Asef Bayat and Eric Denis Who is Afraid of Ashwaiyyat

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DOI: 10.1177/095624780001200215 2000 12: 185Environment and Urbanization

Asef Bayat and Eric DenisWho is afraid of ashwaiyyat? Urban change and politics in Egypt

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Environment&Urbanization Vol 12 No 2 October 2000 185

URBAN CHANGE IN EGYPT

Who is afraid ofashwaiyyat? Urban change and politics in Egypt

Asef Bayat and Eric Denis

SUMMARY: Drawing on the 1996 census, this paper challenges the orthodoxview that rural migrants are causing a rapid expansion of Egyptian cities and havecreated cities of peasants. It describes how most major cities have ceased to becentres for rural in-migration and looks at the spatial diffusion of urban develop-ment through the growth of agro-towns, urban villages and new industrial towns.Many settlements officially classified as rural are growing rapidly and acquiringurban characteristics. The paper also questions commonly held assumptions that thelarge informal settlements in which much of the urban population live are abnor-mal and associated with social deviance and political violence.

I. INTRODUCTION

NINETEEN NINETY-TWO was a watershed in Egypts recent urban historyand in the discourse within Egypt on cities. Imbaba, one of Cairos majorinformal communities, with around one million inhabitants, had beentaken over by the militant Islamic group Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya. Theirpenetration of this very large informal settlement resulted in the creation,according to foreign correspondents, of a state within the state in Egypt.The Imbaba incident and similar events followed a decade of sustaineddebate and discourse on cities and politics, often reviving century-oldassumptions concerning the social consequences of urban transition.

Cairo is currently perceived as a giant city choked by overpopulation,seemingly the result of an influx of fallahin (peasants) which is said to bethreatening its urban configuration and turning it into a city of peasants.By the same token, the argument goes, the ecology of the city is beingtransformed by the spread of ashwaiyyat (informal communities)(1) whichare ruralizing Egyptian urban centres. The last ten years have witnesseda growing concern that rural migration is laying the groundwork for amajor social explosion because of the prevalence of poverty and jobless-ness and the undermining of family relations. Some see ashwaiyyat asunnatural communities which trigger social disease and abnormalbehaviour such as lack of privacy, overcrowding and violence. Othershave commented on the erosion of respect for parents and social controland on the prevalence of immorality.(2) The informal cities are perceivedby many in Egypt as representing a Hobbesian locus of lawlessness andextremism, producing a culture of violence and an abnormal way oflife.(3) The 1996 Egypt Human Development Report summed up the prevalent

Asef Bayat is a professor ofSociology at the AmericanUniversity in Cairo. EricDenis is an urbangeographer working at theFrench Research Centrebased in Cairo.Address: The AmericanUniversity in Cairo, 113Kasr El Aini Street, POBox 2511, Cairo 11511,Egypt; e-mail:[email protected]

1. Ashwaiyyat, the plural forashwaiyya (literally meaninghalf-hazard), is the termused in public to refer to theinformal communities inEgypt, some 111 of whichexist in the greater Cairoarea. Official estimates putthe total number of thesesettlements at about 1,034,accounting for about 12million, or 45 per cent, ofEgypts urban population.Land invasion accounts fora very small proportion ofthese settlements and thevast majority compriseprivately owned homeswhich are built onpurchased agricultural landbut which lack planning,construction permits andmost conventional urbanservices. See Assawi, Ali(1996), Al-ashwaiyyat wanamazeg al-tanmiyya (TheInformals and DevelopmentPatterns), Centre for theStudy of DevelopingCountries, Cairo University,pages 61-62.


expert position thus:During the last 15 years, we have witnessed a process of ruralization of

Cairo, with the growth of many rural formations and semi-rural settlementson the fringe of the city. Consequently, many new sub-populations in thecity have their distinct lifestyles and tend to travel in insular circuits.(4)

Egyptian cities generally are assumed by the national media, acade-mia, government officials and, more significantly, by the planningcommunity, to be spaces of migrants who have ruralized the urbancentres, turning them, like Cairo, into cities of peasants. Ashwaiyyat areseen to represent the epitome of ruralized life in cities, exhibiting anomie,poverty, crime and thus political violence. These assumptions view Egypt-ian cities and the countryside from the vantage point of Janet Abu-Lughods classic study Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious(5) but seem to

186 Environment&Urbanization Vol 12 No 2 October 2000

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2. See the expert opinions ininterviews conducted in Al-Ashwaiyyat SanaaHokoumiyya, Al-Wafd,March 5, 1999.

