ASEAN and Its Security Offspring: Facing New Challenges

8/6/2019 ASEAN and Its Security Offspring: Facing New Challenges

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ASEAN AND ITS SECURITY OFFSPRING:FACING NEW CHALLENGES

Sheldon W. Simon

August 2007

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FOREWORD

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) is celebrating its 40th anniversary this year.Uniting the 10 major mainland and insular SoutheastAsian states, ASEAN has also established formal linksto Northeast Asia (ASEAN+3), as well as to the worldat large (ASEAN Regional Forum). It is appropriate atthis time to take stock of ASEAN and project its future.How effectively have ASEAN and its organizationaloffspring functioned as a security community? Havethe Associations members been able to aggregatetheir security interests? Have they presented a unitedsecurity front to other states? Do they collaborate toresolve internal security problems and protect oneanother against external security challenges?

In this monograph, Professor Sheldon Simon, whohas written on Asian security for over 40 years, arguesthat ASEAN is pursuing an engagement strategy inthe 21st century, bringing the great powers (the UnitedStates, China, India, Japan, and the European Union)into Southeast Asias political and economic discussions.While these large deliberative arrangements provideregular opportunities to keep one another informed ofintentions, they have been too unwieldy to effect majorchanges in political and economic relations. For theUnited States, ASEAN-dominated organizations havetaken second place to Washingtons bilateral ties toSoutheast Asia, particularly with respect to Indonesia,Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Nevertheless,ASEANs symbolic importance to the United States

was acknowledged in the summer of 2006 when boththe State Department and Congress announced thatWashington planned to appoint an ambassador to


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the association. Americas future multilateral securityrelationships with Asia must take a more active ASEAN

into account.The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer

this monograph as part of its efforts to help U.S.military and defense leaders understand the key rolethat Southeast Asia-centered organizations are playingin Asian security.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

SHELDON SIMON is Professor of Political Science andFaculty Associate of the Center for Asian Research atArizona State University where he has been a facultymember for over 30 years. He is also senior advisor toThe National Bureau of Asian Research (Seattle andWashington, DC). A specialist on Asian internationalpolitics, Dr. Simon is the author or editor of nine booksand some 130 scholarly articles and book chapters. Hismost recent books are edited volumes: The Many Facesof Asian Security (2001) and Religion and Conict in Southand Southeast Asia: Disrupting Violence (2007).


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SUMMARY

In its 40 years of existence, the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has played wellabove its collective weight in world politics, thoughits reputation for effective diplomacy was seriouslytarnished by an inability to resolve the regions 1997-98 nancial crisis and other political challenges in the1990s, including East Timors secession from Indonesia,annual forest re haze from Indonesian Borneo thatcreates a regional public health hazard, and the 1997Cambodian coup that overturned an ASEAN-endorsedelection. The primary explanation for ASEANs politicalweakness has been its attachment to the principle ofnoninterference in its members domestic affairs. Muchof ASEANs political effort in the early 21st century is

devoted to overcoming this weakness.The primary impetuses for ASEAN moving

beyond sovereignty protection are transnationalchallenges, particularly terrorism, the exploitation ofocean resources, and maritime security, all of whichrequire international cooperation. Secessionists fromsouthern Thailand and the southern Philippines eeto northern Malaysia and Borneo respectively; illegalarms trafcking moves from Cambodia and Thailandto insular Southeast Asia; and radical Islamists goback and forth between Indonesia and the Philippines.Porous borders, suspicious border guards, inadequatecoast guards, and armed forces that rarely collaboratebeyond bilateral exercises are all counterproductivewith respect to transnational challenges.

ASEAN states are attempting to overcome thesedecits. Trilateral maritime cooperation in the MalaccaStrait by its littoral members (Singapore, Malaysia,


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Indonesia) to patrol for pirates and terrorists receivestechnical assistance from Japan and the United States.

Anti-terrorist collaboration has expanded throughASEAN states law enforcement and intelligencecommunities, with signicant technical supportand training from the United States and Australia.Moreover, in 2007 ASEAN tabled a draft charter thatalters the associations noninterference principle and,for the rst time, promotes democracy as a regionalgoal.

On broader security matters, ASEAN declaredSoutheast Asia to be a nuclear weapons free zone viatreaty in 1995. Concerned about nuclear weaponsproliferation in Northeast and South Asia, ASEANdesired to separate itself from the nuclear standoffs ofits Asian neighbors. Moreover, ASEAN sees the nuclearfree zone treaty to be an extension of its 1976 Treaty

of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) that prohibits theuse of force in settling international disputes. Signingthe TAC has become the prerequisite for joiningAsias latest security discussion forum, the East AsiaSummit (EAS) which held its rst annual meeting inDecember 2005. Inspired by ASEAN and its NortheastAsian partners (the Republic of Korea [ROK], Japan,and China), India, Australia, and New Zealand havealso joined, but so far not the United States. Some inWashington are concerned that ratifying the TACcould limit U.S. military actions in the Pacic, thoughthe treatys advocates point out that Americas closestAsian alliesJapan, the ROK, and Australiaare EASmembers and do not believe their security obligationstoward the United States have been jeopardized.

Asias largest security discussion body is theASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) consisting of all EastAsian states, the European Union, the United States,


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and Canada. While the great powers dominate ARFdiscussions, its structure and procedures are modeled

on ASEANs. Both ASEAN and the ARF emphasizesecurity transparency such as the publication ofnational white papers on defense that include bothorder of battle and doctrine. The ARF looks forward topreventive diplomacy and even conict resolutionthough neither of these future action categories has beenimplemented. The ARF has attained some success inanti-terrorist collaboration involving terrorist nancesand the sharing of information among national nancialintelligence units.

Given ASEAN and ARF deciencies, it is notsurprising that the United States continues to relyprimarily on bilateral security relationships in SoutheastAsia. Nevertheless, with the creation of the EASand ASEAN negotiating a new charter that includes

designating the association a Security Community,Washington would be wise to rethink its multilateraldiplomacy. ASEAN, the ARF, and the EAS could wellbecome prominent political and economic actors inthe 21st century. The United States should not let thisparade pass it by.


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ASEAN AND ITS SECURITY OFFSPRING:FACING NEW CHALLENGES

Until the Asian nancial crisis of 1997-98, theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) wasgenerally considered the most successful multinationalpolitical organization among developing countriesin the world.1 ASEANs international reputation wasburnished in the 1980s by its ability to keep the UnitedNations (UN) focused on the necessity of repellingVietnams invasion and occupation of Cambodia.Hanois subsequent withdrawalthough achievedbecause of the Chinese-Soviet rapprochementwasseen as a major ASEAN victory. ASEAN also arrangedannual meetings between the Association and thegreat powers (the United States, China, Japan, and

the European Union [EU]) to discuss an agenda ofpolitical, economic, and security issues generated bythe Southeast Asian states.

