

CI9.

D id

y o u experience

any problems

using th e

Cockpit Interactive

Keyboard

(CIK) due to :

a. ocat ion of

th e CIK

es

N o

If

yes, check

th e

problems

that

y ou

experienced

(check

all

that

apply)

[

]

Data entry

required

m e

to

lean

to o fa r forward

[

]

Other

(specify)

b. ay ou t of CIK

keypad

(non-QWERTY

format)

Yes

N o

[

]

rrors

in entering

data

[ ]

Data

entry

required

to o

much t ime

[

]

Other

(specify)

59



I NT E NT I ONALLY

LEFT

B L A N K

62



Appendix E.

imulator Siclmess Questionnaire

(SSQ)

Pin#:

Date

Device: E D S / C P C

Circle one)

Fron t Seat

B a ck

Seat

(Check one)

Symptom

Checklist

Instruct ions:

lease

indicate t he severity

of

sy m p t o m s tha t apply

to

y ou r ight now by circling

the

appropriate

word .

S y m p t o m

0

1

Genera l discomfor t

Fatigue

Headache

Eyest ra in

DifiBculty

focusing

Increased

sal ivat ion

Sweat ing

N aus e a

Difficulty

concentrating

Fullness of head

Blurred

vision

Dizzy (eyes

o p en )

Dizzy (eyes closed)

Vert igo*

Stomach

a w a ren ess**

Burping

None

Slight Modera te

Severe

N o n e Slight

Modera te Severe

N o n e

Slight

Modera te

Severe

None

Slight

Modera te

Severe

N on e

Slight

Modera te Severe

None

Slight

Modera te

Severe

None

Slight

Modera te

Severe

N o n e

Slight Modera te

Severe

N o n e

Slight

Modera te Severe

N o n e

Slight

Modera te

Severe

N o n e

Slight

Modera te

Severe

N o n e

Slight

Modera te

Severe

N on e Slight

Modera te

Severe

N o n e

Slight

Modera te

Severe

N o n e Slight

Modera te

Severe

N o n e

Slight

M o d era t e

Severe

Vert igo

is

a loss of orientation

with respect to

vert ica l upright .

**S t o m a ch awareness is a

feeling of discomfor t

just short

of

nausea .

6 3



I NT E NT I ONALLY

LE FT

B LAN K

64



Appendix F

ummary of Pilot Anthropometric

M easurements

Head Length

(cm)

Head

Breadth

(cm)

Head

Circumference

(cm)

Inter-

pupillaiy

Breadth

(cm)

Bitragion

Coronal

Arc

(cm)

Me an

SD

Me an Percentile Rank

Range (percent)

20.0

.58

65th

1 3 to

87

15.0

.40

39th

2 to

80

57.0

1.40

57th

5 to

9 0

6.2

.2 7

24th

2

to

60

33.4

.61

7th

2

to

25

Ey e

Height,

Sitting (cm)

Crotch

Height

(cm)

Hand

Breadth

(cm)

Hand

Length

(cm)

Hand

Circumference

(cm)

Mean

SD


Range (percent)

81.5

2.2

75th

36 to 98

81.9

3.7

36th

8 to

90

8.8

.4 9

29th

lto86

19.8

.8 5

68th

25 to 95

22.0

.1.1

75th

28

to

98

Thumb

Thumbtip

Buttock to

Elbow

to

Wrist Center

Breadth

Reach

(cm)

Knee

Length

Center

of

of

Grip

(cm)

(cm)

Grip

Length

(cm)

Length (cm)

Mean

2.3

79.3

61.5

36.9

7.5

SD

. 1 1

3.9

1.72

1.2

.30


20th

44th

50th

70th

85th

Range

(percent)

6 to

73

14

to 95

23 to 83

39

to

9 0

55 to 98

65



INTENTIONALLY

LEFT BLANK

6 6



Appendix

G . Bedford

W orkload

Rating

Scale

(BWRS) Questionnaire

Workload

Rate the workload fo r

th e Flight

and

Miss ion

T a s k s

you

performed

using the

scale

provided

on

the

las t

pa ge

of this

quest ionnake. lace

the work loa d

rat ing in

the

blank next to each

Flight

and

Miss ion

Ta sk (for

B O T H

average

a nd

pea k

work loa d) .

f

you

did

not

perform

a task

dur ing

the

mission that y o u

just

completed ,

place

an X

in tiie

non-a ppl ica b le

( N A )

c o l i m m .

Task

No.

1007

1042

1100

1117

1127

1136

1138

1146

1151

1153

1162

1173

1182

1230

1245

1300

1410

1422

1426

1442

1448

1449

1451

1454

1455

1458

1464

2157

2476

2500

2502

2511

Flight

and

Mission Tasks

Run-Up, Hover

an d

Before Take-off Checks

5 4

538

539

Maintain

A ir

Space

Surveillance

Radio Communicat ions

VM C

Flight

Maneuvers

Electronically Aided

Navigation

Terrain

Flight Navigation

Fuel Management Procedures

Terrain Flight

Masking

and

Umnasking

Evasive Maneuvers

Actions on Contact

VM C

Approach

Average

Workload

Roll-on

Landing

Inadvertent IM C

Procedures

Unusual

Attitude Recovery

Emergency

Procedures

TSD

Operations

Firing

Techniques

Firing

Position Operations

HIDSS

Operations

EOTADS

Sensor Operations

Digital

Communicat ions

FC R

Operations

Data

Entry Procedures

Data

Management

Procedures

Peak

Workload

N A

Engage

Target

with

PTWS (Hellfire)

Engage Target

with th e

AWS (2 0 m m )

Multi-ship

Operations

Security Mission

Aerial Observation

Area

Reconnaissance

Route

Reconnaissance

Zone Reconnaissance

Digital Artillery Mission

Digital

Remote

SAL Missile Mission

67



2548

2805a

2805b

2823

2837

Transmit Tactical

Reports

Identify

Major

US-Aliied

Equipment

Identify

Major Threat

Equipment

Operate Aircraft Survivability Equipment

Operate

Night

Vision Pilotage

S y s t e m

If you

gave

an average

or

pea k work loa d rat ing

of

6

or

higher

for

any

task, wri te

th e

task

number

and then explain wh y

th e work loa d w as high for th e

task.

Lis t

an y

flight

and-o r

m iss io n

tasks

that

y ou

had to

a sk

y o u r

crew

m e m b e r

to

accomplish

beca use

your workload

was to o

high:

6 8



Appendix H.

ummary

of

Crew

Workload Comments

ATM

Task 1042 - M aintain Air Space Surveillance

Lack of capability f or

th e pilot

in

th e back

seat

to

see outside

aircraft

a t

night

(49 comments)

N o picture

in

th e

back

seat to

help

obstacle

avoidance unless

stop

using TAB.

N o sensor

in

back

to

see outside fo r obstacle avoidance

while

using T AS .

N o

picture

in

th e back

seat to

help

obstacle avoidance

(towers).

Would like

a

button

to

rapidly

toggle

to

BUPS

or

1 2

device

in HIDSS.

Backseat

has no

pilotage

N V S .

When

performing T A S

scan, y ou

have

n o

situational awareness .

H ad

no

visual

outside

of coclqpit

w h e n scanning vwth

TAS.

Could not help maintain surveillance

in

th e back seat because I could

no t

look out

while

w e

were

evading

a

target,

so

I

could

only

say

where

to

go

via

TSD

and

not

b y

looking.

Could

not

help air space surveillance

in

th e back

seat

while

doing

T A S scans.

Had

no

pilotage

N V S system

fo r th e

back

seat

while operating TAS.

N o

night vision

system, relied on

TA S

only

B ack

seater

can ' t s ee

outside

except

with

TAS.

A s

th e back-seater, y ou can ' t see

out th e

aircraft when

using TA S .

N o SA in

back

seat

without

1 2

Can't

maintain

surveillance

around helicopter

except with

TA S

Back

seater operating

TA S

N o

eyes

to

complete task w h e n looking

in

TAS.

Without 1 2 ,

very

difficult to

maintain S A,

can't comply with

M E P O

duties

if viewing

BUPS.

N o

outside

reference

due

to

using

TA S

A ir

space

surveillance

y ou

have

none

w h e n

y ou

a re

in

th e

back

seat;

all

y ou

have is

TAS.

N o

SA of aircraft flight position w h e n

performing

M E P O duties.

N o picture

in

the

rear to help with aircraft

surveillance

wh en using

T A S

N o

ability

to

look outside

to

fl y

when

using TAS.

Back

seat using

E OTA D S

N o

pilotage N V S in back

seat

Cannot

se e

outside

other

than with

TAS.

Had

no

Airspace

Surveillance

due t o E OTA D S

sensor

(when

conducting

a

scan).

N o 1 2

capability

inhibits SA w h e n performing

M E P O

duties.

N o

pilot

NV S

system

in

th e backseat.

N o

sensor

to

look out

w h e n

using TA S

N o external vision in

back

seat

due

wh en TA S

is operating.

N o

sensor to

look

outside

w hen

using

TAS.

Back

seat has

no

visual

other than EOTADS.

Very difficult

to

visually

monitor

surveillance

as

M E P O

without

1 2 .

N o

N V D fo r

th e

backseat.

N o

surveillance

capability

except fo r

TAS.

N o

sensor

in

rear

to

look outside

of aircraft

for

obstacle

avoidance

w h e n

using th e

TAS.

N o

outside

visual due

to

TA S

being

operated.

Without 1 2

in

th e

backseat,

y ou

have no SA.

69



N o

N V D

system

fo r the

back

seat.

Can ' t maintain aerial surveillance without an 1 2 device.

N o

surveillance

outside of

aircraft

except with

TAS.

N o

surveillance except fo r TAS.

N o outside surveillance due

to

TA S being operated.

N o

sensor

to

look

outside

fo r

obstacles

when

using

TAS.

N o pilotage

N V S

system

fo r

backseat.

N o

pilotage N V S system fo r th e

back

seat.

N o w ay

fo r

(back seater)

to

look outside th e cockpit

w h e n using

th e

T AS .

N o surveillance

situational awareness while scanning with TA S .

Other

comment

•

ouldn' t

maintain

air

space

surveillance

while sending messages.

ATM

Task

1100

- Radio

Communications

Radio

Selec

t

Switch

is

Difficult

to

Use

(eight

comments)

•

adio

select

switch

on

collective

is difficult

to use.

• witch

on

collective

ca n

easily

be

bumped

which svwtches

frequencies

on th e

radio.

• ad

to

take

hands

off

controls to

push

tw o buttons

to

switch

radios

instead

of

using

C O M

switch

on H O G .

•

ometimes

y ou inadvertently

bump

switch a nd

change radios.

•

adio

CO M switch on collective too small when y ou need to talk to several people.

Changing

radio

to o

difficult.

•

adio

select

switch difficult

to

u se (off... set-up).

used

E ng

page t o

change

radios.

•

een

using

E N G

PAGE-LMPD

to switch radio because

of

too

m a n y

mistakes

with radio

select

switch.

•

adios were

tuned

wrong

once

on accident.

Makes it

difficult to

know

which f requency

y ou

are using w h e n it is so

easy

to

accidentally off-tune.

Radio

Volume Level Wa

s

Too

Low

(Simulator Problem'>

(four

comments)

•

ould

not hear

CPC

du e

to

lo w volume.

•

adio volume

from

CPC to

EDS

was

to o

low.

• ould not hear

CPC

radios.

•

PC volume

in

EDS headset is very

lo w

and

difficult

to

hear.

•

adios in C P C

and

EDS

are

not

working

well.

Vol ume

is

to o lo w

from

CPC

to

EDS.

Difficult

to

U se

Radios

When

Workload

W as

High

(four

comments)

•

hen radio traffic

is heavy,

workload

is high.

• adios

are

very

busy

when

you're

A M C .