3. Nasir, Abdul-Fattah(1999), Al-Ashwaiyya fiHayatina, Al-Wafd, March9.

4. Cairo Institute ofNational Planning (1996),Egypt Human DevelopmentReport 1996, page 56.

5. Abu-Lughod, J (1971),Cairo: 1001 Years of the CityVictorious, PrincetonUniversity Press.

Airport

6 Octobernew city6 Octobernew city

Map 1: The Greater Cairo Region

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Map 1: The Greater Cairo Region


pay little attention to the significant changes which she later acknowl-edged had occurred since the 1970s. The purpose of this paper is to illus-trate some of these changes, the implications for the current discourse oninformal cities and their assumed association with social and politicalproblems. We argue that the demographic changes of the last 20 years orso have produced a more complex spatial pattern. First, cities have ceasedto be centres for rural migration (which has levelled off) while villageshave begun to assume urban characteristics. These observations thus chal-lenge the assumption of a clear-cut rural-urban dichotomy. Finally, wequestion the basis of the premise which infers social deviance and politi-cal violence from the character of the informal city.

II. DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFT

TRACING THE MAJOR developments in Egyptian urbanization over thelast 20 years, one can observe two distinct trends. On the one hand, therehas been a stabilization and diffusion of urbanization and on the other, astabilization of rural-urban migration. In other words, Egypt is currentlyexperiencing a double movement of deconcentration at both the metro-politan and national levels.

Between 1976 and 1996, Egypts population rose from 36 million to 59million, an increase equal to the total population of Egypt in 1956. Inter-estingly, this high growth rate is associated with an end to urban polar-ization. Contrary to the prevailing idea of a continuous rural-urban influx,the urbanization process in Egypt has been both stabilized and diffused.The urban proportion of the population has declined from 43.8 per cent in1976 to 43 per cent by 1996. This new pattern of stabilization is associatedlargely with the urbanization of large villages and the rapid growth ofsmall towns; this will be discussed below (see Figure 1). Although reli-able data on this do not exist, we suspect that migration to these villagesand small towns may serve as an important stabilizing factor.

The second general trend in Egyptian urbanization has to do with thestabilization of rural migration to large cities. Unlike the 1940s and 1960s,when large cities attracted very large numbers of rural people, the trendhas slowed considerably. In addition, the metropolitan areas are engagedin a structural movement of centrifugal redistribution from the core areas



Figure 1: Annual Population Growth Rates between1897 and 1996


of the big cities to the peripheries a classic trend in megacities all overthe world, from Paris to New York, to Mexico, Bombay and Tehran. Asthe core areas of large cities lose population, new agglomerations emergearound them (see Maps 2 and 4).

Thus, over the past ten years, Cairos central districts (i.e. the WestBank, Dokki and Giza) have progressively lost a large proportion of theirinhabitants, and six qism, or districts, lost population in 1966. Thisnumber increased to 17 in 1976, 18 in 1986 and had reached 22 by 1996. Onthe whole, central Cairo lost some 580,000 inhabitants between 1986 and1996 (see Table 1).

This trend is not limited to Cairo alone but can be observed also inAlexandria, Tanta, Mansoura and the cities of the Canal (see Map 2). In


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Map 2: Greater Cairo Region; Population Change between 1986 and 1996

+270,000 or more

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Variation of population

+135,000 to 269,999+27,000 to 134,999-27,000 to 134,999-135,000 to 269,999

-270,000 or more

Map 2: Greater Cairo Region; Population Changebetween 1986 and 1996




Table 1: Greater Cairo Region; Demographic Trends Since 1947

Area Number of inhabitants (thousands) Annual growth rate Density(ha) 1947 1960 1966 1976 1986 1996 47/60 60/66 66/76 76/86 86/96 1996