This record of Southeast Asian states playingwell above their collective weights in global politicsapparently came to an end in the late 1990s due to aseries of regional challenges to which ASEAN hasbeen unable to respond effectively. These includedthe regions nancial crisis; the Indonesian-generatedforest re haze that periodically blankets Singapore,Malaysia, and the southern Philippines; the upheavaland elections in East Timor leading to its independence;and the 1997 Cambodian coup that overturned theresults of a UN-sponsored and ASEAN-endorsedelection. All of these created what the late Michael Leifer

called a clear failure of regional cooperation andhave led to a crisis of regional identity and credibilitywithin ASEAN.2


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Nor has ASEAN been of help in resolving persistentsubregional tensions, including the Thai-Burmese

confrontation over the latters drug trafcking andallegations by Rangoon that Thailand providessanctuary for Burmas Karen minority, which isghting to create a separate homeland; Thai concernsabout support from northern Malaysia to separatists insouthern Thailand, some of whom seek to unite withtheir Malay brethren across the Malaysian border;discord between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta overhundreds of thousands of illegal Indonesian workersseeking jobs in Malaysia and a similar problem withillegal Philippine laborers in Sabah; and the ongoingsaga over the future of the Spratly Islands, whereChina, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines,and Brunei contest ownership and sometimes seizeeach others shing boats for alleged maritime territory

violations.The primary reason for ASEANs inability to deal

effectively with these issues is its normative attachmentto the principle of noninterference. If regionalism is to bemore than a process of multilateral policy coordinationand negotiation of competing stakeholder interests,then a sense of collective intersubjective identity amongthe regions members is required. ASEAN has not yetachieved this identity, though efforts have been madein the middle of this decade to overcome this obstacle.A proposed new ASEAN charter would modify thenoninterference norm.3

From its inception in 1967, ASEAN embedded anoninterference norm that stipulated consultation,consensus, and noninterference with respect to its

members internal affairs, as well as any disagreementswith each other. The consensus requirement reassuredmembers that sovereignty would remain inviolate,


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and the domination of the sovereignty principle meantthat serious differences among members would be

deferred to defuse conict. Thus, ASEANs approachesto conict were not geared to external threats butrather to helping its members achieve regime securityvis--vis their neighbors through condence-buildingvia consultations. This soft security approachhas contrasted sharply with U.S. bilateral securityarrangements in Asia, which are geared exclusively toexternal threats.4

Already weakened by the nancial crisis and thechallenges listed above, Southeast Asia now has to copewith the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), world. Thoughnational responses varied, generally the region has gonethrough four stages: initially shock and sympathy, thenconcern and anger over the U.S. wars in Afghanistanand Iraq because both are Muslim countries. Anger at

the American invasion of Afghanistan was followedby a third stage, discovery of a major bomb plot inSingapore (January 2002) and the signing of a U.S.ASEAN antiterrorist agreement in August 2002. Finally,there were the October 2002 and August 2003 Bali andJakarta Marriott bombingsthe worst terrorist acts inthe regions history, which killed over 200 people andheralded unprecedented cooperation among regionaland foreign law enforcement agencies in SoutheastAsia. This new cooperation was reinforced by the 2004bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta and asecond bombing in Bali in 2005.5

Paradoxically, the terrorist challenge may provideASEAN with an opportunity to restore cohesionand create a new security agenda, similar to the

opportunity that emerged with Vietnams occupationof Cambodia in the 1980s. Of course, the nature of thethreat is different. Instead of a heavily armed state,


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today the threat is from individuals in relatively smallgroups operating transnationally that endanger an

entire region, requiring governments to cooperateon a priority basis if the threat is to be suppressed.Whether ASEAN is up to this challenge remains tobe seen. Clearly, the noninterference norm must berevisited, as the terrorist challenge necessitates regionalcollaboration in suppressing terrorist cells that operatetransnationally.

Meanwhile, bilateral strife within SoutheastAsia continues. Anti-Thai riots in Cambodia in early2003, which led to the razing of the Thai Embassy,constitute a dramatic example of persistent historicalanimosities lying below the surface of common ASEANmembership. Cambodias delays in creating a tribunalto deal with the former Khmer Rouge leaders andthe countrys endemic corruption keep foreign loans,

grants, and investments at bay and mire the countryin poverty. There are rising tensions along Indonesiasland border with Malaysia in Borneo. Followingthe World Courts ruling in December 2002 that thedisputed islands of Sipadan and Ligatan belonged toMalaysia, Jakarta is looking for ways to guarantee itssovereignty over other disputed islands and to protectits vast maritime boundaries from smugglers, poachers,and pirates. Given its minimal navy, however, thatmay be impossible.

Indonesia and the Philippines resent Malaysiasexpulsion of illegal foreign workers in order to freeup more jobs for Malays. Malaysia has rekindledanimosities with Singapore over water arrangements,contested islands (as their navies monitor each other)

and competing port facilities for international maritimecommerce. In 2005-06, tensions arose between Thailandand Malaysia over southern Thai Muslim separatists of


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Malay ethnicity who may cross into northern Malaysiato escape the Thai army and police.6

In light of bilateral tensions within ASEAN, theAssociations apparently meager ability to deal withcurrent regional challenges including Indonesianforest res, separatist movements in Indonesia, thePhilippines, and southern Thailand, transnationalarms smuggling, illegal population movements, drugtrafcking, and terrorism, the question arises: Whithersecurity regionalism? The remainder of this monographis devoted to assessing whether there are signicantroles for ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) in meeting these challenges and how otherregional arrangements are being created to ll thegaps. While it would be fair to say neither ASEAN northe ARF are leading efforts to resolve the challengeslisted above, neither are they irrelevant. The questions

for their future effectiveness focus on the structurallimits to their capabilities and identifying the normsthat might enhance their roles in conict resolution.

ASEAN: HAS EXPANSION LEDTO THE PETER PRINCIPLE?

If the ve original members of ASEANMalaysia,Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesiacollaborating since the Associations 1967 inception,remain suspicious of each other and wary of multilateralcooperation, how has expansion to all 10 SoutheastAsian states affected the organizations cohesion?Unsurprisingly, this development has had a negativeimpact. In economic affairs, a two-tier system has been

created whereby progress toward an ASEAN FreeTrade Area (AFTA) posed one set of deadlines for therst six members (2003) and an indenite delay for the


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four newest members (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, andBurma), though 2010 is the target date. With respect to

security, when law enforcement investigations revealedthat terrorists moved readily among several ASEANstates because of visa-free travel, porous borders, andcorrupt immigration ofcials, ASEAN has done little toremedy the situation.7 Intra-ASEAN differences overthe long-standing norm of noninterference are difcultto overcome, even when all members face a commonthreat.

The peaceful settlement of international disputesis a core ASEAN norm. However, ASEAN expansionimposes new security burdens arising from unsettledmaritime boundaries and overlapping maritimeexclusive economic zones (EEZs). Thai-Vietnamese,Vietnamese-Cambodian, and Thai-Burmese territorialdisputes challenge the ASEAN non-use-of-force norm

embodied in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation(TAC). For example, Thai and Burmese forces clashsporadically over ethnic minority insurgents alongtheir common border, as well as Burma-based drugtrafcking. Whether ASEANs new members can besocialized into the interpersonal and informal wayin which the Association copes with its differencesremains to be seen.8

Equally problematic is the visibility of the non-use-of-force norm. While no ASEAN membercontemplates outright war with its neighbors, regionalarms buildups are nevertheless conducted, with an eyetoward maintaining a balance with ASEAN partners.Intra-ASEAN military cooperation, therefore, is at besttentative. Even Malaysias suggestion for establishing

an ASEAN peacekeeping force based on the experienceof several ASEAN states armed forces in Cambodia,East Timor, and the Balkans, were shelved, partly


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because it might be seen as an attempt to turn ASEANinto a military alliance and partly because it would be

impolitic to insert such a force into an intra-ASEANconict. Practical considerations also stymie ASEANmilitary cooperation, since weapons systems arepurchased from so many different national suppliersthat interoperability would be problematic.9

An important ASEAN principle with respectto the war on terror is that no member will providesanctuary or support to groups bent on underminingthe government of an ASEAN state. While noASEAN government supports subversion against aneighbor, governments have been unwilling or moreprobably unable to suppress groups that take refugewithin their borders. Thai separatists ee to northernMalaysia; large numbers of Karen are located insidethe Thai northern border; Philippine Moros are found

in Malaysian Borneo; and Jemmah Islamiya (JI) cells,which target several ASEAN states, are entrenchedin parts of Indonesia despite Jakartas efforts atdisruption. Moreover, JI recruits continue to train insouthern Philippine camps run by the Abu Sayyaf, aterrorist group linked to JI.