•

hile engaging targets and

t iymg

to

talk,

I

w as

tasked

to the max.

•

idn't have sufficient spare time

to

disposition multiple

targets and

understand

radio traffic

a t

same

time.

70



• eed

a

feature

to

tell

fiiel

bum

so fa r

in

mission. Difficult

since

w e

don' t have

fuel

bvun

charts

or exact maps to

do

good

fuel

planning,

•

uel management

procedures

should

be

more

automated.

• uel

management

requires

devotion to engme

page

w h e n

computing

fuel

management

procedures .

•

have

to

look

on

engme

page

to

calculate

fuel

bum,

then

calculate

on

paper

th e

b u m- o u t

t ime.

•

ll

attention

is inside.

• equired

to

use engine

page.

• uel management

-

Engine monitor page required total

attention while

calculating fuel.

• o easy

accessible

fuel b um rate to observe

while

conducting mission tasks.

•

uel

bum

rate

calculation

is

not

readily

accessible.

•

he aircraft

systems

don' t help

y ou

compute, y ou

have to use

E6-B

to figure

bum - out t ime,

etc.

•

ystem

doesn' t

present

fiiel

endurance

t imes.

ATM

Task

1146 -Terrain Flight

Simulator

D id

N ot

Rftspn

nd

Well

to

Control

Input

(three

comments)

•

imulator does

not

respond

well to

control

inputs.

Rapid

inputs

are

difficult to

control.

•

imulator does

not

respond well to

pilot inputs

wh en

beyond

minor

maneuvers .

• imulator

does not

respond

to

control

inputs

correctly

and

lo w

resolution

graphics m ake

judging

relative

motion difficult.

Other

Problems

(eight comments)

•

ig h

speed

terrain flight

w as

very

taxing

on

ridgelines because of

poor

depth

perception

along ridgelines.

•

n

simulation,

not enough

terrain

detail to fly effectively a t N O E .

•

errain flight difficult at

high

speeds

because

of

limited

collective

authority

at

higher speeds.

•

ifficult

to

"feel"

out

oftrim

situation

m simulator.

• vasive

maneuvers

at

10 0

knots

at

20

A G L .

•

ouldn' t

easily

maintain

ground

clearance

when

sending fi-ee text.

•

imulator wo u l d not

hold

altitude.

• rying

to

maintam

N O E through

th e

mountams

and

minimize

exposure

caused

m e

to

strike

th e ground twice.

ATM Task 1151

- M asking

and

Unmasking

•

ig h

workload

due

to

actions

on

contact

with

2S6.

•

ifficult

maneuver ing

in

mountamous terrain and finding

a

good

OP without

gaining

to o

much

altitude.

ATM Task 1 1 5 3

Evasive

M aneuvers

7 2



HM D

Display

Blanks When Aircraft is Shot at bv th e

Threat

(eight

comments)

• IDSS goes

re d

w h e n aircraft

is

shot at . Cannot effectively

evade

with

terrain.

• creen blanks

out

during

evasive

maneuvers

and

controls

are

not

great

fo r

y ank

and

bank.

• ifRcult

to

acqxure targets

wh en

screen blanks

while

being shot.

•

hen

performing

evasive

maneuvers

and

being

fired

at

(b y

threat),

the whole

screen

blanks

and

y ou

can't see

to

evade.

•

ed

screen

i s

distracting

during

evasive

maneuvers .

• creen on HM D

goes

blank

wh en

y ou

a re

shot

at .

• vasive

maneuvers

require

all attention ofpilot.

•

M D

turns

blank when

engaged

by

th e

threat which

results

in

no

visual outside.

High

Workload

W h e n Performing

Evasive

M aneuvers

(eight

comments)

•

ctions

on contact with evasive maneuvers requires all

attention

to

flying

aircraft related

systems.

•

as

very

busy

w h e n being

tracked

by

A D A

and

t rymg

to break lock.

Very

easy

to lose

situational

awareness

when

making

rapid

turns.

•

ll

attention is

required to

fly

aircraft in this

manner.

•

lying aircraft

requires individual attention

w h e n

doing

other than

straight

and

level.

•

vasive

maneuvers

very difficult.

Need to

include

in

th e task

to

maintain

altitude

f o r

obstacle

avoidance while

deploying

to

cover.

t

is

easy

to

hit

th e

ground

while trying to get

away

f i * o m

there.

•

reaking

contact with every vehicle

requires

almost all

th e

attention

of

th e pilot

on

th e

controls.

• hen breakmg

contact

with enemy,

almost

all

attention is

directed to flying th e aircraft N O E

to

a covered

position.

•

hen

performing

evasive

maneuvers ,

no other tasks

can be performed. A ll

attention is

focused

on

maneuvers .

Other

Problems

(five

comments)

•

ank

and

bank

maneuvers

difficult to

control.

•

oor visual

references

(sim video)

makes task

difficult.

• rying

to

evade

from

enemy,

th e simulator does

not represent distinctions

between

high

and

lo w ground soon enough.

• ue

to

th e

lack

of

motion

parallax

in

sim ulation.

•

ould

like to have a clock

position

announcement of

A D U

threat.

ATM Task 1162 -Actions on Contact

High

Workload

When Performing

Actions

on

Contact

(four

comments)

•

ctions

on

contact

with

evasive maneuvers

requires all attention

to

flying

aircraft related

systems.

•

ctions

on contact is stressful

because of trying

to

se e

enemy quickly

as

y ou are turning

away

from

i t

and tell

front

seater where

to

go .

73



ATM Task 1442

-HIDSS

Operations

• Evasive

maneuvers

at

10 0

knots

at

20

AGL.

T he

TA S B UP S

didn' t

function on

this

flight

(simulator problem).

Heading tape

disorienting.

Backseat

HIDSS

w as

not

working.

ATM

Task 1448 - EOTADS

Sensor

Operations

EO T

ADS

is

Difficult to Slew While Aircraft is M oving

(seven

comments)

• O T A D S is

very

difiBcult to

manually

slew

while

moving. t is

to o

j um py ,

but

I

w as

forced

to

do them

because

th e scan

"fingers"

only

extended

less

than 50 0

meters

most of th e t ime.

• ensor ops

difficult wh en

moving.

Difficult

to

look

at

area

of interest.

• O

TADS slew

rate

is

difficult to

control during

movement . think

a wide

FO V

wo u l d be

useful

as well

when

maneuvering

thru

mountains.

•

uring

maneuver flight, hard

to

impossible to track targets of mterest.

•

anual

s lewing

of

TA S

difficult

while

flying.

•

anually

s lewing E OTA D S

while

f lymg is

very

difficult.

Might

be helpful to b e

able to

change

slew

hook

sensitivity

so at

t imes

y ou

can slew

faster

and at

other

t imes you c an slew

slower .

• ard to

fl y

and use

th e EOTADS.

M a n u a l Slewing

of

Sensors is

Workload

Intensive

(three comments)

• ackseat

operation

of

EOTADS

in

manual

mode search

requires

all

m y

attenticm.

• anual

searching

requires

almost al l

attention of back

seater.

• anual E OTA D S slewing

is difficult when in

moxmtainous terrain.

Other

Problems

With

EOTADS (1 2

comments)

•

tilizing

TA S

while f lymg

near terrain is very

difficult. ahnost

crashed

twice

because

I

w as trying

to

look at target picked up by th e radar.

•

o

situational

awareness

when

sending

digital

messages

due

primarily to

C IK

being

cumbersome to

operate.

•

uring E OTA D S operation,

m y

attention w as

more

devoted to

E O T AD S

operat ions

and

less

toward

th e

mission. had to

continuously

employ

m y

sensors

and

keep

up

with

th e

mission.

•

ard

to

do

any other

tasks while

trying

to

scan

route

or

area.

•

omet imes

y ou

inadvertently

turn

o ff

contmuous

scan or radar on E O T AD S . Pilot unsure

of

how

he

inadvertently

turned

off

continuous

scan

and radar on EOTADS) .

•

hen

checking

multiple

messages,

y ou

can

not

manually

scan.

•

hen

checking

messages,

y ou

caimot scan.

•

ifficult to

use

rapidly

when trying to

ATS

targets. A TS

doesn' t

a lways

w o r k

well .

•

M C over

tasked witii

tasks.

•

oo

hard

to

operate

TA S and fly.

• O T A D S

w as n ot

working

properly.

t slowed efficiency.

• OTA D S

is very

difficult

to

use at close

distances.

OV is to o narrow in 'Med ium' .

75



ATM Task

1449

-Digital Communications

Cockpit

Integrated

Keyboard

(CBK)

W as

Difficult

to

U se

(2 4 comments)

Keyboard

is

slow

fo r entering data.

Takes

to o

long

fo r

free

text

messaging.

Take to o

long to

create and

send

digital

messages. akes

away

f rom

other

tasks.

Sending

free

text is still

cumbersome

while

looking

down

hunting

fo r

keys.

A

Q W E R T Y

ke y board would allow

to type

and a t least review CHIPs a t th e

same t ime.

C IK

inputs

- need QW E RTY

keyboard.

Free text is to o difficult

with

long messages.

prefer

secure

voice.

Tough

to

send

free

text

messages

because they require

bemg

inside

cockpit

fo r

to o long.

Messages

take to o long.

akes

away from

mission.

Data

management with

this

keyboard

takes

to

long.

When creating

or

sending

reports,

y ou

have

no situation

awareness (SA)

with th e

battle.

Non-QWERTY

keyboard.

Keyboard

should

be

QWERTY.

Keyboard

is

to o

t ime-consuming

fo r

typmg

messages.

C IK w as

hard to

manipulate with N BC

gloves

along

with th e

HO G

and

SA C switches.

When managing

or

creating

text

messages

or tactical reports,

it

takes

away

from

primary

tSSKS.

When

engagmg

multiple

targets, y ou m ay not

have

enough

time to send

BDA

o r Spot

Reports.

Also,

when

sending

text

messages,

it

takes

to o

long (due

to

th e CIK).

Trymg

to send

dig

corns

takes

away from scanning which i s

th e

task at

hand.

Took

to o

much

time

to

send

free

text

messages

while

trying

to

fly.

C IK is

difficult

and

t ime-consuming

to

type (due

to

non-QWERTY

layout).

Need a QW E RTY

layout

fo r

CIK.

N o n -Q W E R T Y keyboard.

A hnos t

hit

ground

once

when

looking

down

to

input

a

free

text

message

in

th e

CIK.

CIK

inputs -

non-QWERTY layout.

C IK

is

to o

cumbersome.

Other Problems (five comments)

• hen

digital

traffic

gets

busy,

back

seater has

little

situational

awareness

as

to

w h a t

is

happening.

• hen

getting

free

text

messages,

it takes too

long

to

create a

route or

locate

points.

• ront

seater

checking

multiple

messages

and

sending

while

in

flight fo r A M C .

•

he

BD A

reports

w as

not working right because it

would

often not allow

m e to

send

th e

message after

giving

a

target a status.

•

M C

over

tasked

with

tasks.

ATM Task

1451

-

FCR

Operations

• ometimes

y o u

inadvertently tu m o ff continuous

scan

or radar o n E O T AD S .

Pilot unsure

of

how he inadvertently

turned

off

continuous

scan a nd

radar

on

EOTADS).

• C R

-Continuous scan in

M ap mode

required multiple

attempts

before

radar would

slew

m

desired

direction.

76



• perating F CR

while flying

overloads

th e flying pilot.

• omet imes y ou get to o busy and have

to

revert

to

using 340 degrees G T M scan FOV.

• ontinuous

scan modes

disengage

when

TA S

is passed

from

crew

member .

ATM

Task

1454 -Data Entry Procedures

Cockpit

Integrated Keyboard

(CIK)

W as Difficult

to Use

(7 8 comments)

The

CIK

is

just

a

cumbersome and slow

method

to enter data. A Q W E R T Y style

keyboard would

be

much

faster and efficient.

