Assessing Uganda's cross-border pursuit of the Lord's Resistance Army

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Clement Ochan is rom South Sudan and lives in Nairobi, Kenya. He has worked as a Senior Research Associate andTeam Leader or South Sudan at the Feinstein International Cent er, Tu ts University, USA and is c urrently enrolledin the Centers Master o Arts in Humanitarian Assistance program. Email: [email protected]

This research is part o a larger study o the e ects o armed confict on civilian populations in northern Uganda,northeastern Uganda, and Southern Sudan undertaken by members o the Feinstein International Center.

This research was supported by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency (CIDA).

Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in cri sis through knowledge and practice

Assessing Ugandascross-border pursuit of the

Lords Resistance Army

by Clement Ochan

February 2009


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Table of C onTenTs

Glossary ..................... .................... .................... .................... ....... 2

Acknowledgements .................. .................... .................... .............. 3

Executive Summary .................... ..................... .................... .......... 4

Methodology .................... .................... ..................... .................... 5

Introduction and Historical Background ................... .................... ... 6

The UPDF in Lobone ................. ..................... .................... .......... 9

The UPDF in Nimule ................. ..................... .................... .......... 13

UPDF Reportedly Reluctant to Engage the LRA in South Sudan .... 17

Tensions and Requests or Withdrawal o UPDF ................... .......... 20

Conclusion .................... .................... .................... .................... .... 21

G lossary

CAR Central A rican RepublicCHMT Cessation o Hostilities Monitoring TeamCoH Cessation o Hostilities AgreementCPA Comprehensive Peace AgreementDRC Democratic Republic o the CongoEDF Equatorian De ense ForceGoDRC Government o the Democratic Republic o the CongoGoS Government o SudanGoSS Government o South SudanGoU Government o UgandaIDP Internally Displaced PersonLRA Lords Resistance ArmyNIF National Islamic FrontSAF Sudan Armed ForcesSPLA Sudan Peoples Liberation ArmySPLM Sudan Peoples Liberation MovementSSDF South Sudan De ense ForceUNAIDS United Nations AIDS

UNLA Uganda National Liberation ArmyUPDF Uganda Peoples De ense Force

Cover photograph, Border crossings rom northern Uganda to southern Sudan, by Khristopher Carlson


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a CknowledGemenTs

Iam grate ul to the civil authorities o Lobone and Nimule payams (districts) or

their assistance particularly in the data collection process. Their cooperation,punctuality, and advice helped make my work easier than expected. Their roles incommunity organization and provision o security to the research team wereinvaluable.

I owe an immense debt o gratitude to the community leaders, chie s, elders,women, and youth representatives who contributed to my understanding andprovided a wealth o in ormation. I appreciate that many others expressed a desireto come or interviews but due to other obligations were unable to do so.

I would like to register my appreciation to all the sta o the ollowing non-governmental agencies and churches: Catholic Relie Services (CRS); NorwegianChurch Aid (NCA); Peace and Justice (PJ); Sekina Mission International (SMI); theInternational Rescue Committee (IRC); Norwegian Peoples AID (NPA); theDiocese o Torit (DoT) and the A rican Inland Church (AIC) or their invaluablelogistical assistance and giving me access to the their acilities.

Last and not least, I am indebted to Pro essor Dyan Mazurana and Dr. Tim Morrisor their technical guidance that helped shape this article.


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a ssessinG U Ganda s Cross - border pUrsUiT of The

l ord s r esisTanCe a rmy

by Clement Ochan

E xEcutivE S ummary

In 2002 the governments o Uganda and Sudan agreed to allow the Ugandanarmy, the Uganda Peoples De ense Force (UPDF), to pursue insurgents o theLords Resistance Army (LRA) and establish bases inside Sudan. The Sudan PeoplesLiberation Movement (SPLM)at the time opponents o the Sudanese govern-ment and now leading the autonomous Government o South Sudan (GoSS)wasnot a party to the agreement, but subsequently welcomed it as an opportunity toprotect southern Sudanese in border regions rom the depredations o the LRA.

In March 2002, a UPDF base was established in the southern Sudanese border town o Lobone rom where soldiers anned out to search out LRA encampmentsinside Sudan. In 2004 a larger contingent was stationed alongside the airstrip inNimule, a border crossing town situated on the eastern side o the White Nile andon the main road between Uganda and the southern Sudanese capital, Juba. Whilethe UPDF contingent in Lobone was withdrawn a ter six months, the UPDF re-mains in Nimule at the time o writing. This is a source o ongoing irritation to theGoSS Vice President, Riek Machar, who in June 2008 called on Ugandan President