The ASEAN Way of emphasizing quietdiplomacy, nonconfrontation, and noninterferencein domestic affairs has been supplemented (if notreplaced) since 9/11 and the Bali and Jakarta bombingsby more proactive measures. Visa-free travel is beingreconsidered among ASEAN states. At the November2001 ASEAN summit, a Declaration of Joint Actionto Counter Terrorism was adopted. Subsequently, inAugust 2002, a U.S.-ASEAN declaration to counter

terror was also endorsed. While these declarationscertainly acknowledge the ASEAN-wide challenge,much remains to be done. In May 2002, the ASEAN


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states agreed on an action plan that provided forenhanced cooperation in intelligence-sharing and the

coordination of antiterror laws. Singapores proposalthat each member form a special antiterrorist teamas a contact point was also accepted.10 However, theASEAN states remain slow to ratify 12 key antiterroristconventions, especially the treaty suppressing terroristnances. Nevertheless, a breakthrough may haveoccurred at the January 2007 ASEAN summit thatagreed on an ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism.While all ASEAN leaders signed off on the Convention,it still must be ratied by each member statea processthat could take years.

ASEAN members could consider modest steps toharden their borders against the transnational ow ofterrorists, their weapons, and their funds. Backgroundchecks for visas constitute one measure, though they

may delay freedom of movement and commerce withinASEAN. Training immigration ofcials in detectingforged documents is another. Passing legislationrequiring closer scrutiny of corporate accounts wouldbring the ASEAN states in line with the antimoneylaundering standards of the Financial Action TaskForce. (Singapore is the only ASEAN state that iscurrently a member of this organization.) In spring of2003, Thailand and the Philippines passed antimoneylaundering legislation. However, enforcement will bekey to their effectiveness.

Maritime policing is another woefully inadequatearea among ASEAN states. A favorite route for illicitarms trafc goes from southern Thailand westwardacross the northern Strait of Malacca to Aceh, as

well as across the South China Sea to Sabah and thesouthern Philippines.11 Collaboration among thelittoral navies and coast guards, especially in the Strait


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of Malacca, is difcult. Hot pursuit of pirates has beenhampered by the requirement that the pursuing state

obtain permission in each instance from the countryinto whose waters the pirates ee. In 2004-05, the threestates that straddle the Malacca Straits (Indonesia,Malaysia, and Singapore) began to mount coordinatednaval patrols as well as joint air patrols over the straitswith one military ofcer from each country on boardmaritime patrol aircraft. However, the patrols are notjoint endeavors in that each countrys ships may onlyoperate in its own maritime territory and must hand offany pursuit if a suspect vessel crosses into a neighborswaters.12 Although terrorist groups so far have nothijacked ships, one can imagine the devastation causedif a liqueed natural gas (LNG) tanker were seized andblown up in the Strait of Malacca. Maritime insurancerates would skyrocket.13 In addition to augmented

U.S. Seventh Fleet patrols in the Malacca Strait, U.S.and Japanese coast guards could engage selectedASEAN navies in antipiracy exercises and provideintelligence on suspicious activities in the MalaccaStrait and its approaches. During 2000, India alsodeployed a destroyer to help escort high-value vesselsthrough the strait.14 And in 2006, Japan promised toprovide equipment, ships, and training as part of itscollaboration with ASEAN on counterterrorism andmaritime security.

In January 2003, ASEAN police forces meeting inJakarta not long after the Bali bombings proposed anantiterrorism task force for each country to strengthenregional antiterrorist collaboration. The modelwould be the cooperation that takes place between

the Indonesian National Police and the police forcesof other countries to arrest the perpetrators of terrorand uncover their networks in the region. Malaysia


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and Indonesia argued that national legislationshould be passed in each country to make terrorism

an extraditable offense. Singapore balked, however,pointing to the different legal systems within ASEAN,though Singapores primary concern is probably thesafety of large numbers of wealthy ethnic Chinese whoed from Indonesia to Singapore in the wake of anti-Chinese riots in 1998.15 A blanket extradition treatyamong ASEAN states could lead Indonesia to claimthat its ethnic Chinese citizens in Singapore committedeconomic crimes by eeing with their resources.16

Other issues on ASEANs table include the U.S. warin Iraq, the SARS epidemic, and Avian u. The Iraq warsplit the Associationwith Singapore, the Philippines,and, to a smaller degree, Thailand backing Washington,while Malaysia, Indonesia, and other ASEAN stateseither condemned U.S. actions or remained silent. The

Philippines was among 30 countries openly backing theU.S. invasion and hence well positioned, so it believed,to obtain some reconstruction contracts in medicaland educational domains. With respect to post-warreconstruction, Malaysia and Indonesia share the viewthat the UN should be given the major role.

Another hopeful sign with respect to reconsiderationof ASEANs noninterference norm has been theAssociations discussion of the Burmese military juntasrearrest of opposition leader and Nobel laureate AungSun Suu Kyi. At its June 2003 annual ministerial meetingin Cambodia, ASEAN broke with its longstandingpolicy of not interfering in the internal affairs of memberstates by demanding Suu Kyis release. MalaysianPrime Minister Mahathir summarized the members

dismay when he stated: We dont criticize membersstates unless what one state does embarrasses us. . . .[W]hat they have done has affected us, our credibility.Because of that, we have raised our voices.


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Mahathir went on to say that even Burmas expulsionfrom ASEAN was a possibility, since ASEAN has a right

to demand standards of behavior from its members.Mahathirs comments were particularly effective,since Malaysia had been instrumental in pushing forBurmas 1997 ASEAN admission in the face of strongobjections from critics of the military regime. Expulsionmay be a hollow threat, however, because there are noASEAN provisions for excluding a state once it hasmembership. Moreover, unlike the United States andthe EU, which have imposed economic and politicalrestrictions on Burma, neither ASEAN nor Chinathejuntas primary economic partnersare willing to doso. Nevertheless, in 2006, ASEAN members persuadedBurma to forgo its scheduled chairmanship of theAssociation so as not to alienate the Associations EUand American partners.

