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Special Edition

Dokdo Research Journal



Published by

Dr. Hak-So Kim

President, Korea Maritime Institute

1652 Sangamdong Mapogu Seoul, 121-270, Korea

Telephone: +82 2 2105 4970 / Facsimile: +82 2 2105 4989

Website: www.kmi.re.kr

All rights reserved. © 2010 Korea Maritime Institute. All materials contained in this journal are

protected by the copyright of the Korea Maritime Institute and may not be translated, reproduced,

distributed, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any other means, whether

electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission

in writing from the publisher.

The publisher, the institute and the editor cannot be held responsible for errors or any

consequences arising from the use of information contained in this journal.

Printed and bound by Aujin & Seoul Advertisement.



The Dokdo Research Journal is a comprehensive journal of

studies on Dokdo and other relevant issues. It is published annually in

English by the Korea Maritime Institute. The journal covers selected

articles of its Korean version, which has been quarterly published since

2008. This is a part of KMI’s efforts to reach out to the world and to

spread Korea’s stance on the ocean policies, including the issues

surrounding Dokdo.

KMI hopes the Dokdo Research Journal helps overseas readers to

understand properly on the issues of the sovereignty over Dokdo from

historical and international law viewpoint.

<remarks>

1. In the articles, a family name comes before a given name.

2. Footnotes in the articles were omitted.

KOREA MARITIME INSTITUTE




“Dokdo” consists of a group of islets located on the easternmost

tip of Korean territory. It is often called “Liancourt Rocks” in the

international society. Dokdo comprises 2 main islets and 89 rocks as a

result of volcanic activity millions of years ago, Even though it is rocky,

a variety of plants grow on beautiful Dokdo, which also serves as an

important habitats for numerous birds including seagulls.

The picturesque islets of Dokdo have long been recognized as the

Korean territory that belongs to Korea. Currently, Korea has been preserving

and utilizing the islands in a very sustainable manner. Although the Japanese

government has claimed its territorial rights with a groundless evidence to

Dokdo from time to time, Korea has firm evidences of its sovereignty over

Dokdo from the perspective of history and international law.

With a view to contribute and solidify Korea’s territorial rights

of Dokdo, the Korea Maritime Institute established the Dokdo and

Marine Territory Research Center in February 2006. The Center has been

doing research and engaging in public relations activities to facilitate the

country in strengthening its territorial rights to Dokdo and using the

island in a peaceful and sustainable manner. As part of such efforts, the

Center began to publish the Dokdo Research Journal in Korean. On

September 1, 2010, the Center was reorganized into the International

Marine Affairs & Territory Research Department for the purpose of

performing the function of leading Korea’s international maritime

policies including the research on Dokdo.

Welcome Message toDokdo Research Journal



Special Edition

Dokdo Research Journal deals with the territorial claim issues

of Dokdo between Korea and Japan from the standpoint of history and

international law. Moreover, it analyzes politically and sociologically of

Dokdo’s implications in Korea and Japan’s bilateral relations. The

content of the journal is not limited to historical and international legal

issues involving Dokdo. The journal handles far more diverse themes, i.e.

territorial claims over islands, delimitation of maritime boundaries,

expansion of the limits of the continental shelf, development of marine

resources, climate change and maritime environment, piracy, and other

issues pertaining to international law. Most of all, Dokdo Research

Journal provides vivid up-to-the-minute information on Korea’s

utilization of Dokdo, which enables its readers to realize that Dokdo

constitutes a precious part of the Korean territory epitomizing the heart

and soul of the Korean people.

This English version of Dokdo Research Journal is based on its

Korean version that has been published quarterly since 2008. Among the

articles carried in the Korean issues of Dokdo Research Journal, articles

will be selected and published in English once a year in order to expand

publicity abroad regarding Korean position on Dokdo and maritime

policies. It is anticipated that Dokdo Research Journal would promote a

more accurate understanding of the territorial issues surrounding Dokdo

and contribute to Korea’s formulation of international maritime policies.

Dr. Hak-So KimPresident, Korea Maritime Institute



INSIDE & OUTSIDE

Know the ocean, protect the ocean, and use the ocean Sung-Wook Nam

OPINION

The DPJ regime and territorial issue between Korea and Japan Dae-Song Hyun

Dokdo and green growthHak-Bong Chang

DOKDO GALLERY 1

Breeding black-tailed gull Hee-Cheon Park

SPECIAL ISSUE 1 Japan's forced annexation of Korea in 1910 and Dokdo issue

The origin of Dokdo issue: having another look at the San Francisco Peace Treaty Ki-Jeong Nam

For the desirable resolution of the Dokdo issue Heon-Ik Kwon

SPECIAL ISSUE 2 Criticism on the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ claims to Dokdo

Criticism on the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ claims to Dokdo:

from the perspective of history Young-Ran Hur

Criticism on the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ claims to Dokdo:

from the perspective of international law Seok-Woo Lee

Maps published by Japanese government that mark Dokdo outside of

Japanese territory Byung-Sup Park

010.

016.

025.

030.

032.

037.

050.

054.

057.

Contents



Autumn 2010 Volume 11

SPECIAL ISSUE 3 Controversy over Okinotorishima

Does it deserve the status of island? Pae-Keun Park

A new maritime dispute? Japan’s Okinotorishima policy and its implication Tetsuo Kotani

Legal nature and problems of the UN Commission on the Limits of

the Continental Shelf Jya Wi

POLICY REPORT

Studies on Dokdo problem by Japanese international law scholars Pae-Keun Park

Natural resources development and environmental issues of the Arctic Ki-Sun Kim

DOKDO GALLERY 2Flock of black wood pigeon Hee-Cheon Park

GLOBAL OCEAN FOCUS

Bangladesh brings sea boundary dispute to ITLOS Soo-Jeong Choi

Climate change: new challenge to the law of the sea regime Ja-Young Kim

Marine biodiversity: trend and challenges of the international community Min-Su Kim

China’s Law on Island Protection to strengthen maritime jurisdiction Piao Wen-Jin

PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF

HISTORICAL MATERIALS ON DOKDO

“Usando and Ulleungdo are different individual islands” Mi-Rim Yoo

078.

081.

094.

096.

101.

106.

112.

116.

060.

065.

069.




Autumn 2010 Volume 11 10Know the ocean, protect the ocean,

and use the ocean

Sung-Wook NamPresident, the Institute forNational Security Strategy

Know the ocean, protect the ocean,

and use the ocean

INSIDE & OUTSIDE

A single-page historical map found at the Edo Museum

I visited the Edo-Tokyo Museum in Ryogoku during my visit to

Tokyo, Japan last fall. It was very surprising when I discovered a map

indicating the sea routes during the Edo period at the museum which

captured the life of the Edo period from 1603~1867. The map of Edo

contained hundreds of channels between the north of Hokkaido and the

south of Okinawa. The map showed that it took at least a month for a cargo

loaded with fish, salt and natural resources to travel from the north through

Tokyo to Osaka and/or Kyushu. In a word, it can be assumed that trade was

mainly accomplished by maritime transportation than on inland. Open

mind about the sea always exceeded the sea horizon and led to interests

about the New World. For the islanders, western ships with smoke fuming

approaching from the Indian Ocean or the Pacific Ocean were the start of a

realization that there exists a new world on the other end of the earth. The

Ocean has been the path to a new world. It stimulated a new challenge.

Hence, visiting the new world and importing cultures from the new world

has commenced.

The Peninsula taboos the ocean

Japan’s embracement of Western learning started when a

Portuguese merchant ship stopped over at Tanegashima in 1543. The term

“Western learning” was used in many ways depending on the change of

period and as the subject of interchange: Nanbangak(南蠻學, Southern

babarians Learning)→Rangaku(蘭學, Dutch Learning)→ Yogaku(洋學,



11Special Edition

Western Learning)→Saigaku(西學, Western Learning), etc., for instance. First

of all, Nammanhak has been used from the year 1543 to the beginning of

the Tokugawa period when Western culture was learnt and adopted while

interchanging with the Portuguese and Spanish merchants. Rangaku was

used from the year 1623 until mid-1850s when it was adopted with the

concentration on the medical science of the Netherlands. Yogaku(Western

Learning) was the general term used for the adoption of Western cultures

from the year 1858 and onwards when the policy of seclusion was

abandoned and the doors to Western powers were opened. The scholars

prescribe the 260 year history of the Tokugawa era, where Rangaku(Dutch

Learning) was adopted as the “seclusionism” period. But, even during this

secluded period, Japan energetically exchanged culture. It imported the

Western cultures through the Dutch temple in Nagasaki and accepted a

grand scale of the Joseon diplomatic corps from Korea. However, seclusion

and controlled policies were carried out restrictively. Thus, at the Dongdo-

seogi-ron(東道西器論 , Eastern Ways and Western Machines) level, the field

of natural science of Rangaku was adopted intensely over the human

studies of the West. We need to pay attention to the fact that, in the early

1700, Japanese adoption of the Western cultures was already excessive and

by the early 1800, people who studied the Dutch language and Dutch

medical science numbered well over 1,000. In modern times, Japan’s

adoption of Western learning is limited to the natural science field. But the

fact that the intellectuals comprehended the new political and social

systems and ideas of rationalism through Western books that had been

officially and/or unofficially passed down is rather impressive and

noteworthy.

The second largest item for the Japanese government in the 17th

Century to purchase from the abroad was books on international law

imported from the Netherlands, the then most advanced nation at that time.

Learning of international practices and legal knowledge was a thorough





INSIDE & OUTSIDE12


and use the ocean

provision for the imminent future. In the 18th Century, Japan devoted to

adopting the advanced cultures of Spain, Britain and Germany in the 19th

Century. Its open attitude became the groundwork for the drastic open-

door policy Japan pushed forward when Commodore Perry of the United

States requested for the doors to be opened.

For Korea, the sea was a remoted area where fishermen could catch

during the day and come back to their places by night. In some parts of

Jeolla region, the use of the sea was limited only to transport goods to

Hanyang due to lack of foresight from its leadership. Japan as an insular

nation regarded the sea as a path, while Korea, as a peninsula, designated

the sea as a remoted area. Both Korea and Japan’s formation of the views of

the world were based on how a nation viewed the sea, as the path to the

outside world or simply as a means of survival, which led to a huge

difference. Once in the past, the Korean peninsula sufficiently flaunted its

status as a maritime nation in the North-East Asia. Chang Bo-Go(one of

Shilla’s-Korea’s ancient Kingdom-powerful families), swept the pirates and

led the Korea-China-Japan’s triple transit trading with his strong naval

forces. However, when Chang Bo-Go was assassinated by a political

opponent and Cheonghaejin (the military camp created by Chang Bo-Go)

was dismantled, Korea lost its chance to develop as East-Asia’s most

powerful maritime nation. Afterwards, Goryeo and Joseon neglected the

use of seas following the continental-oriented toadyism the Chinese

continents widely spreaded out. Eventually when Joseon dynasty ended, a

fatal difference between Korea and Japan in the modern history was

realized.

Roman fleets are the foundation of the Roman Empire’s formation

“We frequently hear a lot about the effects of roads on its culture

when understanding Roman culture. But we have almost ignored the

effects of Roman fleets that brought about miracles. The Roman Empire



13Special Edition

hugely relied on its fleets as much as it relied on its roads.” This is the

remark by the historian J. H. Rose, who analyzed the role of the Mediterranean

in the ancient times. Rome was in full flourish when it actively expanded its

interchanges to the Mediterranean and it shrinked when the interchanges

were limited within the Italian Peninsula. “The mines of Brazil caused the

ruins of Portugal, as those of Mexico and Peru had been of Spain. All

manufacturers fell into insane contempt; before long, the English supplied

the Portuguese not only with clothes but all merchandises and commodities

as well. In 50 years, 500 million dollars worth of gold were extracted from

Brazil; only 25 million dollars worth of gold were left in Portugal.” This is

the evaluation made by Alfred Thayer Mahan who analyzed the effects of

maritime power in 1889. Under the Louis XIV’s reign, the Britain became

the world’s largest mercantile nation and had the most maritime power. The

British navy won the crucial victory against the French and the Spanish

invincible fleets in the Battle of Trafalgar on October 21, 1805. 27 ships of

the British Royal Navy attacked 33 ships of the French and Spanish’s

invincible fleets at Trafalgar in the South-West of Spain. At this battle, the

French and Spanish’s combined fleets lost 22 ships but not any of the

British ship sank: With the victory of this battle, Britain became the world’s

greatest power. Also, this victory led to a new period of industrialization.

Know the ocean, protect the ocean, use the ocean

These days, the nations know the value of the ocean. Following the

historical facts around the world that show the domination of national

maritime power, the ocean has become a “desperate scene” where all

nation’s power clashes against one another. The North-East Asian

countries’ competition in national maritime power is getting fierce. Former

Chinese Ambassador to Korea, Ning Fukui said “1mm in a map with a scale

of 1/50,000 is 50m in reality. And, I will be on alert and hang onto it with

the determination to die to defend this 1mm” when he became Director-

General of the newly established Department of Boundary and Ocean





INSIDE & OUTSIDE14


and use the ocean

Affairs of China in last May. Huang Ju, China’s Vice Premier said on July

11, 2006, “It is important to look at the Sea as a blue territory.” Paul

Kennedy mentioned in The Rise and Fall of Great Powers that the fall of

China happened in 1433 when it abandoned maritime policies by banning

overseas expedition. Eventually, the Ming Dynasty adopted a policy of

seclusion and all the overseas expeditions were suspended. Ultimately,

China foolishly closed its eyes; hence, foreign attacks which came 400

years later were not recognized in advance.

Japanese maritime policy slogan “Know the Ocean, Protect the

Ocean, and Use the Ocean” was presented in 2002. The “Thinking about

National Policy” series of the Japanese Yomiuri newspaper (2005)

emphasized that “A nation surrounded by seas does not necessarily mean it

is a maritime nation. To become a true maritime nation, a complete

national structure is needed to pursue solid maritime policies and maritime

administrations. Thereupon, the Japanese government has taken actions to

establish maritime policies such as legislating a basic maritime law to

establish the Department of Maritime Policy. Under the auspices of such

policies represent the fierce competition of maritime powers among the

North-East Asian countries that regard the ocean as a territory.

Korea should drive integrated maritime policies

As the Northeast Asia’s political and economical situations rapidly

change, Korea's maritime policies are required to be more specific and

systematic. First, a solid policy for the national maritime security is needed.

Maritime security of a nation is an activity that protects people’s lives and

assets within its marine territory. It covers safeguarding border lines, safety

in navigation, protection of activities in the ocean development as its core

work. North Korean Navy’s recent bombardment around the NLL, for

instance, was a serious threat to our national maritime security. Therefore,

South Korea must strongly respond to it. Policies for the prevention of



15Special Edition

maritime terror, pirates, drug trafficking, pollution, and protection of

marine resourse development are essential. Second, preemptive moves are

important to possess the advantageous uplands in the competition of

securing marine resources. Globally, coastal States filed their claims to

extend continental shelves. Korea's actions by complying with the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea also is an urgent task. Third,

sovereignty dispute over the islands is at global stake. 31 regions are under

disputes across the world and 10 regions in Asia. Fourth, a comprehensive

national support for international experts who work for roles in

international organizations such as United Nations, the International

Maritime Organization (IMO), International Hydrographic Organization

(IHO), Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) is needed.

Lastly, Korea needs to enhance its nationwide interest in the ocean which

will play as an engine for the future growth. The government must take a

lead in driving policies which firmly inspires the people to be aware of the

ocean as its territory. 100 years ago, the sea was unfortunately the “fence”

between the world and the Korean peninsula. As Daehan Empire fell into

the pit of a colony as it could not cope with the waves of new civilization,

ignoring the importance of the ocean brings self-destruction to a nation

situated on a peninsula. Korean people who come to realize the sea as a

blue territory and it could be the start of a new challenge. All sorts of new

ideas such as Free Trade Agreements with neighboring countries, building

of second Antarctic base, sustainable use of Dokdo, constructing a tunnel

connecting Busan and Fukuoka, etc. can be realized by seeing the ocean as

a blue territory.