Yoweri Museveni to withdraw all UPDF orces rom Sudan.Local attitudes to the arrival o the UPDF contingents were mixed. SPLA-led

e orts to limit the impact o the Ugandan presence in Lobone were more success ulthan in Nimule where the soldiers arrived unannounced and locals report their behavior has been more undisciplined. Some local people welcomed the commer-cial opportunities provided by the presence o relatively well-paid UPDF soldiers,hoping to pro t rom selling them meat, alcohol, and vegetables. Others com-plained that their presence raised the price o basic commodities and that UPDFpersonnel, allegedly o ten working in partnership with SPLA soldiers, have beenthe main bene ciaries o the UPDF-inspired marketing boom. Local men andchurch and community leaders believe the presence o UPDF soldiers has encour-aged promiscuity and increased rates o HIV/AIDS. There is evidence that somedestitute Sudanese women have been orced (by poverty) into survival sexual liai-sons with Ugandan troops and that others have chosen to do so. Many doubtwhether the UPDF have actively pursued the LRA, or indeed whether this was the

main motivation behind its move into South Sudan, and believe the SPLA is better poised to remove the threat they continue to pose.South Sudan is strategically important to the UPDF which argues that respite

rom the 22-year-old long rebellion that has wrought havoc in northern Ugandacame only a ter Khartoum allowed the UPDF reedom to pursue LRA leader Jo-


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seph Kony into Sudan. This assertion is strongly contested by many southern Suda-nese as the LRA continues to cause havoc in South Sudan. The GoSS-brokered2006 Cessation o Hostilities Agreement between the GoU and the LRA has now

expired. LRA leader Joseph Kony has re used to ollow up on commitments madeby the LRA and sign a fnal peace agreement with the GoU. During peace nego-tiations in 2007 and 2008, the LRA continued to kill and abduct south Sudaneseand loot their property (although to a lesser extent than be ore). 1 The LRA movedits encampments to the Democratic Republic o Congo (DRC) rom where in thefnal quarter o 2008 it has carried out a ser ies o attacks, including massacres, whichhave resulted in the displacement o over 100,000 Congolese and Sudanese and theabduction o hundreds o adults and children. In December 2008, the GoU, theGoSS and the government o the DRC (GoDRC) launched major military opera-tions (Operation Lighting Thunder) against the LRA, destroying fve o its mainbases. The LRA responded with a series o vicious massacres.

The GoDRC agreed to the UPDF presence in their territory a ter years

o strongly protesting incursions by the UPDF. The DRCs policy change was dueto the extent o LRA attacks against Congolese civilians and pressure rom theUnited States. The GoSS agreed to collaborate and provide logistical support or the UPDF operation in the DRC. To date, the UPDF has been reluctant to accedeto GoSS requests or its orces to leave Sudan. The UPDF is now carrying outmilitary operations against the LRA in both the DRC and South Sudan andPresident Museveni has additionally asked the government o the Central A ricanRepublic (CAR) to allow the UPDF to pursue the rebels.

This study looks back over the years since 2002 to assess how the SPLA/Mauthorities and local communities responded to the UPDF presence in South Su-dan. It analyzes southern Sudanese perceptions o whether the UPDF supported or hindered e orts to cope with the continuous threat posed by the LRA and the roleo the SPLA in protecting them against the LRA. This analysis helps to in orm thebackground to the current stand-o between the GoSS and the GoU about thecontinued UPDF presence and the best strategy to eliminate the ongoing threatposed by the LRA.

m eThodoloGy

T he author and his research assistants collected primary data through in-depthfeld interviews. Key in ormants were in part identifed with the help o thecivil authorities, community, and church leaders. Key in ormants were then askedto help identi y other possible in ormants. Semi-structured in-depth one-on-oneinterviews and group interviews were conducted. Secondary data was gathered

1 Franois Misser, (July 2007). DR Congo: A Regional Analysis , Writenet http://www.unhcr.org/re world/country,,WRITENET,,COD,456d621e2,46c407a52,0.html.

Assessing Ugandas cross-border pursuit Ochan


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through a literature review ranging rom academic publications to grey literature.Individual interview data and observational data was collected at Nimule and

Lobone where the UPDF established bases as part o their military operations to

root out the LRA rom Sudan. The team interviewed community members whoprovided rst-hand in ormation regarding their interactions with and perceptionso the UPDF and its operations. We were also able to gather relevant in ormationregarding SPLA participation in joint operations with the UPDF at the two loca-tions. We also interviewed SPLA/M o cials, as well as local o cials. Regrettably,we were denied permission to interview UPDF o cials or soldiers operating inNimule, while the UPDF had le t Lobone be ore our research eld visits.

While we assessed the cross-border pursuit o the LRA by the UPDF beginningin 2002, the majority o eldwork was conducted during 2005 and 2006. Theauthor remained abreast o the situation on the ground, including up to the date o the release o this publication.

i nTrodUCTion and h isToriCal b aCkGroUnd

T he role o the Ugandan army in southern Sudan cannot be analyzed withoutre erence to the protracted civil wars which have brought immense su eringto the peoples o both South Sudan and northern Uganda.