•

IK buttons

are to o

small and layout to o

difficult

to

use efficiently.

N eed

a

QWERTY

layout.

Keyboard cumbersome

and

awkward.

Free

text

is to o

difficult with

long

messages.

prefer

secure

voice.

Cannot

scan

when

checking

messages.

Took

to o

much tune to

send free

text

messages

while

trying to

fly.

Tough

to

send

free text messages because

tiiey

require being mside cockpit

fo r

to o

long.

Keyboard

is

slow

fo r

entering

data.

C IK

is difficult and

t ime-consuming

to

type (due

to

non-QWERTY

layout).

Takes

to o long

fo r

free

text

messaging.

When digital traffic

gets busy,

back

seater

has

little

situational

awareness as to

w h a t

is

happening.

Still

slow

to

send

free

text

messages via

CIK. Also

lost SA

while looking down.

Too difficult and

cumbersome

to

input data

via

th e

C IK d ue

to

non-QWERT Y layout and

lack

of TA B

key.

Free text

takes

to o long due

to

layout of

keyboard

(non-QWERTY), lack

of

TA B key,

and having

to

apply

a lo t of force

to

depress

CIK keys.

C IK

inputs -non-QWERTY

layout.

Hard to

enter

free

text

message

and

maintain SA while

inputting.

The

CIK isn't

user-friendly, difficult

to

efficiently

input data.

Take to o

long to

create

and

send

digital

messages.

akes

away

from other

tasks.

Free text entry

is

difficult

and

tune-consuming.

Very

inefficient to

input data

via

CIK,

C IK

is to o

ciraibersome.

Sending

free

text

is still

cumbersome

while

looking

d o w n hunting

f or

keys.

A

Q W E R T Y

key

board

would allow

to

type

and

at

least review CHIPs

at th e

same

t ime.

C IK inputs non QWERTY.

C IK

requh-es

full attention

while typing.

C IK to o

inefficient

means o f

data

entry.

Messages

take to o long.

akes

away from mission.

C IK

isn't

efficient

with

data

entry.

Data

management

witii

this

keyboard

takes

to o long.

Entering

free text message takes total

devotion of attention.

C IK entries QWERTY.

Very

hard

to

use CIK

because

it

forces

y ou to

look d o w n

th e

whole

t ime

to

type in a

message.

• IK

entiies

QWERTY

to

enter.

77



•

ata Entry -1 used

th e

text bar fo r most of

th e messages I sent

today

since I w as flying.

I

would like

to

make all

selections with

th e

cursor

and

not

have

to

switch

between th e

cursor

and

pushing

buttons.

CIK very

inefficient means

of

data

entry.

CIK is inefficient.

CIK

is

to o

cumbersome.

CIK

inputs

were

QWERTY.

When

getting

free

text

messages,

it takes

to o

long

to

create

a route

or

locate

pomts .

It

takes w ay too

long to input

data

via CIK.

CIK entries

-

QWERTY keyboard.

CIK entries are time

consuming

and do not allow

another

task

to

be

checked.

Only

able

to

type

when

using CIK.

CIK is slow and uses all attention.

CIK entries

are

non-QWERTY.

Typing takes

t oo long

and

requires

al l

aviators ' attention.

N o

QW E RTY

keyboard.

When

creating

or

sending reports,

y ou

have

no

situation

awareness

(SA)

with

th e

battle.

The

CIK

is

very

cumbersome

and

difficult

to

efficiently

enter

data

Non-QWERTY

keyboard.

CIK

entries

due

to

non-QWERTY

keypad.

When operating

a digital remote

mission,

pressing

th e ' show on

m a p '

should slew TA S

on

to th e

target

automatically.

Keyboard

to o

cumbersome

(and

hard

to

find

letter

and

#'s).

CIK

to o

slow

to use effectively.

CIK "ABC"

format

is very

cumbersome.

CIK i s

cumbersome.

CIK is

slow

and cumbersome. Cannot do anything else when typmg.

CIK is very

cumbersome and

makes

it difficult

to

input

infor.

CIK

is

cumbersome

which

makes

it difficult

to

input

data.

Keyboard

should b e

QW E RTY .

CIK slow

and

cumbersome.

Cannot

d o

anything

else

when typing.

N o situational awareness w h e n sending digital

messages

due primarily to C IK bemg

cimibersome

to

operate.

CIK

is

to o

cumbersome

fo r

data

input.

CIK is very cumbersome.

Keyboard

is

not

user-friendly.

Keyboard

is

to o

t ime-consuming

fo r

typing messages.

CIK

is

very

bad.

Keyboard has

inconsistent operations.

CIK is

difficult

to

use.

CIK

is

slow

and

cumbersome

requiring

us

to

look

down

throughout

th e

inputt ing

of

text.

CIK

is

a no-go.

Inputting

a message

into

th e

C IK w as slow and

cumbersome.

Required

m y

full attention.

Non-user friendly

keyboard.

Takes

to o

long

to

input text

into

CIK.

CIK

w as

hard

to

manipulate

with

NBC

gloves

along

with th e

HO G and

SA C

switches.

When managing

or creating text messages

or tactical

reports, it takes

a w a y

from primary

I d SJCS.

78



• on-user

friendly

keyboard.

•

IK sucks

•

hen engaging multiple targets, y ou m ay not have

enough

time to send B D A

or

Spot

Reports .

Also,

when

sending text

messages, it takes

to o

long

(due

to

th e CIK).

• IK is

slow and

cumbersome requiring th e

pilot

to

look down and only

focus on

one

thing.

AT M

Task

1455 -

Data

M anagement Procedures

Cockpit

Integrated Keyboard

(CIK)

W as Difficult

to

Use (seven

comments)

•

eyboard

cumbersome

and

awkward.

• hen engaging

multiple

targets, y ou

m ay

not have

enough

t ime to send

B DA or

Spot

Reports .

Also, w hen sending text m essages,

it

takes

to o long (due

to

tiie

CIK).

• essages

take to o

long. akes away

from mission.

• ata management with

this

keyboard takes to o

long.

•

o

situational

awareness w h e n

sending

digital

messages

due primarily to

C IK being

cumbersome

to

operate.

•

IK is

non-QWERTY.

• IK is very

inefficient.

Other

Problems

(five comments)

•

hen digital traffic gets busy , back seater has

little situational

awareness

as

to

w h a t

is

happening.

• hen getting

free text

messages,

it takes

to o

long to

create a

route

or

locate

points.

• hen creating

or

sending reports, y ou have no SA with the battle.

•

hen managing

o r

creating text messages

or tactical

reports,

it takes

a w a y

from

primary

tasks.

•

ack

seater

getting

m e

to

check messages

and

send

data while

I'm

flying.

ATM

Task 1458 - Engage Target With PTWS (Hellfire)

• ould

not

get constraint symbology

in backseat.

•

o

symbology

in

aft

HM D

fo r Hellfire

engagement.

ATM

Task 1464 - Engage Target With AW S (2 0 mm)

Simulator Problems (six comments)

•

o target effect.

•

o

target

effect

fo r

every

engagement.

•

o

target effect on dismounted troops

(couldn' t

tell if dismounts had been killed by 20

m m ) .

• or

some

reason, target

would not

ATS,

so

it w as

to o tough

to shoot.

•

o

target

effect.

G un

had no effect

on target.

•

o

target

effect with 2 0 mm gun.

79



other Problem

(one

comment)

• O PP gloves

make

engagements

difficult.

ATM Task 2157

-M ulti-Ship Operations

Problems Attributable

to

•*No-Targeting''

Other

Comanche

Aircraft

(five

comments)

• hip

veiy

difficult today because

I

had no targeted

m y wingman and w e

lost

EPLRs data

from him.

• istership no targeted our icon on his

TSD

and w e

had

to

maintain separation and guide

h im

to

our location fo r link

up.

•

ingman's icon disappeared

off

our TSD.

ook

t ime

away

from

flying

t rying to keep a

visual

on

where our

wingman

was.

•

o target of sistership

m a d e

these

tasks

harder.

•

f y ou

inadvertently

"no-target" your

wingman,

it

i s

very

difficult

to

maintain

battlefield

SA .

Other

Problems

(two

comments)

• adios i n CPC and EDS are not working w ell.

V o lu m e is to o lo w from C PC to EDS.

• imulator w as

not

working

properly

and

lost

SA of other

aircraft.

ATM

Task 2476 -Security

M ission

• e le t a

vehicle

sneak up on us underneath our sensor and did not

find

him

unti l

he w as

engaging us.

ATM

Task

2500 - Aerial Observation

•

ue

to

air

route

in mountainous

terrain.

N ot

a

lo t

of

observation

points.

•

ifficult

to

maneuver through th e

terrain

and

get

good sensor coverage on

both

route

and

surrounding

terrain.

• on radar

aircraft

had to

maneuver

more

to

scan terrain (than

th e

radar

aircraft).

• dmin -w as

not

allowed

to

use

black

hot

on N V S system.

• o N V D system fo r th e

back

seat.

ATM

Task

2502

-

Area

Reconnaissance

•

ituation

difficult (for this specific mission) to accomplish with no support (e.g.,

no

wingman

or CAS).

ATM Task 2511 - Route

Reconnaissance

•

hie

to

a ir

route

in

moxmtainous terrain. N ot a lo t

of

observation

points.

• ifficult to maneuver

through th e terrain

and

get

good

sensor

coverage

on both route

and

surrounding

terrain.

ATM Task 2514

-

Zone

Reconnaissance

80



ATM Task

2805b

- Identify Major Threat

Equipment

• rack vehicles

a t

distances

from

5k and up when they

are

viewed

head

on,

they

look

similar.

•

ituational

awareness

degraded

wh en

friendly and

enemy

icons

were

close

together

and

actions

from

th e

crew in

th e aircraft

requires

defensive

posture

(shot

20 m m at

friendly

vehicle

when

w e

flew over

a

ridge and

were

surprised).

ATM Task 2823 - Operate Aircraft

Survivability

Equipment

• ould like to

have

a clock position announcement of

A DU threat.

ATM Task 2837 - Operate Night Vision

PUotage

System

•

ideo

graphics

are poor.

• he

simulation

graphics

are

poor and hinders

ability

to

properly

fl y

th e simulator.

List any flight

and-or

mission

tasks that yo u had

to

ask your

crewmember

to accomplish

because

your

workload

was

to o

high.

Back

Seat Responses

Had Front

Seat

Crew

M em b er

Perform

Communicatinn TasVs (63 comments)

• ften

send

digital

reports.

• ad

th e front seat check

messages to

send

digital

messages

while

I

scanned for

targets

because

it

seemed

more

important.

• asked

fo r

front

seater to

read

reports

when

they c a m e

in .

• asked

m y

front

seater to

operate

EOTADS

and

send

digital

messages.

• ad

front

seater check messages

and

make

radio

calls.

•

end

free

text

messages.

•

end

spot

and

B D A

messages.

• ending B D A , spot reports.

• end spot

(text/SITREP/BDA/ARTY

CFF).

• o m m s

with other

Comanche

aircraft

(Demon

35).

• heck messages .

•

end S P O T , BDA messages.

•

assed

off spot

reports,

BDAs, Free

text,

call

fo r

fire.

• ad

th e

front

seater

create free

text messages

and check

messages.

• ad th e

front

seater enter data

and

transmit

voice

messages.

•

ad

th e

front seater send

SPOT

reports and BDA,

talk

to

th e

wingman.

•

ad

fit)nt

seater

send

BD A

reports

and

call

fo r

fire digitally.

•

ad front

seater check messages, handle radio

communications,

A R T Y and B D A messages.

•

ad

front seater

send

BDA,

SPOT reports and SITREPs.

•

ad

fix)nt

seater

answer messages.

• ad front

seater get many

messages, send Spot reports, sent free text messages, and make

radio

calls.

•

ad

front

seater send Spot reports and do BDAs.