OPINION16

➊ The DPJ regime and territorial issue

between Korea and Japan

The DPJ regime and territorial issue


Dae-Song HyunResearch Professor,Kookmin University

In the 45th election for the Japanese House of Representatives

(lower house of the Japanese Diet) held on August 30, 2009, the

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) led by Yukio Hatoyama captured 308 of

480 seats, winning a landslide victory by the largest margin in the post-

war history of Japan. The DPJ put an end to half a decade of power of

the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) and succeeded in attaining a

power transition. In 1993, the LDP fell from power temporarily.

However, it is the first time in Japanese history that an opposition party

achieved a full-scale power transition, replacing a ruling party by

garnering a majority of seats independently. Such full-fledged power

transition was an unprecedented dramatic event since the first general

election in 1890.

On September 9, 2009, the DPJ, the Social Democratic Party of

Japan (SDP), and the People’s New Party (PNP) agreed to form a

coalit ion government. In an extraordinary Diet session held on

September 16, 2009, Hatoyama, leader of the DPJ, was elected the 93rd

prime minister, which marked the official launch of the Hatoyama

coalition cabinet.

However, a series of unfavorable events including the scandal

surrounding political funds of Prime Minister Hatoyama and Secretary-

General Ichiro Ozawa in the early days of the new cabinet and friction

with the U.S. over relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma at



17Special Edition

Okinawa dramatically lowered the approval ratings for the cabinet and

DPJ at the same time. Amidst a controversy over the relocation of the

Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, the SDP seceded from the coalition

government, which ultimately prompted Prime Minister Hatoyama to

surrender his reign on the government himself. In the upcoming election

of the House of Councilors (upper house of the Japanese Diet) slated for

July, 121 parliamentarians amounting to half of the statutory number of

its membership will be elected. Prime Minister Hatoyama had no

alternative but to relinquish power because a prevailing view was that as

long as he remained in power, a crushing defeat for the DPJ would be

inevitable, which would mean an end to both the Hatoyama cabinet and

the DPJ. Only about nine months after the transfer of political power, the

DPJ faced circumstances where it was forced to replace its leader. On

June 4, Naoto Kan was elected as the new leader of the DPJ in a plenary

meeting of DPJ members of both chambers of the Diet. In the afternoon

of the same day, he was designated as the 94th prime minister of Japan

in a plenary session of both chambers of the Diet. A new cabinet was

inaugurated on June 8.

It may be premature to indicate the merits and demerits of the

DPJ at this juncture where it came to power less than a year ago.

However, I would like to examine the relations between Korea and Japan

over the issue of Dokdo since the turnover of political power in Japan

and cautiously discuss the prospects for bilateral relations.

When the DPJ successfully succeeded the power, many domestic

and overseas experts on Japanese affairs forecasted that such transfer of

power would bring revolutionary change in the country’s national

system and governing structure and substantially improve its relations

with Korea. This was because the DPJ, which came to power as a large

ruling party by absolute stable majority, has a strong reformist leaning



19Special Edition

Firstly, I would like to touch upon the reform of the Japanese

policy-making system espoused by the DPJ. Among its election pledges,

the DPJ made it clear that its national governance will be led by politics,

not bureaucracy. At the heart of such initiative is the establishment of

the National Strategy Bureau under the direct authority of the prime

minister to determine major policies including budgeting and foreign

policies. According to the initiative, the National Strategy Bureau

comprises about 30 working-level staff encompassing both competent

government officials and civilians including approximately 10 DPJ

ranking members, civilian experts and bureaucrats respectively. In

addition, 100 parliamentarians are assigned to the top posts of the 17

administrative agencies responsible for synchronization between the

party and the government.

Establishment of the National Strategy Bureau was determined

by a cabinet decision on February 5, 2010. The ‘bill on partial

amendment to the Cabinet Law, etc. for the establishment of politics-led

decision-making process,’ submitted to the Diet on the same date,

suggested the creation of the National Strategy Bureau in the Cabinet

Secretariat on April 1, 2010 by means of an amendment to the Cabinet

Law. However, the proposed amendment to the Cabinet Law still lingered

in the process of deliberation by the lower house as of June. In a

situation where the central control of politics-led decision-making, a

core pledge of the DPJ government has yet to be established, the

National Strategy Office is in operation merely as a temporary organ

prior to the official launch of the National Strategy Bureau. Even if the

National Strategy Bureau is put into full-scale operations, a drastic

increase in civilians and politicians appointed to administrative posts as

originally suggested means the process will face a greater risk of

populism as policies are prone to be swayed by public sentiment.





OPINION20



Secondly, there are issues deserving attention in connection with

decentralization, a major platform of the DPJ government, from the

perspective of the Dokdo issue. Under a centralized system since the

Meiji Restoration, empowerment of local governments is intertwined

with the reorganization of bureaucracy. This suggests a bumpy road

ahead. Decentralization, focused on local governments, will create

serious repercussions. In Japan, there has been a tug of war between the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs that attempts to control the Dokdo issue in a

comprehensive context of the relations between Korea and Japan and

Shimane Prefecture that intends to underline the issue as a pending issue

in bilateral relations. Under the DPJ regime, it is evident that Shimane

Prefecture will raise its voice further, compared to the time under the

LDP administration. Since Shimane Prefecture wishes to elevate the

Dokdo issue to a level on a par with the Northern Territories in terms of

attention and policies by the Japanese government, the prefecture will

certainly submit more petitions to the incumbent cabinet than it did in

the LDP era as the cabinet takes great interest in the resolution of the

Northern Territories issue.

Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama had repeatedly stated

that he himself would resolve the issue of having the Northern Territories

returned, following the intention of his late grandfather, Ichiro

Hatoyama. In a plenary session of the House of Representatives on June

11, 2009, a proposed ‘Amendment to the Special Measure Laws to

Promote Resolution of the Issue of the Northern Territories, etc.’ was

passed unanimously. The proposal was finally passed in a plenary

session of the House of Councilors on July 3, 2009. The purpose of ‘the

Special Measures Law to Promote Resolution of the Issue of the Northern

Territories, etc.’ established in 1982 was set forth as follows in Article 1 of

the Law: “The purpose of this Law is to develop public opinion on the

issue of the Northern Territories and other issues related thereto



21Special Edition

(omitted), promote resolution of the issue of the Northern Territories and

other issues related thereto (omitted), and contribute to the development

of amicable relations between Japan and the Russian Federation on a

genuinely stable foundation by accomplishing the early return of the

Northern Territories and concluding a peace treaty with the Russian

Federation under, and on the basis of, the current situation where the

issue of the Northern Territories still remains unsettled (omitted).” In the

July 2009 amendment, “the issue of the Northern Territories still remains

unsettled” was changed to “the issue of the Northern Territories still

remains unsettled although the Northern Territories belong to our

country,” and “and pursue projects including exchange” was added after

the praise, “develop public opinion on the issue of the Northern

Territories and other issues related thereto.”

This proposal for amendment constitutes legislation introduced

by a member of the Diet as it was submitted by Seiji Maehara who

chaired the House of Representatives Special Committee on Okinawa

and Northern Issues before the DPJ came to power and appointed to the

Hatoyama cabinet as Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and

Tourism and Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories

Affairs. A bipartisan parliamentarian group called the Parliamentarian

Union for Return of the Northern Territories and Promoting Exchange

Program with the Four Islands, on which former Prime Minister Yukio

Hatoyama himself served as the acting chairman, played a pivotal role in

formation of the bill.

Under these circumstances, the initial targets of petitioning by

Shimane Prefecture are lawmakers from Shimane Prefecture and Tottori

Prefecture. To take a brief look at these parliamentarians: in Shimane

Prefecture and Tottori Prefecture, two lawmakers are elected in single-

seat constituencies, respectively, and one lawmaker is elected by





OPINION22



proportional representation in the Chugoku Area respectively (11

persons from five prefectures, i.e. Yamaguchi, Shimane, Tottori,

Hiroshima and Okayam a). Three membe rs of the House of

Representatives, respectively, from Shimane Prefecture and Tottori

Prefecture represent the regions in national governance. In Shimane No.

1 Constituency, Hiroyuki Hosoda, a seven-term lawmaker serving as

acting Secretary-General of the LDP was elected. Wataru Takeshita, a

four-term LDP lawmaker and Shigeru Ishiba, an eight-term lawmaker

who served as chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council were,

respectively, elected in Shimane No. 2 Constituency and Tottori No. 1

Constituency. In Tottori No. 2 Constituency, Ryosei Akazawa of the LDP

(born in 1960) succeeded in getting re-elected. The LDP lawmakers kept

their seats in the two areas despite the nationwide emergence of the DPJ.

When it comes to DPJ lawmakers, Hisaaki Komuro (born in 1960) was

able to win a seat in a proportionally represented constituency although

he was defeated by Hiroyuki Hosoda in Shimane No. 1 Constituency. In

Tottori No. 2 Constituency, Shunji Yuhara (born in 1962) defeated by

Ryosei Akazawa was also elected by proportional representation. As

indicated by the fact that both Komuro and Yuhara were elected to

prefecture assemblies four consecutive times, they have focused heavily

on local issues. Thus, there existed no notable endeavors by them

concerning the Dokdo issue, compared to LDP lawmakers. Hisaoki

Kamei, a former PNP lawmaker by proportional representation who

proactively represented the interests of Shimane Prefecture along with

Hosoda regarding the Dokdo issue, lost the last election.

Lastly, the DPJ government’s diplomatic and security policies are

characterized by the fact that the party (i) places equal focus on the U.S.

and Asia, breaking away from concentration on relations with the U.S.

during the LDP era; (ii) puts an emphasis on multilateral consultation

gradually; and (iii) has an orientation toward formation of an East Asian



23Special Edition

community as a national goal. This situation may have both favorable

and unfavorable consequences on the Dokdo issue. Former Prime

Minister Hatoyama said, “Issues impeding regional integration such as

military buildup and territorial disputes can only be resolved through

pursuit of regional integration” and “It is made evident by the EU

experience that regional integration tones down territorial issues” in

“My Philosophy” that he published immediately before the general

election in August 2009. The “DPJ’s Policy Platform for Government:

Manifesto 2010” unveiled by the party under the new Naoto Kan

leadership ahead of the House of Councilors election states that the party

“will pursue creation of an East Asian community and converge its

efforts on building confidence with Asian countries including China and

Korea.” At the moment, it cannot be determined when speci fic

negotiations for regional integration will be undertaken. Under the DPJ

regime, however, territorial issues in East Asia are destined to emerge in

whatever form sometime in the future.

Although the U.S.-Japan security system constitutes the basic

axis of Japanese diplomacy, the DPJ government, unlike its LDP

predecessors, intends to pursue closer economic cooperation and forge a

regional security guarantee scheme with Korea and China. Emergence of

territorial issues will only harm the DPJ’s management of the political

scene. For instance, the new manual on government textbook guidelines

for high school-level geography and history issued on December 25,

2009 exposed the posture of the DPJ government. The manual on

middle-school level textbooks published in July 2008 under the LDP

government states that it should be “mentioned that our nation (Japan)

and Korea have different claims over Takeshima.” This escalated into a

serious diplomatic issue as it caused a severe backlash from the Korean

government, which summoned the Japanese ambassador in Korea. Said

new manual merely uses such expressions as “on the basis of learning at





OPINION24



middle schools” and “deepen understanding of interests over territorial

issues,” not making any direct reference to “Takeshima.” Tatsuo

Kawabata, Japan’s Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and

Technology replied with a “no” when asked whether such expressions

came out of consideration for Korean sensibilities. However, this

situation certainly shows the DPJ government’s posture that it would

like to avoid any unnecessary diplomatic friction by stirring public

sentiments in the two countries with a territorial issue that cannot be

resolved in a short time.

This year marks the centennial of Japan’s forced annexation of

Korea. Given that Japan will fully implement the new manual on

government textbook guidelines for elementary, middle and high

schools in an annual sequence beginning from the next year, the

possibility cannot be ruled out that an unexpected diplomatic issue may

ignite between Korea and Japan depending on circumstances.

Fortunately, such a development face only a very slim chance,

considering the stance taken by the DPJ so far that it will not opt for a

hard-line confrontation with Korea or cause unnecessary diplomatic

friction with Korea by intentionally intensifying the issue. However, the

DPJ, as the ruling party, failed to produce any tangible outcome in

domestic governance or diplomacy for almost a year for the Japanese

people who supported historic power transition in half a century. Amidst

doubts about its ability to run the nation, the DPJ has no alternative but

to dedicate itself to making achievements by primarily concentrating on

domestic issues.



25Special Edition OPINION

➋ Dokdo and green growth

Hak-Bong ChangDirector, International MarineAffairs & Territory ResearchDepartment, KMI

Dokdo and green growth

Korea’s greatest topic of conversation right now is of “Green

Growth”. Since the president indicated Green Growth as the “New

National Development Paradigm” at the National Liberation Day

celebration speech in 2008, all government departments and the whole

society as well are shifting to green growth. It could be said that, not just

Korea but the whole world including western countries are concerned

with green growth. President of the European Commissions, Jose

Barrosso, calls this current Green revolution as the Third Industrial

Revolution. He said at the Energy Conference in October 2007 that “I

believe we are now standing on the brink of a Third Industrial

Revolution. Like the previous industrial revolutions, this will be driven

by technology and new forms of energy. It will also transform our

societies in ways we cannot yet imagine.” Barrosso’s remark signifies

that it is now inevitable for the human race to enter a new form of an

industrial society.

Evolving into a new society means that we have hit a limit with

the existing system of the society. Today, key threat to the human race

would be the climate changes. Even 20 years ago most people did not

sense the threat of climate changes. I as a representative of Korea,

attended the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change held at Perth,

Australia in 1990. There were prognostications and warnings that the

global warming would result in the melting of ices of North Pole and

Green lands, thereby, the sea level will rise, unusual temperatures will





OPINION26


continue, and the ecosystem will change as well as some island nations

of the pacific are likely to disappear. I assume the attendees thought that

there would be major changes but most did not seem to take it seriously.

Only the researchers considered it as an extreme opinion. But now, 20

years later, the world has actually felt the threat of global warming and

“Low Carbon Green Growth” for reducing this threat is becoming a

world-wide topic of conversation.

In a green society, notions about development and growth so far

will totally change. We have been placed in a situation where with the

existing model of growth, we cannot expect a sustainable development

which could continuously support earth. A creation of a “Green Growth

Industry” suitable for the green society will be needed. Last month, a

symposium titled “Green Growth through the Ocean” was held in Seoul,

At this symposium, the ocean was prescribed as the source of green

growth no less than any other fields. Maritime industries associated with

the ocean have a big inter-industry effect because they include various

fields. The ocean can be sensitive to environmental factors but it

possesses the capacity to self-cleanse, thus, it is a huge systematic

resource which can solve the environmental problems. Further there is

an increase in demand for clean ocean environment and ocean scenery.

Since it is easy to apply new technology to the ocean, the ocean has high

chance of new industry excavation. Therefore, it has been sympathized

that the ocean is capable of playing a leading role in developing new

green industries. What especially draws my attention is that there has

been a spotlight of hope of the green growth from the ocean, that not

only islands situated by the coasts can contribute to green growth but

those situated at the advance guard of the marine territory such as Dokdo

can as well. The specific role of Dokdo as a basis of green growth was not

mentioned at the symposium. However, by taking opportunity on this

paper, I think a new contemplation of Dokdo in the context of green



27Special Edition

growth will be possible.

Dokdo’s value in the view of green growth is diverse and

enormous. Firstly, Dokdo (including Ulleungdo) is a treasury of marine

biological resources. Large amounts of fishery resources such as abalone,

turbo, trepang, octopus, etc. are caught near sea area of Dokdo.

