This paper examines aspectual

be–type constructions in African American English.These constructions receive a habitual interpretation, but they are distinguished fromsimple tense generics in that they are not ambiguous between generic/habitual andcapacity readings. The analysis proposed to account for these constructions is one inwhich aspectual be neutralizes the distinction between stage- and individual-levelpredicates. Following Kratzer (1995), I assume that stage-level predicates have aseparate event argument associated with them, but individual-level predicates do not.Aspectual be forces individual-level predicates to take an eventuality argument whichcoerces them into stage-level predicates. The logical representations of these con-structions are given a tripartite structure in which a habitual operator binds variablesranging over eventualities.

The analysis can be extended to account for constructions in which permanentlystable entities indicated by bare plural subjects occur with be–type predicates. Thesolution proposed here accounts for some well-known properties of aspectual be thathave not been discussed in the literature.

1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N

African American English (AAE) distinguishes two types of genericity,as given in the sentences in (1–4). In one type of construction, representedby the generics in the (a)-sentences, the verbs are in simple tense, whilein the other type, represented by the (b)-sentences, aspectual be is in con-struction with V-ing:

(1) a. Mice squeak.b. Mice be sqeaking.

(2) a. Bruce sing.1

b. Bruce be singing.

(3) a. Bruce write novels.b. Bruce be writing novels.

LISA GREEN

Natural Language Semantics

8: 1–25, 2000. 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

ASPECTUAL BE–TYPE CONSTRUCTIONS AND

COERCION IN AFRICAN AMERICAN ENGLISH*

* This paper is based on research that I began in my dissertation. I am grateful for detailedcomments provided by Angelika Kratzer and Manfred Krifka. I also wish to thank two anony-mous NALS reviewers for their comments. All errors and omissions in this paper are myresponsibility.1 In general, there is no number distinction in AAE. Number marking is often leveled inthe direction of the plural, so both singular and plural subjects take verbs that are not overtlymarked for number. In some cases, however, singular and plural subjects take singular verbforms in the non-past.

(4) a. They have money.b. They be having money.

The two types of constructions have slightly different meanings, which havenot been clearly explained in the literature. Sentences such as those in (a)will not be discussed in detail. The purpose of this paper is to present aninformal description and formal account of the type of construction in the(b)-sentences, the aspectual be–type constructions. The analysis in this paperbuilds on the distinction between stage- and individual-level predicatesproposed in Kratzer (1995), in which stage-level predicates take aDavidsonian event argument. The solution that I propose is one in whichpredicates in be–type constructions take an occurrence of an eventualityargument. In this way, individual-level predicates in the construction arecoerced into stage-level predicates.

Section 2 provides an informal introduction to aspectual be–type con-structions, presenting the general meaning of the constructions and examplesof the contexts in which they are used. Be–type constructions will be infor-mally distinguished from simple tense sentences in that the latter areambiguous between a generic/habitual and capacity reading, but the formerare not. Section 3 continues the informal discussion by placing AAE inthe context of other languages that distinguish two be’s and by presentinga general overview of the differences between copula/auxiliary be andaspectual be and comparing aspectual be–type constructions to progres-sive constructions. The discussion in section 4 gives an overview of thetreatment of generics in the literature and moves to an analysis of aspec-tual be–type constructions in AAE. A habitual operator (HAB) is introducedinto the logical representations of be–type sentences and argued to bindan eventuality argument in the restrictive clause and in the nuclear scope.Aspectual be–type constructions are distinguished from simple tensegenerics by their quantificational property. The predicates in the construc-tions are viewed as having habitual readings, while simple tense genericsare not obligatorily interpreted in such a way.

In section 5, the relationship between restriction and pragmatic deter-mination in aspectual be–type constructions is discussed. The view is thatit is not necessary to appeal to a separate DEFAULT operator to account forcases in which the restriction is not explicitly given. In the final section,be–type constructions in which the individual-level predicate selects a uni-versal reading of bare plurals are considered. This section focuses on howit is possible for be–type predicates to modify permanently stable proper-ties of entities indicated by bare plural subjects.

2 LISA GREEN

2. I N F O R M A L C H A R A C T E R I Z AT I O N O F A S P E C T U A L B E –T Y P E

C O N S T R U C T I O N S

The meaning difference between the sentences in (2a) and (2b), repeatedhere as (5a) and (5b), respectively, can be captured by the notions habitand occasion:

(5) a. Bruce sing.b. Bruce be singing.c. Bruce can sing.

The sentence in (5a) can have the reading of an existential generic, in whichthe meaning is roughly that there is the possibility that Bruce can singand that he does not object to singing; he does not actually have to sing.The sentence in (5b), an aspectual be–type construction, indicates that theproperty expressed by the predicate occurs on particular occasions. (5b)means that Bruce actually sings (usually sings) on particular occasions.The distinction between (5a) and (5b) is that the latter indicates that thesinging necessarily happens on particular occasions; Bruce has the habitof singing.2 The sentence in (5c) is included to show that a separate sentenceis used to express the ability to sing.

The particular occasions of occurrence of eventualities can be speci-fied by temporal phrases such as when he go to parties, as in John bedrinking when he go to parties.3 Carlson (1989) notes that one functionof the when-adverbial is to pick out instances of what is expressed by thepredicate, in which case instances of John’s drinking are picked out in(the Standard English [SE] sentence) John drinks when he goes to partiesand in (the AAE sentence) John drink when he go to parties. In theaspectual be–type construction and the simple tense construction, the when-clause can be taken as specifying a restriction on the temporal background.But note that even without the temporal modifier, John be drinking mustmean that drinking takes place on different occasions, which is not neces-sarily the case for John drink. I will return to this point in the discussionin section 4.

Aspectual be–type constructions cannot be used to refer simply to a

ASPECTUAL BE–TYPE CONSTRUCTIONS IN AAE 3

2 Lawler (1973) notes this distinction for SE. For example, he explains that the sentenceBill walks to school receives a habitual interpretation such that Bill walks to school “almostall the time.” On the other hand, the sentence Harry’s dog chases cats is not necessarilyinterpreted as habitual. The sentence can be true, for instance, if Harry’s dog has chasedone or two cats that he has spotted (pp. 4–5).3 I adopt Bach’s (1981) notion of eventuality as a general term that refers to states, processes,and events.

general property of an individual or species. On the other hand, simple tensesentences can refer to a general property without reference to frequency.This difference can be illustrated by the following sentences. The simpletense sentence can be used in one context, but the be–type constructioncannot be used in that same context:

(6) a. This printer print a hundred pages a minute.b. This printer be printing a hundred pages a minute.

