Strategies forSustainability:Latin AmericaArturo Lopez Ornat, Editor

The World Conservation Union Earthscan Publications Ltd., London

Strategies forSustainability

Latin America

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IUCN: The World Conservation UnionFounded in 1948, The World Conservation Union brings together states, government agencies and a diverse

range of non-governmental organizations in a unique world partnership. IUCN has over 800 members in all,

spread across some 125 countries.

As a Union, IUCN seeks to influence, encourage and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the

integrity and diversity of nature and ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and ecologically

sustainable. A central Secretariat coordinates the IUCN programme and serves the Union membership,

representing their views on the world stage and providing them with the strategies, services, scientific

knowledge and technical support they need to achieve their goals. Through its six commissions, IUCN draws

together over 6000 expert volunteers in project teams and action groups, focusing in particular on species and

biodiversity conservation and management of habitats and natural resources. The Union has helped many

countries prepare National Conservation Strategies and demonstrates the application of its knowledge

through the field projects it supervises. Operations are increasingly decentralized and are carried forward by

an expanding network of regional and national offices, located principally in developing countries.

IUCN builds on the strength of its members, networks and partners to enhance their capacity and support

global alliances to safeguard natural resources at local, regional and international levels.

The Strategies for Sustainability Programme of IUCN

Based on the principles of the World Conservation Strategy and Caring for the Earth 1, IUCN supports the

preparation and implementation of strategies for sustainability in response to requests from governments,

communities and NGOs. The Strategies for Sustainability Programme of the IUCN Secretariat and the

Working Group on Strategies of the IUCN Commission on Environmental Strategy and Planning (CESP)

assist those involved in strategies through a programme aimed at:

• undertaking conceptual development and exchange and analysis of experience concerning strategies

throughout the world;

• carrying out demonstration and testing of key elements, tools and methodologies in strategies;

• building regional networks of strategy practitioners; and

• strengthening local capacity by engaging the networks in conceptual development, exchange and analysis

of experience, and demonstration activities.

The programme draws on experience with all types of strategies regardless of their sources of support.

Working group members include practitioners in national conservation strategies (NCSs), national environ-

mental action plans (NEAPs), Biodiversity Action Plans, Forestry Action Plans (FAPs), and a wide range of

provincial (state) and local strategies.

1. IUCN, UNEP and WWF (1991). Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living. Earthscan Publications, London.

Strategies forSustainability

Latin America

Arturo Lopez Ornat, Editor

Strategies for Sustainability Programme

The World Conservation Union Earthscan Publications Ltd., London

Strategies for Sustainability: Latin America was made possible by the generoussupport of the Swedish International Development Authority, the InternationalDevelopment Resource Centre (IDRC) and the Swiss Agency for DevelopmentCooperation (SDC).

Published by: Earthscan Publications, in association with IUCN (1996)

Copyright: (1996) International Union for the Conservation of Nature andNatural Resources

Reproduction of this publication for educational or other non-commercialpurposes is authorized without prior permission from the copyright holder.Reproduction for sale or other commercial purposes is prohibited without theprior written permission of the copyright holder.

Citation: Lopez Ornat, Arturo, Editor (1996). Strategies for Sustainability:Latin America. IUCN

ISBN: 1 85383 272 3

Design: Patricia Halladay

Available from: Earthscan Publications, 120 Pentonville Road, London, N1 9JN, UKIUCN Publications Services Unit, 219c Huntingdon Road, Cambridge,United Kingdom, CB3 0DL orIUCN Communications and Corporate Relations Division, Rue Mauverney 28CH-1196 Gland, Switzerland

The view of the authors expressed in this book, and the presentation of thematerial, do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part ofIUCN concerning the legal status of any country, territory or area of itsauthorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.IUCN disclaims any errors or omissions in the translation from the originalSpanish.

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o n t e n t sContents

Preface ........................................................................................................... ixAcknowledgements ........................................................................................ xiWorkshop and Case Study Participants ........................................................ xii

PART 1: INTRODUCTION1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 32 What are Sustainable Development Strategies? ............................................... 33 Types of Strategies in Latin America ............................................................... 44 Selecting and Classifying Cases ....................................................................... 45 Status of Strategies .......................................................................................... 5

Table 1 Status of cases analysed (1995) ........................................................ 6Box 1 Symbols used in Table 1 ................................................................. 7

National Strategies: Summary1 Origin and Present Situation .......................................................................... 82 Development of Processes .............................................................................. 83 Main Results .................................................................................................. 9

Sub-national Strategies: Summary and Analysis1 Origin of Initiatives ...................................................................................... 112 Common Aspects ......................................................................................... 123 Integrating Strategies in Development Planning ........................................... 124 Formulating the Strategy .............................................................................. 145 Content of Proposals .................................................................................... 156 Internalizing Strategies: The Importance of Participation ............................. 167 Prospects for Continuity............................................................................... 188 International Funding and Cooperation ....................................................... 219 Limitations of the Analysis ........................................................................... 2210 Main Common Results ................................................................................ 2211 Main Problems ............................................................................................. 23

Lessons Learned1 The Concept ................................................................................................ 252 Avoiding Loss of Continuity ........................................................................ 273 Participation ................................................................................................. 304 Implementation of Strategies ........................................................................ 31

Map Strategies for Sustainability in Latin America ................................ 33

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a PART 2: CASE STUDIES

CENTRAL AMERICACosta Rica: Strategy for Sustainable Development1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 392 Scope and Objectives .................................................................................... 403 Relationship to Development Planning ........................................................ 414 Initial Development ..................................................................................... 425 Implementation and Results ......................................................................... 436 Lessons Learned............................................................................................ 447 Chronology .................................................................................................. 46

Nicaragua: National Conservation Strategy1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 472 Objectives and Approach .............................................................................. 483 Relationship to Development Planning ........................................................ 494 Initial Development ..................................................................................... 495 Implementation and Results ......................................................................... 506 Lessons Learned............................................................................................ 517 Chronology .................................................................................................. 52

Kuna-Yala, Panama: Sustainability for Comprehensive Development1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 532 Objectives and Approach .............................................................................. 543 Relationship to Development Planning ........................................................ 554 Initial Development ..................................................................................... 555 Implementation and Results ......................................................................... 566 Lessons Learned............................................................................................ 577 Chronology .................................................................................................. 59

Majé-Bayano, Panama: Sustainable Development Strategy1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 602 Scope and Objectives .................................................................................... 613 Relationship to the Planning System ............................................................ 614 Initial Development ..................................................................................... 615 Implementation and Results ......................................................................... 626 Lessons Learned............................................................................................ 627 Chronology .................................................................................................. 64

Petén Region, Guatemala: Sustainable Development Strategy1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 652 Scope and Objectives .................................................................................... 663 Relationship to National Institutions ............................................................ 674 Initial Development ..................................................................................... 685 Implementation and Results ......................................................................... 686 Lessons Learned............................................................................................ 697 Chronology .................................................................................................. 71

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o n t e n t sTortuguero, Costa Rica: Sustainable Development Strategy1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 722 Objectives and Focus .................................................................................... 753 Relationship to Development Planning ........................................................ 764 Initial Development and Organization ......................................................... 765 Implementation and Results ......................................................................... 786 Lessons Learned............................................................................................ 817 Chronology .................................................................................................. 84

Héroes y Mártires: Management Plan1 Introduction and Summary .......................................................................... 862 Scope and Objectives .................................................................................... 873 Relationship to National Institutions ............................................................ 884 Initial Development ..................................................................................... 885 Implementation and Results ......................................................................... 896 Lessons Learned............................................................................................ 907 Chronology .................................................................................................. 92

Talamanca, Costa Rica: Communal Sustainable Development Projects1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 932 Scope and Objectives .................................................................................... 943 Relationship to Development Planning ........................................................ 954 Main results .................................................................................................. 955 Lessons Learned............................................................................................ 967 Chronology .................................................................................................. 97

CARIBBEANGuanica Biosphere Reserve, Puerto Rico: Conservation Strategy1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 1012 Objectives and Approach ............................................................................ 1023 Relationship to Development Planning ...................................................... 1034 Initial Development ................................................................................... 1035 Implementation and Results ....................................................................... 1036 Lessons Learned.......................................................................................... 1047 Chronology ................................................................................................ 105

Samaná, Dominican Republic: Sustainable Development Strategy1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 1062 Objectives and Approach ............................................................................ 1073 Relationship to Development Planning ...................................................... 1084 Initial Development ................................................................................... 1085 Implementation and Results ....................................................................... 1096 Lessons Learned.......................................................................................... 1097 Chronology ................................................................................................ 111

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a Sierra Maestra, Cuba: Conservation and Development Strategy1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 1122 Objectives and Approach ............................................................................ 1133 Relationship to Development Planning ...................................................... 1144 Initial Development ................................................................................... 1155 Implementation and Results ....................................................................... 1176 Lessons Learned.......................................................................................... 1187 Chronology ................................................................................................ 120

SOUTH AMERICAAmazonia Project, Ecuador: Sustainable Development Strategy1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 1252 Objectives and Approach ............................................................................ 1273 Relationship to Development Planning ...................................................... 1274 Initial Development ................................................................................... 1275 Implementation and Results ....................................................................... 1286 Lessons Learned.......................................................................................... 1297 Chronology ................................................................................................ 130

Sierra Nevada, Colombia: Conservation Strategy for Tropical Forests1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 1312 Scope and Objectives .................................................................................. 1343 Relationship to Development Planning ...................................................... 1344 Initial Development ................................................................................... 1355 Implementation and Results ....................................................................... 1356 Lessons Learned.......................................................................................... 1367 Chronology ................................................................................................ 137

Mata Atlántica, Brazil: Biosphere Reserve1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 1382 Objectives and Approach ............................................................................ 1393 Relationship to Government Planning ....................................................... 1404 Initial Development ................................................................................... 1405 Implementation and Results ....................................................................... 1426 Lessons Learned.......................................................................................... 1437 Chronology ................................................................................................ 145

Tambopata-Candamo, Peru: Eco-regional Strategy1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 1462 Objectives and Approach ............................................................................ 1473 Relationship to Development Planning ...................................................... 1484 Initial Development ................................................................................... 1495 Implementation and Results ....................................................................... 1506 Lessons Learned.......................................................................................... 1527 Chronology ................................................................................................ 154

Glossary ............................................................................................................ 155

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Preface

This publication is part of an IUCN series of Regional Reviews of Strategies for Sustain-ability covering Asia, Africa and Latin America. The series is devoted to an analysis oflessons learned in multi-sectoral strategies at national, provincial and local levels. It is ajoint effort by the Strategies for Sustainability Programme of the World ConservationUnion (IUCN) and its Commission on Environmental Strategy and Planning (CESP). Itwas carried out in cooperation with other organizations such as the World Bank, TheUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The International Institute forEnvironment and Development (IIED) and The World Resources Institute (WRI) toassemble and analyze experience with strategies, and use this information to improvefuture strategy development and implementation.

Each volume consists of a status report that summarizes the status of strategies in theregion, a synthesis of case studies, and individual case studies of selected strategies. Thereview attempts to cover only a sample of the region’s strategies, recognizing that reviewssuch as this can never capture all the experiences that a region has to offer. The informa-tion presented here is up to date at the time the case studies were compiled (July 1993 –March 1995).

The case studies are not intended to be evaluations. They are analytical histories ofstrategies, providing a summary of basic information and lessons learned that has notbefore been readily available.

The case studies were prepared by members of the IUCN/CESP Working Group ofStrategies for Sustainability and staff of the IUCN regional and national offices, includingindividuals who have been closely involved in the development and implementation ofthe strategies, and who are from the country concerned. The team includes the partici-pants and resource teams from the 1993 Isla Taboga Workshop and the 1995 PeténWorkshop.

It is important to emphasize that much of the field work undertaken in these cases arepioneering efforts in strategic planning and implementation. The educational value of theworkshops was increased by participants’ willingness to discuss their experiences franklyand openly. They focused on problems they encountered and lessons they had learned;and they considered their failures as good learning opportunities. Because of their open-ness and ability to reflect on their experience, the learning value of the workshops andcase studies was increased significantly.

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a This text was originally written in Spanish by Arturo López Ornat; however IUCN felt itwas important to translate the case studies into English, so that the experience of develop-ing and implementing strategies, particularly at the local level in Latin America, could beshared with other regions in the world. With any translation from an original language,there are bound to be phrases that may not be familiar to readers of English. We hopethat this will not prove too much of an inconvenience to readers.

We hope these experiences provide valuable information, stimulation and motivation toothers facing similar challenges elsewhere. The views presented in the case studies do notnecessarily reflect those of the government agencies or the officials involved.

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Acknowledgements

IUCN wishes to thank the authors of the case studies and the workshop participants forgiving so freely of their time and experience in order to share with others the lessons theyhave learned through perseverance, trial and error. We are particularly grateful to ArturoLópez Ornat for his long hours of work in coordinating the work of the individual casestudies and for compiling this volume. Peter Whiting ably undertook the task of translat-ing the text into English.

We are also grateful for the financial support that enabled us to organize and host the twoworkshops at which these case studies were discussed and analyzed, and finally, for thefunds to publish and distribute this volume.

Local arrangements for the Isla Taboga workshop were made by IUCN–ORMA’sPanama Office, and for the Petén workshop by the SEGEPLAN Office in Petén and byIUCN–ORMA. Funds for the Taboga workshop were provided by the InternationalDevelopment Research Centre (IDRC), the Swedish Development Authority (SIDA) andby the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Funds for the Petén work-shop were provided by IDRC. Funds for the publication of this volume were provided bythe Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC). To these organizations, we offerour thanks for their support.

Nancy MacPhersonCoordinatorStrategies for Sustainability ProgrammeIUCN HQ, Gland Switzerland

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a Workshop and Case Study Participants

Isla Taboga, Panama Workshop, 1993The participants at the Isla Taboga workshop were: Jorge Albán Gomez (Ecuador),Ricardo Almanza (Panama), Augusto Angel Maya (Ecuador), Dionisio Batista (Panama),Miguel Canals (Puerto Rico), Victor Cedeño (Nicaragua), Avecita Chicchón (Peru),Otoniel Gonzalez (Panama), Carlos Hernandez (Guatemala), Oscar Lücke (Costa Rica),Odilia Maessen (Canada), Juan Mayr (Colombia), Carmen Miranda (Bolivia), RolandoMendoza (Costa Rica), Victor Merino (Peru), Nydia E Morales (Panama), Carlos de Paco(Costa Rica), Marco Antonio Palacios (Guatemala), Rosadela Pinzón (Panama), OmarRamirez Tejada (Dominican Republic), Eric Rodriguez (Panama), Guillermo Rodriguez(Colombia), Luis A Rojas (Costa Rica), Pedro Rosabal (Cuba), Sebastião Salles de Sá(Brazil), Maria Virginia Sandino (Nicaragua), Eduardo Soares (Brazil), Gustavo Suarez deFreitas (Peru) and Maryi Valderrama (Colombia). The sessions were moderated by:Alejandro Imbach, Oscar Lücke, Nancy MacPherson, Juan Mayr, Marco A Palacios,Rosadela Pinzón, Robert Prescott-Allen and Pedro Rosabal. The organizing team andsecretariat were made up by: Marcella Bonilla (Colombia), Luis Castello (Argentina),Alejandro Imbach (Argentina), Arturo López Ornat (Spain), Nancy MacPherson(Canada), Robert Prescott-Allen (Canada), Alberto Salas Ávila (Costa Rica) and VivienneSolís (Costa Rica).

Petén, Guatemala Workshop, 1995The participants at the Petén workshop were: Jorge Albán Gomez (Ecuador), AugustoAngel Maya (Ecuador), César Barrientos (Guatemala), Dionisio Batista (Panama), AllenCordero (Guatemala), Eric Dudley (UK), Juan Carlos Godoy (Guatemala), OtonielGonzalez (Panama), José Guillermo Gonzalez Marcos (Guatemala), Carlos Hernandez(Guatemala), Enrique Lahmann (Costa Rica), Alain Meyrat (Nicaragua), Carlos RaulMontes (Guatemala), Natalia Ortiz (Colombia), Marco Antonio Palacios (Guatemala),Omar Ramirez Tejada (Dominican Republic), Ana Victoria Rodriguez (Guatemala),Guillermo Rodriguez (Colombia), Luis A Rojas (Costa Rica), Hernando Sanchez (Co-lombia), Tomi Tuomasjukka (Finland), Florangel Villegas (Venezuela) and NéstorWindevoxhel Lora (Venezuela). The sessions were moderated by: Jorge Albán (Ecuador),César Barrientos (Guatemala), Alejandro Imbach (Argentina), Natalia Ortiz (Colombia),Marco A Palacios (Guatemala), Guiselle Rodriguez (Costa Rica) and Alberto Salas (CostaRica). The organizing team and secretariat were made up by: Alejandro Imbach (Argen-tina), Arturo López Ornat (Spain), Alberto Salas Ávila (Costa Rica), Florangel Villegas(Venezuela) and Néstor Windevoxhel (Venezuela).P

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a r t 1 : I n t r o d u c t i o n

Part 1:Introduction

IntroductionSummary of National StrategiesSub-national StrategiesLessons Learned

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1 Introduction

This volume, which has been translatedfrom the original Spanish text, contains ananalysis of 15 selected strategies forsustainability in Latin America, theircommon themes and a summary of thelessons learned. The original Spanish textcontains an annexe of summary charts ofan additional nine strategies and projectswhich were not developed into full casestudies. These charts are not available inthe English translation.

2 What are SustainableDevelopment Strategies?

Sustainable development strategies areparticipatory and cyclical processes ofplanning and action to achieve threeobjectives – economic, ecological andsocial – in a balanced and integrated way.There is a wide range of strategies atinternational, national, provincial/stateand local levels, including conservationstrategies, environmental action plans, andsustainable development strategies.Sustainable development strategies aim toachieve all three objectives; other strategiesemphasize one or two of them.

Strategies may be multi-sectoral, embrac-ing a wide range of sectors, interests andissues. Or they may be thematic, focusingon particular sectors or topics like biodi-versity, education, climate change, energy,

health or population. There are othertypes of strategies which focus on only oneor two of these objectives. Strategies maybe comprehensive, covering a broadspectrum of sectors; or targeted, focusingon the sustainability of a particular sector,such as forestry, conservation, fisheries oreducation.

Since 1980, more than 75 countries haveinitiated multi-sector strategies at na-tional, provincial, state and local levels.Considerable experience in undertakingstrategies has been gained, but it has notbeen systematically organized or analyzeduntil recently.

Strategies are processes, not documents.The strategy documents are merely instru-ments to make a strategy explicit, so thatit may be discussed, agreed and applied bya broad spectrum of participants.

Strategies are necessary for resolvingcomplex problems involving many actors.A strategy is not a plan, although planningis an important part of a strategy. A plan islinear, rigid and frequently sectoral. Astrategy is a dynamic process dealing witha diversity of groups and interests. Strate-gies are participatory and adaptive, takingadvantage of and strengthening existingcapacities and generating inter-sectorallinks. Strategies reassess the situationperiodically through a system of monitor-ing and assessment, and they adaptaccordingly.

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c a 3 Types of Strategies in Latin

America

A sample of strategies taking place inLatin America appears in Table 1. Theyinclude international, national, regionaland local strategies. Of the 25 exampleslisted, 15 case studies have been developedmore fully in this volume. Summaries ofthe remaining examples are contained inthe Spanish volume.

In our opinion, a sustainable developmentstrategy includes the areas of economicdevelopment, social development andenvironmental and conservational devel-opment in its analysis and policy formula-tion.

The same objectives are considered inFAPs. In 1988, the World Bank madeFAPs a condition of granting credit as anattempt to slow deforestation and topromote sustainable use of tropical foreststhrough forest management programmes,agroforestry, soil and biodiversity conser-vation, organization and industrialdevelopment. FAPs may be joint projectsand may include components aimed atstrengthening and developing nationalinstitutions and non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs). They also includemeasures to strengthen the policies andthe legal and institutional frameworks ofthe countries concerned. FAPs maytherefore be considered strategies, butwith a sectoral approach (forestry).

The biosphere reserves status proposed in1976 by the United Nations Educational,Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO) aims to create a world net-work of protected natural areas, whererepresentative samples of the ecosystemsand species they contain are preserved,where traditional cultures found withinare strengthened, and where new techno-logies are tested or adapted with the parti-cipation of the local population. Somebiosphere reserves now have over ten yearsof experience in trying to combine thesedifferent objectives, and provide an excel-lent source of experience and learning.

4 Selecting and ClassifyingCases

The selection of cases analyzed in thisregional review (Table 1) was based on thefollowing criteria:

• the approach was inter-sectoral withsustainable development objectives;

• participatory planning was applied;• an inter-sectoral action plan was drawn

up with broad participation anddistribution of responsibilities;

• policies were formulated in a consensusdocument, and officially adopted;

• actions have already been initiated toapply the strategy; and

• the planning/action process has beenunderway for a number of years andthere is a body of existing methodologi-cal experience.

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Not all the cases listed in Table 1 complycompletely with all the criteria givenabove. There are differences of approach,scale and implementation time. Somecases are clearly sustainable developmentstrategies, with several years of experience;others offer a potential strategic approachto a variety of actions lacking a cohesiveframework. A number of ‘projects’, forinstance, are in fact working towards analternative to ‘unsustainable’ development,but without a strategic framework. Thegeographical scale of the strategies alsodiffers greatly, from 5,000 hectares inPuerto Rico to over a million in Petén orAmazonia.

The objectives of social and economicdevelopment and an improved quality oflife are implicit in all the cases analyzed,and explicit in the sustainable develop-ment cases (‘SD’ in Table 1). The othercases have a sectoral focus, concentratingmainly on conservation and/or themanagement of natural resources. Theconservation of biodiversity, sustainableforest management and environmentaleducation are the sectors which have re-ceived most attention. A focus on macro-economic and financial aspects of sustain-able development is missing in many ofthe cases, except in those in Cuba, CostaRica, Ecuador and Nicaragua.

The selected cases differ in terms of theirmain themes, and they embrace a broadspectrum of geographical, political andorganizational factors, and varying degreesof success in achieving objectives. Acomparative analysis is given of the keyfactors in the success and the failure ofthese processes.

5 Status of Strategies

The status of these cases is summarized inTable 1, with an indication of their formallink with the development plans of thecountries or regions concerned. Whilethese strategies represent the most ad-vanced experience in the region, definitiveresults are still to be seen.

These are all pioneering processes; ap-proximately half of the strategies analyzedare still at the formulation stage. Theothers have reached the proposal docu-ment stage. The Sierra Maestra Strategy inCuba is well into implementation.

A document does not necessarily guaran-tee action or a change in developmentpolicies. In five cases (APTA, Guánica,Héroes y Mártires, Sierra Nevada andTambopata), practical action has beentaken in specific sectors and results havebeen produced in the field without anydocument.

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Table 1 Status of cases analysed (1995)Strategy Country Approach Status Integration in

(implementation) development plans(document)

A B C D E F G TT PC PS AG NO

InternationalGulf of Fonseca* Salvador, C/D D •

Honduras,Nicaragua

NationalCuba* C/D A •Costa Rica SD B, D • •Nicaragua SD E •Peru* C/D B, E •

RegionalAmazonia Ecuador SD F •Bocas del Toro* Panama SD C, D • • •Petén Guatemala SD A • •San Martin* Peru C+ET E • •Sierra Nevada Colombia SD C, F • •Tortuguero Costa Rica SD B, D • • •

LocalEl Beni* Bolivia C/D B, F • •Guánica Puerto Rico SD B, G • •Heroes y Martires Nicaragua AF B, G •Majé-Bayano Panama C+FO B, G • • •Mata Atlantica Brazil C/D B, G • •Samaná Dominican Rep. C/D C, E • •Sierra Maestra Cuba SD A •Tambopata-Candamo Peru SD B, G • •

ProjectsAPTA* Brazil AF C, G • •Cinturón Verde* Guatemala Urban B, G • •Kuna-Yala Panama C+FO C, G • • •Quintana Roo* Mexico C+FO A •Pikín-Guerrero* Nicaragua AF B • •Talamanca Costa Rica SD C, G • •

See Box 1 for explanation of symbols* Detailed case studies not available in this volume; summaries appear in the Spanish volume

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Box 1: Symbols used in Table 1

ApproachSD Sustainable DevelopmentC/D C + Development elementAF AgroforestryC Conservation/EnvironmentET Education/TrainingFO Forest and/or Water

StatusA Official implementation, binding for all government sectorsB Applied by some governmental or non-governmental participantsC Applied by non-governmental sectorsD Document agreed by participants but not adopted by the governmentE Document formulated, but not agreed by all participant sectorsF Document in course of preparationG Document preparation not yet initiated

Integration in Development PlansTT Strategy totally integrated within government development plansPC Strategy partially integrated (includes sectoral plans)PS Strategy has political support and document is awaiting official adoptionAG Specific agreements have been signed for its partial implementationNO Strategy either not integrated formally, or outside development planning

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c a part in the implementation process,

although the strategy is limited geographi-cally to the National System of ProtectedAreas, which covers 12 per cent of theisland’s area.

In Peru, the strategy is stalled due topolitical instability and the dissolution ofthe government agencies (Planning andNatural Resources) which initiated itsformulation in 1989. In Costa Rica, theprocess was halted during the legislativeperiod (1990–94) when the ruling partywas replaced. Partly as a result of this, thestrategy was formulated by techniciansand experts who were selected on apersonal basis; even though some of themwere officials, they did not officiallyrepresent their institutions. Costa Rica’sstrategy is being reactivated by the presentgovernment (1994–98), whose Declara-tion for Sustainable Development,accompanied by a programme of concretemeasures, constitutes the official policy ofthe present legislature.

2 Development of Processes

All national strategies have emerged froman inter-sectoral analysis of conservationand development problems, drawing onthe expertise of professionals from differ-ent disciplines. The methods used haveincluded sectoral working groups, plenaryworkshops, public consultations, and thecirculation and revision of draft proposal

National Strategies:Summary

The National Strategies of Costa Rica(ECODES) and Nicaragua cover a broadspectrum of environmental, social andeconomic objectives, and may therefore beconsidered sustainable developmentstrategies. Those of Cuba and Peru areaimed basically at the conservation ofnatural resources, although they also takeinto account elements of socio-economicdevelopment when these are related toconservation issues.

1 Origin and Present Situation

In all these cases the initiative started withthe natural resources sectors of govern-ment. In Costa Rica and Peru, nationaland international NGOs played a funda-mental role in promoting the idea ingovernment departments. In Nicaragua,the process was stimulated by interna-tional cooperation. In Cuba, it emergedfrom successful experiments in severalbuffer zones, particularly in the SierraMaestra.

Although there was a consensus amongparticipants in these strategies on theactions required, only in the case of Cubawas the document officially adopted bygovernment. (‘A’ status in Table 1). InCuba, 22 government bodies are taking

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documents. The business and financialsectors did not take part in formulatingthe proposals in the cases of Costa Ricaand Peru.

In those two cases in particular, there wasa tendency to emphasize the production ofa document as the main result, with thedevelopment of the process and theimplementation of actions left to a secondstage. There is a consensus among strategyexperts that, in order to keep the processalive, responsibilities have to be sharedthrough implementation of practicalactivities throughout the process, with thesupport of a coordinating team or secre-tariat. The absence of both these condi-tions in the cases of Costa Rica and Perualso explains why the strategies were notimplemented. Until 1994, the actiontaken in both of these cases was initiatedby NGOs and/or individual professionals.

In Cuba and Nicaragua, many ministriesand government departments are involvedin formulating, approving and applyingthe strategies, including regional andmunicipal governments (all the munici-palities of Nicaragua are involved in theCuban Protected Areas scheme). Except inthe case of Cuba, all the strategies de-pended on external funding during theirformulation.

3 Main Results

The implementation of sustainabledevelopment strategies has been limitedmainly by structural problems andexternal factors: in Costa Rica and Peru byheavy external debt and the socio-environ-mental problems generated by structuraladjustment programmes; in Cuba by thedifficult economic situation created by thesocio-economic sanctions imposed on thecountry; and in Nicaragua both byeconomic difficulties and the political andsocial consequences of the recent war.

Although these national strategies are stillin their early stages, they have all pro-duced some very positive results:

• the strategies of Costa Rica, Cuba andPeru were included in the presentationsof those countries given at the UNConference on Environment andDevelopment (UNCED, Rio deJaneiro, 1992); Cuba’s strategy is alsopart of the Cuban Government’scommitments for Agenda 21 and theConvention on Biological Diversity;

• government planning for the strategiesincluded the participation of NGOs inPeru, Costa Rica and Nicaragua;

• inter-sectoral coordination structureswere set up in Nicaragua and Cuba aspart of the formulation processes;

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a • although they were not always officiallyadopted, these strategies have served asframeworks for sectoral plans, in mostcases producing a positive and promis-ing impact (including protected areas inall four countries, forest action plans inCosta Rica, Nicaragua and Peru, land-use planning in Nicaragua and partially

in Cuba, environmental education inCosta Rica and Cuba); and

• in Costa Rica and Peru nationalstrategies contributed indirectly to thestart of local strategies in La Amistad,Tortuguero, Inka, Grau, Loreto andMariátegui.

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Sub-national Strategies:Summary and Analysis

1 Origin of Initiatives

The initiatives have originated both in thegovernment sector (especially in CentralAmerica and Cuba) and with NGOs (inSouth America). Conceptually, they couldbe said to be derived from the contribu-tion made by the World ConservationStrategy (WCS, 1980), UNESCO’s Manand Biosphere Programme (MAB) and thedevelopment of FAPs.

Economic crisis and large-scale environ-mental problems were the most commontriggering factors, confirming the humantendency to react to problems rather thananticipate them. The problems aresubstantial and originate from deforesta-tion and the socio-economic failure ofinappropriate development initiatives inthe American tropics in previous decades.

The conservation of biodiversity providedthe main stimulus in many of the sub-national cases. The sponsors were eitherNGOs or national park services with theobjectives of preserving extremely fragileand valuable areas. In many cases, socio-economic objectives were subsequentlyadded to conservation goals, in responseto the lack of interest or even oppositionshown by local communities towards

purely conservation objectives (El Beni,Tambopata, Tortuguero); or else as areaction to the pressure exerted by com-munities to obtain development alterna-tives in the neighbourhood of protectednatural areas (Amazonia, Mata Atlántica,Talamanca). In fact, many of the selectedlocal cases are being developed aroundprotected natural areas of internationalsignificance; some have been classified byUNESCO as biosphere reserves.

The concerns of the target populationacted as a stimulus in the cases of APTA,Kuna-Yala, Quintana Roo and Talamanca(and partially in Tambopata).

The formulation of FAPs created aninterest in planning in the case of Kuna-Yala, but in general a reverse effect hasbeen produced, insofar as the introductionof sustainable development strategies hasstimulated the development of the forestrysector through the implementation ofFAPs, as in the cases of ECODES andTortuguero in Costa Rica, and in Bocasdel Toro and Majé-Bayano in Panama.

A common problem provided a sufficientimpulse and rallying point for initiating orstrengthening some of the strategies,bringing together very different and eventraditionally opposed sectors. For exam-ple, in Sierra Nevada (Colombia), interestsas diverse as those of indige-nous peoples,major land-owners, guerrilla fighters, drug

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a traffickers and landless peasants allconverged on the need to pre-serve waterand to regulate water supplies in theSierra. The serious socio-environmentalimpact of the spread of the monoculturebanana cultivation united all the sectors infavour of a strategy for the Tortugueroplains in Costa Rica, while in the Carib-bean, the cases of Guánica and Samanáwere initiated by the local authorities andNGOs as a response to the prospect ofunregulated tourism.