METROPOLITAN AREA 158,086 3,120 5,049 6,365 8,227 10,98813,467 3.8 3.9 2.6 2.9 2.1 85BUILT-UP AREA 54,917 2,455 4,167 5,363 6,945 9,061 10,172 4.2 4.3 2.6 2.7 1.6 185Cairo 31,121 2,065 3,358 4,232 5,074 6,069 6,867 3.8 3.9 1.8 1.8 1.1 221Agglomerate Giza-Qalybiyya 23,796 389 810 1,132 1,871 2,993 3,305 5.8 5.7 5.2 4.8 2.6 139Out of the built-up area 103,169 665 882 1,001 1,282 1,927 3,295 2.2 2.1 2.5 4.2 3.3 32al-Tibbn 2,174 4 7 12 34 51 59 5.3 8.7 11.0 4.3 1.5 27Hilwn 3,701 45 94 203 283 427 539 5.9 13.7 3.3 4.2 2.4 14615 Mayu 1,258 0 0 0 0 24 66 10.5 52al-Ma'd 565 27 23 50 54 47 70 -1.3 14.1 0.8 -1.5 4.2 125Misr al-Qadma 1,118 101 212 254 270 255 229 5.9 3.1 0.6 -0.6 -1.1 205al-Sayyda Zaynab 460 188 254 277 252 199 156 2.3 1.5 -0.9 -2.3 -2.4 339al-Khalfa 949 115 162 233 186 165 191 2.7 6.3 -2.2 -1.2 1.5 202'Abdn 165 90 95 99 88 65 49 0.5 0.6 -1.2 -3.0 -2.8 296al-Msk 75 58 67 63 58 43 29 1.2 -1.2 -0.8 -2.9 -4.1 382Qasr al-Nl 131 21 26 21 20 18 13 1.5 -3.3 -0.8 -1.0 -3.1 98Blq 247 194 202 202 177 124 75 0.3 0.0 -1.3 -3.6 -4.9 304al-Izbkiyya 140 62 64 64 59 45 30 0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -2.7 -3.9 217al-Darb al-Ahmar 143 113 140 143 133 105 79 1.6 0.4 -0.7 -2.4 -2.8 553al-Gamliyya 195 106 131 135 124 90 59 1.6 0.5 -0.9 -3.1 -4.1 303Bb al-Sha'riyya 105 110 124 123 110 79 60 0.9 -0.1 -1.1 -3.2 -2.8 571al-Dhhir 192 61 100 109 104 84 67 3.9 1.6 -0.5 -2.1 -2.2 349al-Sharbiyya 322 64 143 215 292 296 247 6.4 7.1 3.1 0.1 -1.8 768Shubra 140 90 125 136 129 109 84 2.5 1.4 -0.5 -1.7 -2.6 598Rd al-Farag 265 156 265 283 272 232 178 4.2 1.1 -0.4 -1.6 -2.6 671al-Shil 541 96 299 370 418 401 324 9.1 3.6 1.2 -0.4 -2.1 599al-Wyl 489 103 143 159 142 111 90 2.5 1.8 -1.1 -2.4 -2.1 184Had'iq al-Qubba 494 56 164 203 314 341 304 8.6 3.6 4.5 0.8 -1.1 616al-Zaytn 739 46 109 144 267 327 323 6.9 4.7 6.4 2.0 -0.1 438al-Matariyya 663 15 84 177 282 440 499 14.1 13.2 4.8 4.6 1.3 752Madnat Nasr 3,339 0 0 0 65 167 467 9.9 10.8 140Misr al-Gadda 868 75 86 166 127 126 121 1.0 11.7 -2.6 -0.1 -0.4 139al-Nuzha 4,245 0 39 63 102 125 155 8.4 4.9 2.0 2.2 37'Ain Shams 914 8 33 63 182 389 469 11.2 11.2 11.3 7.9 1.9 513al-Zwyat al-Hamr' 472 6 38 86 171 300 306 16.1 14.5 7.2 5.8 0.2 648al-Salm 2,395 0 0 0 7 101 357 30.2 13.5 149al-Zamlik 266 10 17 20 19 22 15 4.3 2.4 -0.5 1.7 -3.6 58Minsht Nsir 324 10 19 24 56 131 168 5.0 4.1 8.6 8.9 2.5 519al-Bastn 1,310 16 30 68 188 450 667 5.0 14.4 10.7 9.1 4.0 509al-Marg 1,365 18 31 43 62 137 252 4.6 5.6 3.7 8.2 6.3 184Tura 350 2 30 22 24 43 67 24.8 -4.8 0.9 5.8 4.6 192al-Khnka * 12,577 68 104 123 155 255 460 3.3 2.9 2.3 5.1 6.1 37al-Qantir al- Khayriyya * 9,879 77 100 118 146 220 297 2.0 2.8 2.1 4.2 3.0 30Shibn al-Qantir * 14,517 106 139 154 190 257 338 2.1 1.6 2.2 3.1 2.8 23Shubr al-Khaym 1 1,020 28 75 134 234 369 417 7.8 10.0 5.7 4.7 1.2 409Shubr al-Khaym 2 1,714 11 25 39 161 345 454 6.8 7.5 15.2 7.9 2.8 265Qalyb madna 9,392 30 43 49 63 84 97 2.1 1.8 2.4 4.3 3.6 10Qalyb markaz * 2,770 66 87 96 122 185 264 2.8 2.2 2.4 3.0 1.4 95Imbba qism 657 39 136 191 325 484 523 10.2 5.7 5.5 4.1 0.8 796al-'Agza 505 19 54 84 144 182 174 8.1 7.7 5.6 2.3 -0.4 345al-Doqqi 484 35 71 86 101 107 94 5.5 3.3 1.7 0.6 -1.4 194al-Giza qism 778 76 164 216 208 259 239 6.0 4.7 -0.4 2.2 -0.8 307Blq al-Dakrr 918 15 55 98 189 288 454 10.8 10.2 6.7 4.3 4.7 494al-Ahrm 1,754 26 36 43 68 128 200 2.6 3.1 4.7 6.5 4.6 114al-'Umrniyya 1,923 13 19 32 141 307 538 2.7 9.3 15.9 8.1 5.8 2806 uctubar * 0 0 0 0 0 1 35 52.1 al-Hawmdiyya 1,981 30 40 47 61 92 115 2.0 2.8 2.7 4.2 2.2 58al-Gza markaz * 5,758 47 63 69 94 128 217 2.3 1.7 3.1 3.2 5.4 38al-Badrashayn * 11,440 87 113 126 158 229 286 2.1 1.8 2.3 3.8 2.2 25al-Saf * 13,537 67 83 93 118 174 225 1.6 2.0 2.4 3.9 2.6 17Imbba markaz * 27,670 139 180 205 270 438 587 2.0 2.3 2.8 4.9 3.0 21Awsm * 5,022 43 58 64 89 140 193 2.2 1.8 3.3 4.6 3.3 38al-Warq * 2,670 30 49 66 117 247 394 3.8 5.1 5.9 7.8 4.8 148

