ASEAN%Submarine%Cable% InternaonalConnec2vity (ASEAN Submarine... · The cable operator must know...
Transcript of ASEAN%Submarine%Cable% InternaonalConnec2vity (ASEAN Submarine... · The cable operator must know...
ASEAN Submarine Cable Interna2onal Connec2vity
(Protec2on and Risk Mi2ga2on)
ENGR. GEORGE P. TARDIO Na2onal ICT Planning Division
DOST-‐ICTO, Philippines
Expert Consulta2on in the Asia-‐Pacific Informa2on Superhighway and Regional Connec2vity
Thimphu, Bhutan 01 -‐ 02 October 2014
Ø Interna(onal Connec(vity
Ø Submarine Cable Connec(vity Risks and Assessments
Ø Submarine Cable Protec(on Regime
ü Regula(ons ü Best Prac(ces ü Capacity Building
Outline
ASEAN Interna2onal Connec2vity
In 2012, ASEAN is served by 24 key submarine cable systems with a Total Lit Capacity of 4.08 Tbps and Poten(al Capacity of 41.24 Tbps
AP Submarine Cable Systems
Submarine Cables Length Asia-‐Pacific Cable Network 2 (APCN2) 19,000 km
Asia Pacific Gateway (APG) 10,400 km
Asia-‐America Gateway (AAG) 20,000 km
Asia Submarine-‐cable Express (ASE) 7,500 km
FLAG Europe-‐Asia (FEA) 28,000 km
Southeast Asia Japan Cable (SJC) 8,900 km
South-‐East Asia -‐ Middle East -‐ Western Europe 3 (SEAMEWE3) 39,000 km
South-‐East Asia -‐ Middle East -‐ Western Europe 4 (SEAMEWE4) 20,000km
Primary Causes of Cable Faults
Tyco Telecommunications (US) Inc. Confidential and Proprietary
Primary Causes of Cable FaultsFishing gear types that contacts the sea bed are a primary cause of cable faults
Recent developments in AIS and vessel tracking have shown that ship anchors are a more significant cause of cable faults than previously thought
Dredging operations; seismic activity; catastrophic weather; theft; abrasion from cable movement due to hard sea bed and strong undersea currents
source: NASA
New Resilience
Preven2ve -‐ concentrate on what causes the majority of problems
Regulatory approach
Generate awareness or problems
Resilient networks (system view & response)
Collabora2ve industry & Govt and university
Strategic maintenance approach
STRATEGIC, MULTI-‐LEVER,
ADAPTIVE APPROACH
Risk Assessment Factor
Concentration Risk Overreliance on a set of submarine cable amongst all the available submarine cable sysytem.
Architecture Risk Vulnerable when there is no adequate built-‐in redundancy given the inherent physical network design of a submarine cable system.
Capacity Risk Bandwidth capacity is not sufficient to meet the bandwidth demand by the country.
Route Risk No diversity route to address its bandwidth demand in the event of disaster and disrup(on.
RIVALRY
DISASTER READINESS
A B
A
A B
C D
Risk Scale HIGH
LOW
Substan2al efforts should be made to reduce the risk. Risk reduc2on measures should be implemented urgently within a define 2me period.
RISK
SCA
LE
Low
Moderate
High
Considera2on should be as to whether the risks can be lowered to a tolerable level and preferably to an acceptable level but the costs of addi2onal risk reduc2on measures should be taken into account.
No addi2onal controls are required. Ac2ons for further reduce these risks are assigned very low.