2 Common Aspects

All the sub-national strategies and practi-cally all the projects are situated in areaswith high biological diversity value, andare subject to strict ecological constraintson intensive agricultural production.Some of the cases are faced with thetypical situation of a tropical agriculturalfrontier, while four (Guánica, Samaná,Sierra Maestra and Sierra Nevada) are inareas of colonization, more stable but alsorecent. Only APTA and Pikín-Guerreroare located in traditional agricultural areas,and only one project is located in anurban periphery, namely the ‘CinturónVerde’ (green belt) in Guatemala.

All these areas are socially and economi-cally marginalized as a consequence ofunderdevelopment. They share similardevelopment difficulties and have incommon ecological problems derived

from deforestation, structural problemssuch as lack of land tenure, limitedinstitutional structure, and poor ornonexistent public services. They alsosuffer from drawbacks such as immigra-tion and colonization by cultures whichare not adapted to the environment,population growth, a low educationallevel, and poor or nonexistent organiza-tional structures. Other common featuresinclude lack of credit services, technicalsupport or alternatives to the system ofmonoculture, extensive cattle farming,forest ‘mining’ and other forms of non-sustainable extractive production. Themost critical strategies are those involvingmultiple resource-use conflicts andstructural problems, thus requiring aninnovative and consistent managementregime.

3 Integrating Strategies inDevelopment Planning

Although the Latin American strategieshave only been integrated to a limitedextent in national and/or sub-nationaldevelopment planning systems, all haveexerted a direct or indirect influence onsectoral planning, particularly in the areasof conservation and forest management.

Official approval

The documents prepared for threestrategies (Mata Atlántica, Sierra Maestra

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and Petén) (‘A’ status in Table 1) havenow been officially approved. Most of theremainder have been internally approvedby the organizations which took part intheir preparation, but have not been madeofficial by the government.

Multi-sector Participation

The most exceptional case is that of SierraMaestra in Cuba, which has been ap-proved by law. It is managed by an inter-sectoral governing board on which sixministries are represented, and which isanswerable to the Council of Ministers.The cases of Petén and Bocas del Toro arealso noteworthy insofar as the strategieswere prepared under the authority of thecountries’ planning ministries. Thestrategy for Majé (Panama), although stillin preparation, also depends on an inter-ministerial committee. In all the othercases, the only ministry officially involvedhas been that of natural resources or alocal equivalent, and only six cases haveinvolved local authorities (Amazonia,Guánica, Sierra Nevada) or regionalgovernments (Mata Atlántica, Petén andSan Martín).

As a result of the limited degree ofintegration, the strategies tend to belooked upon as additions to rather thanintegral elements of the planning process.They are generally considered to bechiefly focused on environmental activi-ties, although some have been included as

part of the national park services (El Beni,Guánica, Samaná, Tambopata).

Direct and Indirect Results

The strategies had a very positive impactby introducing an environmental compo-nent, or a concern for such a component,to the development planning of all theseareas. In some cases, there were no devel-opment plans for the areas concerned (ElBeni, Samaná, Sierra Nevada, Tambopataand Tortuguero); in others the localadministrative authorities directly in-volved in the main aspects of developmentwere weak. For instance, in Bocas delToro (Panama), the strategy took prec-edence over formal planning, introducinga preventive or anticipatory environmentalcomponent in a region which was stillrelatively undisturbed. A similar effectmay be produced by strategies which arein the development phase for Amazonia(Ecuador), El Beni (Bolivia), Majé(Panama), Samaná (Dominican Republic)and San Martín (Peru).

In almost all the cases, official approval ofthe strategies is still pending. This doesnot, however, imply that no official actionis being taken or that benefits are not feltin the system.

• Most of the strategies have had favour-able effects on the planning ofprotected natural areas (in practically allcases), the forest sector (in Quintana

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a Roo since 1984 and in the threePanamanian cases since 1988) with theimplementation of Forest Action Plans,water regulation (Pikín-Guerrero,Majé, Sierra Maestra, Sierra Nevada),formal education (San Martín, Pikín-Guerrero, Tortuguero); and

• Some of the projects which have had agreater impact in the field (APTA inBrazil, Quintana Roo forest plan,Comarca Kuna-Yala in Panama) havebeen organized and developed withoutthe assistance of state institutions.These cases have been purposefully keptoutside the framework of the institu-tions, partly because of the weakness ornon-existence of an institutionalframework, or because of excessivebureaucracy. Generally speaking, thoseinvolved deplore the overlappinginterests and the lack of coordinationbetween institutions, the frequentchanges of priorities in institu-tionalprogrammes, and the lack of any‘institutional memory’, which forces thereiteration of the same requests.

4 Formulating the Strategy

Information AnalysisOne of the first steps in a strategy forsustainability should be an inter-sectoralanalysis which takes account of multi-sectoral structural development problems.This was done in some of the cases(Amazonia, Bocas del Toro, Sierra

Maestra, Petén, Tambopata, Tortuguero).In all the other cases, either the analysiswas limited to specific sectors, or majorsectors were omitted from the analysisaltogether.

For instance, an analysis of existinginstitutional and organizational capacityis essential to ensure that efforts areoptimized and to encourage participationin concrete action. For each institution ororganization involved in the strategy, thefacts to be assessed include its mandateand its role, its capacities, strengths,weaknesses, financial and human re-sources. This type of analysis was com-pleted in the cases of Guánica, Majé, MataAtlántica, Petén, Samaná, Sierra Nevada,Sierra Maestra, Talamanca andTortuguero. The macro-economic andfinancial situation of each region is alsofrequently overlooked, as is the analysis ofloopholes and opportunities in currentlaws and regulations which might affectsustainable development.

Drafting the Document

The formulation of documents wasmentioned in all cases as a tool of analysis,common reflection and a focus for thegeneration of ideas. The sub-nationalstrategies have been less likely thannational strategies to put emphasis on theproduction of documents as the mainachievement of the technical teams,although this has been the case with El

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Beni, Bocas del Toro and Samaná, and tosome extent in Tortuguero. This has hadthe effect of diminishing the priority offield actions and hence the momentumand interest of participants in the process.

The documents, which frequently containcollated summaries of the socio-environ-mental data for each region, proposegeneral sectoral guidelines. Four strategies(Mata Atlántica, Petén, Sierra Maestra andTortuguero) established measurableobjectives, criteria, procedures and actionpriorities individually for each sector.

5 Content of proposals

Land-use Planning

Most of the plans to emerge from thesestrategies have concerned either land-useplanning or the conservation of biologicaldiversity in all regional and local strategies;forest management (in all cases exceptSamaná and Sierra Nevada); and educa-tion in Guánica, Petén, San Martín, SierraMaestra, Sierra Nevada and Tortuguero.

Land-use planning is a basic tool forbuilding a model of sustainable develop-ment in rural areas. It facilitates inter-sectoral integration, the environmentallyappropriate location of productive activi-ties, the resolution of land tenure prob-lems and the establishment of ecological,socio-economic and cultural criteria forexternal assistance.

Future Scenarios

Scenarios were prepared in three cases:Petén, Sierra Maestra and Tortuguero.Scenarios are important for strategicplanning, and are useful in generatinginterest among policy-makers. All threestrategies have drawn up populationprojections, amongst others, which depictalarming scenarios. They propose control-ling the load capacity of ecosystems bydiversifying economic activities, raisingproductivity and establishing a minimumsize for single-family farms. It is difficultto predict the impact of these measures,since the areas concerned are suffering theconsequences of immigration and non-sustainable development from neighbour-ing regions. According to the scenario,while strategies may be successful in rais-ing the quality of life of local inhabitants,they will also attract more immigration.This is a major concern for all the techni-cal teams and advisers involved in strate-gies located in buffer zones and agricul-tural frontier areas.

6 Internalizing Strategies:Participation

Internalization

Strategies must be internalized if they areto have a significant influence over

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a development. While the strategies them-selves have to be sustainable, they have tobe based on and take advantage of bothlocal and national opportunities, capaci-ties, resources and initiatives. Participationis the tool which will most likely ensurethat a strategy is internalized and welladapted to local conditions. This impliesunderstanding local needs and assumingshared responsibility for action.

The importance of participation to thestrategic process has been recognized by allworking teams, although some feel thatthey have not placed enough emphasis onit. Where strategies have produced adocument, it has been achieved bytechnical teams in consultation with thosedirectly concerned. In general, technicalteams have not placed the same emphasison participation and on shared responsi-bility with the target communities andgroups. The cases of Sierra Maestra, SierraNevada, Tambopata and Tortuguero areexceptional in this respect. All theprojects, however, (APTA, CinturónVerde, Kuna-Yala, Quintana Roo, Pikín-Guerrero and Talamanca) are broadlyparticipatory in design.

Internalizing the strategies means offeringappropriate alternatives, incentives andguidelines which are acceptable to thegreatest possible majority. Strategies must

be made attractive to governments andunderstandable by all sectors. They canfocus initially on the less contentiousproblems and facilitate the government’stask by explaining the practical benefits tobe derived in both the short- and long-term, by proposing possible improvementsin all sectors, and by providing a series oftools and actions to ensure that thestrategies do not remain mere planningexercises.

One of the lessons learned in this respectis that achieving real participation dependson using common concepts and simplelanguage. In some cases, it was pointedout that terms such as ‘reserve’ and‘strategy’ are inappropriate since they maybe interpreted by local populations asreferring to plans which are either restric-tive or open to preconceptions by peopleoutside the communities. Some use theterm ‘multiple-use zone’ instead of ‘bufferzone’, or ‘agreement’ instead of ‘strategy’.

It is advisable to reduce the set of issues toone or two common problems and try toresolve them. In Guánica, Samaná, SierraMaestra, Sierra Nevada, Tambopata andTortuguero, for instance, it was foundthat solving a single problem in a commu-nity at the beginning of the process was aneffective way of achieving credibility andgaining the trust of the local population.

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Participation During theFormulation of the Document

One way of creating a feeling of sharedresponsibility is to encourage participationin the preparation of the initial proposalwhich is submitted to sponsors anddonors. In the cases of Guánica and Quin-tana Roo, recipient groups participated inthis stage of the process. Another possibil-ity is sharing the process of obtaininginformation in the field in such a way thateach participant contributes some of theinformation. This approach, whichestablishes strong bonds from the outset,was very helpful for internalizing strategiesin the cases of APTA, Guánica, Kuna-Yala, Petén, Tambopata and Tortuguero.Once the draft documents had beenproduced, however, they were discussedamong the technicians but not alwayscirculated among the full constituency.Only in the cases of Guánica, Petén,Sierra Maestra and Tortuguero werestrategy objectives and priorities arrived atby agreement with those concerned.

Frequently the teams of specialists choseto share their thoughts and conclusionswith others concerned, either at meetingsor workshops. Analysis tends to show,however, that consultations held after theproposals are formulated do not have thesame internalizing and binding effect asfull participation in the preparation ofproposals.

Internal Conflicts andExternal Enemies

One problem which all the processes havein common is internal conflicts amongparticipants. These conflicts are often dueto rivalries either between governmentorganizations or between NGOs. Whenthe process is opened up to differentsectors, which perhaps have never beforetried to resolve common problemstogether, latent conflicts tend to surface.However this also provides an opportunityto resolve such conflicts early in the pro-cess, as was the case in Amazonas, El Beni,Guánica, Majé, Sierra Nevada, Tambo-pata and Tortuguero. Participation maygenerate short-term conflicts, but these arelikely to be of less magnitude than those ithelps to avoid in the longer term.

Half the cases mention outside interestswhich were openly opposed to the strategyand which brought pressure to bear inorder to stop the processes. These in-cluded timber and mining companies,multinationals, land speculators andpolitical and economic sectors benefitingfrom anarchic conditions. Some cases wereable to overcome this resistance and arecontiuing to do so in different ways, eitherby having the strategies officially adopted,or else by bringing into the process thoseinterests which have generally been leftout. Although most of these sectors aretraditionally more interested in short-term

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a economic returns, the forestry, tourismand fishing sectors have recently shownthat they could overcome their initialreluctance (for reasons including stockdepletion, availability of markets, creditand tax benefits, or simply environmentalawareness) and take advantage of multi-sectoral alliances for sustainable produc-tion.

7 Prospects for Continuity

Almost all the strategies analyzed claimsome political support at government and/or ministerial level. This support isparticularly useful where institutionalcapacity is weak and where there is littlecooperation between institutions. It canfacilitate inter-departmental cooperation,break down institutional barriers and helpto give the strategies recognition.

All the strategies considered are, inprinciple, politically independent, butonly half of them so far have achieved thesort of practical results (apart fromproducing a document) which are likely toensure the continuity of the process in theevent of a political change.

Strategies frequently depend on the actionof NGOs and the political support ofgovernments, but except in the cases ofPetén and Sierra Maestra there has not yetbeen a sufficient degree of commitment

(legal, social, economic and financial) toguarantee the continuity of the process, inthe event of either a) a change of politicalleadership; b) the loss of internationalcooperation; or c) the eventual exhaustionof the NGOs’ budgets for the projects.

Loss of continuity ceases to be a risk in thecases where:

• target groups either control the process(APTA, Kuna-Yala, Quintana Roo) orare closely involved (Guánica, Pikín-Guerrero, Talamanca);

• a self-financing strategy is beingdeveloped (Tambopata, Tortuguero);or

• the government itself is organizing theimplementation process (Majé, Petén,Sierra Maestra, Mata Atlántica).

One case worth mentioning in particularis Cuba’s Sierra Maestra, where nationalintegration and inter-sectoral cooperationappear to have been achieved. A weaknessof the strategy might be its dependence onthe government, which would affect itsubstantially if it had to face either apolitical change or market competitionupsetting established industrial andfinancial structures.

Participants have found that the freemarket, driven by short-term competitive-ness, provides no better guarantee of ashift towards ecological and industrial

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sustainability. Cases such as Petén andTortuguero, which produced future sce-narios as analytical tools, foresee alarmingsocio-environmental situations occurringwithin a generation. They suggest that thestate intervene with regulatory measures(in the legal, fiscal and credit areas) so asto encourage the development of sustain-able production activities, while at thesame time, making them competitive.

Institutional Arrangements

The joint participation of government andNGOs is a common feature of all the casesanalyzed. One of the clearest results ofthese processes, which is evident inpractically all the cases, is the liaison andcoordination between governmental andnon-governmental organizations. At leastnine of the sub-national strategies consti-tuted the first experiment in their regionsin inter-institutional and inter-sectoralcoordination to plan the use of naturalresources (Amazonia, El Beni, Bocas delToro, Guánica, Samaná, San Martín,Sierra Nevada, Tambopata andTortuguero).

All the strategies (except Héroes andMártires) either have or will have a jointinstitutional committee responsible fortheir development, generally under theauthority of a government departmentrelated to natural resources, and with theparticipation of local authorities andNGOs. Basic producer groups are repre-

sented on these committees only in Ama-zonia, Sierra Nevada, Tambopata and inthe APTA, Kuna-Yala and Quintana Rooprojects.

Regional committees and working groupsare also useful tools for integrating thestrategies within government planningsystems. The members of these commit-tees or groups may be linked to higherlevels of government; for instance, theresults achieved by the Costa Rica strategywere due to the personal action of expertswho took part in its preparation and werelater appointed to related governmentposts.

The Promoting Team:The Engine for the Strategy

Strategies require an engine or drivingforce. This is usually provided by thetechnical team rather than an intermedi-ate-level joint institutional committee.Technical teams must be convinced of thefeasibility and appropriateness of sustain-able development; they must have a degreeof commitment beyond the work itself;clear objectives; negotiating abilities and astrong determination to overcome thefrequent setbacks and inertia. The idealtechnical team is inter-disciplinary andrepresentative of the main interestsinvolved. This is seldom found in any ofthe cases analyzed, although techniciansare frequently delegated by two or three ofthe main sponsors of each strategy.

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a One important and positive fact is thatthese teams are fully national or local(except in Tambopata and Petén), andgenerally have an office within the work-ing area, which is used as a headquartersby participants. On the other hand,although it is essential that such teams befunded, the necessary financial resourcesusually cover only a year or two. A furtherproblem, which has been illustrated inseveral cases, is that the more able andexperienced technicians tend to abandontheir field work either for family reasons,to look for a better job elsewhere or tojoin one of the international cooperationagencies. This syndrome also affectsprogramme leaders, who, although theyremain involved, gradually distancethemselves from field problems.

The strategies which have produced thebest results all have in common a stronglycommitted team to promote the strategy;sometimes one or two key individualshave kept the process going for longperiods of time. This kind of personalcommitment is more necessary when theprocess has not yet produced enoughresults to convince the different sectors ofthe concrete benefits of the strategy; whenparticipants do benefit, they tend to shiftfrom critical observation to voluntarycooperation, as shown in the cases ofAPTA, Guánica, Kuna-Yala, QuintanaRoo, Pikín-Guerrero, Tambopata andTortuguero. In these cases, the technicalteam’s energy is gradually matched by the

other participants.

Dissemination and Follow-up

Working groupsJoint institutional working groups for thedifferent sectors (agricultural, forestry,tourism, fishing and conservation) wereconsidered in nine cases: Amazonia,APTA, Guánica, Majé, Mata Atlántica,Petén, Samaná, Sierra Maestra andTortuguero.

Pilot projectsAll the strategies (except three) aredeveloping pilot projects in priority areas,in order to promote sustainable produc-tion alternatives and to concentrate effortson concrete actions.

CommunicationThe mass media were utilized in the casesof Guánica, Petén, San Martín andTortuguero.

Monitoring and evaluationA system of participatory monitoring ofthe process, with measurable indicators,has been established only in SierraMaestra. El Beni, Petén, Tambopata andTortuguero have introduced physicalindicators (forest coverage) as well associo-economic indicators (population,family income and production/reinvest-ment ratios). The APTA, Cinturón Verde,Pikín-Guerrero, Quintana Roo andTalamanca projects monitor production

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aspects, while the other cases maintaininternal evaluations of projects, but not ofprocesses.

8 International Funding andCooperation

Funding is an important tool as far assustainable development is concerned. Ifprocesses are to be sustainable, they haveto be self-financing. So far, many strate-gies have depended on external funding.Almost all the cases analyzed have ob-tained international financial support toprepare the strategies, in proportionsvarying from 50 per cent in Tambopata toalmost 100 per cent in Amazonia, El Beni,Cinturón Verde, Fonseca, Majé, Petén,Pikín-Guerrero, Samaná, Sierra Nevada,San Martín and Talamanca. In all thecases except Guánica, Kuna-Yala, Majé,Petén, Sierra Nevada and Tortuguero,projects report shortages of funds; theseare particularly serious in the cases ofSamaná, San Martín and Sierra Maestra.

International Cooperation

The analysis shows that strategies, whetheralready formulated or in the course ofdrafting and/or implementation, aresufficient in themselves to generateinterest among international cooperationagencies. All the strategies preparedfinancing proposals, which in many cases

entailed including the first action plans.Strategies which already included anoverall plan of action were presented asproposals to obtain external funding. Allthe cases, except Cuba, generated interestin some international donor organization.

One possible drawback to internationalcooperation is that some projects will bedesigned according to the criteria andpriorities of the donor agencies in re-sponse to a limited and passing interest.Donor agencies often disregard coordina-tion with other agencies, which may beinvolved in parallel, more broad-ranging,non-sustainable development pro-grammes. Although donors are graduallyachieving a more process-oriented ap-proach, such programmes tend to attractfunds with no guarantee of continuity, orelse the sustainable development process isreduced to being just a series of projectactivities which require continuousfunding.

National Financial Support

While international technical and finan-cial support is recommended in modestamounts to initiate a process, strategiesmust make an effort to strengthen theirself-financing component. The nationaland local financial sectors are conspicuousby their absence in practically all thesestrategy proposal preparation processes.

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a Reasons for this may include:

• the high professional profile of thework teams involved,

• the initial predominance of conserva-tion aims over economic developmentobjectives, or

• frequently, the presence of internationaldonors, which initially fills the gap.

The cases of Sierra Maestra in Cuba,Guánica in Puerto Rico, Quintana Roo inMexico and Mata Atlántica in Brazil areexceptions, in that they are more than 90per cent funded from local and nationalsources. It is worth noting, moreover, thatsome of these cases have been amongthose obtaining the best field results andhave proved to be unaffected by politicalchanges occurring in the countriesconcerned.

9 Limitations of the Analysis

A preliminary analysis of the cases showsthat local strategies are effective; that theyare, to a large degree, experimental andthat we are pioneering new approaches.For this very reason, it is worth trying toextract a few conclusions. However, thelimitations of the reviews should also beacknowledged:

a. The processes analyzed are in theirinitial stages of development. Even

taking into account the positive resultsreferred to previously, the analysis ofthese strategies must be restricted to theformulation and organization stages,since experience of their implementa-tion is limited (except in the case ofSierra Maestra and the projects).

b. The concepts of sustainable develop-ment and strategic planning are newand have not yet permeated all sectors.

c. All these strategies are subject to theinfluence of strong externalities, whichhave not always been identified or dealtwith.

d. Not enough time has passed forconclusive results about whether thestrategies have: set in motion a processof change; correctly identified actionpriorities; strengthened the localcapacity for sustainable development;been adaptive; or been able to be self-sustaining in the long term.

However, the following results appear tobe significant enough to be noteworthy atthis stage.

10 Main common results

Better Planning

The main achievement to emerge from allthe cases analyzed has been the introduc-tion of environmental factors for the firsttime in planning exercises. In many cases,

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the strategies also broke new ground withthe use of inter-sectoral developmentplanning tools and participatory method-ologies.

Greater Capacity

As a result, in all cases there has been astrengthening of the local population’scapacity to manage its own resources, acreation of inter- and intra-sectoralcoordination structures, and an acceptanceof the joint responsibility of NGOs, andcivil and community organizations forplanning, conservation and development.

Appropriate Technologies

The technical results are still incipient, butpromising. Some strategies have served asa framework for new land-use planningschemes. Prospects for conservation ofbiological diversity and natural resourceshave improved substantially in all thestrategies which have begun to be imple-mented. Over half the cases have alsoproduced positive results in the forestrysector and in other major productivesectors, such as agriculture, fishing andtourism.

Wherever the production sector has beenmore involved, better tools have beendeveloped to guarantee that the strategiesdo not remain a mere planning exercise.

The first technologies for sustainableproduction are being developed in thecases of APTA, Cinturón Verde, Pikín-Guerrero, Talamanca and in the participa-tory field projects of the Héroes yMártires, Petén, Quintana Roo, SierraMaestra, Sierra Nevada, Tambopata andTortuguero strategies.

Awareness

All the cases have improved the environ-mental awareness of the public, theofficials involved and local organizations,while some have managed to introduceofficial environmental education pro-grammes as part of the formal educationsystems.

11 Main Problems

Reactive Processes

All the local strategies considered in theanalysis were initiated as a reaction toproblems arising from the degradation ofnatural resources, with an initial emphasison the conservation of biological diversityand forest management. Many of theprocesses began as a response to severelydeteriorated socio-environmental situa-tions, whereas strategic planning shouldbe used as a preventive and not just areactive tool.

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a Strong Externalities

There is a general concern about how tointegrate the strategies into nationaleconomic and development policy, andhow to integrate the latter in turn intointernational policies. All the sub-nationalstrategies are subject to strong externali-ties, particularly of a socio-economic kind,but also political and in some casesmilitary.

Throughout Latin America there aresignificant constraints to achievingsustainable development, including thedetrimental effects of imported economicmodels, high rates of external debt,structural adjustment policies, and creditpolicies that support non-sustainableextractive activities. The affected areasbecome exporters of raw materials with avery low proportion of reinvestment,which adds to the traditional economicundervaluation of natural resources.

The detrimental social effects found inagricultural frontier areas is a furtherconstraint, where population growth isaggravated by immigration from otherneighbouring areas.

Limited Capacity

The capacity to respond to these pressures,especially with the degree of urgencyrequired, is at present very limited. Thereare institutional weaknesses and aninsufficient power base to enforce existingstandards; additionally, there is the lack ofcontinuity of government programmes,duplication, and lack of coordinationamong institutions. This is true not onlyamong organizations of the same sector,but also between different governmentdepartments; for instance, between thosein charge of agriculture and those dealingwith natural resources in the cases of ElBeni, Mata Atlántica, Samaná, Tambo-pata and Tortuguero.

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Lessons LearnedOne very general lesson is that there is nosingle recipe for sustainable developmentstrategies, apart from adapting to localconditions. This does not mean that thereare no common lessons to be learned. It isinteresting to note how projects carriedout over several years, thousands ofkilometres apart, have reached commonconclusions regarding concepts, methodsand approaches.

1 The Concept

Processes

The most widely accepted concept is thatstrategies are processes leading towards acomprehensive, complex objective, namelysustainable development. These processescomprise practical, visible activities, whileat the same time involving planningactivities. Nevertheless, the term ‘strategy’can be misinterpreted as a form of long-term plan, governed by a linear, stage-by-stage approach, with an emphasis onproducing a bureaucratic document.

In practice it has been found that when astrategy is applied, it becomes influencedand altered by events. Undoubtedly theremay be mistakes in the strategy; however,it is wrong to think that by perfectingplanning, we might achieve the ‘perfectstrategy’. This simply does not exist, since

reality is always more complex than weimagine. As strategies are implemented,new concepts and ideas evolve. Planningand coordination have to be dynamic andflexible, since conditions are variable andsituations change.

Is a Document Necessary?

In view of the diversity of situationsanalyzed, it is not easy to give a singleanswer. Some field results appear tosuggest that a document is not necessary.For instance, tens of thousands of familiesoccupy hundreds of thousands of hectaresof farmable forest areas in APTA in Brazil,in the forests of Quintana Roo in Mexico,in the hills of Sierra Nevada in Colombiaor Talamanca in Costa Rica, and in theKuna-Yala territory of Panama. For years,these people have been involved in aprocess leading towards the sustainabilityof production and a self-managementcapacity, without ever feeling the need toput their plans down in writing, except asa means of obtaining external financing.

In other cases, such as in Petén or inCuba, the document was necessary toinitiate the implementation of the strate-gies. While most cases have not managedto have their documents officiallyadopted, they recognize that placingexcessive emphasis on a written productcan divert valuable time and resourcesfrom strategic actions in the field.

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a The analysis of these 24 experimentssuggests that processes should not becomeobsessed either with documents orplanning. All participants agreed that astrategy was much more than a document,although a document was useful forseveral purposes, such as helping to makea strategy explicit, extracting guidelineswhich can be officially recognized bygovernments, helping to establish priori-ties, and providing a useful tool for social-izing concepts and ideas and promotingparticipation.

Planning/Action

According to the analysis, planning andaction should run in parallel; ideally, therewill be cross-fertilization between them.Exhaustive planning devoid of actionresults in a loss of interest and confidenceof participants, and reduces the process tocommittee meetings. Action unrelated toplanning, however, may mean thatopportunities to work with other sectorsand develop common guidelines aremissed.

Strategists must both plan and implement.At all levels, they must retain practical –and at least occasional – responsibilitiesfor implementation activities. Similarly,those involved in field action must partici-pate in planning. Field workers who arenot aware of the significance of their workwithin the strategy as a whole tend to losetheir enthusiasm and become ineffective.

All the formulation/action processesexamined in the review have been inexistence for at least five years. The caseswhich have been most engaged in imple-mentation recommend initiating actionsimultaneously in different sectors.

Feasibility

Strategies must have attainable objectivesand it must be possible to demonstratetheir feasibility. For politicians, objectiveshave to be politically and economicallyviable; if not, the strategies are left outsidegovernment plans. From the communi-ties’ point of view, it is essential to provethat the economic, social and culturalbenefits derived from the conservation ofnatural resources are of benefit to them.

Scales and Levels

The closer to the ground that strategies areimplemented, the greater impact they willhave in practice. The World ConservationStrategy and UNCED (1992) havefurnished a global conceptual frameworkfor sustainable development. Nationalstrategies have introduced an environmen-tal framework for planning. In LatinAmerica, the local strategies are actuallyputting these concepts into practice.

In Latin America, national strategies haveprovided a channel for reflection andawareness at government level, but theyhave produced few concrete results on the

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ground. Many participants consider thempolitically and economically non-viable.They were useful only to integrate someconservation objectives into developmentplans, to provide a basis for reflection onregional development, and to serve as aframework for external assistance.

Local strategies seem to offer betterchances of implementation than strategiesat the national level. Participation isbroader and results are more tangible.Local strategies can be used as appropriateinstruments for implementing nationalstrategies. Going one step further in thehierarchical level, some local strategieshave sought to apply community strate-gies, even within a single village, amongsocial groups which best represent differ-ent development styles and culturaltraditions.

The experience in Latin America supportsthe principle ‘think globally, act locally’.In this sense, decentralization is beneficialto strategies. It also recognizes thatsustainable development is not feasible inisolation. Every locality is subject to strongexternalities; action has to be takensimultaneously at local and national levels.If the national framework is not amenableto sustainable development, then localstrategies can contribute convincingresults which can bring about positivechanges higher up the scale.

2 Avoiding Loss of Continuity

Internalizing strategies

Except in Cuba and Petén, none of thestrategies is an officially sanctioned processlinking all sectors of the government. Thelimited success in this area may be due tothe fact that strategies a) have not concen-trated on macro-economic and regionaldevelopment aspects, which are govern-ment priorities; b) have been perceived asbelonging only to the ‘conservation sector’or the domain of the NGOs; or c) do notpropose specific actions that identify theroles of each participant and are notaccompanied by a plan of action.

Strategies need to be accepted by all theparticipants, and particularly by thevarious ministries involved. While theideal niche would be the Ministry ofPlanning or equivalent, the strategydocument should be prepared with theparticipation of the greatest possiblenumber of institutions involved inachieving the strategy’s objectives. Theinstitutions which need to be consideredinclude those in the economic sector andorganizations responsible for promotingcredit policies and tax exemptions.

Participants must develop confidence inthe process. To achieve this, it is best toinitially avoid controversial subjects, towork on issues of consensus, to create

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a alliances, to make strategic concessionsand to avoid polarization. Some partici-pants advised avoiding any commitmentwith a single political party or movement.

Organizational Bodies

Either a coordinating committee or asupervisory board (inter-institutional)should be set up to maintain the momen-tum of the strategy, coordinate betweenthe parties and maintain a link with thehigher levels of authority. Organizationalarrangements have to be dynamic andflexible; it is futile to set up committeesbefore they are required by the dynamicsof the strategy. The incentives which keepcommittees going are a clear definition ofroles, a distribution of responsibilities andfield results. Written undertakings(agreements) are a good way of backing upcooperation commitments, and formaintenance of joint (technical) institu-tional working groups.

All the case analyses agree that the strategycannot depend on a single institution orNGO. In the absence of any inter-sectoralcommittee or similar body, some strategiesrely on particular government depart-ments or even on senior officials, or haveformed alliances with national interestslikely to provide support. Pressure exertedby donor and cooperation agencies canalso be a positive means of influencingnational policy.

Technical Teams

With or without formal committees,strategies require a source of energy tokeep them going and to motivate the staff.Government bodies may provide thenecessary leadership (as in the cases of thenational strategies of Cuba, Nicaragua andPeru, or the sub-national strategies ofSierra Maestra, Majé and Petén), butfrequently it is the dedication of NGOs orcommitted teams with charismatic leaderswhich lie behind the most successfulexperiments.

It is important to maintain an inter-disciplinary (if possible, inter-institu-tional) strategy team, and to involveintermediate-level officials and not justsenior officials in decisions. It is alsoimportant for technical staff to be nationalcitizens. Having a committed field team isfundamental. Field teams have succeededin maintaining consistency and interestduring difficult times. No strategy willsucceed if we do not believe in them.Many teams have stated that they neveraccept part-time members on the strategyteam to avoid a division of focus andcommitment.

The lack of intermediate, specializedtechnical staff is a limitation mentioned inall the local cases analyzed. Practically allthe strategies have used the humanresources of NGOs. This has made afundamental contribution to sustainable

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their awareness and understanding of theprocess actually improved. The technicalteams also found themselves having toreconsider their priorities and to concen-trate on the more relevant aspects.