* markaz - agglomerateSOURCE : EGIPTE (CEDEJ) and Census of Egypt.


the meantime, while these cities lost some of their inhabitants, the villagesand towns located on their peripheries grew rapidly. Mahalla al-Kubra,the fourth largest city in Egypt, had a growth rate of less than 1 per centbetween 1986-96, but the growth rate in the surrounding villages was over2 per cent per year (see Table 2). Similar patterns prevail in Tanta, Zaqaziqand the city of Dumyat, which experienced a negative (-1.2 per cent)growth rate. Only a few large regional cities in Upper Egypt, such as

Suhag and Qina, have had higher or equivalent rates of growth over theseten years. In this region, population diffusion into the smaller communi-ties has been delayed and the main cities have continued to attractmigrants; moreover, a large number of small towns (such as Qus, Farshut,Luxur and Nagah Hamadi) are able to compete with them in theireconomic activities.

In short, since the 1970s, Egypt has experienced a deconcentration ofpopulation at both the metropolitan and national levels. Urbanization hasstarted to diffuse throughout the country and the rural exodus appears tobelong to the distant past. Already in 1986 some 80 per cent of migrantsrecorded in the cities came not from the countryside but from other urbancentres. In general, the share of inter-provincial migrants, that is, peopleborn outside a given province, decreased from 11 per cent in 1960 to 7.5per cent in 1986. Thus, permanent population movement paved the wayfor an increasingly circular migration pattern.

III. EXPLAINING THE CHANGE

HOW DO WE explain this new pattern? Many people continue to movefrom one place to another but the pattern of population movement seemsto have shifted in the last 20 years. The large cities, notably Cairo, haveceased to attract a large proportion of the migratory population. Greater


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6. A technical note on thesize of greater Cairo isnecessary. In 1986, Cairoagglomeration covered 260square kilometres with afurther 19 squarekilometres for itssurrounding urban villages.In 1994, the figures were320 square kilometres and15 square kilometres,respectively. The decreasein urban village area is dueto the incorporation ofsome urban villages intothe agglomeration(Population Census, 1998).If we link demographicdata and physical dynamicswithin the framework ofthe limits of theadministrative units, we getan extended Cairoagglomeration of 540square kilometres,equivalent to one-third ofthe inhabited space of thegreater Cairo region. Theactual urban spaces built inthe form of new cities and

Table 2: Secondary Cities (excluding Cairo and Alexandria)

Rank Secondary city 1966 1976 1986 1996 Population Populationgrowth rate growth rate

city rural surroundingsCity population (thousands) 1976-86 1986-96 1976-86 1986-96

1 Mahalla al-Kubr 191 292 361 395 2.13 0.93 2.41 2.252 Tanta 230 283 337 371 1.74 0.98 2.68 2.173 Mansr 195 259 318 370 2.04 1.53 2.38 2.224 Asyt 150 209 273 343 2.69 2.32 2.80 2.495 Zaqzq 150 203 244 267 1.89 0.90 2.95 2.356 Faiyym 134 167 213 261 2.47 2.05 3.28 2.697 Kafr al-Dawwr 109 146 193 232 2.79 1.88 2.79 1.888 Aswn 125 145 191 220 2.80 1.42 2.80 1.979 Damanhr 146 171 191 212 1.13 1.07 1.13 1.0710 Miny 113 146 179 201 2.04 1.18 2.94 2.4811 Ban Suwf 90 118 152 172 2.60 1.23 2.88 4.0212 Qin 69 94 120 171 2.50 3.63 2.90 2.6213 Shg 75 103 133 170 2.57 2.52 2.42 2.4714 Shibn al-Km 81 103 132 160 2.55 1.92 2.48 1.7915 Banh 64 89 116 146 2.68 2.34 2.73 2.15

Mean 160 cities 2.60 1.81 2.69 2.31

SOURCE: CAPMAS, General Census of Population, Housing and Economic Activities, 1966, 1976, 1986, Cairo.


