2015 BY THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION ISSN 2155-9708Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and PhilosophiesNEWSLETTER|The American Philosophical AssociationVOLUME 14 | NUMBER 2SPRING 2015SPRING 2015 VOLUME 14|NUMBER 2FROM THE EDITORS Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Matthew R. Dasti ARTICLES Graham Priest Alethic Values Stephen Phillips Seeing from the Others Point of View Shalini Sinha Self: Agency and the Good in Classical Vaiesika K. S. Prasad Mind and Cognition: The Nyya Perspective Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, R. Venkata Raghavan, and Don Wallace Freeman Dcruz Lost in Translation? The Upanisadic Story about Da and Interpretational Issues in Analytic Philosophy J. Barton Scott Philosophy and Anticolonialism Dan Flory Race, Indian Philosophy, and the Historiography of Western Philosophy C. K. Raju Eternity and Infnity: The Western Misunderstanding of Indian Mathematics, and Its Consequences for Science Today CALL FOR PAPERS Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and PhilosophiesPRASANTA S. BANDYOPADHYAY AND MATTHEW R. DASTI, CO-EDITORSVOLUME 14|NUMBER 2|SPRING 2015APA NEWSLETTER ONFROM THE EDITORS Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay MONTANASTATEUNIVERSITYMatthew R. Dasti BRIDGEWATERSTATEUNIVERSITYThe topic of this newsletter is Indian philosophy andculture,chosentoallowforarichdiversityofcontributionsthatillustratesomeofthemajorapproachesorcurrentsofphilosophical investigation into Indian philosophy, Indiancultural production, and the status of Indian thinkers aslegitimate interlocutors within the global philosophicalcommunity.One of the most visible and inuential of these currentshas been the ongoing excavation of classical Indianphilosophy, carried out by those with an eye for bothphilological accuracy and philosophical relevance. This isillustratedbyourrstveessays.GrahamPriestprovidesahistoricalinvestigationintothequestionHowmanytruthvalues are there? Leading answers to this question, aschartedbyPriest,includeresponsesgivenbyMadhyamakaand Jaina philosophers. In his essay, Stephen Phillipscalls attention to the way that Indian philosophy tends tobe categorized into hard divisions based on schools ofthought (e.g., Vednta, Nyya, Skhya), but he seeks tosoften the categories and oers a test case in the formof a reexamination of the standard view of the inuentialpolymath Vcaspati Mira (tenth century CE). PhillipsarguesthatVcaspatiisnotmerelyascholastic,elucidatingschool-bound commentaries delimited by the resourcesof this or that tradition, but rather an original thinker whoarticulates common themes and positions that harmonizeacross his commentaries on the core texts of dierentschools.ShaliniSinhasessayisdevotedtotheconceptofselfwithinthevenerableandinuentialVaieikatraditionof Indian realism. She illustrates the way in which theself, in Vaieika ontology, is the source of agency andnormativity, reason and law, and the good itself, withinnature.K.S.PrasadspaperprovidesanarticulationofmindandcognitionwithinNyya,asisterschooltoVaieika,focusing on the relations between knower, thing known,and act of knowing, along with Nyyas account of theinner organ or mind (manas) which governs cognitivefunctioning.ThepapersprimarilydevotedtoclassicalIndianphilosophy close, ttingly, with reections on translationand interpretation. P. S. Bandyopadhyay, R. V. Raghavan,andD.WallaceDcruzreectonafamousUpanishadicstory,whereasinglesyllableutteredbythecreator,Prajpati,istakeninradicallydierentwaysbythreesetsoflisteners.Bandyopadhyay, Raghavan, and Wallace Dcruz considercontemporarytheoriesofmeaningandarguethattheworkofPaulGriceprovidesthebestresourcestomakesenseofthisstory.Another current of inquiry seeks to understand the wayin which European receptions of Indian thinkers and,indeed, the very notion of Indian philosophy, have beendetermined by colonial and post-colonial contexts. Thisis illustrated in our next three essays. J. Barton Scottspaper examines the myriadand often problematicwaysinwhichtheconceptofIndianphilosophyhasbeenintertwinedwithreligionandreligiosityintheeyesofbothpioneering European Indologists and in the work of anti-colonialIndianphilosophersthemselves.DanFloryspaperexamines Western approaches to the notion of Indianphilosophy as genuine philosophy, and argues that thereareunderappreciatedreasonswhyIndianphilosophywasdenied such status during and after the Enlightenment.FocusingonKantandHegel,hearguesthatEnlightenmentviewsofraceandthelimitedcapabilitiesofnon-Europeanraces informed the dubious refusal to take Indianphilosophy seriously. C. K. Rajus paper engages in boththeclassicalexcavationsnotedaboveandcritical,historicalexamination of colonial attitudes and ways in which theyled to distortions and denigrations of Indias intellectualcontributions.Hecontraststhepractical,empiricalapproachto mathematics in classical India with a more theoretical,religiousapproachintheChristianWest,oftentakenbyits own adherents to be clearly superior. Raju argues thatthisisfarfromthecase.Wehavereceivedalargenumberofqualitypapersforthisissue,andhaveconsequentlydecidedtodivideitintotwo.Therefore,ourfall2015newsletterwillcontinuethistheme,andwillhavealargeportionofpapersdevotedtoathirdcurrentofinquiry,investigatingmodernIndianphilosophyandculture.Finally,wewouldliketothankNaliniBhushan,JayGareld,Leah Kalmanson, David H. Kim, and Erin C. Shepherd forsuggestions,assistance,andguidanceintheeditingofthisnewsletter.APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES ARTICLES Alethic Values Graham Priest THEGRADUATECENTER,CUNY,ANDTHEUNIVERSITYOFMELBOURNETheAsianphilosophicaltraditionsarerichandsophisticated.Most Western-trained philosophers, however, know verylittle of them. The situation is slowly changing as moreWestern philosophers are coming to read the Asian texts,and more Western philosophy departments are teachingAsianmaterial.Thepresentessayisasmallcontributiontothisfelicitoustrend.Thequestionwhichwillconcernusheremightbeposedas,Howmanytruthvaluesarethere?Iwillnotbeconcernedtoanswerthisquestion.Rather,thepointistosurveysomeoftheanswerstothequestionadvancedbysomethinkersand traditions, both East and West. The Eastern traditionsthatwillconcernusherearebothIndianinorigin:BuddhismandJainism.It should be said straight away that we will be looking atsome seminal texts, both East and West. Such texts arealwayssubjecttodisputesofinterpretation,andhereisnottheplacetodefendmyinterpretations.ThoseIshallgivearetheonesthatstrikemeasmostplausible,however.1* * *N=1Letmestartthisexerciseinthehistoryofideasbymakingthequestionmoreprecise.Weareconcernedwithtruthasit applies to propositions, sentences, statements, beliefs,or whatnot (rather than, e.g., friends or coins). Which ofthese sorts of things are the primary bearers of truthindeed,whatsuchaclaimmightmeanisaknottyissue.However, nothing much here will depend on resolving it.So I shall just speak of truth-bearers, in a non-committalfashion.Truth-bearerscanbetrue;butaccordingtomosttraditions,theycantakeothervalues:mostnotablyfalsity.Asweshallsee,theymaybethoughttotakeothervaluesaswell.Toforestall any quibbles about whether values are really ofakindwithtruth,Iwillsimplycallthemalethicvalues.LetNbethenumberofalethicvalues.Ourquestion,then,is,WhatisN?The simplest answer is that N=1: there is only one truthvalue,thetruth(t):alltruth-bearersaretrue;thereisnosuchthingasfalsity.TheviewwasreputedlyheldbyAntisthenes(445365, BCE), and what may have been his argumentsare rehearsed by Plato (429347 BCE) in the Euthydemus,283e284c. A variation on the arguments is rehearsed intheTheaetetus(118d189b),essentially:Thefalseiswhatis not. What is not does not exist. So the false does notexist.We do not need to scrutinize the reasoning. It suceshere to note that it puts the view that N=1 on the table.Andhoweverplausibleitis,onecannotdenythatitisthesimplestofviews!2N=2For the next answer in ascending order, we remain inAncient Greece, but turn to Aristotle (384322 BCE): N=2.Aristotleaddsasecondalethicvalue:falsity(f).Sotherearenowtwovalues,tandf,andtruth-bearerstakeexactlyoneof these. This picture is encapsulated in the Principles ofExcluded Middle (PEM) and Non-Contradiction (PNC). ThePEMsaysthatatruth-bearermusthaveoneofthesevalues;thePNCsaysthattheycannothaveboth.Aristotle defends these principles in Book of theMetaphysics. What, exactly, his arguments are, and howsuccessfultheywere,maybedisputed.TheargumentsforthePNCinBook4,inparticular,areamotleyandopaquebunch.However,thisneednotconcernushere.3N=3The next answer in ascending order is that N=3. And forthis,weturntoAristotleagain.In the somewhat notorious Book 9 of De Interpretatione,Aristotle argues that truth-bearers whose contents arecontingent states of aairs about the future, such as thatit will rain in Melbourne at some time on 1/1/3001, areneithertruenorfalse(n).Sonowwehavet,f,andn.Aristotlearguedthatifsuchtruth-bearerswereeithertrueor false, the consequence would be fatalism, which herejects. How good Aristotles arguments are, again, neednotconcernus.PerhapsofmoreconcernistherelationshipbetweenthepositioninDeInterpretationeandthedefenseofthePEMintheMetaphysics.Aristotlegivesusnoguidetothisquestionineitheroftheseplacesoranyother.Intheend,Isuspect,thetwotextsarejustinconsistentwitheachother.However, of more importance here is the fact that theendorsementofathirdalethicvalueinDeInterpretationeis clearly driven by metaphysical considerations, namely,the open and indeterminate nature of aspects of thefuture.Theanswertoourtargetquestionis,then,nomerebloodlessdisputeaboutthenatureoflogic.Logicisdrivenbymetaphysics.Intruth,thisshouldalreadyhavebeenvisibletouswhendiscussingthelastanswer.ForAristotledefendstheviewthat N=2 in the Metaphysics, not the Analytics. Indeed,there, he points out that the logical validity of varioussyllogismsisindependentofthePNC(An.Post.77a10-21).Metaphysics announces itself at the start as a study ofbeing qua being. The PEM and PNC are, thus, principlesaboutthenatureofbeing.4PAGE2 SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIESN=4For the next answer, we leave Ancient Greece and moveto Ancient India. Here we nd N=4. This is embodied ina principle called the catukoi (four corners). The fourcorners are four alethic possibilities. These add one toAristotles triad, both true and false (b), to give us t (trueand true only), f (false and false only), n (neither true norfalse),andb(bothtrueandfalse).The origin of the catukoi in Indian philosophy isunknown.ItiscertainlyinplacebythetimeofthehistoricalBuddha (Siddhrtha Gautama; according to one standardchronology:563483BCE);forintheMajjhimaNikyaandother stras, we nd the Buddhas disciples asking himdicult metaphysical questions, such as What happensto the enlightened person after death? They put thequestion by asking whether the person exists, not, both,or neither; and it is clear that they take themselves to begivingtheBuddhafourmutuallyexclusiveandexhaustivepossibilitiestochoosefrom.Insteadoftertiumnondatur,wehavequintumnondatur.InthesestrastheBuddha,infact,refusestoendorseanyoftheseanswers.Thereasonoftengiven(forexample,inthe Cula-Malunkyovada Stra) is that such metaphysicalspeculationisawasteoftime,andirrelevanttoachievingenlightenment. But in some of the