Confict between northern and southern Sudan started in 1955, a year be oreSudan won independence. The rst stage o Sudans civil war ended in 1972 withthe signing o the Addis Ababa Agreement, a compromise allowing southernersa degree o autonomy. The second phase o the war started in 1983 when thenewly- ormed Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), suspicious o growing Is-lamization and moves towards imposition o sharia law, took up arms to contestKhartoums rescinding o the agreement. By 1989 the SPLA had scored a ser ies o military victories, capturing a number o Government o Sudan (GoS) garrisonsand taking control o most o southern Sudan but with the Khartoum regimecontrolling major towns. A split within the SPLA/SPLM which began in 1991seriously weakened the movement, allowing Khartoum to regain most o thecaptured towns. Negotiations brokered by the Intergovernmental Authority onDevelopment (IGAD) led to a cease re agreement in 2002. A ComprehensivePeace Agreement (CPA) was signed in January 2005 between the GoS and theSPLM in Nairobi, Kenya. It mandated the establishment o an autonomousGovernment o Southern Sudan (GoSS) and established a Government o Na-tional Unity to rule Sudan or a six-year interim period culminating in a 2011re erendum to decide whether southern Sudan should become independent. Theuneasy coalition between the Juba-based SPLM and the dominant NationalIslamic Front (NIF) regime in Khartoum is under great stress, bedeviled by slowprogress in northern military disengagement rom the south, likely ailure to meetCPA deadlines or holding local, state, national and presidential elections,



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disagreement over contested areas, and the ailure o the NIF to share oil revenues.The current confict in northern Uganda began shortly a ter the Ugandan

President Yoweri Museveni took power through an armed uprising in 1986. The

take-over by Musevenis orces, the National Resistance Army (NRA), came a ter years o turmoil dating back to the regime o Idi Amin in the 1970s. The NRAtook power a ter de eating the national army, then known as the UgandanNational Liberation Army (UNLA). Northerners (primarily Acholi and Langi)comprised a disproportionate part o the UNLA o cer corps. Fearing retributionrom the victorious NRA, many soldiers fed to the north. Some demobilized,while others crossed the border into Sudan. The NRA pursued them, some NRAsoldiers committing gross human rights abusesincluding pillage, rape, torture,the t o cattle, and destruction o in rastructure. These events sowed the seeds o rebellion in the north and the late 1980s saw the emergence o a series o resistancemovements with varying degrees o popular support. The most durable o the lineo resistance leaders was Joseph Kony and the orces he gathered about him became

known, a ter several earlier iterations, as the Lords Resistance Army or LRA.Kony based the LRA in southern Sudan in the early 1990s and received overt

support rom the Sudanese government or much o the decade as part o Khar-toums e orts to destabilize its main regional enemy, the SPLA. From sa e bases insouthern Sudan, the LRA dispatched raiding units into Uganda to loot goods andmedicines and acquire captives to support the rebel orce. In turn, the GoU sup-ported the SPLA, creating a proxy war between the two countries. Overt supportto the LRA rom the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) dwindled in the late 1990s dueto increased international pressure on the NIF regime in Khartoum.

The presidents o Uganda and Sudan agreed in 1999 to end support or theSPLA and LRA respectively and to restore diplomatic relations. A ter the Septem-ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the GoS was keen to disassociate itsel rom the LRA,deemed a terrorist organization by the US State Department. In early 2002, as parto e orts to improve its international image, the NIF government in Khartoumreached an agreement with Kampala allowing or entry o UPDF orces into south-ern Sudan as long as they remained south o the red linesome 100 km north o the Ugandan border along the road connecting the towns o Juba and Torit.

In March 2002, the UPDF launched a massive military o ensive in southernSudandubbed Operation Iron Fistintended to win a conclusive militaryvictory against the LRA. The 10,000 UPDF personnel deployed to Sudan ailed toachieve their mission. The LRA ought back using the stockpile o supplies previ-ously received rom the GoS and allegedly continuing to receive covert assistancerom the SAF and its proxy militias such as the Equatorian De ense Force (EDF)and the South Sudan De ense Force (SSDF). The LRA rebels managed to avoid themore slowly moving UPDF in the rough terrain o southern Sudan with which theLRA, unlike the UPDF, was amiliar. The UPDF ound it di cult to move its heavyartillery, tanks, and armored personnel carriers into Sudan. Instead o militarilydestroying the LRA, the campaign had the e ect o driving the LRA back into



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to southern Sudan had been involved in the war in the DRC where the AIDSepidemic has also reached chronic proportions.

An in ormant reported that:

There was good understanding between the two armies: Because when the UPDF rst came, the UPDF team held a meeting. The rst thing the UPDF were shown wasthe site allocated or their temporary barracks. It was next to the SPLA barrack at Pamaikong (south-east o the main camp). Secondly, the SPLA commander together with the civil authorities brie ed the UPDF commander about the li estyle o the com-munity here in the camp. The UPDF commanders took the same message to their soldiers. The aim o the SPLA allowing them to camp next to them was that or the SPLA to watch their movement. Because i they were to settle away rom the SPLAbarrack, they might sneak in with women or even women might tiptoe into the barracks.9

Two markets were established outside IDP camps in order to prevent UPDFsoldiers rom entering IDP camps in search o goods to purchase. One o the mar-kets sold a variety o commodities including cooked ood while the other sold onlybeer. It was agreed that the two markets would only operate between 7 am and 5pm. The SPLA and the civil authorities urged the IDPs to take their wares to sellin these two new markets and encouraged them to raise their prices in order topro t rom the relatively well-paid soldiers. UPDF commanders accepted these ar-rangements. 10 These markets thus provided everything soldiers requiredcookedood, beer, soap, chicken, goats, and resh vegetables. Vendors were warned againstselling alcohol to UPDF soldiers who appeared to be drunk.