Cairo, for example, now constitutes 17 per cent of the total population,the same proportion as in 1966.(6) The prime reason for this is an apparentsaturation in the big cities for accommodating the low-income (or evenvery affluent) groups. The current urban conditions have caused manyinhabitants to seek residence outside major urban centres. While largecities still provide opportunities for employment, the high price of land,population densities and the shortage of affordable accommodation, asso-ciated with the partially free-market cost of housing, force many newcom-ers as well as long-term residents to think better of staying in the city.Indeed, the existence, by 1996, of some 750,000 vacant apartments (17 percent of the total) in Cairo has done little to halt this process of out-migra-tion.(7) Essentially, home-seekers lack access to rent-controlled accommo-



suburbs on the outskirts ofthe eastern and westerndeserts are approximatelyequivalent to the Cairoagglomeration area butform only 1.4 per cent of thegreater Cairo region. Theofficial size of the region is2,900 square kilometres.

7. These figures includerent-controlled, free-markethousing as well as flats inuninhabitable condition.See CAPMAS (1996),General Census of Population,Housing and EconomicActivities, Cairo, first results.

Map 3: Greater Cairo Region; Population Change between 1976 and 1986

+270,000 or more

N

Variation of population

+135,000 to 269,999+27,000 to 134,999-27,000 to 134,999-135,000 to 269,999

-270,000 or more

Map 3: Greater Cairo Region; Population Changebetween 1976 and 1986


dation even though these flats might not actually be occupied. The verylow (controlled) rents encourage holders to retain these homes even ifthey do not occupy them. Beyond that, the unaffordable prices of newlybuilt formal housing exclude the low-income groups from the housingmarket. Thus, there remains no other option for young people, in partic-ular those intending to start a family, but to seek housing in the informalmarket. Hence, they venture out to join the outsiders who inhabit thelarge ashwaiyyat, the informal agglomerations surrounding metropolitanareas, some of which already accommodate groups of indigenous popu-lations such as villagers or tribal people.

Many of the inhabitants of these communities still depend on job


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Map 4: Variations in Population Growth Rates for Official Cities in Egypt, 1986-1996

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Map 4: Variations in Population Growth Rates forOfficial Cities in Egypt, 1986-96


opportunities within metropolitan areas, to which they commute daily.However, their residential communities are more than simply functionaldormitories. Rather, they are the locus for family, networks of friendsand recreation as well as job opportunities. In addition, these informalagglomerations perform a significant function in the national economy.They accommodate cheap waged labour subsidized by low-cost housingand provide basic necessities such as affordable land and rents, and food,in particular agricultural products. They offer the inhabitants the possi-bility of maintaining strong kinship networks, and security and protec-

tion. Nevertheless, the existence of conflict and competition betweenvarious groups in these neighbourhoods, for example, between oldtimers and newcomers, outsiders and insiders, and owners andrenters should not be overlooked. At any rate, such spatialarrangements and community construction owe much to the peculiarEgyptian spatial form its density and the proximity of communities toeach other. In 1996, on average, there were 1,600 people per square kilo-metre, the same density as in the New York metropolitan area, and localunits had an average of 4,500 inhabitants.(8) However, beyond densityand proximity, a significant factor has been the revolution in informaltransportation, the mushrooming of service microbuses which havereduced temporal and spatial distances and led to an interconnectedsystem of cities and villages. The number of microbuses in Cairo jumpedfrom 14,000 in 1990 to 60,000 in 1995. At the cost of traffic congestion andair pollution, the increase in informal transportation has generated thekind of time-space convergence that characterized early twentiethcentury Egypt, which had one of the oldest train networks in the world.With such transportation, you are never far from the city. As a 1997national household survey indicates, 91 per cent of Egyptian householdsare less than half an hour from a permanent bazaar and 74 per cent fromad hoc markets.(9)



8. Calculated by EGIPTE,CEDEJ, Cairo, 1998.

9. Datt, G, D Jolitte and MSharma (1997), An Analysisof Household Survey Data for1997, International FoodPolicy Research Institute,Food Security ResearchProject.

Table 3: Settlements and Population Distribution in Egypt, 1947-1996

Distribution of settlements by type

1947 1960 1966 1976 1986 1996

Urban agglomeration 38 38 38 38 38 39Cities 45 58 68 76 84 90Agglomeration of villages 20 43 53 65 112 130Urban villages with more than 10,000 inhabitants 42 85 122 205 400 628Urban villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants 5,360 5,281 5,224 5,121 4,871 4,618Distribution, in percentages, of Egyptian populationUrban agglomeration 25.9 31.8 34.3 36.4 38.4 36.9 Cities 4.4 4.6 5.1 5.6 5.9 6.2Agglomeration of villages 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.5 5.7 6.2Urban villages with more than 10,000 inhabitants 3.2 4.6 5.7 8.0 12.5 17.5Urban villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants 63.8 56.1 51.7 46.5 37.5 33.2Egypt 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Urban Egypt 36.2 43.9 48.3 53.5 62.5 66.8