The sentence in (6a) is a statement about the general property of the speedat which the printer is said to be able to print, although it may not often(if ever) have the opportunity to print a hundred pages per minute. Perhapsthe longest documents printed on it are between twenty and twenty-fivepages long. Whereas (6a) can be used to make a general statement aboutthe speed and the number of pages the printer prints per minute, (6b) cannotbe used to express such a general property. The sentence in (6b) is a state-ment about the actual printing activity, and it implies that the printer actuallydoes (i.e., has already printed a hundred pages per minute) what it hasthe capacity of doing.

The distinction between (6a) and (6b) is along the lines of the distinc-tion between the sentences in (7a) and (7b), in which the adverb usuallymay or may not cause a significant change in meaning (Krifka et al. 1995):

(7) a. Mary handled the mail from Antarctica.b. Mary usually handled the mail from Antarctica. (p. 9)

The sentence in (7a) can have a reading in which Mary was in charge ofmail from Antarctica even if mail never came from there, “or that shehandled some particular batch of mail of Antarctica.” If we consider thefirst reading, then the adverb usually only causes a slight change in meaningsuch that there was actually mail that came from Antarctica. On the otherhand, if we take the second reading, the adverb imposes a stronger readingon the sentence in (7b), resulting in a significant change in meaning. Themeaning shifts from a report about a specific event or fact to a generalrule. In effect, (7b) is a quantificational statement.

Schubert and Pelletier (1989) note that the following sentences areambiguous between a generic/habitual and a capacity reading:

(8) a. This car goes 200 kph.b. Kim reads German.c. Robin rides horses. (p. 216)

On the generic/habitual reading, the interpretation is that the car oftengoes 200 kph ((8a)), that Kim usually reads German ((8b)), and that Robin

4 LISA GREEN

regularly rides horses ((8c)). However, on the capacity reading, the inter-pretation is that the car has the capacity to go 200 kph ((8a)), that Kimcan read German ((8b)), and that Robin knows how to ride horses ((8c)).The sentence in (6a) is ambiguous between the generic/habitual and thecapacity reading noted by Schubert and Pelletier. However, the sentencein (6b) is not ambiguous; it only has the habitual interpretation.

There is no certain number of times greater than the number one thatan eventuality expressed by a predicate has to have occurred to be usedin aspectual be–type constructions. The requirement is that the eventu-ality expressed by the predicate be well-established by having occurredon particular occasions. This observation also holds when the eventualitydescribes a state, as know does in (9):

(9) Mary be knowing the answer.

The eventuality indicated by know does not have inherent endpoints; thusit seems paradoxical to talk about its habitual recurrence. The state holds,so initially it seems that the only way that the statement in (9) can makeany sense is if there are times when Mary does not know the answer, timeswhen the knowing state does not hold. This issue will be raised again insection 6, in the discussion of stage- and individual-level predicates.

The predicate in be–type constructions can describe a dynamic or staticeventuality, but the eventuality is always interpreted as if it has endpoints.In the following section, AAE will be compared to languages in whichtwo be’s are distinguished, and aspectual be–type constructions will becompared to other be constructions in AAE.

3 . T W O BE ’ S I N AAE

AAE, like other languages, distinguishes two verbs be. Doherty (1996)argues that in Irish the copula (is) is used to indicate that the subject is amember of a set ((10a)) and the substantive be (tá) occurs with states ((10b)).Also, the substantive verb be is used to indicate temporary properties ((10c)):

(10) a. Is fear é.COP man him (ACC)

‘He is a man.’

b. Tá sé ina fhear (anois).be he in-his man now

‘He is a man (now).’ (p. 38)

ASPECTUAL BE–TYPE CONSTRUCTIONS IN AAE 5

c. Bhí Seán ina dhochtúir tráth.was Seán in-hi doctor once

‘Sean was a doctor once.’ (p. 40)

Doherty concludes that it is possible to characterize the copula construc-tion as one that is used with individual-level predicates and the substantiveverb construction as one that is used with stage- and individual-levelpredicates.

Ramchand (1996) makes a similar observation about Scottish Gaelic(SG), noting that the copula (is) occurs with the individual-level readingand the non-copular form (tha) occurs in contexts that may be ambiguousbetween stage- and individual-level predicates. Representative examples aregiven below:

(11) a. Is faicilleach Calum.COP-PRES careful Calum

‘Calum is a careful person (by nature).’

b. Tha Calum faicilleach.be-PRES Calum careful

‘Calum is (being) careful.’ (p. 173)

In Spanish, ser and estar, equivalents of be, occur in different contexts.Ser has been characterized as indicating identification or predication whenused with nouns ((12a)), pronouns, and prepositional phrases and indicatinggeneral properties when used with adjectives ((12b)). On the other hand,estar occurs with locations ((13a)), the progressive (13b)), and adjectives((13c)) to indicate a change in a state or to predicate temporary proper-ties of individuals:

(12) a. María es medico.‘María is a doctor.’

b. Las flores son bonitas.‘The flowers are beautiful.’

(13) a. El correo está en la esquina.‘The post office is on the corner.’

b. Juan está cantando.‘Juan is singing.’

c. Este postre está muy rico.‘This dessert tastes delicious.’

6 LISA GREEN

At least two be’s are distinguished in AAE: the copula/auxiliary be givenin (14),4 and aspectual be, given in (15), which has been informally char-acterized in section 2:

(14) a. The student Ø talking to the teacher.5

‘The student is talking to the teacher.’

b. The student Ø in the classroom.‘The student is in the classroom.’

(15) a. The student be talking to the teacher.‘The student is usually/always talking to the teacher.’

b. The student be in the classroom.‘The student is usually/always in the classroom.’

Both be’s occur with V-ing, as shown in (14a) and (15a), and the con-structions can have similar meanings. For example, both of the followingcases can be true even if Bruce does not complete the house:

(16) a. Bruce Ø building a house.b. Bruce be building a house.