Secondly, it has a huge ecological value and is wealthy of species

diversity. The ecological value and species diversity becomes an

indicator expressing the potential power of green growth. Korean

Government has already initiated programs to make sustainable use of

Dokdo and its outskirt sea areas. For example, rational management and

utilization plans for ecological and maritime fishery resources around

Dokdo and its outskirt sea areas through the 「Special Act on the

Ecosystem Conservation of Small Islands such as Dokdo」 and 「Laws on

Sustainable Use of Dokdo」 and so forth. Moreover, a scientific survey

showed that there is a grand scale of methane hydrate buried near sea

areas of Dokdo. Hydrate, when being burnt hardly discharges toxic gas

and it only discharges half of carbon dioxide compared to fossil energy.

Thus it does not belong to the polluted resources category like

petroleum. In addition, Ullungdo sea areas are endowed with the deep

ocean waters, which are already being developed. By looking at the

specific characters of deep ocean water, there should be enough

possibility of deep ocean water in the seas surrounding Dokdo. Also, the

scenery of Dokdo itself is a source of tourism. Together with the curiosity

towards Dokdo, over one hundred thousand tourists visit Dokdo every

year. If transportation is improved, the number of visitors will increase

by far. On top of that, Dokdo is playing the role of advance guard of

marine territory. Dokdo is our territory situated on the outskirts of

easternmost of Korean peninsula and it secures our marine territory at

the vanguard location.

Linking Dokdo with green growth is a new point of view. We are





OPINION28


setting our eyes on Dokdo which has a tremendous value as a basis of

green growth. In this regard, this paper proposes some suggestions about

preserving and utilizing Dokdo properly.

Firstly, the preservation of ecosystem and environment of Dokdo

when utilizing and preserving Dokdo is most important than any other

things. In this aspect, Laws on Sustainable Use of Dokdo will serve as an

important legal basis, as sustainable use will be playing the role of

locomotive of the green growth paradigm. Dokdo should maintain its

present enormous marine territorial value and its value shall carry a

greater explosive power in the upcoming green society.

Second, the cultivation of experts in relation to marine territories

including Dokdo is important. Experts are required in many areas such

as study on the Dokdo’s history, culture, historical maps and old

literatures, geographical and ecological research and more. We will need

to excavate historical materials and manage them systematically. On the

other side, we will need to protect our sovereignty over Dokdo in the

international society based on international law and especially on the

law of the sea. The problem is foreseen that younger students

researching Dokdo have recently decreased dramatically. It worries me

that the lines of manpower who can professionally research Dokdo and

the marine territories may die out. The government should set up a

policy measures to overcome this problem. The investment and attention

from the universities and government is required to secure professional

research manpower who can make a good competition.

Lastly, if one considers marine territory as national strength and

a basis of green growth, it will be necessary to widen the notion of

marine terri tory to not just around the sea surrounding Korean

peninsular but to the whole ocean. Three sides of our country is of sea



29Special Edition

and the territorial water in reach of our jurisdiction and the size of the

continental shelf is 4.5 times the size of our land territory. Nevertheless,

it is rather confined compared to the world’s large ocean and other

coastal nations in possession of vast seas. Hence, it is basic to preserve

and utilize the marine territory around us and it is now considered as the

time to extend out to the ocean. The sea provides opportunity to all

nations. Whether keeping the opportunity alive or not will depend on

each nation’s will and efforts. Korea possesses the maritime power which

enters world’s top ten and we are setting off the challenge to take-off to

world’s top five. Based on this capability, we will need a foothold to

advance into the ocean. Still, 30% of the world’s seas is left without

owners which remains as high sea. Moreover, the exclusive economic

zone of other coastal nation could serve a foothold for us. South and

North Poles also comes under this. We can secure the resources of the

ocean through joint-development of resources, join-research, and so

forth with our technology and expertise in the background. Hence, we

need to turn our eyes towards securing more marine activity space in the

world oceans.

The green grow th paradigm has bee n arising as the

countermeasure which can help us solve the crisis of environment,

energy and economical development in general that the world is faced

with. In the society and industry at large, we are searching for the new

growth engine for green growth. In the green growth society, the

utilization of the ocean is the “countermeasure in changing crisis to

opportunity.” Especially in the case of Korea with restricted national

land resources, how well we utilize the sea will exert great effect on the

success of green growth’s actualization.



DOKDO GALLERY 1

English name : Black-tailed gull

Scientific name : Larus crassirostris

Size : 47cm (120cm with stretched wings)

Black-tailed gulls are one of East Asia's most representative gull species that inhabit islands off the east,west and south coasts of Korea. They rest on the seashore, island rocks, sandy fields, dikes, ships and

buildings in flocks. They are nicknamed sea cats as they make a sound reminiscent of cats. They have a

strong homing instinct.

Their breeding season lasts from late April to mid-June, but the prime breeding season is around mid-

May. Female black-tailed gulls ordinarily lay eggs every other day and each litter consists of 2 to 4 squabs.

Eggs hatch after about 24 to 25 days of incubation. Nando in Geunheung-myeon, Taean-gun,

Chungcheongnam-do, Hongdo in Hansan-myeon, Tongyeong-si, Gyeongsangnam-do, and Dokdo in

Ulleung-gun, Gyeongsangbuk-do are known as their major habitats in Korea.

(Photos provided by Hee-Cheon Park, Kyungbuk National University)

© Hee-Cheon Park

Breeding black-tailed gull



Special Edition

Special Issue

SPECIAL ISSUE 1 Japan's forced annexation of Korea in 1910 and

doKdo issue

SPECIAL ISSUE 2criticism on the Japanese ministry of foreign

affairs' claims to doKdo

SPECIAL ISSUE 3controversy over oKinotorishima




Autumn 2010 Volume 11 32

Ki-Jeong NamProfessor,Institute for Japanese Studies,Seoul National University

As the origin of the Dokdo issue, it is often indicated that its dominium

was not settled during the course of Normalization Talks between Korea and

Japan. However, a recent research shows that it was not that Park Cheong-Hee

government who settled the negotiations with Japan ‘could not’ conclude the

Dokdo dominium but rather they ‘did not’ conclude it. In other words, Park

Cheong-Hee government secured the dominant position on the Dokdo issue

by blocking Japan’s attempt at changing the present situation of Dokdo’s

effective dominance under the basic policy of ‘Dokdo issue is not a theme of

Normalization Talks. It must be solved taking time after the normalization of

diplomatic relations'. Considering that the 1965 system of Korea-Japan

relationship was created as a subsystem of San Francisco Peace Treaty system,

it is possible to evaluate that this was the minimal outcome the government

could take in the midst of the limited San Francisco Peace Treaty where Dokdo

issue was omitted. If so, as pointed out by many researches, the work of

finding the origin of the Dokdo issue takes us back to the San Francisco Peace

Treaty. Most of the researches related to this, however, do not differ much in

their results that, as the Peace Treaty with Japan was concluded, which was

generous to Japan under the Cold War, ‘Atonement of Japanese Colonial rule’

was overlooked. This can be said as the World System ie. Cold War

Reductionist explanation. Yet, how obvious will this be? The documents which

were made when Japan was preparing for the peace treaty shows that it was a

successful result of Japan’s strategy aside from the U.S.’ ‘generous

consolidation’ to Japan. The reason why we should pay attention to the

strategy of the Japanese government on their way to San Francisco is here.

The origin of Dokdo issue:

having another look at the

San Francisco Peace Treaty

Japan's forced annexation of

Korea in 1910 and Dokdo issue

SPECIAL ISSUE 1



33Special Edition

On October 22, 1945, the Department of Treaty of Japanese Foreign

Ministry concluded as follows regarding the process and the timing of the

peace treaty’s conclusion. First, there is a possibility that the Japanese side

will intervene in process of drafting the treaty in a method of ‘conveyance of

a written statement.’ Second, territorial issue is not an urgent matter. Third,

compensation issue is a matter which the Japanese side should actively

convey their opinion, thus, they must try harder for that. Based on this

recognition, the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s research attained during the

period from the end of 1945 until the beginning of 1946 enabled them to

predict the policies of the Allied Powers and, in this regard, opinions on what

ways to propose the Japanese side’s hope was gathered. Among the

documents prepared by the Foreign Ministry’s department of Political affairs

in relation to territorial clauses, Ryukyu(Okinawa), Ogasawara, Kazan-

Retto(Volcano Islands), South Karahuto(South Sakhalin), Chishima-

Retto(Kuril Islands), etc. were mentioned but there were no mention of Dokdo.

At this point, according to the executive power’s separation measure of the

SCAP, Dokdo belonged to the U.S.’s military government, and it was more

than enough for the Japanese government to predict the possibility that

Dokdo will be excluded from Japan when Korea becomes independent. As

ascertained from this document, even though the Japanese government was

expecting ‘Jejudo to be dealt with Korea’ ‘under the Cairo Declaration

regarding Korea, as it is stated that they will gain independence,’ the fact that

they did not particularly mention the Dokdo issue can be interpreted as that at

that point, the Japanese government did not have the thought to bring up the

Dokdo issue.

In the meantime, on November 21, 1945, a ‘Peace Treaty Issue

Research Board of Japanese Foreign Ministry’ (herewith “Research Board”)

was organized under the Department of Treaty, and more detailed activities

were launched. The operations of the Research Board mainly concentrated on

the compensation issue. They were trying to get in touch with the U.S. and

U.K. who were planning for compensation with a ‘punitive’ character, to





point out the problems and revise their plan. Japan’s prior maneuvering

commenced between the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947 to derive a

‘generous’ peace treaty. With Japan bringing up the problems, sympathizing

atmosphere was being formed among George A. Acheson (allied council for

Japan’s U.S. representative) and William Macmahon Ball (allied council for

Japan’s Commonwealth of Nations’ representative), and more public figures

from the Allied Nations. One thinks that this sort of formation of an

atmosphere became the opportunity for Japan to actively express their

opinion about the Dokdo issue which they were primarily going to ‘give up.’

Let’s examine the development of the Dokdo issue with this sort of

preparation and operation of Japan set up in the background. There is

SCAPIN 677 and 1033 which interprets Dokdo as Korea’s possession. SCAPIN

677 (January 29, 1946) and SCAPIN 1033 (June 22, 1946) excludes Jejudo,

Ulleungdo and Dokdo from the boundaries of Japan’s administrative district

and fisheries districts. However, they were with a proviso that they are not the

final handling about the territories. In the appendix of U.S.’s State-War-Navy

Coordination Committee’s document SWNCC-59/1 (June 24, 1946), they

were contents which could be interpreted that Jejudo, Geomundo, Ulleungdo,

Dokdo will be returned to Korea which will be independent. In the State

Department’s draft of the Peace Treaty with Japan in March 1947, Chapter 1

‘Territorial Clauses’ Article 1 did not include Dokdo as the territory which are

to be returned to Japan but rather, it was included as part of Joseon which

Japan should abandon with its right and title. In August 1947 and January

1948, the drafts included Dokdo as part of Joseon. Further, there was a slight

modification of place names of Joseon in the drafts of October and November

of 1948 but in basic, contents of the prior drafts were maintained in regards

to territorial clauses.

Political advisor for SCAP, Sebald’s written statement concerning the

draft of November 1949 played a crucial role in imposing changes. He

suggested that Dokdo was specified as Japan’s territory. As a basis, ‘historical



SPECIAL ISSUE 1



35Special Edition

justification and strategic necessity’ was presented. For the historical

justification argument, the interpretation of an effect of a report by Japanese

Foreign Ministry’s declassified document on “the Islands of Pacific Ocean and

the Sea of Japan)” published in June 1947 is dominant. For the strategic

necessity, U.S.’s military necessity may have presented considering the Cold

War situation. From then, the Dokdo’s possession issue clearly progressed

unfavorably towards Korea.

Chapter 2 ‘territorial clauses’ Article 3 in the draft of December 29,

1949 included Dokdo as an island that Japan should possess and Dokdo was

deleted from the territory of Korea which Japan must abandon. In this draft,

Korea was included in the list of signatory powers written in the full text.

Considering that Korea was not included in the list of signatory countries

when the draft of December 2 was written, it could be that the participation of

Korea as a signatory country was once considered by armed forces in

exchange of surrendering Dokdo. In the draft of August 1950, the list of

signatory powers was deleted as a whole, and for the territorial clauses,

general policies were confirmed without any specific examples. Since then, in

the draft of the U.S. the reference to Dokdo disappeared. Conclusively, in the

joint draft of the U.S. and the U.K. in May 1951, Jejudo, Geomundo and

Ulleungdo were specified as within the boundary of Korea which Japan

should give up, but Dokdo was not specified. Eventually, this sort of principle

was ascertained in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Korea requested for Dokdo

and Parangdo to be returned to Korea by submitting a written statement

concerning the joint draft of the U.S. and the U.K. of June 1951. However, the

contents denying Korea’s possession of Dokdo together with Parangdo was

ascertained in the protocol Dean Rusk (Assistant Undersecretary of State)

conveyed to the Korean Ambassador to the U.S.

Here again, let’s pay attention to the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s

contact with the U.S. With the Japanese Foreign Ministry as the core, series of



37Special Edition

For the desirable resolution of

the Dokdo issue

Heon-ik KwonProfessor, London School ofEconomics and Politics

A short while ago, a teacher’s college in Korea’ s North

Gyeongsang province organized a talk by a former teacher of a North

Korean secondary school who is now settled in the South Korean region.

A large number of local teachers and school education officials joined

the talk. During the meeting that lasted well over the scheduled time, the

speaker received many questions from the audience, mainly about

current socio-economic conditions in North Korea and the country’s

school system. The question that was most memorable to her, however,

was not about North Korea. “What do people in North Korea think about

our Dokdo issue?” someone asked. Following this question, there was

also an enquiry about “Baekdusan problem,” a disputed area between

China and the Koreas.

The former teacher replied: “Just as people in South Korea,

people in North Korea also believe that Dokdo is our land. They find it

unjust that Japan should lay a claim on it. About Baekdusan, the North

Korean leadership today may find it somewhat difficult to say much

about it because the issue involves China. However, ordinary North

Koreans believe it unjust that just because China has some power, they

think they can make such claims to our country.” Then she looked

around the room and was delighted to notice that many of her audience,

nearly all of them, looked pleased to hear her remark, nodding in

approval. Later she reminisced that the meeting at the teachers’ college

had left great impression on her. She told me that the experience taught

her that no division existed between North and South Korea on Dokdo. It




Autumn 2010 Volume 11 38 Japan's forced annexation of


SPECIAL ISSUE 1

made her realize that “Koreans are united in one heart and in one spirit

about Dokdo.”

The controversy between Korea and Japan concerning the status

of Dokdo or Takeshima - two different references for the cluster of rocky

islets in Korea’s East Sea - has been explosive in recent years. The rocks

are now among the principal sites of historical disputes between the two

countries, playing a major role in aggravating their diplomatic relations

within the broader international community of East Asia and damaging

the social and cultural relations between civil society in South Korea and

that in Japan. Korea calls the place Dokdo (Rocky Islands) and claims

that these small rocky and uninhabited islets have historically been

Korea’s territory and indisputably so; Japan calls them Takeshima

(Bamboo Islands) and insists that Korea’s claims are disputable, and that

it also has irrefutable historical rights to these rocks. These conflicting

claims have generated a plethora of disputes and mutual distrust

between the two countries, particularly since 2005. The disputes over the

rocks should never have arisen, and the way they unfolded is

lamentable, although it is true that the controversy speaks of the

regrettable fact that unresolved histor ical issues and historical

misunderstandings continue to exist today between Korea and Japan

despite the prolific economic and cultural exchanges taking place

between the two societies.

