ASF IN EUROPE: MAIN CHALLENGES

Prof. José M. Sánchez- Vizcaínojmvizcaino@visavet.ucm.es

OIE-ASF Reference Laboratory

www.sanidadanimal.info

ASFV: A old friend 1978-

MAIN WORK:

DIAGNOSIS TEST &

REAGENTS

EPIDEMIOLOGY-CONTROL

and ERADICATIONOIE ASF REFERENCE LABORATORY

www.sanidadanimal.info

www.sanidadanimal.info

200 nmMore than 100 structural

proteins

Very complex virus, big syze, large genome: 170 kb

Replication in macrophages

NO production of neutralizing antibodies

ASF. The most complex disease of swine

Very complex molecular structure

Genetic variability

22 genotypes (VP72)ONLY TYPE II&I

VACCINE FOR ASF

Many trials have been done in the last decades looking for an effective

vaccine against ASFV:

1.INACTIVATED VACCINES Ab response NO PROTECTION

2.ATTENUATED VACCINES Ab + cytotoxic specific CD8

PROTECTION against homologous & heterologous strains BUT

SAFETY PROBLEMS, No long term studies

ASF VACCINE: Spain1965

A VACCINE FOR ASF

3. SUBUNIT VACCINES very poor, PARTIAL PROTECTION but

SAFE ALTERNATIVE

4. DNA VACCINES PARTIAL PROTECTION with some candidates

Different expression vectors (plasmids, Bacman…)

Enhance CD8 response with no Ab protection

ANTIBODIES and CITOTOXIC CD8 (T cells)ARE RELATED WITH PROTECTION

Ab CHRONIC FORMS IN ENDEMIC AREAS

Eradication without vaccine is

possible but not easy…

MORE RESEARCH IS NEEDED

Ab

PIGS (D & W)

and SOFT

TICKS

To keep in mind

VIRUS

Infection Clinical Signs/Dead Could be Carriers (10%)

•Viremia: starts 2-3 days to 8 days postinfection, and persists for a long time (months)•Specific Antibodies: from day 7-11 during months, even years (all live)•Virus excretion: from the early infection (day2) for long time. Even after recover

AGENDA :

• ASF Epidemiological update. Europe

• Potential ASF spread

• Risk assessment and surveillance program

• Conclusions

Epidemiology of ASF update:

The 3 global scenarios

Currently affected:

ASF in EUROPE

1. The infection

22 described genotypes

Georgia 2007

ASFV p72 genotype II

The viruses from Poland and Lithuania had a TRS insertion identical to

that present in ASFV isolates from Belarus and Ukraine. This TRS

insertion was absent in the remaining viruses from eastern Europe,including Tver Oblast (Russia, 2012) and Georgia, 2007.

Gallardo et al., Genetic variation among African swine fever genotype II viruses, eastern and central Europe. Emerg Infect Dis. 2014- Sep;20(9):1544-7. doi: 10.3201/eid2009.140554.

Highly virulent isolate

ONLY ACUTE FORMS OF THE DISEASE HAVE BEEN OBSERVED IN THE AREA

Fever, short incubation period, high mortality (Gabriel et al., 2011; Blome et al., 2012; Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2014)

1. The Infection

SYMPTOMS and LESIONS

Only Fever and Dead

In Africa 22 genotypes / Hyper-acute-acute-sub-acute forms

In East Europe genotype II /only acute isolates are circulanting

DIFFERENT CLINICAL FORMS

Clinical Signs: Easily Confused with:

Classical Swine Fever

Erisipelas

Salmonellosis

Other Septicaemic conditions

PDNS

• To Keep in mind:

. To be aware and ready is the key

• ASF Clinical Information to veterinarian and farmers is very important for an early detection. In general no clear and good information about ASF is provided. The entrace of the disease is not explosive in most cases.

• Laboratory diagnosis and differential diagnosis is critical.

• EPI and LAB together the best solution.

WHY?. ASF ENTRANCE IN

CAUCASUS REGION

• Combination of factors:

• Increase of ASF in Africa

• Economic crisis

• Swill feeding

• BY. Lack of biosecurity

PIG PRODUCTION:

Armenia & Georgia.

• Traditional and seasonal production

• 85-97% pigs in back-yard system (1-2 pigs/farm)

• Swill feeding, free roaming pigs, no BS

1. Transcaucasian countries

INTRODUCTION: waste from international ships swill feedingTRANSMISSION: • Legal & illegal mov of pigs and products• Free roaming pigs• Wild boar Sources: FAO 2008, 2013; EFSA 2010,2014

ABSENCE OF INFORMATION

2. Russian Federation

ASF NOTIFICATIONS in RF:

• 63% BY

• 18% SMALL

• 16% HBS UNITS

• SLAUTHERHOUSES,

PROCESSING PLANTS,

2014

Sanchez-Vizcaino et al., 2012; OIE 2014

Role of wild boars and domestic pigs in the spread of African swine

fever in Russian Federation (2007-2013)

De la Torre, et al., 2014

3. Ukraine & Belarus

PIG PRODUCTION

• Belarus: 43% HBS

• Ukraine:80%HBS

BACK-YARD in Western regions

INTRODUCTION: • UKRAINE 2012: swill feeding• BELARUS: contaminated feed

(RF)• Wild boar

EFSA, 2014

Back-yard pig density (FAO, 2010)No border with RF

Empres Watch, 28, 2013

Epidemic curve of ASF in East Europe

4. EU

PIG PRODUCTIONIMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EU AFFECTED

COUNTRIES

Sources: Glipha & FAOSTAT (FAO)

4. EU

INTRODUCTION 1st cases Lithuania & Poland (January 14): WILD BOAR

(genetically identical to Ukrainan and Belarusian isolates and some from the Russian Federation.