Strengthening Local Capacity

The prime achievement of formulating astrategy is not the production of a consen-sus document, but rather generating thenecessary participation to internalize itsrecommendations and strengthening thelocal capacity for implementing strategyactions. The strategy team should not tryto resolve all the problems that arise, butshould make use of existing organizations,strengthen them in their sustainable devel-opment objectives and endorse existinginitiatives. In other words it should act asa catalyst, a guide and a supervisor for theprocess, taking advantage of and strength-ening existing capacity in the region, sothat the national and local players caneventually assume ownership.

The capacity required is organizationaland technical as well as economic. It isimportant for strategies to establish theirfinancial self-sustainability on the basis oflocal sources, the development of supervi-sory mechanisms for sustainable develop-ment, and the concept of an economicstrategy which allows these areas a role innational development and ensures theirintegration and competitiveness in thelong term.

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development processes in the region,especially in remote localities where thegovernment’s presence is minimal.

Financing the Processes

In order to keep a process moving, therehas to be at least a minimum amount ofresources to ensure support for the workof the strategy team, and to providesufficient, flexible budgets to cover work-shops, exchanges, small publications andseed funds for local initiatives. Wherethese minimum resources have not beenavailable, strategies have had to becontent with very limited opportunities orhave been unable to carry on. Manyparticipants agree that it is not even worthsetting the machinery in motion for astrategy with insufficient, inconsistent orfragmented budgets.

All the strategies, except in Cuba andpartly in Brazil, have been heavily depend-ent on external funds. A few cases arecontemplating adding to the local/national financial capacity and eventuallydoing without international cooperation.In this respect, some cases (Kuna-YalaPikín, Tortuguero) went through some‘bridging’ periods of up to a year withoutexternal financing. The experience wastough, particularly for the technical teams,but the processes eventually came out allthe stronger. The local and nationalpromoters of the strategies had to makeup for these shortages and in the process

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a 3 Participation

The Importance of Participation

Strategies belong to everyone, not justtheir promoters. Sustainable developmentinvolves the whole of society. All the casespoint to the fact that broad participationand the involvement of government,private, social and NGO sectors in theanalyses, proposals and implementation ofprogrammes are key factors in guarantee-ing the successful outcome of a strategyprocess. In practice this participation takesthe form of shared responsibility; in thissense, participation is more than justconsultation.

Participation in Practice

The parties involved usually have noprevious experience of participatoryplanning. This inexperience was reflectedin the difficulty encountered in generatingan inter-sectoral vision of problems andtheir solutions, and also in the difficulty ofsustaining the interest of participants inthe continuation of the process. Peopleneed incentives to participate in a strategy.One way of doing this is to look for apoint of consensus in the beginning, andto focus on some feature on which all (orpractically all) potential participants canagree.

Participation will be stronger if it isinitiated right from the start of theprocess, with shared responsibility for theresults. Another important aspect is thatall participants must have a clear notion oftheir specific role in the process. This cleardefinition of roles is fundamental ifinternal conflicts are to be avoided. Ingeneral, a better response was achieved byparticipants who had clear planningobjectives.

One way of applying this principle is togather together potential participants inorder to produce a common assessment ofissues and needs. Participants can thencontribute information pertaining to theirspecialized fields. This makes it easier toidentify information, avoids duplication,makes use of local capacity and creates ashared responsibility for the result.

The Limitations of Participation

Participation also has its limitations. Anyserious participatory planning takes timeand patience if it is to be done properly.As mentioned earlier, participation tendsto bring latent conflicts to the surface, butit also prevents them getting worse. Last,it is impossible and impractical to includeeveryone; the breadth and depth of theprocess will depend on the scale and focusof each strategy. For instance, at the levelof a department or province, the participa-tion of target groups should be restricted

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to representatives of local organizationsand should not be open to individuals inthe communities.

Some cases were stalled because of toomuch participation at different levels withdiffering interests. At the level of commu-nity strategies, while target groups shouldparticipate fully, the presence of seniorofficials who may be pursuing specificpolitical interests may hold up the process.Participation can have several layers withthe same objective; the upper layer ofparticipation establishes the generalframework for the region, while the lowerlayer implements practical measuresamong the target groups. The resultingactions reflect the participation of boththese layers.

4 Implementation of Strategies

Mistakes

Mistakes are a basic element of learning,which means that a working strategyshould clearly identify mistakes and learnfrom them. Some participants expressedthe view that there was a right, and evenan obligation, to err. There should be nofear of mistakes and the risk of beingwrong should not be allowed to inhibitaction. Sharing and talking about mistakesis a good way of learning and helpingothers.

Communications

One mistake to learn from is the relativeinability of all the strategies to communi-cate effectively with all sectors of society.Participants make enormous efforts tomaintain the consistency of the processesand to keep participants’ interest alive, butmost forgot to keep the public informedof progress through the mass media.Equally, strategies have not been presentedin a practical, simple way, so as to con-vince the public of the tangible benefitsthey offer and to show governments howthe strategies can facilitate their task.

Representatives? Leaders?

The official authorities in charge are notnecessarily representative of their commu-nities, nor do they necessarily pass oninformation to the public. In Petén, forinstance, where electoral absenteeism wasas high as 80 per cent and mayors weredeemed not representative of their com-munities, the projects began working withassistant mayors in the villages, who haveoften been in their jobs for as long as tenyears.

At the local level, some of the cases(Guánica, Kuna-Yala, Petén, Tortuguero)called attention to the unsatisfactoryrepresentative qualities of many localleaders, who participated in the formula-tion of strategies and action plans without

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a informing their communities. Somecommunities remained closed to thestrategies until the technical teams begannegotiating with them directly. The lessonhere is that a more direct contact shouldbe sought with the communities, not onlythrough their leaders, but through aforum of participation involving allsectors. Most communities have organiz-ing bodies, in sectors such as sport, health,development, education or cooperatives,in addition to their local authorities.Experience shows that the strategies canset up a liaison committee in each com-munity which is representative of allcommunity groups.

Working with Communities

In local strategies, it is the communitieswhich guarantee the implementation andcontinuity of the process. All the casesreport that commitments with the com-munities have to be fulfilled efficientlyand expeditiously if credibility is not to belost.

Working with the communities is acomplex task. Their interest in participat-ing is won through practical actions, not

plans. Actions emerge from a process ofself assessment by the community. It hasbeen found that in most cases the commu-nities relegate the conservation of naturalresources to a secondary level. Severalstrategies were started with social andinfrastructure projects (for example, inCinturón Verde with waste recycling; inSamaná with beach cleaning; inTortuguero with drinking water and inMajé with a food safety scheme).

The tools used most successfully are pilotprojects, credit facilities through localbanks, exchanges of experience amongpeasants, the participation of women andthe extracurricular work of teachers.Attention has also been drawn to the valueof training peasants as a developmentprocess compared with the more tradi-tional methods of agricultutral extension.

The technical issues can be solved,however; the difficult decisions are thosewhich require a change in people’sbehaviour and attitudes. All agreed thatthe pace and priorities of communitieshave to be respected. The main lesson isthe need to start from the community’srequirements and respond.

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Strategies for Sustainability in Latin America

Central America1 National Strategy, Costa Rica2 National Strategy, Nicaragua

3 Kuna-Yala, Panama

4 Majé-Bayano, Panama5 Petén, Guatemala

6 Tortuguero, Costa Rica

7 Héroes y Mártires, Nicaragua8 Talamanca, Costa Rica

Caribbean9 Guánica, Puerto Rico

10 Bahía de Samaná, Dominican Republic11 Sierra Maestra, Cuba

South America12 Amazonia, Ecuador

13 Sierra Nevada, Colombia

14 Mata Atlántica, Brazil15 Tambopata-Candamo, Peru

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Case Studies:Central America

National Strategy, Costa RicaNational Strategy, NicaraguaKuna-Yala, PanamaMajé-Bayano, PanamaPetén, GuatemalaTortuguero, Costa RicaHéroes y Martires, NicaraguaTalamanca, Costa Rica

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Costa Rica

Strategy for SustainableDevelopment

ROLANDO MENDOZA, NATIONAL UNIVERSITY;

CARLOS QUESADA, UNIVERSITY OF COSTA RICA

AND VIVIENNE SOLÍS, IUCN–ORMA

1 Introduction

Costa Rica’s Conservation Strategy forSustainable Development (ECODES) wasthe first effort at a national level to linkconservation and development. It wasboth a response to the growing concernabout threats to the environment and atimely reply to international calls forsustainable development. At present(1995), many of the main guidelines ofECODES have been incorporated in thenew government’s political programme(1994–1998), even though the strategyhas not yet been officially adopted.

The strategy process began during theterm of office of former president OscarArias (1986–1990), with the support ofthe Ministry of Natural Resources, Energyand Mines (MIRENEM), which was setup in the same period. It also obtained thebacking of various ministries, universitiesand autonomous institutions, and theparticipation of a number of non-govern-mental organizations. The document waspublished by MIRENEM in 1990

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COSTA RICAPopulation: 3,000,000Land area: 50,500 km2

Population density: 59.4 inhab/km2

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a (Quesada Mateo, C. (1990). ECODES:Estrategia de Conservación para elDesarrollo Sostenible de Costa Rica.MIRENEM, San José, Costa Rica).

The strategy offered not just anotherdocument proposing environmental plans,but rather a dynamic, long-term planningprocess based on environmental princi-ples. ECODES did not attempt tosubstitute more short-term national orregional planning efforts, but rather wasintended to provided a reference frame-work to ensure that these planning pro-cesses combined the objectives of conser-vation and socio-economic development.

The subsequent government (1990–1994)recognized ECODES as a significantreference document but didn’t adopt it asa working basis for environmental deci-sions. Despite the lack of formal relationsbetween ECODES and the governmentplanning departments in this period, it isinteresting to note that a number ofnational programmes were compatiblewith the strategy’s guidelines, even thoughthey had no direct connection withECODES. Examples include the NationalSystem of Protected Areas (SINAC), theForest Wildlife Act, the Forest ActionPlan and the introduction of environmen-tal subjects in formal education.

ECODES, and especially the process inwhich it originated, represents a signifi-cant milestone in the history of Costa

Rica’s search for a sustainable society. Thepresent government (1994–98), led byJosé M Figueres, has adopted sustainabledevelopment as the guideline of itsdevelopment policies. Taking its inspira-tion from the philosophy and proposalscontained in ECODES, and more re-cently in Agenda 21, the new govern-ment’s first act was to give wide publicityto a political programme aimed at sustain-able development, which included 70major plans covering all socio-economicdevelopment sectors and the conservationof natural resources. The most significantof these policies and practical measures areoutlined on page 44. They include raisingenvironmental rights to constitutionalstatus, the creation of a system of conser-vation areas covering the whole of thecountry, new industrial and energypolicies, guidelines for agriculturaldevelopment and forestry, the creation ofpublic participation forums and theestablishment of the National Coordinat-ing Body for Sustainable Development(SINADES).

2 Scope and Objectives

Costa Rica’s ECODES was conceptuallyrooted in the latest thinking in conserva-tion and development in the late 1980s,and was Costa Rica’s first effort to developa strategy of action in the field of conser-vation for development based on asystematic, comprehensive and long-term

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approach. The fundamental principleunderlying ECODES is that sustainabledevelopment has to be the country’s long-term objective.

In 1994, many of the guiding principles ofECODES had been incorporated in thepolitical programme of the new govern-ment. The following fundamental objec-tive was taken from President Figueres’sdocument (Gobierno de Costa Rica yConsejo de la Tierra, 1994. DesarolloSostenible, Costa Rica: el compromiso esrealizable. Foro Internaciol “Del Bosque ala Sociedad”. San José, 9-11 May, 1994).

“To establish guidelines for governmentaction at national level, aimed atimproving the quality of life of thecitizens of Costa Rica, and managingproductive and economic aspects inharmony with natural resources and theenvironment.”

Specific objectives (in summary form)include:

• active, concerted participation by thegovernment and society;

• a new institutional framework favour-ing decentralization;

• land-use planning;• combating poverty;• promoting information and education

concerning sustainable development;• investigating the use and enhancement

of natural resources;• promoting the recycling of materials

and avoiding pollution;• making the development of major

infrastructure subordinate to itsusefulness to sustainable developmentand minimizing its environmentalimpact;

• promoting sustainable forms of farm-ing;

• promoting appropriate technologiesand reviewing consumption practices;

• ensuring that trade incorporatesenvironmental criteria; and

• creating a national fund for sustainabledevelopment.

3 Relationship to DevelopmentPlanning

Although ECODES has not yet beenofficially adopted, its influence has beensignificant. It served as a starting point forestablishing Costa Rica’s National Systemof Protected Areas, Forest Wildlife Act,Forest Action Plan and EnvironmentalEducation Master Plan.

ECODES guidelines also inspired the lastgovernment’s political programme, whichincluded 70 major plans and gave rise to aconsiderable number of legal procedures.The main innovations were grantingconstitutional status to environmentalrights, creating a nationwide system of

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a conservation areas, signing inter-sectoralagreements, ratifying internationalagreements, and establishing SINADES.

4 Initial Development

Despite the country’s conservation efforts,the rapid destruction of the environmentand the lack of environmental policieslinked to the development process causedconcern among professional groups inCosta Rica. The government of OscarArias set up MIRENEM by executivedecree, which reflected the government’sfirm intention to ensure proper manage-ment of the country’s natural resources.

The 17th General Assembly of the WorldConservation Union (IUCN), held inCosta Rica in 1987, provided timelyencouragement for the idea of forging anational conservation strategy for sustain-able development. Five internationalNGOs promised their financial andtechnical support for the undertaking,namely IUCN, Conservation Interna-tional, Conservation Foundation, TheNature Conservancy and the WorldwideFund for Nature (WWF).

MIRENEM acted as a centre of opera-tions and provided the process withtechnical support. It also supplied initialfunding pending the arrival of the interna-tional support which the project had

attracted. A strategy management team(director, executive assistant and secretary)drafted methodological guidelines andcoordinated the process.

One of the first steps taken in developingthe strategy was to convene a group of 17professionals, who were put in charge ofthe different sectors planned forECODES. Each coordinator worked witha select group (between four and ten) ofprofessionals. In the course of the processthey acted as experts, with the task ofpreparing a sectoral proposal as part of theoverall strategy. These work teams heldmeetings and organized workshops andother activities, meeting in plenary sessionfrom time to time with the other teams incharge of neighbouring strategy sectors.

A technical committee and a steeringcommittee operated throughout theprocess. They comprised some 40 peopleof the highest professional calibre, whohad each demonstrated experience andcommitment. The persons chosen for thetechnical committee had training andexperience in their respective sectors,while the management committee in-cluded professionals with a broad-rangingview. The national governmental institu-tions and NGOs linked to the country’sdevelopment were represented on bothcommittees.

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Three workshops were held during thepreparatory phase of the strategy. Thesewere attended by a team from each sectoras well as by the technical and manage-ment committees. The sectoral teams’systems methodology provided genericreference terms for the different sectorsand helped to find a common language toanalyze the key issues, problems andmandate of the different sectors. Theworkshops were a useful exercise inparticipation and inter-disciplinary work,and provided an opportunity to discussand exchange views on major conservationand development issues.

This work led to the preparation of theFirst National Congress on the Conserva-tion Strategy for Sustainable Develop-ment, which offered an opportunity toimprove the process prior to the prepara-tion of the consolidated document. Allfour presidential candidates attended thecongress, which ensured that the theme ofthe strategy and sustainable developmentwas firmly on the political agenda for theforthcoming elections and would thereforeachieve a high level of public recognition.

Since then, the present government has setup SINADES, with the objective ofensuring the integration of all nationalpolicies and action for sustainable devel-opment. SINADES includes a NationalCouncil, advisory technical committees, a

Public Participation Council and aFoundation for Sustainable Development.

5 Implementation and Results

ECODES provided the starting point fora number of major initiatives in thecountry, such as setting up the Biodiver-sity Institute, preparing the NationalEnergy Plan (following preliminary effortsto encourage energy savings and effi-ciency), and instituting the Forest WildlifeAct, the Forest Action Plan, and theMaster Plan for Environmental Educa-tion. In general, there was a strengtheningof existing initiatives. One such examplewas the National Parks Service, a pro-gramme initiated in 1970 which graduallyevolved into a decentralized system ofconservation areas. The programme wasproposed in 1990 and became official in1994.

Successive governments provided varyingdegrees of support for the strategy.Nevertheless, the seeds sown by ECODESin 1990 – and the interest and commit-ment in favour of sustainable developmentby all those who had helped to launch it –survived and grew, eventually flourishingafter 1994, when political circumstancesimproved.

Notable features of the government’s1994–98 programme include:

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a • granting constitutional status toenvironmental rights;

• the creation of a system of conservationareas covering the whole of the country;

• the ratification of the UNCED Rioagreements and the creation ofSINADES;

• the fight against poverty;• the creation of citizen participation

forums;• land-use planning;• limitation of the agricultural sector’s

environmental impact;• regulation of CO

2 emissions;

• elimination of lead in fuels; and• a public information campaign on

matters related to development.

6 Lessons Learned

Factors in favour of the strategy processinclude:

• the channelling of moral and financialsupport, and the degree of environmen-tal awareness achieved by individualsprepared to work as a team, acted ascatalysts and contributed to the successof the process;

• the participation of local professionals,familiar with the national situation andcommitted to change;

• the technical and inter-disciplinaryemphasis, leading to a proper inter-sectoral analysis based on systemsanalysis; and

• the international image generated bythe process. The government’s explicitpolicy in favour of sustainable develop-ment has proved to be a significantattraction for the tourism sector and forinternational cooperation.

Factors against the strategy processinclude:

• ECODES was set up hurriedly with analready overworked team;

• from 1990 to 1994, the strategy waslimited to the extent that it was notaccepted as a major planning objective;and

• when ECODES was first formulatedand in subsequent years (1987–1993),there was little institutional commit-ment to it. This was due partly topolitical changes, but also to the factthat it began as the initiative of a singleministry (MIRENEM).

Lessons learned from the process include:

• a strategy is a way of moving towardsthe future. It provides a method ofanticipating scenarios and situations inorder to prevent future detrimentalimpacts. The participatory processrequired a great deal of learning. Inter-disciplinary cooperation enabledcolleagues in different departments tolearn together and helped individuals torecognize the other person’s point ofview and arrive at a consensus throughdialogue;

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• changes of government should notmean the end of the process. Eventhough there was not always formalcontinuity from one administration tothe next, one of the most positiveoutcomes in the case of Costa Rica wasthe creation of informal networks;

• as outlined in Quesada Mateo (1990):“There is a need to formulate a strategyto serve as a reference framework forfuture development plans, although thisrequires a greater degree of political

maturity on the part of policy-makersand society as a whole, with regard tothe understanding and significance ofECODES”; and

• the development of an environmentalpolicy in Costa Rica is due as much tothe process initiated by ECODES on anational level, as to the encouragementfor sustainable development policiesderived from international and CostaRican commitments at the Rio summit.

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7 Chronology

1976 Costa Rica 2000 Symposium, the first national forum at which aspects ofdevelopment and the conservation of natural resources are discussed.

1982 Publication of the Environmental Profile of Costa Rica.

1986 Establishment of Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines(MIRENEM) by executive decree.

1987 Appointment of a director for ECODES and start of preparations for thestrategy. International support obtained for the initiation of the process(US$ 110,000). 17th IUCN General Assembly in Costa Rica.

1988 Various public information activities related to the preparation of the strategyat national and international level and participation in several official ministe-rial committees. First Congress of the National Conservation Strategy forSustainable Development (public meeting held in the National Theatre).

1989 Follow-up activities and completion of ECODES sector coordination.Beginning of pre-electoral period.

1990 New government of president Rafael Angel Calderón (1990–1994). Publica-tion of National Conservation Strategy document and of the report on theFirst Congress.

1991 Initiation of Forest Action Plan for Costa Rica. Publication of Master Plan forEnvironmental Education for Costa Rica. Completion of National Biodiver-sity Institute. Establishment of National Environmental Education Commis-sion by government decree following ECODES recommendations and theMaster Plan for Environmental Education.

1992 Approval of new Forest Wildlife Conservation Act.

1994 The government of President J M Figueres proclaims sustainable develop-ment as the basis of its political programme for 1994–1998, including 70major guidelines for national development, and a considerable number ofpractical measures. Establishment of SINADES. Approval of ConservationAreas Act, covering the whole of the national territory, and initiation ofdecentralization in the management and conservation of natural resources.

1995 Environmental rights of Costa Rican citizens raised to constitutional status.

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Nicaragua

National ConservationStrategy for SustainableDevelopment

BAYARDO SERRANO, MARENA,WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ALBERTO SALAS, IUCN

1 Introduction

Compared with other countries in thearea, Nicaragua possesses substantialnatural resources in the form of fertileland, forestry resources, water resources,fisheries, minerals and scenery. This majorpotential could generate a diversifiedsupply of raw materials and services if itwere comprehensively and sustainablymanaged. More diversified productioncould provide the basis for a sound,creative and dynamic relation with worldmarkets while satisfying the basic needs ofthe population. So far, however, develop-ment policies have run into considerabledifficulties when attempting to take fulladvantage of the diversified, complex andgenerous supply of natural resourcesavailable.

The way in which natural resources havebeen used has caused serious degradationin the country’s ecosystems, through waterpollution and shortages, fertile soil erosionand deforestation. In view of the socialand environmental situation currently

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NICARAGUAPopulation: 3,000,000Land area: 148,000 km2

Population density: 21 inhab/km2

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a facing the people of Nicaragua, there is anurgent need to adopt and implement astrategy for sustainable development. Thisstrategy should resolve existing problems,while undertaking to mobilize the coun-try’s full potential. This will help toachieve economic growth and satisfy theessential requirements of the populationand of national development from amedium- and long-term perspective. Sucha strategic requirement must at the sametime remain open to the profoundtechnological, economic and politicalchanges which have occurred in the world.

In 1990, the Government of Nicaraguaundertook to formulate its NationalConservation Strategy for SustainableDevelopment. This initiative coincidedwith the Forest Action Plan and sought tosecure the broadest possible participationof all Nicaraguan sectors. The nationalteam placed special emphasis on the needto involve all local authorities, recognizingtheir independent status and seeking toshare responsibility throughout Nicara-guan society.

The strategy was approved by the centralgovernment in 1992 by presidentialdecree, pending the submission andapproval of the Environmental ActionPlan (PAANIC) to initiate implementa-tion. The Environmental Action Planreceived the financial support of theDanish International DevelopmentAgency (DANIDA) in 1993. Nevertheless

at present (1995), the strategy has lostmomentum in terms of governmentalpolicy. This is due to the disbanding ofthe technical team, which had acted as thedriving force behind the strategy, andbecause the task of following up thestrategy was not delegated to the recently-created Ministry for Natural Resources(MARENA).

2 Objectives and Approach

From the start, Nicaragua’s National Con-servation Strategy for Sustainable Devel-opment included the notion of regionalplanning as a basic means of achievingsustainability. The general objective of thestrategy is to establish a sustainabledevelopment model, which will promoteeconomic growth and satisfy the basicneeds of the population and of futuregenerations, on the basis of the broadestpossible democratic participation, socialjustice, conservation of the environmentand the rational use of natural resources.

Specific objectives may be summarized asfollows:

• helping to eliminate poverty, and toimprove the living standards andquality of life of the majority of thepopulation, by improving the quality ofthe environment;

• enhancing democracy by strengtheninglocal government institutions and

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public participation in environmentalmanagement;

• preserving biodiversity and the viabilityof ecosystems;

• exploiting natural resources rationallyand sustainably;

• increasing the productive supply ofgoods and services for domestic con-sumption, especially basic products forthe population, and reducing thedependence on oil for energy;

• diversifying exports; and• decentralizing administration and

including the areas of the Atlanticcoast.

3 Relationship to DevelopmentPlanning

From the outset, the strategy incorporatedthe notion of land-use planning and closerlinks with the agricultural, tourism andfinancial sectors. Another importantaspect has been the creation of Environ-mental Units by local authorities.

The strategy was approved by presidentialdecree in 1992, subject to PAANIC beingcompleted prior to implementation. It wassubmitted to the international communityin an effort to seek the necessary supportfor priority actions. In 1993, it receivedfinancial support from the Danishgovernment.

4 Initial Development

In 1990, the Government of Nicaragua,with the financial support of the SwedishGovernment, acting through the SwedishInternational Development Authority(SIDA), agreed to launch the ForestAction Plan for Nicaragua (PAFNIC).The technical unit which was set up toprepare the plan insisted that PAFNICcould not and should not be considered asan isolated forest scheme, but rather as aninter-sectoral responsibility and task,which would be an integral part ofnational planning. In the light of pastexperience (a Forest Action Plan had beenestablished in 1985 but never put intopractice), it was recognized that, ifPAFNIC was to succeed, it had to be partof a broader environmental plan, which inturn would follow the guidelines of aconservation strategy for sustainabledevelopment.

At the same time as the importance ofterritorial planning was recognized, it wasalso understood that participation wasneeded at different levels. In this respect,the participation of municipal councils hasbeen a key component.

A national consultation process wasorganized, involving 143 municipalitiesfrom all over the country, local NGOs,departmental delegates of the centralgovernment, representatives of Catholicand Evangelical churches, members of the

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a resistance and demobilized members ofthe Sandinista army. The process providedan opportunity for people to becomeacquainted with local concerns andinitiatives, which were subsequentlyincorporated in the national proposal.

The strategy team held another series ofmeetings with technicians, professionalassociations, indigenous groups, women,journalists, lawyers and others. Manymatters were discussed in order to workout a major proposal on a national scale.At the end of this very broad-rangingnational exercise, the main problemsidentified by the population were defor-estation, water shortage and pollution,and the lack of environmental educationprogrammes.

Information was gathered and sorted, andthe team then returned to each municipal-ity for a second workshop. There partici-pants had the opportunity to review theinformation processed by the work team.Simultaneously, the unit in charge offormulating the National ConservationStrategy for Sustainable Development andthe Forest Action Plan for Nicaragua(ECOT-PAF) organized eight seminars onthe identification and formulation ofprojects, with the support of the FinnishInternational Development Agency(FINNIDA). The seminars were attendedby councillors, town hall officials, NGOdelegates, representatives of universities,farmers’ associations, women and others.

The strategy proposed a series of measuresin all development sectors, as well as 19conservation and sustainable developmentprogrammes (PCODES) as an operationalbasis for the scheme. These priorityprogrammes were divided into threegroups: changes in production, socialtransformation and support programmes.

5 Implementation and Results

PAANIC constitutes the formal mecha-nism for strategy implementation. Atpresent it is being developed with thefinancial support of DANIDA. This isachieving other results, including thefollowing:

• the central government has preparedand approved the strategy, the land-useplanning scheme and the Forest ActionPlan;

• environmental and ecological develop-ment committees have been organizedin the municipalities and departments;

• with the support of MARENA, munici-pal authorities and the Ministry ofEducation, several municipalities haveset up ecological brigades, with theparticipation of primary and secondaryschool students;

• Nicaraguan NGOs have adopted thestrategy, land-use planning scheme,PAFNIC and PAANIC as their own,and use them as guiding principles foraction;

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• the stock-breeding sector and coopera-tives of farmers with small, mediumand large farms have begun the refor-estation of their properties;

• the mass media are playing a funda-mental role in environmental policy;and

• there has been an increased nationalawareness of the need to preserve andmake rational use of natural resources.

6 Lessons Learned

The active participation of the Nicaraguanpeople has been useful in furthering thestrategy. Perhaps the main lesson learnedin this area has been the need to worktogether from the start. In this sense,participation must be activated when thefirst formulation steps are taken. Anotherpositive effect of broad participation hasbeen the adoption of the strategy by local

authorities, and by parliamentary andother government bodies.

The more negative aspects have includedstructural adjustment policies and eco-nomic policy in general, which have attimes distorted the strategy’s development.Other negative factors have been institu-tional weakness and the difficult politicalsituation in Nicaragua.

All these factors are summed up in twobasic concerns expressed by the workteam. One is the impact which interna-tional economic policies may have on thedevelopment of the strategy, and the otheris the absence of an ECOT-PAF follow-upunit. The lack of such a unit has broughtabout the present inertia in the strategy,since the new Ministry of Natural Re-sources has not incorporated the strategyas a guideline for its policies.

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7 Chronology

1990 Establishment of the Coordinating Unit. Recruitment of national specialists,development of national consultation, municipal workshops, governmentprocessing of information, seminars with government bodies.

1991 Seminars with municipalities to discuss the results and the proposal com-pleted in 1990 with local authorities, local NGOs and other bodies. Trainingseminars on the identification and formulation of forestry projects undertakenjointly with local authorities, officials and NGOs. Discussion of proposalswith the work team and discussion of strategy proposals with the govern-ment’s economic office and other central government authorities.

1992 Preparation of final documents and submission to government authorities,both local and national. Approval of the strategy by the government andsubmission of the proposals to international organizations.

1993 Implementation of some FAP projects. Initial formulation of PAANIC,discussions with local authorities and submission of the plan to the centralgovernment.

1994 DANIDA finances the implementation of PAANIC.

1995 The disbanding of the technical team, which was the driving force for thestrategy, prevents any follow-up with the recently-created Ministry of NaturalResources (MARENA).

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Kuna-Yala, Panama

Sustainability forComprehensive Development

OTONIEL GONZÁLEZ, PEMASKY, WITH THE

ASSISTANCE OF VIVIENNE SOLÍS, IUCN

1 Introduction

In 1925, the Kuna revolution led to thegranting of an indigenous territory calledComarca, which remained part of Panamaand was officially recognized in 1953. Theterritory of Kuna-Yala, on the easterncoast of Panama, is made up of 365islands (50 of which are inhabited),situated in the Caribbean, in addition toother territory on the coast and in thehinterland. Kuna-Yala, with 47,000inhabitants, is one of the few remainingindigenous territories in Panama.

Since 1980, the Kuna-Yala people havemade considerable effort to oppose thedestruction of the forest and naturalresources in their territory. For the Kunapeople, the forest represents a source ofgreat benefits, including the protection oftheir aquifers, reefs, fishing, medicines andsupplies. They feel that “without theforest, human survival would not bepossible”. For this reason the forestresource constitutes the focal point of thestrategy. The Kuna have kept intact some80 per cent of the forests in their territory,

KUNA-YALA, PANAMAPopulation: 47,000Land area: 320,800 ha + 365 small islandsEcological zones: tropical forest, limestone islands and reefsMain economic activities: fishing,agriculture, tourism

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a compared with only 30 per cent in the restof Panama.

In 1983, the Association of Kuna Employ-ees (AEK) proposed the EcologicalProgramme for the Management of theForest Areas of Kuna-Yala (PEMASKY).This reflected the Kuna people’s desire toorganize in defence of their environmentalresources. The programme was approvedby the Kuna General Council, and hasbecome the main driving force behind theplan to achieve a local conservationstrategy for sustainable development inKuna territory. The strategy aims toprovide full protection for an area of100,000 hectares and to manage theterritory’s forests and lands sustainably, soas to improve the quality of life for presentand future Kuna generations.

Since 1983, with the endorsement of theKuna General Council, agreements havebeen approved whereby the governmentundertakes to support the Kuna people’ssustainable development activities plannedfor the strategy. The national governmenthas drawn up a Forest Action Plan, whichincludes the strategy among its mainguidelines. The Kuna community hasreceived the support of NGOs which havetaken an interest in the process, such asthe Fundación Panamá, ANCON andothers.

Funding for the forestry component of thestrategy was approved in 1993 by the

International Timber Trade Organization(ITTO) and the Government of Panamathrough the National Institute for Renew-able Natural Resources (INRENARE). Abiodiversity inventory is also being com-pleted. In 1994, the government approvedthe establishment of the full 100,000-hectare reserve proposed for the strategy.Many other activities have been carriedout in the areas of training, disseminationand environmental education.