However, there are some differences between the two constructions.6 Thefollowing points suggest that sentences such as the one in (14a) exhibitthe properties of the progressive, but sentences such as the one in (15a)do not always fall in line with the progressive:

ASPECTUAL BE–TYPE CONSTRUCTIONS IN AAE 7

4 The copula/auxiliary be occurs on the surface in specific environments. It obligatorilyoccurs with first person singular:

(i) I’m here/running. *I here/running.(ii) She(’s) here/running.

The copula/auxiliary be also occurs in certain defined syntactic environments: (1) in emphaticconstructions when it has a pitch accent (She IS here), (2) in questions when it is in COMP(Is she here?), and (3) in past tense (He was running).

Note that the be form can occur on the surface in the sentences in (14a, b) in emphaticcontexts:

(iii) The student IS talking to the teacher.(iv) The student IS in the classroom.

5 The symbol ‘Ø’ will be used to indicate the zero copula/auxiliary be in AAE.6 One possible distinction (that will not be discussed in this paper) is that between thefunction of -ing in aspectual be constructions and its function in the progressive. It hasbeen argued that the progressive -ing stativizes predicates (Vlach 1981; Smith 1997). Green(1993) suggests that -ing in aspectual be constructions is an agreement marker that matchesthe iterativity of be.

1. The be in the aspectual be–type V-ing construction is not inflected fortense, but when the copula/auxiliary be occurs on the surface in finitepositions, it is always inflected for tense.

a. He be reading.b. He Ø reading. (cf. He IS reading.)

2. The aspectual be–type V-ing construction only has a habitual reading.

a. He be reading too loud.‘He is usually reading too loudly.’/‘He usually reads too loudly.’

* ‘He is reading too loudly (now).’

b. He Ø reading too loud. (cf. He IS reading too loud.)

3. Verbs describing states can occur in aspectual be–type V-ing construc-tions, but verbs describing states do not usually occur in progressiveconstructions.

a. She be knowing the answer.b.*She Ø knowing the answer.

4. The eventuality in be–type V-ing constructions can be interpreted asalready being in progress before the time indicated by a when-clause, andit can also be interpreted as starting after the time indicated by the adver-bial. On the other hand, the eventuality in the progressive is interpretedas already being in progress before the time indicated by the when-adver-bial.

a. Bruce be crying when the teacher call his mother.‘It is usually the case that Bruce is already crying when theteacher calls his mother’ or‘It is usually the case that Bruce starts to cry when the teachercalls his mother.’

b. Bruce Ø crying when the teacher call his mother. (I.e., Bruce’scrying is already in progress when the teacher calls his mother.)

This section has presented data showing that AAE patterns with a numberof other languages in using different be’s to indicate different meanings.A broad generalization is that there is a distinction in AAE between thecopula/auxiliary be and aspectual be. There are obvious differences betweenthe copula be on the one hand and the auxiliary be on the other, but theywill not be discussed here, as the focus of the paper is on aspectualbe–type constructions.

8 LISA GREEN

So far in this paper, ‘generic’ has been used as a cover term to refer toaspectual be–type constructions and simple tense constructions. To distin-guish the two, I will often use ‘habitual’ to refer to the aspectual be–typeconstructions and ‘generic’ to refer to the simple tense constructions.

4 . G E N E R I C S A N D H A B I T U A L S

The literature on genericity is vast.7 Heim (1982) represents generic con-structions in a tripartite structure that consists of an operator, a restrictiveclause and nuclear scope: [Quantifier, X, S]. The adverb of quantification,always, binds free variables in its scope. Enç (1991) and Wilkinson (1991)introduce a generic operator that is quantificational and binds variables overtime. It has also been noted in the literature that generics and habitualsare related, and treatment has reflected this relationship. Carlson (1989),in his analysis of generics, notes that habituals are characteristically similarto them. Gerstner-Link and Krifka (1993) (based on Krifka and Gerstner1987) discuss the similarity between habituals and indefinite genericityand present an analysis that is consistent with the tripartite structure intro-duced in Heim (1982). The claim is that a generic operator (GEN) is usedin both types of sentences. Consider the interpretation for the followingSE sentences:

(17) a. John smokes after dinner.GEN (x = John

∧ after-dinner(s) ∧ in(x, s); smoke(x, s))

b. John smokes.GEN (x = John ∧ in(x, s); smoke(x, s)) (p. 975)

The reading of (17a), the habitual construction, is that usually if John isin a situation (s) such that (s) is after dinner, he will smoke then. Notethat in (17b), the generic construction, there is no explicit phrase restrictingquantification, so it says that if John is in a situation, he smokes then.Both sentences allow for exceptions, so if from time to time John doesnot smoke after dinner or in some situations, the sentences can still betrue. That is, if s is a situation that is not conducive to smoking (e.g.,John is in a nonsmoking restaurant, asleep, out of tobacco products), Johnneed not smoke in s. The way in which the strong interpretation that Johnsmokes in all situations is ruled out is by fixing the interpretation of the GEN

operator. A suggestion by Gerstner-Link and Krifka is that the operator isinterpreted as a non-monotonic inference rule. In such a case, “the knowl-

ASPECTUAL BE–TYPE CONSTRUCTIONS IN AAE 9

7 For an extensive bibliography on genericity and related topics see Carlson and Pelletier(1995).

edge that s satisfies one of these conditions would have as a consequencethat John does not smoke in s, and this positive knowledge would preemptthe conclusion warranted by the non-monotonic inference rule that Johndoes smoke in s” (p. 975). This semantic interpretation of the GEN operatorweakens the statement in (17b) by allowing it to be true when John is insituations in which he does not smoke.

One of the advantages of the analysis is that it can account for existen-tial and universal genericity (as identified in Lawler 1973) by using the sameGEN operator. This point is further illustrated by the sentence John drinksbeer, which can be interpreted to mean that John does not object to drinkingbeer (existential genericity) or that John has a habit of beer drinking(universal genericity). In the existential genericity reading, drinks is in focusand stressed, whereas in the universal genericity reading, the VP is in focusand beer is stressed. Examples are given in (18b) and (18c), respectively:

(18) a. John drinks beer.b. GEN (x = John ∧ beer(y) ∧ in(x, s) ∧ in(y, s); drink(x, y, s))c. GEN (x = John ∧ in(x, s);

∃y[beer(y) ∧ drink(x, y, s)] (p. 975)

The representation in (18b) says that if s is a situation in which beer isavailable, John drinks it, while that in (18c) says that when John is in s,he typically drinks beer. The semantic interpretation of the GEN operatormust also weaken the statements in (18b,c), as we do not expect that Johnwill drink beer if certain circumstances prevent him from doing so.