The authorities encouraged local people to report any abuses o the regulations.Some local chie s reportedly assigned male youths to support the authorities inmonitoring the behavior o UPDF soldiers. 11 While this was denied by the police weinterviewed, it was reported that youths did en orce the rules about market hoursand tipped o the police about cases o drunkenness and UPDF soldiers startingrelationships with local women. One woman involved with a soldier was arrested on dubious legal groundsas a warning to others. An in ormant told us that:

A woman who was trying to sneak into the UPDF camp, was arrested but later released. The UPDF soldiers would have spoilt the local women had they beenallowed to move reely in the villages. It is because o rmness and tight security bythe SPLA that it succeeded.12


9 CRS Compound worker, Lobone, interview, 17 June 2006.

10 Civil Administrator, Lobone Displaced Camp, interview, 22 June 2005.

11 Senior Police O cer, Lobone interview, 17 June 2006.

12 Former NGO Compound worker, Lobone interview, 18 June 2006.


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The UPDF presence brought an infux o money into the Lobone IDP camps.Whereas traders o non-essential goods had previously largely depended on customrom NGO sta they now catered to the needs o the Ugandan soldiers. Traders

would shuttle between Uganda and southern Sudan to bring in i tems such as beer and so t drinks which were popular with the UPDF. The presence o the soldierscaused a hike in the price o ruit and vegetables. Meat was in short supply and theprice o chickens and goats tripled. Ducks and rabbits, hitherto very cheap, shot upin price. Women who vended kasesekasese a potent alcoholic drink produced inUgandamade quick pro ts. It was possible to buy 20 liters o the alcohol inUganda or UGSH 30,000 and dilute and sell it in Lobone or UGSH 120, 000. 13 Procedures to tax the pro ts o traders who bene tted rom the UPDF presencewere haphazard, giving rise to rumors that bribes were being exchanged.

Success in controlling the movement and interaction between the UPDFsoldiers and residents o the IDP camps can be attributed to the combined e ort o the SPLA, the local community, the police, and the civil authorities. A respondent

expressed the views o many:

What matters here is how they (UPDF) were controlled, which was diferent romthe way they were treated in Nimule, where they were le t to move randomly the waythey wanted.14

Another commented that:

Lobone administration was their medicine. Here the UPDF were not given a chance.I think they did a wonder ul job, because there was no complication between the UPDF and the population. 15

Ethnic homogeneity was a key actor in enabling the authorities to control theUPDF in Lobone. The act that the majority o the current resident population areDinka and that the Dinka language is widely understood by the authorities and thecivilian population enabled the astute payam administrator to minimize tensions.Most local respondents told us that they believed the UPDF achieved the objectivesthat brought it to Lobone. On joint operations with the SPLA, LRA bases in Ta-langa were discovered and destroyed. They also pointed out that or the six to sevenmonths the UPDF orces were in Lobone, the IDP camps were not attacked by theLRA and the rebels did not come closer.

In ormants attributed the relatively low number o incidents and con rontationscaused by sexual liaisons to proximity to the Ugandan village o Aweno-Olwi.


13 CRS Compound worker, Lobone interview, 17 June 2006.

14 Civil Administrator, Lobone Displaced Camp, interview, 22 June 2005.

15 Former NGO Compound worker, Lobone interview, 18 June 2006.


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Thirteen kilometers inside Uganda, Aweno Olwi had long been a weekly marketwhere vendors rom Uganda and Sudan bought and sold basic commodities. Thepresence o the UPDF in Lobone caused the market to expand to include prostitu-

tion and beer.16

Ugandan women built structures where they sold beer andkasesekasese and o ered sexual services. Since the UPDF movement within Lobonewas closely monitored, it was easier or them to cross the border and go to Aweno-Olwi where they could interact more reely with Ugandan women.

In general, ears expressed be ore the UPDF soldiers came to Lobone that theywould cause problems among the local population and promote immorality were notrealized. The Dinka have a strong cultural commitment to maintaining moral values,tending to strictly control sexual relations between outsiders (i.e., non-Dinkas) andDinka emales. Dinka identity is in large part constructed around their ability to protectthe honor o their women (which o ten translates into strict control o Dinka womenssexual and social behavior). Marriage between non-Dinka men and Dinka women israre, whereas Dinka men marry reely rom other peoples. A non-Dinka who gets

involved with a Dinka emale can expect to be beaten. One respondent told us that:

To us as Dinka, we dont expect our women to go to any strange men; this is our way of keeping our identity as Dinkas.17

Due to the level o poverty in the camps the civil authorities were concernedthat their women would be vulnerable to UPDF soldiers using cash to lure themand then spreading HIV. There were a number o widows as well as wives o SPLAsoldiers living in the IDP camps. The civil authorities and the police claimed thatthey were protecting the human property o their allen heroes and their brothersin the war ront.