At the January 2007 ASEAN summit, a draftASEAN Charter was introduced which, if ratied byits members, would alter the Associations bedrocknoninterference principle. The Charter promotesdemocracy and paves the way for ASEAN sanctionspossibly including expulsionagainst countries suchas Burma that Western governments as well as someASEAN states have condemned for political repressionand human rights violations.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:THE PATH NOT TAKEN17

Unlike several of its neighbors to the north (Chinaand North Korea) and the west (India and Pakistan),

the 10 Southeast Asian States that comprise ASEANhave not chosen to acquire nuclear weapons eventhough several are considering nuclear plants for


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electric power generation in the future.18 Not only havethe ASEAN states foregone nuclear weapons, but they

have also formalized their self-abnegation in a 1995treaty titled the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons FreeZone (SEANWFZ). Concerned from the beginning withmaintaining as much regional autonomy as possiblefrom the great power conicts that generally roiledAsia, the ASEAN states devised a declaration in 1971stating Southeast Asia to be a Zone of Peace, Freedom,and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). ZOPFAN constitutes theframework in which Southeast Asia declares itself tobe free of nuclear weapons.

ZOPFAN: Appealing to the Great Powers.

As small and medium states with minimalcapabilities to defend their territories, sea, and air

spaces from more powerful outsidersyet alsodependent for their prosperity on internationalcommerceSoutheast Asian states needed to devise adoctrine that would convince external powers that thelatters interests were best served by not attemptingto dominate the region. Defensive arrangements byoutsiders with Southeast Asian states, for example,U.S. treaties with the Philippines and Thailand and theFive Power Defense Arrangement among the UnitedKingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia,and Singapore, were tolerated because they predatedZOPFAN and because they were useful insurancepolicies during the Cold War against possible Soviet orChinese designs on the region. Another, less apparent,purpose of ZOPFAN was to reassure ASEAN members

themselves that no state would ally with an outsider tothreaten another ASEAN member. ZOPFAN becamea device to ensure that Southeast Asian security


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would primarily be the responsibility of the regionsoccupants.

From its genesis, ZOPFAN was a reaction totwo contested visions for Southeast Asian security.Malaysia proposed that the great powers (the UnitedStates, Russia, and China) together guarantee theregions neutrality. Indonesia, however, opposed thatplan and countered that the Southeast Asian statesthemselves bear the sole responsibility for the regionssecurity. Jakarta was concerned primarily aboutChina, and Kuala Lumpur ultimately acquiesced.The Indonesian neutrality plan was also acceptable toThailand, Singapore, and the Philippines because it wassufciently vague that a continued American balancingpresence was tacitly accepted.19 This arrangementhas persisted to the present day. So have Indonesiassuspicions of great power intentions.

Nevertheless, Indonesia and other ASEAN stateshave modied ZOPFANs meaning over the years toaccept the fact that outside powers will be involvedin Southeast Asia via trade, investment, and even amilitary presence. Therefore, Indonesia now speaks ofa balance of interests when Singapore offered navalfacilities to the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the early 1990s afterthe Philippines declined to renew the Philippine basesarrangement. ZOPFAN now means the maintenanceof strategic equilibrium: the U.S. presence balances theChinese occupation of some of the Spratly Islands.20Underlying all of this, however, is the premise that theSoutheast Asian states themselves are the managersof their own security even if that means that externalpowers are invited to contribute to a regional power

balance. Nevertheless, critics of ZOPFAN argue thatit is toothless, that Southeast Asian states have nocapability (or intention) of enforcing it by excluding any


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great power presence, and that the concept requires nochange in existing security arrangements with external

powersall Western states.21

SEANFWZ: ZOPFAN for the 21st Century?

At the top of todays global security agenda isthe prevention of the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction (WMD), chief among which are, ofcourse, nuclear weapons. In the post-Cold War world,ZOPFANs original purposeto keep Southeast Asiaout of the Cold Warhas expired. In fact, China,Japan, and the United States are all currently involvedin regional security affairs. A Southeast Asia NuclearWeapon-Free Zone was originally broached duringthe Cold War in the 1980s but was dismissed by theUnited States as a one-sided rejection of U.S. military

deployments in Southeast Asia since the Soviet Unionwould still be able to deploy from Vietnam.

The SEANWFZ Treaty was not reintroduced untilDecember 1995, once again sponsored by Indonesia asa building block to ZOPFAN. In a sense, it was alreadytoo late because the ARF established a year earlier hadinstitutionalized the participation of external actors inSoutheast Asian security. Nevertheless, the SEANWFZTreaty obligated ASEAN members not to develop,manufacture, or otherwise acquire, possess or havecontrol over nuclear weapons. Nor are the signatoriesto allow other states to use ASEAN territories in anyway for their nuclear weapons.22

ASEANs revitalization of a nuclear weapons freezone constituted a way of maintaining the initiative

in regional security after the Cambodian conict hadbeen resolved. It also reected a 1992 ASEAN decisionformally to include security issues on ASEANs


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agenda. Moreover, ASEAN was concerned that nuclearproliferation not spill over from either Northeast Asia

or South Asia. This apprehension was particularlysalient because of Chinas claims in the South ChinaSea.

SEANWFZ is, however, of little interest to nuclearweapons-possessing states. The Southeast Asian statesare not involved in the great power standoffs thatcharacterize Northeast Asia (China, North Korea, Japan, and the United States) and South Asia (India,Pakistan). Rather, SEANWFZ focuses internallyon ASEANs own members, another example ofreassurance of peaceful intentions toward one another.SEANWFZ is an extension of the 1976 Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation that requires its signatories torenounce the use of force in their relations with eachother. Many states have subsequently acceded to the

TAC, including China, Japan, Russia, Australia, NewZealand, and Indiathough not yet the United States.Acceptance of the TAC is a requisite for membershipin Asias newest political-security initiative, the EastAsia Summit (EAS).

Meanwhile, the ARFin which the United Statesholds membershiphas become involved in WMDnonproliferation. Fearing the probable connectionbetween international terrorist organizations and theillegal movement of WMD, in 2004 the ARF issued aStatement on Non-Proliferation, calling for regionaldialogue and cooperation to deal with this seriouschallenge and threat to international security.23

With respect to these concerns, China has indicateda willingness to adhere to SEANWFZ. If other nuclear

weapons states, particularly the United States, followedsuit, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) wouldbenet because SEANWFZ would limit American


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maneuverability in a region that Beijing considers to beits natural sphere of inuence. However, Washington

is loath to agree to any arrangement that would limitthe deployment of its ballistic missile submarines, andSEANWFZ includes not only the territories of SoutheastAsian states but also their continental shelves and 200-mile economic exclusion zones (EEZs). Nonetheless,Washington has assured Southeast Asian states thatthey are protected from nuclear threats by nuclearweapons states because of commitments made underthe Non-Proliferation Treaty that gives assurancesagainst the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclearweapons states. Moreover, the SEANWFZ is furtherweakened by a provision that permits any memberto decide for itself whether a nuclear weapon statesships and aircraft may visit a Southeast Asian statesterritory.24 In actuality, then, SEANWFZ places very

few constraints on the military deployments of nuclearweapon states in Southeast Asia if the Southeast Asianstate involved is willing to accept these deploymentsperhaps on a neither conrm nor deny basis. Theprimary orientation of the treaty is internal to SoutheastAsia and follows earlier self-abnegation commitmentsfound in the TAC.

Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons.