stras, notably theMajjhima Nikya, something else is hinted at: that noneof these four possibilities ts the case, though nothingfurtherismadeoftheideaforalongtime.5N=5ItseemstohavelaindormantinBuddhistphilosophyuntiltakenupbyNgrjuna(datesunknown,sometimerstorsecondcenturyCE),wholaidthephilosophicalgroundforalaterkindofBuddhism,Mahyna.Anditishewhowillgiveusournextanswer:N=5.The central metaphysical claim of Mahyna Buddhism isthat all things are empty (nya). The claim is interpretedsomewhat dierently in dierent Mahyna schools. ButinMadhyamaka(Ngrjunasschool),tobeemptyistobeempty of intrinsic nature: everything is what it is in virtueof its relationships (and only in virtue of its relationships)to other things. Ngrjunas Mulamadhyamakkrik isan extended argument to the conclusion that everythingis empty. Frequently, he runs through the cases of thecatukoiinafour-prongedreductio.But he also says (e.g., ch. 22) that sometimes none ofthe four appliesfor example, with respect to the natureof the enlightened person after death. So we have a fthpossibility.Callthise,noneoftheabove.Sonowwehavet,f,b,n,ande.Butwhatisthise?To understand this, we have to delve into metaphysicsagain. According to Ngrjunaor at least one standardinterpretationofhimanyobjecthasadualreality(satya),conventional and ultimate (like the two sides of one andthesamecoin).Itsultimaterealitycanbegraspeddirectly(if you work hard at it), without conceptual mediation. Itsconventional reality is how it appears when seen throughthegridofconceptsandlanguagewhichthoughtimposesonit.And corresponding to the two sorts of reality, there aretwo sorts of truth: the truth about conventional reality,conventionaltruth;andthetruthaboutultimatereality,theultimatetruth.Thesortsofthingsthatareconventionaltruthsareobviousenough: I live in New York, cats are mammals, Caesarcrossed the Rubicon. What of the sorts of things that areultimatetruthsaboutanobject?Onecannotsay.Todosowould be to impose our conceptual/linguistic grid, andthustodescribeitsconventionalreality.Ultimaterealityisthereforeineable.Thisisourfthvalue,e,ineability.Wenowhavetobealittlecarefulaboutwhattruth-bearersare. It does not make much sense to suppose that asentenceisineable:tobeineableistobeinexpressiblein language. So truth-bearers have to be propositions orstatesofaairs:somethingnot,bydenition,guaranteedoflinguisticexpression.Butthatisbutawrinkle.Asusual,thisisnottheplaceheretogointothetruthofNgrjunasvieworthesoundnessofhisargumentsforit.ItsucesthattheviewhastakenustoN=5.6N=6WhichbringsustoN=6.Sadly,Iknownoexamplesofthis.7N=7ButN=7isquiteadierentmatter.Forthis,westayinIndia,butmovefromBuddhismtoJainism.There,wendN=7.TheoriginsofJainismaresomewhatclouded,butitseemsto arise in India about the same time as Buddhism (andso circa sixth century BCE). Its philosophical foundationswerelaidsomewhatlater,betweenaboutthesecondandfththcenturiesCE,byphilosopherssuchasSiddenansena(.fthcentury).Beforewegettoseven,wehavetogobacktothree.Forthe Jains, there were three basic alethic values, t, f, anda third. Let me call this i. The meaning of i is somewhatobscure (and modern commentators disagree abouthow it is to be interpreted). Sometimes it is glossed (orat least translated) as non-assertible, which suggestsneithertruenorfalse.Sometimesitisglossed(oratleasttranslated)asassertableanddeniable,whichsuggestsboth true and false. Given that ineability is certainly inthe air in both Buddhist and Hindu thought at this time,maybe it should be understood as ineable. Maybe it istododutyforallthese.Anyway,wecanleavescholarstoargueaboutthis.Togetfromthreetoseven,wehavetoconsidersomecoreJainametaphysics.Thisisencapsulatedintheprincipleofaneknta vdathe principle of non-(one-sidedness)asarticulated,forexample,bySiddhasenainhisNyyvatra,v.29.Realityismulti-faceted,likeapolyhedron.EveryoneSPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2 PAGE3APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES whohasaviewhasaviewofoneofthefacets.Theirviewsareallequallycorrectandequallyincomplete.As far as alethic values goes, the result is spelled out byVdideva Sri (. twelfth century CE) in his Prama NayaTattvloklamkra(ch.4,vv.1521),withaviewcalledthesaptabhag(seven-folddivision).Every truth-bearer will have one of the three basic valuesin every facet. (The Jains use the word syd to meansomething like in some facet.) So to capture the wholepicture we have to take into account the alethic value ateveryfacet.So,forexample,ifthetruth-beareristinsomefacets,finothers,andiinnone,itstotalvaluewillbe{t,f}.Thus, the overall possible values of a truth-bearer willbe any non-empty subset of {t,i,f}non-empty, becauserealityhasmanyfacets,andsoatleastone.SoN=7=23-1.8* * *So we have reached N=7. Let me end with a few nalcomments.First, none of the philosophers we have met had anyknowledge of modern formal logic. However, each of theaboveviewscanbeturnedintoarigoroussuchlogic.Themain logical technique to be deployed isnaturallythatof many-valued logic. Formally, many-valued logics allowforNtobeofanysize.Next, I certainly do not claim that we have had anexhaustivetouroftheterrainwehavebeencrossingevenin ancient philosophy. I have chosen some philosopherswhoseviewsareimportantanddistinctive.Iamsurethereare others. Despite this, and modern many-valued logicsnotwithstanding, I know of no natural suggestions forvalues of N greater than 7. With one exception: modernfuzzylogicsallowfordegreesoftruth;soanalethicvalueisanyrealnumberbetween0and1inclusive.Thatis,Nis2tothepowerof0.AsfarasIknow,nothinglikethisviewistobefoundinantiquity.Third, since I expect that most readers of this article willknowlittleofAsianphilosophicaltraditions,andtoforestallpossiblemisconception,IshouldpointoutthattherewerecertainlyIndianphilosopherswhoendorsedtheclaimthatN=2,suchastheHinduNyyaphilosophersaschoolgoingback to about the second century CE, but regenerated inthe tenth century CE as Navya-Nyya (new Nyya)andthe Buddhist logicians Dignga (. sixth century CE) andDharmkrti(.seventhcenturyCE).9Finally,asisclear,Ihavemadenoattempttoevaluatethevarious claims about the value of N, or the metaphysicalviewsonwhichthesearebased.Thatwouldbeanentirelydierent,andmuchlengthier,project.Thepointofthisnotehassimplybeentochartsomehistory;and,intheprocess,Ihope,toopenpeopleseyestosomepossibilitiesofwhichtheymayhavebeenunaware.NOTES1. Iwilladdareferenceortwoattheendofeachsection,forthosewhowishtotakemattersfurther.2. For further discussions of Antisthenes and related matters, seeDenyer,Language,Thought,andFalsehood.3. On the arguments, see Dancy, Sense and Contradiction inAristotle,andPriest,DoubtTruthtoBeaLiar,chapter1.4. OntheargumentofDe.Int.9,seeHaack,DeviantLogic,chapter4),andPriest,IntroductiontoNon-ClassicalLogic,secs.7.9and11a.7.5. Onthecatukoi,seeRuegg,TheUsesoftheFourPositionsoftheCatukoi,andPriest,TheLogicoftheCatukoi.6. For further discussion of Ngrjunas use of the catukoi, seeWesterho,NgrjunasCatukoi,andPriest,TheLogicoftheCatukoi.7. Sothisisthenullreference.8. On Jaina logic, see Ganeri, Jaina Logic and the PhilosophicalBasis of Pluralism, and Priest, Janina Logic: A ContemporaryPerspective.9. Foradiscussionofmany-valuedlogic,includingfuzzylogic,seePriest,IntroductiontoNon-ClassicalLogic,chapters7and11.Fora general discussion of Indian logic, see the papers in Ganeri,IndianLogic:AReader.BIBLIOGRAPHYDancy, R. M. Sense and Contradiction in Aristotle. Dordrecht: Reidel,1975.Denyer, N. Language, Thought, and Falsehood in Ancient GreekPhilosophy.London:Routledge,1993.Ganeri,J.(ed.).IndianLogic:AReader.London:Routledge,2001.Ganeri,J.JainaLogicandthePhilosophicalBasisofPluralism.HistoryandPhilosophyofLogic23(2002):26881.Haack,S.DeviantLogic.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1974.Priest,G.DoubtTruthtoBeaLiar.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2006.Priest,G.IntroductiontoNon-ClassicalLogic:FromIftoIs.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008a.Priest, G. Jaina Logic: A Contemporary Perspective. History andPhilosophyofLogic29(2008b):26378.Priest,G.TheLogicoftheCatukoi.ComparativePhilosophy1(2010):3254.Ruegg, D. The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catukoi and theProblemoftheDescriptionofRealityinMahynaBuddhism.JournalofIndianPhilosophy5(1977):171.Westerho,J.NgrjunasCatukoi.JournalofIndianPhilosophy34(2006):36795.Seeing From the Others Point of View: Counter the Schismatic Interpretation of Vcaspati Mira Stephen Phillips THEUNIVERSITYOFTEXASATAUSTINTextbooktreatmentsofclassicalIndianphilosophytypicallyidentify three pairs of schools falling under the broaderrubricofVedicorHindu:PrvaandUttaraMms(or,MmsandVednta),SkhyaandYoga,andNyyaandVaieika. All six are classically tagged stika as opposedto nstika, the latter being non-Vedic, non-Hindu. TheseincludeBuddhistandJainaschoolsbutalsomaterialist,anti-religiousCrvka.ItisalsosaidthatitislessdoctrinethanPAGE4 SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIESculturalpracticethatunitesthestikaschoolstheSanskritword connotes more orthopraxis than orthodoxy. Theassumption is that there is no orthodox credo for earlyHinduism. Although it is recognized that much is sharedbyapartnerschoolwithitssister,YogawithSkhya,forinstance, the six stika schools often take sharply distinctand opposed positions, it is pointed out or assumed.Indeed,withinMmsandVedntainparticularthereareimportant subschools, Advaita and Viidvaita Vednta,for example, and Bha and Prbhkara Mms, whichtake dierent positions on various issues and presentsometimes pointed, barbed refutations of the theories oftherivalsubschool.Theorganizationofthefteen-centurytextbook by Mdhava, Sarva-Darana-Sagraha, respectsand reinforces these divisions, as does, like almost allmodern treatments, the multi-volumed Encyclopedia ofIndianPhilosophieseditedbyKarlPotter.Therethepracticeistodevoteavolumetoeachseparateschoolandinsomecasessubschoolorlaterperiod(aswiththethreevolumesonNyya).Nowmypointinthisshortpaperisnottooverhaulourwholesense of the classical schools as units of organizationalimportance but rather to try to dislodge the idea thataside from the founders of the separate darana classicalwriterstendednottothinkforthemselves,nottoinnovateorcorrect,butonlytoelucidate,defend,andoccasionallyexpand a bundle of inherited positions collected underthe several banners of Mms, Nyya, and so on.Innovation,onsuchaschismatichermeneutics,ismainlyamatterofsomeonecomingupwithanewlineofdefenseand sometimes new lines of attack on the arguments orpositions of the home schools detractors, not with freshthinking through an issue. The commentarial nature ofthe philosophic literature proves the point, its genresuppositionstakentoextendtonon-commentarialtreatises.However, while it is true that the commentary as a genredominates the later literature, there are many importantnon-commentarialtextsthatareclearlyinadierentclass,with dierent genre suppositions, showing on their face,moreover, a certain originality. Furthermore, despite whatscholars regard as naturally a deep conservatism withinthecommentarygenre,itiswrongtothinkthattheseveralphilosophic inheritances oer their students only rigidlyxedpositions.Withthisquestioninmind,scrutinyofthecommentarial writing of the great philosophic namesafortiori in the case of non-commentarial treatisesshowsinuencesfromahostofsources,stikaandnstika,andadvocacy