Artº Weber and Rationalized Domination - j Cohen

MAX WEBER AND THE DYNAMICS OFRATIONALIZED DOMINATION

by

Jean Cohen

The forms of domination, and the possibilities for freedom in modernindustrial society were the major concerns of both Marx and Weber. Bothrejected a mechanistic notion of progress, according to which economicdevelopment is automatically accompanied by cultural, moral and humandevelopment. Both recognized the central contradiction implied by theprocess of industrialization — the contradiction between an unprecedentedincrease of productive power, and the corresponding increase of domi-nation and cultural impoverishment.1

However, Marx and Weber differed radically in their assessments ofmodern society. A fundamental belief in the possibility of the overcomingof capitalism structured Marx's approach to given manifestations ofcapitalist domination. From this standpoint stems the Marxian dialecticalmethod: the centrality of the categories of totality, subject-object dialectic,class struggle. Using these categories, Marx looks at the forms ofdomination while also trying to locate their hidden dynamic and the possi-bilities for their overcoming. In searching for newly created possibilitiesfor freedom in the changing structures of capitalist society, however, Marxdoes not seem to pay sufficient attention to the manifold expressions ofdomination. He does not elaborate upon the specific forms which domi-nation takes, nor does he adequately discuss the potential extension ofdomination beyond the sphere of production to every aspect of life, andthe problems this presents for the possibility of freedom.2

Weber, on the other hand, does not believe in the possibility of theAufhebung of m6dern industrial society. Weber thinks that one can eitherovercome rationalized domination (bureaucracy) by reverting to moreprimitive forms of organization and relinquishing the technologicaladvances of capitalism, or one can preserve rationalized domination in its

1. We discuss the meaning of this contradiction for Weber in detail in the body ofthe paper. For Marx, we refer to his distinction between poverty and wealth; hisconception of the increasing impoverishment of the proletariat This notion receivesits proper content only in Capital where it refers to the separation of mental frommanual labor with the resultant formation of knowledge into Science as a productiveforce distinct from labor and pressed into the service of capital. The laborer is at onceculturally impoverished and subjected to increased domination by those who controlthe use of knowledge. Cf. Marx, Capital Vol. I, p. 361.2. The failure of Marxists to comprehend the dialectics of domination beyond thesphere of production can be traced back to Marx. Omitted from their analyses is theconsideration of the question of the role of the state, the question of legitimation, theproblem of control over everyday life, the question of bureuacracy. Hence the inabilityto comprehend theoretically and practically such phenomena as fascism. (We refer tothe Second and Third Internationalists here, not to Lukacs, Korsch or the FrankfurtSchool.) Weber is important precisely because he anticipated the forms dominationwould take in advanced industrial society, and their negative implications regardingsubjectivity.

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present form and so retain and increase economic abundance.Consequently, Weber's analysis focuses on the forms of domination which"modern [20th century] industrial society" seems to require. He points tothe interrelationships between the economic, political, and culturalmanifestations of domination, in an attempt to dispell all illusions aboutsuch things as formal democracy and the extent of freedom possible underan electoral system. Weber does not look for structural possibilities orhidden dynamics pointing toward radical change. Yet, precisely becauseWeber confronted the problems of bureaucracy, the role of the state, andcultural control, we find his analysis important for contemporaryMarxism.

Most Marxists tend to disregard Max Weber primarily because he didnot focus his analysis of capitalism on class relations. Consequently he isconsidered to be at best, a bourgeois sociologist of little interest, and atworst, an apologist for capitalist domination. Only a few neo-Marxists —specifically Lukacs and Marcuse — devote any space to a criticalexamination of Weber's work. Lukacs makes use of Weber's analysis bysynthesizing Weber's category of rationalization with Marx's 'fetishism ofcommodities' into the concept of reification. But we maintain that theessential focus on forms of domination in Weber's conceptualization is lostwith Lukacs' translation of the category of rationalization into reification.The category of reification emphasizes the domination of things over man,while rationalization, when concretized in Weber's theory of bureaucraticdomination, stresses the new forms of domination of man over man.

Lukacs certainly grasps the thrust of Weber's category of rationalizationwith its implications regarding the fragmentation and destruction ofsubjectivity. He is the first to note Weber's insights into the structuralsimilarities between the modern capitalist firm with its internal relationsof domination (division of labor), the form of the bureaucratic state, thesystem of rationalized law, and their common basis: fragmented, domi-nated, depoliticized subjects.3 However, in synthesizing the concepts offetishism and rationalization, Lukacs stresses the total commodification(quantification, calculability, abstraction from real needs) of all areas oflife. His emphasis is on the reign of exchange value and the extension ofeconomic rationality to other spheres, rather than on the forms of domi-nation of man over man necessitated by advanced capitalism. ThusWeber's stress on bureaucratic instruments of political manipulation andcontrol, and his critique of formal democracy, is deemphasized by Lukacs.

Marcuse, on the other hand, attempts an immanent critique of Weber'sconcept of formal rationality. He criticizes Weber's methodology bydemonstrating that his 'formally rational' analysis of industrializationpresupposes very material historical conditions: the wage-labor capitalrelationship (separation of workers from means of production, privateproperty). Consequently, technical rationality of industrialization is

3. For Lukacs' analysis of Weber, cf. Georg Lukacs, History and ClassConsciousness (London, 1968), pp. 83-103. See also Andrew Arato, "Lukacs Theoryof Reification," Telos, 11 (Spring, 1972).

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revealed by Marcuse to be capitalist rationality of domination. Inassuming that Weber posits the inevitability of domination in industria-lized society on the basis of technical rationality, Marcuse attempts torefute him by revealing the basis of domination to be capitalist socialrelations which can be historically overcome. But in focusing his critiqueon Weber's methodological self-misunderstanding, Marcuse misses theessential thrust of Weber's work. Certainly Weber's analysis presupposesthe wage labor-capital relation; certainly his categories are not value free.However, precisely because Weber's analysis and evaluation of advancedcapitalism (or industrial society) implicitly rests on these substantiveconditions of domination, he cannot be refuted by simply making thoseconditions explicit. Weber is well aware that he is analyzing the dynamicsof industrialization in its capitalist form. His analysis of advanced capi-talism with its fragmentation and destruction of subjectivity, points to adynamic of bureaucratic domination and industrialization for whichsocialism (as centralized planning) is the logical culmination rather thanthe determined negation. In criticizing Weber's insistence on the inevita-bility of domination accompanying industrialization, Marcuse in no waydemonstrates the opposite — i.e., the possibility of socialism as bothfreedom and abundance. Marcuse does not pay sufficient attention eitherto Weber's insights into the role of political domination in advancedcapitalist countries, or to his critique of the model of state socialism.4

It is commonplace to many contemporary Marxists that the role of thestate, the relation between the economic and political spheres, must be re-examined. In this connection there are several important clues in Weber.The reconceptualization of Weber's work through the medium ofimmanent critique yields important categories that reveal importantaspects of the changed relations of domination under advanced capitalism.For, although it is true that Weber does not focus on class analysis (hisessay on class is purely descriptive) this is not because he is intent onconcealing domination, but because he locates the relations of dominationof advanced capitalism in another sphere — in the political relations ofbureaucracy. Weber's analysis of the process of rationalization points tothe thesis that social relations of domination can no longer be adequatelyexpressed through the categories of political economy and socio-economicclass, but rather through analysis of political forms of domination and thestate. Weber rounds this shift in the immanent developmental tendencies ofcapitalism. It is of course these immanent tendencies that are summed upby the term rationalization. Let us now turn to a critical analysis of theproblematic of rationalization.