Sentences such as those in (17a,b) and (18a) occur in AAE (cf. Johnsmoke after dinner and John smoke), and the Gerstner-Link and Krifkaanalysis can be extended to them. In effect, a sentence such as (17b) hastwo different AAE interpretations, one expressed by the simple tense con-struction and the other expressed by the aspectual be–type construction. Theanalysis using the GEN operator and quantifying over situations wouldadequately account for the corresponding AAE sentences. As such, theanalysis can be extended to account for simple tense sentences such asthe ones in (1a), (2a), (3a), and (6a). However, it is not clear that the analysiscan adequately account for the aspectual be–type constructions that are beingreferred to here as habituals. One problem with extending this analysis tothe aspectual be–type constructions is that they do not have the existen-tial generic reading.

This section reviews the analysis in Gerstner-Link and Krifka (1993) thatis proposed to account for generics and habituals in SE. Whereas the analysiscan account for simple tense generics, it is not clear that it can accountfor habitual be sentences. The following section presents an analysis ofaspectual be–type constructions in AAE.

10 LISA GREEN

5. A S P E C T U A L B E -T Y P E R E P R E S E N TAT I O N S

5.1. A Pragmatics Variable

In the general description in section 2, habitual be constructions wereinformally characterized as constructions that mark the recurrence of aneventuality. In the analysis presented here, the logical representations ofthese constructions are given a tripartite structure: [Quantifier, X, S]. In thatrepresentation, ‘Quantifier’ corresponds to the Habitual Operator (HAB),X to the restrictive clause, and S to the nuclear scope, as shown below:

(19) a. Bruce be crying when the teacher call his mother.b. HAB [call his mother (the teacher, e)] [cry (Bruce, e)]

The habitual operator (HAB), which is introduced in the logical represen-tations of be–type constructions, binds variables ranging over eventualities.The HAB operator fulfills the function of relating an eventuality expressedby a predicate to an occasion. (19b) says that habitually, on occasionswhen the teacher calls Bruce’s mother, Bruce cries then. In these con-structions, the eventuality indicated by the predicate has been establishedas a regular or habitual occurrence, so the sentence in (20) cannot havethe weaker meaning that it is possible that Bruce will cry or that he hascried:

(20) a. Bruce be crying.b. HABe [(P, e)] [cry (Bruce, e)]

This is one reason why the analysis offered by Gerstner-Link and Krifka,in which focus can be used to distinguish existential and universal gener-icity, is not adequate for aspectual be–type constructions, although theydo bear marked similarities to simple tense generics.

I would like to make the even stronger assertion that the HAB operatorcannot be weakened to allow for situations in which Bruce is not crying.The GEN operator can be interpreted in such a way to rule out situationsin which the event does not occur. But in the aspectual be–type construc-tions, the eventuality expressed by the predicate does occur just at thespecified times in the restrictor. We want to avoid the interpretation thatBruce is not averse to crying, but we should also avoid the interpretationthat Bruce cries in all situations. In (20b) the predicate variable P is usedto capture the pragmatic restrictions that are not given in the sentence.Such a variable is used in Krifka and Gerstner (1987) “to single out apragmatically salient occasion” (p. 10). In (20b), the occasion is not spec-ified explicitly in the antecedent, but the information can be filled in by

ASPECTUAL BE–TYPE CONSTRUCTIONS IN AAE 11

the pragmatics. The HAB operator binds an eventuality argument in therestrictive clause and in the nuclear scope, thereby relating the eventu-ality expressed by the predicate ‘crying’ to particular occasions, whichare picked out by the pragmatics variable. This pragmatics variable can alsobe extended to cases such as the one in (19b), in which the value for P isalready supplied. This is shown in (19b′):

(19) b′. HABe [P = when the teacher call his mother, P(e)] [cry (Bruce, e)]

5.2. Pragmatic Restrictions

Pragmatic information is important in the interpretation of aspectual be–typeconstructions just as it is important in the interpretation of generics (referredto as simple tense constructions). In (20b) the pragmatics variable ‘P’ isused in the determination of the restrictive clause; quantifier restriction isbased on pragmatic sources. In effect, both generics and aspectual be–typeconstructions are dependent on context.

Von Fintel (1994) presents an analysis that explains how these prag-matic sources affect the interpretation of quantifiers. He notes that in somecases, the situations restricting the domain of quantification cannot beretrieved from a prior discourse topic nor can they be retrieved frompresuppositions. This is illustrated in his sentences (cited from Schubert andPelletier 1989) in (21):

(21) a. Bullfighters are often injured.b. Muggers often threaten their victims with a knife.c. Hit-and-run drivers are almost always caught.

Although it is the case that in (21a–c) quantification is over bullfightingsituations, mugging incidents, and hit-and-run accidents, respectively, thesesituations are not given by presuppositions of the sentences. Von Fintelpresents a picture in which the link between pragmatic sources and quan-tifier restriction is indirect. His view is that such interaction betweenquantification and pragmatic information is not a grammatical process.

If the pragmatic source were indirectly linked to the restrictor, then itwould be possible to achieve the results of default quantification withoutinvoking an operator that would have the task of restricting the range towhich the HAB operator will apply. Such a DEFAULT operator is used in Krifkaand Gerstner (1987), and it “restricts the universal quantification to casesin which the consequent is compatible with the explicit or derived infor-mation assumed so far” (p. 7). This operator is based on default states of

12 LISA GREEN

affairs and is treated as a quantifier. Consider the DEFAULT operator in(22b):

(22) a. John smokes.b. ∃P[DEFAULT ([x = John′, P(t)], [smoke′(x, t)])]

This example says that x is John; t is some pragmatically specified occasion,and John smokes at t by DEFAULT, that is, if there are no extenuating cir-cumstances preventing him from smoking. In effect, if nothing leads usto assume the opposite, we can assume that John will smoke on somespecified occasions. The DEFAULT operator may be one way of makingexplicit the interpretation of the GEN operator in (17b). It was necessaryto interpret the GEN operator as weakening generic/habitual statements. Bothrestriction and the DEFAULT operator appeal to background knowledge, sothe DEFAULT operator may not be needed if it is possible to restrict therange of quantification by establishing a link between pragmatic sourcesand quantifier restriction. Given von Fintel’s argument about the prag-matic variability of the restrictive clause, we can represent be–typeconstructions without a separate DEFAULT operator.