In both countries, the governments refer to the Dokdo or

Takeshima problem as a “territorial problem” rather than necessarily a

“history problem,” unlike other issues discussed in this volume. The

supposedly territorial problem is, in fact, fundamentally a problem of

historical understanding, however, inseparable from how Korea and

Japan position their respective identities and mutual relationship in the

progression of the region’s modern history. The history in this context



39Special Edition

has multiple dimensions; national, regional and global - and the

controversy over the islets’ status should be viewed in a broad

perspective, considering the formation of the global Cold War and the

two nations’ places in it. The Dokdo/Takeshima issues constitute a

history problem, for they are embedded in how Japan and Korea

experienced the transition from the end of World War II to the onset of

the early Cold War, which was global in scale, and how they did so

differently from each other. The issue also constitute a memory

problem, in the sense that the disputes’ global historical origins are

typically relegated to oblivion by both parties to the conflict today,

which are instead intent on highlighting the milieu of their respective

national histories and the alleged, indubitably legitimate place of Dokdo

or Takeshima in those histories. Forgetting the horizon of global history

takes place in parallel with remembering anew the milieu of national

history, and this is how the humble, weather-beaten rocks called Dokdo

or Takeshima came to take on their current preeminence in Northeast

Asia as a major site of international conflict.

The Dokdo/Takeshima problem involved an upsurge of indignant

national sentiment in South Korea and, in Japan, a revival of imperial

nostalgia. The latter was evident when I went to visit the controversial

Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo in 2005. The shrine complex consisted mainly

of traditional buildings, beautifully laid out according to the Shinto

cosmology, but it also had one recently built structure of a distinctly

hypermodern style, which was the shrine’s public exhibition hall. At the

time of my visit the exhibition hall held a commemorative event for the

Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), showing a collection of memorabilia

dedicated to the heroic fallen soldiers of that victorious war. The Russo-

Japanese War was a decisive event in the history of modern Japan. It is

observed that Japan emerged from this war as a self-consciously

imperial entity worthy of the name, believing that the nation’s victory in





this war proved that Japan was then able to compete with the Western

imperial powers (Russia was considered a European political entity at the

time by Japan). The year 2005 was the hundredth-year anniversary of

the end of the Russo-Japanese War, and, as we will see shortly, it was no

coincidence that the claims on Takeshima were reinvigorated in Japan in

the same year. The fate of the disputed rocks in Korea’s East Sea is

interlocked with the history of the Russo-Japanese War, the outcome of

which meant the pride of an imperial state (and the single modern power

of Asian origin) for Japan and the shame of colonial subjugation for

Korea.

On the Korean side, the disputes over the rocks triggered an

outpouring of anti-Japanese slogans and national sentiments. When the

local assembly of Shimane Prefecture passed an ordinance on 16

February 2005 that was intended to commemorate the 100th

anniversary of Japan’s assumption of control over Takeshima, followed

by the declaration of “Takeshima Day” on 22 February, the Korean

administration moved quickly to denounce it, and subsequently made

an official protest to Tokyo against the declaration, as well as against the

description of the islets as Japanese territory in some Japanese high

school textbooks. The Japanese claims on the islands, while initially

confined to a specific local area that declared its administrative rights on

Takeshima and fishing rights over the nearby maritime environment,

were nevertheless promptly brought into a wider public sphere as a

question of national interest by Japan’s national media and some

politicians. The claims then quickly developed to Japan’s official

position, now featured on the website of the Japanese Foreign Ministry

as “Japan’s Inalterable Position on the Status of Takeshima,” presented

in ten languages, which states:

In the light of historical facts and based upon international law, it

is apparent that Takeshima is an inherent part of the territory of Japan.



SPECIAL ISSUE 1



41Special Edition

The occupation of Takeshima by the Republic of Korea is an illegal

occupation undertaken on absolutely no basis in international law. Any

measures taken with regard to Takeshima by the Republic of Korea based

on such an illegal occupation have no legal justification.

The above development prompted angry reactions from

Pyongyang as well as Seoul, as the former teacher introduced earlier

indicated, and, in South Korea, the public also responded with loud

street demonstrations (with some unfortunate incidents of burning

Japan’s national flag), “Save Dokdo” campaigns organised by diverse

citizen’s groupings and civil associations, and “Love Dokdo” online

assemblies among the youth. The unfolding of the subsequent

controversy has been widely reported in the national press in both Japan

and Korea as well as internationally; here it suffices to emphasise that

Japan’s declared claim on the islands in 2005 has since provoked strong

reactions from Korea, not only from the administration but also from the

public at large, both within Korea and elsewhere. The New York Times

recently featured an article about the city’s new plastic covers for

laundry. Prepared and distributed by New York City’s Korean-American

Dry Cleaners Association, according to the article, the plastic bags show

a picture of a rock in a blue ocean, a place most New Yorkers have never

heard of, on which is written, “Dokdo is Korean territory.”

The timing of the Shimane declaration was most unfortunate.

The year 2005 was supposed to be the year of Korea-Japan Friendship; it

was also the 60th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan’s colonial

rule in 1945. In Korea, as elsewhere in East Asia, the time span of sixty

years signifies the end of a historical cycle and the beginning of a new

spirit and a new era in time. The worst was that 2005 was the 100th year

of what Koreans remember as the beginning of their “National Shame,”

the loss of national sovereignty to Japan’s colonial power in 1905-1910

and the subsequent era of formal colonial rule that lasted until the end of





World War II. This shameful historical epoch began with Japan’s

annexation of Dokdo for military purposes in 1905 amidst its naval

campaigns against the Russian imperial fleet. The loss of Dokdo was

therefore a painful national historical event for Koreans, because it was

emblematic of Japan’s colonisation of their country and nation.

According to a statement from South Korea’s National Security Council

issued in March 2005:

Dokdo was forcefully taken from us in the course of the colonial

invasion and was restored to us with national liberation. This is not

simply a territorial issue. It is nothing short of a denial of the history of

our national liberation as well as a justification of aggression.

This view was not merely an official statement, but rather one

that represented broad public opinion in South Korea, across

generational and political differences. For many Koreans, Japan’s claims

to the islands were indeed nothing short of a blatant denial of colonial

history. The eminent Japanese historian of modern Korea, Wada Haruki,

grasped the situation succinctly when he said, “The Takeshima/Dokdo

problem is not a territorial dispute between sovereign states but a

problem rooted in the historical relationship between the two countries.”

In South Korea, much of the subsequent public attention to the

Dokdo/Takeshima controversy focused on the 1905-2005 temporal

nexus and the perceived return of the historical nightmare of the onset

of Japan’s colonial domination. In this milieu, the fate of Dokdo was

understood to embody the loss of Korea’ s sovereignty, and the

controversy over its status testified to the unresolved historical legacy of

colonialism in the region. In this sense, we may say that the problem of

Dokdo is an exemplary postcolonial question; the enduring, haunting

effect of colonial politics on present history. As several astute observers



SPECIAL ISSUE 1





entails an apparent change in the appearance of an object in view that

results from a change in the position of the viewer. It is a key concept in

astronomy, and is employed to explain such situations as that of a star

apparently changing in form or disappearing from view because of the

Earth (hence the observer) changing position in its orbit. Drawing an

analogy, Cumings explores the origins of the conflicts in Korea and

Vietnam, arguing that they are partly a product of geopolitical parallax.

The post-World War II shift in U.S. foreign policy, which Cumings

tries to depict with the idea of parallax visions, had a huge impact on the

developmental process of many postcolonial nations including those in

East Asia. The same idea applies to the enduring conflicts between Japan

and Korea and their effect on colonial legacies, of which the Dokdo/

Takeshima problem is a part. Kim Young-Soo, a political scientist at

South Korea’s Yeungnam University, argues:

The conflict between the two ideals [anti-fascism and anti-

communism] had a direct bearing on Korea’s post-war position. As the

United States turned from punishment of Japan to friendship with the

former enemy and established its Cold War policies for Northeast Asia,

Korea was confused about its approach toward Japan, clouding its

normalization talks with Japan. Debate on their shared history and the

territorial rights over Dokdo actually revolved around the conflicting

interpretations of the anti-fascist Cairo and Potsdam Declarations on

one hand and the anti-communist San Francisco Peace Treaty on the

other. Korea faced the dilemma of being anti-communist for the sake of

its alliance with the United States and being anti-Japanese because of its

complex historical relationship with Japan.

It is a well-known historical fact that the MacArthur administration

in postwar Japan excluded what Japan now calls Takeshima from the



SPECIAL ISSUE 1



45Special Edition

sphere of Japanese sovereignty. This was clearly stated in MacArthur’s

1946 edict, the so-called MacArthur Line, whereas in the subsequent

documents issued by his administration the status of Takeshima/Dokdo

was left unclear and ambiguous. A similar move took place in the

important international event for the future of northeast Asia, the San

Francisco Treaty of 1951. Historians question why the treaty left the

territorial question of Dokdo/Takeshima unclear, and why the U.S.

administration took measures to keep the islands’ status ambivalent

despite protests from other Allied powers, particularly Great Britain, and

against the Cairo and Potsdam agreements, which stated without

ambiguity the unjustifiable basis of Japan’s colonial rule of Korea,

including its territorial takeover. Kimie Hara describes in detail how the

final draft of the San Francisco agreement went against the several

earlier drafts, in which the islets were clearly marked as Korea’s territory,

avoiding a conclusive stand on the status of the islands and thereby

planting the seeds for future disputes such as those that we witness

today. According to Hara:

The equivocal wording of the treaty was neither coincidence

nor error; it followed careful deliberation and multiple revisions.

Various issues were deliberately left unresolved due to the regional

Cold War. Earlier drafts were, as a whole, based on U.S. wartime

studies and were consistent with the “punitive peace” plan and the

Yalta spirit of inter-Allied cooperation. However, with the emergence

of the Cold War in the immediate postwar years, Japan was given

central status in the U.S. Asia strategy, and the peace terms changed

from punitive to generous as U.S. strategic thinking focused on

securing Japan within the Western bloc and assuring a long-term U.S.

military presence in Japan, particularly in Okinawa.

Korea protested to the U.S. administration against the indecision




Autumn 2010 Volume 11 46SPECIAL ISSUE 1 Japan's forced annexation of


in San Francisco over its East Sea islets, as did Britain, Australia and

New Zealand. However, there was not much it could do to correct the

inconclusive decision apart from voicing opposition in bilateral

diplomatic communiqués. The time of the San Francisco meeting was, as

we know, when the nation of Korea was embroiled in the vicious and

destructive civil-and-international war known as the Korean War, which

was one of the first violent manifestations, as well as one of the most

formative events, of the epochal shift in global power involving the

parallax effects mentioned above. According to Hara, the unfolding of

the Korean War had major implications on the decisions made in San

Francisco, which placed Japan’s territorial questions along the regional

Cold War frontiers of the so-called Acheson Line or Containment Line .

In the view of the United States, it was more rational to relegate the

Dokdo/Takeshima to Japan, which it was transforming into a safe ally in

the liberal world under its military occupation, rather than risking the

possibility of this potentially important geopolitical location falling into

hands of an enemy (North Korea) or those of a main ally of a more

powerful enemy (China), against which it was fighting a vicious total

war at the time.

The question of Dokdo, therefore, ought to be seen in light of the

progression of modern history, both at the regional and global level,

from colonial to bipolar formation. In chronological terms, 1905 and

1951 stand out with particular importance in this historical trajectory.

The year 1905 was the end of the Russo-Japanese war, epitomised in the

broad international sphere by the Treaty of Portsmouth in September

1905, and the Taft-Katsura Agreement in July 1905, in which the United

States and Imperial Japan mutually justified each other’s colonial

ventures into the Philippines and Korea respectively. Dokdo was the first

Korean territory annexed by Imperial Japan, an event that took place

discreetly while the desperate feudal state of old Korea lost its diplomatic



47Special Edition

rights under the 1905 Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty and was thereby

being practically stripped of its status as a sovereign entity. The year

was the actual beginning of Japan’s colonial rule over Korea, and the

public in Korea remember it as such.

If the year 1905 marked the beginning of the gloomy era of

Japan’s colonial expansion and militaristic adventure, which turned out

to have a devastating human and societal impact both within Japan and

far beyond, the year 1951 was supposed to mark the international will to

end Japan’s colonial rule in Asia and to open up a hopeful new era. The

hopeful spirit of the latter, however, was marred by the onset of the

militancy of the global Cold War and the accompanying collusion

between the United States and Japan on the question of containing

international communism in East Asia, and Japan’s increasingly

important role, in the perception of the United States, in defending

international liberal ideals and its own national interests within the region.

In this confusing field of parallax visions - confusing to the new

postcolonial nations, not necessarily to the old imperial powers - the

small, uninhabited, obscure islets in the East Sea became a small price to

pay, for the United States, to its former enemy for keeping the enemy

useful as part of a new regional order in the making. In short, the

ambiguity of Dokdo was, in fact, a gift to the new Japan after the end of

colonialism, made in exchange for Japan’s new role as an economic

power in the region and in the politics of the Cold War. The gift of

ambiguity turned a blind eye to the historical fact that the islets already

had a previous history of having been a gift - when the islands of Dokdo

became the first gift from Korea to the empire of Japan, acquired and

given by no one but the empire itself. The gift-taking in 1905 was, of

course, an unjustified, unjust act of a classical colonial nature. The

acquisition of the gift of ambiguity in 1951 was a less blatant but equally

dishonourable act.




Autumn 2010 Volume 11 48 Japan's forced annexation of


SPECIAL ISSUE 1

The year 2005 was the hundredth year following the tragedy of

1905; it was also the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Korea from

colonialism in 1945, as well as the fortieth anniversary of the

normalisation of Korea-Japan relations in 1965. The year was also

supposed to be the Year of Friendship between the people of Japan and

the people of Korea. In traditional Korean custom, the sixtieth

anniversary is an occasion of considerable cultural importance and

moral import. It is when the community celebrates the longevity of sixty

years, retraces the past years of intimate relationship, and gives blessings

to prosperous future relations. It goes without saying that when

someone celebrates his or her sixtieth anniversary, it is the norm that the

family’s neighbours join the celebration and contribute to it with a good

round of heart-felt singing and dancing. The controversy over Dokdo/

Takeshima broke the celebratory spirit of a full sixty-year cycle away

from colonial history. It is clear that the controversy spoiled the

neighbourhood and its neighbourly spirit. It is also clear that modern

Japan has a lot of homework to do to learn about its neighbour’s culture

and history. The last includes the important recognition that the era of

1904-1905, which Japan remembers, to the nation’s pride, as a bright

shining victory against an imperial power, is remembered by its closest

neighbouring nation with an utterly different meaning, as shameful

subjugation to a colonial power. It is probably also the case that modern

Korea has to learn more about its neighbour’s history, expanding its

interest in questions such as why this great nation in its immediate

neighbourhood is finding it so hard to come to terms with its past,

particularly with the unpleasant aspects of the past, including the history

of colonialism. This includes the recognition that the era of 1950-1953,

which Korea remembers as the nation’s most tragic event of a civil war,

had a different meaning to its closest neighbour, as the end of political

isolation in the international sphere and the beginning of a postwar

economic recovery and eventual prosperity. The two nations have come



49Special Edition

very far from the destruction of war that each endured with great pains,

but they have not come far in getting to know each other’s war

experiences.

In pursuing this mutual understanding, it is important to

recognise that there is a field of geopolitical parallax that complicates

the two nations’ reciprocal relations. In order to strengthen the clarity of

this mutual recognition, it is important to see that the relations between

Japan and Korea are hampered by the enduring legacies of their Cold

War history as well as those of their colonial history. They need to be

able to see the historical traces of American power existing in the

turbulent waters of neighbourly relations across the Sea of Japan. But

this vision has to be a clear-sighted one based on a mutual recognition

of historical differences, yet with a shared sense of morality and

commitment to historical knowledge, rather than one that continues to

be swayed by the illusions created by parallax visions.




Autumn 2010 Volume 11 50SPECIAL ISSUE 2Criticism on the Japanese Ministry of

Foreign Affairs' claims to Dokdo

With regard to territorial rights to Dokdo, the 1905 decision by

the Meiji government on “incorporation of Dokdo” and the public notice

of Shimane Prefecture are a double-edged sword for the Japanese

government. At a glance, they may be viewed as “objective” materials

evidencing Japan’s territorial rights to the island since they are official

documents rendering a decision to incorporate Dokdo in the form of

modern law. At the same time, however, these documents serve as

decisive evidence completely negating Japan’s territorial claims over

Dokdo in that they explicitly deny Japan’s historical possession of the

island.