For Weber, rationalization, as the extension of formal rationality, is notsimply a unilinear, monolithic process immanently unfolding in all areasof modern life. Instead, as formal rationality advances, it evokes counterforces all along the way. It is itself very often an unintended consequenceof action oriented to substantive values, and usually results in unintendedconsequences in turn — in irrationalities from both the formal and sub-

4. Herbert Marcuse, Negations (Boston, 1964), pp. 201-227.

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stantive point of view. In short, the process of rationalization can be seenas a dynamic between formal and substantive rationality.

Formal rationality is the principle of orientation of action to abstract,formal rules and norms — to an impersonal order such that calculationscan be made 'without regard for persons'. It is therefore presented as themodern form of reason — as objective scientific rationality. But whatmakes rationalization Weber's concern (and ours), is the extension offormal rationality to all areas of life as a form of domination. Weberpoints to the elevation of means to the status of ends as the usualunintended irrational consequence of rationalization. This is revealed bothin the bureaucrat's orientation to impersonal rules and the capitalist'sorientation to the impersonal market. Formal calculation, 'means', becomethe 'end' of human activity while man becomes a by-product of 'rationally'functioning machines. The irrationality of rationalization lies in thecreation of impersonal, meaningless forces which tend to functionindependently and despite man. It implies the impotence of subjectivitywhen confronted with these impersonal forces. But it is precisely here thatsubstantive rationality or action oriented to the particular, qualitativeneeds of man as the ultimate value, intervenes and presents tensions andlimits to the process of rationalization.

Weber's conception of 'disenchantment', a major result of the process ofrationalization, is the foundation for his epistemological presuppositions.According to Weber, the rationalization of the modern world hasdestroyed the value universalism of traditional medieval world-views (e.g.Christianity). The this-worldly orientation of modern man, the seculariza-tion and subsequent disenchantment of the world, leaves us with 'manygods' and conflicting values. The principle of modern rationality — thebelief that if one wished, one could master all things by calculation andunderstand all aspects of life — challenges religion's unified world-viewand cultural value system. It results in the disenchantment, and de-magic-ization and fragmentation of the world: there are no longer any mysteriousforces governing the world5 so that it becomes impossible to attribute theultimate meaning of the world to otherworldly gods and at the same timewe can. no longer act according to unambiguous, generally acceptedcultural values. In the disenchanted rationalized world, the ultimatelypossible attitudes to life are manifold and irreconcilable: one must actaccording to individually chosen ethics.

Thus, whereas it was once possible to attribute cultural values touniversally held ethical norms, and to ground the meaning of the world inreligious belief, the rationalization of the modern world denies this today."The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that itmust know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the resultsof its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to createthis meaning."6 It must be understood, however, that the unity of the

5. Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, eds., FromMax Weber (New York, 1958), p. 139.6. Max Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," The Methodologyof the Social Sciences, ed. and trans, by H. Fince and E. Shile (New York, 1949), p. 57.


cultural world is destroyed not because individuals no longer act accordingto absolute values but because these values are now individual: each indi-vidual follows his own god.

Because of this disenchantment, reality is no longer universal, a totalitywith unambiguous meaning. Instead, it appears as an 'heterogeneous flux'unknowable in its infinity. Indeed, the scientific investigator must consti-tute the section of reality which he wishes to study according to his ownindividually held ultimate values and cognitive interests. Since the valuesguiding his investigation are not universally held, he is limited to partialknowledge and a one-sided perspective.7 Rationalization and disenchant-ment result in the fragmentation of the knower into a one-sided specialist,and the fragmentation of knowledge into separate partial systems consti-tuted according to one-sided viewpoints. This implies the impossibility of acollective subjectivity which could attain value consensus in the constitu-tion of the world.

Nevertheless, Weber argues for 'objectivity' in the social sciences, not inthe sense that values can be eliminated from scientific work, for theyalways guide data-selection, but in the sense that the social scientist mustbe aware of and openly state the extra-scientific values guiding his work sothat he can distance himself from them.8 The scientist must not seektotally value-free knowledge but, and this is the important point, he mustmake his values explicit so as to distinguish between the analytical-logicaland the evaluative parts of his work. Thus, 'objective' truth entails therecognition of a realm constituted with reference to values which, however,proceeds value-free after this constitution. "The objective validity of allempirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the givenreality according to the categories which are subjective in a specific sense,namely in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and arebased on the presupposition of the value of those truths which empiricalknowledge alone is able to give us."9

Weber does not mean that scientific truth is now the uniform culturalvalue, or that it always was a value. In fact, he very clearly states that thevalue of scientific truth is itself historical and it is a particular value tothose who choose to accept it.10 While science presupposes that theknowledge yielded by scientific work is worth being known, this presup-

7. "There is no absolutely 'objective' scientific analysis of culture.. .or of socialphenomena independent of special and 'one-sided' viewpoints according to whichexpressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously, they are selected, analyzed, andorganized for expository purposes." Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and SocialPolicy," p. 72. This is basically a neo-Kantian position. For its full elaboration, seeHeinrich Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschqft (Tuebingen, 1899).8. Loewith, "Rationalization and Freedom," in Dennis Wrong, ed., Max Weber(New Jersey, 1970), p. 103.9. Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," p. 110.10. Ibid., p. 110. Weber states that "The means available to our science offernothing to those persons to whom this truth is of no value. It should be rememberedthat the belief in the value of scientific truth is the product of certain cultures and isnot a product of man's original nature."

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position cannot be scientifically proven, but can only be accepted orrejected according to one's ultimate values. Thus, science itself is consti-tuted by prescientific value choices. Nor can science provide us withunambiguous guidelines for action. Weber emphasizes that empiricalscience can never yield objectively binding norms and directives fromwhich one can derive practical activity.11

What, then, can science tell us? For Weber, natural science can onlytell us how to master life technically. He posits the goal of attaining apurely objective (independent of individual contingencies) monistic know-ledge of reality in a conceptual system of metaphysical validity andmathematical form.n The natural sciences, however, cannot tell uswhether we ought to master life technically or whether it is "meaningful"to do so.

Social science can tell us more. In addition to revealing the appropri-ateness of a given means to an end, social science can indicate what theachievement of certain ends, or the use of certain means will 'cost' interms of the loss of other values. Most important, social science can clarifythe ultimate value standards underlying the concrete end for whichindividuals struggle, and the significance of which they may be unaware.This is the ultimate purpose of sociology: to render our actions and theactions of others intelligible and understandable in terms of the under-lying guiding values. Here Weber is not offering a psychologistic science of

