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AsiaOnline Flinders Asia Centre Occasional Paper 4, October 2011

1

ASEAN-led Regionalism

Jed Alexander1

Abstract

This paper argues that ASEAN has become the leader of Asian regionalism. It examines how the

organisation has developed as a means by which states can interact in what has become known

as the ASEAN Way of consensus and non-interference. The absorption of similar approaches

into the workings of all major East Asian and Asia-Pacific forums is a manifestation of

ASEAN‟s leadership. ASEAN‟s significance has also been sustainable due to divisions between

the three great regional powers - Japan, China and the US. Nevertheless, this leadership is

threatened by external and internal factors. The paper concludes by discussing two key examples

of those threats - the rise of China, and ASEAN‟s failure to overcome the “Myanmar crisis”.

Asia and Regionalism

Despite the rise of globalisation, state systems at the regional level have thrived since the

end of the Second World War – and even more so since the end of the Cold War.2

Regional associations have developed at such a pace that regions and regionalism are

heralded as the new paradigm of international relations.3 The European Union is the

primary exemplar, although the emergence of coherent regions has not been confined to

Europe. This paper discusses the development and character of Asian regionalism,

focusing primarily on Southeast Asia and its relations with East Asia (including Northeast

Asia) and the Asia-Pacific. I first construct an understanding of regionalism in Asia, before

demonstrating how ASEAN leads regional organisations despite the presence of more

powerful actors. Finally I consider the rise of China and the Myanmar problem as two

principal issues which impact upon the continued position of ASEAN at the core of the

region, and which are indicative of deeper problems in the ASEAN project.

Regional organisations in Asia are distinct from their European counterparts and,

as a result, discussing the nature of Asia's regional organisations is essential to

understanding how ASEAN holds leadership. Before discussing Asian regionalism,

1 Jed Alexander completed his Bachelor of International Studies at Flinders University, majoring in

International Relations and Asian Studies. This is an edited extract from his Honours Thesis, submitted in

the Discipline of International Relations in October 2010. 2 See Beeson, Mark, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia, pp. 2-3, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire,

2007 and Acharya, Amitav, The Quest for Identity, p. 37, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 2000 3 See Beeson, Mark, “Geopolitics and the Making of Regions: The Fall and Rise of Asia”, Political Studies,

57, p. 498, 2009, Katzenstein, Peter, “Varieties of Asian Regionalism” in Katzenstein, Peter, et al., Asian

Regionalism, p. 1, East Asia Program, Cornell University, New York, 2000 and Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka and

Beeson, Mark, “Asia‟s Odd Men Out: Australia, Japan and the politics of regionalism”, International

Relations of the Asia Pacific, 7, p. 229, 2007


2

however, it is essential that I set the scope of my enquiry in answering the question: what

is the Asian region? A region occurs “by default”4 when particular criteria almost

spontaneously foster interaction between states.5 These criteria include geographic

proximity; cultural or ethnic kinship; a shared history; and economic interaction.

Historically, the “Tyranny of Distance” ensured that all state systems incorporated

only neighbouring states, and even though technological advances have lowered the

boundaries of distance, this criterion remains important.6 Furthermore, cultural and ethnic

kinship is likely to exist between some neighbouring states and can improve the prospects

of regional cooperation.7 Similarly, a shared history aids the creation of a similar world

view that will also facilitate policy coordination. Strong economic relations between states

- private sector interaction stimulating collaboration known as regionalisation8 - encourage

regional organisations to promote this interaction.9 Together these criteria also create a

regional identity – perhaps the most basic requirement of a successful regional

organisation.10

Under these conditions, states may then decide to create policies in coordination

with others to foster the integration of societies and economies in the process known as

regionalism.11

The inclusion of specific states in regional organisations is a highly political

and often somewhat arbitrary decision.12

For example, East Asia encompasses China,

Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN members, but excludes Australia and New Zealand. For

example, despite both nations being longstanding ASEAN dialogue partners,

geographically close, and having significant economic ties with East Asia, they are not

present in ASEAN Plus Three (APT), yet are included in the East Asia Summit (EAS).13

Their inclusion in the EAS highlights the reality that regional identities are subjective

constructions and subject to political expedience.14

4 Examples of "de facto" regions include East Asia and Australia-New Zealand, see: Chia, Siow Yue and

Pangestu, Mari, “Rise of East Asian regionalism” in Soesastro, Hadi and Findlay, Christopher (eds),

Reshaping the Asia Pacific Economic Order, p. 124, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006, Chin Kin Wah,

“Introduction: ASEAN – Facing the Fifth Decade”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29:3, p. 397, 2007 and

Chufrin, Gennady, “Regionalism in East Asia: Development in Stages” in Chufrin, Gennady (ed), East Asia:

Between Regionalism and Globalism, p. 1, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2006 5 Acharya discusses and applies these criteria in reference to Southeast Asia, see: Acharya, Amitav, The

Quest for Identity, p. 4 and Nair, Deepak, “Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated

Regionalism”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31:1, p. 115, 2008 6 See Beeson, Mark, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia, p. 3 and Acharya, Amitav, The Quest for

Identity, p. 8 7 Acharya, Amitav, The Quest for Identity, p. 6, 8, 32

8 See Hurrell, Andrew, “One World? Many Worlds? The place of regions in international society”,

International Affairs, 83:1, p. 130, 2007 and Beeson, Mark, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia, p. 5 9 See Nair, Deepak, “Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism”, p. 117 and

Acharya, Amitav, The Quest for Identity, p. 29 10

See Acharya, Amitav, The Quest for Identity, p. 24, 29 and Kesavapany, K., “ASEAN‟s Role in Asian

Economic Integration” in Kumar, Nagesh, Kesavapany, K. and Yao, Chao Cheng (eds), Asia‟s New

Regionalism and Global Role, p. 62, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008 11

Beeson, Mark, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia, p. 5 12

As a result regions are “imagined” in much the same way that Anderson considers nations to be “imagined

communities”. Acharya, Amitav, The Quest for Identity, p. 2 13

DFAT, “The East Asia Summit” accessible at http://www.dfat.gov.au/asean/eas/index.html, last accessed

24th

of September 2010 14

See Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 272 and Noble, Gregory,

“Japanese and American Perceptions on East Asian Regionalism”, International Relations of the Asia-

Pacific, 8, p. 249, 2008.

http://www.dfat.gov.au/asean/eas/index.html


3

Academic studies in the eastern end of Asia point to the significance of Southeast

Asian regionalism, embodied in ASEAN. 15

For example, all major forums in the Asia-

Pacific and East Asia operate on the ASEAN Way principles of promoting mutual respect,

trust, and understanding. These include the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) which

adheres to consensus-based decision making and voluntarism, and the EAS which also

directly utilises ASEAN‟s membership criteria.16

In this paper, I argue that this significance of the ASEAN way gives ASEAN an

unconventional leadership in East Asia. This breaks with traditional concepts of leadership

in that ASEAN determines how multilateralism in Asia operates, rather than by being at

the forefront of regional initiatives. ASEAN‟s leadership in this sense has been possible

despite the importance of the great powers that influence the region.

Ciorciari captures relations between ASEAN and the great powers by stating that

ASEAN has endeavoured to achieve a “balance of great power influence” in the region.17

Ciorciari and Soesastro note that, at its founding, ASEAN established a goal of

maintaining equidistance from the great powers.18

This policy has been successful to date

and relies on the continued inability of the great powers to cooperate. An example of poor

cooperation between the great powers is Sino-Japanese relations, which are hampered by

lingering memories of Japan‟s activities in World War Two.19

China‟s relations with the

US are also tense and Beijing‟s suspicion at what it perceives as an attempt by the US to

keep it weak has been noted by Beeson and Haacke, among others.20

The major players‟

inability to work as a team has stifled any attempt to build regional organisations in

Northeast Asia and, almost by accident, made ASEAN‟s norms of consensus and non-

interference an attractive alternative.21

15

Beeson, Mark, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia, p. 11; Soesastro, Hadi, “APEC‟s Overall

Goals and Objectives, Evolution and Current Status” in Feinburg, Richard (ed), APEC as an Institution, p.

35, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003, Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 123

and “Remaking APEC and an Institution: The Third APIAN Policy Report”, in Feinburg, Richard (ed),

APEC as an Institution, p. 18, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003 16

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 123, Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an

ASEAN Community, p. 11, Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2006 and Soesastro, Hadi, “APEC‟s Overall

Goals and Objectives, Evolution and Current Status”, in Feinburg, Richard (ed), APEC as an Institution, p.

31, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003 17

See Ciorciari, John, “The balance of great-power influence in contemporary Southeast Asia”, International

Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 9, pp. 157-196, 2009 and Acharya, Amitav, The Quest for Identity, p. 95 18

See Severino, Rodolfo, “ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic Integration”,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29:3, p. 410, 2007, Simon, Sheldon, p. 268 and Ciorciari, John, p. 160 19

See Yeo, Lay Hwee, “Japan, ASEAN, and the Construction of an East Asian Community”, Contemporary

Southeast Asia, 28:2, p. 265, 2006, Hamilton-Hart, Natasha, “Regional Capital and Cooperation in Asia”, in

Katzenstein, Peter, et al., Asian Regionalism, pp. 116-117, East Asia Program, Cornell University, New

York, 2000 and Ciorciari, John, p. 177 20

Beeson, Mark, “Southeast Asia and the Major Powers: The United States, Japan and China” in Beeson,

Mark (ed), Contemporary Southeast Asia, p. 200, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, Haacke, Jürgen,

“The Significance of Beijing‟s Bilateral Relations: Looking „Below‟ the Regional Level in China-ASEAN

Ties”, in Ho, Khai Leong and Ku, Samuel (eds), China and Southeast Asia, p. 116, Institute of Southeast

Asian Studies, Singapore, 2005 and Amiroc, Vyacheslav, “The United States and a New Stage of Economic

Cooperation in East Asia” in Chufrin, Gennady (ed), East Asia: Between Regionalism and Globalism, p. 90,

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2006 21

Severino, Rodolfo, “ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic Integration”, Contemporary

Southeast Asia, 29:3, p. 418, 2007


4

ASEAN developed its norms, known as the ASEAN way, in its first two decades of

existence, enshrining them in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.22

In addition to

consensus-based decision making and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other

states, other major principles are informal discussion, commitment to peaceful dispute

resolution, and renunciation of the use of - or threat to use - force.23

These norms were

developed under the conditions of the Cold War and helped promote stability when great

potential existed for conflict.24

A further reason for the creation of the ASEAN Way was

the position of member states‟ as recently independent nations, because they required an

environment that was favourable to nation building.25

The Development of ASEAN

When ASEAN was created in 1967, the original members26

signed the Bangkok

Declaration to create an organisation that could effectively manage the region in the

setting of the Cold War.27

Doubts were expressed about ASEAN‟s effectiveness in its first

two decades, fostered largely by its failure to successfully pursue its economic goals.28

During this period however, ASEAN did develop its own set of practices and norms.

The end of the Cold War enabled consolidation of Southeast Asia when Cambodia,

Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam ceased their hostile stances towards the grouping. It was also

possible for ASEAN to make progress towards its economic goals due to the resolution of

security concerns, such as Communist insurgencies and the Cambodian crisis. During the

1990s, Southeast Asia‟s economic relationships stimulated interest in the creation of wider

regional groupings and ASEAN firmly established itself at the centre of the region. By the

mid-1990s, ASEAN was the prime influence in new regional groupings, and had

incorporated all of Southeast Asia into its membership.

22

Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, pp. 88-89 and Tay, Simon, “Institutions and Processes:

Dilemmas and Possibilities” in Tay, Simon, Estanislao, Jesus and Soesastro, Hadi (eds), A New ASEAN, p.

163, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore, 2000 23

There are also other, associated, norms such as only moving ahead with dialogue as fast as the slowest

member can manage and making decisions voluntary and non-binding. This latter point has been used so that

while states can veto any proposal and effectively block consensus, if a state does not have a stance on an

issue it can choose to abstain without jeopardising an outcome and implementation for those that do have an

interest in the certain issue. See Simon, Sheldon, p. 269, Tay, Simon, “Institutions and Processes: Dilemmas

and Possibilities”, p. 160, Stubbs, Richard, “ASEAN: Building Regional Cooperation” in Beeson, Mark (ed),

Contemporary Southeast Asia, p. 223, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004 and Ciorciari, John, p. 162 24

During the Cold War Southeast Asia had potential for conflict because of tense relations between states in

Southeast Asia and Communist insurgencies, among several other security issues. See Severino, Rodolfo,

Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 212, Ramcharan, Robin, “ASEAN and Non-

Interference: A Principle Maintained”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 22:1, p. 65, 2000 and Wanandi, Jusuf,

“ASEAN‟s Past and the Challenges Ahead: Aspects of Politics and Security” in Tay, Simon, Estanislao,

Jesus and Soesastro, Hadi (eds), Reinventing ASEAN, p. 25, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore,

2001 25

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 86 and Collins, Alan, “Forming a security community:

lessons from ASEAN”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 7, p. 212, 2007 26

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search

of an ASEAN Community, pp. 1-2, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2006 27

See Simon, Sheldon, “ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long Bumpy Road to Community”,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:2, p. 268, 2008, Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an

ASEAN Community, pp. 1-3 and Ciorciari, John, “The balance of great power influence in contemporary

Southeast Asia” International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 9, p. 160, 2009 28


Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29:3, p. 422, 2007 and Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an

ASEAN Community, p. 4


5

Security issues which surrounded ASEAN at the time of its formation included

Indonesia‟s Konfrontasi campaign against Malaysia;29

concerns over the situation in

Indochina;30

maritime Southeast Asia‟s own Communist insurgencies;31

and the numerous

territorial disputes that existed in the region.32

The global climate of the Cold War was also

important in shaping the new association, since the founding members did not want to

become entangled in that ideological divide.33

The “original five” recognised that

Southeast Asian states had a mutual interest in regional peace and prosperity and agreed to

the creation of a regional organisation to pursue these goals.34

The aims outlined in the

Bangkok Declaration include:

• To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development of the

region.

• To promote regional peace and stability.

• To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common

interest.

• To provide technical assistance to each other.

• To achieve greater utilization of members‟ agriculture and industries, expand their

trade and raise the living standards of their peoples.

• To promote South-East Asian studies.