of positions inaugurated elsewhere than in theschoolortextbeingcommentedupon.Thereisphilosophicprogress over the centuries in my opinion, and often itappears to be sparked by close study of the literature ofapparentlyrivalschools.In sum, my argument is not directed at any and allscholastic labeling but rather against the hardening ofthe categories that would take the barriers between theschools to be much less permeable than is the case andthat would skew our interpretation and evaluation of thephilosophicworkofindividuals.The outstanding example of a classical philosopherwho learns from multiple sources and crosses barriersadmittedly so subtly sometimes that the trespassing iseasilymissedinnovatingandthinkingforhimselfbywayof commanding issues and a broad range of positionsand arguments, is the tenth-century Vcaspati Mira, whoprobably lived in Mithil in what is now Bihar. Vcaspatidoesnotboastofhisaccomplishments,givingcredittohispredecessors for positions and arguments that are reallyhisinnovations.But the going wisdom about Vcaspati is that he wasthe consummate academic, not a philosopher thinkingfor himselfexcept in the case, possibly, of his BhmatcommentaryontheBrahma-stra-bhyaofakarawithinAdvaita Vednta (and even there some say he is muchindebted to Maana Mira). Such academicism wouldapparently explain his having composed major treatiseswithin a total of ve distinct schoolsAdvaita Vednta,Yoga, Skhya, Nyya, and Mmsincluding long,detailed subcommentaries in Nyya and Yoga. In otherwords,thephilosopherwasanacademicspecicallyinhisabilitytochangescholastichats.Thus,forexample,inhisNotes on Uddyotakaras subcommentary on the Nyya-stra,VcaspatispointisnottotellwhathehimselfthinksisthetruthornalwordonsomeissueorotherbutratherthetruthfromtheNyyaperspective;similarlyforhisYogatreatiseandsoon.S.Ranganath,forexample,presentingall-toldasolidstudyof our author showing his many innovations, sees him asmakingseparatecontributionstotheseveralschools.Attheend of a chapter devoted to his contribution to Skhya,Ranganathwrites:Here again we nd in Vcaspati Mira a devotedexponent of the Skhya process of creationwithout any preconceived notions created by hisknowledgeoftheVedntaandothertraditions.HisdefenseoftheSkhyasystemisinthetruespiritof a commentator defending the position of thetextheiscommentingupon.1VcaspatiisthenanexponentofSkhyathewayamodernacademiccanbeanexponentofPlato,tryingtomakeusseethingsthewayPlatosawthem,thatis,withoneexception,namely, unlike with Plato himself, without advocacy. ThusVcaspatiwouldbeaprofessionalintellectualwithacertainexpertise,indeed,asincrediblygoodathiscraft,expositingpositionsandargumentsaccordingtotheparticularschoolwhose literature he is expanding with his compositionall,ofcourse,withthepossibleexceptionoftheBhmat,hisAdvaitaVedntaopuswhereitiscommonlysupposed(on slim evidence, I must say, given the attitude towardsthe non-Vedntic treatises) that here he is telling us whathe really believes, thus founding the so-called BhmatsubschoolofAdvaita.In sum, the separate schools take distinct positions on ahost of issues, and Vcaspati, like everyone else writingin the middle and later classical periods, is pretty tightlyconstrained by a doctrinal inheritance. The inheritance iselucidatedbyhimandperhapsexpandedbutnotrejected.ThisistrueevenfortheBhmat,hisAdvaitaworkwherewemaysuppose(mainlyontheevidencethatthiswasthelastSPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2 PAGE5APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES treatise he wrote) that he is actually asserting for himselftheexpositedviews.That Vcaspati is the consummate academic of classicalthought is, I admit, one way of looking at him, aninterpretation that cannot be proved wrong conclusively.On high-level hermeneutical questions rarely are thereknock-down arguments. My hope, however, is that byshowing a few convergences between or among theschools according to his treatises this paper will help ussee Vcaspatiand others, of courseas philosopherswhose resources are not restricted to any single textual,philosophictradition,andwhosepositionsasphilosophersspantraditionsandschools.The case is rather easy to make. Take rst VcaspatisMms treatise, the Tattva-bindu. This is far from acommentary on the whole long Mms-stra but ratheratreatmentofasingleissue,asthetitlemaybetakentoimply, A Drop of Truth. The issue is sentence meaninganditsrelationstothemeaningsofindividualwords,whichis an important issue, indeed at the center of theory ofknowledge through testimony (abda-prama) which inturnisatthecenterofMmsdefenseofVedicritualism.Vcaspatis reection seems informed by thorough-goingMmsstudy,especiallyofKumrila,theeighth-centuryphilosopher whose view on this issue Vcaspati defendsand expands. Embracing one position hardly makes aMmsaka.Thedeeperpoint,however,isthathendsor carves outconvergence among Mms, Yoga, andNyya in this area of epistemology. The view is that weunderstand words as individually having reference whilewe understand a sentence by cognizing the referents ina certain relationshipcall this the Bha theory, afterKumrila Bhaa. The issue of sentence meaning doesnot arise, as far as I can tell, in Vcaspatis Bhmat, hisAdvaita opus. The Bha theory is nevertheless utilizedby him to make another point, not one endorsed byKumrila,namely,thatstatementsintheUpanishadsaboutBrahman the Absolute are meaningful although they arenot connected to action pace a deeply held Mmsakasupposition.2 What the Tattva-bindu shows then is, alongwith Vcaspatis familiarity with Mmsaka literature(and Kumrila in particular), a full airing of the sentence-meaningissue(vedistincttheoriesarescrutinized).Intheend,theoneknownastheBhaorabhihitnvaya-vdaisdefended. Now this theory of sentence meaning is thenslid neatly into both his Nyya-vrika-ttparya-k (underNyya-stra 1.1.8 on knowledge through testimony) andhisYogicTattva-vairad(under,surprisingly,thesiddhiorpowerofcomingtounderstandthelanguageofanimals,Yoga-stra3.17).ConsidernextVcaspatistheism,plainfromhisextensivenotes on Nyya-stra 4.1.21 (Thakur 564, whereVcaspatitellsuswhyitistheomniscientvarathatmustbesupposedtobetheagentinferred:(Thatwhichistobeaccountedfor)isthesimultaneityofproductionofeectsthroughout immeasurable and unlimited space at everyplace and location, eects perceptible and imperceptibleinanimalsandplantsandtheorganicworldasawholeandso on). Concerning God or vara, we nd convergencewhere we should nd sharp divergence if Vcaspatiwere merely changing hats: in Nyya, Yoga, and AdvaitaVednta.Inallthreetreatises,heputsforthandelucidatesthe same argument for the existence of God. This is thatthere is a single all-embracing intelligence responsiblefor the universe as is shown by the harmony among itsparts. Although Advaita is sometimes thought to be non-theistic, Vcaspatis Advaita presentation of the argumentis as theistic as the others, focusing on the notion of aconscious agent as instrumental cause.3 Admittedly, theGodthatisprovedbyVcaspatiinthethreetreatisesisnotconceptualizedinpreciselythesameways.Nevertheless,there is a supreme being conceived similarly across thethree works and schools whereas vara is not conceivedsosimilarlybythethreeauthorsUddyotakara,Vysa,andakarawhosetextsheiselucidating.Thisinitselfprovesheisnotjustacommentator.Further,althoughKumrilapresentsabarrageofatheisticarguments, our philosopher does not mention them orindeed vara at all in his Mms treatise. Nor is varadirectly discussed in his Skhya-kaumudi. Causationis of course a dominant issue, thoroughly aired, and theSkhyatheoryofsat-krya-vdadefended,i.e.,theeectas anticipated in the cause. Since Nyya holds to asat-krya-vda, the eect as something new, not anticipatedin the cause, we may think that at least here we havedirect opposition that should force Vcaspati to changehats. However, Vcaspati leaves room for the Nyya viewwhich distinguishes three kinds of causal relationship.Thatinsisteduponbytheasat-krya-vdinandVcaspatiinthistextwherehedoesfollowtheSkhya(andVedntic)traditionofarguingexnihilonihilt(fromnothingcomesnothing) is, in the Nyya schema, the inherent cause.The Nyya philosopher can accept the ex nihilo nihil tprinciple, viewing it, in line with Vaieika, as a matterof the continuity between, for example, a piece of clothand the threads that make it up. The intricate subject ofinstrumental causality is not broached by Vcaspati in hisSkhya-kaumudi. That to my ears is a deafening silencefromonewhohasmade(orwillmake)advanceselsewherein the conception of vara as an instrumental cause ofearthandthelike,astheinferentialsubjectinhistheisticargument is conceptualized in his Ttparya-k Nyyatreatise.There is not space here to air many more convergences,although looking one nds them practically everywhere.Another important conict may be taken to concernillusion, which is given a very dierent explanation andoveralltreatmentinNyyaasopposedtoAdvaitaVednta.Or so it is commonly thought. But the truth is that onthis centralmost topicwhich may well be that on whichclassical Indian philosophy as a whole best proves itsexcellence both by a richness of theory and by tight anddetailedanalyses,ahostofconsiderationsbeingbroughtinVcaspati, in a long discussion in his Advaita treatise,seemstofavortheNyyatheoryofanyath-khyti(illusionas awareness of something as other than it is). This istruedespiteakarasstressingnottheroleoftheexternalobjectbutratherinternalsuperimposition(adhysa).Theocial Advaita view is anirvacanya-khyti (awarenessof something indeterminable as real or unreal). In anintroductiontotheireditionandtranslationoftherstfourPAGE6 SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIESstras of the Bhmat, Suryanarayana Sastri and KunhanRaja say the following, making my point though they tooseemtopresupposetheschismaticinterpretation:The anyath-khyti view, though attributed tothe Logicians [Nyya], has some popularity withAdvaitins too in the explanation of sopdhika-bhrama, delusion caused by the presence of anexternaladjunct.Forexample,thecrystalseenasredissoseenbecausetherednessoftheowerinproximitytoitiserroneouslyreferredtoit.Andthe white shell is seen to be yellow, because inthe jaundiced person bile goes forth with rays oflightfromtheeyes,andtheyellownessofthebileiserroneouslyreferredtotheobjectapprehendedbythoseraysoflight.Thisviewissomuchtothefore in Vcaspatis account of superimpositionthatheseemstobeasupporterofanyath-khyti.Amalnanda [a classical commentator] has torescue him from this charge by pointing to theexplanationofthemirage,whereatleastwehavenotacrossedreferencebutapurecreationwhichisnotdeterminableaseitherrealorunreal.4Moreover, in Vcaspatis explanation of the Yoga-strasdenitionofviparyaya,wrongcognition,understra1.8,he again advances the theory of anyath-khyti, havingjust previously, in long comments under Yoga-stra 1.7,presented the gist of the whole of his version of Nyyaepistemology (which emphasizes a defeater-defeatedrelationship among cognitions or beliefs as epistemicallycentral).ThereisalsoastrikingexampleofVcaspatisincorporationofanstikaposition.FromstudyingBuddhistYogcra(aswell as Kumrila, who also studied Yogcra), Vcaspatiinnovates an understanding of perception within Nyyathat is not that of his Nyya predecessors. He introducesintothesystemthenotionofthetypeofperceptionthatisconcept-free, nirvikalpaka, the