• ad

front

seater check messages,

send Spot,

BDA

and

SitRep

reports,

talk

to

w in g m a n .

82



Passed

off

EOTADS, Radar

to

front

seater.

Had th e

front

seater

use

TAS.

Had front seater do EO scans.

Had

front seater

check

Chips

on

TAS.

Had

fit)nt

seater

operate

TAS.

Used

TA S

whUe

I

am

sending

free

text.

Had

th e

front

seater take

TA S when

back seater w as creatmg

text

messages.

O ne

time,

I asked th e

front

seat to

operate

sensors

while

I

set-up

free

text message.

H ad

front

seater

use

th e

radar.

Had front

seater

operate

th e

TAS.

Had

front

seater

look for

enemy.

Had

th e

front seater

operate

TAS.

Had

th e

front seater use

th e

TAS.

Had

th e

front

seater

use TA S

while

I

created

a

route

and w e

were

at a

hover.

Had

front

seater

operate

TAS.

U se

TA S

while

inside

fo r

extended

periods.

Passed

off working

EOTADS.

U se

TA S

while

I

w as

inside.

TA S

operations.

Had th e front

seater

operate

th e

radar and

operate

th e

TAS.

Had front seater

take

TAS

while

entered

text

usmg

th e

CIK.

Had front seater

operate

radar.

Had

front

seater operate TAS.

Had front seater operate radar.

Had front seater operate radar.

H ad

Front

Seat

PUot

Perform Target

Engagement

Tasks

(four

comments)

Had

th e

front

seater

shoot

with

HIDSS

(20mm)

when

th e

TA S

w as

not effective.

Had th e front

seater engage target with HIDSS.

Had

front seater

submerge

targets

after

engagements .

• ad th e front

seater engage

target with

gun

via

HIDSS.

Front

Seat

Responses

Had

Back Seat

PUot Perform Navigation Tasks (eight

comments)

•

elp

with

terrain

flight

navigation.

•

ring

up a route

to

fly

that

I akeady

created.

• eeded

back

seat to

assist

in

air

space surveillance

and terrain navigate vsith

BUPS.

•

sked back

seater

fo r

'direct

to '

and

fo r

help

to

identify

location

of

N A I

and

OP's .

•

sked

back seater

to

find

N AI s

because

I

couldn't take

hands

off

controls

to

look

around

on

TSD. Asked

to

help locate O ps

because

TSD

w as

to o

cluttered

to see

them clearly.

• had

m y

b a ck

seater

give

m e 'direct

to".

• ad m y

back

seater build routes

on

th e

"fly".

•

ad

him

locate

NAI 's

and

O ps because

I

couldn't

search th e

TSD

while

flying.

84



I NT E NT I ONALLY LEFT B L A N K

86



Appendix

I.

ummary of

Pilot

Ratings and Comments

About Usability

of

the

Crew

Station

Controls,

Displays,

and

Subsystem

Interface

For

each funct ional

component ,

indicate

whether

you experienced

a

problem

using the

component in

a quick an d

efficient m anner . h e c k Yes

if

you

experienced

on e or m o r e

prob lems .

heck No if y o u did

no t

experience a ny

problems.

heck Not Used if you did n ot use the

component.

T S D

Funct ional

C o m p o n e n t s

Y es

No

Not U s e d

T S D

Overlay

2%

8 0 %

18 %

T SD

View

0%

9 1 %

9 %

T SD

Tools

4%

8 9 %

7%

T SD Windows

9 %

5 6%

35%

T SD

Config

0%

9 8 % 2 %

T SD

Toolbar

31 %

65%

4 %

T S D

Home

0%

100%

0 %

NAVPlan

9 %

9 1%

0 %

NAVCurr

4%

9 6%

0 %

H M D

Mode

0%

100%

0 %

I M A G

Config

0%

100%

0 %

SM D

Functional

C o m p o n e n t s

|

Yes

No

Not

Used

SMDCOMMFS

16%

8 4%

0 %

SM D

COMM

Repor t s

4 %

9 6%

0%

SM D

COMM C O N F I G

0%

100%

0 %

S M D

COMM

T U N E

7% 9 1 %

2 %

SM D COMM

P S E T

0%

100%

0 %

XPNDR

0%

9 8 %

2%

FLTINST

0%

9 8 %

2%

E N G

INST

0%

9 8 %

2 %

T A S

13%

8 5%

2%

W C A

13%

4 9 %

38%

Pilot

Comments:

Problems

with T SD

Toolbar

(1 4

comments)

•

SD

Tool

bar

-

Cursor

pressure

required to

slew

is sometimes

sufficient to

depress

th e

button and

hook

items

unintentionally.

• SD

Toolbar -

Sometimes

BD A

Report

will send empty report

to

recipients of BD A report.

• SD

Toolbar -

When scrolling at

bottom

comers for change of m e n u or send option on right,

th e

cursor

should

be

less

sensitive w h e n

moving

th e m ap

in those

directions.

87



T SD

Toolbar -

M y

right

slew hook would not

select anything

on

th e

TSD, so I

could not

use

th e Toolbar.

Also,

when

sending

BDA

from th e

Toolbar, th e status w hen selected

sometimes

takes

th e

'Send'

capability away

from th e

Toolbar.

TSD

Toolbar -

Sometimes,

I

cannot

get

th e

BDA

reports

to

send w hen

using

th e

message

bar. had to send th e reports via th e C O M M FS B D A page. his problem did not degrade

th e

mission

m u c h ,

but

it

s lowed

m e

down

significantly.

TSD

Toolbar -

When

trying

to

send

BDA

via

toolbar,

th e

status doesn ' t

show up

to

th e

recipient of

the report.

TSD

Toolbar

- In

some

instances,

when the toolbar w as

in

use at

th e same

t ime

th e CIK w as

enabled,

user

w as unable to transfer information on

CIK to th e SM D by

pressing th e enter

ke y on CIK.

TSD

Toolbar

-When sending a BDA

report

after selecting

th e

status, the

send button did not

become

active.

TSD

Toolbar -

Sending

BDA when

y ou

pick

status

of target

somet imes i t deselects th e

send

button.

TSD

Toolbar

-When selecting a target

fo r

BDA, y ou

have

to

pick

th e

status

from

a

pick

list

and then from

th e Toolbar, y ou

have

to

select

'Send ' .

ometimes,

after

select ing a

target

and

status,

th e

'Send '

button

does

n ot

illuminate.

TSD

Toolbar -When

doing a

BDA from th e

toolbar,

it

defaults to

"Dest royed" and

sometimes it

doesn't .

Also, th e

status does n' t

show

up on

th e

receiver's end.

his

caused

th e

receiver

to request

th e

status again.

T SD

Toolbar

- Sometimes, th e status of th e

target

(destroy, etc.) doesn ' t send with th e BD A

report.

When

doing

BD A

from toolbar, th e status is not

retamed

when

th e

BD A

is

sent .

his

reduces th e

efficiency

of

th e

system.

B D A s sent v ia

toolbar

sometimes

don' t send the

status.

Problems

with

WCA

(seven

conmients)

WC

A

-This

mformation

needs

to

be

more

detailed and

organized.

We

had problems with

our engine, but th e

WCA

only said left engine out.

WCA

-Audio

needs

to

be higher

pitch.

WCA

-Could

not

acknowledge

WCA's

off

th e T SD

by

accessmg

WC A

button

on

HO G

or

WC A

hard

bezel.

WC A

-When

trying

to

clear faults th e

WC A button did not work on th e

collective.

WC A

-

Couldn ' t

acknowledge a message

in th e

CPC

front

seat.

he

WC A

button on th e

HO G

and

WCA

hard

bezel

w ouldn' t

action

advisory

away on th e TSD.

WCA -

Sometimes,

when

encountering an emergency

message

(i.e., E N G

1

Out) th e

message

doesn' t display on

th e

WCA

page right a wa y .

t

took a fe w

minutes

fo r

th e

message

to

appear

on

th e

WC A

page.

88



Problems

With

SM D

C omm FS (six

comments)

•

M D C O M M

FS -1

would

like

a

TSK

target

#

duplicated

in

th e

TIAP

w hen

I

call an

A R T Y

mission.

his would help keep track

of

what mission

is

fo r what target.

his problem did

not

degrade

th e mission much, but i t slowed m e down significantly.

•

M D

C O M M

F S

-1

thmk

th e

C O M M F S

should

add

th e

aircraft

assigned

target

number

to

th e T I AP display.

his

makes

it easier

to

keep multiple calls fo r five straight

rather

than just

mission

1,2 , etc.

s

it

is currently modeled.

•

M D

C O M M

F S

-

Should

list

th e

target

# next

to

any

call fo r fire.

his would allow

m uch

easier tracking

ofArty

missions when more

than one

is

active.

• M D C O M M F S

-

Need to know what

Arty mission i s fo r what target fi"om th e

TIAP

display.

•

M D

C O M M FS -TIAP doesn' t display target number.

• om m

FS

-Does

no t

give

a target # fo r each arty mission would

be easier

to keep track of

multiple missions.

Problems With

TA S

(five comments )

•

AS

-

When th e

aircraft

is

on

th e

move,

it is

almost

impossible to slew E O T AD S

manually

due to

it s

position

on

th e

aircraft

(nose)

and

its sensitivity.

•

A S -1

used th e

" E N G "

button on

Ihe

TIAP,

but it required

tw o

button

pushes

to

make it

work. his

made

f indmg 2 S6 ' s

slower

and more

difficult.

•

A S

-If I

am

reviewing

CHIPs after

an automated

scan

and if

I

select no

target then

th e icon

should

disappear completely rather

than

become

just

a

dot.

• A S -If a

target

is no-targeted accidentally, there is no way

to

reacquire th e target, i.e.,

ATS, lAT).

here

should

be

a

w ay

to

do a

locate fimction

by

utilizmg

laser energy and

ATD-C.

• A S - Somet imes th e ' E N G ' button on th e TIAP did not fimction. ometimes, th e ' F IND '

switch

does

not

function

or it slews the TAS

to

th e

wrong

target.

Problems

With TSD

Wmdow (four

comments)

•

SD

Window

-

When selecting a group details button,

it

does

not

open a

T SD

Window.

Minimal

degradation.

Recommend fixmg

to

allow

easier

target selection

within a group.

•

SD

Windows -Locks-up shnulation.

• SD Window

-Selection

of

windows defaults

to

a

1

KM picture.

oo

small

of

an area/loose

t ime

and situational

awareness .

•

SD w in d o w s if

y ou scale

all

th e w ay

down,

y ou

will

lock

th e

simulator

up.

Problems With

SM D C o m m Reports

(four comments)

•

M D C O M M

Reports -Digital

reports

should

have

some

highlight

system of

all-important

information (i.e.

from

w h o ,

wh a t grid, etc.).

• M D

C o m m R P T S -

T he

free

text

message is

slow

and cumbersome

with

th e

CIK.

• R R FFE displayed on TIAP do esn' t

show

which target is bemg

serviced.

•

he

T A S

and

Radar

switches should be

on

different

panels.

89



•

f a

target is

'n o targeted', there is no

w ay

to recall it .

• o target

function

-

There should be a w ay

to

recall an object if

y ou inadvertently

'n o

target '

it .

•

ou

are

unable to A TS

a

target that

has

been

'n o

targeted'.

• TS

does not a lways work properly. ometimes

it

does

not

function.

•

TS

and

lA T

would

not

a lways

lock

and

classify

a

target. his

causes

a

problem

when

engaging with Hellfire

due

to

no

symbology.

•

TS

does n ot a lways work well. ometimes th e vehicle

will

not be

captured by

A TS

unless

y ou

zoom

in

and

position

sensor

accurately on

th e vehicle.

•

TS

does

not

a lways

operate.

ometimes

operator must

press

A TS several

t ime

to

' t rack'

target.