I suggest that when restriction in be–type constructions is not explic-itly given, it is determined pragmatically. Some constructions occuroptionally without temporal restrictors (while others that will be discussedin section 6 occur obligatorily without temporal modification), but all con-structions are interpreted as if they are restricted in some way. If therestriction is not given explicitly or cannot be supplied by the context ofthe discourse, then it must be supplied by pragmatics. Consider the sentencein (23):

(23) Platform heel shoes be making your feet hurt.‘Platform heel shoes usually make your feet hurt.’

Quantification in this sentence is over situations of wearing platform heelshoes for an extended period of time. It is in such be–type constructionsthat there must be some source of pragmatically determined quantifierrestriction.

6 . BE –T Y P E S TAT E S

6.1. States and Coercion

In AAE, stative verbal predicates can occur in the -ing form in be–type con-structions, as shown in (24) (cf. the discussion of states and the progressivein section 3):

ASPECTUAL BE–TYPE CONSTRUCTIONS IN AAE 13

(24) a. Sue be having a lot of books.‘Sue usually/always has a lot of books.’8

b. Sue be knowing that song.‘Sue usually/always knows that song.’

The sentences in (24a,b) express the same type of meaning expressed bysentences such as the one in (19a), in which the crying eventuality occurson different occasions. This property of occurring on different occasions hasalready been attributed to the eventuality variable that is associated withpredicates in be–type constructions. The predicates have in (24a) and knowin (24b) refer to more static properties, yet they can occur in be–type con-structions to yield a reading in which they express a general property but,crucially, in which the eventuality is understood as holding on differentoccasions. Given the argument in Kratzer (1995), the representations forpredicates indicating more permanent properties are different from thoseof stage-level predicates.

Kratzer introduces into the representation of certain sentences an eventvariable that is bound in quantificational contexts. This variable is in anextra argument position found in stage-level predicates, given that theyare non-permanent eventualities, which can be associated with spatiotem-poral locations. Kratzer argues that stage-level, but not individual-level,predicates have this extra event argument as proposed in Davidson (1967)associated with them, and therefore can be modified by temporal and spatialexpressions. In the following examples from Kratzer, the stage-level pred-icate is dancing can be modified by spatiotemporal predicates, on the lawnand this morning (p. 128):

(25) a. Manon is dancing on the lawn.[dancing(Manon, 1) & on-the-law(1)]

b. Manon is dancing this morning.[dancing(Manon, 1) & this-morning(1)]

c. Manon is a dancer.[dancer(Manon)]

The stage-level predicate is dancing is distinguished by a Davidsonian eventargument, which is indicated by the variable, so it can be modified by alocative, but the individual-level predicate does not have a Davidsonianargument associated with it and cannot be modified by a locative. An

14 LISA GREEN

8 This sentence can mean that Sue usually owns a lot of books, or she usually has a lot ofbooks with her.

important point that Kratzer makes and that will be considered in theanalysis of be–type constructions is that if an individual-level predicateoccurs with a spatiotemporal argument, it is coerced into a stage-levelpredicate. The process of coercion or shift in types has been discussed inrelation to various topics in the linguistics literature. Moens and Steedman(1988) consider change in aspectual type effected by tenses, temporaladverbials and aspectual auxiliaries. They refer to “such modifiers asfunctions which ‘coerce’ their inputs to appropriate types . . .” (p. 17). Smith(1995) considers shifts in situation types as changes from state to activity,activity to state, and achievement to accomplishment.9 Also, Pustejovsky(1995) presents an elaborated discussion of coercion (type coercion, subtypecoercion, and complement coercion) as a semantic transformation thatinvolves shifting of one type to another. In principle, the use of the termcoerce to explain the process of an individual-level predicate becoming astage-level predicate in be–type constructions is in line with the use ofthe term as it applies to semantic and aspectual types. Be–type coercioninvolves a process that takes a stative predicate and changes it to a dynamicpredicate.

As shown in the examples in (25a,b), the spatial and temporal expres-sions also take an occurrence of the Davidsonian argument, which relatesthem to the stage-level predicate that has an occurrence of the variable.Kratzer presents data from variable binding and extraction facts to supportthe claim that there is an extra argument position in stage-level predicates.These data will not be addressed here. Note that the shift from an individual-to a stage-level predicate is a productive process:

(26) a. Richard is nice.b. Richard is being nice.

(27) a. Richard is a nuisance.b. Richard is being a nuisance.

The (a)-sentences are distinguished from the (b)-sentences by virtue ofthe occurrence of an event argument associated with stage-level predi-cates in the latter sentences.

ASPECTUAL BE–TYPE CONSTRUCTIONS IN AAE 15

9 Smith illustrates with the following examples:

(i) a. Sam resembles his great aunt. (stative)b. Sam is resembling his great aunt more and more these days. (activity)

(ii) a. The bird flew. (activity)b. The bird was in flight. (stative)

(iii) a. The old man died. (achievement)b. The old man finally finished dying. (accomplishment)

One way to capture the meaning of the aspectual be–type constructionsin (24) is by representing the predicates as taking an extra argument thatwould give them stage-level properties. That is, aspectual be would forcesome type of spatiotemporal argument to be present. In this way, predi-cates would indicate transitory properties, such as “has a lot of books onparticular occasions” (i.e., be having) and “knows a song on particular occa-sions” (i.e., be knowing). Kratzer makes just the point that predicates thattake the spatiotemporal argument become stage-level predicates. It maybe argued that Kratzer’s generalization holds for the constructions in (28b)and (29b); the predicates in the nuclear scope take an extra argument,which turns the otherwise individual-level predicates into stage-level pred-icates.