In the latest brochure, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

contends that Japan has “long” recognized the exis tence of

Takeshima(Dokdo) and established sovereignty over Takeshima by the

mid-17th century through navigation by the two families of Ohya and

Murakawa. The ministry also argues that in 1905, Japan incorporated

Takeshima into Shimane Prefecture, reaffirming its intention to claim

sovereignty over Takeshima. However, the Japanese Cabinet documents

kept at the National Archives of Japan obviously show that such logic

cannot be substantiated. A cabinet decision states that Dokdo was

incorporated into Japan’s territory and subordinated to Shimane

Prefecture because there were “no traces acknowledging its occupation

by any other country” and sea lion hunting by a Japanese man named

Nakai, which was commenced in 1903, fell under “occupation under

Criticism on the Japanese Ministry

of Foreign Affairs' claims to Dokdo:

from the perspective of history

Young-Ran HurProfessor, University of Ulsan



51Special Edition

international law.” It is illogical to say that Japan, which claims

historical territorial rights to Dokdo, made the decision that the island

belonged to Japan on the grounds of non-occupation by any other

country and fishing activities by an individual during a span of only two

years. A national of a country cannot occupy its territory under

international law. Therefore, it would be reasonable to think that the

Japanese government had no intention of claiming historical territorial

rights in 1905.

Moreover, two official documents of Japan not even mentioned

in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs brochure, i.e. the “Confidential Inquiry

into the Particulars of Korea’s Foreign Relations” (1870) and the

“Dajokan(Council of State) Order on Land Registration” (1877), identify

Ulleungdo and Dokdo as a set, stating that the two islands are territories

of Korea, not Japan. The former submitted to the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs includes a heading that reads “circumstances leading to the

incorporation of Takeshima and Matsushima into Korea.” The latter

containing a Dajoukan order on land registration clarifies that

“Takeshima and one other island are irrelevant to our nation (Japan).”

These documents could never exist if the Japanese government had

established its sovereignty over Takeshima since the 17th century. Since

Japan was aware of the existence of Dokdo as argued by the country, the

assertion that “Matsushima” and “Takeshima and another island” refer

to third islands, not Dokdo, is not convincing.

Given such historical documents, since the late 17th century, the

Japanese government which was aware of the existence of Dokdo had

known that Ulleungdo and Dokdo were at least territories of Korea, not

Japan. In 1905, when Japan was absorbed in imperialistic seizure of

islands, the country made a decision to incorporate Dokdo under the

pretext of prior occupation of an ownerless land.





Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs brochure selectively presents

historical materials in an effort to conceal evident contradictions

inherent in Japan’s claims while pointing out problems with Korea’s

assertion. In other words, the brochure says that there exists no clear

rationale supporting that Usando is Dokdo; the statements by Ahn

Yong-Bok are questionable in many ways; it is doubtful that Seokdo,

mentioned in Imperial Ordinance No. 41 of Daehan Empire issued in

1900, refers to Dokdo; and even if assuming that this is the case, there is

no evidence that Korea has ever exercised effective control over Dokdo.

It is true that description of Usanguk or a tribal nation of Usan in

Samguk sagi (Historical Record of the Three Kingdoms) written by Kim

Bu-Shik in the mid-12th century and portrayal of Usando in Joseon

wangjo sillok (Annals of the Dynasty of Joseon) are different from

modern geographical information. However, it is reasonable from the

perspective of historical science to assume how Korea perceived Dokdo

based on descriptions of Usando in many historical data and ancient

maps. This is because Ulleungdo had been an inhabited island for an

extended period and it was possible to observe Dokdo with the naked

eye. A Japanese document on the Ahn Yong-Bok’s incident,One-volume

Memorandum Concerning the Korean Boat that Came Alongside the Pier

in the 9th Year of Genroku, which was discovered in Oki Island, Japan in

2005, clearly shows that Koreans in the 17th century knew the existence

and location of Ulleungdo and Dokdo, and recognized Dokdo as Korean

territory.

Then , was Dokdo under effective control by the Korean

government? In March 1906, Shim Heung-Taek, head of Uldo County

(Ulleungdo), made an urgent report to the central government, with such

expressions as “Dokdo belonging to our county”, “in the sea about 40

kilometers away” and “Japanese officials who came to the island and

Criticism on the Japanese Ministry of


SPECIAL ISSUE 2



53Special Edition

reportedly claimed it to be a Japanese territory.” This indicates that the

county head of Uldo, without hesitation, recognized Dokdo as an island

under his jurisdiction. It is unquestionable that Dokdo had been under

the jurisdiction of Uldo County. Ulleungdo was upgraded to the status of

Uldo County by Imperial Ordinance No. 41 in 1900, which clearly

defines “Ulleungdo and its annexed islets, Jukdo and Seokdo”, as areas

under jurisdiction. At the time, residents in Ulleungdo referred to Dokdo

as Stone Island or Dok Island. When written in Chinese characters, they

become Seokdo or Dokdo. Accordingly, Seokdo in Imperial Ordinance

No. 41 referred to Dokdo and the head of Uldo County gave an accurate

account. If Seokdo refers to a rocky island near Ulleungdo as argued by

some people, it cannot be explained how the head of Uldo County sent

an urgent report on Dokdo, describing it as an island under the county’s

control, in a situation where the Imperial Ordinance showing

jurisdictions in such detail did not even mention the island which was

deemed located about 40 kilometers away (about 87 kilometers away in

actuality).

Unlike the public notice by Japan’s Shimane Prefecture, Korea’s

Imperial Ordinance No. 41 did not newly declare territorial rights to

Dokdo. In upgrading Ulleungdo to a county, the ordinance specified the

administrative jurisdiction of Seokdo which had always been subject to

the jurisdiction of Daehan Empire. The Imperial Ordinance itself and the

report by the head of Uldo County itself constitute clear evidence of

Korea’s effective control of Seokdo, i.e. Dokdo.




Autumn 2010 Volume 11 54Criticism on the Japanese Ministry of


SPECIAL ISSUE 2

Among the details of the brochure on Dokdo published by the

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, matters requiring understanding

from the perspective of international law are, in many ways, intrinsically

related to the handling of the islands in the process of concluding the

San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Related documents indicate that in

terms of the structure of international politics at the time, the U.S., which

regarded rapid reconstruction and post-war handling of the defeated

Japan as the most prominent issue, abided by a strong pro-Tokyo

attitude while Great Britain and other members of the Allied Powers

called for clear resolution of the Dokdo issue. It seems that a leading role

played by the U.S. in the negotiations to coordinate conflicting interests

of the Allied Powers resulted in adoption of the arguments by the U.S. as

the final wording of the Treaty.

Political circumstances at the time including the outbreak of the

Korean War and enhancement of Japan’s role in East Asia in the Cold

War era prompted the U.S. to recognize rapid negotiations between the

victors and conclusion of a treaty with Japan as the items highest on its

policy agenda. As a result, the wording of the Treaty was written in a

manner that avoids addressing controversial matters. The Dokdo issue

was not free from such policy considerations of the U.S. The final

literature of the Treaty, which is currently known to the public, does not

even mention “Dokdo” or any other equivalent term.

Criticism on the Japanese Ministry of

Foreign Affairs’ claims to Dokdo:

from the perspective of international law

Seok-Woo LeeProfessor, Inha University



55Special Edition

Under these circumstances, one of the matters that must be

considered to understand the essence of this issue is to determine

whether the opinion of the U.S. expressed in then U.S. Undersecretary of

State Dean Rusk’s reply to then Korean ambassador to the U.S. is in line

with the legal conclusion that the San Francisco Peace Treaty attributed

Dokdo to Japan as mentioned in the latest brochure of the Japanese

Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Dokdo issue.

Logically, this issue boils down to whether it is possible to come

to a legal conclusion as follows: First, the Potsdam Declaration

determined that specific islets would be continuously subject to Japan’s

sovereignty; second, such decision was supported by the interpretation

of the Treaty that Japan enjoys the rights to any and all islands and islets

to which it did not renounce rights under Article 2 of the Treaty; third,

prior to the conclusion of the Treaty, Korea made a request that Japan’s

renouncement of any claims to Dokdo be specified in the Treaty, only to

be rejected; and fourthly, the purport of the writers of the Treaty was that

Japan did not relinquish its claims or rights to Dokdo, and as such,

Dokdo is one of the islets determined to remain subject to Japan’s

sovereignty.

Basic understanding of international law is that establishment of

wartime occupation does not necessarily mean legal transfer of an

occupied nation’s sovereignty to the occupying nation. The occupying

nation merely obtains the authority and means to carry out acts

necessary to keep order and restore peace in the occupied country.

Accordingly, an occupying country during wartime has no title or

authority to the territory of an occupied nation under international law.

Accordingly, the occupying nation is not entitled to ultimately dispose

of the occupied nation. The status of the territory of the occupied

country is finally and conclusively determined by a peace treaty. What






SPECIAL ISSUE 2

can be pointed out as a problem is the practice wherein victorious

nations, in handling the territory of defeated countries, do not take into

account historical interests of state parties that hold legal title to such

territory.

Seemingly, those practices were revealed in the process to verify

territorial claims over Dokdo. In connection with this situation, there is a

certain issue requiring consideration: the expression, “according to our

information” emphasized in the reply by then U.S. Undersecretary of

State Rusk to then Korean ambassador to the U.S. At the time, the U.S.

refused to specifically provide in the Treaty that Japan renounced its

claims to Dokdo as an extension of Japan’s relinquishment of

sovereignty over Korea.

This attests to a very limited understanding on the part of the U.S.

of Korea’s historical facts including the Dokdo issue. In particular,

internal documents of the U.S. Department of State concerning Dokdo

are mostly materials in Japanese available in the U.S. Department of

State or the Library of Congress, or merely based on only a few reports

on limited subjects prepared by the Department of State and the

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, an approach to these

documents need to be taken on the basis of acknowledgment that

reference materials lack in objectivity.

Changes in U.S. policies toward occupied Japan were reflected in

the process of concluding the San Francisco Peace Treaty, resulting in a

moderate or favorable peace treaty for Japan compared to that of other

defeated nations including Germany and Italy. The implications of

political and economic interests of the U.S. underlying this situation

need to be resolved by means of the principles of law.



57Special Edition

Byung-Sup ParkRepresentative of the Dokdo/Takeshima Research Net in Japan

Maps published by Japanese

government that mark Dokdo

outside of Japanese territory

Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasizes in its brochure

that Japan had been well aware of Dokdo from ancient times while

Korea, on the contrary, had no knowledge of it. For instance, the

Ministry, in a bid to give an impression that Japan had accurate

knowledge, used Nagakubo Sekisui’s 19th-century Revised Complete

Map of Japanese Lands and Roads (Sekisui’s maps) using latitudes and

longi tudes. In an attempt to give an impress ion that Korea had

inaccurate knowledge, the Ministry used Paldo chongdo (Map of Eight

Provinces), a picture map annexed to Sinjeung dongguk yeoji seungnam

(Augmented Survey of the Geography of Korea), a government-

published book from the 16th century.

Unlike ordinary maps, picture maps are prone to inaccuracies.

Thus, it cannot be expected that the Map of Eight Provinces, a picture

map could provide accurate information on the size, location, etc. of far-

away islands. The Map of Eight Provinces merely shows the perception

of a space where the two islands of Ulleungdo and Usando exists in the

East Sea. It is almost meaningless to discuss the accuracy of the location,

size, etc. of Usando in the picture map. Despite such situation, the

brochure issued by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticizes

that Usando should have been described as a much smaller island than

Ulleungdo. Such critical attitude should be taken toward a full-fledged

map like Sekisui’s maps, not a picture map. From such perspective,

Sekisui’s maps describe Matsushima (Dokdo) as being almost the same






SPECIAL ISSUE 2

size as Takeshima (Ulleungdo). Thus, Japan and its Ministry of Foreign

Affairs are not themselves free from such criticism.

Furthermore, Sekisui’s maps themselves are not favorable for

Japan. As described in the brochure, the first edition of Sekisui’s maps

was published in 1779. In the first edition, Takeshima and Matsushima

are uncolored like the Korean Peninsula whereas Japanese territories are

colored. This gives the perception that the islands are outside of

Japanese territory. This apparently forced the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

to use the sixth edition coloring Takeshima and Matsushima with the

same color as Oki Island to give the impression that Takeshima and

Matsushima are Japanese territories. However, the civilian publisher of

the sixth edition of Sekisui’s maps irresponsibly colored Takeshima and

Matsushima, at its own discretion, as if they were Japanese territory

since the publisher did not have the knowledge that the Edo Bakufu

prohibited illegal sailing to Takeshima (Ulleungdo) in 1696 based on its

judgment that the island did not belong to Japanese territory. At any

rate, the map is irrelevant to territorial recognition by the Shogunate.

Neither the first edition, nor the sixth edition, of the Sekisui’s

maps will be discussed in detail. Japan handles Takeshima and

Matsushima as a set. Ironically, Matsushima meaning “Pine Island” is an

island with not a single pine tree. Its name came from an idea that the

island forms a pair with Takeshima or “Bamboo Island.” Since Sekisui’s

maps representing the later days of the Edo era treated Takeshima and

Matsushima as a set, prohibition of navigation to Takeshima (Ulleungdo)

was simultaneously recognized as a ban on navigation to Matsushima

(Dokdo) as well, in general, during both the Edo or Meiji eras.

The Tokugawa Shogunate produced full-fledged maps named the

Maps of the Japanese Coastal Areas based on a survey by Ino Tadataka.



59Special Edition

Often dubbed Ino’s maps, these maps comprising over 200 pages in total

represent the first modern government-published maps of Japan. Ino’s

maps do not contain Takeshima and Matsushima. This is because

Takeshima and annexed Matsushima (Dokdo) were not regarded as

Japanese territory as amply proven by the Shogunate ban on illegal

navigation to Takeshima (Ulleungdo). Such perception continued in the

Meiji government as well. The Ministry of Home Affairs in charge of

geographical issues produced maps and geographical records, based on

judgment that Takeshima and Matsushima are outside the boundary of

Japanese territory. One example is the Prefecture Jurisdiction Map of

Japan (1881). Included in the book is the Rough Map of Japan that

shows the entire Far East. Its first edition mistakenly colored Takeshima

and Matsushima in the same color as that used for the northwest region

of Japan. However, such error was corrected in its revised edition,

leaving Takeshima and Matsushima uncolored just like Korea.

In sum, maps published by the government of Japan delineating

the country’s territorial perception do not acknowledge Dokdo as its

territory until 1954 except as part of the Japanese colonial rule of Korea.

After the liberation of Korea, Japanese officials made a fuss by landing

in Dokdo, attracting public attention. In the wake of such incident,

Japan began to mark Dokdo as its own territory in its maps.




Autumn 2010 Volume 11 60Controversy over Okinotorishima

SPECIAL ISSUE 3

Pae-Keun ParkProfessor, Pusan NationalUniversity

The question of whether Okinotorishima may have the status of an

island could be raised only after the conclusion of the 1982 UN

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as Article 121 of the

UNCLOS differentiates islands from rocks and provides that rocks, even if

regarded as islands in a geographical sense, shall have no exclusive

economic zone or continental shelf. Accordingly, the question said above

can be answered by applying relevant provisions of the UNCLOS to the

facts concerning Okinotorishima.