IV. URBAN VILLAGES AND AGRO-TOWNS?

IN ADDITION TO the agglomerations on the fringes of the big cities, thelast 20 years or so have also witnessed the dramatic spread of urbanvillages(with 10,000 to 20,000 inhabitants) across the Egyptian country-side. Whilst in 1986, there were only 400 agglomerations with more than10,000 people, by 1996 Egypt had about 628 such villages, totalling 17.5per cent of the countrys total population (see Table 3). The arbitrary andrestrictive official definition of urban in mere administrative terms (asmarkaz) conceals an important trend of urbanization. Under the officialEgyptian definition, urban is defined in terms of its administrative roleand rural is residential. According to such a definition, there are onlyabout 200 cities in Egypt, a clear underestimation. Indeed, if Egyptadopted the Indian definition of urban (communities with more than5,000 inhabitants), around 80 per cent of Egyptians would be urbanites or,following the definition used in the Philippines, 100 per cent would beliving in cities.(10) The Egyptian official definition may be functional foradministrative purposes but it hides an alternative process of urbaniza-tion, namely, that which concerns mostly small towns and the strugglingurban villages with a population of 10,000 or more. Perhaps this patternof unrecognized urbanism in Egypt expresses Jamal Hamdans idea thaturbanism (umran) begins in the village.(11)

In-migration has contributed a great deal to the growth of urbanvillages. With an average population of 15,000, these villages begin toacquire urban characteristics such as greater social distance andanonymity among their inhabitants, a more extensive exchange of goodsand services, the division of labour and occupational diversity. In suchurban villages, occupations are no longer limited to the traditionalbarbers, shepherds or butchers but include many modern occupationssuch as teachers, mechanics, drivers, lawyers, doctors, white collarworkers, shopkeepers, employees of day-care centres and governmentofficials. One way of showing how the countryside is being urbanized isto look at the significant changes in the style of housing. For example, in1996 there were as many apartment buildings being constructed in ruralareas as in the cities, and the number built in rural areas was double thatof ten years earlier. The construction of flats (as opposed to typically ruraldwellings) signifies a convergence in the living conditions between urbanand rural areas.

In addition, modern transportation, television and new consumptionpatterns have enabled these villages to develop some aspects of urban life.The more efficient availability of electricity, a significant factor contribut-ing to a more modern way of life, has resulted from the operation of ahigh dam as well as the unique concentration (in proximity and density)of village communities along the Nile Valley (see Map 4). The vast major-ity of rural households (86 per cent) enjoy electricity and well over half ofthem (57 per cent) have access to running water (to their house plot). Theagglomeration process of this type of community has a momentum whichtends to reproduce the process. As more people gather in these commu-nities, diversification increases and new activities and occupations arecreated which, in turn, will attract more outsiders. Once businesses grow,there will be a need for coffee houses, restaurants and guest houses toaccommodate business people and drivers, and travelers, in turn, createnew non-agricultural job opportunities.

The growing deregulation of agriculture, moreover, is likely to


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10. See Moriconi, F (1995),Geopolis mesurelurbanisation du monde,Paris.

11. See Hamdan, Jamal(1980-84), Shakhsiyat misr(Egypts Character), Alam al-Kutub, Cairo (fourvolumes).


contribute to the growth of urban villages. A new class of well-to-dovillagers, who have benefited from investments in real estate and fromconstruction and cash-cropping, may develop an urban lifestyle, helpedby the current abundance and availability of modern consumer goods. Tobe able to consume new products, it is no longer necessary to be locatedin large city centres (for example, Cairo or Alexandria); these commodi-ties can be brought even to the villages.

We do not intend to present these communities as fully-fledged urbanentities since, in this context the term urban defined in terms of diver-sity, contains many contradictions. In large part, these agglomerations arestill dominated by agricultural activities, a feature which defines them, inthe words of some experts, as agro-towns(12) and, although diversity isgrowing, it is still limited. Conventional urban services (such as pavedroads, piped water, garbage collection and sewer systems) are largelyabsent and the illiteracy rate, especially among women, is quite high.However, it must be noted that urbanization of the countryside should beseen not as a uniform spread of urbanity in the hinterland but, rather, asa new trend of polarization at the level of small cities and large villages,or urban villages.(13)

Nevertheless, this slow but creeping urbanity represents a significantshift in Egyptian demography and political economy. First, it signifies andcontributes to a decline in the pattern of rural-urban migration. Second,it reflects the development of more dynamic communities characterizedby increasing mobility, increased commodification and exchange, and agreater availability of consumer goods. Third, a new pattern of social strat-ification is emerging, where status and influence result not only fromfamily and wealth but also from modern occupations, education andaccess to new products. Finally, it tends to subvert the rural-urbandichotomy, pointing towards a more hybrid demographic reality.

Thus, Egypt at the end of the twentieth century is experiencing a trendin urbanization outside the administrative definition of cities, a sort ofspontaneous urbanization of agglomerations on the periphery of the largecities, in larger villages and in small towns.