(28) a. Sue be having a lot of books.b. HABe [P(e)] [(∃x) [a lot of books(x) have (Sue, x, e)]]

(29) a. Sue be knowing that song.b. HABe [P(e)] [(∃x) [that song(x) know(Sue, x, e)]]

The representation in (28b) says that habitually on some occasions (spec-ified by pragmatics), there are some books that Sue has on those occasions.The sentence in (29a) says that habitually on some occasions (specifiedby pragmatics), there is some song that Sue knows. This process of becoercion is quite productive, as indicated by be + stative verb construc-tions and examples such as the following:

(30) a. Richard Ø nice.b. Richard be nice.

(31) a. Richard Ø a nuisance.b. Richard be a nuisance.

In his discussion about the inherent genericity of individual-level predicates,Chierchia (1995) characterizes the shift from individual-level to stage-level predicates as occurring in special contexts. For example, in thesentence in (32), John is either behaving intelligently or “switching hismental capacities on and off in an abnormal manner” (p. 178):

(32) John was intelligent on Tuesday, but a vegetable on Wednesday.

Chierchia’s characterization is relevant to the instances in which aspec-tual be forces an individual-level predicate to shift to a stage-level predicate.

Given that the states in (28) and (29), indicated by have and know,

16 LISA GREEN

respectively, name more permanent properties, it is a challenge to explainthe temporal restrictions responsible for the ‘on occasions’ reading. If statesremain unchanged, does it make sense to talk about the differentoccasions during which someone has knowledge? But even eventualitiessuch as the state in (29) should be thought of as having a temporal restrictor(although it is pragmatically determined) or as being stage-level. In the caseof Sue be knowing that song, the focal point is on a subset of times duringwhich Sue demonstrates that she knows the song, although it is highlyprobable that Sue also knows the song during times when she is not singingit (or demonstrating that she knows it). In effect, quantification is overparticular occasions during which Sue shows that she knows the song.Perhaps these are times when she is in a singing contest, times when sheis in the car singing the song along with her favorite radio station, or timeswhen she is performing with the members of her choir group. Because thesethree situations require prior knowledge of the song, it is obvious that Suecannot just ‘know’ the song during those particular occasions, but she hasto have some knowledge of it before those times, and if the normal courseof affairs continues, she will know the words to the song after the timesare over. Nevertheless, this otherwise inherently individual-level predicategets a stage-level interpretation in the be–type construction. Hence, thepredicates in (28) and (29) are represented as including an eventualityargument identical to the one associated with the stage-level predicate in(19).

The source of the eventuality argument has not been addressed; however,it has been implied that the eventuality argument is associated with stage-level predicates. In the case of (19a), the predicate is inherently stage-levelbut in (28a), the predicate gets a stage-level reading by coercion. If thisassociation between an extra argument position and a stage-level predi-cate is interpreted along the lines of Kratzer (1995), then the argumentstructures of stage- and individual-level predicates are different, as theformer, but not the latter, have the extra event argument in their argumentstructures. Kratzer’s view is challenged in Ramchand (1996), in which adistinction is made between the Kratzerian event argument and theDavidsonian argument. One of the distinctions that Ramchand makes is thatthe Kratzerian event argument is associated with stage-level predicates,but the Davidsonian event argument is present in the argument structuresof all predicates. Ramchand assumes an analysis in which “the event variablepresent in the semantic representation is a property of the predicational struc-ture as a whole, not of the individual verbal or adjectival predicate” (p. 177).She demonstrates with the following examples from SG:

ASPECTUAL BE–TYPE CONSTRUCTIONS IN AAE 17

(33) Tha Calum a’smocadh.Be-PRES Calum ag smoking.

‘Calum is smoking (right now).’

Stage Level∃s[s has the property of being an event of a particular kind]∃s[λe[. . . . . .] (s)]

(34) Is dhotair Calum.Cop-PRES doctor Calum

‘Calum is a doctor.’

Individual Level∃x[x has a particular property]∃x[λx[. . . . . .] (x)]

In stage-level predication (33), a situational variable is bound by theexistential quantifier. In effect, s in the representation in (33) can havethe property of being a smoking event. The representation makes refer-ence to a situational variable and a Davidsonian event argument.10 Thesituational variable refers to the event expressed in the sentence, and theDavidsonian event argument is the variable associated with all verbs.11 Inindividual-level predication (34), a non-event variable is bound by theexistential quantifier. In the representation in (34), x can have the propertyof being a doctor. On this account, the stage-level construction involvespredication of a situation type, while the individual-level constructioninvolves predication of an individual type. Further, Ramchand also arguesthat the element “base generated in [Spec, IP] is the ‘subject’ of predica-tion and forms the restrictor of the intuitive existence operator” (p. 178).This is in line with Ramchand’s claim that the individual-level subject(34) is base generated in [Spec, IP]. On the other hand, in the case ofstage-level predication (33), “an abstract event variable is introduced inthe semantics, and that event is the semantic ‘subject’ of the predicationalsubject” (p. 178). If the distinction that Ramchand makes it correct, then

18 LISA GREEN

10 See Parsons (1990) for a thorough discussion of arguments in support of an underlyingevents analysis. Higginbotham (1985) also discusses the type of event argument proposedhere.11 Ramchand uses lambda conversion to unify the situational variable and event variablein (33) into one event in a structure that may be represented roughly as follows:

(i) Tha Calum a’smocadh.Be-PRES Calum ag smoking

‘Calum is smoking (right now).’∃s[λe[smoking (Calum, e)]](s)

there are two types of interpretations for event variables: the Davidsoniantype, which is always present, and the Kratzerian type, which is presentin the argument structures of stage-level predicates.12

It has been established that an eventuality variable occurs in the repre-sentation of be–type constructions. The question is whether the eventargument is always present in the argument structures of all verbs or whetherit is associated with stage-level predicates. One general reason for arguingthat an event variable is always present is that individual-level predicatescan get a stage-level interpretation in specific contexts. Note that all typesof XP’s, including nominals, can occur in be–type constructions, as shownin (35):

(35) a. Bruce be running. VPb. Bruce be on the corner. PPc. Bruce be there. AdvPd. Bruce be knowing the answers. VP, where V is stativee. Bruce be nice. AdjPf. Bruce be the choir director. NP

It may be that even nominal predicates can occur with aspectual be, becausethey also have an event argument in their argument structures. As a result,they can be interpreted as stage-level. Sentences such as those in (35),especially those in (35d–f ), in which the predicate is individual-level,strongly suggest that the marker be forces an event reading on the predi-cates. Consider the following sentences, in which the (zero form of the)copula be occurs in (36a) and aspectual be in (36b):

(36) a. John Ø the choir director.b. John be the choir director.