11. It is from this standpoint that Weber rejects both positivism and. dogmaticMarxism. (For Weber, this applied to Marx, but in point of fact this critique is only apolemic with dogmatic Marxism.) On the one hand, Weber rejects the positivistnotion that there are invariant cultural laws which, once discovered through thetechniques of the natural scientist, can yield normative imperatives to practicalaction. Weber rejects the positivist rejection of the problem of meaning, and deniesthat from observing facticity one can grasp the significance of social reality. On theother hand, Weber rejects the dogmatic Marxist belief in an unambiguousevolutionary principle which postulates the identity between the inevitably emergentwith the normatively right Finally, Weber rejects the objectivism implicit inpositivism and dogmatic Marxism, both of which present their theoretical statementsas independent of the values of the knowing subject Loewith correctly revealsWeber's quarrel with Marxism: "Weber combats Marxism as a scientific 'socialism'not because it is based upon ideas and ideals which are altogether undemonstrablescientifically, but because it presents the subjectivity of its fundamental presup-positions under the guise of their 'objective* universal validity, without distancingitself from them. Moreover, it confuses these two aspects and is scientifically 'biased'in favor of its own value judgments and prejudices." See Loewith, "Rationalizationand Freedom," p. 104.12. Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," p. 85. For a critique ofthe 'objectivity1 of this technical reason, see Herbert Marcuse, "Industrialization andCapitalism in Max Weber," Negations, pp. 223-225. Basically, Marcuse argues thatdomination of man over man enters into the very construction of the technicalapparatus and that therefore technical reason cannot be value free. Ultimately,Weber hands the realm of natural science over to the positivists. While Weber himselfis the first to demonstrate the legitimating functions of formal rationality (and itsfunction of concealing domination) in the social sciences, he falls into its ideologyinsofar as the natural sciences are concerned.


motivation but a social science able to uncover the cultural values towhich action is oriented.13

As Loewith points out, Weber's insistence on the separation of analyti-cally pure concepts (types) from evaluative statements; his insistence onthe purely methodological meaning of his 'rational' definitions, types andconstructs, results in a self-misunderstanding. Weber wants concepts andtypes free from the valuations of the historical investigator; he denies thesubstantive character of formal constructs. But the use of formalconstructs reveals that Weber's ideological presuppositions extend eveninto logic.14 Weber's formal rationality of logic hinges on a belief in thevalue of scientific truth. The identification of scientific truth with'objectivity,' however, conceals a value judgment: the capitulation to, andacceptance of, the rationalized world as it appears. The method of formalrationality (use of non-evaluative concepts) is an expression of Weber'sevaluation of the meaning of the rationalized, meaningless world, of hisacceptance and resignation to this rationalization as a form of domination.In arguing for scientific truth as objectivity, he presupposes the rationalityof this society. (The Marxian notion of theoretical truth as a moment ofand as concretized by praxis, presents at least one conflicting viewpoint.)>s

A second value limiting and expressed in Weber's methodology is hisindividualism. Weber always seeks to understand the meaning of socialaction from the standpoint of the abstract individual actor. The historicalsubject is always the individual and not the group, the class, or the

13. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. TalcotiParsons (New York, 1958). This study serves to exemplify the goal of sociology. HereWeber attempts to render intelligible an aspect of the modern world — capitalismand the capitalist spirit He argues that the ultimate value of organizing the worldrationally and controlling it for the glory of God and the ascertainment of grace (theProtestant Ethic) is what underlay the intense innerworldly asceticism of earlyCalvinists and the rationalization of economic activity. Today, however, the originalvalue has died out — the effort to rationally organize the world, formerly the means toachieving the glory of God, has become an end in itself. The Capitalist spirit (rationalorganization and control) and the work ethic have become freed from their originalunderpinnings, have been secularized, and proceed according to their own logic.Thus, the meaning of the meaningless capitalist world is revealed. Its irrationality isthe unintended consequence of action oriented to an ultimate value which has beensacrificed through disenchantment14. Loewith, "Rationalization and Freedom," p. 107.15. The objectivity of formal rationality which Weber argues for presupposes afundamentally contemplative relation between theory and reality. While the consti-tution of the world by the scientific investigator appears to involve active subjectivity,this subjectivity is essentially illusory — at best the scientist constitutes only themeaning of a segment of reality, not the reality itself. Marx presents us with aradically different relation between theory and practice. Because the historical worldis basically conceived of as man's product, Reason and knowledge have a part in thehistorical process itself. Reason comprehends the active social relations of man insociety (totality) and this comprehension (theory) serves to develop practice. Onlysuccessful practice can demonstrate the truth of theory. Thus reason is not reduced toformal rationality.

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community. This is implied by his notion of rationalization: we have theobjectively meaningless cosmos, the 'iron cage' of modern life, contraposedto atomized and isolated individual subjects. Weber's denial of the possi-bility of knowledge of the social structure as a whole is based in the wayreality presents itself to the individual in modern society: as fragmented,separate, autonomous and structurally related spheres (political, economic,private) which affect each other. Weber sees himself as a realist confront-ing reality as it has historically emerged, without any illusions. Thus, fromthe standpoint of the individual in rationalized society, Weber misses theMarxian principle of unity and totalization: the subject/object dialectic ofthe class.16 He does not believe in the reunification of the fragmentedworld or in the possibility of overcoming atomized individuality throughthe constitution of class as subject. The historical emergence of the ration-alized modern world results, for Weber, in the impossibility of collectivesubjectivity.

It is in this light that Weber rejects the 'ethic of ultimate ends' in favorof the individualistic 'ethic of responsibility.' The Marxist ethic of ultimateends entails value-rational (wertrational) action, or the struggle for therealization of an ultimate value without regard for the consequences of themeans used (Weber refers to Trotsky in "Politics as a Vocation"). Theends justify the means. Weber rejects 'wertrational action' on the basis ofthe ethical irrationality of the rationalized world. "The proponent of anethic of absolute ends cannot stand up under the ethical irrationality ofthe world."17 This is so because the ends striven for may never bereached, and the means used may result in unintended, adverseconsequences.

Instead, Weber focuses on the individual and advocates the 'ethic ofresponsibility,' which entails action in which both means and ends areweighed in terms of possible consequences and secondary results (zweck-rational action). With such an ethic, the individual takes moral responsi-bility for his action and its consequences. Of course, the rationality positedhere is means/ends rationality. This rehabilitation of the formal dimensionof Kantian ethics, this constellation of individualism and self-responsibi-lity, implies resignation in the face of the given rationalized world andnegation of transcendence beyond the 'fate of our time.'1*1 (From thisstandpoint the notion of class struggle and the effort to overcomerationalized domination is rejected as irrational and irresponsible.) ButWeber cannot justify his preference for goal-oriented action and the ethicof responsibility on the claim of superior rationality, even if means/endsrationality is assumed. For, as will be demonstrated in this paper, therationalization of the world and the accompanying zweckrational action

16. For an explication of subject-object dialectics see Arato, "Lukacs' Theory ofReification," op.cit. It is essential to note here that Marx sees the possible overcomingof the fragmented modern world (civil society) in the subjectivity of the proletariat.Whether or not this subjectivity is illusory is now an open question.17. Weber, "Science as a Vocation," p. 122.18. Loewith, "Rationalization and Freedom," p. 119.


continually results in irrationalities, i.e., the elevation of means to thestatus of ends, and the reduction of individuals to 'mass individuals.'Accordingly, an ethic of responsibility is no more defensible than one ofultimate ends.

This brings us to Weber's analysis of modern industrial society and theconcrete expressions of rationalized domination in bureaucracy, democracyand capitalism.

Weber considered bureaucracy the most striking problem of modernsocial reality. He discusses bureaucracy within the context of his formalpolitical sociology, as the political form of rationalization in the modernstate. Within the type of domination in which legitimacy is based on beliefin the legality of enacted rules and obedience is owed to a legally estab-lished impersonal order (legal-rational domination), bureaucracy is thecategory applying to the exercise of control by means of a particular kindof administrative staff. "The purest type of exercise of legal domination isthat which employs a bureaucratic administrative staff."19 Thus,bureaucracy is rationalized domination!