The facts surrounding Okinotorishima are clear. Okinotorishima is

an uninhabited atoll of two coral reefs. About 1,740 kilometers south of

Tokyo and 900 kilometers from Ogasawara, it is referred to as the

southernmost island of Japan. It is no larger than a small room or king-

sized bed. Even only one or two people can barely stand on it. At high

tide, it is reportedly only about 70 centimeters above sea level. Several

nearby coral reefs have already disappeared below the surface due to

erosion, and Okinotorishima may suffer the same fate. That is the reason

why Japan built a breakwater made of concrete and steel around encased

the reefs, and again covered them with a titanium net to shield it from

concrete debris. Japan claims the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the

continental shelf around this tiny and feeble maritime feature of

Okinotorishima. The EEZ surrounding Okinotorishima is as large as

400,000 square kilometers.

Does it deserve the status of

island?



61Special Edition

In contrast to the clarity of such facts, the provisions of the

UNCLOS to be criteria for determining the legal status of Okinotorishima

are quite ambiguous. Article 121 para. 3 of the UNCLOS defines an island

as a “naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above

water at high tide.” However, it does not contain any definition of ‘rocks.’

Neither do the records on the negotiations which led to the drafting of the

article. Article 121 para. 3 of the UNCLOS only uses the expression which

says “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of

their own.” Concepts such as “sustainability of human habitation” or

“sustainability of economic life of their own” are so unclear in their

meaning and leave too much room for various interpretations.

To be rocks under Article 121 para. 3 of the UNCLOS, should a

maritime feature be composed of hard rocks including not any soil or

sand? Should Rocks with soil or sand be regarded as ‘rocks’ in the legal

sense if they do not provide sustainability of human habitation or

sustainability of economic life of their own? Can sustainability of human

habitation be acknowledged only when the problomatic feature has

arable land or drinking water and have area no smaller than a certain

size? Or can it be acknowledged if human habitation may be sustained

through outside supply? Is sustainability of economic life of their own

linked to sustainability of human habitation? If so, is sustainability of

economic life of their own acknowledged only when food can be

procured through cultivation? Is sustainability of economic life of ‘their

own’ acknowledged if various economic needs can be satisfied from the

outside by using economic value that can be obtained in the

surroundings? The provisions of the UNCLOS does not answer any of

these questions in their interpretations.

Going back to the most fundamental principle of interpretation of

a treaty, if we interpret the provision according to the “ordinary meaning”





of the terms, what would be the result? Article 121 para. 3 of the UNCLOS

uses the word “or” between the expressions “sustainability of human

habitation” and “sustainability of economic life of their own.” Therefore,

from the logical perspective, it may be said that a geographical feature

which meets either of these requirements can be deemed an island, not a

rock. However, it would be difficult to construe the provision in disregard

of “sustainability of human habitation” when “normal meaning” of the

literature is seriously taken into account, even though the two

requirements are linked by the alternative conjunction of “or.” It seems

clear that Okinotorishima is uninhabitable. Even though the Japanese

government tries to demonstrate Okinotorishima’s “sustainability of

economic life of their own” by taking such measures as an installation of

a lighthouse and exploration of possibilities for power generation using

temperature differences, it does not seem to be arguing that this little

fearure is inhabitable. In this sense, it is very difficult to regard

Okinotorishima as an ‘island.’

What would be the result if we construe the provision in the

context of a treaty which imposes some limitation upon “normal

meaning” of a term? As is widely known, the UNCLOS is a product of

coordination and balancing of varying interests. Differentiation between

islands and rocks also reflects such coordination and balancing by the

UNCLOS. By introducing the regime of the EEZ and extending the limits

of continental shelves, the UNCLOS put more waters which previously

belonged to the international public domain under the jurisdiction of

coastal states. The significance of differentiation between islands and

rocks lies in pursuit of balance between the interests of coastal states and

the interests of the international community as whole by imposing certain

limitations on such expansion of jurisdictions and thus maintaining

traditional high seas as the international public domain. Arvid Pardo,

Malta’s ambassador to the UN who left great influence on the third United

Controversy over Okinotorishima

SPECIAL ISSUE 3





located near the coast of other state or in the EEZ of any other state while

others emphasized the existence of residents who have settled in. It seems

that the drafters of the UNCLOS intentionally used such obscure

expressions in an attempt to embrace all the conflicting positions and

views. This renders obtaining a clear guideline on interpretation of the

UNCLOS very difficult, even if negotiation records are examined.

It is a well-known fact that ambiguous expressions are often

intentionally included in a treaty since it must coordinate and reconcile

divergent interests when it is drafted. The UNCLOS provision on ‘rocks’ is

may be said to be a such example. In such a case, generally an interpretation

that is deemed reasonable and supported by the international community

gradually comes to be settled and adopted during the process of many

subsequent practices of states and exchange of various assertions. Therefore,

states are free at making arguments in favor of themselves and cumulatively

establish state practices in connection with interpretation of Article 121 para.

3 of the UNCLOS. However, it must be noted that some of such arguments

and state practices are accepted by the international community while others

invite objection and protest from many nations. Unreasonable and

implausible assertions or state practices cannot ultimately crystallized into

international law. They merely undermine national reputation.

If a geographical feature like Okinotorishima is acknowledged as an

island, then any rock on earth can be deemed an island and there would be

no “rocks” in the legal sense left. If so, Article 121 para. 3 of the UNCLOS

would loose its raison d’etre. In this respect also, it is deemed very far-

fetched to assert that Okinotorishima is not a rock, but an island. It would

not be easy for the government of a nation to change or withdraw an

argument involving international law that it had presented formerly before

the international community. However, no matter how much the issue is

pondered, it is difficult for Okinotorishima to be regarded as an island.


SPECIAL ISSUE 3



65Special Edition

Tetsuo KotaniResearcher, Ocean PolicyResearch Foundation, Japan

A new maritime dispute?

Japan’s Okinotorishima policy and

its implications

Japan is introducing a law that will promote the development

and conservation of remote islands, notably Okinotorishima - the

southernmost island (atoll) of Japan. This will have important

implications for regional security.

Okinotorishima: basics

Okinotorishima is located on the Palau-Kyushu Ridge in the

Philippine Sea at 20°25′N 136°05′E, or roughly 1,700km south of Tokyo.

Okinotorishima consists of two islets, Higashikojima and Kitakojima. At

high tide, Higashikojima is roughly the size of a twin bed and pokes just

60 centimeters out of the water. Kitakojima is the size of a small

bedroom and rises about twice as high. These islets are in the western

part of a lagoon surrounded by a submerged coral reef and that extends

4.5 km east-west and 1.7 km north-south. Located in a tropical area and

in the path of typhoons, Okinotorishima is on the edge of submersion

due to erosion. In 1987, the Japanese government began protection of

Higashikojima and Kitakojima with concrete encasing. In 1999, the

island was put under the direct jurisdiction of the Japanese government.

In Okinotorishima, Japan conducts various scientific research, such as

biological observation and weather monitoring.

The atoll was discovered by Europeans and named “Douglas Reef”

after its founder the British Captain William Douglas in the 16th century.

After World War I, it became Japanese mandated territory in 1920, and the





SPECIAL ISSUE 3

Imperial Japanese Navy investigated it in 1922. In 1931, confirming that

there was no country claiming it, Japan declared it Japanese territory as

part of the Bonin Islands under the jurisdiction of Metropolis of Tokyo,

and gave it a new Japanese name, Okinotorishima. After World War II, the

Bonin Islands, including Okinotorishima, were put under United States

trusteeship until they were returned to Japan in 1968.

Based on its possession of Okinotorishima, Japan claimed an

Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) of approximately 400,000 square

kilometers - larger than the area of Japanese land territory - under the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The waters

around the atoll are potentially rich in metallic minerals such as nickel,

manganese, cobalt, and copper.

In November 2008, Japan submitted to the Commission on the

Limits of the Continental Shelf(CLCS), in accordance with Article 76,

paragraph 8 of the UNCLOS, information on the limits of its continental

shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines. China and South

Korea object to Japan’s request on the ground that Okinotorishima is

considered as a “rock” that cannot have any exclusive economic zone

(EEZ) or continental shelf.

An island or a rock?

In April, 2004, during bilateral talks in Beijing to discuss Chinese

marine research activities within Japan’s EEZ, Chinese officials argued

that Okinotorishima is not an island but just a group of rocks while

acknowledging Japan’s territorial rights. Thus, by denying Japan’s EEZ

in the area, China claims that about half of 11 cases of such research

activities in 2004 were legal because they were conducted around

Okinotorishima. The Japanese government immediately refused to

accept China’s claim.



67Special Edition

Under the UNCLOS, an island is “a naturally formed area of land,

surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide” (Article 121

paragraph 1). It also states that “rocks which cannot sustain human

habitation or economic li fe of their own shall have no exclusive

economic zone” (Article 121 paragraph 3).

The Japanese government regards Okinotorishima as an island

on the ground that there is no clear definition of rocks in the UNCLOS. A

prominent Japanese international law professor endorses this. Tadao

Kuribayashi argues that coral reefs are not defined as rocks, and

therefore any country can claim its own EEZ or continental shelf based

on its possession of coral reefs.

Japan’s Okinotorishima policy and its implication

Public-private partnership is the primary characteristic of Japan’s

Okinotorishima policy. Given the recommendations from the private

sector, the Japan Coast Guard constructed a lighthouse in Okinotorishima

and started its operation in March 2007, which has improved the safety

of the busy shipping route for ships carrying Australian iron ore and

other raw materials to Japan. Japan also introduced a hydrographic

observation radar in 2005, and the Japanese Fishery Agency started the

breeding of coral in 2006. Tokyo Metropolitan government conducts

several projects to create fishing grounds around Okinotorishima as well.

The Tokyo government also placed an official titanium address plaque in

Okinotorishima.

Japan enacted the Basic Act on Ocean Policy in July 2007 and

then introduced the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy in March 2008. The

Basic Plan calls for the preservation of islands. The white paper on land,

infrastructure and transport refers to the importance of Okinotorishima

as the baseline of a vast EEZ and states that the government will





consider possible use of the island through direct control. Accordingly,

Japan formulated a basic guideline on preservation and management of

remote islands in December 2009, and is preparing a law, aiming at

constructing port facilities in Okinotorishima.

The conservation of Okinotorishima will have positive impact not

only on Japan but also on other countries in Northeast Asia. The

lighthouse on Okinotorishima contributes a lot to the safety of

navigation between Oceania and Northeast Asia. Weather monitoring

from Okinotorishima also contributes to disaster prevention.

More important ly, the conservation of Okinotorishima

contributes significantly to regional security. It is believed that China

opposes the Japanese claim on the EEZ around Okinotorishima because

of its strategic position between Guam and Taiwan. China needs to map

the sea bottom so that its submarines could intercept US aircraft carriers

in a crisis. This has invited sharp protests from Japan that China is

violating its EEZ. As well-known, Chinese strategy conceives two

“island chains” as China’s maritime defense barrier: the first island chain

is formed by the Aleutians, the Kuriles , Japan’s archipelago, the

Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo and the second chain

running from the Bonin Islands and moving southward through the

Mariana s, Guam, and the Caroline Islands. The EEZ around

Okinotorishima lies between China’s first and second island chains. In

this sense, the conservation of Okinotorishima is important for U.S. to

secure U.S. reinforcement from Guam in an armed conflict in the Korean

Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait.


SPECIAL ISSUE 3





SPECIAL ISSUE 3

According to Annex II of the UNCLOS, if a coastal state intends

to establish, pursuant to Article 76 of the UNCLOS, the outer limits of its

continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit ‘particulars

of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and

technical data.’ Such data should be submitted within 10 years of the

entry into forc e of the UNCLOS . The Comm issi on makes a

recommendation to a coastal state who submitted after reviewing the

data. The outer limits of a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles

are determined by such coastal states based on the Commission’s

recommendation that are final and binding.

Given the importance of the outer limits of a continental shelf

beyond 200 nautical miles and the highly complicated technical rules on

the outer limits of a continental shelf as provided in Article 76.4 through

76.6 of the UNCLOS, it was difficult for most developing countries to

submit such information by a set deadline. Therefore the eleventh

meeting of State parties to the UNCLOS in 2001, decided that State

parties which ratified or joined the UNCLOS prior to May 13, 1999 might

submit such data within 10 years from said date (May 12, 2009), which

substantially lessened the burden on State parties. May 12 was set as the

deadline because the scientific and technical guidelines necessary for

state parties to prepare documents on outer limits were issued on May

13, 1999, allowing coastal state parties to prepare and submit documents

on the basis of such guidelines. Despite the situation, most developing

countries faced difficulties in submitting official documents by May 12,

2009 for many reasons. In the eighteenth meeting of state parties to the

UNCLOS held in June 2008, the conditions for legally meeting the

deadline for submission of official documents were significantly relaxed

by allowing replacement of said documents by (i) indicative data on the

outer limits of a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles; (ii) report

on the status of preparation for drawing up such documents; and (iii)



71Special Edition

preliminary information including the scheduled time of official

document submission. Since preliminary information is not an official

document, the Commission does not review it.

2. Legal nature

1) Nature of the Commission

When coastal states submit scientific and technical data on the

outer limits of a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, the

Commission reviews it. The Commission specifically decides from a

scientific point of view whether the submitted data are consistent with

the UNCLOS provisions and standards, and makes recommendations on

the basis of its findings. The Commission is a body comprised of

scientists, not a legal or judicial organ. The UNCLOS does not grant

judicial jurisdiction to the Commission. However, Article 4 of Annex II

of the UNCLOS provides that coastal states are obligated to submit

scientific and technical data regarding the outer limits of a continental

shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Accordingly, the Commission, unlike

ordinary international organizations, is mandated to supervise

determination of the outer limits of a continental shelf beyond 200

nautical miles by representing the international community for the

purpose of preventing coastal states from violating deep seabeds, a

common heritage of mankind. From this perspective, the Commission

plays the role of a watchdog.

2) Nature of recommendations

The Commission makes recommendations to state parties based

on results of its review of data presented by them. Since the Commission

is not a judicial organ, but a body of geologists, geophysicists, and

hydrographers, its recommendations based on its review findings do not

constitute judicial proceedings or judgments and thus are not legally

binding. However, Article 76.8 of the UNCLOS stipulates that the outer





limits of a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles established by a

coastal state on the basis of recommendations by the Commission shall

be final and binding. Conversely, this means that the outer limits of a

continental shelf which are not established on the basis of such

recommendations are not binding. This provision grants forcefulness to

the Commission’s recommendations in an unconventional manner and

renders them semi-judicial precedents.

Considering actual cases to date, the Commission’s recommendations

to coastal states serve as ‘precedents’ already referred to or to be referred

to in the future in examining a proposed determination of sea boundary

and preparing materials necessary for a coastal state to make a submission.

3. Problems

Given submissions by coastal states of extended outer limits of a

continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and their review by the

Commission, applicable provisions of the UNCLOS cannot be deemed

impeccable. An increase in such submissions and extended examination

by the Commission in the future are likely to reveal more problems with

the UNCLOS. In particular, there exist a lack of continuity, ambiguity, or

contradictions among provisions on a continental shelf. Some matters

also still remain unaddressed.

1) Relationship between the Commission’s recommendations and

coastal states’ sovereign rights

According to the UNCLOS, the continental shelf of a coastal state

is the natural prolongation of its land territory. Therefore, a coastal state

has sovereign rights to explore and exploit the continental shelf for the

purpose of developing natural resources. Such rights are inherent and do

not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express

proclamation. However, Article 76.8 of the UNCLOS provides that


SPECIAL ISSUE 3



73Special Edition

information on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200

nautical miles from the baselines shall be submitted by the coastal state

to the Commission and that only the limits of the shelf established on the

basis of recommendations by the Commission shall be final and binding.

These provisions, especially the provision in Article 76.8 of the UNCLOS

emphasizing the Commission’s recommendations, are viewed as

negating the inherent nature of a coastal state’s sovereign rights to

natural resources on a continental shelf as provided in Article 77.3

thereof. In other words, ambiguous or even contradicting relations

between coastal states’ sovereign rights and the Commission’s

recommendations affect overall integrity of the continental shelf system.