unverbalizable, as a rststageoftheprocessthatleadstoknowledge.5Accordingto his Nyya inheritance, in contrast, all perception issavikalpaka,concept-laden.Let me present now a dierent line of evidence for mythesis,towit,Vcaspatiscitingothercompositionsofhis.6This shows that he expected his audience to read acrossdivisions of school. In other words, often Vcaspati takesusalreadytoknowwhathispositionisonanissue,orheassumeswecanndoutbyconsultingtheworkheexplicitlyreferences.Therearealsoreferencestonon-NyyatextsinhisNyyaworkandmutatismutandiforhistreatisesyingother banners. Obviously Vcaspati does not assume hisstudentstohavestrictloyaltytooneschool.Hisnalviewseemsacompositeandverycomplexinitsindebtedness.Well, then, what is his nal view? What does he reallybelieve?ThisisnotforusIthinkpreciselytherightquestion.Let me close by saying a few words about Vcaspati asprecursorofGageaandNavyaNyya.By running through numerous theories and argumentsabout an issue, the nature of the internal organ,manas, for example, one gets not just the right view buta wide appreciation of the subject. Concerning manas,considerations are so complex that one senses thatGageaisnotentirelyconvincedoftheviewheendorses.Muchthesamemaybesaidforhistreatmentofupalakaa,indirectattribution,aswellasforanalogy,upamna,asaseparateanduniqueknowledgesource.Theexplorationis as important as the result. Similarly, by bringing us tosee strengths and weakness of several positions andpoints of view, Vcaspati enriches his readers sense ofwherethetruthlies.Weareablenotonlytoseefromtheothersperspectivebuttoincorporateit,orpartofit,intoourownview.This,tomymind,istherealsignicanceoftheepithet,sarva-tantra-sva-tantra,Whohasmadeallthesystemshisownsystem,commonlyawardedVcaspati(atitlesharednotablywithPrabhkara,therenegadepupilofKumrila,whoinnovatespositionswithinMms).IhavefocusedonVcaspatibecausewithhimitiseasytosee that this is not merely a commentator and academiccapableofchanginghatsbutratheragreatmindexploringuniversalissues.Inanothervenue,Iplantomakethecasefor Raghuntha and other Naiyyikas. With Advaita, thestory is much the same since outside of a commitmentto the reality of Brahman (variously understood) thereis enormous variety within the camp. That Mms andtheistic Vednta are similarly porous is my sense, but letmedesistoutoffearofmakingtoosweepingastatement.School loyalty is a trump in many instances, I admit. Butoftenwendaclassicalauthorthinkingoutsideaparticularscholastic inheritance. It is my view that Vcaspati andmany other classical authors are less like the modernacademic capable of changing hats than like the analyticphilosopher who incorporates a broad inheritance whileforgingherownposition.(ThinkofRawlsstudyingprevioussocial-contract theorists, or Chisholm studying Descartes,Hume,andRussell,etcetera,etcetera.)Unfortunately,thecenturiesrichwithclassicalIndianphilosophyhavenotyetbeenverywellmined.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSIthankNirmalyaGuhafordiscussionswehadofthispaper.NOTES1. S. Ranganath, Contribution of Vcaspati Mira to IndianPhilosophy,189.2. S.S.SuryanarayanaSastriandC.KunhanRaja,ed.andtrans.,TheBhmat:Catusstr,217-18.3. Ibid.,121-22.4. Ibid.,xxv-xxvi.5. AnantalalThakur,ed.,NyyavrttikattparyakofVcaspatimira,10912.6. IntheBhmat,SastriandKunhanRaja46(Skhya),154(Nyya),181-82 (Nyya), and so on, and even in the presumably earlierTattva-vairad,hemakesreferencetotwoworksofhisthatarelost,oneNyyaandoneVednta,JamesWoods,trans.,TheYogaSystemofPatanjali,70.BIBLIOGRAPHYS. Ranganath. Contribution of Vcaspati Mira to Indian Philosophy.Delhi:PratibhaPrakashan,1999.Vcaspati Mira. Bhmat (commentary on akaras Brahma-stra-bhya).Ed.andtr.(rstfourstras)S.S.SuryanarayanaSastriandC.SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2PAGE7APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES KunhanRaja.TheBhmat:Catusstr.Madras:TheosophicalPublishingHouse,1933.. Nyya-vrttika-ttparya-k (Notes on (Uddyotakaras)Intention in his Nyya-vrttika Commentary). Ed. Anantalal Thakur.NyyavrttikattparyakofVcaspatimira.NewDelhi:IndianCouncilofPhilosophicalResearch,1996.. Tattva-bindu. Ed. V. A. Ramaswami Sastri. Tattvabindu byVcaspatimira with Tattvavibhvana by iputra Paramevara.New Delhi: 1991. Ed. and tr. Madeleine Biardeau, Le Tattvabindu deVcaspatimira.Pondichry:InstitutFranaisdIndologie,1979.. Tattva-kaumudi (commentary on the Skhya-krik). Ed. andtr. Ganganatha Jha. 1896. Reprint: Dill: Bhratya Buka Kraporeana,2008.. Tattva-vairad (commentary on the Yoga-stra-bhya). Ed.Jibananda Vidyasagara. 3rd. ed. Calcutta: 1940. Translated: JamesWoods, The Yoga System of Patanjali. Harvard Oriental Series 17.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1914.Self: Agency and the Good in Classical Vaiesika Shalini Sinha UNIVERSITYOFREADINGINTRODUCTIONThe subject of this essay is the idea of self (tman) inthe Vaieika tradition of classical Indian philosophy.Among the major classical Indian schools, Vaieika isdistinguished by a categorial metaphysics that attemptstogiveanaccountofeverythingthereisintheworldinaschema that include substances (dravya), their properties(gua) and motions (karman). I dub this ne-grainedtaxonomy dierential (vaieika)1naturalism,a categorialstructure that by incorporating nonphysical selves andphysical substances2places the phenomena of selfhood,inclusive here of reason, values, and law, at the heart ofnatural order. In what follows, I look at what Vaieikaphilosophers mean by a self, what the nature of a self is,andtheplaceselfhasinthenaturalworld.ThekeyfeaturesoftheVaieikaselfarepresentedinthecoretext of the classical school, the Padrthadharmasagraha(A Compendium of the Characteristics of the Categories)ofPraastapda(c.530CE)anditscommentarialliterature.For the purposes of this essay, I refer to two classicalcommentaries on this text, rdharas Nyyakandal(tenth century CE) and Udayanas Kiraval (late tenthcentury/early eleventh century CE), and an early moderncommentary,JagadasSkti(seventeenthcenturyCE).The notion of self in Vaieika has a particularly widephilosophicalscope.Selfisthebeareroftherst-personalstates of consciousness (caitanya) and agency (karttva),and the ethical states of compositional law (ada)3in the natural world.4 The synonymity here of naturalcompositionallaw(ada)andmorallaw(dharma)meansthatmetaphysicsisinfusedwithanethicsthatplacesthevaluesandlaws(dharma,ada)ofsacricialreason,orinMcDowellsterms(McDowell1996,1998,2004),thespaceofreasonsandtherealmoflaw,inselfitselfinnatureorsoIargue.I rst look at the idea of self in classical Vaieika andthe various levels of reexivity5 and ownership (svatva,svmitva) this involves. I then locate three aspects of selfand selfhoodagentive, constructivist, and elementaland consider how these explicate self as the source ofreason,values,andlawinthenaturalworld.1.THEIDEAOFSELFSelf, in Vaieika, is a substance whose unitary characterandmetaphysicaldistinctivenessgroundpersonalidentityandethicalidentity,atatimeandovertime,inthecategorialorder of things. It is the subject of consciousness (jna)(PDS 1984: 76-7) and the agent (kart) of actions (PDS1984:78),thebearer,orowner,ofmentalstates(PDS1984:79-80)andthewillfulcontroller(prayatnavnadhiht)ofbodilybehaviorandbiologicalprocesses(PDS1984:78).Self appears here as the locus of personal identity wherethisisinextricablyboundtoitsethicalidentityasthegood(nireyasa) itself that is the bearer of compositional law(ada,dharma).6rdhara and Udayana elucidate the inner or introspectiveaspects of selfhood. Self, they claim, is that whichdistinguishesmefromthatwhichisnot-me.Itisthatwhichhas the intrinsic capacity to experience its self-identity,or being-own (sva), from the inside so to speak, that isexpressed as I. And that exhibits underivative ownershiporown-ness(svatva)ofallthatitinformsitsmentalstatesanditsbody(NK1984:84,20-22;ATV1995:346-7).Onlyaself,aunitary,intrinsicallyreexivesubstance,canconferownership of its properties and powers and uniquelyattribute them to me, their owner or bearer (PDS 1994:79). A self-substance is required as the unier of theseessentially reexive mental and ethical states (PDS 1994:77-78);anditisthissubstancethatisdesignatedbytherst-personpronounI(PDS1994:79).7Praastapda denes self as substance in the followingway: Its [i.e., selfs] qualities are, cognition (jna),pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha), desire (icch), aversion(dvea), will (prayatna), [the states of] virtue (dharma),non-virtue (adharma),8cognitive imprints (saskra),9number(sakhy),10spatialdimension(dik),metaphysicaldistinction (pthaktva),11 conjunction (sayoga) anddisjunction (vibhga) (PDS 1984: 80). Three distinctaspects of self are presented here: (i) the agentive selfwhich is the bearer of the rst-personal structures ofagency: the properties of cognition, pleasure and pain,desireandaversion,andwill(PDS1984:79-80);12(ii)theconstructivist self which as the good itself is the bearerof natural compositional law that is synonymous withthe goodness or virtue (dharma) of selfs actions; (iii) theelementalselfwhichexistsasbareself-substancedevoidof all mental and moral structures and is the true nature(svarpasthita)ofself(PDS1994:319).Iconsidertheseaspectsofselfinturn.2.THEAGENTIVESELFAsconsciousagents,Praastapdaargues(PDS1974:78),human beings are deliberative beings who stand in anevaluativeattitudetotheirowncondition.Thisisexplicatedin the structure of human actions in the following way:judgements (jna) about whether an object is a sourcePAGE8 SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES of pleasure (suka) or pain (dukha), favorable (hita) orunfavorable (ahita) for oneself, induces desire (icch) oraversion (dvea) towards it. Desire and aversion, in turn,motivate willful impulses (prayatna) which are executedby manas, selfs instrument of execution and attention(see Chakrabarti 1999), as mental and bodily striving(pravtti) and restraint (nivtti) to acquire or avoid thatobject, respectively (PDS 1974: 78).13 These sorts ofrationaltendenciesareevident,ourphilosophersargue,in(i) intentional acts such as striving to eat a mango whosetaste is considered pleasurable (PDS 1974: 78), butextends to (ii) subintentional and instinctual acts such asbreathing and blinking (PDS 1974: 78),14 or sneezing ina dusty environment to avoid harm (NK(J) 1982: 646), (iii)subpersonal processes that maintain bodily equilibriumandpreventthebodyfromfallingdown(PDS(J)1982:563-4, 646), and (iv) biological processes of growth, healingandrepairofthehumanorganism(PDS1974:78).15The core claim here is that all human mental and bodilyactivity,thatistosay,cognitions,intentional,subintentional,andinstinctualbodilybehavior,subpersonalandbiologicalprocesses, exhibit rational and normative structures andregularitiesthatarecharacteristicofagency(karttva)(PDS1994: 76-80). These activities exhibit normativity, quaself-concern,instrivingforwhatisgoodorbenecial(hita)for oneself, and shunning what is unfavorable or harmful(ahita) to oneself. The rational structure of such activitiesdistinguishesthemfromphysicalcausalregularities,suchas the wind blowing, since the latter fail to demonstratereexive values of self-concernstriving for what isgood for itself.16 Rather, physical regularities and randomor accidental physical events follow an impact-modelof