FLIR Operations (two

comments)

• LIR does

n o t

slew smoothly.

t

is

difficult

to

do

manual

searches.

• hen using

th e ' f ield-of-view'

bezel

button on th e SMD,

I

inadvertently

switched

from

FLIR

to

D T V .

t took

m e

a

couple

of

minutes

to

find out why

I lost

m y

picture

in th e

S M D .

List

and

describe

any

other

crew station fiinctions that

you

were

no t able to

complete in

a

quick

and efficient manner.

Problems W

ith

t he

C T K

(seven

comments)

•

ending

fi«e

text

message is

to o

cumbersome. Requires

to o

many

button

pushes

to

accomplish.

•

ata

entry

through CIK.

•

reating

and

sending text

messages.

•

ending

'free

text ' messages takes to o long because

ofkeypad

layout

and there

is no d o w n

arrow

key.

•

w as

unable

to

type

free

text

messages

in

a

quick

and

efficient

m a n n e r

because

I w as

having

to

search

for the letters on

th e

non-QWERTY

keyboard,

and

also

I

h ad to keep

looking

d o w n

while typing.

• yping

free

text

takes

a long time to accomplish.

• he

keyboard

needs

to be

more

like

a computer keyboard

fo r

faster typing. Also

there

needs

to

be

a d o w n

arrow

key.

Problems

With

Slewing (five

comments)

•

le w

hook los t function temporarily

fo r about

5 minutes

in

th e

back

seat

of

th e CPC.

• lew-to-own hehne t function

did

not work

in

CPC.

•

le w

to-own

hehne t

(didn't

work).

•

lew-to-ownship

is

inoperative.

•

hen

rapidly

slewing

th e

slew

hook,

th e

pressure

required

ca n cause th e aviator

to

inadvertently

hook on icons

that

are

not

desired.

his slows

TSD

operations.

92



Problems

With

Creating Routes

(four

comments)

• ould

not

create

a

route

while

looking

at

grids

sent

as

a free text message

because I

could not

have

both

screens

up

at once.

had to

write

all th e

grids down first and then

input

them.

•

rying

to

create

a

route that

w as

sent

digitally

using

grids

and

then having to

find

th e

grids

on

the

TSD

or

using

th e

locate

function

takes

to o

m u c h

time.

here

should

be

a

w ay

to

show

th e

grid

on th e

map.

•

lanning

a

route

w h e n

sent

grids

via

a

digital

message is a

problem.

We

could

not

have a

message

and perform

a

' locate' fimction

at

th e

same time.

o,

w e had to

write th e grids

down

first

and then enter them.

• nputting

a

route

when received

as

a free text message.

Problems

With Radio Select

Switch

(four

comments)

•

sing

th e radio tune

switch on th e HO G is

difficult.

•

uning radios

from collective is a

guessing

game.

•

O G

radio frequency select switch i s

to o

close to th e

"slave-to-me"

(slew-to-own-hehnet)

button on

collective.

•

have

been

using th e flight instruments

page to change

radios due

to

th e

difficulty

of th e

radio

select

switch

on

th e

collective.

Problems

With

Fuel

Management

(two comments)

•

etermining

ftiel

management procedure JA W

A T M

given

information

on

Eng

page.

•

ompute

fuel

bum-out times.

Other Comments

(five

comments)

•

annot

submerge group

icons

on TSD.

•

all

artillery on

a

templaned position. Required

to

drop

a

point

to

call for fire

on

th e

templaned

position.

• TD-C target labels can' t be

overwritten.

ATD-C

incorrectly

identified a BMP-21 as

a

tracked vehicle. f

y ou

try

to

overrule it , ATD-C

will

create another target. he TSD

could

show multiple targets

when in fact there

is

only

one.

• sing

th e

"direct to "

function is

cumbersome.

• ough to adjust

volume with

switches

on

th e left

console.

93



On average, how

quickly were yo u able to

navigate

through

th e

me n u

screens

on

th e

Mulitpurpose

Displays?

Very

Quickly

Somewha t Quickly

Border l ine

^P

11|

Somewha t Slowly

W

Very

Slowly

80% 100%

On average, ho w

quickly were you able

to

navigate through

th e

menu

screens

on th e

Tactical Interface

Annunciator

Panel?

Very Quickly

Som ew ha t Quickly

Border l ine

Som ew ha t

Slowly

8 0 1 0 0

Pilot

C o m m e n t s :

• T I A P p a n e l

display

can b e c o m e busy

and cluttered with A S E threa t , CFFs

an d Rem o tes .

95



How

often did you have

trouble

remembering

where

you were at

in

the menu system o n

the

IMult ipurpose Displays?

N e v e r

S e l d om

Of t en

Frequen t l y

V

80 100

How often

did

y o u

have trouble

remembering

where y o u were

at

in

the

m e n u

system

o n the

Tact ica l

nterface Annunciator Panel?

N e v e r

Se ldom

Of ten

Frequent ly

38

60%

7 -'Z 7'

0 0

40 60 8 0

100

Pilot

Comments:

•

The

TIAP

doesn' t display th e

target

number associated

with

th e call-for-fire mission.

97



Did

you have

difficulty

using

an y o f

th e

switches

on

th e

Collect ive Grip?

0% 0%

40 %

60%

80%

100%

Problems With th e

Rad io Select

Switch

(2 5

c o m m e n t s )

T h e

radio

tune

switch

is

c u m b e r s o m e

and

gets

'bumped'

to o m u c h

if

y ou

a re th e pilot.

Rad io se lec t switch

is

at a n u nu su a l

sp o t

a nd

is

inadvertently hit

and

cha nged often.

Radio se lec t

switch

often snags o n

gloves and often y o u

forget w h i c h w a y you press to

cha nge

radios/frequencies .

Radio

frequency switch

is

to o

close to th e

s lew- t o-own but ton

causing

unwa nt ed

changing of

radios and

ft-equencies.

In

both

seats,

th e

radio switch

o n

th e

collective

is

to o

easy

to cha nge

presets

b y

mistake. ll

of

th e

but tons

are

to o

close.

In

both

crew

stations,

th e radio

tune

switch

is

difficult

t o

use .

equires

to o

little

pressure

to

change

radios.

T he radio select button w as confiising

at

t imes

because

I

inadvertent ly

hit it a n d

changed

th e

f requ ency .

did

n o t realize

I hit the

but ton until I

w e n t

to

t ra nsmi t

o n th e

radio

and looked

on

th e

R M P D .

Radio

tune

and

Select switch

to close

to

t h u m b

and

slew

to

o w n

switch.

Inadvertently

selected "N O

TT" .

I

swi tched

a radio

w h e n I rea ched

for

th e s lew- t o-own

button.

T h e

radio select

switch

gets,

inadvertent ly,

switch

m a n y

t imes

during mission.

Bo th

crew

stat ions)

Radio

se lec t switch is

h it quite

often

on

accident usually

a b o u t once

every

tw o

weeks .

Inadvertent ly

swi tched

radios and

radio

f requencies.

nadvertent ly

act ioned th e

fiin

from the

side-arm

controller.

Rad io

select

sv^tch

is to

close to

slew to

o w n h e l m e t

switch.

I

don't

like

th e location of th e

radio se lec t switch

beca use I inadvertent ly change th e

radio

at

least

once

every 4

missions.

Radio

select

switch

need s to b e stiffer

as

not

to

inadvertent ly

actuate

it .

Radio se lec t switch

is

in a place to w h e r e

y ou

can

inadvertent ly

switch

radios.

•

Ra dio

se lec t switch

is

to o

sensitive.

akes

it

to o

easy

to

inadvertent ly

cha nge radio

selections.

98



• he

radio

select switch

is

still

accidentally actioned

to

off-tune th e radios.

ven though I

am

aware of it , I

still accidentally hit it

this

week.

• adio

selected

inadvertently.

• he

radio tune

switch is

difficult

to

use

and

gets

bumped

when using iJie m ap

scale

switch on

th e HOG.

orward/Aft

and

Left/Right

axes

f or

actuating

radio

tune

switch is a t an

angle

which

makes

it

not

intuitive.

•

he

radio

select

is inadvertently

actioned and radio

changed.

•

he

C O M M switch

axis

of operation

is

different

in th e EDS

vs .

th e

CPC.

rimarily

used th e

switch

in

th e

back

seat.

he

EDS

C O M M

switch

does

not

actuate forward/aft.

t

actuates

off-center.

• he radio

select switch

is

continuing.

witch is shaped tiie same

fo r

all

axes.

Doesn' t

distinguish

between

radio

select

and frequency

select.

•

he

radio

select

switch position

feels

th e

same

in

each

axis

fo r

radio

select and

frequency

select

• adio

frequency switch is to o close

to

th e ' s lew-to-own-helmet '

switch

on

th e

collective.

Problems With

th e Slew-to-Own Switch (12 comments)

•

ollective Grip

-

Slew-to-own

helmet

switch

is to o small and radio switch is to o sensitive.

•

he

right slew hook switch on th e collective requires to o

much

pressvire to

slew

rapidly.

• ometimes confuse "slew-to-own" WC A acknowledge

button

and

laser

button.

• lew-to-ownship is inoperative

• sing

th e

laser

and s lew-to-own

button

is

difficult wifli

flight gloves.

f th e

slew

hook

switches

were centrally located

in

th e cockpit, it would

preclude

th e

M EP

operator from

leaning to

their

left

to operate

sensors

and

displays.

• ight

slew

hook in

botii

crew

stations

requires

to o

much pressure to slew quickly

without

hooking.

• he

"slew-to-own" switch

feels similar

to

other

buttons

and

I

often

depress th e

other buttons

by

mistake.

he

radio

select

switch

is

very

unuser-friendly.

•

lew-to-own

switch is

to o

close to

th e

radio select

switch.

•

he

slew

hook

switches

require

enough

pressure to

inadvertently hook things on th e

TSD.

•

CA

slew to

ow n

laser

too

small.

•

hen

moving

th e

right

slew

hook to

move

cursor on

TSD

th e

more

pressure

needed

to

move

cursor increased chances

of

deselecting something on TSD.

• lew-to-own,

WCA, laser, and

radio

select.

Problems

With No Target and Details Switches (five comments)

•

o TG T

button

and

details

button

are

easily confused with

flight

gloves on .

mistakenly

'N o

Targeted ' an

object I

meant to

get

details on .

•

ll

seats

on

collective

grip

th e

details

button

and

th e

N o

T G T

switches

are

to

close

and

they

are th e

same type button.

• o

target

and

details

buttons

are

right next

to

one

another and they

are

very

easy to

mistake

fo r

each

other.

• O TG T

and

Details switch

CPC

(F).

•

he

'no target '

and

details switch are

similar

in

size

and

shape

(makes it

easy

to actuate

th e

wrong

switch).

Also,

th e switches

are

to o

small.

99



Problems With Moving Heading Tape (five comments)

• eading tape on

HM D

should be

screen

stabilized.

t

moves

at odd

angles.

•

eading tape geo-stabilized is disorienting.

•

M D heading

tape

should

not

move.

•

he

heading

tape

is

not

easy

to

use.

t

moves

to o

much

in

different

planes.

• Heading

tape

is

disorienting. hould be

stabilized

and

not move

with

artificial horizon.

Yes

Was there

any symbology

depicted that

was

difficult

to quicldy

and

easily

understand

on

the

Systems

Management Display?

- ^ 0 0

2 0 4 0 60 0 1 0 0

N o comments .

Yes

Was

there any

symbology depicted

that

was

difficult

to

quickly

and

easily

understand

on

the

Tactical

Situation Display?

76 %

0 0 4 0 6 0 0

100

TSD

gridlines

are not easy to

read. Numbers

are

easily obscured.

10 1



Yes

Did

you experience an y

problems

with

dizziness that y ou think w as caused

by

th e

mot ion

of

th e

heading

tape

on

th e

H M D ?