Although several Southeast Asian states areconsidering the construction of nuclear energy powerplants to meet growing electricity requirements,their nuclear weapons implications depend on acombination of capabilities and intentions. With respect

to the former, weaponization potential depends onthe types of nuclear reactors being sought for powergeneration. If light water reactors are purchased,


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then the prospect for the creation of weapons gradeplutonium as a byproduct is very limited. Moreover, as

SEANWFZ signatories as well as adherents to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, ASEAN members are prohibitedfrom acquiring nuclear weapons, and their civiliannuclear power facilities would be open to InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection. Moreover,the pace of nuclear energy developments in SoutheastAsia is also constrained by a lack of indigenous trainedscientists and engineers to operate nuclear powerplants.25

There appears to have been only one case of SoutheastAsian involvement in the proliferation of nuclearweapons components, a Malaysian companyScomiOil and Gas. In October 2003, Scomi was exposed aspart of the black market nuclear proliferation networkrun by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khanthe father of

Pakistans nuclear weapons program. The Malaysiancompanywhose majority shareholder was the son ofprime minister Abdullah Badawihad manufacturedand shipped high quality centrifuge componentsdestined for Libya. Centrifuges are a vital part ofthe process for creating highly enriched uranium,essential for nuclear weapons. When the centrifugeparts were seized under the U.S.-led ProliferationSecurity Initiative (PSI), both Scomi and the Malaysiangovernment claimed ignorance about the ultimate useof the centrifuge components, noting that they couldbe employed in a variety of ways that had nothing todo with nuclear weapons. A high level U.S. ofcialdismissed the Malaysian explanation, however, sayingit was unlikely that Scomi was unaware of their

weapons-related purposes since such a large numberhad been manufactured. Nevertheless, Mr. Abdullahwas exonerated because he had purchased Scomi shares


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long after the centrifuge transactions had occurred,and both the company and the Malaysian government

cooperated with the multination investigation andclosure of the A. Q. Khan network.26

Southeast Asia and Nonproliferation Activities.

In various ways, Southeast Asian states areparticipating in nonproliferation activities. OnlySingapore is a formal PSI participant, a coalition of70 countries many of whom exercise together for thepurpose of interdicting illegal shipments of WMD. In June 2006, Indonesian Defense Minister Sudarsonoannounced to U.S. Defense Secretary DonaldRumsfeld that Jakarta would study the Initiative.However, a month later, another high level IndonesianDepartment of Defense (DoD) ofcial stated that his

country would not be involved for the time being.The Director General of Defense Strategy General DadiSusanto demurred that we have found several aspectsof the PSI which contradict . . . the United NationsConvention on the Law of the Sea. . . . Susanto wasreferring to possible PSI interference with Indonesias jurisdiction within its EEZ and its own archipelago.Jakarta has insisted that antipiracy patrolsthat couldalso serve an antiterrorist functionmust remain theexclusive responsibility of the three littoral states,Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. If user states suchas the United States, India, and other countries wantto participate, according to Indonesias Naval Chief ofStaff Admiral Soebijanto, they can provide us withintelligence and equipment. The only other Southeast

Asian state to cooperate with PSI is Thailand, which,although not yet a signatory, agreed in February 2006 tocooperate with PSI-participating countries. Thailands


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potential participation is important because the countryhas been a transshipment point for cargo destined for

North Korea. Interestingly, according to Denny Roy,China has also expressed interest in the PSI as long as itis carried out within the scope of international law andin line with the relevant principles of the UN Charter.However, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs wenton to state: We have reservations concerning forcibleinterceptionan important operational procedure ifPSI is to be effective.27

A new Asian antipiracy agreement that includesNortheast and Southeast Asian states (one againwith implicit antiterrorist applications) took effect inSeptember 2006. Maritime intelligence sharing will becoordinated by a center in Singapore. Earlier in mid-February 2006, the United States convened a meetingin California of countries using the Malacca strait to

see if an agreement could be reached on how to assistthe littoral states in ensuring the safety and security ofthe sea passage. The meeting discussed navigationalaids and communication systems that would probablybe acceptable to Indonesia and Malaysia. However, theprospect of more direct security involvement by usernavies remains unacceptable.28

Coordinated antipiracy patrols among Singapore,Malaysia, and Indonesia that could be extended to theinterdiction of WMD components have been in effectsince July 2004. The three littoral states have hot linearrangements among their navies and coast guards,as well as bilateral pursuit arrangements (discussedabove). There is also an air patrol phase known asEyes in the Sky. The U.S. Pacic Fleet has initiated

a naval counterterrorist exercise with SoutheastAsian states. India also offered to share its navalexpertise for antipiracy cooperation at the June 2006


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Shangri La conference of Asian defense ofcials inSingapore.29 Although there are a number of ongoing

antipiracy arrangements in Southeast Asia, it shouldbe remembered that these are designed to deter andapprehend maritime crime. They do not yet dealspecically with countering the shipment of WMDmaterials, though that task could be added if the statesagreed.

THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM:IS THE TAIL WAGGING THE DOG?

Just as ASEAN faces security problems thatchallenge nonintervention and sovereignty norms, sothe ARF now confronts region-wide issues that makeconsensus difcult to achieve. The ARF emergedfrom ASEAN in the 1990s. The end of the Cold War

left the Asia-Pacic searching for a new organizingprinciple for security. While traditional alliancesremained, including bilateral treaties with the UnitedStates and the Five Power Defense Arrangement,these seemed inadequate to deal with security mattersof a nonmilitary nature, such as transnational crime,environmental hazards, and illegal populationmovements.30 Moreover, traditional security issuespersisted in the form of unresolved territorial disputes,divided states, nuclear weapons proliferation, andconicting maritime jurisdictions resulting fromthe 1982 UN Law of the Sea, all of which have beenaddressed in discussion but not resolved.

Some kind of cooperative security enterprise linkingthe region to its major partners in Northeast Asia and

North America was needed to ll the gap. Throughthe 1976 TAC, ASEAN members had already pledgedamong themselves to resolve intra-ASEAN disputes


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peacefully (or postpone their resolution). Underlyingthis vision of a larger security order was the hope that

the treatys peaceful resolution commitment could beextended to other states. This practice would constitutea kind of minimal diffuse reciprocity. That is, whileASEAN would not expect outsiders automaticallyto come to members aid in times of crisis or cometo their defense if attacked, at least outside countriescould be asked to renounce the use of force in settlingany conicts they might have with the Associationsmembers. The unstated object of these concerns, ofcourse, is Chinathe only extra-regional state withterritorial claims in Southeast Asia. This is essentiallya realist vision of the ARF. If successful, it wouldencourage the PRC to explain and clarify its securitypolicy and planning. Chinas neighbors, through theARF, could then respond with their concerns about

the PRCs policy, in hopes of modifying it and thusenhancing regional stability. In exchange for PRCtransparency, other ARF members would reciprocate.For Beijing, the primary payoff would not be accessto ASEAN defense plans, but rather to those of othermembers, such as Japan and the United States.

Fortunately for ASEAN, no exclusive NortheastAsian efforts were made to create a subregionalcounterpart to ASEAN although the Six Party Talksdealing with North Korean nuclear weapons couldevolve in that direction. In effect, ASEAN was ableto ll this vacuum by offering to create a new region-wide entity modeled on the Associations process ofconsultation and dialogue. Because this approach fellwell short of collective defense, it was not threatening

to any potential adherent. Nor would a new regionalforum interfere with individual states security links tooutsiders.