The sentence in (36a) can have an individual-level or stage-level reading.It can be used in a context in which John has been named the choir director,although he has not had the opportunity to direct the choir. Also, thesentence can be used in a context in which John has been named the choirdirector, but he has only directed the choir once. Finally, the sentence canbe used in a context in which John is the person who usually directs thechoir. In all of these sentences, John has the property of being a choirdirector. The sentence in (36b) is only used in the context in which Johndirects the choir on different occasions. The sentence has a stage-level

ASPECTUAL BE–TYPE CONSTRUCTIONS IN AAE 19

12 Chierchia (1995), among others, also supports an analysis in which every verb has aDavidsonian type argument; that is, all verbs take an extra argument that ranges over situ-ations.

reading, and the NP the choir director allows for that reading although itis predicative and inherently individual-level.

The readings of predicates in be–type constructions are consistent withthe kind of analysis proposed by Kratzer, in which an event argument isassociated with the stage-level predicate. In other words, predicates inbe–type constructions receive a stage-level interpretation because there isan eventuality variable in their argument structures that is forced byaspectual be.

6.2. Bicycle Sentences

Given the appropriate context, virtually any predicate indicating a statecan occur in construction with aspectual be. The eventuality indicated byscared naturally expresses a transitory property, so the construction in (37)gets a stage-level reading without setting up a special context:

(37) I probably can make it pretty good, but I be scared of the otherpeople.‘. . . , but I am usually scared of the other people.’

Contextual meaning: I probably can drive well in the ice andsnow, but when I’m driving in that weather, I am usually afraidof the way other people are driving.

In this case, the HAB operator binds an eventuality argument that is alreadyassociated with the stage-level predicate, and the indication is that thereare occasions of being scared.

So far, it has been argued that verbal predicates (e.g., have, know) thatname individual-level properties and transitory states (e.g., is scared) receivea stage-level reading in be–type constructions. However, not all states inconstruction with aspectual be are as easily interpreted as stage-level. Theconstructions that raise questions for the stage-level readings of predicatesin aspectual be sentences are those involving bare plurals and predicatesthat indicate a permanently stable property of an entity. The sentences inthis group are similar to a descriptive sentence about particular bicycles pre-sented in Fasold (1972), given in (38a) below, so I will refer to them asbicycle sentences.13 Consider the bicycle sentences in (38):

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13 Fasold (1972) presented the sentence in (38a) in his discussion of tense marking inAAE. He noted that the sentence was peculiar in that the predicate did not refer to aneventuality that expressed recurring states of affairs. His data led him to conclude that bicyclesentences are very rare. It is clear, however, that these sentences occur quite freely in con-versation.

(38) a. Some of them be big and some of them be small. (Fasold 1972, p. 151)

‘It is usually/always the case that some of them are big and someof them are small.’ (gloss mine)

b. Sam’s wholesale stores be on the outskirts of town.‘It is usually/always the case that Sam’s wholesale stores areon the outskirts of town.’

Fasold characterizes the subject in the sentence in (38a) as being distrib-uted over time. I suggest that what is indicated by the sentence in (38a)is that the bicycles exist in big and small sizes, so there may be situationsin which members of this class of bicycles are big and situations in whichother members of this class of bicycles are small. Similarly the sentencein (38b) means that there are situations in which Sam’s wholesale storesare on the outskirts of town. The predicates describing the size of thebicycles (‘are big and small’) and the location of Sam’s wholesale stores(‘are on the outskirts of town’) name more permanent states, so the bicyclesare not to be understood as changing sizes nor are the stores to be inter-preted as changing locations. In this way, the bicycle sentences differ fromother be state constructions in which the predicate names a temporarystate (cf. (37)).

If the states in the sentences in (38) are permanent, how is it possibleto represent them with aspectual be, which is argued to force a stage-levelreading of predicates? The statements are based on generalizations derivedby observations during particular times, or encountering entities at partic-ular times, such that these bicycles are continually appearing in differentsizes and Sam’s stores are generally being built outside the city limits. Timein these bicycle sentences may be thought of as metaphorical. Recall thatin section 5.2, it was argued that in some be–type constructions, restric-tion must be supplied by pragmatics. For example, in the case of Fasold’ssentence, quantification is over situations of encountering bicycles. Theelement of time is associated with encountering entities and individuals,so in the case of bicycles we may consider a shift from entities to time.As is the case with Sam’s stores, time can be extended to some spatialdimension such as location.14 Binnick (1991, p. 4) comments on the wayin which time is “conceived of in spatial terms,” and he further notes thatexpressions used to indicate location are also used to situate events: in 1990,in Toronto; on December 15th, on 5th Avenue; at noon, at the corner of5th Avenue and 42nd Street; before the party, before the judge.

ASPECTUAL BE–TYPE CONSTRUCTIONS IN AAE 21

14 I am grateful to Manfred Krifka for pointing out this use of time to me.

As with generics, there may be exceptions with bicycle sentences, soSam’s stores can usually be found on the outskirts of town, but they mayon occasion be located in the center of town. A notable distinction hereis that the predicates in the be-type constructions that have been discussedin previous sections are iterable, but those in the bicycle constructions donot seem to be. Chierchia (1995) suggests that individual-level predicatesare not iterable due to their tendential stability. He goes on to note that “theirduration tendentially occupies a significant portion of an individual’s lifespan” and that “the tendential stability of i-level predicates triggers apresupposition that there is going to be at most one state of the relevantsort . . .” (p. 216). Naturally, during their life spans, a bicycle will remainin the state of being a certain size, and a Sam’s store will remain in astate of being in a certain location.

In the cases in (38), we get a universal reading of bare plurals withindividual-level predicates, but to characterize these sentences by just thisproperty would be an inadequate account of their meaning. To see this,we can compare (38a) (repeated as (39a)) and (39b):

(39) a. Some of them be big and some of them be small.b. Some of them Ø big and some of them Ø small.