The principle of bureaucratic administration rests on the notion of the'office' — a specified sphere of competence held by an official (appointedon the basis of his specialized knowledge) whose authority to givecommands is strictly delimited by laws or administrative regulations. (VVewill discuss only the purest type of bureaucratic administration — mono-cratic.) Only at the top of the bureaucracy is there a non-bureaucraticelement — the political rule or the capitalist entrepreneur. The separationof the official from the ownership of the means of administration (separ-ation of public and private characteristic of rationalized domination) is ofprimary importance in the structure of the ideal type of monocraticbureaucracy. The position of the modern official most closelyapproximates that of the wage laborer — with the difference that theentrance into an office is considered an acceptance of a specific duty tothe impersonal and functional purposes of the office. It should be stressedthat the official serves not the ruler who appoints him in a personalmanner, but the impersonal demands of his office.20

The extension of formal rationality is expressed in the orientation of theofficial to abstract rules and the impersonal exercise of the power of hisoffice. Substantive rationality, or action according to particular humanneeds, is precluded. The official is the perfect embodiment of formal ratio-nality — he is a specialist whose activity depends not on his own personalsubjectivity but on an objective impersonal order which denies andfragments subjectivity.

The tension between formal and substantive rationality is developed byWeber in the dynamic between democratization and bureaucratization.Weber is one of the first to demystify formal plebiscitiary democracy andto reveal it as a modern farm of domination. According to Weber, when

19. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. H.Henderson and T. Parsons, ed. by T. Parsons (New York, 1947), p. 333.20. Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," From Max Weber, op.cit., pp. 196-204.

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democracy is a substantive value, and the phenomenon of democratizationis in progress, feudal, patrimonial, and (in intent) plutocratic privileges inadministration are swept away. Democratization in the form ofconstitutional development sets fixed rules limiting the arbitrariness ofpersonal absolutist rule. It must be made clear here that by 'democrati-zation' Weber does not mean 'direct democracy' or increasing active parti-cipation of the governed in governing. Instead he means 'mass or passivedemocratization' based on the principle of 'equal rights of the governed'in the face of abstract norms affecting all equally. Rule by an objectiveprinciple — law — replaces personal rule. This entails the universalaccessibility of office as opposed to a closed status group of officials, andthe stress on the influence of public opinion (substantive rationality) overthat of the authority of officialdom. In short, political democracy attemptsto give voice to public opinion, to shorten the term of office and to makeit subject to recall, and to avoid binding the candidate to special expertisethrough the medium of election. In this sense, democratization is opposedto bureaucratic rule.

However, the most decisive aspect of democratization — the levelling ofthe governed — has unintended consequences. In striving to realize thesubstantive value of 'equal rights of the governed,' democratization fostersthe extension of formal rationality. (At the same time this means theextension of irrationality, for means to democracy become elevated to thestatus of ends.) Ironically, the democratization of society is a favorablebasis for bureaucratization. In the struggle against rule by privilege,democratization unavoidably puts paid professional labor in the place ofthe historically inherited avocational administration by notables. Inbreaking with traditional notable rule based on personal power, personalrelationships and personal esteem, democratization raises the principles ofabstract formal regularity of the execution of authority and the principleof equality before the law. This leads to bureaucratic tendencies and infact implies bureaucracy with its administration of authority according toimpersonal legal rules which apply objectively and equally to all. Thus,"Democracy as such is opposed to the rule of bureaucracy, in spite andperhaps because of its unavoidable yet unintended promotion of bureau-cratization."21 This dynamic is evidenced in the issue of educationalrequirements for administrative positions. Democratic principles stressselection according to qualifications as opposed to selection on the basis ofprivilege, but they are opposed to the creation of a privileged mandarinateand as such are opposed to technical qualifications for office holding.

Weber shows that the separation of public and private is the expressionof the 'democratic' principle of 'objective' (unbiased) administration.According to the values of democracy, the power of the electedrepresentative of the sovereign people must be impersonal, and exercisedaccording to known rules which apply equally to all (rule of law). As weshall show, this formal impersonal rule presupposes very particular socio-economic (capitalist) relations and conditions — i.e., the separation of the

21. Weber, "Bureaucracy," p. 231.


official from the means of administration and power. If the officialpersonally owns the instruments of power, power will be personal, andcontrary to the principles of formal democracy. Thus the official mustbecome a paid worker exercising only the power of his public office. Therelation between the economic inequalities of capitalism (on which wagelabor rests) and the formal equality before the law of formal democracy,will be discussed in the next section. Here, we argue that since democrati-zation (under capitalism) implies mass democracy (the levelling of thegoverned), the separation of public from private implies the separation ofthe personal from the political as well. Hence both formal democratizationand bureaucratization have the identical consequence and presupposition— mass, atomized, essentially depoliticized, manipulated individuals asthe governed. Plebiscitiary democracy is revealed as domination of thegoverned by the bureaucratic state. This distinction between public/privatealso characterizes the capitalist economy, with its rational accounting andseparate legal status for the capitalist enterprise (corporation), and theseparation of the laborer from the means of production.

Both democratization and bureaucratization (in the modern state)presuppose the separation of the state from the personal authority of indi-viduals. The state is conceived as an abstract bearer of sovereign prero-gatives and the creator of legal norms. 22 The process of democratizationwith its demand for equality before the law and legal guarantees againstarbitrariness tends toward the establishment of formal rational adminis-tration of justice according to abstract norms which apply to all, even thesovereign. However, rational law (formal adjudication) is not identical withdemocratic principles of justice. Again we see the contradictory tendenciesbetween the substantive value of 'objective' equality before the law, raisedin the process of democratization and the resultant formal administrationwhich serves to veil and perpetuate privilege, domination and inequality."The propertyless masses especially are not served by a formal equalitybefore the law and a 'calculable' adjudication and administration asdemanded by 'bourgeois' interests. Naturally, in their eyes justice andadministration should serve to compensate for their economic and sociallife-opportunities in the face of the propertied classes. Justice andadministration can fulfill this function only if they assume an informalcharacter to a far-reaching extent." & In other words, the masses woulddemand substantive justice — 'ethical' justice oriented toward concreteinstance and person. Weber stipulates that under the conditions of massdemocracy, such an ethos of substantive justice is usually manipulated (byparty leaders or press) and is born of 'irrational sentiments.'

The relationship between the formally rational state and the capitalisteconomy is historically conditioned. Weber states that while capitalismand bureaucracy have arisen from many different historical sources, they

22. Ibid., p. 239.23. Ibid., p. 221. Thus Weber presents a critique of formal rationality of law and theState and shows that it is based on domination and inequality. He locates possiblechallenges to the ideology precisely on this level.