The activities proposed for the strategyhave a very good chance of obtainingfinancial support, although funding willdepend on the results produced in thisfirst stage of implementation. On theother hand, the strategy might havebenefited from more participation in theformulation process. In addition, there arestill problems arising from the attributionof responsibilities, lack of coordinationand a poor exchange of information withother NGOs and with some communities.Frequent changes of government have alsohad a negative effect on local organization.Since 1994, however, these problems aregradually being overcome.

2 Objectives and Approach

The basic goal of the strategy is to supportinitiatives for the protection of environ-mental and natural resources in the Kunaterritory that will ensure the sustainableuse of the forest and improve the living

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standards of the Kuna people. The stra-tegy is a response to the imminent dangerof losing the forest resource throughdeforestation caused by the introductionof settlers and peasants from the centralprovinces of the country.

Despite the fact that the forest componenthas been given greater attention within theprocess, the strategy includes otherimportant aspects for development and forimproving the quality of life of theterritory’s inhabitants, including land-useplanning, activities for the protection ofwater basins, protection of forest wildlife,agroforestry and improvement of theinternal economy.

3 Relationship to DevelopmentPlanning

The Kuna people have set up the KunaGeneral Council, which makes decisionsand discusses actions to be taken. TheCouncil is made up of 200 officialdelegates, with three delegates from eachcommunity and three territorial chiefsacting as the highest authority. Techni-cians prepare proposals that are submittedto the Council for approval. The strategy’stechnical team submitted drafts on threeoccasions to the Kuna General Council,which approved the document on thethird submission.

At present (1995), there is a fairly closerelation to the policy of the nationalgovernment. In Panama, INRENARE isthe body in charge of monitoring, protect-ing and managing the country’s naturalresources. It was this institution whichcoordinated the implementation of theForest Action Plan for Panama. Thisnational planning exercise incorporatedthe sustainability strategy for the compre-hensive development of Kuna-Yala as partof its guidelines. In 1994, at the request ofthe Kuna-Yala people, the state declared100,000 hectares within the territory aprotected area.

4 Initial Development

As outlined at the beginning of thischapter, the indigenous territory ofComarca was recognized in 1953. TheKuna-Yala community now has its ownlegislation, language and religion.

Before the arrival of NGOs, and prior tothe launching of the PEMASKY pro-gramme in 1983, decisions were made bygovernment institutions. This has nowchanged, and direct consultations are heldwith organized groups in charge ofprogramming projects for the benefit ofindigenous communities. The strategy forthe conservation of the Kuna-Yala forestwas planned from the start without stateinterference; that is, it was an initiative

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a that originated entirely within the Kunacommunity. Following the inception ofthe project in 1983, serious problems withfunding arose during the period of thedictatorship in Panama. It was difficult tosign agreements, for instance, or to followup any attempts to implement the project.The situation has now improved, how-ever, and there is a direct link withnational government policy.

At the beginning, the PEMASKY pro-gramme was run by a group of eleven localtechnicians (specializing in forestry,agronomy, architecture and topography),who constituted the work team responsi-ble for preparing the basic document. Thisgroup now recognizes that the documentwas prepared without sufficient grassrootsparticipation by the Kuna people. Never-theless, the project team briefed the KunaGeneral Council twice a year on theprogress with strategy preparation. Thedocument was eventually approved byCouncil. Other measures were laterimplemented as part of the programme inthe field of environmental education,which gave the rest of the population abetter idea of what was being proposed forthe strategy.

Although there are several Kuna NGOs,only the PEMASKY programme obtainedthe official recognition of the KunaGeneral Council. The other organizationshave participated in the process, but onlythrough indirect consultation.

At the beginning of the process the idea offormulating a strategy received interna-tional support. The main organizationsinvolved were WWF ($150,000), theMacArthur Foundation ($50,000), andthe Interamerican Foundation (IAF,$50,000). When the proposal documentwas prepared, several countries expressedan interest in providing support. Japan,the US and the ITTO sent missions to thearea and have all supported the initiativein some form or other. At present theKuna vision of the project has beenaccepted, but at the beginning there wassome fear among the Kuna people thatthese outside bodies might interfere withproposed strategy activities, one suchpossibility arising in the case of Japanesesupport and the marketing of timber. Theproject leaders consider that it wasunderstood by the ITTO that the purposeof the project was not to commercializethe timber, but to carry out a basic studyaimed at guaranteeing the conservation ofthe forest resource.

5 Implementation and Results

The strategy includes activities scheduledfor immediate implementation whichwere given priority in a plan of action.The strategy as a whole will be imple-mented under the PEMASKY pro-gramme, with the advice of techniciansworking for the Forest Action Plancoordinated by the INRENARE. Current

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activities include an inventory of forestresources, research into biodiversity,agroforestry projects, indigenous medicineand environmental education. The localcapacity for conservation has improvedsubstantially. The community’s owntechnicians have taken an active part inpreparing and implementing the strategyguidelines.

In 1994, the national government estab-lished a 100,000-hectare reserve in theterritory at the Kuna people’s request.This notwithstanding, the achievements ofthis project in practice have been severelyhampered by political and economicproblems. The collection of funds hasnever been properly organized, while localNGOs have proliferated and have in someform or other diverted funds originallycollected for PEMASKY. Once again, thefrequent changes of government have alsohad a substantial effect.

The main tools used for management are:

• land-use capacity plans emphasizing theprotection of waterways and forests;

• inter-institutional working groups(forestry and conservation sectors);

• training of project technicians andseminars for local forestry officials;

• systematic environmental education;• frequent meetings with communities,

leaders and grassroots organizations;• requests to international sponsors for

funds;

• development of self-financing plansbased on ecological tourism activitiesand other productive activities (includ-ing the sale of handicraft products); and

• review of the strategy every three years.

6 Lessons Learned

Aspects in favour of the process include:

• the interest and dedication shown bylocal technicians in the formulation ofthe document, and the support ofprofessionals from foreign universities;

• incorporation of ideas from the culturalperspective of the Kuna people, withthose concerned taking a direct part inpreparing and implementing thestrategy;

• achievement of a consensus among theparties (communities, users andgovernment bodies);

• approval of the plan by the nationalgovernment and incorporation of thestrategy within the Forest Action Planfor Panama; and

• definition and planning of short- andmedium-term scenarios based on stan-dards for the use of natural resources.

Main factors against the strategy processinclude:

• the leaders of the Kuna communitywere not brought in from the start. The

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a technical team planned the strategy’sguidelines without any proper consulta-tion, even though the guidelines wereapproved by the Kuna General Coun-cil. The basic document would havebeen more complete if the communityhad been involved from the first stagesof drafting. Permanent consultationsneed to be held with the communitiesinvolving the grassroots leaders;

• some ecological concepts and terms areincomprehensible to the target groups;

• lack of forestry technicians familiarwith the Kuna cultural reality; and

• the strategy is almost entirely limited tothe forestry sector, while insufficienteffort has been made to develop otheraspects linked to biodiversity andhuman development.

The main lessons learned are:

• the participation of the population atlarge in strategy formulation, not mereconsultation through the leaders, isimportant as a means of obtainingpublic support and assistance in laterstages;

• the strategy must be developed by alocal team. This will identify andstrengthen the Kuna people’s owninitiatives in the area of sustainabledevelopment; and

• the indigenous communities are fullyable to conduct a process based onappropriate guidelines for the manage-ment of their own natural resources.

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7 Chronology

1925 The Kuna-Yala, through a revolution, obtain the autonomy of their territory(Comarca).

1953 The Government of Panama officially recognizes the Comarca by official act

1983 AEK establishes PEMASKY, which is approved by the Kuna GeneralCouncil.

1987 Completion of the document (Kuna-Yala Management Plan) covering thebasic conservation aspects of the territory’s natural resources. The manage-ment plan is the beginning of the process of preparing the strategy. Thedocument is approved by the Kuna General Council.

1989 Invasion of the Republic of Panama by the United States. First revision of themanagement plan. Cooperation agreements are concluded with variousinstitutions, national NGOs and donor organizations.

1991 Second revision of the management plan and cooperation agreement with theINRENARE.

1993 Funding obtained for a general evaluation of the document and previousplans (three-month evaluation supported by the Interamerican Foundation).Approval obtained to implement the forestry component of the strategy(ITTO–$222,000) and start of the first phase of this component.

1994 At the request of the Kuna people, the government declares 100,000 hectaresas a reserve within the Comarca. Move to institutionalize PEMASKY as theProgramme of Ecology and Management of Kuna-Yala Forest Areas.

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a Alto Bayano Basin,Rio Majé, Panama

Sustainable DevelopmentStrategy

DIONISIO BATISTA, IUCN–PANAMA

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ARTURO LÓPEZ, IUCN

1 Introduction

The Alto Bayano, which covers an area of350,000 hectares and is the largest hydro-electric basin in Panama, has been affectedby colonization and deforestation sincethe 1970s. After 1976, the governmenttried to resolve the problems of landtenure and inefficient use of the landwhile trying to slow the pace of deforesta-tion, but the conflicts continued toworsen with the passage of time. Anofficial commission was set up in 1985 asa means of protecting the basin. Known asthe Bayano Commission, it is composedof representatives of 11 national institu-tions, local communities and the privatesector. In 1990, as part of the TropicalForest Action Plan (TFAP), it was decidedto start a regional strategy to guide theefforts of different institutions and helpestablish a framework of agreementbetween conflicting interests.

Little progress was made in the early years,apart from promoting the strategy within

MAJÉ-BAYANO, PANAMALand area: 350,000 haEcological zones: river basin,tropical forestMain economic activities: timber andsubsistence agriculture

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the government itself and setting up thecommission in 1990. Then in 1994 thechange of government opened the way tomore operational possibilities in the field.The difficult relations between indigenouspeople and peasants were finally improvedwhen the groups reached an agreementhalting further penetration of the forest.This was largely achieved through theintroduction of proposals for economicalternatives, rather than by repressivepolicies. The alternatives put forward wereaimed at solving the problems pointed outby the communities themselves.

Although the government is responsiblefor the strategy, there is no documentformally setting out the new policies. Ithas attracted growing interest on the partof the government, however, which is now(1995) studying the possibility of expand-ing the strategy’s application.

2 Scope and Objectives

The objective of the initial project was toprotect the basin. The project has sinceevolved into a strategy with the followingobjectives:

• preserving the Alto Bayano basin, itsecological function and its waterregulation capacity;

• sustainable development for localcommunities;

• preserving the characteristic biodiversityof the area;

• resolving inter-ethnic problems,particularly between indigenous groupsand settlers; and

• regulating farming and forestry activi-ties and offering the local populationsustainable production alternatives.

3 Relationship to DevelopmentPlanning

Although the government is responsiblefor the strategy, the latter has still notbeen formally set out in a document. TheBayano Commission has producedrecommendations, however, which willconstitute the basis of official policy forthe area in the water, forest and conserva-tion sectors. The TFAP and the activitiesof international aid organizations in thisarea have been fully integrated withinthese policies. It is possible that thesepolicies will now be officially adopted.The government is showing a growinginterest in incorporating the project withits policies and is considering the possibil-ity of extending the area of the strategy tothe whole of the basin.

4 Initial Development

Initially, the objective of the plan formanaging the problems of the upper basin

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a of the Bayano River was to protect thebasin by stabilizing the advance of theagricultural frontier and by solving inter-ethnic problems. These were generatingan escalating level of violence betweenindigenous groups (Kuna and Emberá)and settlers from the central provinces ofPanama. After 1976, the government andother national organizations made aneffort to resolve conflicts related to landuse and tenure, and to halt the conversionof forests to other uses by cattle ranchersand loggers. The conflicts continued toworsen, however.

In 1985 the Bayano Commission wasestablished. With the initiation of theTFAP in 1990, a management plan forthe basin was prepared. This processbegan towards the end of 1993, with thefinancial support of Bundesministeriumfür Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit(BMZ, Germany). IUCN provided tech-nical assistance, and still plays an impor-tant role in promoting the actual strategy.

5 Implementation and Results

The establishment of the Bayano Com-mission constituted a real milestone, asdid the incorporation of the TFAP in1990. There were difficulties during theinitiation phase, and because of having tostart up the bureaucratic machinery beforebeing able to move on to the field with aproposal. The government elected in 1994

supported the strategy and thus moreprogress with field work was achieved in ashort period of time than had beenaccomplished previously.

Although strained relations betweenindigenous peoples and peasants affectedthe project considerably, in 1994 theopposing groups reached an agreement tostop invading the forest. This wasachieved through the introduction ofproduction alternatives aimed at solvingthe problems encountered by the commu-nities, such as the security of food sup-plies. The basic tool was encouragingexchanges between the peasants. A furtherpositive outcome was the fact that theKuna-Bayano indigenous people, who hadpreviously been reluctant to considerparticipating in government programmes,actually asked to participate in the project.This was the first time that this hadhappened in the community.

6 Lessons Learned

The limitations of the project include:

• colonization in indigenous Kuna andEmberá territories;

• invasion of Panama and politicalchanges in 1989–1990, which held upthe process and aggravated conflicts;

• poor support by the Ministry ofAgriculture and other governmentbodies;

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• limited participation by the communi-ties in the early years; and

• lack of territorial planning or an overallstrategy.

Among the opportunities realized were:

• emphasizing the basin’s hydrologicalfunction as a national asset;

• integration of the strategy within theTFAP and links with internationalorganizations; and

• the positive effects of the recent changeof government.

The lessons learned include:

• working objectives must be politicallyviable;

• planning and coordination must bevery dynamic and flexible, sinceconditions are variable and situationschange;

• commitments with the communitiesmust be dealt with effectively andexpeditiously if credibility is to bepreserved;

• work with the communities shouldbegin by dealing with the priorityproblems brought up by the communi-ties themselves, and peasants from otherareas should be encouraged to exchangeexperiences.

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7 Chronology

1970 The Kuna and Emberá indigenous territory is gradually colonized by peasantsfrom other parts of the country. The process of deforestation and inter-ethnicconfrontation begins.

1976 The government identifies the problem as a serious threat to the hydro-electric function of the country’s main basin. A plan is instituted to avoiddeforestation.

1985 Establishment of the Bayano Commission, composed of 11 representatives ofnational institutions, local communities and the private sector.

1986 CATIE undertakes a study of the situation in the basin.

1989 Invasion of Panama by the U S. Process halted for a year.

1990 Formulation of a Tropical Forest Action Plan for the area, with greaterpowers for the Commission, which is instructed to formulate a strategy forthe whole of the basin.

1993 IUCN joins the Commission’s work. Funds are obtained from BMZ for theimplementation of the strategy.

1994 Initial contacts with the communities lead to agreements for the protection ofthe forest and the development of sustainable productive activities.

1995 The Kuna-Bayano people request participation in the process. The govern-ment considers extending the coverage area of the strategy.

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Petén Region, Guatemala

Sustainable DevelopmentStrategy

MARCO A PALACIOS M, SEGEPLAN

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ALEJANDRO C IMBACH,IUCN

1 Introduction

The Petén region, in the extreme north ofGuatemala between Mexico and Belize,has a long history going back to the pre-classical and classical periods of Mayanculture. The territory contains some of theMaya’s finest works, such as the cities ofTikal, Uaxactún, Yaxjá, Naranjo, Miradorand others. The Maya left behind remark-able remains in the form of stone cities,beautiful works of art, impressive engi-neering achievements and the still unre-solved mystery of their swift disappearanceat the end of the first millennium.

The tropical jungle invaded the inhabitedsites and engulfed the karstic plains andhills that were the dominant feature inPetén for hundreds of years. It was only inthis century that people returned in greatnumbers to these warm lowlands. Thisreturn has been linked to a number ofunderlying structural problems in Guate-mala, such as very high population densityon the Altiplano, concentration of land onthe south coast and degradation of natural

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PETÉN REGION, GUATEMALAPopulation: approximately 150,000Land area: 3,600,000 haEcological zones: flatlands, seasonaltropical forestMain economic activities: timber,tourism, hunting

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a resources in the east. These factors havegiven rise to a powerful migratory flowinto the Petén region, causing the popula-tion to grow at a rate of over 10 per cent,with all the resulting problems of massivedeforestation, soil erosion, shortages ofservices for the local population, etc.

The origins of the Integrated Develop-ment Plan for Petén (PDI Petén) go backto 1987, at the beginning of the firstcivilian government in Guatemala afterseveral decades of military rule. Thiscivilian government took office under themandate of a new National Constitutionspecifically mentioning the ‘urgenteconomic integration of Petén’ (transi-tional article No 15 of the PoliticalConstitution of Guatemala) and under-took a regional assessment, which wascompleted in 1987 by the GeneralPlanning Department (SEGEPLAN).

At the same time as PDI Petén waslaunched, the government also establishedthe National Environmental Commission(CONAMA). The government undertookthis initiative as one of its immediatepriorities to deal with the degradation ofnatural resources in Petén, and requestedIUCN support to prepare a first regionalsustainable development strategy for thearea. This task was pursued jointly withCONAMA and SEGEPLAN during1988, and the final document was used tonegotiate a loan with the Federal Republicof Germany through the Kreditanstalt für

Wiederaufbau (KfW), with a view topreparing an integrated development plansetting out detailed guidelines for adevelopment process in harmony withnature.

The plan was prepared between 1990 and1992, under the coordination of thePlanning Department’s Petén Implemen-tation Unit (UNEPET) and Agrar undHydrotechnik (AHT), a German consul-tancy firm, with the participation of manynational institutions and IUCN. As of1995, the plan was still awaiting govern-ment approval.

2 Scope and Objectives

The Integrated Development Plan forPetén is a comprehensive proposal cover-ing the whole of the Department of Petén(35,800 km2). In conceptual terms, thePetén Plan explicitly adopts sustainabledevelopment as its basic goal, and coversall the main sectors of regional activity,such as:

• regulation of land tenure and use;• social development;• promotion of sustainable development

among the communities;• preservation of biological diversity

(ecosystems, species and genes);• energy and communications infrastruc-

ture;

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• cattle farming, agroforestry and forestryactivities;

• tourism;• industrial activity and micro-enter-

prises; and• institutional and legal aspects.

The specific objectives of the IntegratedDevelopment Plan are:

• to increase agricultural, stock-breedingand forestry productivity, while ensur-ing their sustainability;

• to protect the forest through a systemof protected areas and the generation ofalternative sources of income for thepopulation;

• to apply and give effect to legislationprotecting natural resources;

• to focus public action on improvingservices and the environmental situa-tion;

• to regulate immigration according tothe availability of suitable land;

• to protect the cultural and archaeologi-cal heritage;

• to develop an adequate communica-tions network;

• to generate non-farm employment inPetén; and

• to develop adequate energy, drinkingwater and sanitation systems.

3 Relationship to NationalInstitutions

UNEPET fully assumed its role as coordi-nator of national institutions (health,education, agriculture, forestry, protectedareas, land, public works, etc), workingwith them to formulate the plan. In addi-tion, through SEGEPLAN, the plan is co-ordinated with the country’s developmentpolicies, which are less advanced in termsof adopting sustainability as their basiccriterion, but not openly opposed to it.

The Integral Development Plan for Peténis not officially binding on the otherministries. However, a Petén Develop-ment Council has been established, withrepresentation from all ministries. Imple-menting the plan is the mandate of thisCouncil, which comprises nine representa-tives of ministries, 12 municipalities, tworepresentatives from the private sector,two from workers groups, two fromcooperatives and two from NGOs.

Petén has become the focus of action forsome 30 NGOs of different kinds. Theyare coordinated and integrated byUNEPET through a specific NGO forumwhich meets regularly. The local commu-nities have taken part in the planningprocess at regional level through theirrepresentatives (deputies, mayors andassistant mayors) and their own develop-ment organizations.

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a 4 Initial Development

The Integrated Development Plan wasprepared by SEGEPLAN throughUNEPET, with technical assistance fromGermany and other local, national,regional and international institutions.

It is worth mentioning that previousefforts, such as the Regional Strategy forthe Sustainable Development of Petén(SEGEPLAN–CONAMA–IUCN), led tosome sustainable rural development fieldprojects in agricultural frontier areas ofPetén. The projects included the YaxjáProject (CONAP–IUCN), which beganin 1990 and was financed successively bythe Norwegian Agency for DevelopmentCooperation (NORAD) and DANIDA;and the OLAFO–Petén (CONAP–CATIE) Project, financed by SIDA,NORAD and subsequently DANIDA,which was established in 1989.

These projects, which were developed onthe same conceptual basis as the Inte-grated Development Plan, have not onlyprovided a source of valuable experiencefor the implementation of plan projects,but have also proved to be a fund ofvaluable information, as in the case of theProposal for the Integrated System ofProtected Areas of Petén, prepared byCATIE–OLAFO and incorporated in thePlan.

5 Implementation and Results

Until the end of 1995, implementationwork on the Integrated Development Planwas limited to using the resources of thenational budget and external cooperationfor the preparation of the plan, seekinggovernment approval and obtainingfunding for the Plan’s new projects.

The implementation of some PDI projectshas already begun. Some 70 per cent ofthe programmes and projects are currentlyat the stage of being negotiated withvarious governments (Germany, Taiwan,China, European Community) and withthe Interamerican Development Bank andthe World Bank. Projects currently beingimplemented include environmentalimprovement in central Petén, supplies ofdrinking water in Flores and in SanBenito, a hydro-electric plant in ElCamalote and some road development. Atthe same time, in view of the considerablenumber of national and foreign NGOssetting up their activities in Petén,UNEPET–SEGEPLAN VIII has under-taken to coordinate their activities system-atically, using its legal powers of coordina-tion and the PDI as a framework.

In this sense, most of these activities maybe considered as those parts of the PeténIntegrated Development Plan which arealready being implemented. Many ofthem are concentrated in the Maya

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Biosphere Reserve, which was set up in1990 and which covers one third of thePetén region, encompassing an area ofmore than one million hectares. Someprojects are run jointly with the NationalCouncil for Protected Areas (CONAP) forthe management of the reserve, both in itscore areas and in the buffer zones. TheMAYARENA Project (CONAP-USAID)assists CONAP in supervising andmonitoring the reserve and runs a broad-ranging environmental education pro-gramme in the buffer zone.

Other projects were started before theBiosphere Reserve was established(OLAFO–Petén, 1989; and Yaxjá, 1990)in the agricultural frontier areas. Whenthe reserve was set up, they found them-selves located inside it. Both projects workactively with the local communities, withthe objective of stabilizing the agriculturalfrontier by improving peasant farmingsystems and by introducing new alterna-tives, based on the comprehensive andsustained use of forest resources (timberand non-timber) and on local processingof those resources (handicrafts, woodwork,etc). While the Yaxjá project is focusedmore on rural development, the Conserva-tion for Sustainable Development Projectin Central America (OLAFO) concen-trates on studying the management ofresources, so that their efforts are comple-mentary and they are able to develop morecomprehensive activities within theirrespective areas.

6 Lessons Learned

The preparation and implementation ofthe PDI for Petén has yielded a consider-able store of experience, which may besummarized as follows:

• it is possible to adopt a regional sustain-able development concept and toincorporate it officially within a broaderplan which covers not only conserva-tion but also more traditional develop-ment aspects (such as production,communications, services, etc);

• the government body in charge of theprocess has assumed a coordinatingrole, linking the implementation effortsof both governmental and non-govern-mental bodies within a coherentscheme;

• the political instability inherent in mostLatin American governments caused aseries of delays in the process, but didnot stop it altogether, thanks to thewritten undertakings obtained from thegovernment in support of the institu-tions involved, and to the persistence ofthe working group responsible for thecontinuity of the process;

• a broad level of participation wasachieved, even though generally speak-ing the communities only participatedthrough their local political representa-tives (mayors, deputy mayors, etc). Onelesson learned was to avoid going to thecommunities at election time;

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a • actions must be initiated simultane-ously in many different sectors (eg,infrastructures, forests, tourism, etc),which constitutes a challenge in itself;and

• the implementation of the Petén Plan isnot entirely dependent on international

support, since many of its activities arepart of the work plans of nationalinstitutions which coordinate thepreparation of its budgets and theimplementation of its activities throughSEGEPLAN–UNEPET.

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7 Chronology

AD 900 Highest point of the classical period of Mayan culture in Petén.

1000 Emigration of last Mayan groups to other regions.

1900 Beginning of extractive activity for the production of gum, peppers andtimber in Petén.

1959 Establishment of the FYDEP (Promotion and Development of Petén), thefirst body responsible for the region’s development. FYDEP was autonomousand carried full responsibility for all activities in the region. It constituted aninsurmountable obstacle to the entry of any other governmental institutionsin the territory.

1985 Election of the civilian government of Dr Vinicio Cerezo A.

1987 SEGEPLAN completes the regional diagnosis for Petén.

1988 SEGEPLAN–CONAMA–IUCN prepare the sustainable developmentstrategy for Petén.

1989 SEGEPLAN comes to Petén and sets up the Implementation Unit of theIntegrated Development Plan for Petén (UNEPET), initiating the process ofinter-institutional and inter-sectoral coordination.

1990 Creation of the Maya Biosphere Reserve.

1990–92 SEGEPLAN–UNEPET and AHT head the preparation of the IntegratedDevelopment Plan for Petén, and the PROSELVA Programme for theProtection of the Tropical Forest.

1992–94 Establishment of the Petén Information Centre and construction of twobuildings for the sub-regional offices of SEGEPLAN in Sayaxché and Poptún.

1992–94 SEGEPLAN joins the Advisory Council of the Maya Biosphere Reserve andthe Mayan Technical Council. A land survey is launched, together with aprocedure for the legalization of land holdings in buffer zones.

1994 Institution of the NGO Monthly Forum.

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a Plains of Tortuguero,Costa Rica

Sustainable DevelopmentStrategy

LUIS A ROJAS, MIRENEM

JAVIER JIMENEZ AND ARTURO LÓPEZ, PACTO

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ROBERT PRESCOTT-ALLEN, IUCN–CESP

1 Introduction

The formulation of the Strategy for thePlains of Tortuguero (Costa Rica) startedat the end of 1990 with an agreementbetween the Ministry for Natural Re-sources (MIRENEM), the EuropeanEconomic Community (EEC) and IUCN.Joint biophysical, socio-economic andlegal studies were undertaken, and in1991 a draft strategy was produced, whichwas revised and endorsed for the Ministryby 80 organizations. The formulationprocess attracted the participation ofcentral government departments, munici-pal leaders, producer associations, NGOs,local organizations and a solid technicalteam.

In 1991, the strategy’s initial objective wasto establish the Tortuguero ConservationArea (ACTo), on the basis of a zoningplan covering 170,000 hectares of land,which would be subject to certain ecologi-

TORTUGUEROPopulation: 140,000Land area: 514,000 haEcological zones: coastal flatlands, tropicalrainforestMain economic activities: bananas,tourism, cattle, timber

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cal, socio-economic and cultural con-straints. The conservation area consists ofa core zone of 75,000 hectares, thepriority for which was the conservation ofbiodiversity, and a buffer or multiple-usezone of 95,000 hectares, providingincentives and support for the sustainabledevelopment of the local population. Thestrategy also suggests guidelines for thesustainable development of a surroundingarea of influence covering up to 419,000hectares, and includes a self-financing planto ensure sustainability.

After 1992 no further effort was made inthe communities to work on a generalplanning basis or to insist on a regionalstrategy. Instead, communal strategieswere initiated in six critical communitieseither on the coast or on the agriculturalfrontier, and a series of projects waslaunched. Some of the projects wereearmarked for the communities, some fortechnical and administrative support; oneset up communal banks to deal with thefinancial aspects of the projects. Agree-ments were signed for the implementationof activities, at first with producer associa-tions, and later directly with the commu-nities. Assistance was provided to set uplocal tourism and fishing facilities. As partof the land-use planning programme, aparticipatory survey of population, landuse and ownership was carried out inorder to establish land tenure guaranteesfor local inhabitants.

The strategy was partially held up in themiddle of 1993 owing to delays in thefinancing of the subsequent phase.Although this period caused problems forthe technical team, it did provide anopportunity to strengthen the internalorganization of the Project for the Con-solidation of the Tortuguero ConservationArea (PACTo), and to establish prioritiesand optimize the implementation phase,as well as obtain further support fromnational sources, particularly the Ministryfor Natural Resources.

Draft legislation in February 1994established the Conservation Area, whichcovered a total of 176,100 hectares of land(with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants). InFebruary 1995 a major area of influencecovering up to 514,000 hectares (with140,000 inhabitants) was added.

The strategy has yielded a great deal ofexperience and many lessons. One of theseis that all participants, including thegovernment and donors, must understandthat a sustainable development strategy isa long-term process, and not just a one-time funding exercise. It is also importantto strengthen local and national capacityfor sustainable development throughoutthe process by delegating responsibilitiesand making good use of existing capacity.Another lesson is the benefit derived fromhaving full community participation fromthe beginning, without relying solely on

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a local leaders. Communities are better rep-resented by sectors that they organize forthemselves, such as health, sport, develop-ment, or education. It was only after aninitial period of discussions on sustainabledevelopment planning, through a partici-patory diagnosis of problems and solu-tions, environmental education, and theprovision of seed funds to support localinitiatives, that the support of the commu-nities was secured and the necessary degreeof credibility was achieved.

The Main Issues

Costa Rica has a remarkable system ofprotected natural areas that cover 11.2 percent of the country; however, the protec-tion of biodiversity is not guaranteedoutside these areas. In 1992, the country’srate of deforestation was the highest inLatin America, and it is estimated thattropical rainforest suitable for logging willbe exhausted by the year 2010. Protectedareas are being isolated one from theother; some are threatened by pollutionfrom external sources. People living nearthe protected areas often consider themobstacles to economic development. Withpopulation growth and immigration, theagricultural frontier is constantly advanc-ing, bringing strong pressure to bear onthese areas.

The Tortuguero National Park (PNT),with 18,946 hectares on land and 52,000hectares at sea; and the Barra del Colorado

Forest Wildlife Refuge (RBC), at 92,000hectares, were set up in 1972 and 1985respectively. The two areas were subse-quently physically and administrativelymerged into ACTo, which constitutesCosta Rica’s main contribution to theIntegrated System of Protected Areas forPeace (SIAPAZ) programme run jointlywith Nicaragua. The PNT remainsnational property and is under fullprotection, although the surrounding areahas an annual deforestation rate of ten percent per year. The RBC was set up onprivate property and is located in a typicalagricultural frontier, with an annualdeforestation rate of four per cent (repre-senting 3,500 hectares per year) between1984 and 1991.

In April 1990, in order to physically unitethe conservation area and the refuge, thegovernment set up the TortugueroProtected Zone on land mainly suited toforestry or conservation. Local peasantsand the logging company operating thereattacked the government’s action asunconstitutional. Although the state wasbuying properties with funds donated byNGOs, some property owners wereunwilling to sell, and the land purchasesgave rise to new invasions. Land reclama-tion reached as far as the edge of thecoastal marshes, where individuals whohad sold land to the ‘biological corridor’invaded and claimed areas of land in themarshes with the intention of ‘selling’them back to the conservationists.

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Efforts to pass legislation creating bufferzones around the protected areas madelittle progress until 1995, owing to thefact that the Costa Rican constitutionestablishes the private right to define theuse of land on private property. By 1995,environmental guarantees had been builtinto the constitution, allowing a certaincontrol over activities outside stateproperties.

ACTo now has 140,000 inhabitants,although less than 15,000 of them live inthe buffer zone, and less than 500 live inthe core zone. In the buffer zone, thepopulation is split into 20 communities,consisting of two main cultures: Creolepeasants in the interior and on the banksof rivers and lakes, and mainly Afro-Caribbean fishermen on the coast.

The coastal communities felt confinedbetween the sea on one side and theprotected areas on the other. This was thecase until 1992, when their participationin the strategy became more substantial.Meanwhile, the communities in theinterior felt trapped between the protectedareas and the advance of monoculturebanana plantations, which more thandoubled in area between 1984 and 1992(from 21,000 to 44,000 hectares).