V. DISCOURSE OF INFORMALITY AND POLITICS

THIS NEW PATTERN of diffuse urbanization raises some importantissues regarding assumptions about the urbanization process, in particu-lar about the informal cities and their assumed association with certainsocial and political problems. To begin with, it challenges the classicpremise which attributes current urbanization in Egypt to a supposedmassive rural-urban migration and the current urban problems to theinflux of fallahin to cities.

On the other hand, this pattern points to a shift from a universal, statemanaged and planned urbanization to a more private and spontaneousone. This post-metropolitanization should be seen as a new trend in,and a challenge to, Egyptian political economy at the end of the twentiethcentury. Here, post-metropolitanization does not mean a reduction inthe economic power of metropolitan Cairo. Rather, it signifies a diffusionof urbanity over a vast area (through the growth and interlinkages of agro-towns, urban villages and new industrial towns) beyond, but close to,greater Cairo, with the latter retaining its dominance. It is this contradic-tion between massive urban diffusion on the one hand and economic and



12. The term used byHopkins, Nicholas andKirsten Westergaard(editors) (1998), Directions ofChange in Rural Egypt,American University inCairo Press, page 2.

13. This urbanizingcharacter of rural Egypt isclear from a few casestudies which haveappeared in recent years. InEl-Karanshawys study, forinstance, proximity totowns seems to play asignificant part in theintegration of villages intourban economy and society,notwithstanding thedominance of agriculture.See El-Karanshawy, Samer(1997), Class, family andpower in an Egyptianvillage in Cairo Papers inSocial Science Vol 20, No 1,Spring; also Dundon, Tom(1998), AMahallat al-Ruh:understanding physical andsocial form in a suburbanvillage, unpublishedpaper, American Universityin Cairo; and Hopkins,Nicholas (1998), SocialResponse to EnvironmentalChange and Pollution inEgypt, IDRC report, Cairo,which contains useful dataon the village of Akhbaz inthe Egyptian delta region.


social polarization on the other that characterizes current Egyptian post-metropolitanization.

This unplanned urbanization in Egypt highlights not only a concen-tration of population but also the needs, concerns and possible urban-typeconflicts which would directly involve the state. It is not, therefore,surprising that the state refuses to recognize these agglomerations asurban, since doing so would oblige it to make expensive urban provisionssuch as sewerage, paved roads and running water. Furthermore, chang-ing the status of a village might put certain obligations upon the resi-dents (for example, paying tax) and reduce the power of the local lites.

It also becomes evident that the belief that the ruralization of the main


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Map 5: Where Children are Concentrated: TheDistribution of Inhabitants under 15 years ofAge within the Greater Cairo Region in 1996


cities is the result of an influx of peasants is rather overstated. In fact, over80 per cent of the population of Cairo and 86 per cent of that of Alexan-dria were born there. Of the remaining migrants (over 80 per cent of them)the overwhelmingly majority come from other cities and not from thecountryside. Indeed, the strict official definition of what constitutes anurban unit and the invention of the concept of ashwaiyyat as a politicalcategory tend to produce new spatial divisions which exclude many citi-zens from urban participation. The ashwaiyyat are perceived as abnor-mal places where, in modern conventional wisdom, the non-modernand thus non-urban people, that is, the villagers, the traditionalists, thenon-conformists and the unintegrated live. It is indeed puzzling that over20 per cent of all Egypts and half of greater Cairos populations, whoreside in the ashwaiyyat, are considered outsiders, living in abnormalconditions.

But what is a normal city? It is viewed primarily as a modernentity, that is, one in which the buildings, streets, means of communica-tion and people (their behaviour, clothes, jobs and lifestyles) are somehowsimilar to those of the lites. Thus, those neighbourhoods where build-ings have no permits, where streets have no formal names, where menwear the traditional galabia, where women sit and socialize in front of theirhomes in the alleyways and where adults are largely active in the infor-mal economy are considered as non-modern and thus abnormal.Moreover, these settlements are not even thought of as part of the moderncity since their inhabitants, mainly migrants, are seen to have, in effect,ruralized their settlements.

This simple picture obscures the fact that the populations of informalsettlements are involved in the complex urban economy and division oflabour, and constitute one significant component of the diversified wholewhich is the city. In the old sociological tradition, what defines urban isprimarily the organic ensemble in a particular space, with a variety oflifestyles and economic activities, and those of the ashwaiyyat are onesignificant component.(14)

It is true that many of the inhabitants in the informal communitiespursue an informal life. That is, they tend to function as much as possi-ble outside the boundaries of the state and the modern bureaucratic insti-tutions. They wish to exert some degree of autonomy in their workingand cultural lives, basing their relationships on reciprocity, trust and nego-tiation rather than on the modern notions of individual self-interest, fixedrules and contracts. Thus, they might opt for self-employment or resortto informal dispute resolution rather than report to the police; or theymight be married by a local sheikh rather than at government offices; orborrow money from informal credit associations rather than the banks.This is the case not because these people are essentially non- or anti-modern but because their conditions of existence force them to seek aninformal way of life. Modernity is a costly condition. It is expensive andrequires a capacity to conform to types of behaviour (adherence to strictdiscipline of time, space, contract and so on) which most poor peoplesimply cannot afford. Thus, while these people wish to watch colour tele-vision and enjoy clean tap water, they are wary of paying their bills orgoing to work at a specified time.(15)