• To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and

regional organizations.35

Vietnam, Burma (now Myanmar) and Cambodia were invited to join the new association,

but these advances were turned down, in the case of Burma and Cambodia because of their

29

See Wanandi, Jusuf, “ASEAN‟s Past and the Challenges Ahead: Aspects of Politics and Security” in Tay,

Simon, Estanislao, Jesus and Soesastro, Hadi (eds), Reinventing ASEAN, p. 25, Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies, Singapore, 2001, Severino, Rodolfo, “ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic

Integration”, p. 408 and Simon, Sheldon, p. 268 30

Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 2 31

Indonesia and Malaysia had experienced Communist insurgencies, Thailand and the Philippines have

continuing issues with Islamic insurgency groups. Ramcharan, Robin, “ASEAN and Non-Interference: A

Principle Maintained”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 22:1, p. 65, 2000 32

These included disputes of the Spratly Islands and Sabah, among others. See Öjendal, Joakim, “Back to

the future? Regionalism in South-East Asia under unilateral pressure”, International Affairs, 80:3, p. 523,

2004, Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 2 and Severino, Rodolfo,

“ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic Integration”, p. 408 33

See Severino, Rodolfo, “ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic Integration”, p. 410,

Simon, Sheldon, p. 268 and Ciorciari, John, p. 160 34

ASEAN, “The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)” accessible at

http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm, 8th

of August 1967 (last accessed 11th

of August 2010) 35

This is an abridged version of the Bangkok Declaration available on ASEAN‟s website. See Stubbs,

Richard, “ASEAN: Building Regional Cooperation” in Beeson, Mark (ed), Contemporary Southeast Asia, p.

217, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN

Community, p. 3 and ASEAN, “The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)” accessible at



of August 2010)

http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm



6

commitment to neutrality.36

In contrast, Vietnam was highly suspicious that the

organisation might be a tool of the US and simply a reincarnation of the collapsed

Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO).37

Brunei was unable to join until 1984

when it became independent from the United Kingdom.38

ASEAN made little progress towards its goals until 1976 when the first leaders‟

summit was held, after the fall of South Vietnam.39

This stimulated the organisation‟s

development, resulting in members signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation which

enshrined ASEAN‟s norms and processes.40

The ASEAN Way helped ASEAN achieve its

then-primary goal of fostering peace and stability in Southeast Asia.41

This goal had

become ASEAN‟s highest priority during the Cold War because of the Vietnam War and

the Communist insurgencies that were active in ASEAN states. Then, after the fall of

South Vietnam, ASEAN found itself focusing on the Cambodian crisis, in part due to

transnational affects such as refugee flows, and also because it wanted to ensure that

Vietnam did not gain dominance of Indochina.42

Following the 1976 leader‟s summit, ASEAN took its first initiatives in fostering

regional economic cooperation. This was done through the creation of the ASEAN

Preferential Trade Area (ASEAN-PTA), in addition to the proposal of a series of

cooperative industrial projects.43

The ASEAN-PTA had very limited effectiveness,

however, and it failed to stimulate intra-regional trade.44

The cooperative industrial

projects were similarly ineffective, primarily due to the competitive nature of the

individual ASEAN economies.45

Despite the failure of the PTA and industrial projects,

ASEAN members experienced strong economic growth from the late 1970s, peaking in the

36

Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, pp. 44-45 37

See Simon, Sheldon, p. 269, Severino, Rodolfo, “ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic

Integration”, p. 408 and Emmerson, Ralf, p. 72 38

See Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 53 and Ganesan, N.,

“State-society Relations in Southeast Asia” in Ganesan, N. And Hlaing, Kyaw (eds), Myanmar: State,

Society and Ethnicity, p. 13, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2007 39

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 88, Routledge, New York, 2008 and Chin Kin Wah,

“Introduction: ASEAN – Facing the Fifth Decade”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29:3, p. 395, 2007 40

Though the Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) that ASEAN created in 1971 was the

precursor to this it was not until 1976 that ASEAN‟s norms were wholly incorporated into a single treaty.

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, pp. 88-89, Tay, Simon, “Institutions and Processes:

Dilemmas and Possibilities” in Tay, Simon, Estanislao, Jesus and Soesastro, Hadi (eds), A New ASEAN, p.

163, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore, 2000 and Ramcharan, Robin, p. 65 41


ASEAN‟s interest in preventing this was due to the Vietnam‟s hostile stance towards ASEAN. See

Acharya, Amitav, p. 49, 107 and Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p.

276 43

See Chia, Siow Yue and Soesastro, Hadi, “ASEAN Perspectives on Promoting Regional and Global Freer

Trade” in Morrison, Charles and Pedrosa, Eduardo (eds), An APEC Trade Agenda, p. 191, Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2007, Severino, Rodolfo, “ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political

and Economic Integration”, p. 409, Fumio, Yoshino, “ASEAN in APEC” in Sekiguichi, Sueo and Makita,

Noda (eds), Road to ASEAN-10, p. 39, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999 and Dent,

Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 88 44

In fact the member state‟s themselves were quite cynical about the project, as is evident from the inclusion

of such things a snow mobiles and cold weather clothing in the agreement – goods that were clearly not

traded in the region. See Fumio, Yoshino, p. 39, Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 89, Severino,

Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, pp. 215-216 and Severino, Rodolfo, “ASEAN

Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic Integration”, p. 409 45

Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 217


7

late 1980s and continuing into the 1990s.46

Growth was fostered by Japanese investment in

the region and Japanese companies capitalised on Southeast Asia‟s low labour costs.47

Investment from Japan increased further when, in 1985, the Plaza Accord was signed and

the Japanese Yen increased dramatically in value.48

Whereas ASEAN regionalism failed to

stimulate intra-regional trade, extra-regional trade grew strongly and pressures of

regionalisation integrated the ASEAN economies into the Asia-Pacific trading area.

ASEAN in the 1990s

By the beginning of the 1990s ASEAN economies were experiencing solid economic

growth, even though ASEAN had been unsuccessful in promoting regional economic

cooperation and integration. The end of the Cold War allowed ASEAN to focus more

strongly on its economic goals and to create an enlargement programme designed to reach

out to non-member Southeast Asian countries. Regional consolidation in Europe and North

America stimulated this process and ASEAN felt a sense of urgency to avoid being left

behind while the rest of the world developed into regional blocs.49

ASEAN quickly responded to these changes when it proposed the ASEAN Free

Trade Area (AFTA) at the 1992 ASEAN Summit in Singapore.50

ASEAN intra-regional

trade levels are consistently between 20-27% compared to Europe‟s 60% and AFTA was

not expected to stimulate trade substantially.51

The lack of intra-regional trade in Southeast

Asia was caused by similarities in goods being produced in the ASEAN economies and

their consequent lack of complementarity.52

AFTA‟s primary function was to attract

foreign investors as an extension of Japan‟s development of the region as a production

basin.53

Japan‟s role in the ASEAN‟s economies continued unabated in the 1990s, despite

46

See Takeuchi, Junko, “Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Cooperation” in Sekiguichi, Sueo and

Makita, Noda (eds), Road to ASEAN-10, p. 99, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999,

Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 96, Felker, Greg, p. 55 and

Okuda, Hidenobu, “International Capital Movement and Financial Movements” in Sekiguichi, Sueo and

Makita, Noda (eds), Road to ASEAN-10, p. 60, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999 47

The development and transformation of Southeast Asia‟s production networks and a Southeast Asian

production base is discussed below, in Chapter Three, through the importance of Japan and China. See

Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 301 and Felker, Greg, “Southeast

Asian Development in Regional and Historical Perspective” in Beeson, Mark (ed), Contemporary Southeast

Asia, p. 60, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004 48

Fumio, Yoshino, p. 51 and Felker, Greg, p. 64 49

The North American bloc was of most concern given the importance of the US as a market for ASEAN

goods. As it has turned out bloc trading has yet to be fully realised, although it continues to promote regional

development. See Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 222, Ba, Alice,

“The Politics and Economics of “East Asia” in China-ASEAN Relations” in Ho, Khai Leong and Ku,

Samuel (eds), China and Southeast Asia, p. 172, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2005 and

Takeuchi, Junko, p. 123 50

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 89 and Kumar, Nagesh, “Relevance of Broader

Regional Economic Integration in Asia and a Roadmap” in Kumar, Nagesh, Kesavapany, K., Severino,

Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 224 and Yao, Chao Cheng (eds), Asia‟s

New Regionalism and Global Role, p. 24, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008 51

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 20, Sekiguichi, Sueo, p. 195 and Takeuchi, Junko, p.

109 52

See Lincoln, Edward, East Asian Economic Regionalism, p. 152, Brookings Institute Press, Washington

D.C, 2004 and Sekiguichi, Sueo, p. 196 53

See Takeuchi, Junko, p. 123, Sekiguichi, Sueo, “Prospects for Intra- and Extra-regional Relations” in

Sekiguichi, Sueo and Makita, Noda (eds), Road to ASEAN-10, p. 199, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

Singapore, 1999 and Ariff, Mohamed, “Trade, Investment, and Interdependence” in Tay, Simon, Estanislao,


8

the collapse of the Japanese economic bubble at the beginning of the decade. AFTA was

originally scheduled to be completed in 2008, but after ASEAN‟s enlargement, target dates

were adjusted.54

The most economically developed members (Singapore and Thailand)

fully implemented AFTA by 2003, while the least developed (Cambodia) was expected to

complete implementation by the end of 2010.55

The first new member to join ASEAN in the 1990s was Vietnam and because it

had previously been the most hostile to ASEAN this represented a significant

achievement.56

The collapse of the Soviet bloc forced Vietnam to seek reconciliation with

ASEAN57

and Vietnam achieved Dialogue Partner status in 1993 before joining the

organisation in 1995.58

In 1997 Myanmar and Laos also joined. Cambodia had been

expected to join in the same year but was delayed by deterioration of the nation‟s political

situation.59

Cambodia eventually joined in 1999, after ASEAN utilised its troika

mechanism through which three members sent representatives to hold peaceful dialogue

between the conflicted parties in Cambodia.60

Cambodia‟s membership completed the vision of ASEAN‟s founding fathers in

creating a Southeast Asia united in a single regional grouping.61

Enlargement also brought

a host of new challenges however, because the organisation needed to integrate four much

less developed countries.62

Laos, for example, is one of the least developed and poorest

countries in the world, ranking on par with some of the least developed countries in

Africa.63

Yet to join ASEAN the new members were required to agree to all preceding

agreements and declarations, including AFTA.64

It was feared that the low level of

development in the Indochinese countries threatened to compromise AFTA, but this did

not eventuate because of the longer timelines for new members to meet their

requirements.65

The challenges of enlargement linger however through ASEAN‟s

difficulty in dealing with Myanmar, as I discuss later.

Jesus and Soesastro, Hadi (eds), Reinventing ASEAN, p. 56, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore,

2001. 54

See Fumio, Yoshino, p. 40, Ariff, Mohamed, p. 47 and Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an

ASEAN Community, p. 226 55


Ariff describes ASEAN‟s biggest successes as turning “foes and adversaries into friends and partners”.

Ariff, Mohamed, p. 45 57


See Chin Kin Wah, p. 396 and Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p.

50 59

See Ramcharan, Robin, p. 67, Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p.

50, Emmerson, Ralf, p. 74, Funston, John, “ASEAN: Out of its Depth?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia,

20:1, p. 25, 1998 and Tay, Simon and Estanislao, Jesus, “The Relevance of ASEAN: Crisis and Change” in

Tay, Simon, Estanislao, Jesus and Soesastro, Hadi (eds), Reinventing ASEAN, p. 4, Institute of Southeast

Asian Studies, Singapore, 2001 60

See Funston, John, p. 25, Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 59

and Ramcharan, Robin, p. 67 61


See Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 67, Funston, John, p. 26,

Akrasanee, Narongchai, p. 39 and Tay, Simon and Estanislao, Jesus, p. 5 63

See Jones, David, “Security and democracy: the ASEAN Charter and the dilemmas of regionalism in

South-East Asia”, International Affairs, 84:4, p. 749, 2008 and Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search

of an ASEAN Community, p. 68 64


These flexibilities allowed for the new members‟ smooth inclusion into AFTA. See Akrasanee,

Narongchai, p. 39 and Ariff, Mohamed, p. 48


9

ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific

ASEAN‟s largest success in the 1990s came from its ability to transfer its norms and

processes to new regional organisations of the Asia-Pacific. The concept of the Asia-

Pacific region was not new: Japan first proposed an “Asia-Pacific Community” in the

1960s.66

Historically, Australia and Japan have had the most interest in the Asia-Pacific

and both worked to create numerous Asia-Pacific groupings. 67

Such groupings include the

Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and Pacific Basin Economic Council

(PBEC).68

Both failed to become influential and it was not until the end of the Cold War

that successful Asia-Pacific institutions were created. These were Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). ASEAN plays an important

role in both through their utilisation of the ASEAN Way.

Australia and Japan have been the strongest advocates of the Asia-Pacific, due to

their interest in maintaining US involvement in Asia.69

In 1989, the Hawke Labor

government in Australia proposed the creation of APEC, with the first meeting of the

group taking place between economic ministers in Canberra, Australia.70

The founding

members were the then-six ASEAN members71

(Brunei joined in 1984), Australia, New

Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Canada and the United States.72

The grouping quickly

expanded in the 1990s, bringing a total of nine new members before membership was

frozen for a decade.73

These new members were: China, Hong Kong, Taiwan74

(all in

1991); Mexico, Papua New Guinea (both in 1993); Chile (1994); Russia, Peru and

Vietnam (all in 1998).75

This makes APEC the only regional grouping to include the three

most influential powers in Asia76

and the only forum to include the PRC, Hong Kong and

Taiwan.77

The inclusion of the United States was not in Australia‟s original proposal for

66

Morrison, Charles, “An APEC Trade Agenda” in Morrison, Charles and Pedrosa, Eduardo (eds), An

APEC Trade Agenda, p. 4, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2007 67

Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka and Beeson, Mark, “Asia‟s Odd Men Out: Australia, Japan and the politics of

regionalism”, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 7, pp. 237-238, 2007 68

These were largely failures or failed to become very significant. See Kato, Kozo, “Open Regionalism and

Japan‟s Systemic Vulnerability” in Katzenstein, Peter, et al., Asian Regionalism, p. 41, East Asia Program,

Cornell University, New York, 2000, Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 121 and MacDuff,

David and Woo, Yuen, “APEC as a Pacific OECD Revisited” in Feinburg, Richard (ed), APEC as an

Institution, p. 47, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003 69

See Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka and Beeson, Mark, p. 234, Cook, Malcolm, “The United States and the East

Asia Summit: Finding the Proper Home”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:2, p. 298, 2008 and Dent,

Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 121 70

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 118 and Fumio, Yoshino, p. 37 71

I would like to note here that membership in ASEAN does not automatically confer membership to APEC.