causation (NK 1984: 84, 2-3; S 1983: 364). For thisreason, two domains of causation, rational and physical,aredistinguishable.Therst,denedbythereexiveandrationalstructuresofimplicitorexplicitownershipandself-referentialitythatarecharacteristicoftherationalorderofagency.Thesecond,bytheimpersonalstructuresofimpactcausationthatcharacterizephysicalcausalorder.As the locus of conscious agency, the agentive self is areexivebeingthatdemonstratesthecapacitytoknowthegood, to determine its good, and strives to achieve thisby its actions. We might say, in this case, that self is thesource of those powers and properties that incorporatethe force of ought:17 reexive and relational powers andpropertiesthatnecessarilyrefertothegoodforsomeone,by way of reasons and values that are self-referring andexhibitownership(svatva,svmitva).Buttheforceofoughtarisesherefromthepossessiveorappropriativeownership(svmitva) of mental states, that is, from their associationwiththeI-object(ahakra)asI(aham)andmine(aham)thelayingclaimtooneselfasanownerandanagent,thatinstigatesintentionalactions(NK(J)1982:597).18Further,thedomainofought,asofreexivityandownership,isnotlimitedtoconsciousanddeliberativeagencybutextendstoanintegratedspectrumofmoreprimitiveformsofagencyandlife19thatareownedandself-referring,andsomarkthepresenceofaself(PDS1974:78).203.THECONSTRUCTIVISTSELFANDTHEGOODNESSOFACTIONItisthegoodness(dharma)ofactionthatisthesourceoftheconstructiveandconstructivist21activitiesoftheself.Activegoodness(dharma)22isexplicatedinselfsactionsanditslife as the virtuous (dharma) or non-virtuous (adharma)relationship in which it stands, qua agent, to all otherelementsoftheworld.Itconcernsselfspropensitytoownand appropriate objects as me and mine by its I-forming(ahamkra)orI-objectifyingcapacitiessinceactingisthepositingofIastheI-form(ahakra)orI-objectthatlaysclaimtoselfasanowner(svm)ofitsmentalstatesandanagent(kart)ofitsactions.The notions of the good and the goodness of an actionrefer here, at least implicitly, to a sacricial conceptionof rationality. Sacricial rationality (see Chakrabarti 1999:260-61)23 consists in giving-up the false cognition of selfas the I-object (ahakra). For this is the source of non-virtuous (adharma) passions and interests that motivateactions which claim the world of objects as me or mine.Non-virtuous interests must be replaced by virtuousconsiderations,considerationsthatseekthegood(dharma)and ultimately the highest good (nireyasa), the true orelemental self, which is arrived at by reective analysisand meditative attention (see NK(J) 1982: 596; ATV 1995:378 ;).24 It is by the degree to which an action accordswith this fundamental sacricial norm of giving-up of theI-object (ahakra) that its moral quality is judged (NK(J)1982:596-98,608).Concordance,ornot,withthissacricialethics determines the compositional characteristics ofthe psychophysical self and its world. These explicate aperceptual,aective,andphysicalorderthatappearstobebasedinthereciprocalnormsthatstructurecausation(PDS1994:31).25Theideaisthatthegoodnessofaselfsactions,historically,26determines the sorts of objects (artha) it can experienceand enjoy (bhoga) as sources of pleasurable and painfulexperience. But this requires a body t to provide thenecessarycausalbasis(dhra)forexperiencingthemorallyappropriate range of aective pleasures and pains (PDS1994:31,359).Italsorequiresaworldofobjectsthatcanaordthisrangeofaectiveexperiences.Objects,inthisview,areinherentlysourcesofvaluethatelicitaectiveandvolitionalconcernfromselves,quaagents;andtheirmodesof appropriation as me or mine in intentional actions hasvirtuous or non-virtuous consequences for the self (NK(J)1982: 42). This means that both selfs body and its worldexplicate the historical or genealogical goodness of itsactionsinitspastlives(PDS1994:31,59,80),andariseasontologicalconstructsthatareequallymoralconstructsinvirtueoftheirconcordancewithsacricialnorms.Selfappearshereasthatwhichcomposesandrecomposesits embodiment, as body and world, by its own eorts. Itdoessoasthesourceofagentialvaluesandnormsandtheethicalpowersofintentionalpracticesthatiscompositionallaw (ada).27It is the synonymity of the norms andregularities of law (ada) with the goodness (dharma,adharma) of actions that grants to self compositionalpowers that structure nature as an ethical order that isSPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2 PAGE9APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES irreducible to mere matter (bhta). Because natural orderincorporatestherealmofagentialvaluesandreasonsandthedomainofsacricialnormsthatunderpincompositionallawandorder.284.EMBODIEDAGENCYANDTHEELEMENTALSELFThe agentive and constructivist self is an embodiedself because only the bodied self is minded, a locus ofconsciousness(caitanya)andagency(karttva).29Further,itisonlythebodiedselfthatisalocusofgoodness(dharma)orcompositionallaw(ada).30Theliberatedselfwhichisdisembodied is unminded; it is a de-composed self, anelementarysubstancethatisdevoidofmentalandbodilypropertiesandthephenomenaofownershipandreexivity.This elemental self exists as bare substance, a structuraldimension, much like spatiality (dik) and temporality(kla), devoid of selfs distinguishing (viea) propertiesof consciousness, agency, and law. It appears as themetaphysicalinfrastructureoftheagentialandethicalself,abaremetaphysicalindividual(viea)thatistheconditionofpossibilityofmentalcausationandnaturalcausalorder,much as space and time are the condition of possibilityofphysicalcausationandorder(PDS1994:319;NK1984:287, 15-16). This is the true form (svarpa) of the self, itsexistenceasabaremetaphysicalsingularity(kevala).CONCLUSIONWe see above that the assimilation of an ethics of actionand composition into a metaphysics of self in classicalVaieikastructuresanontologyinwhichselfisthesourceofagencyandnormativity,reason,andlaw,andthegooditself, in nature. Such a self is sui generis a relational andreexivesubstance,onwhichaccount,itisthegooditselfwhich can have a good, and act for its own good, as theconditionofpossibilityofrationalagencyandnaturalorderandcausation.NOTES1. The term dierential (vaieika) owes to the concept ofa dierentiator or distinguisher (viea) that individuateselementary substancesa concept that is unique to classicalVaieikaas well as Vaieika's ne-grained dierentiation oftheconstituentsoftheworld.2. This is a non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) somewhat inthetraditionofNCSDssuchasE.J.Lowesemergentsubstancedualism. See E. J. Lowe, Personal Agency (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2008).3. Ada literally means non-visible, unobserved, or unseen. Itrefers to those natural forces or laws that are unobservable,non-visible, or simply unknown. See Anantlal Thakur, Originand Development of the Vaieika System. History of Science,Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization, ii/4 (Delhi: CentreforStudiesinCivilizations,2003),15.Theseforcesandlawsareregulative principles that deal with the laws of composition bywhichtheelementaryconstituentsoftheworldcometoconstituteaworldofcompositeobjects.Adaunderpinsphysicalcausalregularitiesastheirconditionofpossibilitybutremainsdistinctfrom these. It also includes those forces that govern physicalcausal relations that lie beyond a dened domain of physicalcausalregularities,suchasmagnetism,etc.Physicalregularitiesrefertothingssuchasthewindblowinghorizontally,etc.(see,ibid.). I term this compositional and constructivist, as well asregulative,powerlaworcompositionallaw.4. Note that for the purposes of this essay, nature, natural order,and natural world refer specically to the domain of naturalcausal law (ada), qua moral law (dharma), which integratesallaspectsoftheuniverse,physical,mental,andmoral,astheirconditionofpossibility.5. Reexiveisusedhereinthesenseofsomethingthatisdirectedback on itself. Thus, I, for example, is a reexive pronoun.Reexivitydoesnotrefertothereexivityofconsciousness,thatis, the idea that consciousness is immediately aware of itselfin each cognitive act, which Vaieika does not acknowledge.ForVaieika,selfcannotbebothawareofitselfandofanotherobjectinthesamecognitiveact.Rather,selfcanbecognitivelygrasped only in a succeeding cognition which has the rstcognition as its object. Note that cognition of the true self isconsideredtheultimategoodhere.6. Note,itisthetrueself,ortheelementalself,thatisthehighestgood. The vitalistic conception of self espoused here owesmuch to Upaniadic claims of a self that is the essence of lifeand the world (Bhadrayaka Upaniad, in Upaniads, editedand translated by Patrick Olivelle, 2.4.12, 4.5.12-4 [Oxfordand New York: Oxford University Press, 1996]; Kaha Upaniad,inUpaniads,editedandtranslatedbyPatrickOlivelle,5.10-1[OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996];aswellastotheUpaniadicnotionofanagentiveself(ibid.,1.1;3.3-4).7. The claim here is that a self must be the referent of the rst-person pronoun I, given its unique usage, which distinguishesitfromotherwords.TheuniquenatureofIseemstorefertoitsreexivityandtothedemandthatthisrequiresauniquesortofreferent,aself(PDS1994:79).Butthismaybedebatable.8. Dharma and adharma are the inherited moral dispositions andcapacitiesoftheindividualself,derivedfromthemoralqualityofitspreviousintentionalactions,whichareoftentranslatedasmerit and demerit, respectively. They are the source of selfspleasurable and painful experiences in its current embodimentbut also underwrite mental and bodily life and natural order.See Praastapda, Word Index to the Praastapdabhaya, eds.J.BronkhorstandY.Ramseier(Delhi:MotilalBanarsidass,1994),31,80.9. These are imprints of cognitive experiences, aections, andactions, and include the learning of theoretical and practicalskillsacquiredinaselfscurrentembodiment.Cognitiveimprintsareretainedandaccessedasmemories,dispositions,charactertraits,andtheoreticalandpracticalskills.10. Number (sakhy) is the property of there being one or more(selves).11. Pthaktva refers to the quality of intrinsic metaphysicaldistinctivenessthatisresponsibleforthenumericalidentityandindividualityofasubstance.12. They (pleasure, pain, desire, aversion) are always expressed[sententially]with[referenceto]theI-object(ahakra)(ibid.,79).13. Justasacharioteerisinferredbythemotionofthechariot,soa willful controller (prayatnavan adhiht) [of the living body]is inferred by such activity (pravtti) as is t for obtaining whatis advantageous (hita) and such restraint (nivtti) as is t foravoidingwhatisdisadvantageous(ahita),bothbeinglocatedinthebody(vigraha)(ibid.,78).14. [Theselfisalsoinferred]fromsuchprocessesasbreathinginandbreathingout.Howso?Fromobservingthechanging(vikta)movement of the air contained in the body, [we infer a willfulcontrollerwhois]likeonewhopumpsthebellows.Onaccountof the regular activity of opening and shutting the eyes, [weinferacontrollerwhois]likeapuppeteer[directing]awoodenpuppet(ibid.,78).15. From the growth of the body, the healing of its wounds andfractures, etc., [we infer a controller] like a house-owner [whoextendsandrepairshishouse].16. [Self is inferred from these] two [types of movement, bodilystrivingandrestraint,insofaras]theyenablethat[theacquisitionor avoidance of desired and undesired objects, respectively].Themovementofwind,etc.,ontheotherhand,doesnothavethe