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are today interdependent. On the one hand, capitalism is the mostrational economic basis for bureaucratic domination, since it supplies thenecessary monetary resources for the payment of officials, etc. Bureaucracypresupposes a monetary economy for its continued existence. On the otherhand, the need of a capitalist economic system for stable, calculableadministration and law played a major role in the development ofbureaucracy.24

It must be explained in this context that Weber, unlike Marx, does notdefine capitalism as a structural social relationship.zs Instead of stressingthe social relationships under which production is carried out (wagelabor/capital) and thus having the 'economic' categories be socialcategories of domination as well, Weber defines capitalism through formal'economic' categories. His definition stems from the standpoint of theindividual entrepreneur, and emphasizes the formally rational character ofthe calculations of capital made with regard to the market andprofitability. Thus capitalism entails the continuous pursuit of profit byrational capitalist enterprises. "It is only in the modern western world thatrational capitalistic enterprises, with fixed capital, free labor, the rationalspecialization and combination of functions, and the allocation of produc-tive functions on the basis of capitalistic enterprises, bound together in amarket economy, are to be found."26 The distinctive feature of the capi-talist enterprise is its formally rational capitalist accounting which involvesthe valuation and verification of opportunities for profit and of the successof profit-making activity. It presupposes the entrepreneur, the free market,rational technology, calculable law, and free labor. However, free labor isconsidered by Weber only as a pre-condition for rationalized economicactivity, as a calculable, easily disciplined labor force. The category ofwage labor is not worked through the analysis in terms of the developmentof the structure of labor or in terms of social and class relations. Thus,unlike the Marxian schema in which the changing structure of labor andclass struggle are the dynamics to economic development, the Weberianapproach leaves class as a purely descriptive sociological category and seeseconomic development in purely economistic terms. This is so becauseWeber's standpoint is that of the capitalist entrepreneur who considersfree labor only as a means of production which, from the interest offormally rational calculations, can be treated as a cost of production. Thevery form of this approach precludes recognition of the possible subjecti-vity of the class.

However, Weber does see connections between economic factors andrationalized domination. He explicitly states that bureaucracy is the farm

24. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, p. 338.25. For Marx the categories wage-labor and capital are categories of production(economic) as well as structural social categories, implying a social relationship(between classes) under which production is carted out. Thus, development must beseen in terms of changes in the structure of labor, in class relations, as well astechnological changes; the motor of this development being the class struggle.26. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, p. 279.


which the separation of the worker from the means of production takes inmodern society: "This all important economic fact: the 'separation of theworker from the material means of production, destruction, administra-tion, academic research, and finance in general is the common basis of themodern state, in its political, cultural, and military sphere, and of theprivate capitalist economy. In both cases, the disposition over these meansis in the hands of that power whom the bureaucratic apparatus.. .directlyobeys or to whom it is available in case of need. This apparatus is now-adays equally typical of all those organizations; its existence and functionare inseparably cause and effect of this concentration of means ofoperation — in fact, the apparatus is its very forml" (My emphasis.)27

Thus, while avoiding class analysis, Weber points to the interrelationshipbetween the economic fact of wage labor and the modern bureaucratic,formally democratic state. From a Marxist standpoint, it seems thatWeber is implying that bureaucratic domination is the form of dominationnecessary for the maintenance of the wage labor-capital relationship.Within the advanced (rationalized) enterprises themselves, and in theirdependence on the State, bureaucracy emerges as the form of domination.Thus bureaucracy and political sociology replace class and politicaleconomy as the areas which will yield the relations of domination inmodern society.

Accordingly, Weber treats economics as a sphere distinct from political,social and other 'non-economic' spheres, and argues against economicdeterminism. He sees 'economically rational action' as action which isrationally oriented, by deliberate planning, to economic ends. And an'economic' system is an autocephalous system of economic action. Thus,economic action needn't be social action in Weber's opinion. The sameeconomic system (such as peasant agriculture) can exist under differentpolitical, religious, and social conditions.28 But this hypostatization of theeconomic realm and its conceptual separation from the social situation inwhich it occurs, is unacceptable. Marx shows that 'economics' cannot beseparated conceptually from social relations of production, and that thesesocial relations entail political, cultural, and legal relations, all of whichconstitute the mode under which production is carried out. 29 Despite its

27. Weber, Economy and Society, p. 1394.28. Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," p. 70.29. We again must distinguish here between Marx and Marxists. For Marx, thecritique of political economy meant precisely the critique of frozen economiccategories which appeared to constitute an independent realm with objective lawsregulating their interrelationships. Marx shows that these categories both conceal andpresuppose social relationships. The point of his immanent critique of the categoriesis to reveal and release their social dynamic. Thus while one could speak of 'laws ofpolitical economy' at a particular point in time, these 'laws' presuppose specific socialrelations (class relations), and once these relations change due to class struggle, the'laws' no longer apply.

Nevertheless, Marxists of the Second International for the most part did have avulgar economic standpoint. They spoke of the economy as an objectively lawfulrealm, to which they reduced all other phenomena. Thus, by arguing that the

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theoretical weaknesses, however, Weber's challenge to economic determin-ism is important. By arguing for the autonomy of the economic and thepolitical spheres, Weber opens the way for a reinterpretation of the rela-tionship between political and economic domination.

For Weber, economic and political means of domination have much incommon. Rational economics, or capitalist entrepreneurial activity, has incommon with bureaucracy the orientation to an impersonal 'objective'order — in this case, the market. "Without regard for persons" is thenorm of bureaucratic administration as well as the watchword of themarket. Both entail the 'objective' discharge of business in the sense ofacting according to calculable rules. Since calculation of results on themarket is the basis of the modern capitalist concern, the existence of abureaucratic state with its rational laws is crucial to the maintenance ofcapitalism. "For these modern businesses with their fixed capital and theirexact calculations are much too sensitive to legal and administrativeirrationalities. They could only come into being in the bureaucratic statewith its rational laws...where the judge's behaviour is wholly predict-able."30 In the capitalist market economy, official administration must beas rapid, continuous, and unambiguous as possible. In short, moderncapitalism needs bureaucratic administration or rationalized dominationin order to persist.

The extension of both bureaucracy and capitalism in this regard, entailsconcentration of the means of administration, on the one hand, and of themeans of production on the other. In both the bureaucratic state and thecapitalist enterprise the official/worker is separated from the ownership ofthe means of his work, which are concentrated in the hands of thepolitical ruler or the entrepreneur. In fact, capitalist enterprises arethemselves bureaucratically organized. The distinction between thebureaucratic organization of the business enterprise and that of the'democratic' state lies not in the fact that the head of the enterprise is nota bureaucrat, for this is also true of the elected politician who runs thestate apparatus. Rather, it lies in the fact that the capitalist entrepreneuris " . . .in our society, the only type who has been able to maintain at leastrelative immunity from subjection to the control of rational bureaucraticknowledge."31

At this point, the connection between democratization and the capitalisteconomic system can be made. Weber states that the economic conditionsalways play their part in democratizing developments. For example, thenew plutocratic petty bourgeois classes, in their fight against feudal privi-lege, successfully furthered formal democratization. This can be seen inthe historical development of England and France. In these instances,

economic system can be related to other independent spheres but not in a primarycausal way, Weber attempted to combat the economic determinism of the Marxismhe knew. However, because Weber had the same tendency to hypostatize theeconomic realm as they did, his argument represents only an abstract negation.30. Weber, Economy and Society, p. 1395.31. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, p. 339.


what appeared to be the universal interest of man — the democraticlevelling of social differences — turned out to be the means of securing aprivileged class position for the bourgeoisie. The social consequence ofdemocratization and bureaucratization historically was the tendency toplutocracy. Although democratization is not essential to the developmentof capitalism, capitalism tends to foster formal democracy where demo-cracy exists as a substantive value.