It is for this reason that while Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are all members of ASEAN only

Vietnam is a member of APEC. It is plausible that Cambodia and Laos may join in the future since the end

of the freeze on APEC‟s membership (noted below), but the US‟s refusal to hold any dialogue with

groupings that include Myanmar almost certainly precludes its membership until such a time as this policy

changes. 72

Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 118 73

Fumio, Yoshino, p. 44 74

As “Chinese Taipei”. APEC consists of “member economies” not “member states” this allows for the

participation of Taiwan and Hong Kong where the PRC would almost certainly oppose it otherwise. 75

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 118 and Fumio, Yoshino, p. 37 76

Japan, China and the US: Chapter Three discusses the importance of each of these. 77

See “Remaking APEC and an Institution: The Third APIAN Policy Report” in Feinburg, Richard (ed),

APEC as an Institution, p. 18, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003, Lincoln, Edward, p. 132

and Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka and Beeson, Mark, p. 234


10

APEC, but was included later at Japan‟s request.78

ASEAN also had an interest in the US‟s

participation in APEC: Thailand and the Philippines are both close US allies;79

and the

grouping had an interest in keeping the US involved in the region after the end of the Cold

War.80

ASEAN membership does not automatically confer membership to APEC, which is

why Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are not members.

Though APEC had the potential to foster greater economic relations between

Southeast Asia, Japan and the US, ASEAN feared APEC would make it irrelevant. To

overcome this fear, the APEC proposal was modified by adopting ASEAN‟s consensus-

based decision making, informal discussion, and promising to proceed with initiatives at

the speed of the slowest member.81

In addition, an ASEAN member would hold the chair

of APEC every second year, a move which placed ASEAN in a dominant position.82

APEC established three main goals: trade and investment facilitation; trade and investment

liberalisation (in cooperation with international multilateral trade organisations); and

economic cooperation and technical development.83

The latter goal had greatest significance for ASEAN member states because most

were developing economies.84

Japan‟s investment had helped develop regional production

networks and ASEAN hoped that greater cooperation and development could take place

through APEC, allowing for the better utilisation of these networks. Unfortunately,

although APEC had set three main goals, trade and investment liberalisation became its

exclusive economic focus. ASEAN states became increasingly frustrated, seeing APEC as

a tool for US influence and disliking its strong focus on trade and investment liberalisation

and facilitation.85

78

See Soesastro, Hadi, “APEC‟s Overall Goals and Objectives, Evolution and Current Status” in Feinburg,

Richard (ed), APEC as an Institution, p. 35, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003, Dent,

Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 123 and “Remaking APEC and an Institution: The Third APIAN

Policy Report”, p. 18 79

See De Castro, Renatocruz, “The US-Philippine Alliance: An evolving hedge against an emerging China

challenge”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31:3, p. 399-423, 2009, Wanandi, Jusuf, p. 26 and Cook,

Malcolm, p. 298 80

See MacIntyre, Andrew and Soesastro, Hadi, “Political-strategic dimensions of economic cooperation in

the Asia-Pacific” in Soesastro, Hadi and Findlay, Christopher (eds), Reshaping the Asia Pacific Economic

Order, p. 268, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006 and Soesastro, Hadi, “APEC‟s Overall Goals and Objectives,

Evolution and Current Status”, p. 34 81

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 123, Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an

ASEAN Community, p. 11 and Soesastro, Hadi, “APEC‟s Overall Goals and Objectives, Evolution and

Current Status”, p. 31 82

Sumsky, Victor, p. 51 83

See Chufrin, Gennady, p. 7, Soesastro, Hadi, “APEC‟s Overall Goals and Objectives, Evolution and

Current Status”, pp. 31-32 and and Krongkaew, Medhi, “The Wheel that Drives APEC: The Critical Role

and Mandate of ECOTECH in APEC” in Feinburg, Richard (ed), APEC as an Institution, p. 153, Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003 84

As evident by ASEAN‟s support of China‟s new description of APEC‟s goals in 2001 of ECOTECH being

the wheel that drives APEC and its TILF goals. See Krongkaew, Medhi, p. 153 85

APEC‟s trade and investment liberalisation and trade and investment facilitation goals tend to be dealt

with as a single aim, in practice the focus has always been on liberalisation, not so much facilitation. Having

said this, liberalisation theoretically facilitates trade, therefore the two goals are linked in such a way that

achieving one should achieve the other. ASEAN members and China also resented the move by the US to

encourage the use APEC to discuss security issues such as terrorism. On APEC‟s foray into security issues

see McKay, John, “APEC‟s Role in Political and Security Issues” in Feinburg, Richard (ed), APEC as an

Institution, pp. 229-266, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003


11

On the other hand, ASEAN‟s role in the ARF has continually frustrated its Western

members. The ARF was created in 1993 during ASEAN‟s Post Ministerial Conference and

its first meeting took place in Bangkok the following year.86

The ARF operates on the

principles of the ASEAN Way and is driven by ASEAN, focusing on constructive,

informal and peaceful dialogue between its members.87

At its inaugural meeting the goals

of the organisation were outlined as: to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on

political and security issues; and to contribute in efforts towards confidence building and

preventative diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific.88

Initially, the US and its supporters (Australia,

New Zealand and Canada) had advocated for the new security forum to immediately focus

on preventative diplomacy.89

ASEAN was not supportive of this idea because of the strain

placed on its principle of non-interference.90

Instead members agreed that the ARF would

begin with confidence building measures and gradually develop to preventative diplomacy

when trust had been built up between its members.91

The ARF, however, has so far failed

to move beyond dialogue and confidence building, and this failure has annoyed the US,

Australia, Canada and New Zealand – all of whom want the forum to shift to proactive,

preventative diplomacy.92

ASEAN has been unwilling to make this shift and is supported

in its stance by China, which has become an active and constructive partner in the process,

despite initially being highly defensive of its national interests.93

The Asian Financial Crisis and the Rise of East Asia

1997 brought ASEAN its biggest challenge when the Asian Financial Crisis unexpectedly

struck.94

This crisis had a profound effect, reshaping the region and providing the stimulus

for new regional institutions and initiatives. From its beginnings in Thailand, the crisis

quickly spread to other countries in the region, with Indonesia the next to be affected and

86

See Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 189 and ASEAN Regional

Forum, “The ASEAN Regional Forum” accessible at

http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/AboutUs/tabid/57/Default.aspx, last accessed 26th

of September 2010 87

See Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, pp. 191-192 and Haacke,

Jürgen, “Regional Security Institutions: ASEAN, ARF, SCO and KEDO”, p. 136 88

See ASEAN Regional Forum, “The ASEAN Regional Forum” accessible at

http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/AboutUs/tabid/57/Default.aspx, last accessed 26th

of September 2010

and Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 190 89

Haacke, Jürgen, “Regional Security Institutions: ASEAN, ARF, SCO and KEDO” in Hoadley, Stephen

and Rüland, Jürgen (eds), Asian Security Reassessed, p. 136, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore,

2006 90

Haacke, Jürgen, “Regional Security Institutions: ASEAN, ARF, SCO and KEDO”, p. 136 91

See Simon, Sheldon, p. 280, Haacke, Jürgen, “Regional Security Institutions: ASEAN, ARF, SCO and

KEDO” pp. 136-137 and Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 193 92

See Chia, Siow Yue and Soesastro, Hadi, p. 225, Haacke, Jürgen, “Regional Security Institutions:

ASEAN, ARF, SCO and KEDO”, pp. 136-137 and Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an

ASEAN Community, p. 195 93

These interests are mainly territorial, such as its disputes of a number of island chains in the East and

South China Sea (Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands and the Spratly Islands) but China‟s human rights issues and

governance of Tibet were also issues. Haacke notes that all regional security forums in Asia fall victim to the

national interests of their members, Haacke, Jürgen, “Regional Security Institutions: ASEAN, ARF, SCO

and KEDO”, p. 129 94

See Felker, Greg, “Southeast Asian Development in Regional and Historical Perspective” in Beeson, Mark

(ed), Contemporary Southeast Asia, p. 56, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, Severino, Rodolfo,

Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 100 and Haley, Usha, “Post-Crisis Management

Strategies in Asia: An Overview” in Haley, Usha and Richter, Frank-Jürgen (eds), Asian Post-Crisis

Management, p. 8, Palgrave, Hampshire, 2002

http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/AboutUs/tabid/57/Default.aspx



12

arguably becoming the worst hit.95

The Philippines and Malaysia were also significantly

affected, although Malaysia enacted capital controls that shielded it to a large extent.96

ASEAN did very little in response to the financial crisis and instead called for

assistance from the US and IMF.97

ASEAN‟s inability to provide initiative is unsurprising

for two reasons. Firstly the organisation is a collection of developing states and only

moderately wealthy at best. Secondly, the challenges of incorporating Laos, Myanmar and

Vietnam into the grouping preoccupied ASEAN, demanding the attention of its limited

resources.98

Even if ASEAN had not been busy expanding its membership, the dramatic

effects of the crisis are likely to have rendered it ineffective. The US showed little

sympathy for the region,99

leaving the IMF to issue the first major response to the crisis

when it announced a number of large rescue packages for crisis affected countries.100

These packages were designed around liberalising the affected economy, and carried with

them reform measures that would have to be undertaken in order to receive IMF

assistance.101

ASEAN states found this highly distasteful – the US had shown no sympathy

to their plight and now the IMF was forcing “the West‟s” economic system on them.102

Furthermore, the IMF‟s initial response and prescribed reform measures worsened the

crisis and undermined confidence in the region.103

Regional relationships were influenced by the IMF‟s rescue packages, lack of

interest from the US, and by several other significant responses. Firstly APEC, the leading

regional institution of the Asia-Pacific, reacted ineffectively causing ASEAN members of

95

This is because not only did its currency plummet, losing 80% of its value, but because the financial crisis

would lead to the overthrow of Suharto‟s New Order regime. See Wang, Gungwu, p. 9, Dent, Christopher,

East Asian Regionalism, p. 99, Routledge, New York, 2008, Kotabe, Masaaki and Gupta, Shruti, p. 19 and

Sinai, Allen, p. 5. 96

See Kotabe, Masaaki and Gupta, Shruti, p. 22, Tay, Simon and Estanislao, Jesus, “The Relevance of

ASEAN: Crisis and Change” in Tay, Simon, Estanislao, Jesus and Soesastro, Hadi (eds), Reinventing

ASEAN, p. 7, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2001 and Hamilton-Hart, Natasha, “Regional

Capital and Cooperation in Asia”, in Katzenstein, Peter, et al., Asian Regionalism, p. 138, East Asia

Program, Cornell University, New York, 2000 97

See Tay, Simon and Estanislao, Jesus, p. 3 and Funston, John, “ASEAN: Out of its Depth?”,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 20:1, pp. 29-30, 1998 98

See Acharya, Amitav and Tan, See Seng, “Betwixt balance and community: America, ASEAN and the

security of Southeast Asia”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 6, p. 52, 2006 and Öjendal, Joakim,

“Back to the future? Regionalism in South-East Asia under unilateral pressure”, International Affairs, 80:3,

p. 520, 2004 99

Privately those in the US are said to have been pleased with the financial crisis as it immediately dismissed

the “miracle” aspect of Asia‟s economic growth and proved that it had some serious shortcomings. Lincoln,

Edward, p. 147 100

Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka, “Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Searching for the mode of governance”,

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 10, p. 257, 2010 101

Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka, p. 257 102

See Dieter, Heirbert and Higgot, Richard, “Exploring alternatives theories of economic regionalism: from

trade to finance in Asian cooperation”, Review of International Political Economy, 10:3, p. 432, 2003, Men,

Jing, “The construction of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: A Study of China‟s Active Involvement”,

Global Society, 21:1, p. 252, 2007, Lincoln, Edward, p. 3 and Beeson, Mark, “Geopolitics and the Making of

Regions: The Fall and Rise of Asia”, Political Studies, 57, p. 509, 2009 103

See Cheng, Joseph, “Sino-ASEAN Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century”, Contemporary

Southeast Asia, 23:3, p. 431, 2001, Stubbs, Richard, “ASEAN: Building Regional Cooperation” in Beeson,

Mark (ed), Contemporary Southeast Asia, p. 227, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004 and Nabers, Dirk,

“The social construction of international institutions: the case of ASEAN+3”, International Relations of the

Asia-Pacific, 3, p. 123, 2003


13

APEC to lose interest in that grouping.104

Meanwhile, both the two Asian great powers

issued important responses to the crisis. Firstly China refused to devalue the Yuan

Renminbi and experienced diplomatic gains in Southeast Asia because of this decision.105

ASEAN members had feared that China would devalue the Yuan because of the lower

value of Southeast Asian currencies, which made Southeast Asian goods more competitive

in export markets.106

China had already devalued its currency in 1994 however, and the

crisis did not affect it so this course of action was unnecessary.107

China also made

political gains by providing crisis affected-countries with low interest loans with no

stipulations.108

Though this financial assistance was only modest in size, ASEAN members

were grateful, especially in light of the dramatic reforms the IMF was imposing on the

region. By contrast, Japan provided vast amounts of financial aid to the region, but

primarily in conjunction with the IMF.109

Despite this huge financial assistance, Japan‟s

support of the IMF gained it no political goodwill in Southeast Asia and created the

impression it was a tool of the US.110

Japan‟s other important response was its suggestion

that the region create an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), an initiative originally suggested

by Thailand.111

This proposal received only a lukewarm response in the region with mixed

responses from ASEAN members.112

Opposition from the US then precluded any further

development of Japan‟s proposal,113

showcasing Japan‟s shortcomings as a regional leader.