All the studies performed so far in Europe (Spain and

Sardinia) revealed that the wild boar by its own it is no able to

mantain the disease without the re-infection from

domestic/contaminated products (Laddomada et al., 1994; Manelli et

al., 1997, 1998; Mur et al., 2012; Rolesu et al., 2007).

THE ROLE OF THE WILD BOAR

4. EU

Latvia: •WILD BOAR from Belarus•Domestic pigs swill feeding in Back-yard

First domestic outbreak

High ASFV pressure(wild boar andcontaminatedmeat) from Belarusin May/June(Cvet, 2014)

4. EU

Latvia: • Domestic pigs Low BS back-yard farms. Several introductions

at the same time

• Wild boarmovement/ slaughterhouse disposal?

High ASFV pressure (wildboar and contaminatedmeat) from Belarus inMay/June

(Cvet, 2014)

4. EU

Lithuania: • Domestic pigsHBS FARM

• HUMAN FACTOR is the most likely source of introduction. No explosive ASF presentation

• Potential spread

Good BS and preventivemeasure in place

4. EU

Estonia: wild boar Latvia: WB + Back yard outbreaks

4. EU

Data Source: OIE WAHID, own ellaboration

ASF epidemic curve in European Union (2014)

Similar to European East Countries

LEVELS OF RISK

•Part III: pig holdings and feral pig population

•Part II: only feral pig pop.

•Part I: risk due to proximity to feral pig pop.

Prohibitions:

•Dispatch to other MS and third countries (all parts)

•Dispatch of live pigs (II & III)

•Dispatch of semen, ova, embryos/meat/products (III)

•Especial derogations available

(2014/178/EU)

UE Current situationUpdated 5th Sept. SANCO, 2014

Main Challenges

. Stop the potential endemicity of ASF in wild boar

. Avoid pigs farms in suitability wild boar áreas

. Increase biosecurity in back yard production

. Used new non invasive methodology for the evaluation of

Asf virus and antibodies in wild boar (Ej. Oral fluid,faeces..)

The best recipe for ASF

Awarness and Early Detection

Early detection: Risk Assessment and Surveillance

Program

Control actions: A good Contingency plan

Control Actions

Which is the Risk and potential consequences of this situation to EU

and China ?

RISKS of SPREAD

RISKS of SPREAD

EVALUATING THE RISK OF ASFV

ENTRANCE IN CHINA

Pig census 679 million

(estimated)

Pig product imports!

(56% global trade)

EVALUATING THE RISK OF ASFV

ENTRANCE IN CHINA

2500km aprox.

Increasing commercial and cooperation

relations with African continent

840 million of kg of pig offalsimported in China in 2012

Only East Europe

Specially in Nigeria and South Africa(more than 50.000 residents)

Very strong connections by boat with Africa(new ports under construction)

AFRICA and East Europe

Mur, et al. 2014

840 million of kg of pig offalsimported in China in 2012

From Russian Federation

Specially in Nigeria and South Africa(more than 50.000 residents)

EVALUATING THE RISK OF ASFV EXPOSURE IN

CHINA

Evolution of pig production systems in China (Source:

Schneider y Sharma, 2014)

Even the specialized production not allways good biosecurity level(Quaratine, separation between production units…) McOrist et al., 2011

Presence of otherdiseases:

PRRS, CSF, FMD

Confussionand

late diagnosis

Exposure

Routes of introduction

Spread

Infection at origin

OUTSIDE CHINA

IN CHINA

Risk assessment workshop

Russia Africa

Why a risk analysis??

Plane Boat

RANK 1-10

What route would have a higher risk?

Routes of introduction

Hazard Identification

At each entry point in China….

…for now in two regions with potentially different routes of entry: Xinjiang and Shandong

Hazard Identification: Routes of introduction

TRADE

Animal products

Semen and ova

Meat and meat products

Live animals

Domestic pigs

Wild pigs and boars (zoos, hunting, etc)

FOMITES

Leftovers, people, vehicles, other fomites

WILD BOAR

LEGAL orILLEGAL

Imported live pigs: Please identify the Russian regions from where live pigs are imported with destination Xinjiang

Russian Regions of origin of live pigs

LEGAL orILLEGAL

1

76

3 4 5

2

8

Xinjiang

1 (negligible)

2 (low)

3(médium)

4(high)

5 (very high)

Plane

Road

Train

Imported live pigs. Please identify the Russian regions from where live pigs are imported, with destination

ShandongRussian Regions of origin of

live pigs1

76

3 4 5

2

8

Shandon

g1 (negligible)

2 (low)

3(médium)

4(high)

5 (very high)

Plane

Road

Train

Boat

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A WORLD FREE of ASFjmvizcaino@ucm.es