Other problems arose from deforestation:erosion; pollution generated by bananacompanies; lack of fishing regulationsthroughout the area; lack of land tenure

guarantees (affecting over 70 per cent ofthe population in the buffer zone); andlack of credit for sustainable productiveactivities. Government assistance isgenerally limited throughout the area tothe National Park and Forest WildlifeServices (responsible for the park andreserve respectively).

2 Objectives and Focus

The strategy’s focus is sustainable develop-ment, and it has the following objectives:

• maintaining ecosystems and biodiver-sity, and demonstrating that socio-economic development is the bestguarantee of conservation;

• reforming current development policiesin the region;

• land-use planning and the establish-ment of a 514,000-hectare conservationarea, consisting of a core zone (to act asa biological corridor between CostaRica and Nicaragua), a buffer zone anda zone of influence;

• generating wide-ranging discussionconcerning the significance and impli-cations of sustainable development, andcoordinating joint actions between thegovernment and various social andeconomic sectors; and

• strengthening the capacity of localcommunities for self-diagnosis, organi-zation and environmentally sustainablesocio-economic development.

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a 3 Relationship to DevelopmentPlanning

MIRENEM and the Ports and AtlanticDevelopment Board of Administration(JAPDEVA) have both given their supportto the strategy. Together with the Minis-try of Planning (MIDEPLAN) and theInstitute for Agrarian Development(IDA), they participated in the prepara-tion of the initial document until 1992.

ACTo was set up by decree in 1994. Froman institutional point of view, ACTo coor-dinates three previously separate generaldirectorates: forestry, forest wildlife andnational parks. In practice, ACTo alsocoordinates the actions of NGOs workingin the area and acts as a link with interna-tional cooperation programmes. In thenear future it is hoped that a regionalcommittee will be set up, with the partici-pation of the Ministries of Agriculture andStock-breeding and Rural Development,the main producer organizations andNGOs.

The strategy, although still not official,had a decisive effect on the legal establish-ment of the conservation area, and hasinfluenced the implementation of sectoralplans, such as the Forest Action Plans. Ithas also affected formal education and theregulation of the expansion of bananaplantations, while helping to establish pri-orities and generate coordination betweenvarious international donor agencies.

4 Initial Development andOrganization

The strategy began with the signing of anagreement between the Government ofCosta Rica, acting through MIRENEM,and the EEC. Its implementation waslaunched in October 1990. The project,known as PACTo, was run jointly until1992 by the MIRENEM and the IUCNRegional Office for Central America(IUCN–ORCA).

A team of eight technicians, taken fromdifferent institutions and with differentspecializations, was coordinated by thejoint managers of PACTo (MIRENEMand the EEC). The team enlisted as manyas 100 organizations, including govern-ment institutions, producer groups,NGOs, companies, academic departmentsand communal development associationswith an interest in the conservation andsocio-economic development of the Plainsof Tortuguero. Approximately 12 to 15organizations were most involved, andwere able to strike a balance between theirsocio-economic backgrounds and theirinterest in conservation and/or develop-ment. Tasks were distributed amongthem, until a team of 24 technicians wasset up, with a further 13 auxiliary or part-time members.

Initially the technical team was dividedinto four working groups – biophysical,socio-economic, institutional and legal –

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with one local peasant team. The teamcollated existing information which,though abundant, was dispersed amongmany institutions. Team members alsocarried out field surveys and investiga-tions, generated new information wher-ever necessary and took advantage of theprocess as an opportunity to attract theparticipation of new partners.

The next phase (lasting four months)consisted of a joint analysis of informationthrough six sectoral workshops andplenaries, consultation meetings and visitsto the communities. At the same time, theinformation was used to produce maps ondifferent themes, while the public wereinformed through pamphlets and shortradio programmes. Local teachers werealso enlisted to help prepare an environ-mental education strategy for the area. Insubsequent workshops, which wereattended by representatives of up to 80different organizations, priority problemswere identified and causes and effects wereanalyzed from an inter-sectoral point ofview. As a result of this work, an addi-tional workshop was able to establishaction priorities and working guidelines.For instance, the area was subdivided into23 sub-areas, following a classification ofhuman communities, based on 15 bio-physical and 15 socio-economic variablesin each sub-area. This led to the identifi-cation of those critical areas (combiningmaximum biodiversity with minimum

socio-economic potential) where thestrategy should concentrate its efforts.

The following phase, lasting six months,saw the formulation and revision of thefirst draft of the strategy. The SmallProducers’ Association (UPAGRA), with3,000 members in the area, and theLoggers Association (ASIREA) madedetailed revisions to the first draft. Mean-while, field projects were started in thesectors of forest management, agriculturaldiversification and organizational training,among others.

A second draft of the document wasprepared and widely circulated amongparticipants. Preliminary draft legislationwas also prepared, which included theestablishment of the conservation area.Contributions were made by producerorganizations (UPAGRA and Justice andDevelopment), although they provedreluctant to envisage any sort of legallimitation on socio-economic conditionsprevailing in the buffer zone. The frame-work for actions is provided by a land-useplan, which includes a revised, updatedversion of the land survey, and which aimsto settle land tenure conflicts by givingguarantees of ownership to the localinhabitants.

Part of the process was held up in themiddle of 1993 owing to delays in thefunding of the subsequent phase. Al-

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a though this period gave rise to problemsfor the technicians, it provided an oppor-tunity to strengthen the internal organiza-tion of the PACTo, establish priorities andoptimize implementation plans, as well asobtain greater support from domesticsources, especially MIRENEM.

After 1992, the process changed. Lessemphasis was placed on overall planningand the participation of broad regionaland national sectors. Instead, the focuswas field work with the communities. Inthe target groups, there was no furtherinsistence on introducing a regionalstrategy. Instead, community strategieswere initiated in the six critical communi-ties (three on the coast and three on theagricultural frontier). Implementationbegan on projects identified by thecommunities as being part of their ownstrategies, with the provision of technicaland administrative assistance and thecreation of communal banks to manageproject funding. Agreements were signedfor the implementation of activities,initially with the above-mentionedproducers’ associations, and then directlywith the communities.

Despite the significant progress achievedso far, the links within the strategy are stillsomewhat tentative. The field projects andcommunal strategies may help the com-munities and organizations involved tobecome more aware of the importance ofsustainable development to the region as a

whole, and to the overall Tortuguerostrategy. On the other hand, they mightlead to a weakening of the overall process,or to the general strategy disintegratinginto a series of independent projects andcommunal strategies.

5 Implementation and Results

The technical team had to overcomepowerful mistrust of the conservationprojects among people in the communi-ties, who expressed particular antipathyfor MIRENEM, JAPDEVA and otherstate institutions. After 18 months, duringwhich the participatory process matured,the parties involved arrived at a generalconsensus concerning the need for asignificant change in conservation anddevelopment policies. They initiallyfocused on the creation of a new conserva-tion area. The extent of consensus onother aspects of the strategy is less clear.What is definite is that both conservationand long-term planning were given ahearing by the communities, althoughonly to the extent that they were com-bined with socio-economic improvements.

Land-use planning: Local inhabitantsparticipated in a population census. Ityielded data on land tenure, the state ofproperties and their production. The datawas then used as a basis for attributingplots and land titles in the most disputedareas.

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Forest resources: ACTo has helped thelocal population obtain information andtake advantage of existing financial andtechnical incentives. Schemes have beenlaunched to promote the establishmentand management of communal forests intwo communities, while two additionalpilot forest projects have been supportedin recently legalized estates. A total of 75forestry permits have been issued in thearea, following another series of forestrymanagement plans implemented for theestates. A review is currently underway ofthe extent to which these plans haveactually been put into effect by thebeneficiaries.

Aquatic resources: Work has been centredon the Barra del Colorado community,leading to the establishment of the firstfishermen’s association in the region,providing assistance to fishermen withoutequipment, and setting up a communitybank. In Barra de Tortuguero, the secondlargest coastal settlement, an ecotourismprogramme provided a course for localguides.

Environmental education: Many work-shops were held with the 70 teachers ofthe area. Videos, audiovisual material andradio programmes were produced. TheMinistry of Education has recognized thecourse given to teachers as being part ofthe official curriculum. Teachers who haveattended the course receive a monthly

allowance of US$10. Formal and informalenvironmental education activities havesignificantly increased local support forthe conservation area and have helped tostart up activities in remote communities.

Banana plantations: In the early part of1992, IUCN carried out an assessment ofthe environmental impact of the expan-sion of banana plantations in the Atlanticregion of Costa Rica (Sarapiquí, Tortu-guero and Talamanca), recommendingguidelines to minimize their ecologicaland socio-economic impact. Althoughthese guidelines have not yet been applied,a verbal commitment was obtained fromthe banana multinationals by MIRENEMhalting the expansion of further cultiva-tion within the conservation area. Thiscommitment has so far been fulfilled,thanks no doubt in part to the removal, in1992, of European banana import quotas.

Other projects: Field projects with thecommunities have been strengthened,including the attribution of land title,communal diagnoses, communal sustain-able development plans, agricultural/forestry/pastoral systems, small-scalefishing, waste management, renewableenergy, transport and drinking water.Agreements for the implementation of theprojects have been signed with thecommunities, and are revised and renewedevery three months.

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a Protection: Two communities close to thecore area have set up committees for thevoluntary protection of natural resources,a task which has been officially recognizedby MIRENEM. These volunteer bodieskeep a watch on the illegal extraction offorest, aquatic and wildlife resources. Theprotection programme emphasizes theparticipatory protection of core areas andthe guard houses provide many other localservices, such as dealing with emergencies,serving as community premises andorganizing environmental education.

Financial support and training: TheACTo strategy has supported localinitiatives with seed funds. UPAGRA, forinstance, received US$50,000 to trainsmall farmers to administer projects, andto help them develop ecotourism andforest management projects. Training isalso provided for production and forservices. Communal banks have been setup to finance these activities using rotat-ing funds. Although the strategy isdependent on external funds (mainly fromthe European Union) for field projects, ithas a growing component of nationalfinancing. This currently funds 70 percent of the official staff involved and issure to increase in the future.

Coordination: There is coordinationamong the sectors of fisheries, tourism,natural resources, energy, health, drinkingwater and public security. Although thereis no formal coordinating committee, a

monitoring committee meets every threemonths, with the participation of thethree general directorates of MIRENEM(forestry, forest wildlife and nationalparks). These will soon be joined by theenergy department, in addition to thedonor (the EEC) and IUCN. The strategyalso coordinates the activities of NGOsworking in the area.

Community Strategies

In the beginning, participation was tosome extent informal; that is, individualsfrom the various organizations were notalways official representatives with thepower to undertake commitments.Neither was there any clear procedure bywhich they could obtain a commitmenton the part of their organizations. Duringmost of the formulation process, thecommunities participated through theirleaders, and their participation did notincrease until the communal strategieswere launched.

The priority populations began to assesstheir own problems. In Tortuguero, forinstance, the issues included public trans-port and tourism managed by the commu-nity. In Barra del Colorado, discussionscentred on the management of fisheries,organization for production and market-ing, roll-over credits, land-use planning,and the establishment of a communalforest. In Pueblo Nuevo, the focus was onenvironmental education, nature trails,

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analysis and supply of water and theprotection of aquifers. In Palacios andLinda Vista, the important issue was thesustainable management of the forest inselected estates.

Communal strategies were formulated bythe technical team and by members ofeach community. The team began byidentifying key individuals in eachcommunity to initiate discussions aboutlocal problems and requirements, andabout sustainable development as analternative to conventional development.At the same time environmental educationprogrammes were introduced in schools,seed funds were provided for local initia-tives, and training courses were given inorganization and production. The nextstep was to initiate a cooperative relation-ship with other local organizations bylearning about their programmes andexperience, analyzing their points of viewabout local problems, and seeking appro-priate coordination mechanisms.

Communal strategies were initiallycoordinated by the governing boards oflocal development associations. Theseassociations were made up of the residentsof the communities. Later, a substantialimprovement was introduced in the formof ‘councils of notables’, which broughttogether communal representatives notonly on matters of development, but alsohealth, sport, education and other sectors

recognized by the community. Thesecouncils turned out to be significantlymore representative than the developmentassociations. Representatives of the sixcouncils of notables already establishedmeet every six months to coordinate theirwork and exchange experience.

6 Lessons Learned

Main factors against the strategy include:

• structural adjustment programmes andthe priority allocation of credit andtechnical support for non-sustainableproduction activities;

• land speculation and the rapid displace-ment of peasants as a result of theexpansion of banana plantations;

• the limited control exercised by institu-tions on the development of their ownand other programmes when makinguse of natural resources;

• the precarious social conditions ofmany communities in the area, the lackof an organizational basis in thehandling of natural resources, and thelack of guarantees for land tenure;

• the initial hostility of communitiestowards protected natural areas as aresult of the state of social abandon-ment in which the government had leftthem, and of initial pressures by someconservationist sectors to buy land andto expand the national park without

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a taking the socio-economic conditionsof the environment into account; and

• the duplication and lack of coordina-tion in relations between institutionsand NGOs, and the distrust of aprocess run by a single ministry.

Main factors in favour of the strategywere:

• the work done by ECODES madeorganizations and area leaders aware ofthe concept and the importance ofsustainable development;

• the understanding, unconditionalsupport and clarity of the governingbodies of MIRENEM and the donor inovercoming the project’s difficultiesand conflicts;

• participants were actually broughtcloser together by some structuralproblems, such as the socio-environ-mental effects of the expansion ofbanana plantations; and

• the favourable results likely to occurwith the declaration of sustainabledevelopment as the central policy of theGovernment of Costa Rica (1994-98).

Main Lessons Learned

From the point of view of strategy formu-lation, lessons included:

• the formulation of a sub-nationalstrategy is not a document but a process

of analysis, consensus, training andchange in attitudes, behaviour andpractice;

• there is no single recipe for content,even at the community level, althoughit is possible to identify some methodo-logical guidelines;

• the active participation of all sectorsinvolved in conservation and develop-ment is an essential requirement of theprocess. Participation is much morethan consultation and should take theform of shared responsibility;

• all existing information must be madeuse of in order to represent all view-points and to generate participationfrom the outset;

• the project must act as a catalyst, aguide and a supervisor of the process; itmust take advantage of and strengthenexisting capacity in the region so thatthe process can be continued bynational or local players once thesponsoring project has been completed;

• it is important to maintain an inter-disciplinary – if possible an inter-institutional – promoting team, and toinvolve intermediate-level officials aswell as senior officials in decision-making; in addition, technical staffshould be national citizens;

• it is important to have a clear commit-ment on the part of the government infavour of any changes or processes, andto have close coordination betweendonor, government and implementingagency;

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• priority should be given to aspectswhich the communities themselveshave identified as urgent, even whenthey do not concern natural resources;

• a closer and more direct contact has tobe sought directly with the communi-ties, not only through their leaders;

• it is worth promoting committeeswhich include all the community’srepresentative bodies, not just official ortraditional institutions; and

• communal banks based on a savingsand loan system should be establishedfor the implementation of projects.

• budgets should be adequate and flexibleto cover the cost of workshops, ex-changes, small publications and seedfunds; and

• it is preferable to take action withoutspending too much time on exhaustiveplanning.

From the point of view of application inthe field, lessons include:

• there was a need to implement localstrategies in communities which weremost representative of different devel-opment styles and traditions;

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7 Chronology

1972 Establishment of the Tortuguero National Park.

1972 Establishment of the Forest Wildlife Refuge of Barra del Colorado.

1988 Costa Rica and Nicaragua sign the SIAPAZ frontier agreement.

1990 In October, MIRENEM, EEC and IUCN initiate the Project for the Con-solidation of the Tortuguero Conservation Area (PACTo).

1991 January–February: establishment of technical strategy coordination with theparticipation of MIRENEM, JAPDEVA AND IUCN. Initiation of discus-sions concerning the concept and methodology of the strategy with a team ofpeasant leaders and representatives of the main NGOs.

March–May: team expanded to 24 technicians belonging to various institu-tions and groups carries out basic studies, and environmental educationstrategy begins to be applied.

June–September: up to 80 representatives of different organizations in sixsectoral and plenary workshops analyze available information and draw up thefirst draft of the strategy.

October: a three-day plenary workshop revises the draft of the strategy andsends MIRENEM a declaration expressing its support for the strategy and itsconcern at the conflict between the strategy and the rapid expansion ofbanana plantations.

1992 January-February: the draft of the strategy is reviewed by communal leadersand production sectors, who submit their comments for a second draft;IUCN carries out the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) into theeffects of the monoculture of bananas and a commitment is obtained fromthe multinationals to halt expansion in the area.

March–May: the second draft of the strategy is proposed in consultation withcommunal leaders and producer associations; guidelines are established forthe management of the core zone and preliminary draft legislation is tabledbefore the Legislative Assembly for the sustainable development of the Plainsof Tortuguero.

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May–October: a participatory survey is initiated in ACTo, at the same time astwo communal strategies and pilot projects in three priority communities;strategy agreements with UPAGRA and with development associations ofTortuguero and Pueblo Nuevo.

1993 PACTo arrives at a ‘bridging’ stage, almost devoid of external finance foreight months; MIRENEM commits a growing percentage of national fund-ing, covering up to 70 per cent of the officials involved. The strategy isfocused on community priorities, and agreements are signed with an addi-tional three critical communities. Field projects with the communities areconsolidated through the issue of land titles, communal diagnoses, communalsustainable development plans and combined agricultural/forestry/pastoralschemes.

1994 February: ACTo (core zone and buffer zone) is set up by decree with 171,000hectares; its governing body coordinates the three previously separate generaldirectorates: forestry, forest wildlife and national parks.

May: the new government (1994–1998) adopts sustainable development as apolicy guideline for the legislature and submits a programme of practicalmeasures. ‘Councils of notables’ are set up in the six priority communities,with communal representatives of the development, health, sport, educationand other sectors recognized by the community; representatives of the sixcouncils of notables meet every three months to coordinate activities andcompare experience. Communal banks are set up to finance activities, usingroll-over funds; projects include small-scale fishing, waste management,renewable energy, transport and drinking water.

1995 February: a new decree extends the conservation area to the entire 514,000-hectare area considered in the 1992 proposal by adding an area of influence of340,000 hectares. Volunteer groups are set up at the request of some commu-nities for the protection of natural resources, including forests, fishing andwildlife. Permanent coordination is set up among the sectors of fishing,tourism, natural resources, energy, health, drinking water and public safety.

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a Héroes y Mártires deVeracruz and Pikin-Guerrero, Nicaragua

Management Plan and Sus-tainable Development Project

ALAIN MEYRAT, IUCN–PÍKIN

VICTOR CEDEÑO, IUCN–NICARAGUA

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ALEJANDRO C IMBACH,

IUCN–CESP

1 Introduction and Summary

The Héroes y Mártires de Veracruzmanagement plan covers an area of over200,000 hectares in the areas of Léon andChinandega in northwest Nicaragua. Thearea includes the volcanic mountain rangeof Los Maribios and its foothills andcoastal plain, which contains the country’sbest agricultural land.

The area is now very much degraded dueto the extensive monoculture of cotton.This has completely denuded the plainand generated a devastating process ofdeforestation. It has also displaced thesmall-holding peasants to the foothills ofthe mountains and the coastal mangroves,polluted the environment with massivequantities of pesticides, and depleted theproductive capacity of the natural resourcebase. Water and wind erosion of the soilshave followed, along with periodic floods,

HÉROES y MÁRTIRES, NICARAGUAPopulation: approximately 50,000;Pikin 20,000Land area: 200,000 ha; Pikin 43,600 haEcological zones: volcanic slopes andcoastal flatlandsMain economic activities: cotton, coffee,agriculture

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which have destroyed bridges, roads,railways and infrastructure.

The Héroes y Mártires de Veracruzmanagement plan was jointly designed bythe Institute for Natural Resources andthe Environment (IRENA) and IUCN in1986–1987, and was later implementedthrough a series of specific field projectsdealing with different aspects of theregion’s problems. One of these projects isPikin-Guerrero, which is one of the casestudies considered in this chapter.

Although the projects are currently in theprocess of being implemented, themanagement plan’s central coordinationand conceptual cohesion have decreasedover the years. The overall objectives ofthe plan have been lost, along with thepossibility of reviving it as a strategic toolfor the environmental recovery of this keyarea.

Like other regional and national strategies,it served in its time to introduce conserva-tion objectives into development plans, toprovide a basis for reflection on regionaldevelopment, to initiate some coordinatedpriority actions and to provide a frame-work for programmes which had alreadybeen started with external cooperation.

The Pikin-Guerrero project, whichincludes training and roll-over credits,benefits 700 families of farmers and 300families of loggers in the middle and lower

reaches of the basin, over a total area of15,000 hectares. The project is nowentering its third phase, where the empha-sis is on land-use planning – to provideprotection for forests and biodiversity inthe upper basin – for an area of 43,600hectares. The experience gained with thisproject has been considerable, both interms of improving the local population’ssocial and working conditions and ofpreserving biodiversity.

2 Scope and Objectives

The management plan was essentiallyaimed at the recovery and conservation ofnatural resources (soils, water, forests,forest wildlife) as the basis for a gradualsustainable improvement in the livingconditions of the local population. Itsobjectives were:

• to consolidate the protected areasestablished by the IRENA Institute(now MARENA, the Ministry for theEnvironment and Natural Resources)in the highlands of Los Maribios and incoastal mangroves;

• to recover the ecological functions ofecosystems on the mountain slopes ofLos Maribios, working in conjunctionwith peasant cooperatives;

• to develop alternative sustainable formsof production for coastal mangroves;

• to control erosion in the plain, restorethe area’s fertility and change its use to

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a more appropriate production activitiesthan cotton monoculture; and

• to manage the area comprehensively soas to coordinate all actions undertakenin the upper, middle and lower parts ofthe various basins within a unifiedscheme.

3 Relationship to NationalInstitutions

The management plan was prepared bythe Department of Protected Areas andForest Fauna of IRENA, with the techni-cal assistance of IUCN consultants, andthe initial field projects (Pikín Guerrero,Los Maribios and OLAFO–mangroves)were jointly prepared by the institutionsconcerned and IRENA.

The regional directorate of IRENA–Region II was at first in charge of theoverall coordination of the managementplan. This arrangement underwent aconsiderable number of changes in thefollowing six years, until IRENA wasreplaced by MARENA.

The field projects obtained the backing ofmany governmental and non-governmen-tal institutions. For example, PikínGuerrero was supported by the Autono-mous University of Nicaragua (based inLéon), the National Union of Farmersand Stockbreeders, the Municipalities ofChichigalpa and Posoltega, the Nicara-

guan Environmentalist Movement andothers, which have been actively involvedin field work with the peasants and theircooperatives.

4 Initial Development

The initial stage of the plan consisted ofidentifying regional and internationalinstitutions, such as IUCN, theAgroeconomic Research and EducationCentre (CATIE) and the United NationsFood and Agriculture Organization(FAO), which might be interested indeveloping activities in the area. It alsoinvolved preparing proposals for specificprojects and seeking international finan-cial support to implement them. Threefield projects were launched as a result.

a. The Pikín Guerrero project wasdeveloped jointly by IRENA and IUCN,with NORAD funding. The project islocated in the northern part of Héroes yMártires, on the slopes of the SanCristóbal-Casita volcanic chain. It waslaunched in 1988 and went through twostages as a joint IUCN–IRENA projectbefore being fully taken over by IRENA in1993. The project covers a broad range ofactivities related to the production andconservation of natural resources. Itoriginally covered an area of some 15,000hectares with 15,000 inhabitants, and hasnow been extended to 47,000 hectareswith 20,000 inhabitants.

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b. The development project of LosMaribios was developed jointly by FAOand IRENA, with Netherlands funding.This project began in 1989 in a locationsimilar to that of the Pikín Guerreroproject, but to the extreme south, near thetown of Léon. Its objectives are similar tothose of Pikín Guerrero, but the method-ology is based on rural development withmodel farms. The project is still being runby the original institutions at the time ofwriting (1995).

c. The OLAFO–Manglares project wasdeveloped jointly by IRENA and CATIEthrough the Project for Conservation andDevelopment in Central America. It wasfinanced in its first phase by SIDA andNORAD, with the added cooperation ofDANIDA in the second phase. Thisproject is located in the mangrove area ofHéroes y Mártires and is an attempt toestablish systems of sustainable productionin the mangroves, such as processing toextract charcoal and tannin, along withother activities, including sea and estuaryfishing.

In the last two years, there have beenother initiatives that would fit within theconceptual framework of Héroes yMártires, such as the Cortinas Forestalesproject (IRENA–FINNIDA). Unfortu-nately, because formal coordination forHéroes y Mártires has been abandoned inpractice by default, and because the

scheme has not been officially declared bythe Ministry as part of its policy for theregion, it is doubtful whether these otherinitiatives will ever become part of Héroesy Mártires. Despite this, there is a conti-nuity of approach.

5 Implementation and Results

Both the Pikín Guerrero and the OLAFOprojects are community-based. Thegroups are organized in different ways andcarry out activities which they considermost appropriate to local circumstances.The Maribios project is more oriented toworking with model farms, where peasantscan learn how to continue the proposedactivities.

OLAFO–Manglares began with a detailedsurvey of the land and sea flora and faunaresources in the mangrove area. This wasfollowed by discussions with the commu-nities to determine appropriate ways ofusing these resources, to ensure that theintensity of extraction did not exceed therate of regeneration. In view of thepopulation density in these areas, anumber of activities have been startedwith a view to increasing local processingof resources (such as charcoal, tannin, salt,handicrafts based on local produce, etc),in order to generate additional incomeand thereby reduce pressure on themangroves.

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a Both the Pikín Guerrero and the Maribiosprojects are based in the hills, concentrat-ing their activities on soil conservation,renewal of tree cover by the introductionof agroforestry systems and reforestationwith multiple-use species, control ofwatercourses created by water erosion,control of forest fires, and improvementsin methods of cultivation. Pikín Guerrerois also working on a comprehensive pestcontrol programme to reduce the use ofpesticides; on organic crops (such ascoffee); on supporting the management ofprotected areas in the upper part of themountain chain; and on managing forestwildlife, both in captivity and in itsnatural habitat.

The results achieved by the PikínGuerrero project are:

• training of agricultural technicians, whoin turn will train local farmers, whothen act as local promoters for farmplanning, production and marketing;

• agroforestry promotion, includingtraining for farm planning, soil andwater conservation, agricultural diversi-fication, comprehensive pest control,nurseries, plantations, and incorporat-ing women in the production process(this has been particularly successful –82 women have been trained);

• forest protection and management andtraining in forest inventories andmanagement (each year, public cam-

paigns in the countryside teach peoplefire control, reducing the frequency offire outbreaks by half and of burnt areasby 75 per cent in just three years;

• environmental education and health,with the participation of 200 teachersin charge of 4,000 children in the area.The project supports the Ministry ofHealth in providing primary health careto 6,000 community dwellers, and sexeducation has also been provided foradults; and

• irrational logging has been reduced,production systems have become morestable from an economic point of view,and the net income of families takingpart in the project has been improved.

These three projects have gained valuableand varied experience. Unfortunately,because of the disbanding of the overallcoordinating authority for the Héroes yMártires scheme, this experience has notbeen exchanged, systematized or dissemi-nated. On the basis of the progress madeso far, including the degree of credibilityachieved, the project is currently (1995)advocating restarting a sustainable devel-opment strategy for the region.

6 Lessons Learned

The Héroes y Mártires de VeracruzProject, as an overall process, has pro-duced some interesting lessons:

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• the grave crisis in production and thedestruction of expensive infrastructureworks (roads, bridges, etc) had theeffect of triggering the preparation ofthe management plan, reconfirming thehuman tendency to react rather than toanticipate and prevent;

• environmental questions only becamereally important when they affectedaspects of traditional economies, whichhighlights the very limited penetrationachieved by sustainability concepts insome government bodies;

• there is a need for a permanent mecha-nism for follow-up work on projectsimplemented within the broad concep-tual framework of the strategy. Thisfollow-up work should be carried outby government agencies;

• there is a need for specific field activi-ties to test strategic guidelines inpractice in order to enrich the generalframework of the scheme and to enableit to evolve and to gain in-depthexperience. In the case of the Héroes yMártires project, these feedbackmechanisms never materialized;

• the involvement of both governmentand civilian institutions and sectors infield projects was and is crucial for theirsuccess, especially when projects enterstages of institutional transfer, as in thecase of Pikín Guerrero; and

• the projects were very instructive fortechnicians, inhabitants and participat-ing institutions alike. Nevertheless, fewof the lessons were disseminated toother sectors (government, otherpeasants, conservation and develop-ment institutions, etc).

The analysis of the Píkin Guerrero projectin particular also highlights many lessons:

• the most suitable concept for field workis agroforestry using a systems approachand farm planning;

• a committed field team is absolutelyessential. The field team maintainedconsistency and interest in difficulttimes when it seemed the project couldnot survive;

• incorporating women in the project,who carried out specific tasks in thefamily plots, definitely increased thesocial effectiveness of the project;

• results were improved by enlistingteachers and assigning them specificresponsibilities and tasks in environ-mental education, a factor which is nowconsidered essential. The teachers havepassed on their knowledge to children,young people and heads of families; and

• training peasants proved to be anexcellent development tool, comparedwith the more traditional methods ofagrarian counselling.

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7 Chronology

1950s Beginning of cotton expansion in the region.

1970s Height of cotton plantation activity.

1979 The Sandinista revolution brings down the Samoza dictatorship.

1980s Growing problems of wind and water erosion. Huge dust storms engulf Léon,Chinandega and other localities. Floods destroy roads and railways.

1984 Establishment of the Western Erosion Control Plan (PCEO), setting up tensof kilometres of wind breaks to control wind erosion. National elections wonby the Sandinistas.

1986–87 Preparation of Héroes y Mártires de Veracruz management plan.

1988 Conversion of IRENA from autonomous institute to ministerial directorate(DIRENA), giving rise to many redundancies (concentration). Establishmentof Pikín Guerrero project.

1989 Establishment of Maribios and OLAFO–Manglares projects.

1990 Elections and change of government in Nicaragua. Re-establishment ofIRENA as an autonomous institute with ministerial rank.

1990–93 Continuation of projects and dispersion of Héroes y Mártires project.

1992 Transfer of the Pikín Guerrero project as a whole to IRENA.

1993 MARENA set up to replace IRENA.

1994 ‘Bridging’ phase of the Pikín Guerrero project, practically without funding.

1995 Start of third phase of the Pikín Guerrero project. Land-use planning includ-ing the highlands.

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Talamanca, Costa Rica

Communal SustainableDevelopment Projects

DAVID LYNCH (ANAI), BENSON BENEGAS

(ANAI) AND FLORANGEL VILLEGAS (ANAI)WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ALBERTO SALAS

(IUCN)

1 Introduction

Talamanca is the largest canton (2,810km2, five per cent of the national territory)of the province of Limón in Costa Rica. Itcontains seven protected areas underdifferent kinds of management, whichtogether account for 49 per cent of thecanton’s total area. Biodiversity is veryhigh. There is also great cultural andlinguistic diversity, with populations ofwhite peasants and indigenous Bríbris andCabécares, mainly in the interior, and apopulation of Afro-Caribbean origin onthe coast, along with European, Canadianand American residents.

Talamanca has one of the highest povertyrates in the country. The area is economi-cally depressed due to minimum reinvest-ment of capital from the main productiveactivities, which are banana plantations,tourism, agriculture and subsistencefishing. The area has only been linked bybridge to the mainland at Limón since1978. Few institutions are present,

TALAMANCA, COSTA RICAPopulation: approximately 20,000Land area: 281,000 haEcological zones: tropical rainforest,mountains, coastMain economic activities: bananas,tourism, subsistence agriculture andfishing

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a although there has been some improve-ment since 1994.