East Asian states became aware in 1997/98 of just how integrated Asia as a whole

had become in the 1990s, stimulated by Japanese investment and the growth of China.114

This prompted the East Asian states to develop a cooperative solution to the financial

crisis,115

and regular group dialogues began in 1997 in the process which became known

104

See Dieter, Heirbert and Higgot, Richard, p. 433, Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 140 and

Lim, Hua Sing, p. 298 105

This would occur as each country would attempt to achieve a lower currency value than others in order to

stay competitive in export markets. See Kotabe, Masaaki and Gupta, Shruti, p. 24, Severino, Rodolfo,

Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 284 and Lim, Hua Sing, p. 235 106

Chinese goods remained more competitive compared to ASEAN due to their price, but ASEAN retained

advantages in quality and transparency. Haley, Usha, p. 6 107

Kotabe, Masaaki and Gupta, Shruti, p. 18 108

See Vatikiotis, Michael, “Catching the Dragon‟s Tail: China and Southeast Asia in the 21st Century”,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25:1, p. 69, 2003, Ciorciari, John, “The balance of great power influence in

contemporary Southeast Asia”, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 9, p. 170, 2009 and Lim, Hua

Sing, p. 235 109

Kato, Kozo, “Open Regionalism and Japan‟s Systemic Vulnerability”, in Katzenstein, Peter, et al., Asian

Regionalism, p. 35, East Asia Program, Cornell University, New York, 2000 110

Lincoln, Edward, p. 217 111

The AMF idea is often wrongly associated as a Japanese initiative. Although the proposition came from

Japan, the initiative was from Thailand which put it to Japan to propose. See Dent, Christopher, East Asian

Regionalism, p. 142 and Funston, John, p. 31 112

For instance, Malaysia did not support the proposal. See Lim, Hua Sing, p. 303 and Nabers, Dirk, p. 119 113

See Kato, Kozo, “Open Regionalism and Japan‟s Systemic Vulnerability”, p. 35, Nabers, Dirk, p. 119 and


See Chapter Three for the economic roles of Japan and China in Asia. Also see: Rajan, Ramkishen,

Economic Globalisation and Asia, p. 59 and Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 3 115

See Roland-Holst, David, “Global Supply Networks and Multilateral Trade Linkages: A structural

analysis of East Asia” in Harvie, Charles, Kimura, Fukunari and Lee, Hyun-Hoon (eds), New East Asian

Regionalism, p. 39, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2005, Young, Sogil, “Economic Integration and Asia‟s New

Role in the Global Economy” in Kumar, Nagesh, Kesavapany, K. and Yao, Chao Cheng (eds), Asia‟s New

Regionalism and Global Role, p. 17, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008 and Lincoln,

Edward, p. 165


14

as ASEAN Plus Three (APT).116

The financial crisis gave the forum an immediate agenda

that shaped the nature of the organisation.117

Recognising the increasingly integrated nature of East Asia and the lack of good

responses to the crisis, APT members moved to propose initiatives to help build regional

financial resilience and confidence.118

This was initially done through the New Miyazawa

Initiative (NMI - the “old” Miyazawa Initiative being the AMF proposal), named after the

Japanese Finance Minister.119

The initiative formed a number of bilateral currency swap

arrangements between Japan and specific countries, such as South Korea, Thailand and

Indonesia.120

These countries were still being affected by the financial crisis at the time

and the agreements formed part of Japan‟s assistance package.121

The various swap agreements became formally institutionalised in 2000, at which

time they were consolidated into the single institution known as the Chiang Mai Initiative

(CMI),122

strongly led by Japan but with the support of both China and ASEAN.123

Measures put in place by the CMI facilitate the sharing of information on capital

movements in the region and are an early warning system if large, short term capital flows

are identified.124

In addition to these surveillance measures, the CMI has two main

benefits: it can provide short term liquidity to states and consequently financial

institutions; and it can help defend currencies under speculative attack.125

East Asia is

provided with a greater degree of financial autonomy because of this initiative, even if

there is still some reliance on the IMF.126

Initiatives to develop Asia‟s financial markets built regional financial resilience

and act as protections against the outbreak of any future crisis.127

The financial crisis

116

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, pp. 150, 153, Soesastro, Hadi, “Towards an East Asian

Regional Trading Agreement” in Tay, Simon, Estanislao, Jesus and Soesastro, Hadi (eds), Reinventing

ASEAN, p. 226, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2001. Nabers. Dirk, p. 120 and Lincoln,

Edward, p. 156 117

The financial and economic initiatives have defined the character of APT. Simon, Sheldon, “ASEAN and

Multilateralism: The Long Bumpy Road to Community”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:2, p. 280, 2008 118

Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 150 119

See Lincoln, Edward, p. 217 and Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 156 120

See Lincoln, Edward, p. 217 and Nair, Deepak, p. 437 121

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 156, See Dobson, Wendy, “Asia-Pacific regional

architecture and financial market integration” in Soesastro, Hadi and Findlay, Christopher (eds), Reshaping

the Asia Pacific Economic Order, p. 250, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006, Dieter, Heirbert and Higgot, Richard,

p. 437 and Rajan, Ramkishen, “Monetary and financial cooperation in Asia: taking stock of recent

ongoings”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 8, p. 35, 2008 122

See Rajan, Ramkishen, “Monetary and Financial Cooperation in Asia” in Kumar, Nagesh, Kesavapany,

K. and Yao, Chao Cheng (eds), Asia‟s New Regionalism and Global Role, p. 187, Institute of Southeast

Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008, Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka and Beeson, Mark, “Asia‟s Odd Men Out: Australia,

Japan and the politics of regionalism”, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 7, p. 239, 2007 and Lim,

Hua Sing, p. 304 123

Gelbras, Vilya and Kuznetsova, Valentia, “Foreign Economic Strategy of China” in Chufrin, Gennady

(ed), East Asia: Between Regionalism and Globalism, p. 42, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore,

2006 124


See Dobson, Wendy, p. 250 and Rajan, Ramkishen, Economic Globalisation and Asia, p. 60 126

See Ba, Alice, “The Politics and Economics of “East Asia” in China-ASEAN Relations”, in Ho, Khai

Leong and Ku, Samuel (eds), China and Southeast Asia, p. 184, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

Singapore, 2005 and Simon, Sheldon, p. 280 127

See Rajan, Ramkishen, “Monetary and financial cooperation in Asia: taking stock of recent ongoings”, p.

33 and Rajan, Ramkishen, “Monetary and Financial Cooperation in Asia”, p. 187


15

therefore provided an event that unified East Asia and, in recognition of their common

fortunes, led to the consolidation of the APT process. With the short lived but intense

effects of the financial crisis quickly passing, attention turned to fostering East Asian

integration.

East Asia into the New Millennium

Despite ASEAN‟s ineffectiveness in dealing with the financial crisis alone, by the

beginning of the new millennium it had successfully established cooperation with its

Northeast Asian neighbours. In the process it secured itself a limited leadership position in

this dialogue, indicated by the name of ASEAN Plus Three.128

East Asian cooperation

developed with ASEAN through the first decade of the new millennium to consolidate the

view of East Asia in such a way that served to reinforce this position. ASEAN enacted its

first charter in 2007 and announced its intentions to form a comprehensive Southeast

Asian community by 2015. The members of APT have also shown interest in developing a

similar community for East Asia, leading to the creation of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in

2005.

ASEAN has established itself at the core of East Asian development for two

reasons. Firstly East Asia‟s trade system is centred on the grouping. Secondly ASEAN

lends its norms and processes to both APT and the EAS, in addition to the EAS utilising

its membership criteria, ensuring that East Asia is ASEAN-led both in practices and focus.

The financial crisis irreversibly shook Asian confidence in APEC, though it

remained an important grouping for its non-Asian members.129

APEC has struggled on

regardless and its continued longevity is attributed to the continuation of US involvement,

since it is the only regional forum to consistently draw its attendance.130

APEC has been

far less active in the new millennium than in its heyday of the early to mid 1990s and

continues to focus on its trade and investment liberalisation goals.131

Further regional change had already begun occurring because of the US' preference

to use Free Trade Agreements as its main trade policy, and Asia felt compelled to follow

to avoid being left behind. A number of individual ASEAN members signed FTAs with

important trading partners.132

In particular, Singapore and Thailand have been the most

proactive and now have agreements with Japan, China, Australia and the United States

128

In addition ASEAN gains greater prominence from being in a grouping in which it is backed by two of

the region‟s great powers, Japan and China. See Ariff, Mohamed, “Trade, Investment, and Interdependence”

in Tay, Simon, Estanislao, Jesus and Soesastro, Hadi (eds), Reinventing ASEAN, p. 62, Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2001 and Soesastro, Hadi, “Towards an East Asian Regional Trading

Agreement” p. 226 129

Elek, Andrew, “APEC in the emerging international economic order: lame duck or catalyst?” in

Soesastro, Hadi and Findlay Christopher (eds), Reshaping the Asia-Pacific Economic Order, p. 117,

Routledge, Abingdon, 2006 130

Ciorciari, John, p. 179 131

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 134 and Ciorciari, John, p. 173 132

See Garnaut, Ross and Song, Ligang, “Truncated Globalisation” The fate of the Asia-Pacific

Economies?” in Soesastro, Hadi and Findlay Christopher (eds), Reshaping the Asia-Pacific Economic Order,

p. 73, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006, Scollay, Robert, “East Asia and the evolution of Preferential Trading

Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific: A Stocktake”, p. 21 and Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, pp.

110, 184, 191


16

among others.133

Northeast and Southeast Asia also began to pursue free trade between

themselves in the new millennium.134

There were many ways in which this could be

achieved,135

but China determined the process in 2001 when it proposed an FTA between

ASEAN (as a whole) and itself.136

This move took other Northeast Asian countries by

surprise and South Korea and Japan quickly proposed their own agreements with ASEAN

in response.137

Initially the US was reluctant to deal with the grouping as a whole, but

began pursuing an FTA with ASEAN by the middle of the decade.138

These various

agreements have reinforced the view of the region as East Asia with ASEAN at the centre,

because the new FTAs have linked individual (though very important) countries to

ASEAN as a whole.139

In the new millennium, ASEAN pushed ahead with its own consolidation through

the proposed creation of an ASEAN Community by 2020,140

based on three institutional

133

See Scollay, Robert, “East Asia and the evolution of Preferential Trading Arrangements in the Asia-

Pacific: A Stocktake”, p. 21 Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, pp. 110, 184, 191 and Garnaut,

Ross and Song, Ligang, p. 73 134

This, along with the FTAs and more mentioned previous, was pursued in an effort to “catch up” to the

rest of the world and the prominence FTAs had come have in world trade. See Roland-Holst, p. 39, Dent,

Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 193, Young, Sogil, p. 17 and Lincoln, Edward, p. 165 135

These include Northeast Asian partners acceding to AFTA, developing a comprehensive East Asia wide

FTA, developing an infant East Asia wide FTA and then slowly progressing towards a comprehensive

agreement and establishing individual agreements between different partners and Asia and later

consolidating these (which has become the way by which an East Asian FTA will probably be achieved). On

these and the complexities with achieving an EAFTA see Lijun, Sheng, “China-ASEAN Free Trade Area:

Origins, Development and Strategic Motivations”, ISEAS Working Paper (accessible at

http://www.iseas.edu.sg/ipsi12003.pdf), pp. 5-6, 2003 (last accessed 7th

of August 2010, Dent, Christopher,

East Asian Regionalism, pp. 200-203, 217 and Cook, Malcolm, “The United States and the East Asia

Summit: Finding the Proper Home”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:2, p. 295, 2008 136

See Wang, Vincent Wei-Cheng, “The Logic of China-ASEAN FTA: Economic Statecraft of “Peaceful

Ascendency”” in Ho, Khai Leong and Ku, Samuel (eds), China and Southeast Asia, p. 18, Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2005, Yao, Chao Cheng, “China‟s Role in the Asian Economic

Integration Process” in Kumar, Nagesh, Kesavapany, K. and Yao, Chao Cheng (eds), Asia‟s New

Regionalism and Global Role, p. 95, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008 and Tay, Simon,

“ASEAN and East Asia: A new regionalism?” in Tay, Simon, Estanislao, Jesus and Soesastro, Hadi (eds),

Reinventing ASEAN, p. 221, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2001 137

See Jones, David, “Security and democracy: the ASEAN Charter and the dilemmas of regionalism in

South-East Asia”, International Affairs, 84:4, p. 736, 2008, Lincoln, Edward, p. 182, Kesavapa in Kumar,

Nagesh, Kesavapany, K. and Yao, Chao Cheng (eds), Asia‟s New Regionalism and Global Role, p. 76,

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008 and Öjendal, Joakim, p. 530 138

Sutter, Robert, “The Obama Administration and US Policy in Asia”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31:2,

p. 211, 2009 139

ASEAN is consciously attempting to construct a hub and spokes system of trade agreements centred on

itself, what this means for further expansion into some form of consolidated region-wide agreement is

unknown. See Scollay, Robert, “East Asian regionalism – undermining or underpinning Asia-Pacific

integration” in Soesastro, Hadi and Findlay, Christopher (eds), Reshaping the Asia Pacific Economic Order,

p. 186, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006, Bonapace, Tiziana and Mikic, Mia, “Forging an Integrated Asia-Pacific

Region” in Kumar, Nagesh, Kesavapany, K. and Yao, Chao Cheng (eds), Asia‟s New Regionalism and

Global Role, p. 150, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008 and Scollay, Robert, “East Asia

and the evolution of Preferential Trading Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific: A Stocktake”, p. 20 140

See Dent, Christopher, “The New Economic Bilateralism of Southeast Asia: Region-Convergent or

Region-Divergent?”, p. 91 and Kesavapany, K., “ASEAN‟s Role in Asian Economic Integration” in Kumar,

Nagesh, Kesavapany, K. and Yao, Chao Cheng (eds), Asia‟s New Regionalism and Global Role, pp. 63, 65,

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008

http://www.iseas.edu.sg/ipsi12003.pdf


17

pillars of Economic, Socio-cultural, and Security Communities.141

The target date was

later moved to 2015 and the first steps were taken towards achieving this goal in 2007

when ASEAN adopted its first charter.142

Although not without difficulties ASEAN has

pressed ahead with its goal to form a comprehensive community.

Interest was also expressed in forming a broader community, resulting in the first

East Asian Summit in 2005.143

The EAS is based on ASEAN Plus Three, with the

additional inclusion of Australia, New Zealand and India, a move that was supported by

other members of ASEAN – notably Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.144

This

membership expansion was an effort to blunt the influence of China in the grouping, but at

the same time it raised questions about the scope East Asia.145

ASEAN‟s membership

criteria were directly applied to the East Asia Summit,146

and members of the EAS must

agree to all ASEAN‟s past declarations. They are also required to sign the Treaty of Amity

and Cooperation and, despite reservations, Australia and Japan did so prior to joining,

reinforcing an acceptance that ASEAN leads the region. This requirement was not an issue

for China because it had already signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003,

becoming the first great power to do so.147

This latest forum represents an important sign of ASEAN‟s political prominence.

In part, this prominence is due to the utilisation of ASEAN‟s membership criteria, which

all proposed members eventually accepted. In addition, ASEAN played an important role

in altering the membership of the EAS to moderate the influence of China, which had

otherwise made large political gains after the Asian financial crisis.

Balancing the Influence of Great Powers

In the ever-changing regional environment, marked in particular by the rise of East Asia,

the great powers of Japan, China, and the United States continue to play important roles.