The activities of Islamist militants in Imbaba, an informal communityin Cairo, and the subsequent massive intervention by security forces inthe early 1990s have reinforced the image of ashwaiyyat as Hobbesiancentres of lawlessness, extremism, crime and poverty. These may indeed



14. A random sample of theresidents of Dar-Essalam,an informal community inCairo, reveals thetremendous diversity ofoccupations. After thehousewives group (with37 per cent), white collarworkers constituted thelargest group (over 14 percent) see reference 12.

15. For an elaboration ofthis discussion, see Bayat,Asef (1997), Un-civilsociety: the politics of theinformal people, ThirdWorld Quarterly Vol 18, No1.


be present in the poor squatter areas. However, this type of behaviour isnot the result of inhabitants cultural essentials, since ashwaiyyat, despitetheir appearance, consist of heterogeneous occupational and culturaluniverses. Although stigmatized as rural, they not only receive migrantsfrom urban core areas but also, more importantly, comprise Cairos youth(20-25 year-olds) and newly married couples the future of Cairo (seeMaps 5 and 6). The ashwaiyyat are not simply exclusive poverty belts butthe home of many middle-class urbanites, professionals and civil servants.What perhaps may breed lawlessness is not the cultural essentials of resi-dents but, rather, the consequences of their being perceived as outsidersand of the density and lack of spatial clarity of the communities. Anoutsider community, even if located in the heart of a city, by definitionlacks street names, house numbers, maps, a police presence, paved roadsfor police cars and, thus, state control.


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Map 6: The Distribution of Population with Education in1996


The Islamist violence, which is attributed directly to informal citiessocial ecology, is more complex than simply being a phenomenon ofpoverty and ignorance. The militants (from al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya and El-Jahad) are mostly young, educated individuals, many of whom live in theashwaiyyat because of the high costs of housing in Cairo which excludeand marginalize many, even middle-class, families. Sociologically, theseyoung, educated people are different from the cultural type portrayed bysome academics and planners, and there is little empirical evidence tosuggest that they share the features that characterize Oscar Lewissculture of poverty, that is, lawlessness, lack of ambition, fatalism, lackof respect for authority and a fading adherence to family relations and thelike.(16)

This tendency to see informality and the ashwaii way of life asproducing outsiders has been highlighted by a shift in emphasis frompublic to private spatial development. This is exemplified by the new,highly exclusive townships exhibiting global styles of urban planning.Thus, if anything is abnormal, it is not the ashwaiyyat (which form halfof greater Cairo) but, rather, these recently emerging opulent private citieswith lavish properties equipped with swimming pools and athletic facil-ities and names such as Al-Rihab, New Cairo, Mena Garden City, DreamLand, Utopia and Beverley Hills.(17) This trend points to the transition ofCairo from a European model of a compact city such as London to theAmerican pattern of vast diffused spatial development such as LosAngeles where identity, history, memory and symbolism (e.g. the citycentre) are lost to the diversified sub-centres of the vast urban plain.

Many factors have led to the emergence of this new urbanity. Cairossuper-rich are escaping from high densities, traffic congestion, air andnoise pollution, and spatial constraints which are transforming even theupmarket districts. Casual observation would reveal how rapidly the old,spacious villas in the Zamalek and Maadi suburbs of Cairo are beingdemolished and turned into densely built apartment high-rises.(18) It is nolonger Zamalek and Maadi which are the status symbols but, rather, thesenew private cities. New money (from lucrative private businesses), moreefficient means of private transport and communication, and the new ringroads around the city have all enabled the rich to pursue this historicexodus. Yet, the very discourse of the ashwaiyyat as a political spectaclehas also contributed to the emergence of these private cities whose inhab-itants can keep their distance from the sight and severity of poverty andfrom the violence and political Islam which is seemingly permeating theirold localities.

This duality of peripheral informalization on the one hand and plannedexclusive suburbanization on the other is a stark manifestation of theurban polarization and social cleavage present in Egyptian society today.Indeed, Egyptian urbanism is characterized by closure or the surround-ing-wall paradigm it is not a shared space, rather, it produces outsiders.



16. This discussion is basedon Bayat, Asef (1999),Detotalizing thehistoriography of theIslamist movements: theurban poor and the Islamistpolitics, unpublishedpaper presented at theworkshop on AlternativeHistory, La Paz, Bolivia,May 17-18, 1999.

17. For Al-Rihab privatecity, see Business Monthly,Cairo, June 1997, pages 41-44.

18. Farag, Fatemah (1998),The demolition crew inAl-Ahram Weekly, February6-11, page 15.


Asef Bayat and Eric Denis Who is Afraid of Ashwaiyyat

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