The first people to begin developmentwork in Talamanca, in1976, were a groupof volunteers who established an experi-mental farm in the community ofGandoca, with the initial objective ofcarrying out research in natural resourcesand providing environmental education.By 1984, the group had establishedsufficient coordination with local bodiesto extend the scope of its efforts. In 1983,the initial group set itself up as an NGOwith the name ANAI. At that time, it alsocalled for the issuing of land titles and theestablishment of the Forest WildlifeRefuge of Gandoca Manzanillo.

It was during this period that the Moniliapest in the cocoa plantations causedeconomic disaster and sparked the com-munities’ interest in finding alternativeproduction outlets, particularly inagroforestry. ANAI fostered local organi-zational capacity through a great numberof community projects, such as nurseries,reforestation, or the recovery of fruitorchards.

The organization is at present workingwith some 30 local organizations andmany other NGOs. Recent achievementsinclude the establishment of 18 commu-nal banks, improvements in infrastructure,training in various aspects of communitydevelopment, advice to producer groups,

and encouragement for administrativeregionalization.

The situation is now considered to haveevolved enough for a sustainable develop-ment strategy to be created for the canton,including actions aimed at strengtheninglocal self-management capacity. At presentthe political situation in Costa Rica isfavourable for such an undertaking.

2 Scope and Objectives

ANAI’s objectives reflect a gradualadaptation to a changing situation in thefield. The initial objectives (1976–1983)focused on environmental research andteaching, but in light of the socio-environ-mental problems of the canton, sustain-able economic alternatives in agroforestrybecame important (1984–1989). As thelocal saying goes: “Love with hunger doesnot last”. By 1990, the strategy’s purposebecame more specific, namely to promotealternatives and opportunities for thesustainable development of the communi-ties.

By 1994, with the addition of successfulactions and experiments, the objective haddeveloped into the formulation of asustainable development strategy, backedby actions aimed at strengthening thecommunities’ own capacity for sustainableproduction and self-management.

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3 Relationship to DevelopmentPlanning

The actions undertaken are not part ofany government plan, nor is the strategyfor Talamanca set out in a document. Thepresence of institutions in the area is verylimited. An effort is nevertheless beingmade in the field in coordination withrepresentatives of the Ministry of Educa-tion to introduce environmental educa-tion, and to merge the National ForestWildlife Refuge of Gandoca Manzanillowith the Conservation Area of La Amistadrun by MIRENEM.

There is a good chance that the sustain-able development activities may beintegrated with national policies becauseof several factors: the political frameworkestablished at regional level by the CentralAmerican Alliance for Sustainable Devel-opment; the process of decentralization inthe management of natural resourceswhich has occurred with the creation ofConservation Areas; the President’sdeclaration of sustainable development asa development policy for the presentlegislature (1994–1998); and the govern-ment’s own efforts, through the Ministryfor Rural Development (MDR) and theMinistry of Planning (MIDEPLAN), todevise a development plan based oncommunity assessments.

4 Main results

Several local and regional organizationshave developed, based on the principle ofsustainability which originated in theprocess that began ten years ago. Theyhave now generated economic productionalternatives, such as the establishment of24 communal nurseries.

An area of 1,500 hectares was plantedwith cocoa, part of which has recentlybeen managed as an organic crop, whilean additional 300 hectares were plantedwith fruit trees and 100 hectares withforest.

ANAI promoted the establishment of theForest Wildlife Refuge of Gandoca-Manzanillo, while calling for the legaliza-tion of land holdings for local inhabitantsover a total area of 10,000 hectares, bothinside and outside the refuge. This wasone of the first projects in Latin Americato link land tenure guarantees withprospects for conservation and commu-nity development.

In 1990, technical and administrativetraining for the local population wasstepped up, and by now 440 farmers havebeen able to attend the educational farm.Other actions have been aimed atstrengthening community management,such as the management and administra-

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a tion of credit, the ability to plan projectsand proposals, and accountancy. Therewre 18 community banks set up and the‘organic products’ label was obtained forthe cocoa and banana crops produced bythe communities. Other more recentresults have been improvements in infra-structure and progress towards administra-tive regionalization in Talamanca.

Environmental education is also beingprovided in indigenous schools, workingin combination with representatives of theMinistry of Education and local teachers.Interest is being maintained in forestspecies, such as the green iguana, as well asin research into natural resources, includ-ing marine resources such as reefs, shad,lobster and turtles.

5 Lessons Learned

Many lessons were learned over 14 yearsin a highly dynamic environment:

• successful projects and actions willgradually lead to a culture of sustain-able development, but this process takestime. Short-term objectives can beunrealistic.

• sustainable development is a dynamicprocess, and work should go onsimultaneously in activities focused ondevelopment and sustainability;

• there cannot be a valid process at thegrassroots level if there is not realparticipation in decision-making at alllevels;

• ANAI’s investment in the sustainabledevelopment of Talamanca will be amere drop of water in a desert of non-sustainability, if efforts are not com-bined in strategic alliances; and

• lack of certainty in funding restricts anylong-term undertaking or global vision.Financial flexibility and technicalsupport are needed on the part of theagencies contributing the resources.

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7 Chronology

1976 A group of volunteers initiates projects directed at environmental research andteaching in the region of Talamanca.

1978 Talamanca is linked to the rest of Costa Rica with the completion of thebridge of La Estrella.

1977–83 The group participates in the establishment of the Forest Wildlife Refuge ofGandoca-Manzanillo. It extends its interest to the whole of the canton ofTalamanca, and sets itself up as the ANAI (1983). ANAI works with localcommunities to offer alternatives in agroforestry to offset the economicdisaster generated by the Monilia pest in cocoa plantations.

1984–89 An effort is made to obtain guarantees for land holdings as a basis for com-munity development and for the conservation of the refuge. Several projects,including 24 local nurseries and many reforestation schemes, significantlyincrease the organizational capacity of the communities.

1990–92 Significant changes in the economic and political situation, combined with ashortage of funds for projects, lead to a general review of activities. It issuggested that work be directed at strengthening an indigenous process ofself-management for sustainable development.

1994 With the favourable political environment in Costa Rica, the situation isconsidered ripe to initiate the formulation of a sustainable developmentstrategy for the canton.

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Case Studies:Caribbean

Guánica Biosphere Reserve,Puerto RicoSamaná Biosphere Reserve,Dominican RepublicSierra Maestra, Cuba

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Guánica BiosphereReserve, Puerto Rico

Conservation Strategy

MIGUEL CANALS MORA, DEPARTMENT OF

NATURAL RESOURCES, PUERTO RICO

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ARTURO LÓPEZ

ORNAT, IUCN

1 Introduction

The Forest Reserve of Guánica, in south-west Puerto Rico, was established in 1919.It contains 4,050 hectares of the best drysub-tropical forest on the island as well asthe country’s greatest diversity of speciesand endemic life. In 1981 it was declareda biosphere reserve.

The Municipality of Guánica, where thereserve is situated, was isolated from therest of the country in the past. The areahas concentrated on sugar cane harvestingsince the beginning of the 20th century.The reserve did not have any conservationproblems, although it was not accepted bythe inhabitants. In the mid 1980s PuertoRico’s tourist boom reached isolatedGuánica, bringing with it land specula-tion, deterioration of the landscape, andopportunistic, short-sighted, tourism-based development.

A plan to construct two roads across theforest and build several hotel centres and

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GUÁNICA, PUERTO RICOPopulation:Land area: reserve 4,050 ha; municipalityEcological zones: dry tropical forest, coastMain economic activities: sugar cane,tourism, fishing

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a secondary residences generated a powerfullocal movement against the uncontrolledspread of tourism. Supported by localassociations, NGOs, the park administra-tion and the local authorities, the move-ment resorted to whatever means were athand to publicize the problem and tomanifest their opposition; methods suchas sit-ins, marches, discussion groups anddialogue with the press were used.

In 1987, they decided to concentrate alltheir efforts on a local conservationstrategy. The strategy was supported by anew Municipal Autonomy Act (1988),which gave municipalities the power todecide on the use and management ofland. The aims of the strategy includesolving the problem of unwanted tourism,incorporating social development intosustainable production alternatives,organizing tourist routes managed by localorganizations, and recovering local historyand culture.

As of 1994, the strategy was in the processof participatory formulation. The firstactions are being undertaken, such asproposals for the development of pilotprojects, the establishment of sectoralworking groups and a local advisorycommittee for the reserve, which is nowseen as part of Guánica’s common naturaland cultural heritage.

2 Objectives and Approach

Initially the objective was the strictprotection of what remained of the drysub-tropical forest. The presence of acommon problem, however, in the formof unwanted mass tourism, broughttogether very different sectors around theissues of conservation and unplanned,non-sustainable development. Since 1987,the working objectives have been ex-tended, the main ones being:

• to make economic developmentcompatible with the conservation ofnatural resources;

• to preserve the dry sub-tropical forestand foster Guánica’s cultural identity;

• to promote the municipality’s develop-ment by fostering sustainable produc-tion practices among the local popula-tion;

• to raise environmental awareness ininstitutions and communities;

• to offer an alternative to mass tourism;and

• to coordinate and organize the differentsectors in relation to the strategy,including municipalities, conservationbodies, NGOs and associations.

With the official establishment of munici-pal autonomy, the strategy may now beclassified as local/administrative, with afocus on conservation and development.

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3 Relationship to DevelopmentPlanning

Although the strategy is still in theformulation phase, many of its fundamen-tal principles are well supported in existingPuerto Rican legislation, which combinestraditional features with others borrowedfrom US legislation. The strategy’sprospects have been substantially im-proved by the new Municipal AutonomyAct, which gives municipalities the powerto regulate land use. The municipalitywould act as the authority approving thestrategy. The strategy also aims to providea framework for plans in the sectors ofagricultural, forestry, fishing, manufactur-ing, tourism and education.

4 Initial Development

As outlined earlier, the wave of tourismthat Costa Rica experienced began tothreaten Guánica in the mid 1980s. By1987, the central government in consulta-tion with private enterprise was planningto build two roads across the forest, as wellas four major hotels, three marinas andseveral secondary home developments.

The plan generated a powerful localmovement against the invasion, formed bylocal associations, NGOs, the parkadministration and the municipality. In1987, they decided to coordinate theirefforts in a local conservation strategy,

incorporating the recently created Com-mittee for the Rescue of Guánica andother similar groups, cultural centres, theUniversity of Puerto Rico and fourpolitical parties (Socialist, New Progres-sive, Independent and sections of thePartido Popular in power in 1987). Themovement was later joined by conserva-tion NGOs, the University of Humacao,the US Forestry Service, Yale University,CANARI, the Municipality of Guánicaand a considerable number of privateindividuals.

The new Municipal Autonomy Act offersa good opportunity to coordinate andmanage the strategy. It provides a meansof coordinating the work of centralgovernment departments which haveresponsibility for natural resources, withland-use plans prepared at a municipallevel. It also opens the door to participa-tion by NGOs, civil associations andcommunity groups, and has led to theestablishment of the Guánica ReserveAdvisory Committee.

5 Implementation and Results

The strategy identifies and strengthens anumber of existing local initiatives, suchas diversified agriculture, bee-keeping,small-scale and commercial fishing,ecotourism, and local inhabitants’ knowl-edge and appreciation of the environment.This has helped to develop traditional

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a activities, such as handicraft workshopsand literary work, which have also beenencouraged by a new type of visitor who ismore interested in the area’s naturalbeauty and cultural wealth.

The main results achieved to date are:

• agreements and common objectivesamong different sectors, particularlycivil sectors and NGOs, for the area’sconservation;

• improved conservation prospects; forinstance, a sense of belonging has beendeveloped among the inhabitants withregard to the protected area and afeeling of cultural pride in protecting itas a common heritage of the Munici-pality of Guánica;

• better information on natural resourcesin the area;

• a new Biosphere Reserve AdvisoryCommittee; and

• sectoral working groups (fishing,conservation, forestry).

The strategy includes pilot productionprojects, and also supports other initia-tives, such as a museum about the sugarindustry, local management of ecologicaltrails, a community marina, etc. Some ofthe tools used in this process have been:

• an analysis of the many existing legalpossibilities;

• public information, protest and presen-tations in the capital and the press;

• public meetings, technical workshopsand work with teachers and schools;

• sectoral working groups and pilotprojects in various sectors; and

• support for local initiatives, such as amunicipal history museum, and smalllocal tourist organizations.

6 Lessons Learned

Several lessons have been learned from theprocess:

• participation is stronger if initiated atthe start of the process, with sharedresponsibility for results;

• public participation is essential in alocal strategy and must involve allsectors of the community;

• it is vital to work around consensuspoints, create alliances, make strategicconcessions, avoid polarization, andavoid commitment to a single politicalparty or movement;

• use existing organizations, particularlyby strengthening them in their sustain-able development objectives, andsupport existing initiatives in the area;

• use the colloquial language of thecommunities and familiar examples toexplain sustainable development andwhat it means in practical terms; and

• explain the tangible economic, socialand cultural benefits to be gained fromthe conservation of natural resources.

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7 Chronology

1919 Creation of the Guánica Forest Reserve of 4,050 hectares to protect a uniquedry sub-tropical forest ecosystem, with a high content of biodiversity andendemic life.

1919–80 The Municipality of Guánica is one of the most isolated in Puerto Rico. Itseconomy revolves around the production of sugar cane and subsistencefishing. The forest reserve is not under pressure.

1980 Puerto Rico promotes and suffers the effects of mass tourism.

1981 The UNESCO MAB declares Guánica a biosphere reserve.

1985 The tourist boom reaches Guánica, attracted by its preserved natural charac-ter; government projects for roads and the building of hotels and housing.

1987 Public movement, backed by communities and NGOs in reaction to theimpact of tourism, supports greater regulation and respect for local naturaland cultural conditions; the movement is later joined by universities, govern-ment departments in charge of natural resources and municipal authorities.Decision to initiate a conservation and development strategy for the Munici-pality of Guánica.

1988 The Municipal Autonomy Act allows municipalities to plan land use and tomanage natural resources; the municipality will be the authority approvingthe strategy.

1991 Sectoral working groups are set up as the embryo of a future BiosphereReserve Advisory Committee; the strategy formulation process begins along-side the first activities in support of conservation and sustainable develop-ment.

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a Samaná BiosphereReserve, DominicanRepublic

Sustainable DevelopmentStrategy

OMAR RAMIREZ TEJADA, CEBSE

ROSA A LAMELAS, CEBSEWITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ARTURO LÓPEZ, IUCN

1 Introduction

Samaná Bay is the largest bay in theCaribbean. It comprises two protectedareas: the Haitises National Park and theNatural Scientific Reserve of LagunasRedonda y Limón. Every year, fromJanuary to March, it is visited by apopulation of some 1,000 humpbackwhales (Megaptera novaeangliae). This hasencouraged the development of a whale-watching industry.

A multi-disciplinary team carried out amission in 1990; as a result the biospherereserve of Bahía de Samaná and itssurroundings was proposed. The reservecomprised the above-mentioned protectedareas, and potentially included a marinecore zone for the protection of humpbackwhales. The biosphere reserve will includeSamaná Bay and its land surroundings,covering a total area of 5,204 km2, with apopulation of 246,835 inhabitants (1991

SAMANÁ, DOMINICAN REPUBLICPopulation: 248,000Land area: 520,400 haEcological zones: tropical coastal flatland,wide baysMain economic activities: tourism, sugarcane, fishing, agriculture

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census). The proposal defines and justifiesthe core, buffer and transition zones.

In 1991, the Centre for the Conservationand Ecodevelopment of the Bay ofSamaná and its Surroundings (CEBSE)was set up as an NGO to catalyze theprocess. The centre’s objectives includeestablishing the biosphere reserve whileinvolving the communities in projectplanning and implementation.CEBSEtook steps to restructure the DominicanMAB Committee, which was formallyestablished in 1992 by DecreeNo 136–92.

In 1993, a multi-disciplinary group ofprofessionals came together to undertakean assessment of the area in light of thearea’s future management. Students andlocal people were brought into the fieldwork and were kept informed of theresults through discussions and pamphlets.An outline management plan was pre-pared in 1994, and drafts were circulatedto the different sectors involved, includingrepresentatives of the communities.

Field actions resulting from the assess-ments proved extremely useful in terms ofachieving credibility and gaining the trustof the communities. Particularly effectiveactions included a campaign to clean upthe beaches and municipal control overharassment of whales in the bay. CEBSEfocused part of its work on environmentaleducation programmes for young people

and teachers and on participatory researchconducted on the theme of women andthe environment.

Since 1995, the government has beenstudying the possibility of setting updecentralized planning bodies, initially aspilot projects, in three areas of the coun-try. One of the selected areas is Samaná.The Provincial Planning Council ofSamaná, which also comprises representa-tives from business, production and non-governmental sectors, would be the idealbody to promote the emerging conserva-tion and sustainable development strategyfor the area.

2 Objectives and Approach

The focus of the strategy is on land-useplanning and establishing a zoning systembased on criteria of land capability. It willrecommend alternatives to non-sustain-able farming activities in surroundingareas, regulate the development of tour-ism, seek greater local participation andpromote the regionalization of develop-ment planning.

The main objective of the strategy is toestablish a regional cooperation frame-work to ensure the conservation ofbiodiversity and improve the quality of lifeof local communities through appropriatemanagement of natural resources. Morespecific objectives are to promote eco-

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a nomically profitable and environmentallysustainable activities, with greater localparticipation, as well as the self-financingof programmes for the protection andmanagement of the area.

3 Relationship to DevelopmentPlanning

In the Dominican Republic, natureconservation has traditionally been a formof protection organized without theparticipation of local communities.Although buffer zones are not legalentities, a biosphere reserve can be offi-cially recognized. The National Commit-tee for MAB has to evaluate the projectand give its approval. The proposal is thensubmitted to the government for approvalby Presidential Decree. The recentpolitical instability has delayed theapproval of the strategy; it was submittedto the MAB in 1994, but as of May 1995had gone no further.

In 1994 the Department of Tourism setup a decentralized Provincial TourismCommission for the region of Samaná,with the power to recommend sectoralpolicies and to regulate tourist activities inthe area. Representatives of the privatetourist sector and NGOs also sit on thecommission, and CEBSE supplies thesecretariat.

From an institutional point of view thesituation improved when the governmentdecided to decentralize three pilot regions.One of them was Samaná; it was chosenbecause planning had already begun in thearea. A Planning Council for the Regionof Samaná (COPLASA) was set up, withrepresentatives of all five productivesectors. COPLASA was thought to be theideal body to promote the emergingconservation and sustainable developmentstrategy for the area.

4 Initial Development

The initial idea arose from a scientificinterest in preserving the reserve’s biodi-versity. Since 1991, CEBSE has been incharge of coordinating the establishmentof the biosphere reserve, and has acted as amediator and a forum for the settlementof conflicts. A proposal document wascompleted in 1992 by a team of govern-ment, NGO and international technicalspecialists.

A move then began to involve the com-munities, with the objective of obtainingtheir views and experience and establish-ing a common agenda. Tourist activity,especially the whale-watching industry,began to be regulated through consulta-tion with those involved. At the sametime, an assessment and strategy for thedevelopment of ecotourism was preparedfor the region.

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An assessment of the fishing sector wasalso drawn up as part of a project aimed atpromoting joint management of fishing inthe region. Fishermen were trained andmeetings and workshops were held toprepare a work plan for the sector.

5 Implementation and Results

The document prepared by the manage-ment committee in 1990 and published in1992 supported the proposal to set up thebiosphere reserve. The proposal was usedas a conceptual planning framework forthe tourist sector. It also served to activatethe restructuring of the MAB Committee,which had been set up in 1976 but hadnot operated for over a decade.

Although the development phase of thestrategy has not yet been completed, someresults have been obtained in the course offield work. Since 1994 in particular,CEBSE has encouraged the local popula-tion to participate in the areas’s planningand management. After CEBSE com-pleted a socio-economic diagnosis of theregion, the results were presented to thelocal communities. These results willsubsequently be submitted to the govern-ment in order to highlight the importanceof participation in the management of thereserve, and to gain official support forthis more participatory approach. CEBSEhas also set up a database, which it shareswith local and central government depart-

ments. The fisheries working group hasdrawn up a work plan and is currentlypreparing one for tourism.

Other noteworthy results have beenachieved by the environmental educationprogrammes, teacher training and thegrant of assistant teacher posts to studentsstaying on as volunteers. In addition,CEBSE completed a participatory genderassessment to determine the role played bySamaná women in the use of naturalresources for domestic and economicpurposes. In the course of this process,seven community organizers of theCouncil of Samaná Peasants’ Associations(JACASA) were trained in the techniquesof participatory research. The aim is toobtain more information about thesituation of women and to train them sothat they can take part in formulating theregional management plan.

As a result of community participationactivities, CEBSE has helped to set upcommunity committees in three of thefour main towns of the region. Thesecommittees are currently working insupport of the biosphere reserve.

6 Lessons Learned

Opportunities include the following:

• international interest for the biospherereserve; and

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a • local interest for ecotourism and forsustainable fishing.

Limitations were as follows:

• no legislative framework for buffer zonedesignation;

• duplication of tasks and lack of institu-tional coordination;

• initial distrust on the part of the localpopulation towards conservation andthe reserves;

• little social organization or tradition ofcommunity participation;

• lack of training programmes;• over-dependence on a single NGO; and

• shortage of funds and lack of equip-ment.

Lessons learned during the processinclude:

• the communities, their representativesand NGOs who have shared responsi-bility for participating in the manage-ment of protected areas have shown anincreased interest in the natural valuesof the area; and

• agreements are convenient instrumentsto ensure shared responsibility foractions requiring cooperation amonginstitutions.

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7 Chronology

1990 A scientific mission proposes the creation of a biosphere reserve.

1991 CEBSE set up; objectives include catalyzing the process.

1992 Dominican MAB Committee restructured; CEBSE publishes a summary ofthe proposal to establish the biosphere reserve.

1993 Basic field data obtained to support a proposal for the management of thearea. Idea of a biosphere reserve publicized in the region.

1994 Initiation of environmental education and community participation pro-gramme; participatory research with groups of women. Biosphere reserveproposal submitted to national MAB Committee for evaluation and, ifappropriate, forwarding to the government. Department of Tourism sets up adecentralized Provincial Tourism Commission for the Region of Samaná,with the participation of the business sector and NGOs. Commission secre-tariat provided by CEBSE. Campaign to clean up beaches and control whale-watching activities (initiated in 1992) intensifies.

1995 The government considers setting up a decentralized body, on a pilot basis, inthe Samaná Region. The body, called COPLASA, will have participationfrom government, business and NGOs. A possibility arises of setting up aprotected marine area on the north coast of the Samaná peninsula with theparticipation of the tourist sector.

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a Sierra Maestra, Cuba

Conservation andDevelopment Strategy,National Systemof Protected Areas

ANTONIO PERERA PUGA, COMARNA (CUBA)

PEDRO ROSABAL GONZALEZ, COMARNA

(CUBA) WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ARTURO LÓPEZ

ORNAT, IUCN

1 Introduction

Cuba is the largest island in the WestIndies and has the greatest biodiversity inthe Caribbean. The Sierra Maestra isCuba’s largest mountain range, encom-passing part of the provinces of Granma,Santiago de Cuba and Guantánamo. It is250 km long and 30 km wide at itsbroadest part; it covers a total area of530,000 hectares, with altitudes ofbetween 200 and 2000 m above sea level.Because of its relief, geomorphology,hydrological structure, soils, climate andvegetation, it forms a complex and fragileecological system.

The National System of Protected Areas(SINAP) was set up in 1990 to completethe representation of protected areas,contribute to national socio-economicdevelopment and environmental aware-ness, and strengthen institutional capacityfor these objectives. The creation of

SIERRA MAESTRA, CUBAPopulation: 60,000 familiesLand area: 530,000 haEcological zones: seasonal, tropicalmountains 200-2,000 mMain economic activities: coffee, cocoa,cattle, timber, mining, tourism

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SINAP resulted from the success of thesustainable development and conservationstrategy for the Sierra Maestra, whichbegan in 1980.

Until 1980, the area was exposed tocolonization and forested areas wereconverted into pasture and plots of landfor migratory agriculture. This resulted innegative repercussions for soil erosion andregulation of the water supply.

The conservation strategy was startedunder Law No 27 (1980), with the aim ofregulating soil erosion, ensuring thepreservation of biodiversity, and improv-ing the standard of living and socio-economic conditions of the area’s inhabit-ants. The strategy was formulated in 1984and revised in 1991. It provides guidelinesfor the area’s development and is fullyintegrated with the national developmentplanning system.

A territorial plan was drawn up on thebasis of nine categories of land-usecapacity, establishing 14 core zonestotalling 250,000 hectares. Buffer zonesare being developed by a combination oflocal government, communities andcitizens’ committees of different kindsthrough programmes of environmentaleducation, infrastructure improvements,reforestation (approximately 4000 hectaresannually since 1984), and general supportfor the agricultural and tourist sectors.This strategy served as a test case and

general framework for other protectedareas in Cuba, and contributed to thesetting up of the National System ofProtected Areas.

The process has been based entirely onnational technical and financial resources.The Cuban government (acting throughsix ministries), the National Environmen-tal Commission (COMARNA), thePhysical Planning Institute (IPF), provin-cial governments, the 13 relevant munici-palities and the National Small FarmersAssociation (ANAP) were mainly respon-sible for formulating the strategy and forpreparing and implementing annualaction plans in consultation with thecommunities.

The process has led to effective inter-sectoral collaboration, undoubtedlyfacilitated by Cuba’s centralised planningsystem. The main limitation has been thedifficult economic situation generated bythe international embargo, which hampersthe allocation of budgets and reduces theavailability of staff for technical trainingwork.

2 Objectives and Approach

This is a governmental strategy, local inscope, aimed at the conservation andsustainable development of the mainmountainous region of Cuba. Because ofthe area’s geographical characteristics, it

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a has different requirements than the rest ofthe country. Half of its area is set aside forthe preservation of biodiversity in 14 corezones, which have different categories ofmanagement.

The main objective of the strategy is ‘toprotect historical/cultural and naturalvalues and foster comprehensive, harmo-nious development’ within the boundariesof the area officially known as the GreatNational Park of Sierra Maestra.

Specific objectives are:

• conservation and study of biodiversityin the Sierra Maestra;

• regulation of land use;• protection of soils and water catchment

areas;• protection of the countryside and

reforestation;• socio-economic development of

inhabitants;• environmental education and aware-

ness;• recreation and tourism; and• enhancing places of historical/cultural

interest.

The strategy formulated in 1984 estab-lished new inter-sectoral coordinationmechanisms at the national level, as wellas coordination between national bodiesand provincial, municipal, communal andcitizens’ organizations.

3 Relationship to DevelopmentPlanning

Because of its structure, the Sierra Maestrastrategy relies on official institutionsalready connected with regional activities.Under the 1980 law, ANAP – the mainNGO in the area – also plays a part inplanning and decision-making.

The strategy provides guidelines for theregion’s development and is fully inte-grated with the national developmentplanning system. The Cuban government,acting through its agencies, is responsiblefor preparing and implementing yearlyaction plans.

The system of protected areas was set upin 1990 by COMARNA. COMARNA iscomposed of the 22 governmental organi-zations and five NGOs most closelyconnected with this sector, and was madeofficial by decree that same year. Therelated regulations await approval by theState Council and National Assembly.The management of SINAP is coordi-nated by COMARNA, in conjunctionwith two ministries, three nationalinstitutes and local authorities. Work iscarried out through provincial environ-mental commissions, and inter-sectoralworking groups have been set up tocoordinate and strengthen the combinedefforts of participants. Each member bodyof COMARNA is in charge of imple-

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menting and monitoring those strategytasks which fall within its area of responsi-bility. COMARNA supervises the strategyas a whole. Any disagreement whichcannot be resolved within the commissionis referred to the Council of Ministers.

4 Initial Development

From the 18th century on, the SierraMaestra was colonized and significantlyaffected by inappropriate use of land,particularly in the form of migratoryagriculture and most recently by theexpansion of cattle farming. Such activityaffected almost 40 per cent of the moun-tainous region. This has caused seriouserosion, sedimentation and loss of waterregulation capability. Various watercatchment areas, including Cauto, thelargest in Cuba, originate in this moun-tain, with associated systems of drinking-water storage and supply, hydroelectricproduction, agricultural irrigation and fishfarming, which is of great importance tothe eastern part of the island.

Not only was the ecological equilibrium ofthe mountain areas affected, but a socio-economic imbalance arose due to emigra-tion to the flatlands. These emigrantsabandoned coffee and cocoa cultivationand caused an excessive demand foremployment and services in the cities.

In 1980 a law was passed declaring theregion a ‘protected rural area’ (IUCNcategory VIII) to be called Gran ParqueNacional Sierra Maestra, with the objec-tives of sustainable development andconservation. Since then, two prospectivedevelopment proposals for the park havebeen issued, one in 1984 and another in1991.

The first of these proposals (1984) isbased on an analysis of the region’sproblems and sets forth regulations forland use, conservation, forestry andfarming development. It is also a strategyfor socio-economic development, coveringaspects such as population, productionand employment, human settlement,social services and infrastructure. Itsguidelines were used in planning andoperations until 1991, when approval wasgiven at inter-ministerial level to theproposal for prospective development tothe year 2000. This was an update of theprevious proposal, including some newsectors such as tourism.

The action plans cover three basic fields:

• environment and natural and historical/cultural resources;

• economy and infrastructure; and• population and services.

Part of the methodology projected eight-to ten-year scenarios (1984–1991 and

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a 1991–2000), with a view to analyzingsituations and scenarios specific to theregion and neighbouring provinces. Thesewere developed in light of the need toreadjust plans for human settlements,review the supply of labour and economicfundamentals, furnish adequate economicincentives and propose new regulations.Local political divisions and ecologicalunits and catchment areas provided theframework for action proposals. Onceaction priorities had been identified,investments were earmarked accordinglyand operational resources, incentives andgrants were allocated to local authorities,communities and producer groups. Planswere implemented by national technicalstaff and financed entirely by nationalresources.

An inter-disciplinary governmental groupprepared the draft legislation and set up asteering committee, which was dependenton the Council of Ministers and assistedby a technical advisory board. The board’sspecialists are responsible for analyzingtasks and plans and for monitoring imple-mentation. Both the steering committeeand the technical advisory board includerepresentatives and specialists of the 20organisations involved in the developmentof the region.

The steering committee’s componentbodies are responsible for financing andimplementing projects. They are theMinistries of Agriculture, Basic Industry,

Transport, Construction, Public Healthand Communications. The NationalInstitute of Tourism, the Physical Plan-ning Institute and the People’s Provincialand Municipal Organs (from threeprovinces and 13 municipalities) are alsorepresented.

Work is carried out through these organi-zations and, as is often the case in Cuba, issupported by civic associations such as theDefense, Federation and Cuban Women’sCommittees, schools, and ANAP. On thebasis of a priority action schedule, thetechnical team adapts annual plans todifferent scenarios according to theavailability of funds.

A number of sociological indicators aremonitored each year as a means of identi-fying changes in local conditions. Thetechnical team decided to use the sameindicators as those used by the Ministry ofAgriculture and the Central PlanningCouncil, in order to establish a commonlanguage and ensure reliability of data.Results tend to indicate that while someconditions improve and some difficultiesare resolved, other problems appear.

Bringing the strategy to the field was noteasy. The working methodology wasrevised three times in order to adapt it tolocal conditions. The initial ‘top-down’concept was gradually combined with amore participatory approach, whichallowed feedback in both directions.

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Field projects are essentially implementedthrough the local communities by theabove-mentioned committees. Thecommunities are also consulted when itcomes to preparing annual action plans.In several cases producer associationscontracted the services of forestry expertsand agronomists.