Thus, the rationalization of economic activity reinforces and is rein-forced by the development of rationalized domination in the politicalsphere. However, tensions between formal and substantive rationality existin the economic realm as well as in the political. In the first instance, theextension of formal rationality to everyday economic activity (the capitalistspirit) can be seen as an unintended consequence of the substantive valuesembodied in the Protestant ethic.32 In terms of economic activity itself, asystem of economic action is formally rational insofar as calculation andaccounting are applied to the greatest possible technical extent and to thedegree to which the provision for needs is also so expressed. Substantiverationality of economic action, on the other hand, regards the degree towhich a group could adequately be provided with goods by economicallyoriented social action. The satisfaction of human needs is the main valueat work from this standpoint.33 This entails economic activity oriented toultimate values which cannot be measured by formal calculations.Furthermore, the formal rationality of money calculations is itselfdependent on substantive conditions — such as 'market freedom' (absenceof monopolistic limits), and disciplined organization and appropriation ofthe means of production. In other words, the formal rationality of eco-nomic activity presupposes the substantive condition of the wage labor/capital relationship, for without this, labor as the force of productioncould not be calculated as a rational cost of production. Weber statesthat, given complete market freedom, formal rationality in capitalistaccounting is absolutely indifferent to all substantive issues involved. "Butit is precisely the existence of those substantive factors (power relations)underlying monetary calculations which determine a fundamental limit onits rationality. This rationality is of a purely formal character. No matterwhat the standards of value by which they are measured, the requirementsof formal and substantive rationality are always in principle in con-flict. . .'>34 In other words, from the standpoint of the individual entre-preneur, with the set goal of maximization of profit, calculations are madein terms of 'impersonal, objective, laws of the market.' Production is notoriented to use, but to exchange and profit. The principles of substantiverationality, which here would be concerned with production for utility (forWeber) and the satisfaction of needs, therefore, conflict with formalrationality.

32. Cf. note 13 above.33. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, p. 185.34. Ibid., p. 212.

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Thus, inevitably, rationalization of the economy results in irrationalities.Formally rational economic action results in the elevation of the means ofeconomic action to the status of ends. The economy becomes independentto the degree that it barely exists in any relation to the needs of man assuch. Moneymaking as an ends in itself, beyond the end of self-preserva-tion, is the irrationality of the system. Technical" rationality prevails overand against the principle of production for use, or for man. It isimportant to note here that Weber does not consider the capitalist controlover 'free labor' as 'irrational,' but only the unintended consequences ofproduction for the market, i.e., the irrationalities regarding distributionand satisfaction of needs, and the domination of means (formally rationalcalculations) over ends.

Accordingly, Weber states that "All that which now socialismunderstands by the 'domination of things over man' (fetishism of commod-ities), should mean the domination of means over the end."3S As pointedout earlier, Weber accepts the rationalized domination of the modernworld as a given — including the division of labor and the fragmentedspecialized man who is the result of it. He rejects only its irrationalities —the loss of cultural values and the domination of means over ends. Interms of economic activity, its irrationality lids in its diversion fromproduction for human needs. This implies that rational planning, coordi-nation of production and distribution, possibly with state intervention,could presumably solve the problem. In fact, that is exactly what Weberassumes the Marxists mean by socialism. (On the other hand, Weberknows that the Marxists also envision the abolition of all forms of domi-nation under socialism.) Accordingly, Weber tries to show that socialismwould not be an adequate solution, for it too would result inirrationalities.

Weber sees the two values inherent in socialism — the satisfaction ofhuman needs, and freedom from domination — as contradictory. On theone hand, socialism would entail rational planning of production, whichwould be oriented to the most efficient satisfaction of human needsinstead of private profit. (Socialism as abolition of private property.) Assuch, it would attempt to do away with the above mentioned irrationalitiesof a capitalist market economy, subjecting economics once again tohuman control. On the other hand, a socialist revolution would be foughtaccording to the ideal of abolishing capitalist relations of domination inorder to establish new forms of autonomous social organization. Accordingto Weber's analysis, however, the satisfaction of human needs would entailincreased industrialization and centralized planning, and this would havethe unintended consequence of tremendously increasing bureaucraticdomination! Thus, while Weber (as Marx) certainly was an advocate ofboth 'richness' and freedom, he argues that we have to choose between thetwo.

For Weber, industrialization implies bureaucracy because of its superiorefficiency as a form of administration. ". . .The decisive reason for the

35. Cited by Loewith, "Rationalization and Freedom," p. 114.


advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technicalsuperiority over any other form of organization... precision, speed,unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strictsubordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs —these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic adminis-tration . . . " 3* Bureaucracy is domination on the basis of knowledge. Assuch, it is a power instrument of the first order for those who control it.As an impersonal mechanism, it can function unchanged in a capitalist orsocialist society. In addition to being the most efficient form of domina-tion, the bureaucratic machine today is the means through which themajority of the material needs of the masses are satisfied! "More andmore the material fate of the masses depends upon the steady and correctfunctioning of the increasingly bureaucratic organizations of privatecapitalism. The idea of eliminating these organizations becomes more andmore Utopian." 37 In this light, modern technology and business methodsrender bureaucracy indispensable. And, the complicated and specializedcharacter of modern culture demands a bureaucratic supporting structure.The quantitative and qualitative increase in administrative tasks necessi-tates continuous carrying out of administrative work by officials in offices.These tasks are in part created by the exigencies of large scale productionand distribution for which bureaucratic organization is essential.

Thus any 'rational' type of socialism would have to take over thebureaucracy and extend it. Presupposed here is the assumption thatsocialism means centralized planning, and for this, that a large formallyrational administration would be required. Bureaucracy would be neces-sary under socialism to maintain a comparable level of technologicalefficiency. For Weber, then, insofar as socialism is involved, the onlyquestion is whether a stringent bureaucratic organization would be pos-sible, since socialism would require an even higher degree of formalbureaucracy than capitalism. "If this should prove not to be possible, itwould demonstrate another of those fundamental elements of irrationalityin social systems — a conflict between formal and substantive rationalityof the sort which sociology so often encounters."38 In other words, thesubstantive value of socialism — the abolition of domination — would bethe irrationality limiting formal rationalization and the proper functioningof socialist society as regards satisfaction of needs. Thus Weber is the firstto criticize the implications of socialism based on centralized planning.

Weber's critique of centralized planning is an apt criticism of theconcept of socialism of Kautsky and the Bolsheviks (Lenin, Trotsky,Bukharin, etc.), and of Soviet and East European contemporary models ofsocialism. Kautsky and the Bolsheviks saw the anarchy of productioncharacteristic of capitalism as the fundamental source of its irrationalities(i.e., lack of coordination of production and consumption, lack ofplanning rooted in individual private property). Thus, socialism was to

36. Weber, "Bureaucracy," p. 21437. Ibid., p. 229.38. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, p. 339.

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mean rational centralized planning of production to meet human needs,and subordination of the economy to the dictatorship of the proletariat.However, both Kautsky and Lenin saw this in terms of extending theorganized and planned division of labor of the factory to society as awhole. Kautsky (in The Class Struggle, his commentary on the Erfurtprogram), uses the expression that society must become a factory. Marxanticipated this position and mockingly dismissed it in the Machinerychapter in Capital I, where he argues that to extend the discipline of the|factory to society would be to extend the despotism of the factory to thestate.39 But Marx elsewhere argued for the dictatorship of the proletariatas the first stage of socialism in which the increased power of the statewould effectuate through centralized planning a tremendous increase inindustrialization, productivity, and abundance.

In this context Marx's assumption about the eventual withering away ofthe state, i.e., the end of domination as such (Critique of the GothaProgram) does not immediately help. From the Communist Manifesto on,this famous concept was merely another expression of the end of classsociety. But no Marxist (unlike some anarchists) ever assumed that theproletarian revolution immediately establishes a classless society and theend of domination. On the contrary, it was not unreasonable or"un-Marxist" of Engels to assume that in "a period of transition" thestate as an instrument of class power (this time of the proletariat) wouldhave to be strengthened. Similarly and even more significantly, Lenin'sstress on the withering away concept in State and Revolution (August1917), was in a few months replaced by a stress on the strengthening ofthe state. Like Engels, he even saw an authoritarian state capitalism asidentical to one phase of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Furthermore,during the struggle with the left and Worker's Oppositions, it becameclear that Lenin, and even such "leftists" as Bukharin40 and Trotsky,adopted notions of authoritarian planning and centralization (militariza-tion of labor) that amounted to a dictatorship not of, but over theproletariat itself.