Risk Assessment Summary
Sustaining Network Development
Emergency Response
Early Restora2on
Response to recovery
Preparedness
Risk Reduc(on
Response, Recovery and Development
Risk Reduc2on Framework
• Interna2onal cable laws • Cable protec2on corridors, forbidden zones • Civil recovery of damages under general mari2me law • Special permits
• Preven2ve inspec2ons/warnings
• Permits during installa2on and repair
• Customizes maintenance based on local environment
• Informa2on to fishing industry /mariners
• Cable route published charts, maps on board
• Exact cable posi2ons, or areas where fishing/anchoring is restricted
• Informa2on campaign
• Planning and survey tools • Burial depth based on soil condi2ons
• Deep water data PLANNING DESIGN AND REVIEW
INFORMATION AND
EDUCATION
EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION
OPERATIONS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
Useful Tools
• Iden%fying seismically ac%ve areas of the Pacific plate and historical analysis
Risk Mi2ga2on Method
• HIGH
HIGH LOW
Risk Impact/Probability Chart
Impact of Risk
Prob
ability of O
ccuren
ce
Government/Regulators -‐ Can Help! Eliminate Permit requirements for repairs to interna(onal cables beyond territorial seas jurisdic(onal claims
Expedite the permibng process inside territorial seas to an agreed-‐upon regional or interna(onal protocol
Accord cable repair ships innocent passage status for the purpose of undertaking repairs in territorial seas & flexibility in opera(onal area aeer repair has begun
Educate fishermen and mariners to avoid interference during cable opera(ons and to comply with interna(onal law requiring 1-‐mile clearance from working cable ships
Ensure that laws and regula(ons protec(ng cable security are enforced
Facilitate repair of interna(onal cables in a spirit of coopera(on for the mutual benefit of all na(ons and users of communica(on infrastructure
Cable and Route Informa2on
Correct information about cable route (cable record) must be collected and stored by the cable operator
Updated charts must be present on vessels
Fishermen must have updated charts on board their vessels and know the location of submarine cables
Information about all submarine power cables must be given to the institute (or similar) responsible for updating charts
Marine officers and pilots must be familiar with local conditions and know who to contact in emergency situations
Fishermen must know if it is forbidden to use bottom trawl in a zone
1
2
3
4
5
6
The cable operator must know how to act when a submarine cable has been hit by an anchor or fishing gear
Fishermen must act correctly when it comes to forbidden zones 7
9
Fishermen must know who to contact if they hit a submarine cable 8
Con2ngency Planning Process
Analyse poten2al
emergencies
Analyse poten2al impact
Establish clear objec2ves & strategies
Implement preparedness
ac2ons
Due to “Ring of Fire” zones and paierns, submarine cables of Asia Pacific regions is at risk of large scale cable faults
Up to 10 interna(onal submarine cables could be affected: -‐ Traffic -‐ Revenue Loss -‐ Outage dura(on
• Resilient Network
• Immediate restora(on
• Prepare early warning mechanism
• Informa(on and educa(on
Best Prac2ces (New Zealand)
Cable awareness educa2on for mari2me communi2es is impera2ve, our “catch fish not cables” phrase is central to this campaign.
Best Prac2ces (Denmark)
Government Par2cipate in Regular Mee2ngs MAS provide 24/7 Surveillance of the Area
Engage Proac2vely in Cable Protec2on Measures
The Execu2ve Order on Cables (No 939 of 27th November 1992): Act No 54, 15th February 1895, last revised 1972 Protec2on Zone 200 Metres either side of Submarine Cable En2tlement to Compensa2on for Loss of Sacrificed Gear Viola2ons shall be Fined
No Permit Required for Repair Opera2ons
Conven2on on the Interna2onal Regula2on for Preven2ng Collisions at Sea, 1972 apply to all Vessels
Jurisdic2on of the Danish Mari2me Authority Requirement for Re-‐burial of Repairs since 1991 Requirement to Remove Out-‐of-‐Service Cables within 12 Miles
Best Prac2ces (Australia)
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION • Implement na(onal legisla(on to
protect subsea cables • Crea(on of protec(on zones or
corridors around cables • Restrict and prohibit ac(vi(es in
the zones • Introduce significant criminal
penal(es in accordance with UNCLOS
• Educate seabed users www.iscpc.org
Source: Australian Communications & Media Authority
Protecting the infrastructureSee ICPC Recommendation 6
Cable protection zones;
Positions on charts;
Vessel tracking;
Physical protection especially burial;
Education/Liaison
Projecting trends.
Capacity Building for ASEAN
Strengthen ASEAN analysis planning, implementa(on and preven(ve measures
Foster informa(on exchange
Share and promote Best prac(ces
Raise awareness
Communicate lessons learned
Network disaster response drills among ASEAN
AIM 2015
AGAIN, resilience and protec2on of our cables cannot be achieved by either government or industry alone, let’s
COLLABORATE.
Thank you for your a;en%on…