Japan and China have economic importance for the region, with production networks

developed by the Japanese now being fuelled by Chinese demand for parts and

components. The US has been a major export market for Asia, but is more important as a

key security partner of the region and continues to maintain a considerable military

presence. Despite these important roles, the three great powers are unable to lead because

of their tense relationships. Japan‟s ties with the US and China are influenced by its

continued denial of its wartime legacy and its alliance with the US. Meanwhile, relations

between Washington and Beijing remain tense as China suspects the US of undertaking a

strategy to keep it from achieving great power status. In contrast, ASEAN norms represent

141

See Collins, Alan, “A People Oriented ASEAN: A Door Ajar or Closed for Civil Society Organisations?”,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:3, pp. 315-317, 2008 and Kesavapany, K., p. 65 142

See ASEAN, “Media Release: ASEAN Leaders Sign ASEAN Charter” accessible at


of November 2007 (last accessed 11th

of August 2010), Simon,

Sheldon, p. 274, Collins, Alan, p. 314 and Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 20 143

See Yeo, Lay Hwee, “Japan, ASEAN, and the Construction of an East Asian Community”, Contemporary

Southeast Asia, 28:2, pp. 261, 2006 and Lim, Hua Sing, pp. 332, 340 144

See Lim, Hua Sing, p. 317, Ciorciari, John, p. 181, Cook, Malcolm, p. 302 and Dent, Christopher, East

Asian Regionalism, pp. 25, 169 145


See Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka and Beeson, Mark, p. 234, Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an

ASEAN Community, p. 274 and Cook, Malcolm, p. 303 147

Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 168



18

a way by which states in the region can interact cooperatively and consequently are placed

at the core of the region.148

Japan

Japan‟s modern history of influence and dealings with the region date to the Meiji

Restoration after it was forced to end its policy of isolation.149

Notably, Japan pursued the

creation of a colonial empire, acquiring the Korean peninsula, Manchuria and Taiwan

(then Formosa) before invading China in 1937.150

Prior to World War Two, Japan had

begun to formulate the idea of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in which it

envisaged the participation of all East Asian nations under its leadership.151

During the

Second World War it implemented this plan, though only to a limited extent, after forcibly

taking the Southeast Asian colonial possessions of the British and the Dutch. It eventually

became apparent to the newly “liberated” nations of Southeast Asia, however, that the

Japanese were simply replacing one colonial power with another.152

This stunted foray into

regionalism during the 1930s and 1940s came to an abrupt end with the defeat of Japan in

1945, but Japan‟s wartime legacy lingers.153

During its post-war focus on economic development, Japan formed a security

alliance with the US, maintaining Japan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for halting the

spread of Communism.154

Japan‟s relationship with the US stimulated its economic

recovery, and Japanese companies later provided important aid and investment into

Eastern Asia, stimulating development of regional economies.155

More importantly the

Japanese business structure promoted the creation of production chains that eventually

diversified and formed a production basin in Southeast Asia.156

Japanese financial capital

was utilised in the development of ports, roads and other infrastructure and the exploitation

148


Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29:3, p. 410, 2007, Simon, Sheldon, “ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long

Bumpy Road to Community”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:2, p. 268, 2008 and Ciorciari, John, p. 160 149

Morris-Suzuki, Tessa., “Japanese Nationalism from Meiji to 1937” in Mackerras, Colin (ed), Eastern

Asia, p. 182, Longman Chesire, Melbourne, 1993 150

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 42, Routledge, New York, 2008 and Beeson, Mark,

“Geopolitics and the Making of Regions: The Fall and Rise of Asia”, p. 502 151

See Katzenstein, Peter, “Varieties of Asian Regionalism” in Katzenstein, Peter, et al., Asian Regionalism,

p. 1, East Asia Program, Cornell University, New York, 2000 and Beeson, Mark, “Geopolitics and the

Making of Regions: The Fall and Rise of Asia”, Political Studies, 57, p. 503, 2009 152

Beeson, Mark, “Geopolitics and the Making of Regions: The Fall and Rise of Asia”, pp. 502-503 153

This is especially the case in Northeast Asia, as I shall discuss below in considering how Japan is

precluded from regional leadership. 154

See Beeson, Mark, “Geopolitics and the Making of Regions: The Fall and Rise of Asia”, p. 505, Acharya,

Amitav and Tan, See Seng, “Betwixt balance and community: America, ASEAN and the security of

Southeast Asia”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 6, p. 41, 2006 and Bisley, Nick, “Securing the

“Anchor of Regional Stability”? The Transformation of the US-Japan Alliance and East Asian Security”,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:1, p. 74, 2008 155

See Katzenstein, Peter, “Varieties of Asian Regionalism”, p. 2 and Lincoln, Edward, East Asian

Economic Regionalism, pp. 87, 89, Brookings Institute Press, Washington D.C, 2004 156

See Cheow, Eric, “A Strategic Perspective on Asian Economic Integration: The importance of building

„one Asia‟” in Kumar, Nagesh, Kesavapany, K. and Yao, Chao Cheng (eds), Asia‟s New Regionalism and

Global Role, p. 49, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008, Kimura, Fukunari and Ando,

Mitsuyo, “International Production/Distribution Networks and FTAs” in Harvie, Charles, Kimura, Fukunari

and Lee, Hyun-Hoon (eds), New East Asian Regionalism, p. 75, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2005,

Katzenstein, Peter, “Varieties of Asian Regionalism”, p. 17, Lim, Hua Sing, pp. 2, 6, 151, Dent, Christopher,

East Asian Regionalism, p. 2 and Noble, Gregory, “Japanese and American Perceptions on East Asian

Regionalism”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 8, pp. 251-252, 2008


19

of Southeast Asia‟s resource wealth.157

Japan has been unable to turn this economic

influence into political power, however, for various reasons primarily relating to its

relationship with the US and its lingering wartime history.

China

China is the oldest great power in Asia and, long before the European powers began their

colonial expansion into Asia, had constructed a tributary system in which the various

kingdoms of Southeast and Northeast Asia recognised the Emperor and the Middle

Kingdom.158

This system came to an abrupt end with the entrance of the colonial powers

into Asia and their pressures to open up China.159

More recently, China‟s role in the

Korean War and its support of other Communist parties in Southeast Asia made it a

security concern for the region, and these destabilising factors fostered the formation of

ASEAN.160

Following the US‟s normalisation of relations with China in 1971 the ASEAN

states slowly normalised their own relationships with China.161

China was then invited to take part in the Asia‟s various forums.162

It remained

highly sceptical of these multilateral processes however, believing they were a new way

for the US and others to restrain China.163

China began participating in both APEC and the

ARF, although primarily to protect its own interests.164

These interests were predominately

China‟s numerous territorial disputes with Japan and the ASEAN states over a number of

island chains in East Asia. These disputes have contributed to suspicion about the

seriousness of China‟s commitment to cooperation in achieving a peaceful and prosperous

region.165

157

See Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 48 and Lim, Hua Sing, p. 223 158

This system played a role in stimulating trade between Southeast Asia and China in ancient times, though

the Qing Dynasty ended this when China closed itself off from foreign trade. The tribute system continued,

but as an elaborate ceremony serving little real economic value with the Southeast Asian kingdoms giving

token cultural gifts to the Emperor who in return bestowed gifts of much greater value to them. Stewart-Fox,

Martin, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia, pp. 33, 76, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2003 159


Such as the Burmese Communist Party, Communist Party Malaya and other communist insurgencies in

Thailand and Indonesia. See Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 3,

Stewart-Fox, Martin, p. 159 and Kurlantzick, Joshua, “China‟s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia”, Current

History, 105, 692, p. 271, 2006 161

A process which took until the early 1990s to complete. See Stewart-Fox, Martin, p. 192, Haacke, Jürgen,

“The Significance of Beijing‟s Bilateral Relations: Looking „Below‟ the Regional Level in China-ASEAN

Ties” in Ho, Khai Leong and Ku, Samuel (eds), China and Southeast Asia, pp. 118, 136, Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2005 and Vatikiotis, Michael, “Catching the Dragon‟s Tail: China and

Southeast Asia in the 21st Century”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25:1, p. 69, 2003

162 These included APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and, in the late 1990s, ASEM and APT. Over

the course of the 1990s and into the new millennium China gradually became more at ease with

multilateralism, in fact even by the mid-1990s China had dropped its provocative stances in these and began

to be a cooperative partner, as its role in ASEM and APT show. See Heginbotham, Eric and Twomey,

Christopher, “America‟s Bismarckian Asia Policy”, Current History, 104, 683, p. 246, 2005 and Ba, Alice,

“The Politics and Economics of “East Asia” in China-ASEAN Relations”, in Ho, Khai Leong and Ku,

Samuel (eds), China and Southeast Asia, p. 185, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2005 163

See Kuik, Cheng-Chwee, p. 105 and De Castro, Renatocruz, “The US-Philippine Alliance: An evolving

hedge against an emerging China challenge”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31:3, p. 409, 2009 164

See Kurlantzick, Joshua, p. 271 and Kuik, Cheng-Chwee, p. 106 165

Such as the instance of China‟s actions on the Mischief Reef when territorial disputes drove a wedge

between China and the Philippines, see De Castro, Renatocruz, p. 408 and Cheng, Joseph, p. 424. See also

Ba, Alice, “The Politics and Economics of “East Asia” in China-ASEAN Relations”, p. 171, Dent,


20

Nevertheless, the continued view of China as untrustworthy and uncooperative was

diminished with the Asian financial crisis. China‟s refusal to devalue its currency, along

with its loans without stipulations created a large amount of goodwill in Southeast Asia.166

Furthermore, China‟s continued strong growth throughout the 1990s made it an

increasingly important trading partner for both Southeast and Northeast Asia.167

The crisis

severely damaged ASEAN‟s export industries, but their loss in trade was soon replaced

with trade to China.168

This shift helped dispel ASEAN‟s concern that China was a

competitor economy and a threat to ASEAN‟s trading position.169

Trade between ASEAN

and China grew strongly into the new millennium, reaching over $100bn in mid-2004170

and then near doubling by 2008.171

This growth has been at the expense of Japan and the

US, which have continually lost ground in their share of total ASEAN trade.172

Trade

slowed somewhat with the advent of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, but this event was

only a temporary setback.173

ASEAN continues to enjoy a healthy trade surplus with

China, and the creation of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) has

solidified this relationship.174

China‟s role in proposing ACFTA highlights that it is now

the region‟s key economic stimulus and ASEAN its primary production base.175

Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, pp. 261-262, Severino, Rodolfo, “ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards

Political and Economic Integration”, p. 418 and Lim, Hua Sing, p. 282 166

China was one of the first countries to come to the aid of Thailand in the financial crisis. See Vatikiotis,

Michael, p. 69, Ciorciari, John, p. 170 and Lim, Hua Sing, p. 235 167

Southeast Asia is not only in the Japanese structure but the overseas Chinese business sphere also has a

very strong presence in Southeast Asia, and companies run by ethnic Chinese dominate Southeast Asia‟s

business landscape. This was a great boon in stimulating trade between the PRC and ASEAN as the former

began to open up. See Yue, Ming, “Chinese Networks and Asian Regionalism” in Katzenstein, Peter, et al.,

Asian Regionalism, pp. 91-93, East Asia Program, Cornell University, New York, 2000 and Vatikiotis,

Michael, p. 66 168

Trade with China has been growing at double figures yearly since the late 1990s, such as Indonesia-China

trade growing at 30%. See Kesavapany, K., “ASEAN‟s Role in Asian Economic Integration” in Kumar,

Nagesh, Kesavapany, K. and Yao, Chao Cheng (eds), Asia‟s New Regionalism and Global Role, p. 75,

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008, Sekiguichi, Sueo, “Prospects for Intra- and Extra-

regional Relations” in Sekiguichi, Sueo and Makita, Noda (eds), Road to ASEAN-10, p. 210, Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999 and Vatikiotis, Michael, p. 66 169

Though China has become seen as an opportunity, concerns over competing for investment with China

remain. Lim, Hua Sing, p. 275 170

Reaching $100bn in two-way trade had been set as a goal by the two parties to be achieved by the end of

2004, in fact it was reached part way through the year – many months ahead of schedule. Men, Jing, pp. 249,

256 171

See ASEAN, “ASEAN Community in Figures 2009”, p. 14 accessible at

http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ACIF2009.pdf, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 2010and ASEAN,

“ASEAN Economic Community Chartbook 2009” accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/publications/AEC-

Chartbook-2009.pdf, p. 20, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 2009 and Simon, Sheldon, p. 282 172

For instance China is now ASEAN‟s most significant single market, a title Japan once held. See Lim, Hua

Sing, p. 148, Lijun, Sheng, “China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Origins, Development and Strategic

Motivations”, ISEAS Working Paper (accessible at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/ipsi12003.pdf), p. 2, 2003 (last

accessed 7th

of August 2010) and Lincoln, Edward, pp. 43, 55 173

See People‟s Daily Online, “China-ASEAN trade volume increases 80% in Jan 2010”, People‟s Daily

accessible at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90861/6903618.html, 26th

of February 2010

(last accessed 25th

of May 2010) and ASEAN, “ASEAN trade by selected partner country/region” accessible

at http://www.aseansec.org/stat/Table19.pdf, 15th

of July 2010 (last accessed 11th

August 2010) 174

The proposal of which came as a surprise to others in the region. See Garnaut and Huang have noted that

China‟s trade surplus is growing as a result of its deficits with individual countries, and groupings (including

ASEAN) are decreasing, thus this position may be under threat and ASEAN might find itself more reliant on

China. See Garnaut, Ross and Huang, Yiping, “Mature Chinese growth leads the global Platinum Age” in

Garnaut, Ross and Song, Ligang (eds), China: Linking Markets for Growth, p. 19, ANU E Press, Canberra,

http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ACIF2009.pdf

http://www.aseansec.org/publications/AEC-Chartbook-2009.pdf



http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90861/6903618.html

http://www.aseansec.org/stat/Table19.pdf


21

The United States

The history of US involvement in Asia extends to its opening of Japan and acquiring the

Philippines as a colony after winning the Spanish-American war. The latter led to the

forging of a close relationship between the Philippines and US that persists to this day.

When the US became one of the world‟s two superpowers after WWII it assumed

responsibility for the defence of non-Communist Asia, and developed close security ties

with regional partners. The Vietnam War created instability within the region, and the end

of the war and withdrawal of US troops brought further uncertainty.176

It is for this reason

that ASEAN supported the inclusion of the US in APEC in the late 1980s, fearing a US

that ignored the region.177

After the Cold War, US influence experienced a steady decline. It closed a number

of its military facilities, primarily in the Philippines, and US troop deployments to the

region were also rolled back, while other regions of the world such as Africa, Eastern

Europe and the Middle East began to take up more of its attention.178

The economic

dimension of the US-Asia relationship also declined over the course of the 1990s, evident

from the US‟s share of ASEAN trade declining from 17.6% in 1993, to 9.7% in 2009.179

The US-Japan alliance continued to be important, but principally for the security of

Northeast Asia.180

In the new millennium, the Bush administration continued with a pattern of

“periodic interest” in Asia though the region already felt neglected after the Asian

financial crisis.181

The Bali Bombings of 2002 changed this situation, because Southeast

2007 and Rogozhin, Alexander, “Economic Cooperation in East Asia: Main Directions, Dynamics and

Scale” in Chufrin, Gennady (ed), East Asia: Between Regionalism and Globalism, p. 17, Institute of


See Yao, Chao Cheng, “China‟s Role in the Asian Economic Integration Process”, p. 97 and Men, Jing, p.