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Purposefully imitative of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), the ARF objective was

to develop a predictable and constructive pattern ofrelationships in the Asia-Pacic, providing the wholeregion with opportunities for ASEAN-style dialogue.By themselves, the PMCs were viewed by NortheastAsians as insufcient for broad discussion of theirsubregions concerns on issues such as competitivearming, maritime exclusive economic zone rules,and the roles of China and Japan. Although ASEANunderstood that these issues needed to be addressed,the Association also desired to create a body that wouldacknowledge ASEANs institutional status as primusinter pares. The ARF achieved this goal by ensuring thatASEAN states would be the venue for the ARFs annualmeetings; that ASEAN would dominate the agenda;that intersession study groups, each composed of two

states, would always include an ASEAN member; andthat the ASEAN consensus principle would prevail inARF decisions.

By its second meeting, the ARF agreed on athree-stage progression toward comprehensivesecurity in Asia, which would move from condence-building to preventive diplomacy, and nally onto the development of mechanisms for conictresolution. The development of these mechanisms wassubsequently renamed elaboration of approachesto conict out of deference to Chinas concern thatconict resolution could be interpreted as justifyingthe ARFs interference in members internal affairs.ASEAN PMCs, senior ofcers meetings (SOMs)and ARF workshops have generated a cornucopia of

transparency possibilitiesthat is, the discussion ofsecurity intentions. Both ASEAN and the ARF agreethat security transparency is a prerequisite for more


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sophisticated preventive diplomacy and conictresolution. Condence-building measures (CBMs)

that have been raised in ASEAN-related gatheringsinclude notication of military exercises, hotlinesamong political and military leaders, extension of theRussian-U.S. Incidents-at-sea Agreement to the entireAsia-Pacic, and regional maritime, air surveillance,and safety regimes. These measures all fall within thetrust and condence-building category as dened bythe ARF.31

The ARF has conducted an extensive securitydialogue over the years encompassing human rightsin Burma, problems on the Korean Peninsula, theSouth China Sea islands, WMD proliferation, andthe implications of ballistic missile defense (BMD)deployments. The ARF has called for support of theNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and ratication of

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It also addressestransnational security issues, especially piracy andillegal migration, as well as narcotics and small armstrafcking. These plenary discussions and intersessionalmeetings have had some practical results: annualdefense policy statements and increased publication ofDefense White Papers, which contribute to transparency;military exchanges at the staff college level; growinginvolvement and participation of defense ofcials inARF deliberations; and the creation of an ARF Registerof Experts/Eminent Persons who can be called uponby ARF members in conict situations.32 However, theARF has no secretariat to provide continuity or engagein staff studies between its annual plenary discussions,special meetings, or intersessional group conclaves.

Nevertheless, recently, in 2006, the ASEAN Secretariatagreed to provide administrative support for ARFactivities.


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While the ARF has turned from exclusivelycondence-building to the next stage of preventive

diplomacy, the transition is difcult. Chinas reticence,as well as some other members, reects a concernthat basic national security issues, such as the futureof Taiwan, not be subject to ARF deliberations. Bycontrast, Canada, Australia, Japan, and the UnitedStates would like to see ARF strengthened. The UnitedStates particularly hopes that the ARF will serve as anantiterror cooperative mechanism. However, the ARFsconsensus rule, adopted from ASEAN, has proven aserious obstacle to managing tensions that arise fromthe divergent strategic interests of ARF members.33

The ASEAN overlay on ARF procedures hasprovoked resentment among some participants,particularly South Korea, which believes that ASEANsproprietary attitude has constrained any Northeast

Asia dialogue within the forum. Moreover, even thenumerous condence-building measures implementedby the ARF are mainly declarations of transparency thatdo not involve constraints on behavior. For example,there may be discussions among defense ofcials,but no agreement, on refraining from adding certainkinds of weapons into national arsenals. Nor can theARF discuss intrastate conicts because of Chineseobjections.34

While Washington did not expect the ARF to bean action-oriented security organization, after 9/11,the United States has urged the ARF to become moreinvolved in devising ways to actively combat terrorism,such as shutting down terrorist nances through ARFtransnational crime agreements. Another possibility

would be to expand ARF undertakings on search-and-rescue operations to include simulating a shiphijacking in the Strait of Malacca that would require


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practical cooperation among littoral navies to rescuehostages.35 Singapores December 2003 participation in

the U.S.-led multilateral PSI could be an initial step inthat direction. Designed to stop the transfer of WMD tostates of concern and terrorists, participating naviesare simulating the cooperative interdiction of suspectships.

To its credit, the ARF laid out an agenda for itsmembers to block terrorist nances at its July 2002Brunei summit, urging members to implement UNmeasures, which include blocking terrorists accessto national nancial systems, freezing terroristsnancial assets, publicizing terrorist organizationswhose assets have been seized, and creating nationalnancial intelligence units to share information.These exhortations are exemplary, but they are notmandatory. There is no enforcement mechanism nor

any sanctions against ARF members who choose notto comply.36 Moreover, the ARF consensus principleobstructs joint agreements. This obstacle could beovercome if the ARF adopted an ASEAN procedureused to bypass a similar constraint. Called the ASEANMinus X understanding, it permits a coalition ofthe willingwhereby those states that agree on aprinciple may proceed, while those that do not mayrefrain from participation.

OTHER FORMS OF REGIONAL SECURITYCOOPERATION

While ASEAN and the ARF are the primaryAsian regional security institutions, they are by no

means the only ways in which Southeast Asian statesengage in multilateral security cooperation. Interstatesecurity cooperation takes place in both bilateral and


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multilateral arrangements outside of the ASEAN andARF frameworks. The terrorist challenges posed by al

Qaida, JI, and other groups that transfer personnel,weapons, money and information across SoutheastAsias borders require a coordinated response amongthose states most affected. Intelligence sharing isparticularly important, since captured JI members haveprovided authorities with useful information leadingto further arrests or the discovery of new plots.

Several Southeast Asian states have increasedantiterrorist cooperation with one another. Intelligenceorganizations in Malaysia, Singapore, and thePhilippines, are exchanging information about regionalterrorist groups, as well as with U.S. intelligenceagencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).Nevertheless, constraints still exist. In February 2003,Indonesian security ofcials arrested Mas Salamat

Kastori, the alleged leader of JI in Singapore, based oninformation provided by the Singaporean government.Because the two countries have no extradition treaty,however, Indonesian authorities planned to try MasSalamat on a false passport charge, rather than extraditehim to Singapore to face more serious allegations.37

In May 2002, a Southeast Asian antiterror pact wasinitialed by the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, towhich Thailand and Cambodia subsequently adhered.The pact was activated in the aftermath of the Davaobombings, when Philippine ofcials claimed thatIndonesian nationals were involved in collaborationwith elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF), all of whom had trained in terrorist campsin North Cotobato.38 Similarly, Thai authorities have

acknowledged that JI members met in southernThailand in January 2002, where a decision was madeto attack soft targets in the region, such as nightclubsand restaurants.39