2) Revised or new submissions

The Commission reviews documents submitted by coastal states

and subsequently issues recommendations lacking clear legal force. For

this reason, coastal states may refuse to give consent to such

recommendations. According to Article 8 of Annex II of the UNCLOS, in

the case of disagreement by a coastal state with the recommendations of

the Commission, the coastal state shall, within a reasonable time, make a

revised or new submission to the Commission. However, this entails the

following problems:

First, how many times is a coastal state permitted to make a revised

or new submission, or how many times is it allowed to repeatedly make a

revised or new submission in disagreement with the Commission’s

recommendations? Theoretically, a coastal state may continue its

‘argument’ with the Commission indefinitely by making a revised or new

submission. Under Article 76.8 of the UNCLOS, the Commission will win

ultimately because only the outer limits of a continental shelf beyond 200

nautical miles established by a coastal state on the basis of the

Commission’s recommendations are deemed final and binding.





Second, by which deadline is a coastal state required to make a

revised or new submission? This issue pertains to definition of a

reasonable time provided in Article 8 of Annex II of the UNCLOS.

Theoretically, the following two cases may be considered: (i) a coastal

state may make such submission on the day immediately following the

date of a recommendation by the Commission; and (ii) a coastal state

may not make a revised or new submission because it already met the

deadline by making a submission to the Commission within ten years

from its joining the UNCLOS. Under such circumstances, the outer limits

of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles established by a

coastal state will remain not finalized for a long time.

Third, by which deadline is a coastal state, which submitted

preliminary information, required to submit an official document?

Preliminary information merely mentions the time when the coastal

state is scheduled to submit an official document. Thus, it is at the

discretion of a coastal state to decide when it will submit such document.

By submitting preliminary information, a coastal state satisfies a

requirement in terms of time limits. From the standpoint of the

Commission, however, the practical period for submission of an official

document is prolonged.

3) Protection of the international community’s common interests

Deep seabed is a concept newly established by the UNCLOS. It

refers to the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the

limits of national jurisdiction. A coastal state’s deep seabed and its

resources outside the outer limits of a continental shelf represent a

common heritage of mankind. The International Seabed Authority,

representing mankind, exercises rights to deep seabeds and their

resources. No country may claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign

rights to deep seabeds and their resources. In addition, no country,


SPECIAL ISSUE 3



75Special Edition

natural person, or juristic person may occupy deep seabeds or their

resources.

There is a clear link between determination of the scope of deep

seabeds and establishment by a coastal state of the outer limits of a

continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. A coastal state establishes

the outer limits of a continental shelf on the basis of the Commission’s

recommendations and also determines the boundary between such

continental shelf and deep seabeds, a common heritage of mankind.

Accordingly, prolongation of the outer limits of a continental shelf by a

coastal state reduces the scope of deep seabeds. If a coastal state

excessively calls for extension of the limits of a continental shelf, it may

lead to reduction in the scope of deep seabeds and consequently

compromise the common interests of the international community.

In its official document submitted to the Commission on

November 12, 2008, Japan claimed the outer limits of a continental shelf

beyond 200 nautical miles regarding Okinotorishima, drawing the

attention of the international community and triggering related

discussions. China and Korea respectively submitted objections. On

February 6, 2009, China raised an objection to the UN secretary-general,

saying that Japan’s claim to a continental shelf within and beyond 200

nautical miles from the baseline of Okinotorishima is outside the

Commission’s authority to make recommendations under the UNCLOS.

China urged the Commission not to deliberate on said matter. Immediately

afterwards, Korea submitted a similar objection. In the fifteenth general

assembly of the International Seabed Authority in May 2009 and the

meeting of state parties to the UNCLOS in June 2009, Japan’s submission

was subjected to in-depth discussion. Many countries expressed keen

interest in possible erosion of international deep seabed areas by Japan’s

claim to the limits of a continental shelf with a reef as the baseline.





Natural attributes of Okinotorishima constitute common sense

and common perception by the international community. Article 121.3

of the UNCLOS provides that rocks which cannot sustain human

habitation or economic life of their own have no continental shelf,

which means that extension of the limits of a continental shelf cannot be

an issue. The fact that Japan’s claim to the extension of the limits of the

continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline of

Okinotorishima violates international deep seabed areas, goes against

the principle established under the UNCLOS that deep seabeds and their

resources are a common heritage of mankind, and directly breaches the

international community’s common rights and interests.

Members of the international community assume obligations to

protect the integrity of deep seabeds and their resources. They also need

to safeguard the principle of a common heritage of mankind. In

particular, the Commission, which deliberates on outer limits of a

continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles on the basis of the UNCLOS,

has to uphold the order of international maritime law established by the

CLOS.


SPECIAL ISSUE 3



Policy Report

studies on doKdo problem by Japanese

international law scholars

natural resources development and

environmental issues of the arctic





POLICY REPORT78

➊ Studies on Dokdo problem by

Japanese international law scholars

Pae-Keun ParkProfessor, Pusan National

University

The so-called Dokdo problem is, in its nature, a matter of law,

thought it has many other aspects as a matter of politics, history,

economy, education, and so forth. As a legal problem, both law and

historical facts are important for it, for the truth and persuasiveness of

the arguments concerning territorial sovereignty over Dokdo is decided

by application of law to the established facts. However, the studies of

Dokdo problem in Japan seem to be focused on the historical facts.

Compared with the vigorous studies of the problem by historians, those

by international lawyers in Japan appear to be very little.

It was in 1952 when the so-called Peace Line Declaration was

proclaimed by Korea and Dokdo began to be perceived as a problematic

island or rock between Korea and Japan. From this year to now, articles

concerning Dokdo written by Japanese scholars of international law do

not exceed ten or so. In addition, greater part of them were written in the

time when Korea and Japan concluded their Basic Relations Treaty and

Fishery Treaty in 1965. From 1970 to 1990 is a period of blank and we

cannot find any Dokdo articles written by Japanese international

lawyers. From the late 1990s, some articles of international law treating

Dokdo problem have been published. However, their number is limited

to 3 or 4. This constitutes a remarkable contrast to the active

publishment of articles by Korean scholars of international law.

The reasons why Japanese scholars of international law did not

and do not write much regarding Dokdo problem are not so obvious.

Studies on Dokdo problem byJapanese international law scholars



79Special Edition

Some assumed reasons may be as follows: besides Dokdo problem,

Japan embraces other more important territorial problems such as four

Kurile Islands problem and Senkaku/ Diaoyutai problem, and their

attentions are more directed to these problems; though the number of

the articles is small, all the important legal points have been fully dealt

with and they do not feel any necessity to write redundant articles; and

territorial problem is not a subject attracting interest of many scholars in

the Japanese society of international law.

Among the small numbers of Dokdo articles written by Japanese

scholars of international law, the most influential ones may be those

written by Takeshi Minagawa and Kanae Taijudo. In particular, one of

Taijudo's article was published in the most authoritative international

law journal in Japan, Kokusaihogaikozassi (Journal of International Law

and Diplomacy). Academic appraisal of Taijudo is also high among the

Japanese international law scholars.

Taijudo's article has covered almost every important legal points

concerning Dokdo issues. Those points include: does Dokdo dispute

exist?, the critical date, effective occupation of the islet, necessity of

notification for an occupation to be valid one, Korean protest against

Japanese occupation of Dokdo, proximity theory concerning Ulleungdo

and Dokdo, interpretation of SCAPIN 677 and the article 2 of the 1951

Treaty of Peace with Japan. It goes without saying Minagawa and

Taijudo are supporting Japan's claim to Dokdo as its territory.

One problem which makes Japanese international lawyers feel

perplexed would be the contradiction between the argument that Dokdo

is historically original territory of Japan and the argument that Japan

occupied it as terra nullius, as historically original territory of a State

cannot be a terra nullius at all. The explanations about this contradiction

by Minagawa and Taijudo are as follows: the incorporation of Dokdo by





POLICY REPORT80

➊ Studies on Dokdo problem by

Japanese international law scholars

Japan through the measure of occupation is a substitution of a inchoate

title for a title under international law; or it represents a re-confirmation

of Japanese will to possess Dokdo as its own territory. Thus, they argue,

there is no contradiction between the two seemingly apparently

inconsistent arguments. These explanations sound as if poor excuses

and lack persuasiveness. Among Japanese scholars of international law,

Matsukuma frankly acknowledges the contradiction and regards

Japanese government's measure of occupation of Dokdo as an evidence

that it was not historically original Japanese territory. Professor Fukazu

also wrote an article concerning Dokdo. He seems to be trying to

maintain objective and academic position and his article does not seem

to be written under the object of proving and justifying Japanese

territorial sovereignty over Dokdo.

One Japanese scholar of international law who deserves special

reference is professor Serita. He, like Minagawa or Taijudo, tries hard to

demonstrate that Dokdo is a territory belonging to Japan. However, at

the same time, he proposes to recognize Korean sovereignty over Dokdo,

a bold assertion as he is a Japanese scholar. His suggestion of the

solution to the Dokdo problem is very definite and groundbreaking: on

the basis of the recognition of Korean sovereignty, designating the sea

belt around Dokdo as Natural Preservation Area and opening it for the

scientific research of the world. How much this suggestion comes to be

realistic and acceptable by Korea and Japan should be still observed.



81Special Edition POLICY REPORT

➋ Natural resources development and

environmental issues of the Arctic

Ki-Sun KimDirector,

Sanhaon Environment Institute

The Korean icebreaker Araon and Korea's polar region activities

Korea's first ever icebraker, the Araon accomplished its first

Antarctic exploration and safely returned. During this exploration, the

Araon executed a close examination on Cape Burks and Terra Nova Bay

which are the promising sites for the Antarctica station. The Korean

government set up a plan to build the second station in the Antarctica

until 2014. On the basis of the examination results of the Araon, Terra

Nova Bay was decided as the final site and an environmental impact

assessment will be submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative

Meeting (ATCM). After 20 years from the construction of the King

Sejong Station in King George Island of the Antarctic, the construction

of the second station is around the corner.

The Araon will leave for a voyage next July and it will carry out

polar researches in the Antarctic following the Arctic, which means

Korea is expanding it's marine scientific activity in the Polar regions.

Since 2002, Korea has been conducting ocean researches in the Dasan

Arctic Station in the Arctic's Spitsbergen Island and is now waiting for

an evaluation to join the Arctic States' High Ranked Government's

Forum, the Arctic Council as an observer. The neighboring countries are

all attempting for an active entry into the Arctic through the Arctic

Council, China joined in 2007, Japan applied to join as a observer in

2009. This shows that the Arctic Circle is a pressing matter of the

international society.

Natural resources development andenvironmental issues of the Arctic





POLICY REPORT82



Climate change in the Arctic region

Global warming caused by human extensive use of fossil fuel

subsequent to the industrial evolution is bringing about a serious climate

change. The place where climate change is most fast and is happening

in a large extent is the Polar Regions. Climate change caused melting

the enormous ice of the Polar Regions, threatening the environment and

ecosystem which are vulnerable to external changes, causing abnormal

change of weather and the rise of the sea level.

In particular, climate change is prominently appearing in the

Arctic region. Compared to other regions, in the Arctic, the rise of air

temperature is happening 2 times higher and the thickness of the Arctic

Ocean's ice is reducing by over 30% and its size is reducing by 4% every

10 years. In the report of World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in October 2008, it

estimates that all of the ice in the Arctic Ocean will melt and disappear

by year 2013. The environment and the ecosystem of the Arctic are

being suffered the most by this sort of climate change. The Arctic's

peculiar ecosystem was formed by adjusting to the harsh natural

environment and climate condition. It is very sensitive to climate change

and external changes thus; the ecosystem is in a critical crisis of

extermination due to the change of habitat and decrease of food. Arctic's

representative animal, the Polar bear's population is rapidly decreasing

<A polar bear is sitting on a melting ice of the Arctic>



83Special Edition

because of lack of food; this symbolically shows the crisis of Arctic

ecosystem. In north of the Pacific Ocean, Atlantic Ocean and in the

Arctic Ocean, the rise of sea level drove cod fishes, herring, etc. to them

thus, large sized fishing grounds are being formed. However, ocean

ecosystem's devastation due to excessive fishing using the trolling boats

is one of the suffering that the Arctic ecosystem is faced with.

Development of natural resources - sovereignty and marine jurisdiction

The present condition of the snow and ice disappearing due to

climate change in the Arctic paradoxically provides a turning point

which accelerates the development of the mineral resources that are

buried under there. The Arctic is well known as a rich repository of

natural resources such as oil, natural gas, gas hydrate, gold, silver,

diamond, iron, manganese nodules, etc. The U.S. Geological Survey

(USGS) evaluates that oil of about 90 billion barrel and natural gas of

1670 trillion feet3, natural gas liquid (NGL) of 44 billion barrel, etc. are

buried in the arctic. They reach the world's undiscovered oil of 13%, gas

of 30% and NGL of 20%, of which 84% are distributed in the coastal

regions with less than 500m depth, especially the natural resources are

mostly distributed in Russia. 1)

The estimated amount of arctic oil is not as huge to change the

whole world's oil provision pattern. Also, considerable concern over the

Arctic Ocean's environmental issues is followed by the development of

mineral resources. However, the international society who is in the crisis

of energy resources exhaustion is showing a huge interest in the

development of Arctic's mineral resources, thus, the Arctic States are

starting disputes on sovereignty and marine jurisdiction to secure more

resources. Canada and Denmark are both arguing sovereignty over the

Ellesmere Island and Hans Island which are between the northern

Greenlands. Russia and Norway over the Barents Sea, U.S. and Canada

over the Beaufort Sea areas are engaged in conflicts to expand their





POLICY REPORT84



marine jurisdiction. Especially, in the Lomonosov oceanic ridge that

goes through the seabed of the geographical North Pole, it is estimated

that there are 10 billion tons of natural gas, oil, silver, copper, diamond,

etc. buried under there. Thus Russia, Canada and Denmark, these three

countries are fiercely competing to occupy the jurisdiction over

geographical North Pole.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS) regulates that the coasta l states could expand their

continental shelf for over 200 nautical miles. 70% of Arctic Ocean's total

area is occupied by the continental shelf, and is formed of a long

coastline of continent 45,389km. Therefore it allows the Arctic Circle

countries an advantageous condition. According to the guide “Maritime

jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region" published by Durham

University's IBRU (International Boundaries Research Unit) in 2008, if all

of the Arctic State set up their continental shelf limit to 200 natural

miles, most of the Arctic Ocean will belong to these countries' marine

jurisdiction and in some cases, certain country's jurisdiction will reach

the geographical North Pole and its circumference. This sort of Arctic

State' division of the Arctic Ocean has a critical viewpoint, in terms of

“Territorialization of the Ocean" by the coastal states. But, there is a

dilemma in the respect that it is a legitimate marine jurisdiction exertion

based on the current international law.

Among the Arctic Ocean countries, Russia in 2001, Norway in

2006, Denmark in 2009, each country submitted a document about

setting up continental shelf limit to the United Nation Commission for

Limits for the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS). Russia's document about the

Lomonosov oceanic ridge was returned due to lack of scientific proof,

and 5 years later since then, in August 2007, Russian midget submarines

MIR No. 1 and No. 2 fixed Russia's national flag made of titanium at

4,261m deep in the water under the geographical North Pole. This case

caused military tension in the North Pole region against the neighboring



85Special Edition

countries expanding their scientific exploration activities around the

Arctic Ocean and strengthening their military activities. Russia made its

position that it will not extend the Sovereignty or the marine jurisdiction

disputes and peacefully resolve this matter through UNCLCS and

bilateral negotiations. But the international society is still watching this

region's military conflicts and military expansion with anxious eyes.