capacity of bringing about and averting what is favourableand unfavourable, respectively, for the wind, etc. Jagada,Skti,inGopinathKavirajandPanditrajDhundhirajShastri,eds.Praastapdabhyam of Mahaikalpa - Praastadevcrya, withCommentaries (up to Dravya), Skt by Jagada Tarklakra,Setu by Padmanbha Mira and Vyomavat by Vyomaivcrya,(Varanasi:ChowkhambAmarabhratPrakaana,1983),364.PAGE10 SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES The thrust of Praastapdas argument (Praastapda. op. cit.,7680), and those of his commentators, is that reexivity andownershipofthissort,whetherself-consciousanddeliberative,orprimitive,requiresasubstancethatissuigenerisaself,thatis to say, a substance that is sui generis self-referring. But thismust be a non-physical substance because of the atomic andcompositeontologyofthephysical(ibid.,77),andthefactthatphysical properties lack reexive and relational features, i.e.,they lack intentional contents or telic goals that refer back totheirownerorbearer.SeealsoJagadaopcit.,364.17. See Christine Korsgaard, Moral Animals, Lecture One: TheOrigin of the Good and Our Animal Nature, people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.MA3.pdf.18. From these notions of I and mine follow an aection for thepleasant and aversion for the unpleasant; these aections andaversionsgiverisetoactivityandrestraintofactivity;thencefollowdharmaandadharma...Seerdhara,Padrthadharmasagrahaof Praastapda With the Nyyakandal of rdhara, ed., andtrans.,G.Jha(Varanasi:ChaukhambhaOrientalia,Reprint,1982),597.Asopposedtoappropriativeepistemicownershipofmentalstates, their non-appropriative ownership lies merely in theirmetaphysicalbasisinasubstantiveself,onwhichaccount,theyarephenomenallyandperspectivallyuniquelymyown(sva).19. SeealsoChristineKorsgaard,op.cit.20. Theconceptionofselfasbearerofthereexivityofconsciousnessandthereexivestructuresoflifeandthegoodlie,Isuggest,inearlyIndianphilosophy.SelfarisesintheUpaniadsasthelivingessence of human life and the natural world as the vital forceor breath that re-enters itself, goes back into itself, followingits emergence as, and in, a world of objects. See Brian Smith,Reections on Resemblance, Ritual, and Religion (New York:OxfordUniversityPress,1989),58.21. Constructive refers to constructing or composing something ina telic manner. Constructivist or constructivism refers here tothe construction or composition of ones own psychophysicalselfandworldthroughtheethicalpowersassociatedwithonesintentionalactions.22. Thenotion of the good or active goodness (dharma) is adevelopmentoftheVedicconceptionofta.TheVedasproposean aesthetic, harmonic and ethical principle, ta, a principle ofactive,creativetruthoractiverealizationofthetruth(MichaelWitzel, Vedas and Upaniads, Gavin Flood, ed., The BlackwellCompanion to Hinduism [Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003],70), which is later termed dharma. This principle maintains acohesiveanddierentiatedorderofobjectsandactionsacrossthe physical, moral, and divine realms, biological and socialphenomena. Moreover, as we see below, just as sacricialactions institute or realize ta in the Vedic sacrice, so dointentional actions institute dharma in classical Vaieika in amoregeneralizedmanner.23. Thenotionofrationalityhereisoneofsacricingorgiving-upthefalsesenseofself,quatheI-object(ahakra),inthoughtandaction.ThisaccordswithChakrabartisthesisthatsacriceisthehumanrationalactivityparexcellenceinIndianphilosophy.Ahumanbeinghasthecapacitytoriseabovenarrowself-interestand perform sacrices both in the literal and ritualistic sensefor the sake of unseen results in the future. Further, [o]nlyhumans are capable of dharma considerations of piety andmorality,rightorwrongconductandreectiveanalysis(vicra),and aware of what causes what (karaja) while consciouslyseeking pleasure. Arindam Chakrabarti, Rationality in IndianPhilosophy,E.DeutschandR.Bontekoe,eds.,ACompaniontoWorldPhilosophies(Oxford:Wiley-Blackwell,1999),260-61.24. rdharaexplainsthatethicalpractices,epistemicandbehavioral,mustleadtotheattainmentofwisdomoftheform:Iamnot,nothingismineand[thereis]noI(SmkhyaKrika64,quotedin rdhara. op cit., 596, revised trans.), and this is true self-knowledge.OrasUdayanaexplains,theethicalselfisthatwhichhasovercomenarrowpassions,interests,andlimitations:[It]isnot aected by . . . [the] passions; for one who has discardedall limitations has no attachment to progeny or riches becausehe is not beneted by these. . . . This false cognition [of self]is dissipated by right knowledge. As to this right knowledge,it arises gradually through listening to scriptural statements,thenmeditationontheseandsoon.Thecause(ofdesiresandaversions)beingthuseliminated,theeect[thatis,desireandaversion] is also eliminated. Udayana, tmatattvaviveka ofUdayancryawithTranslation,ExplanationandAnalytical-CriticalSurvey, N. S. Dravid, ed. and trans. (Shimla: Indian Institute ofAdvancedStudies,1995),378,revisedtrans.25. The virtuous (dharma) and non-virtuous (adharma) actions ofbeings...actonatomstoformbodiesasameansofexperiencingpainandpleasurethatisconsistentwiththequalityoftheirpastactions.Godsandsagesthusobtainbodiesthatresultfromtheaction of meritorious deeds on atomic matter, whereas insect-bodiesareappropriatetoexperiencingpunishmentsthataccordwiththepastdeedsofthesebeings(PDS1994:31).NotetheparallelwithearlyBrahmanicalthought,whichconstruesselfassomethingthatisself-distributingandreturnstoin-formitselfasself(tman).SeeBrianSmith,ReectionsonResemblance,RitualandReligion(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1989),58.26. Historical actions refer to selfs actions in past lives whosemoralquality,ormoralgenealogy,isrecordedasaccruedvirtue(dharma)andnon-virtue(adharma).Accruedvirtueandnon-virtueinuencetherangeofpossibleexperiencesofpleasureandpainthataselfcanenjoyinthislifeandthesortofbodyitcanhaveabodythataordsthepossibilityofsuchexperiences.27. The inuence of early Brahmanical thought is evident here.tmanrefersintheseearlyphilosophiestobody,self,andsocio-ontologicalidentity.ItisconstructedandperfectedintheVedicsacrice.Selfismade(saskurute)t,whole,andperfect,bythesacricialactivityquaself-perfection(tma-saskti)asaworkofart(ilpa).Sacricialactivitythusexpressesandregeneratesthesacricerstman,hispsychophysicalandsocio-ontologicalbeing.BrianSmith,ReectionsonResemblance,101.Human beings depend on ritual or sacricial actions (karman)forcreatinganontologicallyviableselfandtheworldthatselfinhabits. So that both self and world emerge as constructsof sacricial action: a human being takes birth, is embodied,in a world whose construction is measured by his sacricialactions.Sacriceistheconstitutionofbeingitself,humanandcosmic, through a process of ritual construction (ibid., 101-2).As in Vedism, in classical Vaieika, human life is a process ofconstructingandreningaself,antman,bysacricialactivitywhere sacrice refers to giving-up of the I-object rather thanritualsacrice,andreferstoallactionsratherthanmerelyritualaction.28. Nature, if we are to use the term, pertains not merely to thematerial since matter (bhta) is considered dead or inactive inVaieikaintheabsenceofitsactivation,i.e.,theactivationofitsproperties and powers, by selfs vital powers of dharma whichinstitutecompositionallaw(Praastapda.opcit.,57-58).29. Thisisanimportantnon-CartesianaspectofVaieikassubstancemetaphysics.30. In thePDS, the post-mortem self that is the bearer ofadapossessesasubtlebody(ibid.,358-59).BIBLIOGRAPHYSANSKRIT TEXTS AND ABBREVIATIONS TV tmatattvaviveka.N.S.Dravid,ed.withtrans. tmatattvavivekaofUdayancryawithTranslation,ExplanationandAnalytical-CriticalSurvey.Shimla:IndianInstituteofAdvancedStudies,1995.PDS Padrthadharmasagraha. J. Bronkhorst and Y. Ramseier,eds. Word Index to the Praastapdabhaya. Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass,1994.PDS(J) Padrthadharmasagraha. G. Jha, ed., and trans.Padrthadharmasagraha of Praastapda with theNyyakandalofSrdhara.Varanasi:ChaukhambhaOrientalia,Reprint,1982.NK Nyyakandal.V.P.Dvivedin,ed.TheBhyaofPraastapdatogether with Nyyakandal of rdhara, 2nd ed. Delhi: SriSatguruPublications,1984.NK(J) Nyyakandal.G.Jha,ed.andtrans.PadrthadharmasagrahaofPraastapdawiththeNyyakandalofrdhara.Varanasi:ChaukhambhaOrientalia,reprint1982.Ki Kiraval. Jitendra S. Jetly, ed. Praastapdabhyam withtheCommentaryKiravalofUdayancrya.Baroda:OrientalInstitute,1971.SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2PAGE11APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIESS Skti.GopinathKavirajandPanditrajDhundhirajShastri,eds.Praastapdabhyam of Mahaikalpa Praastadevcrya,with Commentaries (up to Dravya), Skt by JagadaTarklakra, Setu by Padmanbha Mira and Vyomavatby Vyomaivcrya. Varanasi: Chowkhamb AmarabhratPrakaana,1983.TC Tattvacintmai.S.H.PhillipsandN.S.RamanujaTatacharya,trans.EpistemologyofPerception:GageasTattvacintmai,Jewel of Reection on the Truth (about Epistemology):The Perception Chapter (Pratyaka-khaa). New York: TheUniversityPressGroup,2004.BUp Bhadrayaka Upaniad. Patrick Olivelle, ed. and trans.Upaniads. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press1996.KaUp Kaha Upaniad. Patrick Olivelle, ed. and trans. Upaniads.OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996.WESTERN LANGUAGE REFERENCES Chakrabarti,Arindam.RationalityinIndianPhilosophy.InACompaniontoWorldPhilosophies,editedbyE.DeutschandR.Bontekoe,25978.Oxford:Wiley-Blackwell,1999.. The Connecting Manas: Inner Sense, Common Sense, orthe Organ of Imagination. In After Appropriation: Explorations inIntercultural Philosophy and Religion, edited by Morny Joy, 5776.Calgary:UniversityofCalgaryPress,2011.Ganeri, Jonardon. Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work ofReason.London:Routledge,2001..TheSelf:Naturalism,Consciousness,andtheFirst-PersonStance.Oxford:ClarendonPress,2012.Kim, Jaegwon. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough. Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2005.Korsgaard,Christine.TheSourcesofNormativity,TheTannerLecturesonHumanValues,DeliveredatClareHall,CambridgeUniversity,November16 and 17, 1992. Accessed September 16, 2014. tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/k/korsgaard94.pdf.. Moral Animals, Lecture One: The Origin of the Good and OurAnimal Nature. Accessed September 15, 2014. people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.MA3.pdf.Lowe,E.J.PersonalAgency.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008.McDowell,John.MindandWorld,2nded.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1996..TwoSortsofNaturalism.InMind,Value,andReality,16797.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1998.. Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind. In Naturalism inQuestion,editedbyM.DeCaroandD.Macarthur,91105.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2004.Mohanty, J. N. Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought. Oxford:ClarendonPress,1992.Smith,B.K.ReectionsonResemblance,Ritual,andReligion.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1989.Sosa, E. Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation. InMidwestStudiesinPhilosophy9(1984):27181.Thakur,A.OriginandDevelopmentoftheVaieikaSystem.HistoryofScience,Philosophy,andCultureinIndianCivilization,ii/4.Delhi:CentreforStudiesinCivilizations,2003.Witzel, M. Vedas and Upaniads. In The Blackwell Companion toHinduism,editedbyGavinFlood,68101.Oxford:BlackwellPublishing,2003.Mind and Cognition: The Nyya Perspective K. S. Prasad UNIVERSITYOFHYDERABADAllofusengageinvariouscognitiveepisodesthroughoutour life. Whether it is reading a book, talking to a friend,watching a movie, or simply listening to music, we areattendingto,makingsenseof,andsometimesrememberingwhatwesaworheard.Whileallthesecognitiveepisodesare routine, seemingly simple, and often eortless, theprocess involved in them is more sophisticated than isapparent.Analysisofcognitionleadstotheconclusionthatitisspeciedbyacertaintypeofconnectionbetweenthecognizingpersonandtheobjectcognized.IfIassertthatIcognizesomethingaboutsomethingelse,thisimpliesthefollowing:rstly,thatmycognitionrelatestosomeobject;secondly, that this cognition belongs to me, that it is mewho implements the process of cognition; and thirdly,I claim to express an actual state of things. A completeaccountofthecognitivesystemmustexplainhowittakesinformation in and retains as well as how it transmits.AmongclassicalIndianthinkers,reectiononcognitionanditsepistemicstatuswasinitiatedbyGautamainhisNyya-sutras. Indian philosophers in general and the Naiyyikasin particular have addressed issues on cognition withinthe framework of their discussion on pramas (methodsof valid cognition). An eort is made in this paper topresenttheNyyatheoryofcognition.Ibeginwithanoteontranslationofthetermbuddhi,whichisanapproximateequivalentofthetermcognitionfollowedbythenatureof buddhi as understood in the Nyya system. Next, Iconsider the cognitive apparatus, which includes variouscomponentsinvolvedincognition,and,nally,theroleofmindincognitiveprocess.IAccording to the Naiyyikas, buddhi is taken to meanthe same as jna (cognition), upalabdhi (apprehension),bodha (understanding), pratyaya (cognizance), andadhyavasya (ascertainment). In other words, they treatthese three words almost as synonyms.1 Gautama hasdevoted fty six sutras in Nyya-stras on cognition(buddhi).2Twoimportantissueswereraisedanddiscussedin this connection. They are as follows: 1) What iscognition as a fact of reality? 2) Is cognition enduring orephemeral?Cognition,accordingtoNyya,consistsinthemanifestationofobjects(arthaprakaobuddhih).Thingsaremademanifestorrevealedtousonlywhentheybecomeobjects of cognition. According to Nyya, cognition is aquality. Vtsyayana states, of what then is the quality? ItisthequalityoftheCognitiveAgent,asitishewhoisthecontroller.Asamatteroffact,thecontrolleristhecognizerand that which is controlled is the instrument.3 It cannotbe quality of any material substance, for, unlike that, itdoes not admit of external perception. Physical qualitiesareperceivedbytheexternalsenses,butcognitionisnotso perceived. Being thus fundamentally dierent fromall physical qualities, cognition is to be regarded as thequality of the immaterial substance called self. To quote:PAGE12 SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIESBy reason of EliminationThe quality of cognition beingdeniedinreferencetotheBody,theSense-organsandtheMind,4 there being no other Substance left to which thesaid quality could belong, and the Soul5 being the onlylikely Substance leftCognition is regarded as being thequalityoftheSoul.6Further,cognitionisnotanessentialqualityoftheself.Theselfhasacquiredthispropertyinitsbodilysettingand,hence,cognitionisephemeral.IIInasimplecognitiveprocesslikeperceptionwehavefourentities and three connections. The four entities are self,object,sense-organ,andmind.Thethreeconnectionsaresense-object,sense-mind,andmind-self.The presence of self is an indubitable fact in the processofcognition.EventhoseschoolsofIndianphilosophythatare skeptical about the existence of self also recognizetheimportanceofacognizerincognitionthoughtherearedierencesamongthemwithregardtotheessentialnatureof the cognizer. Self (tman) is the rst in Gautamas listof objects of cognition. According to Gautama, the marksoftheselfaredesire,aversion,eort,pleasure,pain,andcognition.7Itisonthebasisofthesemarksthatwecaninferthe existence of self. Uddyotakara, while commenting onthis,explicitlystates,becauseDesireandtheresthavethesameobjectasRecognition,theyprovethatallcognitionsappearingintheRecognitionmusthaveacommonagent;itisawell-knownfactthatnorecognitionofcognitionsispossible,(a)whenthesecognitionshavedierentagents,or(b)whentheirobjectsarenotthesame,or(c)whentheyarebroughtaboutbydierentinstruments.8Wend,forinstance, a cognizer can remember and recognize what(s)he has perceived and not what remained unperceivedfor him/her or what others might have perceived. Desireto acquire a thing or aversion towards a thing originatesonlyfromtheremembranceofpreviouscognitions.Thisispossibleonlywhenallthecognitiveeventsareregisteredasattributesofthecognizer.Thus,selfisthesubstratumofcognitions.Proper cognition presupposes an inventory of objects ofcognitionthatarediscussedunderthecaptionofprameyasin Nyya philosophy.9 These prameyas constitute thebasic types of cognitive reality that exist independent ofcognitions.Wecanaswellbringthemundertwovarieties.They are entities that are directly related to the senses,suchastable,etc.,andtheotherentitiesthatareindirectlyrelated to the sense-organs, such as color of the table,etc. We cannot withhold the acceptance of the evidentialvalueofourexperiencethatguaranteestherealityoftheseobjects of the world. A detailed Nyya discussion on thecognitionofdierentkindsofobjectsisbeyondthescopeofthispaper.IratherconnemyselftothepointthattheNaiyyikasbeingcommittedtorealismbelieveintherealityof the external world consisting of objects, and a properunderstandingoftheseobjectsalonewillshowthewaytotheattainmentofthehighestgood.The next entity in the cognitive process is the sense-organ. According to Gautama, the sense-organs are thirdinthelistofobjectsofcognition(prameyas).Therearesixsense-organs. Of these, ve are external senses and oneis internal sense.10Gautama establishes the reality of theveexternalsense-organsintwostages.Tobeginwith,herejectstheviewthatthereisonlyoneexternalsense,thecutaneous sense-organ, and the other sense-organs aresimplythespecialpartsofit.Hethenproceedstoexplaintherealityofalltheveexternalsense-organs.Vtsyyana,while commenting on Nyya-stra 3.1.54, explains thatthe existence of ve sense-organs is inferred from vedistinct varieties of sense experiences, namely, touch,color,smell,taste,andsound.Thesevedistincttypesofsense experiences require ve distinct sense-organs fortheircognition.Forinstance,coloriscognizedbythevisualsense-organ(eye)butdoesnotapprehendsmell.Similarly,weinfertheexistenceoftheolfactorysense,whichservesthepurposeofapprehendingsmell.Likewise,theexistenceof other sense-organs also can be inferred.11 Thus, fromthevekindsofapprehensions,visual,auditory,olfactory,gustatory,andcutaneous,wecanvalidlyinfertheexistenceofthevedierentsense-organs.Further,themultiplicityof the sense-organs is also inferred from the diversity oftheir locations. These sense-organs are responsible forreceivingthesensations.Sensationsarethosewhichmakethe object intelligible to the cognizer through mind. It isimperative that the sense-organs should function and beincontactwiththemindbeforesensationsofobjectscanhave some meaning to the cognizer. This takes us to theconceptofmindinthecognitiveprocess.IIIThe concept of mind has a long history in Indianphilosophical scenario. However, my task here is notto present an elaborate analysis of the development ofthis concept but rather to situate its role in the cognitiveprocess. Mind is considered both as object of cognitionandalsoamaterialmeansforcognitioninNyyaliterature.Itissixthinthelistofobjectsofcognitionenumeratedinthe Nyya-stras.12 Gautama establishes the existence ofmindonthebasisofthenon-simultaneityofcognitionsbydierentsense-organs.13Itisamatterofcommonobservationthateventhoughseveralsensibleobjectsareincontactwiththeirrespectivesense-organsatoneandthesametime,thereisnosimultaneouscognition of these objects. From this we conclude thatthereissomeinstrumentalcauseotherthanthevesense-organs that is responsible for all our cognitions, and thatinstrumentalcauseisnoneotherthanthemind.Ifmerelythesense-objectcontactwereabletobringthecognitions,independentlyofmind-sensecontact,thenweshouldhavesimultaneouscognitions,whichisnotthecase.Hencewehavetoadmittheexistenceofmindasaninstrumentthatconnectsthesensationswiththecognizer.Anexampleofour everyday behavior may serve to contradict this view.Imaginethatwearewatchingaprogramontelevision.Apartfrom cognizing the visual images, we are also cognizingauditory sensations simultaneously. This apprehension ofsimultaneityamongcognitions,accordingtoNyya,isduetothefactthatmindcomesincontactwithdierentsensesinsucharapidsuccession;itlookslikeapprehensionofacircleofre-brand.14Whenare-brandmovesrapidlyinacircle, there is a succession among several cognitions ofthe re; but because it moves with extreme rapidity, weperceive continuity in the circle of re as if it is a singleSPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2 PAGE13APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIEScontinuous circle of re. The fact of non-simultaneity ofcognitions also suggests that there is only one mind in abody.ToquoteVtsyyana,Iftherewereseveralminds,itwouldbepossibleforseveralsense-organstobeincontactwith several minds simultaneously; whereby there shouldbe several cognitions appearing (through these contacts)atoneandthesametimebutthisneverhappenshencethe conclusion is that, inasmuch as cognitions of thingsappearonlyoneafteranotherandneversimultaneouslythereisasinglemind(inonebody).15Anotherargumenttodemonstratetheexistenceofmindisbasedoninternalperceptions of our cognitions. It is a fact that cognitionsofpleasure,pain,aversionandthelikearedierentfromthe objects of the external senses; still, they are objectsof cognition and hence they need an instrument for themanifestations of such cognitions. Such an instrument isnone other than the mind.16 The fact that our feelings arealso successive and not simultaneous supports the ideathat there is only one mind in one body. Even our eortsthat are based on our feelings appear only one after theother.Havingestablishedtheexistenceofmind,weneedtolookatthenatureofmind.AccordingtoNyya,mindisanon-physicalsubstance.Itisasubstancebecauseithasqualitiessuch as conjunction, and it is non-physical because it isnot constituted by any of the physical elements of earth,water, etc. Further, it is atomic in magnitude. If the mindis something non-atomic in magnitude, then it is quitepossible for the mind to come in contact with severalsense-organsatoneandthesametimethroughitsdierentparts,givingrisetosimultaneouscognitions.Thefactthatourcognitionsarealwayssuccessiveandnotsimultaneousestablishesthatthemindisatomicinmagnitude.17Withregardtothelocationofthemind,Upaniadsconsidertheheartastheseatofthemind,18whereastheNaiyyikasare more general in stating that the mind lies within thebody.19 Here the term lies should not be taken literallyin the sense of a container and contained. Uddyotakarawhile commenting on this explicitly states that all that ismeantbythemindlyingwithinthebodyisthatthemindnever functions except through the body.20 Of course,the functioning of the mind has meaning only when it isconnected with the self. Thus, according to