258 176

See Acharya, Amitav and Tan, See Seng, p. 45 and Takano, Takeshi, “The ASEAN-10 and Regional

Political Relations” in Sekiguichi, Sueo and Makita, Noda (eds), Road to ASEAN-10, p. 26, Institute of


See MacIntyre, Andrew and Soesastro, Hadi, “Political-strategic dimensions of economic cooperation in

the Asia-Pacific” in Soesastro, Hadi and Findlay, Christopher (eds), Reshaping the Asia Pacific Economic

Order, p. 268, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006 and Soesastro, Hadi, “APEC‟s Overall Goals and Objectives,

Evolution and Current Status”, p. 34 178

See Acharya, Amitav, De Castro, Renatocruz, p. 404 and Tan, See Seng, p. 50 and Cook, Malcolm, “The

United States and the East Asia Summit: Finding the Proper Home”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:2, p.

306, 2008 179

See ASEAN, “ASEAN trade by selected partner country/region”, ASEAN, “ASEAN Community in

Figures 2009”, p. 15, ASEAN, “ASEAN Economic Community Chartbook 2009”, p. 22, Kato, Kozo, “Open

Regionalism and Japan‟s Systemic Vulnerability”, p. 37 and Amiroc, Vyacheslav, “The United States and a

New Stage of Economic Cooperation in East Asia” in Chufrin, Gennady (ed), East Asia: Between

Regionalism and Globalism, p. 83, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2006. In addition,

contrary to what is often assumed, US investment into the region has never been as important as investors

native to East Asia because the US FDI is more focused on the developed, Western nations, instead leaving

Japan and ASEAN members to be more prominent investors in Southeast Asia. See Fumio, Yoshino,

“ASEAN in APEC” in Sekiguichi, Sueo and Makita, Noda (eds), Road to ASEAN-10, p. 53, Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999, Rogozhin, Alexander, p. 21 and Lincoln, Edward, p. 109. 180

Ikenberry, G. and Tsuchiyama, Jitsuo, p. 70 181

The US‟s involvement in Asia has been highly variable and occurs in spurts, regardless of which party

holds the executive position. See Acharya, Amitav and Tan, See Seng, pp. 45-46 and Ba, Alice, “Systemic

Neglect? A Reconsideration of US-Southeast Asia Policy”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31:3, pp. 371-

372, 2009


22

Asia became the “second front” in the “War on Terror”.182

Washington renewed its

attention and provided large amounts of financial and technical assistance to Southeast

Asia.183

The election of President Obama was expected to increase US support of

multilateral processes in Asia, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signing the Treaty of

Amity and Cooperation in 2009.184

Furthermore, she declared that the US was “back in

Asia”, ending speculation on Asia‟s position in Obama‟s foreign policy.185

As yet, these

intentions have not produced significant change, and security continues to be the most

important aspect of the US‟s relationship with Asia.

How David Leads the Goliaths

Although Japan, China and the US are all vitally important economic and security players

in the Asia-Pacific region, divisiveness between those powers has allowed ASEAN to

maximise the advantages that have come with being a regional leader. Lack of cooperation

between the great powers means that one cannot lead without attracting suspicion and

hostility from others. In this environment ASEAN is able to present itself as a non-great

power alternative, even though this leadership shall only remain so long as ASEAN is

unified and the great powers divided.186

Japan‟s wartime activities may have occurred over 65 years ago, but the legacy of

those actions continues to linger. The so-called “history issue” has been the sticking point

in Sino-Japanese and Japan-Korea relations since the end of World War Two.187

Consequently, Japan and China have exhibited a failure to cooperate with one another,

despite such cooperation being important to the development of East Asia. This history has

182

See Simon, Sheldon, p. 271, Sutter, Robert, “The Obama Administration and US Policy in Asia”,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31:2, p. 206, 2009, Ba, Alice, “Systemic Neglect? A Reconsideration of US-

Southeast Asia Policy”, p. 376 and Öjendal, Joakim, “Back to the future? Regionalism in South-East Asia

under unilateral pressure”, International Affairs, 80:3, p. 522, 2004 183

See Ba, Alice, “Systemic Neglect? A Reconsideration of US-Southeast Asia Policy”, p. 376, De Castro,

Renatocruz, p. 402 and Öjendal, Joakim, p. 526 184

The US had long had refused to, because it was concerned that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

would limit its freedom in the region. See Sutter, Robert, “The Obama Administration and US Policy in

Asia”, p. 205 and Limaye, Satu, p. 451 185

See Elliott, Geoff, “Hillary Clinton firmly commits the US to Asia-Pacific security” in the Australian

accessible at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/clinton-commits-us-to-asia-pacific/story-e6frg6no-

1225713815717, 21st of May 2009 (last accessed 11

th of August 2010), Sutter, Robert, “The Obama

Administration and US Policy in Asia”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, p. 205 and Alford, Peter, “US back in

Asia to stay: Hillary Clinton” in The Australian accessible at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/in-

depth/asia-to-create-122bn-crisis-fund/story-e6frgagx-1111117844234, 14th

of January 2010 (last accessed

11th

of August 2010) 186

See Hamilton-Hart, Natasha, “Regional Capital and Cooperation in Asia”, in Katzenstein, Peter, et al.,

Asian Regionalism, pp. 116-117, East Asia Program, Cornell University, New York, 2000 and Ciorciari,

John, p. 177 187

An example of this is when in the late 1990s nationalist forces in Japan built a lighthouse on disputed

territory with China, causing an uproar of anti-Japanese sentiment. See Lingle, Christopher, The Rise and

Decline of the Asian Century, p. 180, Asia 2000, Hong Kong, 1997 and Yeo, Lay Hwee, “Japan, ASEAN,

and the Construction of an East Asian Community”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 28:2, p. 265, 2006. It

must be noted that while Japan‟s wartime history has caused unending trouble in its relations with Northeast

Asia, Southeast Asia has largely moved on as is clear from a statement by Dr Mahathir that Japan should not

continue to apologise for things that occurred half a century (at the time) ago. See Yang, Jian, “Sino-

Japanese Relations: Implications for Southeast Asia”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25:2, p. 317, 2003

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/clinton-commits-us-to-asia-pacific/story-e6frg6no-1225713815717


http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/in-depth/asia-to-create-122bn-crisis-fund/story-e6frgagx-1111117844234



23

also been responsible for the lack of any Northeast Asian regional grouping that might be

an alternative to ASEAN‟s East Asian leadership.188

Ironically, Japan‟s alliance with the United States is also part of this wartime

legacy because the US has consistently blocked any moves by Japan that are in pursuit of

political leadership,189

even though it has increasingly pressured Japan to take greater

responsibility for its own security.190

Furthermore, China in particular believes Japan is an

agent of the US and that Japan represents US interests in groupings that do not include the

US.191

This situation makes Japanese leadership undesirable to China,192

but also

highlights that the US is external to the region. US leadership is also highly undesirable to

China and ASEAN, and one reason for the formation of the latter was to ensure that US

management of the region would not be required.193

Meanwhile China is especially

adverse to US deployments in Asia and the military bases that it maintains in the region.194

China believes these are an effort to halt China‟s rise and encircle it, keeping China weak

and subservient.195

Finally, China‟s leadership is precluded mainly by its continued development and

its own historical legacy. China is principally a developing country and is still far behind

the US or Japan in terms of its overall levels of technology and economic size196

and

Beijing has no illusions about this situation. China has placed its support behind ASEAN

because it understands that it is incapable of leading such a grouping and because the

region would be uneasy with such leadership.197

China must also contend with its own

188

Though there have been moves recently towards greater cooperation in Northeast Asia, these are slow in

developing. See Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 264,

Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka, pp. 248, 254 and Fedorovsky, Alexander, “Regional Economic Cooperation in

Northeast Asia: Issues and Prospects” in Chufrin, Gennady (ed), East Asia: Between Regionalism and

Globalism, pp. 66-79, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2006 189

See Yeo, Lay Hwee, p. 266, Soesastro, Hadi, “APEC‟s Overall Goals and Objectives, Evolution and

Current Status”, p. 35 and Dent, Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 151 190

Through the 1990s and into the 2000s the Japanese Parliament passed a number of bills that expanded the

operational scope of Japan‟s Self Defense Forces (SDF). Examples include the PKO, allowing for

deployment of the SDF for reconstruction duties in Afghanistan, deploying the SDF to Iraq for

reconstruction and other duties and allowing for the SDF and Japanese Coastguard (JCG) to fire pre-

emptively (as opposed to only when fired on first in defence). See Lim, Hua Sing, p. 283, Sukuwa, Kentaro,

p. 508 and Yang, Jian, pp. 313, 318 191

See Lijun, Sheng, p. 11, Rozman, Gilbert, p. 104 and Yeo, Lay Hwee, p. 272 192

Yang, Jian, p. 311 193

Sumsky, Victor, “ASEAN and East Asia” in Chufrin, Gennady (ed), East Asia: Between Regionalism and

Globalism, p. 51, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2006 194

See Haacke, Jürgen, “The Significance of Beijing‟s Bilateral Relations: Looking „Below‟ the Regional

Level in China-ASEAN Ties”, p. 116 and Amiroc, Vyacheslav, p. 90. 195

The US has been recognised as trying to pursue a containment policy against China, though at the same

time it has sought to engage it. This has been termed a “hedged balance”. Lim, Hua Sing, p. 279 196

See Sutter, Robert, “Asia in the Balance: America and China‟s “Peaceful Rise””, Current History, 103,

674, p. 286, September 2004, Lingle, Christopher, p. 183, and Lijun, Sheng, p. 5. For instance China has

recently begun to implement a comprehensive national healthcare policy, see Sainsbury, Michael, “China

moves to modernise” in The Australian accessible at

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/china-moves-to-modernise/story-e6frg9if-

1225697027661, 13th

of April 2009 (last accessed 11th

of August 2010) 197

ASEAN was created not just to stop the US in its capacity as a superpower being overly influential in the

region but to stop any great power becoming too influential. China recognises that, in accordance with its

policies of a “peaceful rise” and “good neighbourliness”, allowing ASEAN to lead with its support is far

more beneficial and accords it much greater influence than trying to lead the region on its own. See Sutter,

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/china-moves-to-modernise/story-e6frg9if-1225697027661



24

legacy of supporting Communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia and its confrontational

nature over territorial issues.198

China has improved its behaviour in relation to its

territorial disputes and many have been resolved in the 2000s, but suspicions of Beijing

remain.199

As a result, China‟s overt acceptance of ASEAN‟s place in the region, its

support for the grouping and active involvement in relevant multilateral forums have given

Beijing large political gains that increase its influence.

Together these failures have helped ASEAN to become the most successful

regional grouping outside of Europe and the most successful grouping in Asia.200

Furthermore, ASEAN is a network of small and medium powers, precluding any

possibility of hegemonic power201

making its leadership acceptable to the great powers.

Challenges for the Future

ASEAN's centrality to regionalism in Asia, however, is not without its challenges. Two

broad categories of challenges exist - internal and external - and I will now consider two

dilemmas that ASEAN must successfully manage if it is to maintain central to regional

organisations in Asia. The first of these challenges is an internal one that has been labelled

ASEAN's "Myanmar crisis" by Christopher Roberts.202

Myanmar is a source of regional

instability and because of this reason ASEAN chose to engage the military Junta that rules

that country and help it develop as a responsible state. ASEAN has been unsuccessful,

however, and, furthermore, in 2010 allegations surfaced that Myanmar was trying to

acquire nuclear weapons.203

The second challenge to ASEAN's regional leadership is the

rise of China, which threatens to disrupt the "balance of great power influence" in the

region. China is now ASEAN's top trading partner and has shown leadership by becoming

the first great power to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and encouraging the

development of the East Asia Summit. ASEAN will need to pay more attention in the

future to managing its relationships with the great powers in Asia to ensure that a trend of

favouring China over the others does not emerge.

Robert, “Asia in the Balance: America and China‟s “Peaceful Rise””, p. 284 and Yao, Chao Cheng, “China‟s

Role in the Asian Economic Integration Process”, p. 100 198

Ciorciari, John, p. 185 199

See Sutter, Robert, “Asia in the Balance: America and China‟s “Peaceful Rise””, p. 285, Dent,

Christopher, East Asian Regionalism, p. 91, Simon, Sheldon, “ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long

Bumpy Road to Community”, pp. 270, 276 and Vatikiotis, Michael, p. 72 200

See Tay, Simon, “Institutions and Processes: Dilemmas and Possibilities” in Tay, Simon, Estanislao,

Jesus and Soesastro, Hadi (eds), A New ASEAN, p. 155, Singapore Institute of International Affairs,

Singapore, 2000 and Stubbs, Richard, “ASEAN: Building Regional Cooperation”, in Beeson, Mark (ed),

Contemporary Southeast Asia, p. 216, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004 201

With the possible exception of Indonesia which is often referred to as the “potential” or “natural”

hegemon of Southeast Asia. Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 31,

Severino, Rodolfo, “ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic Integration”, p. 418, and

Stubbs, Richard, p. 224 202

As identified by Roberts in Roberts, Christopher, ASEAN‟s Myanmar Crisis, Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies, Singapore, 2010. Other issues which one might consider in discussing how ASEAN‟s leadership is

under threat include disunity on free trade issues, the wider problem of differences between ASEAN-6 and

Indochinese (CLMV) countries, greater US-China cooperation, and greater Sino-Japanese cooperation. 203

Spillus, Alex and Mcelroy, Damien, “Photos expose Burmese nuclear weapons project” in The Age

accessible at http://www.theage.com.au/world/photos-expose-burmese-nuclear-weapons-project-20100726-

10rx4.html, 26th


of August 2010)

http://www.theage.com.au/world/photos-expose-burmese-nuclear-weapons-project-20100726-10rx4.html



25

Myanmar

Myanmar has a long history of domestic instability, originating in the policies

implemented by its colonial master, Britain.204

The country experienced two brief years of

democracy at the start of the 1960s, before a military coup brought intense civil war and

sustained human rights abuses.205

A second military coup took place 25 years later, in

1987, before democratic elections were held in 1990. The government overruled the result

of this election, however, after the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a

resounding victory and the military junta continued its rule. The government was renamed

the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997 and in the same year Myanmar

joined ASEAN.206

Civil war against ethnic minorities continued despite earlier ceasefire

arrangements, and civil unrest in the interests of democracy did not abate. In 2007, the

government initiated a harsh crackdown in response to mass protests sparked by the

removal of fuel subsidies.207

In addition, the world became acutely aware of the extreme

failure of the SPDC in early May 2008 when Cyclone Nargis ravaged the southern coast of