Weber's critique of such a conception of socialism is devastating. Hedemonstrates that in taking over the capitalist economy with the goal ofincreasing abundance and productivity, the dictatorship of the proletariatdoes not alter the structure of labor in the factories but rather extends thisstructure of domination to all of society. Centralized planning, then, is notthe overcoming of capitalism, but its logical extension. Even under theconditions of the advanced capitalist economy, the state begins to take onthe role of stabilizer. Thus, socialism as centralized planning is actuallythe extension of formal capitalist rationality and bureaucratic dominationto all spheres of life! While socialists claim to be guided by the values of

39. For a critique of the Taylorism implicit in the position of the Bolsheviks, seeFred Fleron and Lou Jean Fleron, "Administration Theory as Repressive PoliticalTheory: The Communist Experience," Telos, 12 (Summer, 1972), pp. 63-92.40. Nicolai Bukharin, Economics of the Transformation Period (New York, 1971).Cf. especially Chapter 8.


freedom and abundance, Weber shows that the realization of statesocialism would mean the sacrifice of freedom to abundance. Theproblems Maoist China is facing in this regard are indicative of the forceof Weber's analysis. Whether or not the cultural revolution has been asignificant attempt to fight bureaucratization; whether or not this attempthad any success, we can note without hesitation that typically Weberianproblematic has presented itself in China and (certainly less self-con-sciously) in the other so-called socialist countries.

Weber stresses that bureaucracy is a form of domination which shapesevery aspect of life. He states that the whole pattern of everyday life is cutto fit this framework.41 He anticipates Reich's study on the authoritarianpersonality (The Mass Psychology of Fascism) in a brilliant insight into thepersonality type required and produced by bureaucratic domination.Bureaucracy as a form of domination institutes strict discipline as thebasis of all order — both in regard to the official and the governed. Thisdiscipline refers to the attitude sets of the officials and the governed forprecise obedience within their habitual activity, in public as well as inprivate organizations. An orientation to obeying rules and regulations isconditioned into both the official and the ruled. Echoing Pascal, Weberspeaks of "specialists without spirit," "sensualists without heart," asresults of the mechanical world of bureaucracy. Accordingly, revolutionaryactivity directed against the bureaucratic state is doomed to the recreationof the 'machine' to rule over the masses, for it must be deduced fromWeber's statements on mass democracy that the masses are incapable ofself-rule.

Weber, therefore, argues against the socialists of his time who,concerned with the seizure of power, could not see that their aims wouldmerely increase the evil against which they were fighting. This is abrilliant insight, despite its theoretical difficulties. Weber points to the'necessary' consequences of the fight for the absolute, ultimate value ofsocialism as freedom from domination. In the first instance, the meansused would promote bureaucracy. For, in order to fight successfullyagainst the existing apparatus, it would be necessary to create anorganization which would itself be subject to the process ofbureaucratization.42 In the second instance, socialism would result in thebureaucratization of those few areas of individual freedom and creativityleft — it would mean that the top management of nationalized or social-

41. In his essay, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat", in Historyand Class Consciousness, op.cit., Lukacs searches for a structuring principle throughwhich he can concretize the concept of rationalization and locate it in the dynamics ofcapitalist social relations. He sees commodification as the principle which shapesevery aspect of life. Lukacs also sought a subject/object dialectic that would unite allthe spheres which Weber cites as examples of rationalization: the political, economic,and private. But one of the reasons Lukacs was unable to concretize thissubject/object dialectic was his failure to distinguish between objectification andreification. In the end, he stayed too close to Weber's concept of rationalization whichin principle excludes the subject/object dialectic.42. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, p. 338.

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ized enterprises would become bureaucratic. Socialism as centralizedplanning, would not result in the destruction of the 'iron cage' of modernindustrial work, nor of modern officialdom. Working conditions wouldremain the same, perhaps even more regimented, after the abolition ofprivate property. Simply the state bureaucracy would rule alone if privatecapital were eliminated. Socialism would inevitably mean state capitalism.

Formal rationalization in its political form of bureaucracy, then, isvirtually escape-proof in Weber's eyes. In the past, wherever bureaucracygot the upper hand, it was not destroyed unless the total supportingculture collapsed. Modern bureaucracy, with its rational specialization andtraining is even more insurmountable. "Only by reversion in every field —political, religious, economic, etc., to small-scale organization would it bepossible to any considerable extent to escape its influence."43 If largescale industrialization is to be maintained, this alternative is not possible.Formal rationality, while subject to limits and constraints regardingsubstantive values, triumphs and imprisons us in its irrationalities. Theonly question today is who controls the bureaucratic machine.

Weber's answer to the deadening effect of bureaucracy is individualisticopposition from within (the ethic of responsibility). Since the objectivelymeaningless order cannot be destroyed, the only possibility of salvaginghuman freedom is through individual self-responsibility. The point is tosalvage the soul against the impersonal, calculating formal rationality ofdomination. Self-responsibility is determined by the individual who actsaccording to chosen values, but always with a sense of proportion andresponsibility for the consequences of his acts. The self-responsibleindividual, although a 'specialist' like everyone else, is engage" in everyspecialty and therefore remains human. He never conforms to the set role,but brings his individuality to it, thus enriching his acts. Thus, Weberopposes the political leader to the bureaucratic official (who symbolizesimpersonal selfless rule). The political leader takes a stand, he ispassionate in his activity. His honor lies precisely in an exclusive personalresponsibility for what he does. Such political leadership would providethe optimum of freedom if combined with democracy in the form ofparliamentary government of plebiscitiary democracy. Of course, theindividual freedom and responsibility posited here presupposes dominationand submission to the bureaucratized structure of bondage. All that theself-responsible individual can do is place himself in moral opposition,abstractly negating this bondage through his subjective attitude.

Here we can see the differences between Weber and Marx most clearly.Weber accepts the modern structures of domination as inescapable, andposits the 'human hero' as the locus of freedom. Marx, on the other hand,seeks to abolish this structure of domination and to constitute humanfreedom in the activity of the social individual — a freedom of highestcommunity. "To Weber, this idea of Marx's was utopianism, while toMarx, the human hero of Weber probably would have seemed a'conjuration of the dead,' an isolated second edition of the heroic age of

43. Ibid.


the bourgeoisie whose 'sober reality' is 'unheroic' and merely the ghost ofits once great past."44

Loewith accounts for the different world views of Weber and Marx withthe dissimilarity of their determining point of departure — for Weber,rationality, for Marx, self-alienation. We wish to be more precise in thismatter, for while we agree with Loewith that Weber and Marx are bothresponding to the same historical phenomenon (capitalism), we disagreewith the assumption that they differ only in terms of the subject (forWeber, the individual, for Marx, the class). To Loewith, rationalizationand alienation express the same object — the modern industrial world.But we maintain that if the subject is different for these authors, so mustthe object be different. Let us proceed more slowly.