67%

0% 0%

40%

60 %

80%

100%

Problems

W

ith

Motion

of

Heading

Tape (21 comments)

It

becomes very

severe

during

rapid

movements and

degrades

performance.

The fact

that th e

heading

tape

is

geo-stabilized

is

disorienting.

N ot very severe because I have learned

to

ignore it .

I

ignore

th e

heading tape though. only

use

th e

boxed

aircraft heading

tape because

it

is not

confusing.

I

usually

ignore th e heading

tape

wh en I'm not straight and level.

N o,

However,

heading

tape is

difficult

to

interpret

when

in

a

medium

to t ight bank angle

(Screen

vs .

geo. Stabilized)

N ot

so

much

as

dizziness,

as

just

spatial

disorientation.

Heading

tape

should

be

screen

stabilized.

N ot

severe

but

while

deploying

to

cover

or

actions

on contact.

t's hard

to

chase

heading

tape

m th e

HIDSS.

I ignore

th e heading tape now because

it

i s

confijsing. only use th e

boxed

aircraft heading.

When

in

steep

turns

or

unusual attitudes,

th e reading tape

becomes

disorienting.

No problems because

I

ignore

it

now

and

only

use

th e

boxed

aircraft

heading.

M ay cause

spatial

disorientation.

During aggressive maneuvers ,

th e

heading

tape

is

disorienting.

M ay

cause

spatial

disorientation.

When performing

actions on

contact,

y ou

do

several

turns

and

your heading tape

is

all over

th e

place

in th e

H M D.

t's to o hard to check th e headings.

Still

ignore

th e

heading

tape.

Only

use

th e

boxed

aircraft

heading

tape.

In turns,

y ou

lose some of the heading

tape

and

it

is

disorienting.

Causes spatial disorientation.

N ot severe,

but after

performing evasive maneuvers y ou need

to

quickly get your

bearing.

No,

I

ignore

it usually.

•

When

banking

aircraft,

y ou

lose

part

of

th e

heading

tape

and

all th e symbology

movement

is disorienting.

10 2



Did

y o u exper ience

an y

problems using tlie

Cockpit

interactive

Keyboard

(CiK)

due

to

location o f th e

CiK?

Yes

62 %

80

100

Problems

With

Location

of

C IK

(11

comments )

• ata

entry

required m e to

lean to o

fa r forward. (3 comments) .

• ose SA entirely wh en looking

d o w n

between

legs.

•

don' t like

looking

down

fo r

extended

periods

because I lose

SA totally.

A nd

in an

aircraft,

y ou

could

experience

spatial

disorientation while

y our

head

is

i n a

different plane

than

your

body,

• don' t

like

looking

d o w n

th e whole

t ime

than I

am typing. It

should appear on

th e

screen

so

I

can

still

glance at

th e

other

screen.

•

he

front seat

in

CPC. he

CIK

w o n ' t extend

when

in

a comfortable

seating

position.

•

on't

like

looking

down.

•

orces user

to

look d o w n and

does not

allow y ou to

monitor M P D s

and MFDs.

•

equires heads

down

operation to o

long.

ose

ability

to

do

anything

else.

• ose

all

SA while

focusing

all

attention

downward.

Other

Problems (six

comments )

•

ayout

of

CIK

is a problem.

•

ould

not

enter

entries

unless

TSD

w as

a t

h o m e

position

(not have

anything

selected).

• uttons

to o

small. ayout

not intuitive.

• utton to o small,

layout not

efficient. Would prefer to

a

"QWERTY"

layout.

• eeds

to

have a

down

arrow

key

on

CIK.

•

s

to o

slow,

has

no

TA B

function

and

should

be

a

standard

keyboard.

10 3



• ould like

data to

go

to

SM D

directly and be saved

so

y ou could come back to

a

message if

necessary.

•

ould like

data to

appear

on

SM D

as

I

input

it .

herefore, I

can

keep

m y

head

up

and

still

maintain

some

SA.

•

equired

m e

to

be

"heads

down"

to

long.

Maintaining SA is

difficult

w h e n

heads

down

so

long.

•

oss of situational awareness due

to

being

involved

in

data

entry on free text

messages.

•

oes

not prompt user to

required

spaces.

• ou have to

push th e

buttons

hard to

make

an

entry.

•

f

when

entering information,

th e

system auto-filled

information

based

on

th e

type

of

data

y ou are entering,

this

would increase pilot efficiency.

• eed

a down

arrow

key

to

skip

lines

fo r data entry.

Were

there any

significant

differences

in

the

o

the following components

in

the EDS versus i

peration

th e

CPC?

Yes

No

Cockpit Interactive Keyboard

2%

98 %

Multipurpose Displays

0 %

100%

Systems

Management

Display

2% 98 %

Tactical

Situation

Display 0 % 100%

Tactical

Interface

Annunciator Panel

0 % 1 0 0 %

Head Mounted Display

0%

100%

Collective

Grip

29%

71 %

Sidearm

Controller 0%

100%

Radio

Select

Switch

on

Collective

Grip

(1 3

comments )

Radio switch positions

are

on

different axis

on

Collective Grip.

Radio select

switches

are

90

degrees

out

from

each

other.

Radio

tuning switch

is

different

in

each

s imulator

making i t extremely

difficult

to

learn to

use

it

efficiently.

Radio

select i s

opposite.

Radio frequency

switch is not identical

in

direction

(o f

actuation)

to

perform functions.

Radio select

switches

in tiie tw o cockpits

are

90

degrees

out from

each other.

The

C O M M

switch axis

of operation is

different

in

th e

EDS

vs.

th e

CPC. rimarily

used

th e

switch in th e back

seat. he

EDS

C O M M

switch does

not actuate

forward/aft. t actuates

off-center.

Radio

select

switches

are

in different

orientation

from

tiie

EDS

to

th e

CPC.

Radio

switch actuates

differently

in

th e CPC vs.

EDS.

Radio select

switches

are

different

in

EDS

than

CPC. akes

a little

longer if y ou change

radio frequencies by mistake.

Radio

select

SW not

positioned

correctly

in

th e EDS.

Radio select switches are not

positioned

correctly

in

EDS.

The

conmi. Switch on th e

hands

on grip

in th e

EDS

has

a

rotated axis

of activation

than th e

CPC.

105



Other

Differences

(two

comments)

• M D C O M M TUNE

-

Securing th e UHF and V HF radios

in

th e CPC

(is a

problem).

After

selectmg KY and

then pressing

secure

soft bezel,

y ou

have

to

oflf-tune th e

frequencies and

come

back fo r i t to

actually

go

green

on th e

R M P D.

ecuring

radios,

y ou have to

select KY

variable

(using

th e

CIK

is

very

difficult)

before

securing

th e

radio.

hese

add

great

time

to

th e

tasks

at

hand.

•

IK

in

th e

EDS

has

to

have a

warm

up

t ime

in th e

back seat before anything can b e entered.

List

any

other

crew station

usability

features

that

hindered

your

performance during

missions.

Pilot

Comments:

• emote Hellfire

page

is to o busy ' .

oo

much

information

to

look

through.

•

IAP/SMD

fimctions

that

require

user

to

focus

on

both

TIAP/SMD

are

not

user-friendly.

User

should only

have

to

focus

on

one

screen

fo r

th e

same

task.

•

eed to be able to send overiay messages

to

help change of

mission

planning.

• adio control

panel

on

left

console needs

more

lighting.

• think

that

th e

BDA

report

should assign a defauh status

of destroyed

since that is wh a t

I

pick

9 5%

of th e

time.

•

think

I should

be

able

to

select a status with th e

slew hook rather than pushing

a button on

th e TSD.

t

seems

counter-productive

to initiate

th e

message

with

th e

slew

hook, select

STAT,

push

a

button

fo r

status,

and

then

go

back

to

th e slew hook to send

th e

message.

•

he

TIAP

doesn' t display

th e

target number associated with

th e

fire

mission

when

y ou

call-

for-fire.

f y ou have multiple missions, it is

easy

to

forget which mission is

associated with

which target.

•

ord

to

th e

ProView

50

needs

a

clamp

to

secure

th e

cord

to

th e

user

to

prevent

th e

device

from

moving

during head

movements .

•

om e

sort

of off

hand controller

fo r

operations

of

left

and right

slew hooks

and

EOTADS

fimctions.

Currently,

crew member has

to

lean

to

th e left wing panel with

right

hand fo r

operation

of systems

and

i t

becomes

uncomfortable

after

a period

of time.

•

hen

wearing N BC

gloves,

th e slew to

ow n

switch

is

to o close to th e

radio select

switch and

th e details button is to o close

to

th e no

target

switch.

•

olume

ofheadset

varies

greatly

in

th e

CPC.

1 06



Appen dix

J.

u m m a r y o f

Switch

Actuat ions

Switch Actuations

N o.

Percent

Switch

Actuations

N o.

Percent

Communicat ion System (Total) 167,765

66

Target Acquisition

System

56,571

22

X M I T

O n

6 209 2

N o Target

12,300

XMITOff

61963

Find

5655

Inbox

14218

Review

5639

T SD Designate

11055

Fie ld-of-View 4542

Battle

D a m a g e

Assessment

6 9 20

T A S

4478

C om Reports

3123

Zoom

3113

Ne x t Radio

X m i t

1315

Line-of-Sight

Select

2 4 8 0

Recon-Spot

1186

Continuous O n

2442

Previous

Radio Xmit

8 9 6 Targ e t

2333

TI A P

722 Scan

2 1 8 6

Call

Fo r

Fire

557

Field-of-View Ch an g e

1950

Recon-Si tuat ion

R epor t

445

Slave

O n

1812

Preset

435

Slave

Off

1812

Free T ext

421

Label Targets

1035

ComFS

29 4

Auto Track System

9 72

R econ

271

Scan

M o d e

8 67

Arty

223

Continuous Off

69 6

Del-Save

213

La ser

O n

4 34

Situation R epor t

18 5 L ase r

Off

433

T r a nsponder

14 6

HT S Slave O n

337

M essa ge

Bar

13 9

HT S

Slave Off

337

S p o t

13 4

Setup

330

Next

P r ese t

12 6

Point-of-Interest

17 8

Previous

Preset

11 0

Next Track 87

A r m y

Aviat ion

-Re m o te

87

Previous

Trac k

51

Forward

72

I m ag e

Auto Track

39

C om Tu n e

60

Sensor

21

A r m y

Aviat ion:

BD A

54 Polarity

6

Configure

42

A im

6

Return

36

Next R a dio

33

Radio

29

X M I T

28

N e x t

26

Security

21

Previous

20

A r m y

Aviat ion

-Han d o v e r

15

A r m y

Avia t ion

14

A r m y

Aviat ion:

Target

12

A r m y

Aviat ion:

Return

9

M o v e

Display

7

Blank

3

M e ssag e List

3

Previous Radio

3

Frequency K ey

1

Select

1

10 7



Switch Actuations

No.