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Possible linkages between the Bali and Davaobombings have led to intelligence and police

cooperation among Malaysia, Indonesia, and thePhilippines. Manila insists that the MILF is responsiblefor the Davao and other recent Mindanao attacks,although MILF leaders deny the allegations. It seemslikely that some rogue MILF splinter groups may beamong the perpetrators, but there is little evidence tosuggest that the MILF leadership, who are negotiatingwith the Philippine government to resolve their conictin Mindanao, are directing terrorist actions. Joinedby Thailand and Cambodia, the ve adherents to theSoutheast Asia antiterror pact agreed at a January2003 gathering in Manila that they would establish acommunication protocol to ght terror, piracy, moneylaundering, smuggling, and gun running. Whetherthese plans will facilitate collaboration among

law enforcement authorities in the countries mostsusceptible to terrorist movements and actions remainsto be seen, although Malaysian authorities have statedthat they are regularly exchanging intelligence withIndonesia and the Philippines.40

Unsurprisingly, the most effective form of SoutheastAsian security cooperation continues to be bilateral andfocused on specic problems. Malaysian armed forcesare patrolling waters between Sabah and the southernPhilippines to interdict MILF militants eeing Manilascrackdown. Australian police have been credited byIndonesia with providing the technical assistanceneeded to intercept cellular phone conversations, whichled to the apprehension of many of the Bali bombers.41

Piracy is a continuing challenge in Southeast Asia,

the possible marriage of piracy with terrorism causesconsiderable worry for the region. The deep waterchannels in Malacca and a number of Indonesian straits


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are so narrow that a single burning supertanker andits spreading oil slick could block the route for other

tankers. Moreover, in these narrow straits, there maynot even be enough room for naval escorts to screentankers from attacks by small, fast craft.42

While Japan has proposed a regional coast guardto combat piracy, national sensitivities in the littoralstates inhibit any broader collaboration. ManySoutheast Asian countries are unwilling to prosecutepirates apprehended in their territorial waters foracts committed in other countries jurisdictions. Mostoften, pirates are deported rather than prosecuted.Furthermore, since boundaries have not yet beendrawn in some parts of the Malacca/Singapore straits,jurisdiction over piracy is unclear.43 Nevertheless, bothSingapore and Malaysia are upgrading their air forcespartly to enhance antipiracy, antiterrorist, and illegal

immigration patrols. Both countries are acquiring air-to-air refueling aircraft, and Singapore has manufacturedits own unmanned aerial vehicle to extend surveillanceover waters surrounding the island city-state. Malaysiahas also produced its own reconnaissance aircraft, theEagle, which is to be deployed in Sabah for coastalpatrols.44

There were a signicant number of attacks ontankers in the Malacca Strait in 2003, though theseseemed to be piracy rather than terrorism; however,from 2005-2006, piracy has signicantly declined in theStrait of Malacca.45 Hijacked tugboats could be usedfor terrorism, drug trafcking, or human smuggling.Taking these possibilities into account, Singaporerequires tugboats to provide 6 hours advance notice

before coming into port; and all small vessels havebeen prohibited from entering the special anchoragesdesignated for chemical, oil, and LNG carriers.46 In


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2005-06, the three littoral statesSingapore, Indonesia,and Malaysiaformed a coordinated sea and air

antipiracy patrol arrangement for the Malacca Straitthat seems to be effective. It is the rst such trilateraleffort in Southeast Asia.

CONCLUSION

Most Southeast Asians believe their security is bestmaintained in the early 21st century not by isolatingthe region from great power activities, as originallyenvisaged in the 1970s Zone of Peace Freedom andNeutrality, but rather by engaging them in multilateralendeavors, such as the ASEAN post-ministerialconferences, ASEAN Plus Three, and the ARF. Whilethese measures were initially directed toward keepingChina and the United States involved in assuring the

regions security, ASEAN also welcomes participationby India and Japan.

India and Japan have exchanged high-level visitswith virtually every Southeast Asian state. ASEANmembers welcome Indias efforts to strengthen tieswith Burma as a way of balancing Chinas inuence.Also, India is involved in the ASEAN PMC. AlthoughDelhi has not been able to turn ASEAN Plus Three intoASEAN Plus Four, it has been accepted into the ARFand the new East Asian Summit.

For the United States, ASEAN and the ARFsecurity deciencies are not a signicant drawback.Washingtons security strategy in East Asia continuesto rely on bilateral relations and has developed a mix ofbilateral and multilateral endeavors in Southeast Asia.

In the war against terror, the strongest bilateral tie iswith the Philippines where U.S. military assistance andtraining, now in their 8th year, are designed to enhance


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the Philippine armed forces ability to suppress theAbu Sayyaf group in Mindanao.

On the multilateral dimension, little has beenaccomplished because neither ASEAN nor the ARF havebeen willing to tackle the core security issues affectingthe region, be they external support for insurgencies,major refugee ows, or disputes over sovereignty ofislands. Inclusive memberships in both organizationsand the ASEAN consensus principle work againsttheir security effectiveness.47 Thus, Washingtons onlymultilateral initiative in Southeast Asia is quite modest:the offer to fund a regional antiterrorism training centerin Malaysia, which would focus on law enforcementand intelligence exchange, but not involve militarytraining. As Stephen Leong of Malaysias Instituteof Strategic and International Studies said, not onlywould the center show that ASEAN was involved in

the antiterror struggle, but it will also help to boost thecondence for foreigners who want to invest or travelin the region especially after the Bali bombing. Morerecently, the United States seems to be paying greaterattention politically to ASEAN, when in the summer of2006, Washington announced that it would appoint anambassador to ASEAN as an organization, though noone has been appointed to that ofce by early 2007.48

Security regionalism in Southeast Asia remains,therefore, a weak reed. Absence of interoperabilityamong the regions armed forces, embedded suspicionsabout neighbors motivations, and an unwillingnessor inability to set up effective arrangements to copewith transnational challenges all tend to move securitycooperation by default to the bilateralor at most

trilaterallevel where more effective collaborationexists. This principle appears equally true for U.S.security arrangements in Southeast Asia. Bilateral


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military exercises and bilateral antiterrorist and lawenforcement collaboration dominate. Multilateral

exercises, such as Cobra Gold in Thailand, whilevalued, are viewed by Southeast Asians as less usefulthan bilateral security links to the United States.49 Thereis no evidence that this situation will change.

ENDNOTES

1. ASEAN members are Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,

Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, andBurma. East Timor, which seceded from Indonesia in 1999, is notyet a member.

2. Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Peace Process: A CategoryMistake, Pacic Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1999, p. 37.

3. Lorraine Elliott, ASEAN and Environmental Cooperation:Norms, Interests, and Identity, Pacic Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2003,pp. 30-31; and Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International

Relations of Southeast Asia, Singapore: Oxford University Press,2000. For the changes proposed for a new ASEAN Charter, seethe ASEAN December 2006 Summit documents.

4. Rajshree Jetly, Conict Management Strategies in ASEAN:Perspectives for SAARC, The Pacic Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2003,p. 55. Also see Amitav Acharya, Competing and CongruentApproaches to Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacic Region: AConcept Paper, unpublished paper, Singapore 2002.

5. Nayan Chanda, Southeast Asia After September 11, inRobert Hathaway and Wilson Lee, eds., George W. Bush and Asia:A Midterm Assessment, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centerfor Scholars, 2003, pp. 118-119.

6. A good review of Southeast Asias bilateral conicts can befound in Southeast AsiaSecurity, stratfor.com, February 12,2003.

7. Chanda, Southeast Asia After September 11, p. 129.

8. Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community inSoutheast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, NewYork: Routledge, 2001, p. 121.