The nature of the Cuban system ofinternal organization is particularlyfavourable to the implementation of asustainable development strategy, particu-larly from the point of view of long-termplanning, inter-sectoral coordination, theapplication of investment and incentiveregulations and policies, and the participa-tion of rural and urban populations. Theseconditions cannot really be extrapolated toother countries in the region.

The founding of SINAP was due in largepart to the success of the Sierra Maestraexperiment, as well as the Ciénaga deZapata (the archipelago’s most extensivewetland) and other land and marine areas.A further vital contribution was a nationalassessment of protected areas (Perera, A.and P. Rosabal. (1987). Estudio integral dela Sierra Maestra. Comisión Nacional delMedio Ambiente y los Recursos Naturales(COMARNA). Havana, Cuba), alongwith the hosting of a national workshop in1989, which produced the recommenda-tion of the technical group responsible forproposing the system.

5 Implementation and Results

Two of the most visible results of theSierra Maestra strategy are the introduc-tion of an environmental awareness tosocio-economic development planningand the establishment of a structureensuring inter-sectoral coordination. Thestrategy has served as a test and generalframework for other protected areas inCuba, particularly the Ciénaga de Zapata,and has given national status to the systemof protected areas. The Sierra Maestrastrategy was the first planning methodol-ogy developed for mountainous regions inCuba and marked the first time that aninter-disciplinary study of this particulararea was undertaken. This eventually ledto the Prospective Development Proposal(PDP) for 1984–1991.

The 1984–1991 PDP proposed ninecategories of use, identifying some areasfor strict conservation (36 per cent of theregion), some for limited forestry andtourist use (14 per cent) and some fordiversified use (the remainder). Theconservation areas cover nearly 250,000hectares and are composed of differentcategories of protected area: six naturereserves, four national parks, three wildliferefuges and eleven areas for tourist use.Currently only four of these areas (threeparks and a refuge) have a managementplan and/or assigned personnel.

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a In the areas allocated to diversified use,there are 60,000 dwellings (equivalent tosome four hectares per family) distributedover nearly 1,000 settlements. Electrifica-tion in these settlements has increasedfrom 21 to 70 per cent. One-third of thearea is intended for agricultural use,(mainly cocoa and coffee), the rest forfruit growing and subsistence agriculture.Initially the project’s technical team con-centrated on achieving agricultural resultsin a series of pilot farms. Most of theremaining 170,000 hectares are still usedfor cattle, although it is planned to reducethis area to 90,000 hectares. This wouldbe more in line with land-use capacity andwould take account of genetic advancesresulting in increased milk production.

Tens of thousands of hectares in the areawere restored for use by replacing second-ary vegetation with forest and/or coffeeand cocoa plantations. Since 1980, morethan 30,000 hectares have been reforestedin this way and the proportion of forestedland is due to be increased to 50 per centof the total area by the year 2000. Themost common species are Pinusmaestrensis, Pinus caribaea, deciduous treessuch as Hibiscus elatus and, to a lesserextent, eucalyptus. Some areas are devotedto mining; their ecological recovery isplanned once exploitation has beencompleted. The promotion of tourism hasbeen extended to 1482 lodgings in 13communities, a number which is expectedto rise significantly in the future.

SINAP has also achieved significantresults; it now covers some 12 per cent ofthe national territory. SINAP has beenintegrated into national developmentpolicies through the National Environ-ment and Development Programme,which was presented by Cuba atUNCED, and forms part of Cuba’scommitments to Agenda 21 and theBiodiversity Convention.

SINAP’s development has been basedentirely on national technical and finan-cial capabilities. Each sector contributespart of the resources required for itsmaintenance. Currently, the most heavily-visited protected areas help to finance themaintenance of those with more restricteduse. Since 1989, the economic problemsgenerated by the international embargohave made it difficult to allocate thenecessary funds and to assign staff totechnical training work. These problemshave also seriously weakened the areas’management programmes and in someremote areas have brought about a returnto non-sustainable subsistence production.

6 Lessons Learned

Main factors against the strategy include:

• the lack of regulations, which have beenprepared but still await approval by theCouncil of Ministers;

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• the implementation of large-scalepublic works was not always in keepingwith environmental conditions;

• the economic problems generated bythe embargo, particularly since 1989,prevented the allocation of plannedfunds, created circumstances conduciveto non-sustainable subsistence produc-tion, and caused a scarcity of technicalpersonnel to disseminate the results ofresearch into stable production alterna-tives such as fish farming andagroforestry; and

• for SINAP, initial limiting factorsincluded the sectoral conservationapproach adopted by both specialistsand institutions, and the unfamilarityof the concept of sustainable develop-ment applied to protected areas.

The main opportunities for the develop-ment of the process have been:

• the richness and fragility of the area’secosystems, combined with gradualdepopulation and the area’s marginaleconomic situation before 1980, whichdrew attention to its developmentprospects;

• centralised planning, which ensuredstrong collaboration between govern-ment institutions in all sectors;

• the existence of a high-level environ-mental commission and an extensivecommittee structure at community andcitizen level; and

• Cuba’s commitment to Agenda 21 andthe Biodiversity Convention, especiallyfor SINAP.

The principal lessons learned were:

• the importance of a methodology inwhich categories of land use are as-signed in accordance with the charac-teristics and capacities of the region;

• the need for inter-sectoral analysis ofconservation and development prob-lems;

• the need for broad consultation withthe affected populations for theirassessment of the socio-environmentalsituation and their outlook;

• the desirability, during the diagnosisstage, of determining priorities for theimplementation of programmes inconsultation with communities, and ofapplying corrective action rapidly toovercome specific problems;

• the use of research/action based onmodel plots of land, as a basis fortechnical training and dissemination,which should be given priority over orat least be equal to basic biologicalresearch; and

• the importance of a comprehensiveappraisal in the analysis of the system asa whole, rather than on a case-by-casebasis, and the need for action plans tobe kept flexible and adaptable to theconditions of time and place.

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7 Chronology

pre 1980 Spontaneous colonization of the Sierra Maestra, deforestation, extensivelivestock rearing and subsistence agriculture in mountainous regions poorlysuited to such activity.

1980 Act passed creating the Sierra Maestra Protected Rural Area, covering500,000 hectares, aimed at conservation and sustainable development.Creation of an inter-ministerial steering committee and a technical advisoryboard, composed of more than 20 national and local organizations, includingsix ministries.

1980-84 Implementation of the first prospective development proposal 1984–1991 bytechnical teams in consultation with the Sierra Maestra population.

1984 Application of the strategy, establishing a territorial plan based on ninecategories of use; 14 protected areas and one multiple-use area instituted on250,000 hectares for the purpose of sustainable development, with inter-sectoral cooperation mechanisms.

1987 National assessment of protected areas.

1984-90 Management plans for four of the Sierra Maestra protected areas. Develop-ment of applied research into productive aspects of agroforestry; reforestationof 8,000 hectares yearly, recovery of abandoned wells and relocation of crops;fostering of evergreen wooded areas; development of 1,432 lodgings fortourists in 13 Sierra communities.

1989 National workshop for protected areas; technical group placed in charge ofthe SINAP proposal.

1990 Creation of the National System for the Protection of the Environment;constitution of the national technical group for protected areas and approvalof SINAP by COMARNA.

1991 Second prospective development plan for the Sierra Maestra, 1991–2000.

1992 SINAP is officially included as part of the Cuban contribution to UNCEDand its commitment to Agenda 21 and the Convention on BiologicalDiversity .

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1989-93 Severe deterioration in Cuba’s economic situation due to the political changein the Soviet bloc, causing a tightening of the blockade to which the countryis subjected. Strong budgetary limitations, shortage of technicians, fuel andoperational resources. Regression of some communities to subsistence activi-ties and non-sustainable farming.

1993 Inter-institutional and inter-disciplinary working groups at local level.Revision of SINAP to include marine areas.

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Case Studies:South America

Amazonia Project, EcuadorSierra Nevada, ColombiaTambopata-Candamo, PeruMata Atlántica/APTA, Brasil

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Amazonia Project,Ecuador

Sustainable DevelopmentStrategy

JORGE ALBÁN GOMEZ, NATURA FOUNDATION

AUGUSTO ANGEL MAYA, IUCN–SUR

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ARTURO LÓPEZ,IUCN

1 Introduction

Over the last three decades EcuadorianAmazonia has been dramatically affectedby several developments, including theimpact of the petroleum industry (whichproduces 50 per cent of Ecuador’s GDPin this area alone) as well as colonization,timber extraction and cattle-raising. Thearea covers 140,000 km2 and has 450,000inhabitants. Annual deforestationamounts to 70,000 hectares, and over onemillion hectares have already been con-verted to pasture. Approximately 40 percent of the area is designated protectedland; for example indigenous reserves,forest reserves, or forest areas. Legalindigenous reserves account for fourmillion hectares.

As an exporter of raw materials, the areapresents a typical profile of an economydeprived of reinvestment. The nationalgovernment does not have any specific

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c u a d o rAMAZONIA, ECUADORPopulation: 450,000Land area: 14,000,000 haEcological zones: Amazonian rainforest,riversMain economic activities: petrol, timber,cattle, subsistence agriculture

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a policies for developing the region, localorganizations are politically weak, and allmiddle-range decisions are taken by thecentral government. It could be arguedthat only the indigenous peoples in theregion have a strong sense of purpose andtradition.

The process of formulating a sustainabledevelopment strategy for Amazonia beganin 1993 as a result of IUCN initiatives,wide-ranging consultations, and theinvolvement of the Natura Foundation.The strategy is currently in the stage offormulation and negotiation with localand national players.

The joint IUCN–Natura Foundationteam organized five regional forums, onefor each of Ecuadorian Amazonia’sadministrative provinces. These forumsbrought together all the players in thearea, including local authorities, businessand social sectors, indigenous groups, theChurch and the military. Indigenousgroups were reluctant to cooperate withthe government and with some NGOs;the governments of the departments werethe most enthusiastic participants.

Sectoral meetings were also organized toprepare practical proposals. The objectiveof these forums was to prepare a plan ofaction for each province, with a view tonegotiating the plans with the central

government. The eventual objective is forthe government to formulate a proposalfor Amazonia, which can then serve as abasis for negotiations with the timber andoil industries.

The central government recently set upthe Institute for the Ecodevelopment ofAmazonia (ECORAE), with whichIUCN–Natura Foundation made anagreement. Another agreement was signedwith the presidential environment com-mittee. However, the aim is for theAmazonian players themselves to defendtheir proposal. In this phase, the IUCN–Natura Foundation wish to give priorityto land-use planning; specific projects (egexperimental farms in Puyo, a jointexperiment in Napo, environmentalsanitation in several municipalities);communication and environmentaleducation; and strengthening existingprojects and bodies, such as the agrariancouncils.

Decentralization has been very slow, andalthough some provinces and municipali-ties have responded satisfactorily, theprocess is not yet complete. Other note-worthy limitations so far have been thepeasant representatives’ perceived lack oflegitimacy, and the uneven and feeblenature of the indigenous participation. Asof 1995 the situation was further aggra-vated by a border conflict with Peru.

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2 Objectives and Approach

The ultimate objective is the sustainabledevelopment of the Amazonian region ofEcuador. Specific objectives are:

• to encourage the participation of all thedifferent players in the process informulating sustainable developmentpolicies for Amazonia;

• to encourage decentralization indecision-making related to the develop-ment of Amazonia, seeking to ensurethat each province prepares its owndevelopment proposals;

• to generate agreements and commit-ments based on those proposals;

• to promote land-use planning;• to strengthen existing projects; and• to promote sustainable development

activities.

Methods include:

• organizing provincial forums in the fiveprovinces which involve all players, andsubmitting proposals to the centralgovernment;

• having the government develop anAmazonian proposal throughECORAE based on the proposals fromthe forums;

• promoting sectoral forums;• developing specific projects in the areas

of production and environmentalsanitation; and

• generating and disseminating informa-tion concerning the region, particularlythrough communication and environ-mental education.

3 Relationship to DevelopmentPlanning

The strategy is still in the developmentphase. A plan of action was prepared foreach province at provincial forums; theseplans will be negotiated with the centralgovernment. The aim is for the govern-ment to develop a proposal for Amazoniawhich can serve as a basis for negotiationswith the timber and oil industries. Strat-egy formulation is part of the process ofdeveloping a master plan for Amazoniaunder the responsibility of ECORAE. It ishoped, however, that the Amazonianplayers themselves will defend theirproposals.

4 Initial Development

The process of developing a sustainabledevelopment strategy for Amazonia beganin 1993. The central strategy group wasmade up of four professionals, with onepromoter in each of the five provinces.The group of professionals included ananthropologist, an economist, an agrono-mist and a historian. The promoters forthree of the provinces (Sucumbíos, Napo

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a and Morona) were private individuals. Inthe province of Pastaza, an NGO waschosen to act as promoter (the ZAAR-ENTZA Corporation), while in Zamora agovernment body (PREDESUR) wasappointed. The results differed accordingto the approaches.

The joint IUCN–Natura Foundationteam organized five regional forums.Before each forum was convened, organi-zations were informed about the project’sobjectives and their comments weresolicited. The results of this effort wereuneven.

At each of the provincial forums, partici-pants were asked to circulate their conclu-sions and thus broaden the scope of thediscussion. That did not happen, however,except in a very few cases. This is perhapsan indication that community participa-tion in planning tasks in Amazonia hasstill not become routine practice. Thesuccess of regional forums was heavilydependent on the leadership of somemembers of the community, and on theorganizational capacity and experience ofthe promoters of the project.

5 Implementation and Results

The strategy has entered the developmentstage. It was initiated only two years ago,and it is already facing a complex situa-tion, limited by strong externalities. The

main result so far has been to promotediscussion of, and consensus on, regionaldevelopment. A process of participatoryanalysis has been initiated through theprovincial forums and the first proposalsfor submission to the central governmentare beginning to emerge.

Although some provinces and municipali-ties have responded well, this type ofparticipatory approach is not yet firmlyestablished. In addition, there is notenough political authority to imposeforms of conduct on the different sectors.Decentralization is making very slowprogress, although it is still one of themain concerns of the strategy.

The urgent need to arrive at some prelimi-nary agreements has already been stressed,since logging in the area is increasing, withplans to market eight million cubic metresof timber per year. It is feared that it willbe no easy task to reconcile the indigenousproposals with those of the provincialgovernments.

A few specific projects have been started,including studies in social communica-tion, the economic implications ofenvironmental externalities, guidelines forthe management of natural forests, anassessment of the legal structure ofAmazonian development and possiblerelated structural reforms, an assessmentof existing financial instruments and aproposal for gender-related work.

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6 Lessons Learned

Limitations included the following:

• an isolated economy (50 per cent ofEcuador’s GNP comes from oil). Thereare plans to extract eight million cubicmetres of timber per year;

• political weakness of the highly-centralized national government, andregional governments without proposalsof their own;

• very limited means of communicationand transportation within the region –it is easier to travel from outside theregion than within it;

• an agricultural frontier situation,including lack of land-use planning,colonization without any understand-ing of the culture of forests, organiza-tional weakness, and powerful technicaland financial constraints;

• lack of fair, organized representation forpeasants; and

• indigenous people are reluctant to takepart in programmes jointly with thegovernment or even with NGOs.

Lessons taught by the process include:

• provincial and municipal governmentshave been keen to cooperate from thebeginning, but the representatives ofcentral government bodies initiallylacked enthusiasm;

• indigenous communities were generallyreluctant and distrustful at the firstmeetings. The players were not in-volved in participatory planningproposals. This was due to a greatextent to the centralized nature andpaternalism of the state;

• the best response came from sectorswith a focused planning framework,political consistency and personalleadership. For instance, the response oflocal governments was more effectivethan that of provincial councils;

• the representatives of social groupsseldom passed on information from thediscussions to their organizations;

• the success of provincial planningforums depended to a great extent onthe participation of a representative ofthe Ministry for Agriculture andStockbreeding (MAG); and

• it is best not to go to meetings with anypre-established notion of what regionaldevelopment should be.

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7 Chronology

1970 Beginnings of colonization, driven by oil exploration activities.

1987 Agrarian councils set up in Ecuador, involving all official national andregional bodies dealing with the farming sector, and attended by socialorganizations without the right to vote.

1993 IUCN and the Natura Foundation initiate the process for the formulation ofa strategy.

1994 Plans for the annual extraction of eight million cubic metres of timber.Provincial forums held in the five Amazonian provinces. Support for the‘Broad Front for the Defence of Amazonia’, whose main aim is to control theactivities of the oil industry and their impact on indigenous lands.

1995 Publication of first newsletters: ‘The Future of Amazonia’. Strengthening ofagrarian councils and some specific projects: experimental farm in Puyo,shared experience in Napo, environmental sanitation at Lago Agrio, Tena andPuyo, communication by means of newsletters in two provinces, and environ-mental education committees in three provinces. Armed border conflict withPeru.

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Sierra Nevada de SantaMarta, Colombia

Conservation Strategy forTropical Forests

JUAN MAYR, GUILLERMO RODRIGUEZ, NATALIA

ORTIZ, HERNANDO SANCHEZ, PRO-SIERRA

FOUNDATION, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ROBERT

PRESCOTT-ALLEN, IUCN–CESP

1 Introduction

The Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta risessharply from the Caribbean coast; in just42 km its snowy peaks reach a height of5,775 m. It covers an area of 17,000 km2

and is the highest coastal mountain rangein the world, separated from the mainAndes range by flat, semi-arid regions.

Due to its size, variation in altitude,location and isolated nature, the SierraNevada is important from a hydrologicaland biological point of view. It is the‘water factory’ for 35 water catchmentareas, which supply about one and a halfmillion inhabitants in the plains. Itstropical rainforests, dry tropical forestsand many other habitats are representativeof most of the ecosystems of tropicalAmerica. There is a rich diversity ofspecies; 20 to 40 per cent of them areendemic. Part of the Sierra Nevada is anational park and biosphere reserve. The

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SIERRA NEVADA, COLOMBIAPopulation: 190,000Land area: 1,700,000 haEcological zones: seasonal tropics, fromsea level to 5,775 mMain economic activities: coffee, subsist-ence agriculture, cattle, marijuana; bana-nas and cotton in surrounding flatlands

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a massif is divided politically and adminis-tratively into three departments, elevenmunicipalities and two indigenousreservations.

In prehispanic times the area was inhab-ited by the Tairona. They developed acomplex system of lithic settlementscomposed of inhabited terraces of differ-ent densities interconnected by stonepaths. The Tairona made use of differenttemperature gradients through a sustain-able system of vertical economy. With thearrival of the Spaniards came war, andafter 100 years of continuous battles theTairona were defeated. A few groups tookrefuge in the most remote mountains.

Because of the difficulty experienced byEuropeans who tried to settle in themountains of the interior, the remainingindigenous groups managed to live inrelative isolation until the end of the 19thcentury. Three indigenous groups, theIjka, Kogui and Sanja, live in the highmountainous area, with a total populationof 30,000 inhabitants. The Kogui andsome of the Ijka retain their pre-Colom-bian traditions, while the others are beingrapidly deprived of their culture. Another160,000 people from various regions livein the middle and lower ranges of themountains. Many settled there over thelast 50 years to escape the crisis unleashedin the 1940s by the fall in the price ofbananas, which was the main lowland

crop, and to avoid the sectarian violencein the interior of the country at that time.

During the 1970s, thousands of hectaresof forest were cleared to grow marijuana,which offered an economic return at leastten times greater than that of coffee. Thegovernment countered by partiallyeradicating the crops with herbicides. Thiswas also an era marked by a resurgence ofviolence. Some settlers left the land; othersreturned to growing coffee, still othersstarted growing coca. In the 1980s landwas abandoned, conflicts were polarizedand exacerbated, the soil was impover-ished and erosion continued. Nationalgovernment was either absent or repres-sive. Guerrillas emerged to fill the vacuumleft by the government, competing forterritorial control with paramilitary groupswhich had appeared during the marijuanaboom.

Nowadays, indigenous people, peasants,settlers, businessmen, guerrillas and otherdwellers of the Sierra Nevada form amixed society with different values andinterests. There is little if any cooperationamong them.

The principal causes of the impoverish-ment of the Sierra Nevada resource baseare the rapid destruction of the forests, theintroduction of unsuitable productionsystems, inappropriate technology,continued drug cultivation, the lack of a

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national government presence and poorcoordination between the three depart-mental governments and 11 municipalitiesof the region. Only 15 per cent of theprimary forest remains. The loss of theforests has had disastrous consequences forthe region’s hydrology, affecting both thesupply of water to neighbourhood com-munities and the irrigation of largefarming areas.

The Pro-Sierra Nevada de Santa MartaFoundation was founded in 1986 with theaim of halting environmental damage andpromoting conservation of the Sierra. Thefoundation is a non-profit NGO. Thecentral government and the departmentaland municipal authorities share thefoundation’s organization and work withbusiness representatives, indigenouscommunities, peasants, scientists andprivate individuals.

Since 1987, the foundation has carriedout a restoration programme for the SierraNevada de Santa Marta. In the first stageit completed a comprehensive diagnosison the basis of available information andgenerated new information about theregion, covering its history since the 15thcentury and its institutional, ecological,political, economic, cultural and territorialaspects.

The foundation has set up two ecologicalstations, one inside the park, the other onthe border. Their principal objectives are

to provide protection for the park,undertake ecological research, study ethnicrelations and forest regeneration, andpromote appropriate technologies incollaboration with local populations.

The foundation has also established twocommunity care centres. The CongoCentre works with a peasant communityon preventative health, mother and infantcare, sanitation, training, organization,agro-ecology, fish farming and archaeo-logical research and restoration. Morethan 100 reservoirs have been set up forfish breeding in an effort to reduce thehigh level of infant malnutrition. TheShimelumke Centre is located in one ofthe most impoverished areas of the Sierra,with a population of indigenous peoples,peasants and mixed races. Violence in thearea has grown in response to the enlarge-ment of the indigenous reservation andhas limited the scope of the centre tomonitoring the situation. In 1993, thecentre had to suspend activities onaccount of public unrest.

In 1991 the foundation recognized theneed for a broader and more participatorystrategy. Its action focused on disseminat-ing information and providing training forthe different players – indigenous people,peasants, businessmen, politicians,governmental and NGOs – in order tostrengthen their ability to take action,with the ultimate aim of halting thedeterioration of the Sierra Nevada. The

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a foundation’s management is now workingto institutionalize the strategy; there is(1995) a preliminary draft documentalready in place.

2 Scope and Objectives

The objective of the strategy is tostrengthen the coordination and actioncapacity of the communities and ofgovernmental and non-governmentalorganizations in order to halt the deterio-ration of, and improve ecological andsocio-economic conditions in, the SierraNevada. This is the start of a participatoryprocess to lay the foundations of a conser-vation strategy and sustainable develop-ment plan for the area.

Specific objectives are:

• to better inform the players concernedand the public about the Sierra Ne-vada’s environmental, institutional,legislative, and socio-economic proc-esses;

• to establish mechanisms for coopera-tion and coordination between institu-tions for the management of the SierraNevada’s natural resources;

• to improve the standard of living of theinhabitants and guarantee security ofland tenure for indigenous communi-ties and the security of their holy sites;

• to plan land uses and resolve conflictsbetween interest groups;

• to seek to establish a single administra-tive body for the Sierra Nevada;

• to promote the use of appropriatetechnology;

• to preserve biodiversity and the waterregulation capacity of ecosystems,particularly their role in water supply,through cooperative action; and

• to set in motion a sustainability moni-toring and evaluation process.

3 Relationship to DevelopmentPlanning

In 1995, following consultation with thedifferent parties, the National PlanningDepartment initiated the formulation of adraft document. Efforts have continued todevelop a mechanism for institutionalizingthe strategy’s recommendations andresults, thus providing the basis for asustainable development plan for theSierra Nevada. Work is progressing onthree levels.

1. At the national level, through theNational Planning Department and theMinistry of the Environment, bysetting up Corposierra (by law) andnegotiating its recognition as thecoordinator of the sustainable develop-ment plan, in accordance with theresults and guidelines produced by thestrategy.

2. At a departmental level, through theRegional Planning Council for the

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Atlantic Coast (CORPES) and theNational Rehabilitation Plan (PNR),renamed the Social Solidarity Networkin accordance with the new governmentplan, in a project to include the massifas an environmental priority area incentral government policy and topromote the introduction of an envi-ronmental component in departmentaland municipal development plans.

3. At the municipal level, a project wasundertaken under the PNR to set upthe Association of Sierra NevadaMunicipalities (Asosierra), with the aimof joint environmental action in themassif. Asosierra is now operational anda second phase of consolidation isunderway.

In addition, an inventory is being drawnup of the programmes and projects ofother governmental and non-governmen-tal organizations, with a view to analyzingthem and establishing coordinated action.Meanwhile, an effort is being made withNGOs to set up an association to ensurethe feedback of experience and jointplanning in the Sierra Nevada.

4 Initial Development

Initial work on the strategy began in1992, with a series of consultationmeetings throughout the region supportedby the Swedish Nature Society. In 1993,with the financial support of GTZ and

technical assistance from IUCN, thefoundation began to formulate a conserva-tion strategy for the tropical forests of theSierra Nevada de Santa Marta. Thestrategy aimed to lay the foundations for asustainable development plan for theregion, with international sources provid-ing 90 per cent of funding. An all-Colombian team of 34 people has been setup to prepare the strategy.

Participating organizations include theColombian government (represented bythe National Planning Department),CORPES-Atlantic Coast, the Ministry ofthe Environment and other local organiza-tions working in the area, such as therecently created Asosierra, the Associationof Peasant Leaders of the Sierra Nevada(Asolideres) and the indigenous organiza-tion Gonawindua Tayrona.

5 Implementation and Results

Although the strategy is not in a phase offormal implementation, it has generatedguidelines which are starting to be assimi-lated by official institutions in theirpolicies, plans and programmes (section3). The strategy is chiefly a process forreaching consensus. Participation andenvironmental education are two of themain tools used in recreational anddiscussion workshops with communities.Other tools frequently used include themass media, such as radio and newspapers,

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a informative literature, videos, audio-visualpresentations, theatre performances,puppets and musical festivals. By givingpriority to working with indigenous andpeasant communities, institutions andunions; by consulting them and providinginformation; by creating awareness andoffering training, the process has gener-ated a series of mechanisms to ensurecontinued participation.

This type of joint approach is intended toadd real viability to the regional plan,which will be proposed after consultationwith the players. The approach will alsofacilitate the conclusion of practical agree-ments on the use of natural resources.

A first draft of the general conservationstrategy document is ready. This docu-ment, which covers the process and thevarious points of view and approaches ofthose involved, will then be resubmittedto the groups for their opinions. Afterthat, a final version should emerge, whichwill further facilitate agreement and whichwill be incorporated into a sustainableregional development plan.

6 Lessons Learned

A strategy dealing with dynamic groupsand interests should itself be dynamic.Dynamism is not generally associated withthe preparation of documents, and a

documentary strategy might thereforeappear to be a waste of time. Between1987 and 1991, the Pro-Sierra Nevada deSanta Marta Foundation operated withsome degree of success using an implicitstrategy. Since 1993, however, it has beenconsidered preferable to implement anexplicit strategy, since only an explicitversion can be shared, developed andimplemented with a broad range ofparticipants.

People need incentives to participate in astrategy. One means of providing this is tofocus on an issue that every (or nearlyevery) potential participant agrees with: inthis case, the value of water and the role offorests in safeguarding the quality andsupply of water.

Having worked with all the key players,raising awareness, informing and trainingwere found to be insufficient. There wasalso a need to strengthen their internalmanagement and negotiating abilities,even at municipal and institutional levels.That is to say, it was necessary to firstwork within each organization (internalconsultation) before seeking to reach aconsensus among them, so that when thetime came to implement the strategy, thenecessary mechanisms would already be inplace. The strategy requires political willat all levels, and the failure to obtain thissupport at a national, regional or locallevel may bring the process to a standstill.

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7 Chronology

1986 Creation of the Pro-Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta Foundation.

1987 The foundation sets up the first ecological station; its aims include protectingareas of great diversity and ecological importance and involving the commu-nities.

1988 The foundation carries out a comprehensive assessment of the Sierra Nevada.

1989 The foundation sets up the community care centre, promoting a comprehen-sive methodology of research and action with local communities.

1991 The foundation recognizes the need for a broader and more participatorystrategy that incorporates other sectors, including government.

1992 Work on the strategy begins; consultative meetings are held in 27 areas of thedepartments of Cesár, Guajira and Magdalena.

1993 Formulation of the strategy becomes explicit, with all parties involved in theprocess.

1994 The new constitution opens up possibilities for sustainable developmentplanning. A law is passed creating Corposierra. Asosierra is then set up at adepartmental level, and the first local organization of leaders takes place atlocal level. Indigenous communities define the ‘black line’ or traditionalterritory. The national government recognises access to the sea for indigenouscommunities, thus guaranteeing their access to different ecosystems.

1995 The Presidential Office for the Atlantic Coast, the Ministry of the Environ-ment, the National Planning Department, the Indigenous Affairs Divisionand the Pro-Sierra Nevada Foundation set up a joint working party for theformulation of a sustainable development plan for the Sierra Nevada.

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a Mata Atlántica, Brazil

Biosphere Reserve and Agro-ecological Exchange Network

SEBASTIÃO SALLES DE SÁ, GOVERNOR OF THE

STATE OF ESPÍRITU SANTO AND EDOARDO

SOARES, APTA WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF LUIS

CASTELLO, IUCN

1 Introduction

The Mata Atlántica (Atlantic ForestRegion) Biosphere Reserve programme inBrazil involves 14 federal states and federalgovernment organizations, as well as theAssociation of Alternative TechnologyProgrammes (APTA). APTA is a peasantexchange training network operating in sixstates: Río Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina,Paraná, Río de Janeiro, Espíritu Santo andCeará.

In the state of Espíritu Santo – the caseexamined here – the biosphere reserveprogramme is coordinated by the StateDepartment for Environmental Affairs(SEAMA). This department was set up topromote, in coordination with the privatesector, public policies and actions aimed atfacilitating sustainable development at thelocal level.

The Mata Atlántica biosphere reservecovers an area of 16,200 km2, which is 36

MATA ATLÁNTICA, BRAZILPopulation:Land area: 1,620,000 ha; plus agriculturalzonesEcological zones: Atlantic seasonaltropical forestMain economic activities: agriculture,cattle, eucalyptus

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per cent of the state. Espíritu Santo’sbiosphere reserve is considered a priorityproject in the state government’s plans,and will act as an indicator and guide forthe ecological and economic zoningscheme which is being prepared bySEAMA.

The Mata Atlántica Consortium, which isresponsible for implementation of thestrategy at the national level, is composedof the environmental departments of allthe states (currently 14) taking part in theprogramme, and the Brazilian Institute ofthe Environment and Renewable NaturalResources (IBAMA), which is a federalbody. The consortium will coordinateactions between the different states, findfinancial resources and foster exchanges oftechnical and scientific information.

The area suffers from severe structural andagricultural development problemsresulting from the “green revolution”policies of previous decades, and from thecultivation of eucalyptus to producecellulose. An association of agro-ecologicalproducers was formed through fieldprojects and technical exchanges toaddress these problems.

2 Objectives and Approach

The principal objective of the programmeis to reverse the current deterioration of

what is left of the Mata Atlántica; toimprove the region’s socio-economicconditions; and to raise the standard ofliving of the local population. Theintention is to turn the Mata Atlánticainto a biological corridor 4,000 km long.

These objectives are to be achievedthrough the following actions:

• consolidation of the state system ofconservation units and scientificknowledge;

• passing of a forest policy law;• forest supervision and monitoring;• strengthening and promotion of

environmental education projects;• more demonstration units for sustain-

able development experiments; and• establishment of a state management

committee for the biosphere reserve.