T he Updf in n imUle

N imule, also a payam in Magwi county, is a border town on the junction o theWhite Nile and Anyama rivers. Home to the Madi, the town is also inhab-ited by IDPs that are members o other southern Sudanese ethnic groups includingthe Acholi, Lotuko, Bari, Dinka, and several others. When the town was captured bythe SPLA in 1989, most o the local Madi people fed Sudan and became re ugeesin Uganda. Some returned although the war in Sudan was still continuing, pre er-ring home li e to living as re ugees. As in Lobone, there was a signi cant displacedpopulation o IDPs. Some 19,000 were settled in Mugali I and II and roughly 7,000in Masindi camp. Mugali I and II are located about 24 kilometers north east o Nimule town and Masindi about our kilometers north east rom the main town.


16 CRS Compound worker, Lobone interview, 17 June 2006.

17 Senior Police O cer, Lobone interview, 17 June 2006.


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There were two other camps: Olikwi, about two kilometers to the east o Nimuletown, had a population o 3,646 returnees mainly rom the Madi people 18, and Jellecamp situated a ew kilometers along the Juba road. Nimule is a bustling town with

numerous small businesses. Cross-border trade and population movement meansthe Ugandan shilling and Sudanese pound are both used.

Nimule hosts a large population o displaced people o Dinka origin, who fedthe civil war in the Bor region o Jonglei in the 1990s. An NGO survey in April2006 indicated that more than hal the residents o Nimule are o Dinka origin. 19 E orts to encourage their repatriation have not succeeded. Local people say resent-ment toward the Dinka is based not only on their acquisition o land, but also theact that key positions in the military, police, and customs are held by Dinka, not bylocal Madi people.

In 2004, a unit o UPDF orces was sent to Nimule to track down the LRA.They were settled just next to the airstrip about one kilometer rom the main town.Unlike in Lobone, the local authorities and traditional leaders did little to prepare

communities or the arrival o the UPDF orces. The civil population was notwarned in advance that the UPDF were coming and UPDF personnel were notgiven the brie ng their colleagues received in Nimule about how to interact withthe local, IDPs and returnee populations. This resulted to a number o tensionsbetween the UPDF and residents.

Local in ormants in Nimule said that the UPDF ailed miserably in huntingdown LRA rebels. O cials interviewed in Nimule thought the UPDF were in-competent, a orce sticking to conventional tactics, patrolling in armored vehiclesand unable/unwilling to nd and engage the LRA (detailed below).

Relationships between the UPDF and SPLA in Nimule were unstable. At timesthe two armies conducted joint operations against the LRA but mostly arguedabout tactics. An SPLA (a Lokoya Community leader) interviewee spoke or manywhen he said that UPDF soldiers were not as skilled as they should have been inengaging the LRA. He said:

There are incidents when the UPDF turned their arms on us rather than fghting the LRA. For example, it happened to us that when we escorted them [UPDF] and elt the place we were in was dangerous, we warned them that the place was bad, so we had to re-plan an exit, they insisted that we go orward. Suddenly, we ell in an LRAambush, we were shot at and scattered. To our dismay the UPDF started to shoot at us and killed seven o our soldiers. We escaped through a stream called Lu ro. We were so scattered that every one ran on his own way. A ter reaching the SPLA base, we reported the incident to Commander Obuto Mamur. He then came and he asked the UPDF to explain why and how the incident occurred. They said it was just an accident,


18 SRRC database 2005.

19 Sudan Tribune , Boomtown Sudans Nimule under strain, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22344


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they didnt know they had allen in an ambush. I have experienced a lot o this kind o situations with the UPDF because I used to work with them during the operations.20

A group o SPLA soldiers expressed similar sentiments, accusing the UPDFsoldiers o laxity in pursuing the LRA. They claimed that whenever UPDF soldiersengage the LRA, they dont re directly at them but instead pretend to be tryingto capture the LRA soldiers alive. Another SPLA soldier who took part in a jointoperation with the UPDF to ollow the LRA recounted his rst hand experience:

These people [UPDF] on Dec. 8th 2005, I went with them, to ollow the enemy[LRA]. When we got the LRA, instead o ghting them, the UPDF said no we donot want to ght the LRA. Moreover it was me who escort them and showed themthe LRA hideout and we could see some LRA rebels drinking water. To my surprise,the UPDF soldiers pretended not to have seen the LRA. In a group o seven we moved nearer the LRA and I made sure that they saw them. Instead o attacking the

LRA, they decided that we go back to the group o soldiers we le t behind.

Although the respondent said they were well armed and could have ought theLRA, the UPDF stopped them rom ring as they claimed they had to return or rein orcements.