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9. Sheldon W. Simon, Asian Armed Forces: Internal andExternal Tasks and Capabilities, in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., TheMany Faces of Asian Security, New York: Rowman and Littleeld,2001, pp. 49-40. Also see Archarya, Constructing a SecurityCommunity in Southeast Asia, pp. 150-151.

10. The Straits Times, Singapore, May 18, 2002; and RobertKarniol, A Total Defence, Janes Defence Weekly, August 28,2002. p. 25.

11. Kumar Ramakrishna, Applying the U.S. National SecurityStrategy for Countering Terrorism to Southeast Asia, paperprepared for the Institute for National Strategic Studies, U.S.

Institute of Peace Workshop on Terrorisms New Front Lines:Adapting U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy To Regions of Concern,Washington, DC, May 8-9, 2003, pp. 7-9.

12. Sheldon W. Simon, Southeast Asias Defense Needs:Change or Continuity? in Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills,eds., Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era ofUncertainty, Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005,p. 277.

13. Authors discussion with a high-ranking U.S. naval ofcerat the Institute of National Strategic Studies, U.S. Institute of PeaceWorkshop on Terrorisms New Front Lines, May 8, 2003.

14. See the discussion in Sheldon W. Simon, Theater SecurityCooperation in the U.S. Pacic Command: An Assessment andProjection, NBR Analysis, August 2003.

15. See ASEAN Police to Set Up Antiterrorism Task Force,news release by the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, January 22,

2003.16. Andrew Tan, Terrorism in Singapore: Threat and

Implications.

17. This section is adapted from a paper delivered by theauthor to a workshop sponsored by The National Bureau of AsianResearch and the U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC,October 2, 2006.

18. The National Bureau of Asian Research, The Prospects

for Civilian Nuclear Programs in Southeast Asia, unpublishedBackground Paper, August 2006, p. 2.

19. Yeung Foong Khong, Michael Leifer and the Prerequisitesof Regional Order in Southeast Asia, in Joseph Liao and Ralf


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Emmers, eds., Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memoryof Michael Leifer, London: Routledge, 2006, pp. 33-34.

20. Leonard Sebastian, Domestic Security Priorities, Balanceof Interests, and Indonesias Management of Regional Order, inibid., pp. 185-189.

21. Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Powerin ASEAN and the ARF, London: Routledge Curzon, 2003, p. 69.For a critique, see Donald Weatherbee, International Relations inSoutheast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, Boulder, CO: Rowmanand Littleeld, 2005, pp. 70-71.

22. Quoted in Bates Gill, Proliferation: the Challenge ofProliferation in Asia, in Richard Ellings and Aaron Friedbergwith Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2003-04: Fragility and Crisis,Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004, p. 385. Alsosee M. C. Abad, Jr., A Nuclear Weapons Free Southeast Asia andIts Continuing Strategic Signicance, Contemporary SoutheastAsia, Vol. 27, No. 2, August 2005, pp. 170-171.

23. Quoted in Abad, A Nuclear Weapon Free Southeast Asia,p. 178.

24. Ibid., pp. 178, 180, 181.

25. See the discussion in NBR, The Prospects for CivilianNuclear Programs in Southeast Asia.

26. This discussion of Scomi and centrifuges is drawn fromSheldon W. Simon, Southeast Asia: Back to the Future? in AshleyTellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2004-05: ConfrontingTerrorism in the Pursuit of Power, Seattle: The National Bureau ofAsian Research, 2004, pp. 273-274.

27. Kompas, Jakarta, July 4, 2006;Antara (Internet Version) June9, 2006: Thailand Attends PSI Meetings, in International ExportControl Observer, Monterey Institute of International Studies,April 2006, p. 20; and Denny Roy, Lukewarm Partner: ChineseSupport for U.S. Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia, Honolulu:Asia-Pacic Center for Security Studies, March 2006. p. 4.

28. The new Asian antipiracy arrangement is described in aBangkok Post editorial, July 5, 2006; and Sam Bateman, Burden

Sharing in the Straits: Not so Straightforward, IDSS Commentaries,Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, March 20,2006.


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29. For more details on these antipiracy arrangements, seeSheldon W. Simon, U.S. Emphasizes Security and Trade Interestsin Southeast Asia . . ., Comparative Connections: An E-Journal ofEast Asian Bilateral Relations, Honolulu: Pacic Forum/CSIS,April-June 2006.

30. This new security agenda is explored in Sheldon W. Simon,ed., The Many Faces of Asian Security, Boulder, CO: Rowman andLittleeld, 2001.

31. Trevor Findlay, The Regional Security Outlook, inGary Klintworth, ed., Asia-Pacic Security: Less Uncertainty, NewOpportunities, New York: St. Martins Press, 1998, pp. 275-292.

32. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Partnership for Peace in Asia:ASEAN, the ARF, and the United Nations, Contemporary SoutheastAsia, Vol. 24, No. 3, December 2002, pp. 536-537.

33. See Seng Tan et al.,A New Agenda for the ASEAN RegionalForum, Singapore: Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies,2002, pp. 14-15.

34. Ibid., pp. 32, 35.

35. Ibid., pp. 43, 48, 66.36.ARF Statement Against Terrorist Financing,July 30, 2002.

37. Mark Manyin et al., Terrorism in Southeast Asia, Washington,DC: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, March26, 2003, pp. 16-17.

38. AFP, Hong Kong, April 8, 2003, in Foreign BroadcastInformation Service (FBIS), Daily Report-East Asia, April 9, 2003.

39. AFP, Hong Kong, December 26, 2002, in FBIS Daily Report-

East Asia, December 27, 2002.

40. AFP, Hong Kong, January 16, April 28, and May 16, 2003,in FBIS Daily Report-East Asia,January 19, April 29, and May 19,2003, respectively, as well as the Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 10,2003, in FBIS Daily Report-East Asia, April 11, 2003.

41. Bernama, Kuala Lumpur, March 13, 2003, in FBIS DailyReport-East Asia, March 17, 2003; and AFP, Hong Kong, May 7,2003, in FBIS Daily Report-East Asia, May 8, 2003.

42. Neela Banerjee and Keith Bradsher, A Vulnerable Time tobe Moving Oil by Sea, The New York Times, October 19, 2002.


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43. Mark Valencia, Southeast Asia Piracy Runs Rampant;Coastal States at Loggerheads over Protection, Washington Times,June 4, 2001.

44. Regional Worries Speed Singapore-Malaysia Arms Race,stratfor.com, August 23, 2002.

45. Nick Brown, Report Reveals Decline in Piracy, JanesDefence Weekly, January 31, 2007, p. 5.

46. Keith Bradsher, Attacks on Chemical Ships in SoutheastAsia Seem to be Piracy, not Terror, New York Times, March 27,2003.

47. John Garfano, Power, Institutions, and the ASEANRegional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?Asian Survey,Vol. 42, No. 3, May/June, 2002, p. 520.

48. Sheldon W. Simon, U.S.-Southeast Asian Relations: U.S.Strengthens Ties to Southeast Asian Regionalism, ComparativeConnections: An E-Journal of East Asian Bilateral Relations, Honolulu:Pacic Forum/CSIS, July-September 2006.

49. Sheldon W. Simon, Theater Security Cooperation in the

U.S. Pacic Command: An Assessment and Projection, NBRAnalysis, August 2003.

ASEAN and Its Security Offspring: Facing New Challenges

Documents

Transcript of ASEAN and Its Security Offspring: Facing New Challenges