Both "Weber and Marx are aware that man's creations becomeindependent of and wield a power over him. His products follow laws oftheir own, imprisoning man in an impersonal alien world. Weberinterprets this with the dynamics of formal and substantive rationality, adynamic which takes place within the rationalized world of domination.Marx, on the other hand, interprets this through the concepts ofobjectification and alienation — concepts which imply the belief in thepossibility of the Aufhebung of capitalism. It is necessary in this contextto briefly explain Marx's concept of objectification. For Marx, objectifi-cation entails a dialectical relationship between subject and object — theactive subject transforms the world, creates the object, and is himselftransformed through labor. Labor must be interpreted to mean self-objec-tification in the broadest sense — implying intersubjectivity, consciousness,and self-reflexivity. As such, objectification is praxis. The active subject isan historical one whose needs, capabilities and world are created in thedialectical interrelationship with other subjects and objects through themedium of labor.

Nevertheless, under the capitalist system of production in which produc-tion is oriented to exchange and profit, and is based on wage labor, objec-tification becomes alienation, labor becomes alienated labor. Theindividual is separated from his productions (including cultural products)and subordinated to their independence and power. Both Marx andWeber attribute this phenomenon to the capitalist principle of 'productionfor the sake of production;' both see its irrational results. But Marx alsosees the potentialities created when the principle of production forimmediate consumption is replaced with that of production for its ownsake, for this "...means nothing but the development of humanproductive forces, in other words, the development of the richness ofhuman nature as an end in itself... although at first the development ofthe capacities of the human species takes place at the cost of the majorityof human individuals and even classes, in the end it breaks through thiscontradiction and coincides with the development of the individual..." 4$

44. Loewith, "Rationalization and Freedom," p. 122.45. Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part II (Moscow, 1968), p. 118.

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While the capitalist form of this principle is production for exchangeand private profit, and entails alienation, it also allows for the develop-ment of man's potential. Labor is pushed beyond the limit of 'naturalneeds' and produces the material elements needed for the development ofa rich individuality with new historical needs.46 Thus the masses whomWeber presupposes in his statements on bureaucratic and formal demo-cratic rule, are no longer the same as at the beginning of the historicalprocess. They are more "developed," "richer," and increasingly educated— through struggle they can develop the capacity and need for self-rule,free from both domination and artificial scarcity. Socialism in this frame-work, therefore, is not based on a model of centralized planning andincreased productivity — it implies a model of society based on the reduc-tion of alienated labor to a minimum and the possibility of the comingtogether of species being and the individual such that each individual hasthe possibility for a many-sided autonomous development.

Of course, this is only a possibility for Marx. Marx does not give themediations necessary for the reunification of the wealth and capacities ofspecies being (cultural development) and the individual. He argues for thepossibility of the development of a collective subject but does not demon-strate this. But he does point to the changing structure of labor and classstruggle as the essential dynamic elements which must be studied by anysocial theory which aims to point to possibilities for the future.

Weber's conceptualization of the modern world in terms of rationaliza-tion, on the other hand, reveals the absence of the notion of objectifyinglabor, self-creating subjectivity. For Weber, the subject is in the firstinstance the value-positing individual. Thus, what at first seems to be anotion parallel to that of alienation, turns out to be closer to Simmel's'tragedy of culture' (rationalization). The Weberian subject is at best aculture-creating subject, but given the modern rationalized world, its intel-lectual creations become independent and rule over him. Humanknowledge in its objectified form turns against man and becomes themeans of almost total domination over man. Objectification is identifiedwith and is the same as alienation and there is no possibility for reunifi-cation of subject and object: the subject does not develop through praxisbut remains impoverished throughout modern development. "Aninanimate machine is mind objectified. Only this provides it with the

46. The argument in itself raises more problems than it solves. The development ofnew needs can't necessarily be conceived to mean an increase in the possibilities forfreedom. In the period of advanced capitalism, the planning and integration of newneeds might mean increased domination and repression. But we needn't go so far asMarcuse in One Dimensional Man and regard all new needs as serving to integratethe individual into the existing social structure (consumerism). Gorz presents analternative approach in Strategy for Labor (Boston, 1964). Gorz sees the period ofadvanced capitalism as affording for the first time the opportunity for thedevelopment of new qualitative liberating needs beyond immediate needs for survival.(For example, refusal of the alienating character of labor instead of fighting for higherpay.) But the development of both liberating and repressive needs in relationship tothe changing structure of labor has yet to be worked out.


power to force man into its service and to dominate their everydayworking life as completely as is actually the case in the factory. Objectifiedintelligence is also that animated machine, the bureaucratic organization.. . . Together with the inanimate machine it is busy fabricating the shell ofbondage which man will perhaps be forced to inhabit some day... Thiswill happen if technically superior administration is the sole value." 47

Only with the positing of new values can man recapture the lost unity andfree himself from formal rationality. But for this to succeed, man wouldhave to relinquish the benefits of industrialization, for, as previously stated,the only alternative to rationalized domination would be a reversion tosmall scale economy and community. The reunification of subject andobject would thus be an impoverished one based on a reduction of humanneeds. Ultimately Weber's one-sided understanding of development in theeconomic realm as only development of technology and productivity, leadshim to deem the principle of production for the sake of production asirrational, because means are elevated to the status of ends (technicalrationality prevails). He sees only the cultural and material impoverish-ment of the masses, never the development of the forces of production(man) and the educational and cultural advances of the masses implied byproduction for production's sake. Thus he is left with no real solution atall.

While on the level of immediacy Weber describes a similar objectthrough the concept of 'rationalization' as does Marx with 'alienation,' theWeberian object is totally separate from the individualistic subject, whilethe Marxian object remains related and integrated to the collective subjectthrough the concept of praxis, despite alienation. Consequently, the total-ity with which Weber deals exists only on the level of immediacy — therationalization of the social, economic, religious, and political spheres.There is no structuring principle other than that of the process of ration-alization itself. The notion of rationalization, in spite of Weber's discoveryof many dynamic elements within its structure, is thus turned into amysterious force having its own developmental tendencies, separate fromthe development of man.

But the value of Weber's work must not be hidden behind these criti-cisms. His insight into the historically produced authoritarian character ofthe masses required by bureaucracy is important not because the ruledremain passive automatons under capitalism, but because it points one tothe search for the dynamics (new needs) of subjectivity in every area oflife. We must demonstrate what Marx simply posits — i.e., thedevelopmental possibilities of subjectivity (the other side) in relation tobureaucratic domination. But the most important of Weber's insights forus today is his perception of the connection between the 'economic' fact ofthe separation of the worker from the means of production and the 'polit-ical' fact of bureaucratized domination. He anticipated the increasedimportance of the bureaucratized state and located its necessity in therequirements of advanced capitalist society. Within the formally

47. Weber, Economy and Society, Appendix II, p. 1402.

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democratic capitalist world, as well as in the 'socialist' countries, Weber'sstatements about the empirical tendencies to bureaucratization have beenborne out. What must be studied today is precisely the relationshipbetween the political and economic spheres in advanced industrialsocieties. It is the task of Marxist theory to demonstrate the possibility ofsocialism — the possible realization of both richness and freedom. Theorycannot simply negate the fragmentation of spheres of bourgeois reality(civil society) and the atomization, privatization of individuals by declara-tion, it must demonstrate that there is a developing subjectivity and adynamic moving towards their dissolution. A theory of the state must bedeveloped in relationship to the changing structure of labor and needs,and changing forms of domination. Then perhaps we will be able to pointto the objective possibility of an historical subject with new radical needsand the possible overcoming of all forms of rationalized domination.

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Artº Weber and Rationalized Domination - j Cohen

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