We discussed and were insisting to go and ght the LRA. From there the UPDF soldiers told us that they have to go or rein orcement, an order that we heeded. A ter that we spent seven days. A ter seven days, we went back and ailed to get LRA. That incident touched me and made me to be angry about behavior o the UPDF. This iswhy I say UPDF were sent here just to stay in one place not to clear this LRA sothat the people have peace. So that incident really annoyed me so much. This made me to decide in my heart that i this is the way soldiers can behave, I would not join the army. I it were me commanding the orces, I would have ordered attack on the LRA.21

In Nimule many in ormants spoke scathingly o the UPDF. One told us:

The UPDF presence in the area is completely useless. They are not protecting the residents rom the LRA, who are displacing the local communities while UPDF are

just watching. What is their work? And what do we expect rom them? I the LRAcan still move reely and the UPDF are around we will begin to question the purpose o their being in the area. We actually thought that the presence o UPDF in the areahas got nothing to do with the security o the people in the area. When the LRAattack a place, the UPDF only pursued them or about ve km then they came back


20 Lokoya Community leaders, interview, 21 March 2005.

21 Lokoya Community leaders, interview, 21 March 2005.


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instead o ollowing them properly. It is my view that the presence o the UPDF in Nimule is only encouraging more insecurity in the area.22

A local priest pointed out that the presence o the Ugandan soldiers had worsenedsecurity:

Be ore the coming o UPDF the LRA would move about without killing people. But since the UPDF soldiers came the LRA soldiers are behaving like wounded bufa-loes. It is like the LRA have realized that they are being ollowed. Now they kill anybody who crosses their path. It is like they want to die with as many people as

possible. That is why the situation instead o improving, it is getting worse.23

Our fndings echo those reported by Small Arms Survey researchers:

The animosity towards the UPDF in Eastern Equatoria is striking. Locals and

international security observers alike accuse them o having orchestrated attacks made to look like LRA actions, an explanation that has also been used by the LRA toclear themselves o blame. O ten, however, even the locals have trouble telling one armed group rom another. Others point out that the UPDF started sponsoring EDF 2, a successor o the EDF, to maintain insecurity in Eastern Equatoria and toclear the LRA rom the area. Witnesses describe how South Sudanese and ormer LRA ghters were recruited into the 105th battalion o the UPDF to enter Sudanand ght the LRA with its own people. The 105th is also said to be one o the more success ul UPDF battalions in engaging the LRA militarily. Locals say that it wasused to set up attacks made to look like LRA activity and that its soldiers were still very active in the area in the spr ing o 2007. While it remains almost impossible tosubstantiate such claims, they underline the murky and lawless environment. While there is little doubt that individual soldiers or units have abused their military pow-er, it is hard to establish the institutional motivation.24

The UPDF are also accused o ocusing on drinking and womanizing. Thepopularity o the UPDF soldiers with the local women and girls appears to stemrom the act that they were almost the only wage earners in a highly impoverishedregion. Soldiers took advantage o their economic might to lure the local womenand girls into sexual liaisons. There were many incidents involving UPDF soldiersand local women which went unreported. Among those that were reported, one


22 Catholic Diocese o Torit Pr iest, interview, Nimule, 19 March 2006.23 Pastor o the Nimule Evangelical Free Church o Sudan, interview, Nimule 17 March 2006.

24 Mareike Schomerus (2007), The Lords Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview,Small Arms Survey, Geneva, p. 31 http:/ /www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=87841


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included a case in March 2004 o a UPDF soldier who paid UGSH 50,000 to sleepwith the wi e o an SPLA soldier. He was arrested, convicted o adultery, sentencedto six months in jail and ordered to pay a ne o seven head o cattle or its equiva-

lent (UGSH 960,000, $480). The soldier paid the ne and was released, while thewoman was sent back to her husband. 25 In another incident a UPDF soldier oundin bed with a wi e o an SPLA soldier was brought be ore the local SPLA com-mander, not the county judge. The o ending UPDF soldier had to pay UGSH860,000 which was to be deducted rom his monthly salary by his commander. TheSPLA is not supposed to play a judicial role but in this, and other cases, it was al-leged that senior o cers prevented cases going to court so that they could illicitlytake a proportion o the nes paid by UPDF soldiers. 26

Updf r eporTedly r elUCTanT To e nGaGe The lra in s oUTh s Udan

ANimule court member, ormerly with the SPLA, reported that joint SPLA-LRA operations led members o the SPLA to doubt the sincerity o theUPDF claim to want to eradicate the LRA. They noted that most o the UPDForces stationed in Nimule were Acholi, the ethnic group rom which most LRAghters are drawn. The SPLA speculated that these UPDF troops seemed hesitantto attack their ellow Acholi. One in ormant asked:

What are the UPDF soldiers here for if they dont kill the LRA? How can one catchan enemy with a gun? Secondly, some UPDF soldiers were overheard saying in their

Acholi language that a dog cannot bite a fox. This means they are the same people,therefore can not harm each other.27

Critics have suggested that it has not been in the interests o the GoU to ensurethat the LRA is de eated. The GoU has presented its war with the LRA as part o theglobal war on terror and received nancial and military support rom the UnitedStates and other Western donors. Rumors abound among people in Nimule that inorder to continue these fows, it was necessary or the UPDF to spin out the campaign.