The sentences in (39a) and (39b) are identical in one way: they both havea generic reading in which there is a universal interpretation of the bareplural.15 But this reading does not capture the complete meaning of thesentence in (39a). As has been argued in previous sections, aspectual beforces some type of iterative reading on the predicate. Here the predicateis individual-level; any given Sam’s wholesale store will be permanentlylocated at some place unless it is destroyed by some force, an act of manor nature. As such, it is difficult to conceive of any Sam’s wholesale storeas moving from one place to another on the outskirts of town. However,given the nature of the marker, be forces an iterative meaning on theconstruction. Because the property indicated by the predicate names apermanent state, the only iterative reading that the construction can haveis one in which there are different situations of different Sam’s stores

22 LISA GREEN

15 It has been claimed that the aspectual use of be is a relatively new phenomenon inAAE. Bailey and Maynor (1987), in their study of AAE in Brazos Valley, Texas, foundthat younger speakers use aspectual be in environments preceding V-ing, whereas olderspeakers use the marker in copular environments. It is not clear that this claim has beentested in other communities of AAE speakers. In any event, it can be shown that the meaningof aspectual be is distinct from the meaning of the copula although there is considerableoverlap in some environments.

being on the outskirts of town, that is, situations of encountering the stores.16

Then there is an eventuality variable ranging over situations in the bicyclesentences that is bound by the HAB operator.

The logical explanation for why bicycle sentences do not generally allowtemporal restrictors is that the predicates are stable and name permanentqualities, and they remain stable in spite of be coercion. However, theydo allow adverbials that restrict quantification over situations or individ-uals. Consider the italicized when-clauses in the sentence in (40):

(40) Sam’s wholesale stores be on the outskirts of town (when theyØ) in Louisiana, but they be in the city limits (when they Ø)in Texas.

The when-clauses in (40) restrict quantification over situations involvingthe occurrence of Sam’s wholesale stores. The conclusion is that theiterative reading forced on these constructions is one that involves viewingtime in a spatial dimension. By virtue of the nature of a stable entity beingconfined to a particular space or having a permanently stable quality, aspec-tual be cannot force it to be interpreted as occurring in different spaces oras changing properties. However, as has been argued in this paper, one ofthe functions of be is to coerce a stage-level reading. To resolve the conflict,the iterative reading is shifted to instances in which the stable entities arefound in a particular location or observed as having a certain property.

This section has focused on bicycle sentences, in which aspectual be isin construction with an individual-level predicate that selects a universalreading of bare plurals. These predicates indicate permanent states of affairs,so the only iterative reading that be can force on them is one in whichdifferent members of a particular group can be described by the stateindicated by the predicate.

ASPECTUAL BE–TYPE CONSTRUCTIONS IN AAE 23

16 This view may also be summarized by saying that, based on the speaker’s observations,Sam’s stores always occur on the outskirts of town. Encountering Sam’s stores on the outerlimits on different occasions leads to the assessment that the stores are usually built in thatgeneral location. On this note, one reviewer raised the question about whether such ageneralization could be made about some object that cannot be observed very often. Inparticular, the reviewer asked whether the sentence Deep sea creatures be big can be usedto describe the size of deep sea creatures that are not observed much due to the fact that itis difficult and expensive to conduct the necessary exploration to observe them. There isno set number of times (greater than one) that an activity has to occur to be described byaspectual be, so the sentence can be used even if the creatures are not observed very often.

7. C O N C L U S I O N

Aspectual be–type constructions can be characterized by a stage-levelreading of predicates. Be–type constructions express regularities; the even-tuality indicated by the predicate occurs or holds on particular occasions.I have argued that individual-level predicates that occur in be–type con-structions are coerced into stage-level predicates. The result of this coercionis that individual-level predicates have an eventuality argument associatedwith them. Thus all predicates in these constructions take an eventualityargument that is bound by the habitual operator. I have also discussed therole of pragmatic determination in contexts in which restriction is notexplicit.

Bicycle sentences, in which bare plural subjects receive a universalinterpretation, can also be accounted for under the analysis presented here.The subjects in these constructions are permanently stable, so the onlytype of iterative reading available is one in which time can be extendedto some spatial dimension.

AAE falls in line with other languages that distinguish between a copulaand substantive be. The analysis in this paper accounts for some well-knownproperties of aspectual be that have not been discussed in the literature.

R E F E R E N C E S

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Bailey, G. and N. Maynor: 1987, ‘Decreolization?’, Language in Society 16, 449–474.Binnick, R. I.: 1991, Time and the Verb: A Guide to Tense and Aspect, Oxford, New York.Carlson, G.: 1989, ‘The Semantic Composition of English Generic Sentences’, in G. Chierchia,

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Green, L. J.: 1993, Topics in African American English: The Verb System Analysis, PhDdissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

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F. J. Pelletier (eds.), The Generic Book, pp. 125–175. The University of Chicago Press,Chicago.

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Krifka, M., F. J. Pelletier, G. Carlson, A. ter Meulen, G. Link, and G. Chierchia: 1995,‘Genericity: An Introduction’, in G. N. Carlson and F. J. Pelletier (eds.), The GenericBook, pp. 1–124. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

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Representation Theory to Interpret Generics’, in G. Chierchia, B. H. Partee and R. Turner(eds.), Properties, Types and Meaning, Vol 2: Semantic Issues, pp. 193–268. Kluwer,Dordrecht.

Smith, C. S.: 1995, ‘The Range of Aspectual Situation Types: Derived Categories and aBounding Paradox’, in P. Bertinetto, V. Bianchi, Ö. Dahl, and M. Squartini (eds.),Temporal Reference, Aspect and Actionality, Vol. 2: Typological Perspectives, pp.105–124. Rosenberg & Sellier, Turin.

Smith, C. S.: 1997, The Parameter of Aspect, 2nd edition, Kluwer, Dordrecht.Vlach, F.: 1981, ‘The Semantics of the Progressive’, in P. Tedeschi and A. Zaenen (eds.),

Syntax and Semantics Vol. 14: Tense and Aspect, pp. 271–292. Academic Press, NewYork.

von Fintel, K.: 1994, Restrictions on Quantifier Domain, PhD dissertation, University ofMasschusetts, Amherst.

Wilkinson, K. J.: 1991, Studies in the Semantics of Generic Noun Phrases, PhD disserta-tion, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Department of LinguisticsUniversity of Texas at AustinAustin, TX 78712USAE-mail: lgreen@mail.utexas.edu

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