Percent

Switch

Actuations

N o

Percent

TSD

Functions

(Total)

13 ,224

5

Cockp it Interactive

Ho m e

9 9 0 6

Keyboard

(CIK)

(Total)

57 9

.2

To o l

8 54

Enter

579

Overlay

801

Configure

75 6

Aircraft Survivability

42 2

.2

Image

Configure

39 3

Equipment

(ASE)

(Total)

View

266

A S E E n g ag e

30 4

Window

18 3

A SE

C o m m

FS

1 0 1

HM D M o d e

42

A S E Next

17

Slave H R D l

22

Update

System Configuration

Functions (Total)

31 6

.1

M ap Functions

(Total)

6092

2

Alarms

10 6

M ap Switch D o w n

2854

System Configure

1

\J\J

9 8

M ap Switch

U p

2814

Preferences

39

M ap Detai l

424

System

Config:

N a v

Status

36

17

Weapons Functions

(Total)

3932

1 .5

Sensors

14

Detent

8 47

Co m b at

6

Trigger

Gu ard D o w n

52 9

Trigger Release

522

Flight Instruments (Total)

1 78

<.l

Trigger

Gu ard

U p

521

Flight Instruments

178

Detent

2

48 2

Missi le

Switch

328

Warnings-Cautions-

94

<.l

Missi le

M ain

256

Advisories

( W C A )

(Total)

G un

216

WC A

9 4

G un

Switch

13 9

T

M aste r

A rm

Laser

M o d e

65

27

Right

M ultipurpose

Display

( R M P D )

(Total)

Alternate Switch

#2

77

77

<.l

SM D Functions

(Total)

2 9 15

1

Flight

Control

Functions

68

<.l

Slave HR D2

1877

(Total)

SM D

Designate

1038

Altitude

Hold

Velocity Stabil ization

49

19

Navigation Functions (Total)

1844

.7

Aircraft Start-up (Total)

28

<.l

N A V Current

9 23

Start

Off

15

N A V Plan

9 21

Ignition

Auto

Ignition

Off

8

5

E ngine

Instruments

(Total)

795

.3

Engine Instruments: C o m m

437

Other Switches (Total)

81

<.l

Engine Instruments

353

A lt

59

Engine

Instruments:

M o v e

5

Landing Ge ar Switch

NoRMAD

Primary

Fire

Bottle

*J7

18

2

2

10 8



Appen dix K.

u m m a r y of

Crew

Situation

Awaren ess

C o m m e n t s

List

any instances whe n you had lo w situational awareness.

Front

Sea t

Problems

W ith

M ainta in ing

Situation Awareness D ue to

Size

of M ap

Scale-TSD

(six

comments)

•

h en

reposit ioning

aircraft ,

it

is

diff icult

to

ma int a in a wa reness

of

T SD m a p . Did n o t ha ve

g o o d

a wa reness

of w h e r e targets w e r e w h e n they w e r e

outside

T SD

screen.

•

h en in

7.2K

scale m ap

o n T S D ,

I

could n o t

see

rela t ion

of

m y

aircraft

to

my

sister aircraft

and

targets.

•

ad

lo w

SA

w h e n

f l ipping thru

m ap

scales. n

18 K

m a p

scale ,

you lose

terrain deta i l

bu t

g et

broade r

view

of

area .

n

7.2K

m a p

scale,

y o u

get

m o r e

terrain

detail

but

lose

broader

view of area.

•

hen performing

evasive

ma neuvers ,

I lose SA

whi le

ma king rapid 9 0

degree turns.

t's

easy to regain SA

wit h

m a p ,

b u t

w o u l d

b e

even

better

if contro l m e a s u r e s a n d

e n e m y

within

10 km would b e

disp la yed

o n

th e

36

km scale.

• hen m y

T S D

is

in a la rger scale,

I lost

S A

of Holding Area ,

Tact ica l

A s s e m b l y A r e a ,

and

the

route.

• h en in

7.2K sca le on

T S D ,

I los t

SA relat ive

to

posit ion in th e

zone

and rela t ive to

sister

aircraft .

L ow Situation Awareness W h e n Engaged b y

th e

Threat

(five

comments)

•

hen

being

enga ged

by

e n e m y ,

I

lose

SA

of

w h e r e

th e

e n e m y

is

enga g ing

m e

firom.

•

h en enga ged

by

threat ,

could

not

determine w h e r e th e

fire

w as

c o m i n g from

and w h e r e

I

needed to go to

deploy

to cover .

•

a d lo w

S A

w h e n

being lased b y

B M P . he

A SE wa rning

gives m a g

degrees

hea ding

ins tead

of

c lock

posit ion. Would help

to

react

quicker

to

threat

if A S E

w a r n i n g

w a s

clock

position

(i.e.,

laser

2 o'clock ).

• hen w e

w e r e

being

shot ,

th e screen blanks (goes

red) and

th e

pilot

loses

a ll

SA rela t ive

to

the

gro u nd .

•

ad low

SA

w h e n

being

sho t

at.

Other Prob lems (1 4

comments)

•

ot

having A M P S

m a k e s p re

data

entry

and miss ion

planning

diff icult

(i.e., routes

a nd

speeds) . i r speeds

should

upda t e

to a s s u m e

all

after selected w a y p o i n t

unless

locked.

•

oute

Crow w a s

picked

by

s o m e o n e

else. W e h a d n o A M P S

to

check

intervisibility

of

route.

• h en

f ly ing

format ion,

los t a wa reness

of

loca t ion

of

route.

W as

concentra t ing to o

m u c h

o n

format ion.

• h e E D S radios v o l u m e

w as to o lo w.

t

w as

very

ha rd

to

unders t a nd

th e

crew in

th e

C P C .

•

ow

S

A

w a s

d ue

to

A T C O M

failure.

109



When looking

down

to

input free

text

messages via th e CIK,

I

did not have good situational

awareness.

On

take-off, 2S6's were searching

from convoy. We were not briefed ofhost nation vehicles

v v d t h i n our

convoy.

When I

w as

inside th e cockpit inputting

a

free text message

in

th e CIK, I wasn ' t able

to

look

out

fo r

an

extended

period

and

had

lo w

SA .

The

graphics

are a little ambiguous.

ifficult

to maneuver

along

a

ridgeline

N O E

due

to

marginal depth perception.

A t

th e

very

start

of

th e

mission,

I

didn' t

have

t ime

to

look a t

TSD

m ap

to get

idea

ofwhere

I

w as

and where

I

needed

to go . have

very

lo w

situational

awareness.

Would prefer

a clock

position

instead

of a

compass

heading from

th e

warning

system.

While flying

N O E

altitudes,

it

is

very

hard

to conduct

ground

observations

to

clear around

th e aircraft.

When w e

were

busy,

I

couldn' t keep

slewing

down

to

see wh en

th e

wingman

w as

engaging

so

I

only ha d SA fo r m y

sector mos t o f

th e time.

Only w h e n

I

did not check messages and I

w as using

TA S or flying

and th e back

seater did

not

frilly explain

what

th e

messages

said.

Back Seat

Low Situation

Awareness When

Using the TSD

(eight comments)

•

hen

targets

get displaced

on th e

TSD, then it becomes confrising because w h e n i t sees

them

again,

it has new

icons.

o

y ou thmk

that

th e

enemy

has

doubled

in

size

when

it is th e

same

vehicles

seen twice.

•

ow

SA

when

using

TSD.

Remember ing

to

press "TSD Home" after any

cursor

input

is

cumbersome.

Also,

when

in

a

large

scale

(o n

th e

map),

I lost

SA

of th e surrounding

elements.

•

hen

zoomed

in

on

th e

TSD,

I

lost

awareness

of

targets

and

route.

•

ad

lo w

SA

frequently during

th e

mission. Could

not

maintain

SA

while

in

7.2

km

scale.

But if zoomed

out, y ou

lose

terrain detail.

When

A M C ,

it

hampers ability

to

fight

and

maintain SA

of

battlefield.

•

hen

dispositioning

targets

and front seater

repositioned

th e

aircraft,

I lost situational

awareness

on th e

TSD

map.

had

to

come

out

to different

scale

to

re-orient

m y s e l f

•

hen zoomed

in

on

TSD enough to se e

terrain features,

I

lost


with

other

targets and

wingman.

• ad

lo w

SA

wh en

I

scrolled

down

in m ap

scale

and pilot performs evasive

maneuvers . By

th e t ime y ou

scale

up, it takes

a

fe w

seconds

to get

your

bearing.

•

had difficulty

maintaining

SA

with

other

aircraft

when

they

were

not

close

to our

aircraft.

When battlefield

is spread out, it is

difficult to keep slewing

around to look fo r targets and

change

m ap

scales.

11 0



Low

Situation Awareness Due to

Lack

of Night Vision

Device

(seven

comments)

A s

M E P O ,

y ou have no

aircraft SA due

to

lack of

1 2

device.

Had

no

SA

of

aircraft

outside position

because

I did

not

have

1 2 .

I had

no


of

w h a t

th e aircraft flight

profile was,

w as

to o

busy

to

come

up

BUPS

to

get

a

look

around

th e

aircraft.

he

aircraft

needs

an

IRII system

fo r

th e

back

seater

to

gain

SA

of

aircraft.

Slow

SA

when

w e

were

avoiding

a target

and

I could

not

se e

outside to

engage i t

and

help

th e

pilot

maneuver.

A s th e

M E P O , y ou have virtually no SA of wh a t th e aircraft is

doing.

2

would

help a

lot.

A s

backseater, y ou have no SA

without using

TA S

BUPS.

Without

1 2 , th e M E P O

has

no aircraft

SA (a t

night).

Other

Problems

(1 1

comments)

Had

lo w

S

A

wh en

creating text messages because

it is

a

t ime-consuming

task.

Had

lo w

SA

when managing

messages.

O n

complex

missions

witii

multiple

threat,

it

is

easier

to

keep

SA

when

TSD

is

oriented

36 0

degrees

at all

times

rather

than

track.

Only

w h e n searching fo r a target

that

moved while I w as masked.

Without radar, I

did not

have

good security around th e aircraft at

all

times.

A t

one point, w e had three

2S6's searching

our area, but in

order fo r us

to

get

eyes on th e

route

w e

were

reconning,

w e had

to

come

up

in

altitude

over mountains.

When w e

were

traveUng near

towers

and

th e

front

seater w as

having

difficulty

controlling th e

aircraft,

I could

not see

out except with

TAS.

o,

I could not help

with

obstacle

avoidance.

It took a

long t ime

to

get

a

fix

on

th e

last BM P

because

he w as

up

in

th e

mountains . think I

should

have

adjusted m y

radar to

look

more

down so

that

it would

pick

him

up

faster

and

help m e

find him

sooner.

Had

lo w

SA

only

wh en wingman w as engaging

dismoimted troops. did

not know

how

long

he

w as

taking.

When engaging multiple targets, I could not read messages so I

had

no

idea

on th e

data

flow

from higher HQ .

On takeoff

fo r

a

brief

instance,

I w as

not

aware Chalk 2

had

not

left

th e

assembly area

with

us.