What is beyond doubt is that the UPDF was extensively engaged in naturalresource extraction during its participation in the DRC civil war. Ugandan militarysupport or the rebellion o Laurent-Dsir Kabila which eventually led to theoverthrow o the regime o Mobutu Sese Seko was accompanied by plundering o DRCs natural resourcescoltan, diamonds, timber, and gold. The Congolese civil


25 Nimule Payam Court Panel, interview, 18 March 2006.

26 Magwi County Court member, interview, 26 March 2006.

27 Nimule Payam Court member, interview, 18 March 2006.


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war served both to enrich members o the ruling Ugandan political elite whilstsimultaneously serving their national political ends. 28

Some UPDF orces have reportedly looked or similar opportunities to engage

in lucrative illegal activities in southern Sudan. An interviewee told us:

You see when the UPDF were here [in Lobone], they were saying, they would just die here without bene ting since there was nothing to go back with to Uganda, unlike in Congo, where they got many things including American dollars, gold, and manyothers. That is why they started to look or other ways o making quick money.29

In 2007 the Small Arms Survey alleged that the UPDF was ocusing on loggingo teak trees in the Palotaka area o Sudans Eastern Equatoria region instead o prosecuting the war against the LRA. Teak, a tropical hardwood used mainly inbuilding ships and manu acturing outdoor urniture, is valuable because it has natu-ral oils that makes it water resistant. The Small Arms Survey report quotes local

leaders:

Since the UPDF came to Sudan, they never had a ace-to- ace con rontation withthe LRA. It is like the LRA has been given sa e passage. People wonder why the UPDF is here. I their presence in Sudan can still aggravate tension with the LRA,why can they not move behind re lines? The UPDF should be asked politely toleave. Their presence is not very wise to reach a tangible peace with the LRA.30

Our in ormants urther accused the UPDF o seizing Sudans natural resources.Under the guise o using helicopters to trans er wounded personnel back toUganda the UPDF carried mahogany logs:

Helicopters would go rom here [Lobone] to Talanga. Talanga has a fat place where a helicopter can land sa ely. A ter the UPDF completed the road work between here [Lobone] and Talanga, the helicopter began to requent that area and it was later reported to civil authorities in [Lobone] that they were errying mahogany logs romthe area be ore they were stopped.31


28 See, or example, Peter Danssaert and Brian Johnson Thomas (2006), Greed and Guns: UgandasRole in the Rape o the Congo, IPIS, Antwerp. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fles/portal/spotlight/country/a r_pd /a rica-uga-drc-2006.pd

29 CRS Compound worker, Lobone interview, 17 June 2006.30 Mareike Schomerus (2007), The Lords Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview,Small Arms Survey, Geneva:30-31 http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=87841

31 Former NPA cook/SPLA soldier.


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LRA changed tactics and increased the requency o its attacks on the local popula-tion in southern Sudan. These attacks generated panic and increased displacementamong the local population in Magwi County, especially within Pageri, Nimule,

and Mugali payams. Between March and May 2005 there were at least our LRAattacks around Nimule to which the SPLA did not respond. LRA cross-border at-tacks, killings and abductions o populations in and around Nimule continuedthroughout 2006-2008. The joint UPDF/SPLA attack on December 14, 2008, andsubsequent military operations, has resulted in the LRA moving into South Sudanand increasing its attacks there. In view o the ailure o the SPLA to protect themcivilians, including local leaders and elders, have repeatedly asked the SPLA authori-ties or weapons to de end themselves but their requests have been turned down.

Many people we spoke with resent what they perceive to be the attitude o Dinka SPLA soldiers that it is the duty o the Madi and the Acholi, and not theSPLA, to de end their tribesmen. The SPLA, they eel, is punishing the Madi andthe Acholi as they did not enthusiastically support the SPLA in their rst years o

struggle and are now being e ectively le t to end or themselves against a brutaland well armed LRA.

T ensions and r eqUesTs for w iThdrawal of Updf

T ensions between erstwhile allies came to a head around an incident alleged tohave taken place in the village o Nyongwa in Pageri Payam in Western Equa-toria in mid June 2008. Armed raiders stole provisions rom households o ex-re -ugees who had recently been repatriated rom Uganda and abducted a man later ound dead. The GoSS Vice-President Riek Machar accused the UPDF o mas-querading as LRA rebels and carrying out the raid. Citing the discovery o a UPDFback-pack as evidence, he said that GoSS President Salva Kiir had instructed theSPLA chie o sta , General Oyai Deng Ajak, to in orm Ugandan authorities thatthe UPDF should leave the country. Machar said that there was no operationalprotocol to keep the UPDF in southern Sudan, that the agreement they had reachedwith the Khartoum government had expired in 2006, and that the SPLA is now anorganized army able to take charge o security in the territory o southern Sudan. 35

Captain Chris Magezi, the UPDFs o cial spokesman, refected Kampalas surpriseat the announcement, saying that:

The UPDF has had good relations with the SPLA and civilians during the last sixyears. The two armies share intelligence in ormation and conduct joint operationsagainst the LRA. We also have a history o solidarity in the resistance against Ara-bisation o the black southerners. Uganda has also hosted several Sudanese re ugees


35 Sudan Tribune , July 5, 2008 www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article27745


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for decades. Why then would the UPDF now choose to hurt the people of SouthSudan? Our stay or departure from South Sudan will be discussed at the highest

political level between Kampala, Khartoum and Juba.36

Ugandas International A airs Minister Okello Oryem reported that the GoUhas not received any ofcial communication requesting withdrawal o UPDForces and challenged the GoSS understanding o the agreement allowing UPDForces to operate in Sudan. He was quoted in the Ugandan press as saying that:

When the North and the South signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in [January] 2005, it became automatic that UPDF could then go beyond the four degrees latitude (also known as the red line) to pursue LRA in all places in Southern Sudan.37

The Ugandan press quoted South Sudans President Salva Kiir as saying theGoSS had not expelled the UPDF rom its territory, thus urther showing the ri t

between Kiir and Machar. To date, UPDF units remain inside southern Sudans ter-ritory as part o military operations against the LRA. They are also positionedwithin the territory to possibly provide sa e passage or the rumored impendingsurrender o LRA deputy commander Okot Odhiambo. 38

C onClUsion

Seven years a ter the agreement to allow the UPDF to operate in southern Su-dan it is clear that their presence has not improved security or either Sudaneseor Ugandan civilians. Operation Iron Fist and successive military operations haveailed to dislodge the LRA rom Sudanese territory. From bases in the DRC andthe CAR the LRA remains able to move reely in Eastern and Western Equatoria.A ter a period o relative calm ollowing the 2006 cease re a rejuvenated LRA isusing brutal terror tactics o abduction, rape and massacres even o those seekingsanctuary in religious institutions.

In retrospect, it is hardly surprising that the UPDFs cross-border operation hasbeen such a dismal ailure. The GoSs strategy in allowing UPDF entry to Sudanwas deeply cynical. In 2002 the Khartoum regime was keen to shed its interna-tional image as a sponsor o terrorism. Formally abandoning support or the LRAand apparently encouraging pursuit o the rebels was clearly in the NIFs interestsas Khartoum sought to demonstrate it was an active partner in the war on terror.


36 New Vision, July 16, 2008 www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/459/639393

37 The Independent , http://www. riends orpeaceina rica.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=231&Itemid=110

38 New Vision, February 20, 2009 http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/670905


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The terr itory inside the red line on the eastern side o the Juba-Torit road whichthe UPDF was not to cross was SPLA-controlled so UPDF soldiers would pose nomilitary threat to the GoS. The red line allowed LRA rebels to cross into GoS con-

trolled territory knowing they would not be pursued by the UPDF.Ugandas motives were similarly couched in the new global terror discourse.

Museveni was keen to secure US patronage and to present the UPDFs struggleagainst the LRA as an anti-terror war. In 2002, the GoU passed a Suppression o Terrorism Act, which imposed mandatory instant death penalties or terrorists andcollaborators o terrorists. The United States then signi cantly increased militaryaid to Uganda as a partner in the global war on terror. Many suspect that it is notin the interests o the UPDF to secure a clear-cut military victory against the LRAor this would lead to cessation o generous military aid.

Minority groups and communities without connections to those in power in Juba and Kampala are particularly at risk. Testimonies gathered during this researchcon rm the widespread judgment that the SPLA is incapable o protecting the

Acholi, the Madi, and other ethnic minorities rom the LRA and has been unwill-ing to pressure Dinka IDPs into returning land to its original owners. There is awidespread perception that the SPLA is unwilling to help members o those com-munities who did not welcome its arrival and support its struggle.

The International Crisis Group warned in late 2008 that the LRA was en-trenched along the borders o DRC, Sudan, and the CAR, terrorising communitieswhile engaged in lucrative illegal trade in gems, gold and ivory. 39 It has potential tospoil prospects o regional peace. Should the NIF wish to disrupt either the na-tional elections scheduled or later this year or the scheduled 2011 re erendum onwhether South Sudan should secedeboth o which are mandated under theterms o the CPAthen the LRA is poised to again serve the GoS as a vital proxyand counterweight to the military orce o the SPLA.

All the regions conficts are linked. Western donors should urgently invest inpeace dialogues, supporting civil society initiatives to reconcile communities andethnic groups, rather than continuing to generously und the UPDF. Policymakersneed to acknowledge that:

The UPDF is not pursuing the objectives cited in 2002 by the GoU to justifymilitary intervention outside its borders.

The SPLA should protect all southern Sudanese communities from LRAattacks as not doing so will urther alienate non-Dinka populations.

There is a real risk that the north-south Sudanese civil war could reignite. The LRA retains capacity to wreak untold havoc on civilian populations.


39 International Cr isis Group. (10 December 2008) Northern Uganda: The Road to Peace, With or Without Kony. International Crisis Group: Brussels. A rica Report N146 http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/news/146-northern-uganda-the-road-to-peace-with-or-without-kony.pd


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The populations at risk from the LRA now include southern Sudan,westernand northern Uganda, northern and eastern DRC, and southern CAR.

Given thatthe LRA has beenconducting operations in South Sudanthroughout

the peace negotiations and in the a termath o Operation Lighting Thunder, itis imperative that that SPLA seal its border with the DRC and actively pursueLRA rebels that have crossed into and are currently attacking civilians insideSouth Sudan.

Assessing Uganda's cross-border pursuit of the Lord's Resistance Army

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