The objectives of the APTA peasantexchange network are:

• to identify, develop and make availablesystems of production, processing andmarketing developed by the farmersthemselves;

• to organize a state agro-ecologicalexchange and mutual support network;and

• to promote agricultural productionbased on ecological sustainabilitythrough the provision of technicaladvice and assistance to farmers.

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a 3 Relationship to GovernmentPlanning

In Espíritu Santo, the strategy is imple-mented by SEAMA, which is a stateorganization. At the federal level, SEAMAworks closely with the National Environ-mental Programme (PNMA), which is thenational coordination authority responsi-ble for channelling funds to agencies fromthe World Bank. SEAMA also coordinatesthe work of other state departments thatare responsible for different areas closelyrelated to strategy implementation. Theseinclude the conservation units, of which11 are under federal jurisdiction; 14 aredependent on SEAMA; 17 are undermunicipal jurisdiction and three areprivately run. In addition, a planningdepartment coordinates projects generatedby the biosphere reserve.

4 Initial Development

The Mata Atlántica programme was set upin 1988 after the launch of the PNMA,which in turn is coordinated by IBAMA.The programme receives 75 per cent of itsfunding from the World Bank and 25 percent from the federal government.

The programme started planning topreserve what was left of the MataAtlántica on the Brazilian coast. Onlysome five per cent of the original sub-tropical forests remained, making the area

one of the world’s most threatenedecosystems, one in danger of completeextinction.

That same year, SEAMA was set up in thestate of Espíritu Santo, with the conserva-tion and recovery of this threatenedecosystem as one of its main institutionalmissions. A participatory planning processwas initiated, involving federal and stateinstitutions, NGOs, local inhabitants,municipalities, universities and specialistscollaborating on a private basis.

At a very early stage, it was necessary toestablish the area to be set aside for thebiosphere reserve. This in turn required anofficial application to have the site recog-nized as part of the state’s heritage (underthe tombamento procedure). The requesthad to be made to the State CulturalCouncil, which is a government bodyconsisting of representatives from 11NGOs and two state governments. Dis-cussions regarding the legal incorporationof the protected areas as part of the stateheritage lasted until April 1991, at whichtime another procedure began to make theareas part of the biosphere reserve. Thiswas achieved in November 1992. In thisinitial period, two main processes movedahead simultaneously.

1. The Mata Atlántica Consortium beganto negotiate with UNESCO’s MAB tohave the biosphere reserve approved.The Brazilian MAB Committee

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(COBRA–MAB) was reactivated forthis purpose. Originally the proposalcovered the Mata Atlántica areas in thestates of Río de Janeiro, São Paulo andParaná. The following year, EspírituSanto and Minas Gerais were added,followed a year later by Santa Catarinaand Río Grande do Sul, and finally bythe northeastern states. As a result,these areas came to be incorporated inthe biosphere reserve and approved byUNESCO. Each of the successiveincorporations gave rise to a differentphase in the biosphere reserve proce-dure at the federal level.

2. Within the state of Espíritu Santo itself,there were a number of operationalstages in the process. The initial prep-aratory stage consisted of marking outthe areas, drafting the correspondingmaps, preparing a technical documentas the basis for the proposal, and hold-ing the necessary working and discus-sion meetings among technical staff andrepresentatives of the social sectors con-cerned with the strategy. The second orconsolidation stage consisted of draw-ing up a register of projects required toimplement the strategy. Altogether, 34institutions participated in selecting 75projects from the 323 proposed for thewhole reserve. Some of these projectsobtained funding and were able to start.Eventually the project register will beincorporated in an action plan, whichwas in the early drafting stage in 1993.

At the federal level, the biosphere reservemanagement system operates through anational council of 36 members, repre-senting the federal government, stategovernments, universities and NGOs. Inaddition, there are regional technicalboards which analyze technical andscientific issues; and state committees,which are in charge of administeringresources, establishing priorities andapproving action plans. The strategy alsosupports discussion forums, which arewidely attended by local institutions,residents, and by NGOs working inrelated fields.

The SEAMA work team responsible forcoordinating the strategy is composed ofone coordinator, one lawyer to deal withlegal matters, two biologists to planconservation units and environmentaleducation projects, three forestry engineersfor the recovery of degraded areas andconsolidation of conservation units, onecivil engineer for forestry policy matters,one army representative for forest control,two administrators for administrative andfinancial matters and two students forsupport tasks.

The APTA Network

In the 1980s, as a result of the productioncrisis affecting the peasant community,the Brazilian Alternative AgricultureMeetings (EBAAs) were initiated. Thesebiannual events brought together techni-

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a cians and students and a few farmersinterested in developing a new technologybase for agriculture.

At the second of these meetings (EBAA II,held in Petrópolis in the state of Río deJaneiro), a group of technicians agreedthat, if agriculture was to move forward, anational inventory of all existing alterna-tive agriculture experiments had to bedrawn up. It was believed that a great dealof useful experience could be gleaned fromsmall producers, who had actively opposedthe advance of the “green revolution”. Thefoundations were laid for the AlternativeTechnologies Project (PTA), which in justtwo years became established in five states:Río Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina,Paraná, Río de Janeiro and Ceará.

At this time, the officials in charge ofsome of the state departments of agricul-ture (in Paraná and Espíritu Santo inparticular) expressed concern about theproblem of peasants and the environment.In mid-1984, negotiations began betweenthe PTA and the Espíritu Santo Depart-ment of Agriculture (SEAG) with a viewto establishing a project in that state.

In September of that year, SEAG organ-ized a state event on the theme of alterna-tive technologies, which managed to bringtogether some 70 persons, mostly govern-ment technicians. One of the meeting’soutcomes was the decision to conduct a

state inventory of alternative technologyexperiments. The Department of Agricul-ture assigned the task to the PTA, whichbegan work in Espíritu Santo in Decem-ber 1985.

One year later, another alternative tech-nologies meeting was held in the state, thistime with 150 participants, 132 of whomwere farmers. To some extent, the meetingconfirmed the ideas outlined in previousmeetings regarding the need to developalternative technologies for rural produc-ers. From then on, the beneficiaries of theproject took an increasingly active role, ina continuous effort to improve and extendthe process.

An agreement with the government wasfinalized in 1987 and a PTA was set upfor Espíritu Santo. It was a subsidiary of aRío de Janeiro NGO. In 1987, discussionsbegan on converting the body into anautonomous NGO. This was accom-plished in March 1990 with the founda-tion of APTA.

5 Implementation and Results

A general state system for environmentalinformation is being created, whoseprincipal aims are as follows:

• ecological and economic zoning (in theprocess of preparation);

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• a coastal management project, underfederal coordination; and

• a forest monitoring system.

Much is being done in the field of envi-ronmental education through pilot com-munity projects. These include fishingschools for fishermen’s children, who, inaddition to subjects in the normal curricu-lum, are taught boat mechanics, ecologyand methods of breeding marine speciessuch as oysters. Similar schemes are run inrural schools. The valuable scientific andtechnical work performed by the RíoDoce Forestry Commission has achievedrecognition at national and internationallevels, especially in the field of woodlandagriculture (agroforestry), management ofnative tree species, agroforestry systems(tropical agriculture under shade) andrecovery of degraded areas using pioneerspecies in systems that simulate naturalgrowth. These efforts are coordinated withthose of APTA.

Another initiative has been the introduc-tion of various types of forest gardens.These are model units used for therecovery of degraded areas, the enrich-ment of secondary forest, and so on.There is a plan to set up 29 of these gar-dens; nine were planted as of 1993.

Certain indicators have been defined toevaluate the effectiveness of the strategy inpractice. In the case of the system of

conservation units, for example, thefollowing criteria were established:

• biodiversity conservation;• increase in the population of endan-

gered species;• reduction in hunting;• reduction in deforestation;• increased research; and• an increase in the numbers of visitors.

APTA’s more notable results have in-cluded:

• improvement of state regulationsthrough indirect pressure;

• better coordination between govern-ment and business forestry sectors andstate conservation programmes;

• research and implementation pro-grammes for the use of appropriateseeds and agro-ecological productiontechniques; and

• training of NGO technicians andstudents.

6 Lessons Learned

Several lessons have been learned duringthe process, including:

• the need to rely on the wholeheartedsupport of policy-makers at the highestlevel and the need for the right institu-tions, such as SEAMA, to lead thestrategy process;

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a • the need to bring other governmentsectors into the discussions and coordi-nate efforts with them, in order to forma consistent front when dealing withother parties (especially organizationsresponsible for credit policies, taxexemptions and other legal aspectswhich have to be consistent with theobjectives of the strategy);

• the need for a multi-disciplinary teamof specialists, with plenty of experiencein dealing with complex processes suchas strategies, and the ability to beflexible and share a common languageand methodology with the othermembers of the team;

• when the strategy is implemented itbecomes influenced and altered by day-to-day realities. Errors may occur eitherin the strategy or in planning and it iswrong to believe that a ‘perfect strategy’can be achieved. There is no suchthing, since reality always turns out tobe more complex than expected;

• no method or strategy will work unlesspeople believe in it. Strategists must be

given practical responsibilities inimplementing the strategy. Conversely,those who are active in the field shouldalso be involved with planning. If theyfail to understand the significance oftheir task in the context of the strategyas a whole, they will have difficultydeveloping any enthusiasm, which leadsto inefficiency;

• the strategy’s proposals must be viable –it is very important to test the attain-ability of goals. In the case of APTA, agreat deal of importance was attachedto short-term goals and actions. Forexample, within a short amount of timefarmers were obtaining harvests withoutthe use of agro-toxins or chemicalfertilizers. This was modest proof thatagro-ecology was possible; and

• the risk of error must not be allowed toprevent action. Sharing mistakes withothers is a good way of helping to getthings right, since one ‘wrong’ inpractice is more instructive than 200‘rights’ in theory.

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7 Chronology

1983 Foundations are laid at the EBAA for PTA. In just two years the project isadopted in five states.

1984 PTA and the state of Espíritu Santo sign an agreement to undertake a stateinventory of alternative technology experiments.

1986 Another Alternative Technology Meeting takes place in the state, this timeattended by 150 participants, 132 of whom are farmers.

1988 The National Environmental Programme is started with World Bank fundingand federal contributions. The Mata Atlántica Consortium is officially set upin 14 states, under the protection of the Brazilian Constitution, whichdeclares the dry tropical forest of the Mata Atlántica as part of the nationalheritage. Creation of SEAMA for the state of Espíritu Santo.

1989 Approval of the technical document for the proposal, for submission to theWorld Bank, to create a biosphere reserve in the state. Start of procedure(tombamento) for recognizing areas of special ecological importance as part ofthe state heritage.

1990 Founding of APTA. The National Environmental Programme is givenapproval by the World Bank and spending on implementation activitiesbegins.

1991 Tombamento procedure approved. Initial steps are taken to include areas ofinterest in the biosphere reserve and to seek UNESCO approval. The firstinstalment of the funding is received.

1992 UNESCO approves the incorporation of the demarcated areas in EspírituSanto in the Mata Atlántica biosphere reserve.

1993 Discussions concerning the strategy action plan for the full implementation ofthe biosphere reserve.

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a Tambopata-Candamo,Peru

Eco-regional Strategy forSustainable Development

THOMAS MOORE, EORI CENTRE

AVECITA CHICCHÓN, CONSERVATION INTERNA-

TIONAL WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ALBERTO

SALAS, IUCN

1 Introduction

On January 29, 1990 the Reserve Zone ofTambopata-Candamo (ZRTC) in thePeruvian Amazon region was establishedover an area of 1,478,942 hectares byMinisterial decision. The decision wasobtained after years of lobbying byconservationist groups for the protectionof the Tambopata River basin in thedepartments of Madre de Dios (Inkaregion) and Puno (Mariátegui region).Initially the local inhabitants rejected theestablishment of a reserve zone because ithad been imposed upon them. Thisattitude changed after some painstakinggroundwork efforts, undertaken chiefly bythe Eori Centre for Amazonian Researchand Promotion and by the coordinator ofthe ZRTC on behalf of the Directorate ofProtected Natural Areas (formerly thenational parks programme).

TAMBOPATA-CANDAMO, PERUPopulation: 7,200; growing quicklyLand area: 1,478,942 haEcological zones: Amazonian rainforest,riversMain economic activities: timber, Brazilnuts, alluvial gold, subsistence agriculture,fishing, hunting

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According to Peruvian law, a reserve zoneis a provisional arrangement which shouldbe replaced by an environmental planningorder in accordance with the current andpotential uses of its resources. The strategydescribed below is sponsored by theDirectorate of Protected Natural Areasand Forest Fauna, which is itself part ofINRENA. The directorate works througha technical team, which is in charge ofdesigning the strategy. The team includesa forestry engineer, a regional planningspecialist, an agricultural economist and asocial anthropologist.

The strategy has generated a considerableamount of information, which has servedas a basis for diagnoses and studies of thearea. The Eori Centre, an NGO with itsmain office in Puerto Maldonado, hasplayed a key role in the design andimplementation of the strategy through itscontacts with indigenous and farmingorganizations. The team has managed toobtain the combined support of the mainindigenous organizations, settlers andNGOs. The technical and financialsupport of Conservation International(CI) has also been available throughoutthe process.

A series of production and marketingactivities has begun among organizationsin the area. These activities have mobilizedgrassroots organizations and, in the case ofindigenous communities, have led to therecovery of part of their ancient territories.

This process of social mobilization hasbrought together grassroots organizationsand NGOs engaged in social and conser-vation work under the umbrella of theUnion for Sustainable Development ofMadre de Dios (UDSMAD), coordinatedby state conservation and developmentinstitutions. While the strategy has not yetbeen formalized as an official or consensusdocument, it does exist as a participatoryprocess for sustainable development.

2 Objectives and Approach

The situation at present

The ZRTC is an area of Peru withconsiderable and unusual biologicaldiversity. According to CI’s Rapid Assess-ment Programme (RAP), no fewer than200 species of trees have been found inless than one hectare, with a comparabledegree of diversity among the fauna. Con-servation of the territory, through protec-tion and sustainable use, deserves to be aregional and national priority. The ZRTCis located in the departments of Madre deDios and Puno. Some 3,200 inhabitants(as of 1993) live in the northern part ofthe zone (Madre de Dios), while thepopulation of the southern area (Puno)amounts to some 4,000.

Despite its present low population den-sity, this rich biodiversity is in danger ofgradually disappearing unless measures are

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a taken to protect key ecosystems andestablish sustainable development in areasof human impact. There is a settlementarea in the upper Tambopata River inPuno and another in the lower Tambo-pata region near Puerto Maldonado. It isworth mentioning that the reserve zone isadjacent to biologically important areas inBolivia. Contacts are maintained betweenthe directors of the Bolivian and Peruvianparks for the purpose of devising apractical working strategy to guarantee theconservation of this extensive frontier area.

Objectives

The general objective for the region is toconsolidate conservation and sustainabledevelopment initiatives in the ReserveZone of Tambopata Candamo and its areaof influence. Specific objectives includethe following:

• to introduce land-use planning for theZRTC through zoning based onecological, economic and social criteria;

• to identify, analyze and establishpriorities between conservation anddevelopment alternatives in the areas ofagriculture, stock-breeding, forestry,mining, tourism, water resources andthe protection of ecosystems;

• to ensure the participation of thepopulation and local organizationsthroughout the process, and strengthentheir capacity for self-management andeconomic and social development;

• to propose alternative economic andfinancial means of guaranteeing sourcesof income for the population without anegative impact on the environment;and

• to analyze the situation and presentcapacity of existing organizations andinstitutions in order to implementrecommendations arising from thestrategy.

3 Relationship to DevelopmentPlanning

The ZRTC’s planning strategy is headedby the Directorate of Protected NaturalAreas, making it part of an internalnational plan for conservation. Owing tothe current weakness of regional institu-tions in Peru, the strategy receives littlesupport from regional bodies, but it has agreater level of support from the localauthorities in Madre de Dios. In theZRTC–Puno sector, the groundwork andlobbying at the local authority level hasbeen rather weak because of the unfavour-able political environment. In theMariátegui region, proposals tend to bemore geared to development, such as roadbuilding and settlement projects. It ishoped that the situation will improveunder the management of new authorities,within the general framework of regionaland national environmental management.

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4 Initial Development

ZRTC was created in January 1990 afteran initial period of lobbying. There was anegative reaction on the part of the peopleof Madre de Dios because the reserve zonehad been imposed on them without anyprevious consultation. The first forum todiscuss the future of the ZRTC was usedto explain concepts, to request derogationfrom Article II of the decision establishingthe ZRTC (which prevented the renewalof forestry contracts), and to generatesupport for planning among the popula-tion.

The Eori Centre carried out a census andcompleted other components of a generalanalysis in a joint effort with local com-munities and their federations, especiallythe indigenous Federación Nativa del RíoMadre de Dios y Afluentes (FENAMAD)and the farmers’ organization, FederaciónAgraria Departamental de Madre de Dios(FADEMAD). The Eori Centre alsosought the support of the Association ofNut Growers and Agro-industrial Produc-ers of Lago Valencia and the Associationof Nut Producers and Tourist Services ofLago Sandoval.

This slow and painstaking work began bybuilding up exhaustive documentation onexisting legal rights over lands, timber,nuts, mining resources (alluvial ore), fish-ing, tourism and other natural resources

and economic activities. When all theinformation had been collected, it waspassed on to grassroots organizations andto the Ministries of Agriculture, Energyand Mines, Fisheries, Industry and Tour-ism, as well as local and regional planningbodies. None of them had ever had accessto such a complete range of data.

A supporting technical team was set upunder the Directorate for ProtectedNatural Areas to design a comprehensiveconservation and development strategy.Consultation workshops on conservationand development topics were held withthe four indigenous communities involvedin the ZRTC. This led to the establish-ment of an Executive Committee, madeup of the secretary for productive andextractive affairs of the Inka Region, hisequivalent for the Mariátegui Region, andthe Director of Protected Natural Areas.

A central element of this strategy has beenits participatory character at every stage,including design, discussion, testing,implementation, modification, approvaland evaluation. This degree of participa-tion has been achieved by insisting oninvolving local populations in all decision-making, through municipal assemblies,federation congresses, workshops, theparticipatory implementation of activitiesand, above all, continuous and thoroughcommunication with all the partiesconcerned.

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a 5 Implementation and Results

The strategy has not been adopted in theform of an official consensus document. Itdoes, however, exist in essence as a par-ticipatory process for sustainable develop-ment. This process has matured throughjoint actions in the field toward anobjective shared by many sectors, and hasbeen regularly reflected in new legislationor local planning agreements. In thissense, the results have been significant.

When the government established anAgricultural Development Fund in late1991, representatives of the Inka regionalgovernment, with the support of the EoriCentre, asked FENAMAD andFADEMAD to define their priorities foragriculture development in Madre deDios. This was the first time the localcommunities and their representativefederations had been consulted regardingpublic investment in their region.

After much debate and consultation withgrassroots organizations, FENAMAD’spriorities were identified as territorialconsolidation, confirmation of landtenure, extension and rectification ofboundaries, and a request for communalreserves to protect forest wildlife. At thesame time, FADEMAD requested supportfor soil recovery through agroforestryactivities and for start-up capital to buildprocessing plants for manioc and bananaflour.

At the beginning of 1992, the twofederations began implementing theseactivities with loans from the governmentand technical support from the EoriCentre. The activities have been verysuccessful among the local communities,which have been keen to expand them toan extent which neither the Peruviangovernment nor the NGOs envisaged. Animportant feature of the strategy has beenthe alliance built up between FENAMADand FADEMAD, a link between Amazo-nian indigenous peoples and settlers whichis unusual in South America.

In January 1993, FADEMAD, supportedby FENAMAD and backed by largenumbers of local inhabitants, stormed thepremises of Empresa Colonizadora delArroz (ECASA), the former rice-farmingenterprise. ECASA held a monopoly overthe sale of rice until being abolished bythe government at the end of 1992, atwhich time producers were left withoutprotection but were also free to act forthemselves. The two federations, sup-ported by the Eori Centre, requested thesupport of the Ministry for Agriculture.Finally, on 5 February 1993, PresidentFujimori came to Puerto Maldonado withthe Minister of Agriculture and handedover the premises of ECASA to the twofederations for them to manage.

FENAMAD and FADEMAD then set upthe Agro-industrial Production andMarketing Enterprise for the Province of

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Tambopata (EPCA–Tambopata). Thisinstitution not only deals with the market-ing of the rice harvest, as ECASA used to,but is also designing a strategy for theharvesting and marketing of a full range ofvaried crops. These include manioc,bananas, and, most particularly, perma-nent cultivation which can be combinedwith other activities of the programme forsoil recovery. The main limitation onactivities is now the lack of capital to takethese plans a stage further. FENAMAD,with the technical support of the EoriCentre, is marking out boundaries andregulating the territory as fairly as possible,thus avoiding actual and potential bound-ary conflicts between settlers and indig-enous communities.

Meanwhile, other NGOs have beenpromoting ecotourism and appliedbiology activities, which offer alternativesto traditional forest extraction in theZRTC. Among the most interestingexperiments are projects combining naturetourism with the production of nuts andfishing, in addition to subsistence agricul-ture. These activities are currently under-taken by the communities which make upFADEMAD, Lago Valencia (which isadjacent to the ZRTC) and Lago Sandoval(inside the reserve zone). Near the mineralbanks of the Tambopata River, also insidethe ZRTC, the NGO ECCO is running amacaw breeding project, which has beenfairly successful and which offers commer-cial potential. Another interesting project

has been butterfly breeding in theComunidad Nativa (Ese’eja group)Infierno, which is being run by the NGOCEB/TReeS.

The nut-growers were initially excludedby the general ban on extracting forestproducts within the zone. They have cometogether and, with the support ofFADEMAD, FENAMAD and the EoriCentre, as well as all the institutionsengaged in planning activities for thezone, have managed to overturn the ban.N ut-growing is now considered a sustain-able economic activity and is thereforeallowed in the ZRTC.

In 1991, an NGO called CANDELAPERU began a marketing programmeaimed at providing more services for nutproducers. The programme is nowmanaging a significant part of the totaloutput. Since 1993, CANDELA PERUhas received funds from CI to extend itsoperational capacity, at a time when thegovernment has done away with allexisting subsidies for the export of non-traditional products and reduced theprofitability of nut sales.

On the basis of these joint activities andthe coordinated planning of sustainableeconomic alternatives, FENAMAD,FADEMAD, the Eori Centre, ECCO,TReeS, CANDELA PERU and theAsociación de Conservación de la SelvaSur (ACSS) joined forces in March 1993

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a to establish UDSMAD. This was set upmainly to allow joint financing of projects,so that all participants could have betteraccess to financial sources in order toimplement their conservation and sustain-able development activities.

In addition, the Peruvian Foundation forNature Conservation (FPCN), withZRTC coordination, works on projectsfor the protection of the lower Madre deDios River. These projects are carried outthrough the Santuario Nacional Pampasdel Heath team. The FPCN has alsojoined with the Peruvian Society forEnvironmental Law (SPDA), the Conser-vation Data Centre (CDC) and theUDSMAD, setting up an advisorycommittee to assist the Directorate ofProtected Natural Areas with its planningwork in Tambopata.

Despite some conflicts between institu-tions, there is a will to cooperate, not onlyon the part of the local communities, butalso by NGOs and government authori-ties, which previously had kept apart andhad not thought in terms of participatoryplanning. In 1994, contacts were estab-lished between the directors of protectednatural areas in Peru and Bolivia with aview to devising joint policies for theprotection of the Tambopata-Heath andMadidi basins on the border between thetwo countries.

In 1993, a second forum was held todiscuss proposals for land-use planningand sustainable development. Before theforum, both FADEMAD andFENAMAD spent a great deal of timewith their communities explaining thescope and limitations of the proposals.The most important outcome was theapproval of the land-use plan, whichincludes the creation of a new nationalpark over an area of some 760,000hectares. The proposed name for the parkis Bahuaja, which is the name of theTambopata River in the Ese’eja language.

6 Lessons Learned

The main limitations included:

• rivalries among NGOs, among publicsector institutions and between the twofactions. The struggle for scarce re-sources often gives rise to conflicts ofauthority, which hamper the strategy’sprogress;

• the opposition from some sawmillowners and other businessmen bent onshort-term extraction of naturalresources, as well as from ill-intentionedpolitical authorities and other generaltroublemakers. A further complicatingfactor is the political uncertaintyprevailing in Peru;

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• the isolation and difficulty of access tothe more remote areas, which while ithas protected the resources of theseareas from deforestation and theexploitation of natural resources, hasalso been an obstacle to communicationbetween local populations; and

• the economic crisis which Peru isundergoing has had the effect ofreducing sustainable developmentalternatives, bringing greater pressure tobear on natural resources in the area.

The main opportunities include:

• the previous experience of the EoriCentre in its efforts to organize andsupport local communities, a keynoteof this being the personal willingness ofteam members to treat the indigenousinhabitants and poor farmers whichmake up the population of the ZRTCas equals;

• economic factors, such as the failure ofthe Banco Agrario’s policies, which

caused FADEMAD to oppose newsustainable development concepts andpractices; and

• the worldwide trend towards environ-mental awareness, which encouraged agreater willingness in Peru and in theZRTC to adopt the strategy.

The main lessons learned included:

• most importantly, that all serious,participatory planning takes time andpatience if it is to succeed;

• differences between institutions have tobe overcome and gains have to beconsolidated, not only in the ZRTC,but in the whole of the Amazon region;and

• local inhabitants, through their repre-sentative organizations, must take onthe process as their own. They them-selves must develop contacts with theother organizations involved. The fullparticipation of local inhabitants helpsto ensure successful planning.

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7 Chronology

1990 Creation of the ZRTC in January. The National Parks Directorate invites CIto support ZRTC planning. Preparation of the study “The State of CurrentKnowledge Concerning the Reserve Zone of Tambopata Candamo” by theAssociation for the Conservation of the Southern Forest and the ConservationData Centre.

1991 First forum on the future of the ZRTC. The Eori Centre initiates a censusand socio-economic study of the population of the Madre de Dios ZRTC andits area of influence. The NGO CANDELA PERU initiates a marketingprogramme for nut-growers. The government announces a fund for thedevelopment of agriculture in Madre de Dios, with the participation (for thevery first time in this type of consultation) of FENAMAD and FADEMADrepresentatives, who define their priorities for the development of the sector.

1992 Rapid biological evaluation carried out by the CI’s RAP in the Tambopataand Heath River basins. Socio-economic survey in ZRTC–Puno. Technicalteam selected to support National Parks Directorate for ZRTC planning.

1992 FENAMAD and FADEMAD successfully initiate activities, with loansprovided by the government and Eori Centre technical assistance.

1993 In January, FADEMAD, with the support of the FENAMAD, storms thepremises of the former rice-farming enterprise, ECASA. President Fujimorihands over the premises of ECASA to the two federations. CANDELA PERUreceives CI funding to extend its operational capacity, at a time when thegovernment eliminates subsidies for nut-growers. FENAMAD, FADEMAD,Eori Centre, ECCO, TreeS, CANDELA PERU and ACSS unite to foundUDSMAD. Establishment of the government’s executive committee forZRTC planning. Completion of pre-feasibility study.

1993 Second forum to discuss the proposals for territorial planning and sustainabledevelopment. The most important conclusion gives approval for the land-useplan which includes the creation of a new national park.

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GlossaryACSS Asociación de Conservación

de la Selva Sur

ACTo Tortuguero ConservationArea

AEK Association of Kuna Em-ployees

AHT Agrar und Hydrotechnik

ANAP National Small FarmersAssociation

APTA Association of AlternativeTechnology Programmes

ASIREA Loggers Association

Asosierra Association of Sierra NevadaMunicipalities

BMZ Bundesministerium fürWirtschaftlicheZusammenarbeit

CANARI Caribbean NaturalResources Institute

CATIE Agroeconomic Research andEducation Centre

CDC Conservation Data Centre

CEBSE Centre for the Conservationand Ecodevelopment of theBay of Samaná and itsSurroundings

CESP Commission on Environ-mental Strategy andPlanning

CI Conservation International

COBRA Brazilian MAB Committee

COMARNA National EnvironmentalCommission

CONAMA National EnvironmentalCommission

CONAP National Council forProtected Areas

COPLASA Planning Council for theRegion of Samaná

CORPES Regional Planning Councilfor the Atlantic Coast

DANIDA Danish InternationalDevelopment Agency

EBAAs Brazilian AlternativeAgriculture Meetings

ECODES National Strategy of CostaRica

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a ECORAE Institute for theEcodevelopment ofAmazonia

ECOT-PAF National ConservationStrategy for SustainableDevelopment and the ForestAction Plan for Nicaragua

EEC European EconomicCommunity

EIA Environmental ImpactAssessment

EPCA Agro-industrial Productionand Marketing Enterprise(for the Province ofTambopata)

FADEMAD Federación AgrariaDepartamental de Madre deDios

FAO UN Food and AgricultureOrganization

FAP Forest Action Plan

FENAMAD Federación Nativa del RíoMadre de Dios y Afluentes

FINNIDA Finnish InternationalDevelopment Agency

FPCN Peruvian Foundation for

Nature Conservation

GO Governmental organization

IAF Interamerican Foundation

IBAMA Brazilian Institute of theEnvironment and Renew-able Natural Resources

IDA Institute for AgrarianDevelopment

IDRC International DevelopmentResearch Centre

IIED International Institute forEnvironment and Develop-ment

INRENARE National Institute forRenewable Natural Re-sources

IPF Physical Planning Institute

IRENA Institute for NaturalResources and theEnvironment

ITTO International Timber TradeOrganization

IUCN The World ConservationUnion

IUCN- IUCN Regional Office forORCA Central America

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JACASA Council of Samaná Peas-ants’ Associations

JAPDEVA Ports and Atlantic Develop-ment Board of Administra-tion

KfW Kreditanstalt fürWiederaufbau

MAB Man and Biosphere Pro-gramme (UNESCO)

MAG Ministry for Agriculture andStockbreeding

MARENA Ministry for NaturalResources

MDR Ministry for Rural Develop-ment

MIDEPLAN Ministry of Planning

MIRENEM Ministry of Natural Re-sources, Energy and Mines

NGO Non-governmental organi-zation

NORAD Norwegian Agency forDevelopment Cooperation

OLAFO Conservation for Sustain-able Development Project inCentral America

PAANIC Environmental Action Plan(Nicaragua)

PACTo Project for the Consolida-tion of the TortugueroConservation Area

PAFNIC Forest Action Plan forNicaragua

PCODES Conservation and Sustain-able Development Pro-grammes (Nicaragua)

PDI-Petén Integrated DevelopmentPlan (Petén)

PDP Prospective DevelopmentProposal

PEMASKY Ecological Programme forthe Management of theForest Areas of Kuna-Yala

PNMA National EnvironmentalProgramme of Brazil

PNR National RehabilitationPlan

PNT Tortuguero National Park

PTA Alternative TechnologiesProject

RBC Barra del Colorado ForestWildlife Refuge

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a SEAG Espíritu Santo Departmentof Agriculture

SEAMA State Department forEnvironmental Affairs

SEGEPLAN General Planning Depart-ment (Petén)

SIAPAZ International System ofProtected Areas for Peace

SIDA Swedish InternationalDevelopment Authority

SINAC National System of Pro-tected Areas

SINADES National CoordinatingBody for SustainableDevelopment

SINAP National System of Pro-tected Areas

SPDA Peruvian Society for Envi-ronmental Law

TFAP Tropical Forest Action Plan

UNCED UN Conference on Envi-ronment and Development

UNDP United Nations Develop-ment Programme

UNEPET Petén Implementation Unit

UNESCO United Nations Educa-tional, Scientific andCultural Organization

UPAGRA Small Producers’ Association

USDMAD Union for SustainableDevelopment of Madre deDios

WCS World ConservationStrategy

WRI The World ResourcesInstitute

WWF Worldwide Fund for Nature

ZRTC Reserve Zone ofTambopata-Candamo