the Nyya,mindisaninstrumentalcauseofcognitionthroughwhichall cognitions, both external and internal objects, getactualized.Ifwetakeselftobethecognizerofcognitions,thenmindisthematerialmeansofcommunicatingtotheselftheimpressionsaswellassensationsbroughtthroughsense-objectcontact.Asimplecognitiveprocesssuchasperceptionleadingtoa denite cognition involves, to begin with, the contactof the sense-organ with the object. Of the ve externalsenses, the sense of sight and sense of touch can giveus perception of substances, while the sense of smell,senseofsound,andsenseoftastecangiveusperceptionof qualities. These sense-organs are capable of receivingsensationsoftheirrespectiveobjectsonlywhentheyareincontactwiththeirrespectiveobjects.Thiscontactbetweenasense-organanditsobjectistermedassamyoga.Amongthedierentsensoryinputsreceived,themindcomesintocontact with only one sensory input at a time dependingontheselectiveattentionofthecognizersothatonlyonesensationreachesthecognizeratonetime.Thesensationsoreceivedfromthemindisanapprehensionoftheobjectassomethingindeniteanduncharacterized.Itisasimpleapprehensionoftheexistenceandattributesofanobjectwithout any corresponding judgment of it. According toNyya this cognition is termed in as nirvikalpaka. It is aconscious state but not a self-conscious state. To be self-consciousistocognizecognitionexplicitlyascognitionofthis or that object. In the case of a perceptual judgment,thisisanapple,therststepisthecontactofthesensewith the object, which immediately leads to a simpleapprehensionoftheappleassomethingasindenite.Theapprehensionofanindeniteobjectbeingassociatedwithacertainclassnameinourpastexperiencerevivestheword-imageansweringtothatname.Withthisweremembertheclass-nameoftheperceivedobjectandcallitbythatname.It is here that we have determinate perceptual cognitionof the object expressed as this is an apple. In Nyyaterminology this is known as savikalpaka cognition.21 Thisdoesnotaddanythingthatisnotcontainedintheobject;rather,itbringsachangeintheperceptiveconsciousnessof the object. There is a development from the feeling ofsomethingtheretoanarticulatedexpressionofthefeelingofadenitecognitionofanobject.Indianthinkersingeneralhaverecognizedtheimportanceofmindinthiscognitiveprocesssincetimeimmemorial.InBrhadrayakaUpaniad,wehavethefollowingverse:My mind was elsewhere; I did not see it. My mind waselsewhere, I did not hear it. It is through the mind thatoneseesandhears.22Commentingonthis,ankaracryasays,Thereisamindapartfromtheexternalorganssuchastheear.Foritiswell-knownfactthatevenwhenthereisaconnectionbetweentheexternalorgan,the object and the self, a man does not perceivethatobject,whichmaybejustinfront,andwhenasked, Have you seen this form? he says, MymindwaselsewhereIwasabsentminded,Ididnotseeit.Similarlywhenasked,haveyouheardwhat I have said he says, I was absent-minded,I did not hear it. Therefore it is understood thatsomethingelse,viz.theinternalorgancalledmind,which joins itself to the objects of all the organs,exists,intheabsenceofwhichtheeyeandotherorgansfailtoperceivetheirrespectiveobjects.23This clearly indicates the importance of mind in thecognitive process. There can be no cognition unless themindrespondstotheinuencesofthesurroundingworld.Atanymomentofinattentionorabsent-mindednesswedonot perceive sounds or things other than those in whichweareengrossed,althoughthesoundsorthingsmaybeacting on our sense. Thus, in a cognitive process such asperception,mindmustbeincontactwiththeobjectthroughthemediumofthesense-organsontheonehand,andwiththeselfontheother,andinthissensemindseemstobealiaisonbetweentheobjectsandsenseorgansononehandandwiththeselfontheother.However,cognitionssuchaspleasureandthelikearedirectlyapprehendedbytheselfPAGE14 SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES throughtheinstrumentalityofmind.Ineithercase,theroleofthemindisindispensable.NOTES1. Buddhi upalabdhijnamityanararthantaram, Nyya-stra.1.1.15, trans. M. M. Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana (Delhi: MotilalBanarsidas,1981),7.Nyya-bhsya,3.2.3,trans.GanganathJha,TheNyya-strasofGautamawiththeBhyaofVtsyyanaandthe Vrika of Uddyotakara, Vol. III (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas,1984),1269.2. Nyya-stra.1.1.15&3.2.1-55,trans.Vidyabhusana,7.&10527.3. Nyya-bhya.3.2.19,trans.Jha,1332.4. Mind is a translation for the Sanskrit term manas, which isregardedasinnersenseinclassicalIndiantradition.5. Soulisasynonymforself.6. Nyya-vrika.3.2.39.Ibid.,1370.7. Ichcha dvea prayatna sukha duhkha jnani tmanolingam iti.Nyya-stra.1.1.10,trans.Vidyabhusana,6.8. Nyya-vrika.1.1.10,trans.Jha,220.9. tmaarrendriyrthabuddhimanahpravttidoapretyabhvaphaladuhkhapavargstu prameyam. Nyya-stra. 1.1.9, trans.Vidyabhusana,5.10. It is interesting to note that in Nyya-stras 3.1.54-55, we ndonlyvesense-organslistedonthebasisoftheircorrespondingobjects.Mind,whichisconsideredanorganofinternalperceptioninstra3.1.16,isnotmentionedalongwiththesesense-organs.However,Gangesopadhyaya,inhisTattvacintamani,enumeratessix senses: the ve external and the one internal. S. C.Vidyabhusana,HistoryofIndianLogic(Delhi:MotilalBanarsidas,1978),411.11. Nyya-bhya.3.1.54,trans.Jha,1232.12. Nyya-stra.1.1.9,trans.Vidyabhusana,5.13. Jnyaugapadyatekammanah.Nyya-stras.3.2.56.Ibid.,127.14. Altchakradaranavat tadupalabdhirusacrat. Nyya-stras.3.2.58.Ibid.,128.15. Nyya-bhya.3.2.56,trans.Jha,1396.16. manograham sukham duhkhamiccha dveo matih ktih,Viswanatha Nyaypancanana, Bhsapariccheda 57, & Sktkaresukhdnam karaam manocchate, Ibid., 85. Trans. SwamiMadhavananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1977), 85 &175. Sukhdyupalabdhisdhanamindriyam manah taccapratytmniyatatvtanantam paramurpam nityam ca.Annambhatta, Tarkasamgraha, Section II. 9, trans. SwamiVirupakshananada(Madras:SriRamakrishnaMath,1994),52.17. Nyya-bhya.3.2.59,trans.Jha,1399.18. Aitareya Upaniad. III.i.2, trans. Swami Gambhirananda, EightUpaniads,Vol.II(Calcutta:AdvaitaAshrama,1992),63.19. Nantah arravttitvnmanasah, Nyya-stras. 3.2.26, trans.Vidyabhusana,114.20. Nyya-vrika.3.2.26,trans.Jha,1344.21. We do not nd explicit reference to the distinction ofnirvikalpaka and savikalpa states of perception in Nyya-stras, Nyya-bhsya, and Nyya-vrika. Vcaspatimira, in hisNyya-vrika ttparyatka, interprets the words avyapadayaand vyavasyatmakam present in the Nyya-stra denition ofperception to mean nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka, respectively.Later Naiyyikas, following Vcaspati, distinguished betweennirvikalpakaandsavikalpakaastwostagesofthesameperceptualprocess. Indriyrthsannikarajanyamjnam pratyakam.Taddvividhamnirvikalpamsavikalpamcheti.Tatraniprakrakamjnam nirvikalpakam yathedamkincit saprakrakam jnamsavikalpakam yath ditthoyam brhmaoyam symoyampcakoyamiti. Annambhatta, Tarkasamgraha. Section IV, 32,transl.SwamiVirupakshananada(Madras:SriRamakrishnaMath,1994),79.22. BhadrayakaUpaniad(withthecommentaryofSankaracarya),I.v.3, trans. Swami Madhavananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama,1988),147.23. Ibid.,148.Lost in Translation? The Upaniadic Story about Da and Interpretational Issues in Analytic Philosophy Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay MONTANASTATEUNIVERSITYR. Venkata Raghavan UNIVERSITYOFHYDERABADDon Wallace Freeman Dcruz UNIVERSITYOFHYDERABADOVERVIEWIn the Bhadrayaka Upaniad, one of the principalUpaniads, we nd a venerable and famous story wherethe god Prajpati separately instructs three groups ofpeople (gods, humans, and demons) simply by utteringthe syllable Da. What is remarkable about this passageis the way this single syllable is interpreted in dierentways,datt,dmyatanddayadhvam,bythethreegroups,witheachinterpretationconsideredcorrectbythespeaker,Prajpati.Thisstory,whichwaslargelyknownonlytoIndianreadersoftheUpaniads,becameafeatureoftheEuropeanimaginationofIndiain1922whenitwasreferencedinthesection What the Thunder said in T. S. Eliots The WasteLand.1In this paper, our concern is not with ethics but theoriesof meaning and interpretation: How can all divergentinterpretations of a single expression be correct, and,indeed,endorsedbythespeaker?Asanexerciseincross-culturalphilosophicalreection,wewillconsidersomeofthe leading modern theories of meaningthose of Grice,Quine, and Davidsonin order to see if the Upaniadicstoryreceivesanaturalhomeinanyofthem.Thestructureof our paper will be as follows. We will rst narrate thestory from the Bhadrayaka Upaniad (section 1). Wewill then discuss Paul Grices (1957) account of meaning,followed by Quines (1960), which challenges the formeraccount. In this connection, we will also address DonaldDavidsonswork,which,inturn,contrarytoQuine,pleadsfor the possibility of radical interpretation (Davidson,1984)(section2).Then,wewillcomparetheviewsofGrice,Quine, and Davidson with the Upaniadic story to seewhetherthestorycanbeanalyzedintermsofanyoftheiraccounts(section3).Finally,weconcludethatthestoryisbestunderstoodthroughGricestheoryofmeaningratherthanQuinesorDavidsons.1.THEUPANISHADICSTORYPrajpatiisoneofthecreatorguresintheVedicliterature.ThestoryinBhadrayakaUpaniadisaboutPrajpatiandhis three childrengods, human beings, and demons.2Aftercompletingtheirstudyunderhimasvedicstudents,it was time to say a respectful goodbye to their father.SPRING2015 | VOLUME14| NUMBER2PAGE15APA NEWSLETTER|ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIESEachposedaquestiontoPrajpati.Godsaskedhim,TheVenerable Lord, please instruct us. Prajpati replied byutteringthesyllable,Da,andasked,Haveyouunderstoodme?Daisnotawordinanylanguage,includingSanskrit(inwhichthestorywaswritten).Godsreplied,YesSir,wedid. You told us to practice restraint (dmyat). Prajpatireplied, Yes, you have understood me perfectly well.The gods are said to be naturally self-indulgent and soPrajpati instructs them to practice restraint.3 Then it wastheturnofthehumans.Theyasked,TheVenerableLord,pleaseinstructus.Prajpatirepliedbyutteringthesamesyllable, Da, and asked, Have you understood me?Humans replied, Yes, Sir, we have understood you. Youaskedustopracticecharity(datt).Prajpatireplied,Yes,youhaveunderstoodmeperfectlywell.Menarenaturallyavaricious and so they are instructed to distribute theirwealth to the best of their ability.4 Demons repeated thesamequestiontotheirspiritualfather.Prajpatirepliedtothembyutteringthesamesyllable,Da,andasked,Haveyou understood me? Demons replied, Yes, Sir, we haveunderstood you. You asked us to practice compassion(dayadhvam).Prajpatireplied,Yes,youhaveunderstoodme perfectly well. Since the demons are by nature crueland prone to inict injury on others, they are instructedto be compassionate and kind to all.5What we notice inthisstoryisageneralthemeofhowword-playandfancifuletymologyisalargerpartofUpaniadicliterature.2.MEANING,TRANSLATION,ANDRADICALINTERPRETATIONINANALYTICTRADITIONThe role of meaning in its dierent shades, along withotherissues,dominatedordinarylanguagephilosophy,aninuentialmovementinthemiddleoftwentiethcentury.Todevelophisversionofordinarylanguagephilosophy,Gricebeginsbydistinguishingwhathecallsnaturalmeanings(asinthosespotsmeanmeasles)fromwhathecallsnon-naturalmeaning(asThosethreeringsonthebellmeanthat the bus is full). Since we are concerned with non-naturalmeaning,wewillbeginwithhisdenitionofnon-naturalmeaning:AmeantsomethingbyxisroughlythesameasAutteredxwith