Myanmar. The SPDC organised little assistance for citizens in the aftermath of the disaster

and Myanmar initially refused international aid, barring foreigners from entering the

cyclone affected regions.208

The junta eventually opened up parts of the country to foreign

aid workers, but it remained suspicious and continued to hinder aid delivery.209

The

government also rushed polls to adopt Myanmar‟s new constitution during the crisis,

securing domestic support for the constitution despite international criticism.210

The

constitution came into force in 2010 and in the same year Myanmar held its first

democratic election since 1990.211

The new constitution still gives primacy to the military,

204

See Taylor, Robert, “British Policy towards Myanmar and the Creation of the „Burma Problem‟” in

Ganesan, N. and Hlaing, Kyaw (eds), Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, p. 71, Institute of Southeast

Asian Studies, Sinagpore, 2007, Roberts, Christopher, p. 54 and Taylor, Robert, “Pathways to Present” in

Hlaing, Kyaw, Taylor, Robert and Than, Tin Maung Maung (eds), Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal

Imperatives, pp. 1-29, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2005 205

These include rape, torture and forced labour. For a full account of the atrocities of Myanmar‟s military

regime over the years. See Taylor, Robert, “Pathways to Present”, p. 24, Eldridge, Philip, The Politics of

Human Rights in Southeast Asia, p. 73, Routledge, New York, 2002, Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in

Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 131 Than, Tin Maung Maung, p. 111, Ganesan, N., “State-society

Relations in Southeast Asia”, p. 22, and Roberts, Christopher, p. 55. 206

See Ganesan, N., “State-society Relations in Southeast Asia”, p. 23 and Than, Tin Maung Maung, p. 340 207

This event is known as the “Saffron Revolution” because the protests were initiated by Myanmar‟s

Buddhist priesthood, who otherwise refrained from participating in politics. See Jagan, Larry, “Fuel price

policy explodes in Myanmar” in Asia Times Online accessible at

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IH24Ae03.html, 24th


of

August 2010), Simon, Sheldon, “ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long Bumpy Road to Community”,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:2, p. 273, 2008 and Roberts, Christopher, p. 154 208

While countries like the US and UK denounced the regime‟s actions, France went so far as to propose a

draft resolution in the UN Security Council (UNSC) that would see the UNSC invoke a “right to protect”

Myanmar‟s people and forcibly conduct an intervention to deliver aid. See Haacke, Jürgen, “ASEAN and

Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:3, p. 370,

2008 and Roberts, Christopher, p. 190 209

See ASEAN, “Media Release: ASEAN forms Emergency Rapid Assessment Team for Myanmar”

accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/21534.htm, 13th

of May 2008 (last accessed 11th

of August 2010),

Haacke, Jürgen, “ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative?”, p. 370,

Roberts, Christopher, pp. 191-193 and Haacke, Jürgen, “The Myanmar imbroglio and ASEAN heading

towards the 2010 elections”, International Affairs, 86:1, p. 162, 2010 210

The referendum was far from a transparent and democratic process. See Haacke, Jürgen, “The Myanmar

imbroglio and ASEAN heading towards the 2010 elections”, International Affairs, p. 153 and Roberts,

Christopher, p. 196 211

See Daniel, Zoe, "Burma sets date for general election" on ABC News accessible at

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IH24Ae03.html



26

exempting it from civil law and awarding it the majority of parliamentary seats.212

It is

unsurprising, given these reasons, that there are strong doubts Myanmar's new semi-

democracy will be much different from previous military rule.213

Myanmar‟s ongoing civil strife has generated instability and transnational

problems which impact upon ASEAN members. Firstly there is a continuing flow of

refugees from Myanmar into neighbouring countries, particularly Thailand.214

Economic

circumstances often force these refugees into underpaid and exploited employment,

including prostitution. Linked to that is the spread of diseases such as HIV/AIDs to

Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.215

In addition, there are issues related to illicit

trafficking of all kinds - people smuggling, narcotics trade, and the illegal movement of

small arms.216

The drug trade is of particular note because the production of narcotics is an

important source of income for all sides of Myanmar‟s civil war.217

For example, the

impact on ASEAN members is evident in former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin‟s stance

that the narcotics trade out of Myanmar is Thailand‟s number one security threat.218

ASEAN granted membership to Myanmar in 1997, despite strong protests from the

EU and US, in the interests of constructively engaging the regime. ASEAN aimed to be a

conduit between Myanmar and the outside world because of Myanmar‟s isolation.219

The

presence of Myanmar, however, stifles ASEAN‟s dialogue with the US and EU, even

though ASEAN has tried to convince Myanmar to make progress towards democratic

goals and to respect international norms. ASEAN has consistently supported the junta‟s

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-08-13/burma-sets-date-for-general-election/943432, 13th of August 2010,

last accessed 12th of October 2011 and Daniel, Zoe, "Civil war threatens following Burma's election" on

Lateline transcript accessible at http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2010/s3060800.htm, 8th of November

2010, last accessed 12th of October 2011 212

See AFP, "UN Chief says Myanmar must open up" in The Australian accessible at

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/un-chief-says-new-myanmar-government-must-open-up/story-

fn3dxix6-1226000567582, 5th of February 2011, last accessed 12th of October 2011 and "Burmese elections

not 'democratic norm'" on ABC National Radio transcript accessible at

http://www.abc.net.au/rn/breakfast/stories/2010/3057774.htm, 5th of November 2010, last accessed 12th of

October 2011 213

For example, Thein Sein, a former leading general in the Tatmadaw (Myanmar's military) has been

named President. AFP, "UN Chief says Myanmar must open up" in The Australian accessible at

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/un-chief-says-new-myanmar-government-must-open-up/story-

fn3dxix6-1226000567582, 5th of February 2011, last accessed 12th of October 2011 In addition, fighting

broke out following the election and a restart of civil war appeared likely: Daniel, Zoe, "Civil war threatens

following Burma's election" on Lateline transcript accessible at

http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2010/s3060800.htm, 8th of November 2010, last accessed 12th of

October 2011 214

See Ganesan, N., Myanmar‟s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World”, p. 46 and Simon, Sheldon,

p. 272 215

Myanmar has the highest incidence of HIV/AIDs in Southeast Asia. Other diseases include such things as

the various forms of hepatitis and sexually transmitted disease. See Roberts, Christopher, pp. 57, 80, 82 and

Smith, Martin, p. 58 216

See Snitwongse, Kusuma and Bunbongkarn, Suchit, “New Security Issues and Their Impact on ASEAN”

in Tay, Simon, Estanislao, Jesus and Soesastro, Hadi (eds), Reinventing ASEAN, p. 156, Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2001 and Roberts, Christopher, pp. 57, 80 217

See Smith, Martin, p. 60 and McCartan, Brian, “Myanmar‟s ceasefires on a tripwire”. 218

Roberts, Christopher, p. 87 219

Myanmar is isolated both because of the sanctions that the EU and US have against it and its own

domestic focus. See Ganesan, N., “State-society Relations in Southeast Asia”, pp. 22, 25, Ganesan, N.,

Myanmar‟s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World”, p. 33, Haacke, Jürgen, “The Myanmar imbroglio

and ASEAN heading towards the 2010 elections”, p. 171 and Roberts, Christopher, pp. 218, 221.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-08-13/burma-sets-date-for-general-election/943432

http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2010/s3060800.htm

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/un-chief-says-new-myanmar-government-must-open-up/story-fn3dxix6-1226000567582



http://www.abc.net.au/rn/breakfast/stories/2010/3057774.htm






27

efforts towards democracy and advocated the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house

arrest.220

ASEAN also proposed that the UN create a special envoy position to Myanmar to

help facilitate meaningful discussion between parties in the domestic conflict.221

The

acceptance of this proposal by Myanmar would have been impossible had it not been for

the unique relationship between Indonesia and Myanmar.222

Other individual ASEAN

members have also attempted to build their relationships with Myanmar for mutual

economic advantage. As an example, Thailand has become a major party in the

exploitation of Myanmar‟s timber resources since the improvement of relations between

Rangoon and Bangkok.223

Thailand is also Myanmar‟s largest trading partner, accounting

for over 35% of Myanmar‟s total trade.224

Other Southeast Asian countries, notably

Singapore, are interested in Myanmar‟s energy reserves and have invested in the

development of its gas fields.

Despite ASEAN‟s moves, Myanmar has continually tested ASEAN‟s patience

through its failure to reform and through its public expressions of disrespect towards the

association. The SPDC had made little effort towards its democratic goals until the new

constitution was announced in 2008.225

The National League for Democracy had

abandoned the National Convention – the dialogue to develop the new constitution – by

the early 2000s and did not return to the discussions, despite ASEAN‟s attempts to

encourage the SPDC to engage pro-democracy campaigners.226

Furthermore, the new

constitution will give the military a prominent position in the parliament and exempt it

from the civil judiciary. Myanmar‟s announcement in 2008 of the new constitution was a

220

See Ciorciari, John, “The balance of great power influence in contemporary Southeast Asia” International

Relations of the Asia Pacific, 9, p. 173, 2009, Smith, Martin, p. 57, Roberts, Christopher, p. 144 and Jagan,

Larry, “ASEAN Myanmar agree to disagree” in Asia Times Online accessible at

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LG27Ae02.html, 27th


of

August 2010) 221

ASEAN also continues to encourage Myanmar to utilise the UN support available to it. See Roberts,

Christopher, pp. 146, 157 and Haacke, Jürgen, “the Myanmar Imbroglio and ASEAN: heading towards the

2010 elections”, p. 158 222

Myanmar considers Indonesia much closer to it than other ASEAN members as Myanmar‟s military

modelled itself on that of Indonesia. In addition Indonesia has made a successful shift from military rule to

democracy and thus represents a potential model for Myanmar‟s own transition. As a result Indonesia has

consistently had access to Myanmar‟s heads of government, in particular the elusive Senior General Than

Shwe, which other countries (with the exception of China) have been unable to achieve. See Haacke, Jürgen,

“ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative?”, p. 362 and Roberts,

Christopher, p. 146 223

See Haacke, Jürgen, “ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative?”, pp.

357-385 and Roberts, Christopher, p. 91 224

Myanmar also has the highest level of intra-regional trade of any ASEAN economy. See ASEAN,

“ASEAN Economic Community Chartbook 2009” accessible at

http://www.aseansec.org/publications/AEC-Chartbook-2009.pdf, pp. 25-26, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta,

2009 and EUROSTAT, “Myanmar”, accessible at

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113423.pdf, p. 6, 19th

of July 2010 (last

accessed 16th

of September 2010) 225

See Haacke, Jürgen, “The Myanmar Imbroglio and ASEAN: heading towards the 2010 elections”, p. 153

and Haacke, Jürgen, “ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative?”, p. 352 226

Democracy promotion has also been pursued through the UN‟s “good offices”. See Than, Tin Maung

Maung, pp. 342-343 and Haacke, Jürgen, “The Myanmar Imbroglio and ASEAN: towards the 2010

elections”, p. 158

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LG27Ae02.html


http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113423.pdf


28

surprise to ASEAN, because it had received little information on its development,

indicating that the grouping is of little importance to the SPDC.227

A further insult to ASEAN occurred when the UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail

resigned, because Myanmar had continually delayed his entry into the country.228

This

event was a slap in the face for ASEAN for not only had the special envoy position been

its initiative, but Ismail had held a distinguished career in the Malaysian foreign ministry

before his UN posting. In response, ASEAN created a special research mission to

Myanmar and sent Syed Hamid Albar, then Foreign Minister of Malaysia, to assess its

progress towards democracy.229

His entry into the country was also continuously delayed

on the grounds that the government of Myanmar had pressing domestic issues – yet it was

not too busy to meet the Chinese Premier.230

When Myanmar finally allowed Syed Hamid

into the country, he was denied a meeting with Senior General Than Shwe and allowed

access only to the Prime Minister, General Thein Sein. In addition, his requests to meet

with Aung San Suu Kyi were denied, forcing him to cut his trip short.231

Initially Syed

Hamid reported that Myanmar‟s progress was satisfactory, but he later completely

overturned this statement and issued damning criticism, at the same time questioning the

SPDC‟s commitment to its democratic goals.

From 2000, ASEAN members became increasingly critical of the SPDC, putting

pressure on the association‟s adherence to the principle of non-interference.232

In 2005,

after US and EU pressure, ASEAN members successfully urged Myanmar to relinquish its

scheduled turn to hold the ASEAN chair.233

Former Thai Foreign Minister, now ASEAN

Secretary General, Surin Pitsuwan has also long held the position that Myanmar‟s failure

227

See Haacke, Jürgen, “The Myanmar imbroglio and ASEAN heading towards the 2010 elections”, p. 153

and Roberts, Christopher, p. 196. Another example of something that ASEAN were given little forewarning

about was when the SPDC decided to move Myanmar‟s capital to Naypyidaw. See Roberts, Christopher, p.

143 and Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 135. In addition Selth

notes Myanmar as the most enigmatic country in Southeast Asia as so little is known about it even by other

members of ASEAN due to government concealment and a lack of intelligence from Southeast Asian nations

and others. Selth, Andrew, “Known Knowns and Known Unknowns: Measuring Myanmar‟s Military

Capabilities”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31:2, pp. 273, 280-281, 2009. 228

As a result he had not been in Myanmar for almost two years. Roberts, Christopher, p. 146. Myanmar has

shown continuing disrespect for the UN special envoy position since the resignation of Razli, Haacke,

Jürgen, “The Myanmar Imbroglio and ASEAN: towards the 2010 elections”, p. 156 229

See Roberts, Christopher, p. 145 and Simon, Sheldon, p. 273 230

This also highlights the close relations between Myanmar and China. See Haacke, Jürgen, “The Myanmar

imbroglio and ASEAN heading towards the 2010 elections”, p. 160, Roberts, Christopher, p. 145 and

Haacke, Jürgen, “The Significance of Beijing‟s Bilateral Relations: Looking „Below‟ the Regional Level in

China-ASEAN Ties”, pp. 121-123 231

See Haacke, Jürgen, “The Myanmar imbroglio and ASEAN heading towards the 2010 elections”, p. 160

and Roberts, Christopher, p. 147 232

For instance see the ASEAN Chair‟s statement in response to the extension of Suu Kyi‟s detention last

year in which Thailand expressed its “deep disappointment” at the event. Commenting on and disapproving

of another state‟s domestic matters like this is quite at odds with the ASEAN Way. See ASEAN, “ASEAN

Chairman‟s Statement on Myanmar” accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/PR-090812-1.pdf, 11th

of August

2009 (last accessed 11th

of August 2010). Also see Simon, Sheldon, p. 273 and Roberts, Christopher, pp.