Ill



Acronym

List

AAR

after-action

review

A F C S

au to m ated flight contro l system

A M C

a ir

mission

c o m m a n d e r

A R L

A r m y

Resea rch Labora tory

A SE

aircraft

survivability

equipment

A T C O M

a dva nced

tactical c o m b a t

A T D - C

aided target

detection-classification

A T M

aircrew

training

m anu al

A W S

area

w e a p o n

sys tem

B D A

batt le

d a m a g e

a ssessment

B U P S

back-up pilotage

system

B W R S

Bedford

Workload Rating

Scale

C IK

cockpit interactive keyboa rd

C P C

C o m a n c h e

portable

cockpit

C W 2

Chief Warrant Officer,

W -2

E D S

engineer ing

deve lopment

simulator

E O T A D S

electro-optic

target acquisi t ion

and designat ion system

D T V

day

television

F A R P

fo rwa rd

a iming

and

refueling poin t

FDEl

Force

D e v e l o p m e n t

Ex p er im en t

FDTEl

Force

D e v e l o p m e n t Test and Experimenta t ion 1

FFE

fire for

effec t

FLIR

fo rwa rd

looking

infrared

FMSl

Full

Miss io n Simulat ion

FO V

field of

view

F R A G O

fragmentary

order

HIDSS

he lm e t

integrated display sighting system

H O G

hands-on

grip

HM D

helmet -

o r

hea d-mount ed

display

11 2



H T S

e l m e t t racking

sys tem

12

m a g e

intensif ica t ion

IM C

ns t rument

met eoro log ica l

condit ions

IR

nfirared

L M P D

eft

mult ipurpose

display

M A N P R I N T

a n p o w e r

and

personne l integra t ion

M E P

iss ion e q u i p m e n t pa cka ge

M O P

easures

of

performa nce

M O P P

iss ion-oriented protect ive posture

M P D

ult ipurpose

display

N B C

uclear ,

biologica l ,

chemica l

O M S - M P

pera t ional

m o d e

summa ry-miss ion

profi le

O T W

ut

th e w i n d o w

P O I

oint of interes t

P T W S

oin t ta rget w e a p o n

sys tem

R A H - 6 6

econna is sa nce

attack

helicopter

R C S

a da r cross

section

R M P D

igh t

mult ipurpose

display

SA

ituation a wa reness

SA L

emi-act ive

laser

S A R T

ituation

A w a r e n e s s Rat ing

Technique

SA C

ide-arm controller

SM D

ystem m a n a g e m e n t display

SM E

ubject

ma t t e r

expert

SSQ imula tor

Sickness

Quest ionnaire

T A S

a rge t

acquis i t ion sys tem

T I A P act ica l

interactive

aimunciator pa ne l

T R A D O C

ra ining

and

Doctrine

C o m m a n d

T SC

act ical

steering commit t ee

T S D

act ica l

situation d isplay

T S M - C

R A D O C

System

M a n a g e r - C o m a n c h e

T T P actics,

techniques ,

and

procedures

11 3



U S A O T C

nited

States A r m y

Operat ional

Tes t

C o m m a n d

^ C

isua l

meteorological

condit ions

W B G T

e t

bulb

globe

tempera ture

W C A arning,

caution, advisory

W S R T

i lcoxon

Signed

Ranks

Tes t

X M I T

ra nsmi t

114



N O . O F

COPI E S

R G A N I Z A T I O N

1

A D M I N I S T R A T O R

D E F E N S E

T E C H N I C A L INFO

C T R

A T T N

D TI C O C A

8725

J OHN

J

K I N G M A N

R D

ST E

0 9 4 4

FTBELVOm.

V A 2060-6218

1

D I R E C T O R

U S

A R M Y

R S C H

L A B O R A T O R Y

A T T N

A M S R L

CIAIR

R E C

M G M T

2 8 0 0 P O W D E R M I L L R D

ADELPHIMD 0 78 3-1 1 97

1

D I R E C T O R

U S A R M Y

R S C H L A B O R A T O R Y

A T T N

A M S R L

CILL E C H

L IB

2 8 0 0

P O W D E R

M I L L R D

ADELPHIMD

0 78 3-1 1 97

1

D I R E C T O R

U S

A R M Y R S C H L A B O R A T O R Y

A T T N A M S R L

D

S M I T H

2 8 0 0 P O W D E R M I L L R D

ADELPHIMD

0 78 3-1 1 97

1

D IR

FO R

PE RS

T E C H N O L O G I E S

D PY

CHIEF

O F

S TA F F PE RS

300 A R M Y P E N T A G O N C733

W A S H I N G T O N C 0310-0300

1

D IR

A R M Y

A U D I O L O G Y &

S P E E C H

C T R

W A L T E R

RE E D A R M Y

M E D

C T R

W A S H I N G T O N

D C

0307-5001

1

OUS D (A ) /D D D R&E (R&A ) /E &L S

P E N T A G O N R O O M 3D 1 2 9

W A S H I N G T O N D C 0 30 1 -30 8 0

1

CODE1142PS

O FC

O F

N A V A L

R S C H

8 00

N

Q U I N C Y S TRE E T

A R L I N G T O N

V A 22217-5000

1

W A L T E R R E E D I NST O F

R S C H

A T T N GRDUWIC C O L

R E D M O N D

W A S H I N G T O N D C

0307-5100

1

C D R

U S

A R M Y R S C H

I NST

A T T N E RI

ZT

D R E

M

J O H N S O N

5001 E I S E N H O W E R A V E N U E

A L E X A N D R I A V A 22333-5600

N O . O F

COPI E S

O R G A N I Z A T I O N

D E F L O G I S T I C S S TUD I E S

I N F O R M A T I O N E X C H A N G E

A T T N

DIRDLSIEATSZDL

B L D G

12500

2401 Q U A R T E R S

R O A D

F O R T

L E E

V A

38 0 1 -1 70 5

H E A D Q U A R T E R S U S A T R A D O C

A T T N

A T C D

SP

F O R T

M O N R O E

V A

3651

C D R

U S A T R A D O C

C O M M A N D S A F E TY

O FC

ATTNATOS E S S A G N O / L Y N E

F O R T

M O N R O E

V A 3651-5000

D I R E C T O R

D A D

D C S T

A T T N

A T T G

C

B L D G 161

F O R T M O N R O E

V A

3651-5000

HQ

U S A M R D C

A T T N

SGRDPLC

FORTDETRICK

M D

1701

C D R

U S A A E R O M E D I C A L

R S C H

L A B

A T T N

I B R A R Y

FORTRUCKER A L

6362-5292

U S

A R M Y

S A F E TY

C T R

A T T N CS S C SE

FORTRUCKER

L

6362

Cff lEF

A R M Y R S C H

I NST

A V I A T I O N R & D

A CTI V I TY

A T T N PERIIR

FORTRUCKER L 6362-5354

AIR

F O R C E

F L I GHT D Y N A M I C S

L A B

A T T N

A F W A L /F I E S /S URV I A C

W R I G H T

P A T T E R S O N

A FB O H

543 3

U S

A R M Y

N A T I C K

R D & E

C T R

A T T N STRNCYBA

N A T I C K M A

1760-5020

U S A R M Y

T R O O P

S U P P O R T

C M D

N A T I C K

R D & E

C T R

A T T N B E H A V I O R A L

SCI

DIVSSD

N A T I C K

M A

1760-5020

11 5



N O .

O F

C O P IES

O R G A N T Z A T T O N

1

U S

A R M Y

T R O O P S U P P O R T C M D

NATICKRD&ECTR

A T T N

E C H L IB

(S TRNC M I L )

N A T I C K

M A

1760-5040

1 D R

R I C H A R D J OHNS ON

H E A L T H

&

P E R F O R M A N C E D IV

U S

AR IEM

N A T I C K

M A 1760-5007

1

P R O G R A M

M A N A G E R

RA H-6 6

A T T N

FAEAVRAH

B L D G 5 6 8 1 WOODRD

R E D S T O N E A R S E N A L A L

5 8 9 8

1

N A V A L

SU B

M E D

RS CH

L A B

M E D I C A L

LIB

B L D G

14 8

B O X

9 00

S U B M A R I N E B A S E

N E W

L O N D O N

G R O T O N C T

6340

1

U S A F A R M S T R O N G

L A B /CF TO

A T T N

D R

F

W

B A U M G A R D N E R

S US TA I NE D O P E R A T I O N S

B R

B R O O K S

A FB

X 8235-5000

1

AR I FIELD

UNI T

T

K N O X

B L D G

2423 ER I IK

F O R T K N O X

KY

0121-5620

1

C D R

WHITE S A N D S M ISSILE R A N G E

A T T N

ST EW S

T E

R E

W S M R N M 8002

1

S TRI COM

12350

R S C H P A R K W A Y

O R L A N D O L

2826-3276

1

P U R D U E UNI V E RS I TY

SER IALS

UNI T

CD M K A R D E X

1535 S T E W A R T

C T R

W E S T L A F A Y E T T E

N

7907-1535

1

G O V T

PUB L I CA TI ONS LIB

409

W I L S ON M

UNI V E RS I TY

O F

M I N N E S O T A

M I N N E A P O L I S M N

55455

1

DR

R I C H A R D PE W

B B N S Y S T E M S & T E C H C O R P

10

M O U L T O N

S TRE E T

C A M B R I D G E M A 2138

N O .

O F

COPI E S

O R G A N I Z A T I O N

D R H A R V E Y

A

T A U B

R S C H S E C T I O N

S Y C H S E CTI ON

V E T E R A N S

A D M I N

H O S P I T A L

I RV I NG

A V E &

U N I V E R S I T Y

P L A C E

S Y R A C U S E NY 3210

D R

R O B E R T C

S U G A R M A N

13 2 S E A B R O O K D R I V E

B U F F A L O N Y

4221

D R

A N T H O N Y

D E B O N S

IDIS U N I V

O F

P I T T S B U R G H

P I T T S B U R G H

A

5260

MRRBEGGS

B O E I N G - H E L I C O P T E R C O

P30-18

PO B O X 16858

P H I LAD E LP f f iA

A 9142

D R

R O B E R T K E N N E D Y

E S S E X

C O R P O R A T I O N

STE227

1040 W O O D C O C K

R O A D

O R L A N D O

L

2803

L A W R E N C E

C

P E R L M U T E R

PHD

U N I V

O F H E A L T H S CI E NCE S

T H E

C H I C A G O

M E D I C A L S CHOOL

D E P T

O F

P S Y C H O L O G Y

3333 G R E E N B A Y

R O A D

N O R T H

C H I C A G O

B L

0064

G E N E R A L D Y N A M I C S

L A N D S Y S T E M S

D IV L I B R A R Y

P O

B O X

1901

W A R R E N

M I 8 0 9 0

DRMMAYOUB

D I R E CT OR

I NS T

FO R

E R G O N O M I C S

R S C H

TE X A S

T E C H UNI V E RS I TY

L U B B O C K

X 94 0 9

D E L C O

D E F SY S O P E R A T I O N S

A T T N R A C H E L

G O N Z A L E S

B204

7 410

HOL L I S TE R

A V E

G O L E T A C A 3117-2583

M R W A L T

T R U S Z K O W S K I

N A S A / G O D D A R D

S PA CE FLIGHT

C T R

C O D E

588 .0

G R E E N B E L T M D 0771

116



N O .

O F

COPI E S RGA h f lZA TI ON

1

U S

A R M Y

A T T N AVAGEDDES

M S YA:219-1

M O F F E T T

FIELD

C A

4 0 35 -1 0 0 0

1 DR

N O R M A N

B

A B L E R

D E P T

O F

C O M P U T E R

&

INFO

S C I E N C E

UNTV O F

P E N N S Y L V A N L V

P H I LAD E LP f f lA A

9 104- 6 3 89

1

C D R

U S

A R M Y

RSCHINST

O F

E N V I R O N M N T L

M E D I C I N E

N A T I C K M A

1760-5007

1 HQDA(DAPEZXO)

A T T N

DRFISCHL

W A S H I N G T O N D C

0 31 0 -0 30 0

1

H U M A N

F A C T O R S

E N G

P R O G R A M

D E P T

O F

B I O M E D I C A L E N G N G

C O L L E G E

O F E N G I N E E R I N G

&

C O M P U T E R

S C I E N C E

W R I G H T

S T A T E

U N I V E R S I T Y

D A Y T O N

O H

5435

1

C D R

U SA M E D I C A L R & D C O M M A N D

A T T N S G R D P L C T C K F RI E D L

FORTDETRICK M D 1701-5012

1 P E O

A R M O R

SYS

M O D E R N I A T I O N

U S A R M Y T A N K - A U T O M O T I V E C M D

A T T N

SFAEASMS

W A R R E N

M I

8 397-5 0 0 0

1 P E O S T R A T E G I C D E F

P O B O X 15280

A T T N

DASDZA

U S A R M Y S T R A T E G I C

D E F

C M D

A R L I N G T O N

V A

2 2 1 5 -0 2 8 0

1 JO N T A T R O

H U M A N F A C T O R S

SY S

D E S I GN

B E L L

H E L I C O P T E R

T E X T R O N I N C

P O

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48 2 M A I L S T O P

6

FT

W O R T H

X 6101

1 CHI E F C R E W SYS I N T E G R A T I O N

S I K ORS K Y A I R C R A F T M / S

S3 258

N O R T H

M A I N S TRE E T

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Assessment of the RAH-66 Comanche Pilot-Crew Station Interface for the Force

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Transcript of Assessment of the RAH-66 Comanche Pilot-Crew Station Interface for the Force