153-155 233

See Haacke, Jürgen, “The Myanmar imbroglio and ASEAN heading towards the 2010 elections”, p. 160,

Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 141 and Roberts, Christopher, pp.

124-125

http://www.aseansec.org/PR-090812-1.pdf


29

to progress towards democracy can no longer be ignored.234

In 2007 Singaporean Prime

Minister Lee Hsien Loong issued a statement criticising the SPDC‟s response to the

government protests of that year. Singapore held the ASEAN chair in that year and the

statement had been circulated to other ASEAN members before it was issued – none

disagreed with its contents.235

Finally, expelling Myanmar from the grouping has been

raised several times. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad first

suggested this course of action in 2003, though members were ambivalent.236

Then, in

2008 when ASEAN pressured Myanmar to accept foreign aid workers, Indonesia‟s

Foreign Minister issued a clear threat to his Myanmar counterpart, querying the

significance of ASEAN to Myanmar.237

This statement highlights just how frustrated

members of ASEAN have become at Myanmar‟s failure to progress towards democracy

and to respect international norms.

Through using the power of veto, Myanmar constrains the operation and

development of ASEAN, encouraging Indochinese states to do the same. This act subverts

the consensus-based decision process in which only proposals supported by all members

are adopted, though by convention members can abstain from proposals that do not affect

them so that such proposals are not held back by their disinterest. As an example, the

original draft of the ASEAN Charter included strong commitments to human rights and

democracy, incorporating the provision to create a Human Rights Council in Southeast

Asia.238

Had the original document been voted on, Myanmar would have opposed it and

used its power of veto to prevent its implementation. This situation required that the

original draft be altered to lessen its commitment to democracy and human rights.239

In a recent development, in July 2010, the Democratic Voice of Burma released a

report detailing that the SPDC had ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons.240

ASEAN

members pressured Myanmar to allow this issue to be placed on the agenda for discussion

234

Consequently, he has pressured Myanmar to accept ASEAN‟s initiatives, such as ASEAN‟s task force in

the wake of Cyclone Nargis. Roberts, Christopher, pp. 114, 194 235

ASEAN members have also supported a briefing by the UN special envoy at the EAS over progress in

Myanmar, although Myanmar refused and blocked the presentation. However, all other ASEAN members

supported individual briefings after the meeting. Roberts, Christopher, pp. 157-158 236

See Kim Beng, Phar, “Myanmar: ASEAN‟s thorn in the flesh” in Asia Times Online accessible at

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EG25Ae01.html, 25th


of

August 2010), Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 138 and Jagan,

Larry, “ASEAN Myanmar agree to disagree” 237

Roberts, Christopher, p. 192 238

See Collins, Alan, “A People Oriented ASEAN: A Door Ajar or Closed for Civil Society Organisations?”,

p. 314 and Collins, Alan, “Forming a security community: lessons from ASEAN”, p. 219 239

See Simon, Sheldon, p. 275 and Eldridge, Philip, p. 82. Collins notes that the final document was sorely

disappointing compared with the original draft. See Collins, Alan, “A People Oriented ASEAN: A Door Ajar

or Closed for Civil Society Organisations?”, p. 314 and Collins, Alan, “Forming a security community:

lessons from ASEAN”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 7, p. 219, 2007 240

See Spillus, Alex and Mcelroy, Damien, Linter, Bertil, “Deception and denials in Myanmar” in Asia

Times Online accessible at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LF30Ae01.html, 30th

of June

2010 (last accessed 11th of August 2010),Macan-Makar, Marwaan, “Myanmar‟s nuclear plans under fire” in

Asia Times Online accessible at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LG21Ae02.html, 21st of July

2010 (last accessed 11th

of August 2010), Linter, Bertil, “Myanmar‟s nuclear bombshell” in Asia Times

Online accessible at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LF05Ae01.html, 5th

of July 2010 (last

accessed 11th

of August 2010) and “North Korea Helps Burma Begin Nuclear Weapons Program” in The

Advertiser accessible at http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/breaking-news/north-korea-helps-burma-

begin-nuclear-weapons-program/story-e6frea73-1225875649482, 4th

of June 2010 (last accessed 11th

of

August 2010)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EG25Ae01.html

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LF30Ae01.html



http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/breaking-news/north-korea-helps-burma-begin-nuclear-weapons-program/story-e6frea73-1225875649482



30

in a key regional security forum during July‟s ASEAN summit. Myanmar refused and left

the Summit early, highlighting once again how little influence ASEAN has on the

regime.241

This issue is new and evolving but it undoubtedly represents another dimension

to a problem that ASEAN has struggled with for over thirteen years. Although Myanmar

has been a continuing source of instability for the region, expelling the nation would not

end the problems it creates. Dealing with a rogue member preoccupies ASEAN and

impedes its leadership of Asian regionalism, as well as discrediting ASEAN‟s operations

and effectiveness as an organisation.

The Rise of China

The rise of China - ASEAN‟s largest single trading partner in a relationship which is

growing at a rapid pace - represents the most pressing external challenge to ASEAN's

continued leadership. China is a major investor in ASEAN economies, especially in

Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. The ties are not just economic, however, and China has

excellent security relations with members of ASEAN, especially Myanmar, Thailand and

the Philippines. ASEAN relations with China give Beijing increased leverage to influence

the decisions of both individual states and the grouping as a whole. China has shown

leadership throughout the first decade of the new millennium by proposing the ASEAN-

China Free Trade Area, becoming the first great power to sign the Treaty of Amity and

Cooperation and by advocating the creation of the East Asia Summit.

In contrast to Japan and the US, China‟s regional engagement has grown in

prominence since the end of the Cold War. Asia‟s production networks have diversified

and Chinese demand for parts and components stimulates the growth of not just the

Southeast Asian economies, but those of Northeast Asia as well. China has made gains as

ASEAN economies expanded their trading and security relationships in order to lessen

their reliance on the US. 242

For example, ASEAN members which have developed

security relationships with China include the Philippines, a close US ally. After the

Mischief Reef incident of 1995, the government in the Philippines decided that closer

cooperation with China would be beneficial so the two did not come into conflict.243

Thailand, another close ally of the US, has also diversified its security relationships so that

it now exhibits almost the same level of cooperation with China as it does with the US.244

China‟s importance to Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar is even greater than other

countries in Southeast Asia.245

Beijing considers its relationships with Cambodia and

Myanmar to be “friendly” and has an important role economically in both countries plus

Laos. China is helping the Laotian government develop hydroelectric capability, and

241

Macan-Makar, Marwaan, “Myanmar‟s nuclear plans under fire”, Jagan, Larry, “ASEAN Myanmar agree

to disagree” 242

See Wang, Vincent Wei-Cheng, pp. 26, 31 and Chirathivat, Suthiphand and Mallikamas, Sothitorn, p. 83,

Ba, Alice, “The Politics and Economics of “East Asia” in China-ASEAN Relations”, pp. 172/178 243

Haacke, Jürgen, “The Significance of Beijing‟s Bilateral Relations: Looking „Below‟ the Regional Level

in China-ASEAN ties”, p. 129 244

On the close relationship between Bangkok and Beijing, see: Haacke, Jürgen, “The Significance of

Beijing‟s Bilateral Relations: Looking „Below‟ the Regional Level in China-ASEAN ties”, p. 118-120 and

Stewart-Fox, Martin, pp. 204-205 245

More accurately it is the tense nature of Sino-Vietnamese relations that make Vietnam more independent

of China than the other land based states of Southeast Asia, with relations having been on the verge of

conflict numerous times since the Cold War. Simon, Sheldon, p. 277


31

provides infrastructure investment to Cambodia.246

China also promotes Chinese language

and cultural study in these and other ASEAN countries.247

Myanmar‟s relationship with

China is the closest of the three countries and in the early 1990s, China provided military

equipment and technical assistance that helped modernise the Tatmadaw. China also

helped fund and construct a modern naval base and surveillance stations in the Bay of

Bengal for the junta, in return for intelligence sharing.248

China is Myanmar‟s second

largest trading partner, and its largest source of investment, money which has been used to

develop Myanmar‟s oil and gas fields and other infrastructure. The Chinese leadership has

also been one of the few in the world to meet consistently with Senior General Than

Shwe.249

ASEAN states had been concerned that the rise of China would make their

economies reliant on Chinese imports because their local industries would be unable to

compete. This situation has not eventuated and ASEAN states now recognise China as

opportunity for growth.250

Furthermore, the positive feelings in ASEAN states towards

Beijing are a dramatic shift from the suspicion and distrust that existed in most member

governments at the end of the Cold War. This shift towards increased interaction and

positive feeling towards China disrupts the balance and distance that ASEAN has

previously sought in its relations with the great powers.

ASEAN may have avoided over-reliance on Chinese imports, but the economic

health of ASEAN members is reliant on their exports to China. This situation allows China

to have greater and growing influence over ASEAN, especially if the organisation fails to

produce a unified stance on issues. Unified outcomes within ASEAN may also be more

difficult to achieve if ASEAN members begin to view their relationships with China as

more important than their commitment to ASEAN. Myanmar is an example of this

situation because of China‟s support and the ideological kinship shared by the two states.

The result of this increased influence is that China has been able to take the

political lead in the region since the new millennium. Evidence for China‟s influence is in

Beijing effectively dictating the means by which free trade would be achieved in Asia

when it proposed the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area in 2001. Other proposals from

Japan, South Korea and the US rapidly followed to link individual trading partners to

ASEAN. Notably, it was not ASEAN or a member state that took the initiative to propose

this development, but Beijing. China‟s influence and appropriation of regional practices

are also prominent through its signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Other

246


Level in China-ASEAN Ties”, pp. 126-127, Heng, Yee-Kuang, “Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the

softest of them all? Evaluating Japanese and Chinese strategies in the „soft‟ power era”, International

Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 10, p. 298, 2010 and Ciorciari, John, p. 171 247

Heng, Yee-Kuang, p. 285 248

See Takano, Takeshi, p. 23, Ganesan, N., Myanmar‟s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World”, p.

37 and Haacke, Jürgen, “The Significance of Beijing‟s Bilateral Relations: Looking „Below‟ the Regional

Level in China-ASEAN ties”, p. 123 249

Roberts, Christopher, pp. 93, 95-96, 145 250


Level in China-ASEAN Ties”, p. 113 and Chirathivat, Suthiphand and Mallikamas, Sothitorn, “The Potential

Outcomes of China-ASEAN FTA: Politico-Economic Implications for Participating Countries” in Ho, Khai

Leong and Ku, Samuel (eds), China and Southeast Asia, p. 82, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

Singapore, 2005


32

important political actors have since followed suit, such as India (2003), Japan and Russia

(2004) and the US and EU (2009).251

Conclusion: ASEAN-led Regionalism - for how much longer?

Despite the scepticism that surrounds its record, ASEAN has been a remarkably successful

organisation which, in forty three years of life, has come a long way from the founding

group of five underdeveloped countries.252

At the beginning of the 1990s ASEAN member

economies were performing strongly; ASEAN had developed its unique set of norms; and

the Cold War ended allowing ASEAN to make progress on its economic goals and enlarge

its membership. In response to regional consolidation in North America and Europe,

ASEAN created the ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1992.253

Over the course of the 1990s,

ASEAN expanded its membership to include the Indochinese states and Myanmar –

though the latter was highly controversial. ASEAN‟s enlargement brought new challenges

in integrating four much less developed states, but this did not slow regional progress.

ASEAN norms also began to spread – for instance, when APEC utilised consensus-based

decision making along with informal dialogue processes and the spirit of “voluntarism”.

Economically, various free trade agreements have linked single trading partners with

ASEAN as a whole, creating a hub and spokes system centred on the grouping.

ASEAN leads the region, not in the traditional and full sense of leadership, but

because its norms and practices are at the core of all East Asian and Asia-Pacific

groupings. This is made possible by ASEAN being the most consolidated and developed

grouping in the region. Its early development of the ASEAN Way is its biggest asset and it

has succeeded in imparting these to all major regional groupings. It is for this reason that

regionalism in Asia has been and continues to be ASEAN-led. This leadership is also

made possible because of divisiveness among the great powers, which remain important to

all states in the region. Tension in relationships between Japan, the US and China have

enabled ASEAN to take the political lead, because it provides a framework by which states

in Asia can interact peacefully.

ASEAN‟s leadership is under pressure, however, since it shall last only so long as

it remains cohesive and unified, and the great powers remain divided. ASEAN‟s continued

division over the issue of Myanmar leaves it vulnerable because it is discredited as an

organisation and preoccupied with its consequences. At the same time, ASEAN‟s efforts to

keep all great powers equidistant from the organisation are beginning to unravel. China

continues to make strong relationships and gain influence, repeatedly at the expense of the

US and Japan. This situation will only lead to China becoming more influential in shaping

the region and though ASEAN‟s norms may remain, their application, change and other

regional initiatives will be determined by China, not ASEAN. The inclusion of India,

Australia and New Zealand in the East Asia Summit was the result of the recognition of

this problem by ASEAN, but Malaysia, a key ASEAN-6 member, opposed this expansion

– highlighting that differences threaten its policies, even amongst its core members. As a

result, ASEAN-led regionalism is in doubt, its unity endangered, and Asia‟s first, single,

great power leader in centuries is poised on the edge of regional hegemony. 251

ASEAN, “Table of ASEAN Treaties/Agreements and Ratification” accessible at

http://www.aseansec.org/Ratification.pdf, pp. 5-6, 47, June 2010 (last accessed 18th

of September 2010) 252

Severino, Rodolfo, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, p. 4, Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies, Singapore, 2006 253

The creation and expansion of the EU, the signing and implementation of NAFTA, and the birth of the

APEC process which was feared to perhaps end in ASEAN‟s redundancy.

http://www.aseansec.org/Ratification.pdf


33

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Journal Articles

Acharya, Amitav and Tan, See Seng, “Betwixt balance and community: America, ASEAN and the

security of Southeast Asia”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 6, pp. 37-59, 2006

Ba, Alice, “Systemic Neglect? A Reconsideration of US-Southeast Asia Policy”, Contemporary

Southeast Asia, 31:3, pp. 369-398, 2009

Beeson, Mark, “Geopolitics and the Making of Regions: The Fall and Rise of Asia”, Political

Studies, 57, pp. 498-516, 2009

Bisley, Nick, “Securing the “Anchor of Regional Stability”? The Transformation of the US-Japan

Alliance and East Asian Security”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:1, pp. 73-98, 2008

Cheng, Joseph, “Sino-ASEAN Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century”, Contemporary


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