Opening of the Arctic route

Another change due to the Arctic climate change is the opening

of the Arctic Route. In the meantime, the Arctic Route was hard to sail

along because of the thick ice, but the decrease and retreat of the ice

helped facilitate opening of the rout. The voyage distance of North-West

route passing over Canada's archipelagos sea area and the North-East

route passing over Siberia's coast was reduced by 40% than the original

route, and if a direct route is opened that passes the geographical North

Pole, then this distance will be shortened by far more. In July 2009,

German freight vessel the Beluga Fraternity and the Beluga Foresight

which shipped cargo from Ulsan harbor in Korea succeeded in the

voyage to Rotterdam of Netherlands via the North-East route. This was

the first ever voyage that has been used the North-East route, Russian ice

boat escorted them but there was no ice thus, the voyage could not be

accomplished without the ice boat's help and it shortened 10 days more

than the original route which took 24 days.

The problem was the disputes based on international law related

to the ships' right-of-way for the Arctic route. Canada is limiting foreign

ships' voyage, for the reason that Canada's archipelagos sea area which

the North-West route passes through is historical internal water where

the Inuit tribe's livelihood was attained thousands of years ago. Canada

regards that their voyage can be limited according to the Canadian Law

since the foreign ships do not have the right of navigation based on

international law for the internal water. As another base to limiting the



87Special Edition

obtain authorization from the Canadian government when passing

through this sea zone. However, in 2005 when the U.S. nuclear-powered

submarine Charlotte sailed along Canada's Arctic sea zone without prior

notification and made it public in 2007, it brought a big stir in the both

countries' relationship.

Yet, there are not that many ships sailing in the North-West and

North-East route. In case of the North-West route, there are 20 to 30

sailings per year and fewer sailings are made in the North-East route.

Thus it is hard to acknowledge the straits located in these routes as

international straits. But, the Arctic ice is melting in quick speed; it

seems that sailings of the ships will rapidly increase accordingly. When

the internationalism of these routes are secured with the frequent usage

of the ships, one can see that their status as international straits will be

acknowledged and that the transit right-of-way will be guaranteed.

Marine pollution of the Arctic

Following the resources development of the Arctic and the

possibility of using of the Arctic routes, the problems that was being

brought up are the pollution of the marine environment and occurrence

of environmental disasters. In areas such as Canada, North Alaska,

Barents Sea, Kara Sea, Siberia region of Russia, etc., developments of

crude oil and natural gas were successful, thus, mining operations are

already being processed. The Arctic State did not stop here but it has a

wide plan to develop further mineral resources. At this time, what

naturally follows this is the environmental pollution, especially the

pollution of marine environment. This is because most of the oil and

natural resources are buried under the coastal regions.

The development of the oil resources by digging the Arctic

Ocean's ice carries a big danger. Because not only there are difficulties

with the drilling and mining, but when there is a spillage of crude oil due

to spurting of oil wells, leakage of pipelines, etc. their removal operations





POLICY REPORT88



are also difficult. The marine pollution problem has been continuously

pointed out to the mining operations that are currently in progress.

However, considering that Arctic Ocean's oil resources are mostly buried

under the continental shelf, if the development is expanded, it can be

expected that a serious marine pollution will be accompanied. The crude

oil that is spilled onto the ice sea does not biologically decompose,

evaporate, dissolve nor precipitate; it will affect constantly effect to the

fragile Arctic environment and its ecosystem. In addition, the large sized

substructure that is needed for the development of oil and gas and

transportation of ports, roads, drainage works, etc. will indirectly give

damage to the ecosystem such as destruction of ecosystem's habitat and

the traveling routes and erosion of the sea beds, etc.

Transporting the oil resources using the Arctic routes has a

possibility to create even bigger environmental problem. As one can

see from the Exxon Valdez's accident that occurred in the Alaska coast

in 1989, in the Arctic Ocean, accidents of supertankers lead to a grand-

scale of environmental disaster. This accident resulted in 258,000 barrel

of crude oil spllage that covered 3,400km of the waters of Alaska,

250,000 sea birds, 300 sea otters, 250 bald eagles, 22 whales, and large

number of herring and salmon suffered deaths en masse. The ecosystem

around that sea water is still constantly being affected by the marine

pollution, and it is estimated that it will take over 30 years for it to

recover. Many Alaskan people lost their livelihood not only due to the

sea but due to the oil polluted land surrounding the sea water.

The situation is more serious when the marine pollution

accidents occur in the routes of North-West and North-East. There are

large numbers of islands scattered in the Archipelago water areas of

Canada, and because some routes pass near to the land, if a supertanker

is shipwrecked in that area, it seems that an unrecoverable damage will

occur. The North-West route is less severe than the North-East route but

in a respect that it passes around the islands of the Siberia coast, marine



89Special Edition

pollution is still a problem.

On this account, many environmental organizations oppose the

resources development of the Arctic. Environmental organizations such

as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the International Union for

Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are worried about the effect that the

development of resources has made on the environment of the Arctic

and its ecosystem. The WWF is urging each government and oil

companies to reconsider the grand-scale development of oil and gas and

the IUCN chose Arctic fox, dolphins, ringed seal, etc. as the ten living

things that are faced with extermination crisis and points out that

climate change, commercial use of ships, oil and gas developments, etc.

are damaging their habitat.

The Arctic Council and regulations on marine pollution

The Arctic Council is a forum of high-ranking governments

established in 1996 for the environmental protection of the Arctic Circle

and its sustainable development. Even though the Arctic is a wild region

far from the industrial region, since 1980s environmental damages

started to appear, which were caused by decreasing ozone layers,

radioactive materials, Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), heavy metal

and oil, etc. Compared to residents of other regions, it is known that

10-20 times more POPs such as the polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) and

dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), etc. are accumulated in the

internal bodies of the Canada's Inuit tribe that lived in the Arctic region

for thousands of years. This is because the marine mammals which the

Inuit tribe regarded as their traditional food were polluted with POPs,

which entered their internal bodies through the food chain. The Arctic

State, who realized the necessity to tackle the environmental problems,

adopted the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991

and 5 years later, an Arctic Council was established for accomplishing

this job.





POLICY REPORT90



The Arctic Council has 6 working groups. Among them, a group

that is directly related to environmental pollution of the marine are the

Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group (PAME)

and the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Working

Group (EPPR). PAME totally handles the problem, which the Arctic

coasts and the marine environment are faced with. EPPR handles

environmental emergency preventions and response issues of spillage

and transportation of oil and gas, radioactivity damage, natural

disasters, etc. With their constant efforts, Arctic Environmental Impact

Assessment (EIA) Guideline, Arctic Guide for Emergency Prevention,

Preparedness and Response, and Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines,

etc. were adopted and many reports were published such as the Arctic

Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) of 2004 that scientifically evaluated

and consolidated the impact of Arctic climate change.

In April 2004, PAME published a recent Arctic Coast Oil and Gas

Guideline. This guideline presents a series of recommended practices and

strategic measures that are to be considered when Arctic States are in the

process of developing oil and gas along the coast. This guideline

supports the basic rule of the precautionary principle, polluter pays

principle and sustainable developments, etc. It also presents detailed

standards from the Environmental Impact Assessment process and

environmental monitoring standard up to the preparation and

countermeasures, dismantlement of development tools and purification

of development areas regarding the safety of development activities,

environmental management, waste management, human health and

safety, transportation, state of emergency. This guideline was adopted to

protect the Arctic environment from the Arctic Coast's indiscreet oil

development activities and related potential impact. Thus, it reflects

environmental damages caused by Arcti c States' oil and gas

development activities. However, this sort of guideline does not force the

Arctic States but it is merely a guideline and that is used for joint policy



91Special Edition

development considering the Arctic States' legal, political, economic

conditions. Thus, difficulty in forming a regulation with a binding force

is the weak point it has.

Possibility of Arctic Treaty

The Arctic Council has successfully led an international

cooperati on for environmental protection and sustainable

development between the countries and the respect that it has obtained

good resul ts in the field of environmental pollut ion are being

acknowledged. But, the Arctic Council is an organization with a legal

aspect and a decision-making power, thus it is based on the approach

method of soft-law. Accordingly, the Arctic Council's system depends

on guidelines than forceful law regulations. Therefore it cannot impose

obligations with binding powers to the relevant countries. Also, it does

not inclusively handle problems that the Arctic Circle is faced with

such as climate change, Sovere ignty, resource competiti on,

environmental management, aborigine's pro tection of rights,

ecosystem protections, etc.

Because of this, the insiders of the Arctic Circle and the

international society have been requesting to make a legal system with

binding powers, modeling the Antarctic Treaty System. Especially the

European Union has suggested starting negotiation to enter into a new

treaty for the Arctic through the report of European Union's council

members of March 2008. In the resolution about Arctic management

adopted in October 2008 and in the resolution draft of March 2009. The

European Union urged to freeze the Arctic's resources development for

50 years and set up a new treaty. Thereupon, five Arctic States; U.S.,

Canada, Russia, Denmark, and Norway refused the suggestion through

the Illulissat declaration adopted in the Arctic Ocean conference in May

2008 as well as Tromsø declaration adopted in the 6th Cabinet Meeting

of the Arctic Council in 2009. In line with states' positions, they claim





POLICY REPORT92



that in the Arctic Circle, a rock-ribbon legal legislation including the

UNCLOS and IMO agreement are already constituted and that they will

solve the problems of the Arctic Circle through this.

With this, Arctic's issue related to a new treaty entered a state of

lull. In a situation where the powerful countries such as U.S., Russia and

Canada, etc. actively rejects to entering into a treaty, it seems to be hard

to raise further questions. In addition, in the position of the EU, rather

than stimulating the Arctic States, they may have judged that it would

be better to construct a favorable position in the resources development

of the Arctic Circle and use of Arctic routes through the international

cooperation which the Arctic States request for. Now, the international

society is watching the development of the state of things with a deep

interest.

Closing comments

Like the Antarctic, the Arctic maintains cold and harsh climates

and fragile natural environment and ecosystem, but for the past

thousands of years, aborigine who preserved the traditional history and

culture has lived, and it is a place where their own economic activities

have been operated. For a long time, the Arctic was their livelihood

passed through East and West camps' Cold War Structure, and now, a

new Cold War time is being announced by conflicts among the countries

regarding Sovereignty, marine jurisdiction, resources developments and

environmental problems. The Arctic Ocean is facing a division caused by

the Arctic States and it is placed in an unknown situation where the

geographical North Pole may become appertained under these countries'

jurisdiction. The more serious thing is the environmental problem which

the resources development of the Arctic Circle will bring.

The Arctic States say that it is no wonder that they have the

rights for resource development because the territory and Ocean of the

Arctic Circle are within their sovereignty and jurisdiction. It is true.



93Special Edition

However, the Arctic States also have the responsibility to prevent the

environmental pollution resulted from resource development and the

damages it causes against other countries and other regions.

Furthermore, the Arctic is a region which it has a direct impact on the

whole earth's weather and climate and its environmental pollution also

has an impact on the whole earth. In this respect, the Arctic States'

development activity not only reaches their own regions but it is directly

related to the gain and loss of the international society on the whole.

Consequently, one thinks that a new treaty system is necessary instead

of the original legal system centered on the Arctic Council, so that

imprudent development activities of the Arctic must be actively

regulated. In order to minimize the environmental damages due to

reckless development activities and to make sustainable development

possible, a legal system with a compelling and binding power is a

necessity.

Korea begins ahead a full-scale of entry into the Arctic region

along the Arctic routes that are starting to open due to climate change.

Korea as one of the world's six maritime powers relies on sea

transportation for most of its exports and imports. If the Arctic routes

are used instead of the original route of passing through the Suez Canal,

the distribution costs will be largely cut down. Making inroads into the

shipbuilding industry of building ice boats, etc. will be possible, and it is

not long before, we have the opportunity to participate in the resource

development. However, before the entry into the Arctic, we need to have

understanding and interest towards the new opportunity that climate

change in the Arctic is giving us. Most of all, we must have a deep

understanding and interest towards the darker side in which the Arctic is

encountering various issue, such as the environmental impact, military

tension, aborigine's protection of rights, etc.



DOKDO GALLERY 2

English name : Black wood pigeon

Scientific name : Columba janthina

Size : 40cm

A specimen of a female black wood pigeon caught by a Japanese on Ulleungdo on August 26, 1936 was

introduced to the Korean academia for the first time in 1938.

Black wood pigeons are mainly distributed in islands. They live in dark woods. Their primary habitats inKorea are silver magnolia forests. On Ulleungdo, the colony of silver magnolia near Sadong Port remains

designated as a protection area for these birds. At present, black wood pigeons tend to spread in many

areas around the island. On Dokdo, a small number of the birds are observed in some areas on its West

Island that features a gentle gradient as well as on its peak.

On Ulleungdo, black wood pigeons have been under protection since their designation as Natural

Monument No. 215 on November 20, 1968. Their habitat in Sadong is being protected as a Natural

Monument. They breed from February to October each year.

(Photos provided by Hee-Cheon Park, Kyungbuk National University)

Flock of black wood pigeon

© Hee-Cheon Park



Global Ocean

Focus

Bangladesh Brings sea Boundary dispute to itlos

Climate Change: new Challenge to the law of

the sea regime

marine Biodiversity: trend and Challenges of the

international Community

China's law on island proteCtion to strengthen

maritime jurisdiCtion



97Special Edition

Marine resources development is at the heart of the sea boundary

dispute

The sea boundary dispute involving Bangladesh flared into a full-

scale row in 2008. It originated from development of oil resources across the

wide continental shelf in the Bay of Bengal. Sediment deposition by the

Ganges-Brahmaputra River out of Bangladesh has created the world's

largest delta in the Bay of Bengal. The fan of the delta ranges over 350

nautical miles from Bangladesh towards the Indian Ocean. Since declarationof the EEZ by Bangladesh in 1974 , the country's frictions with neighboring

nations over oil resources exploration have persisted, though full-scale

frictions were not touched off until 2008, when Bangladesh granted oil

exploration licenses in Block AD-7 claimed by Myanmar. Myanmar

concluded an agreement with Daewoo International, a Korean company, to

explore this block. Myanmar raised a strong objection, which consequently

brought the entire development programs undertaken by the two nations to

a halt.

‘Depth criteria’ in Delta area was not accepted

The coastline of the delta formed by Bangladesh ’s Ganges-

Brahmaputra River varies enormously due to heavy annual precipitation of

1,500mm to 2,500mm. This prompted Bangladesh to adopt a unique method

of determination of the straight baseline called ‘depth criteria,' rather than

to use a low-water line. A layer of sediment under the estuary barragechanges markedly each year owing to frequent flooding. For this reason,

Bangladesh employs the depth criteria approach, in which a certain depth of

water with minimal coastline changes serves as a baseline standard.

However, Article 7(2) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

concerning determination of the straight baseline of a delta designates the

‘furthest seaward extent of the low-water line' as the baseline. This provision





GLOBAL OCEAN FOCUS98

➊ Bangladesh Brings Sea Boundary

Dispute to ITLOS

was newly adopted in drafting the third UN Convention on the Law of the

Sea. Artic le 7(2) can be understood as response of the demand by

Bangladesh, which participated in the drafting process beginning with the

second Convention in 1974, to reflect its method to determine the delta

straight baseline. Nevertheless, the ‘depth criteria and bathymetric factors'

argued by Bangladesh regarding 'unstable characteristics of its coast' were

never accepted. In its final letter for the negotiation, Bangladesh expressed

its position that Article 7 of the draft Convention does not deny a baselinesystem based on the depth criteria and bathymetric factors.

Myanmar requests application of an equidistance line

When Bangladesh set the straight baseline at 10 fathoms of waterdepth according to the depth criteria, there was a strong backlash from India

and Myanmar, its neighbors. In sum, they did not acknowledge the method

as to determining the straight baseline. India asserts that about 21 nautical

miles of its territorial waters have been violated as a result of Bangladesh's

application of the depth criteria. India and Myanmar have suggested that the

low-water line should be strictly used as a point to determine the straight

baseline. They also have contended that Bangladesh should apply the

equidistance line in the waters of the Bay of Bengal where a sufficient EEZ

<Bangladesh's straight baseline>Source: Muhmmad Nazmul Hoque,“The legal and scientific assessment of

Bangladesh's baseline in the context of Article 76 of the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea", 2006, UN, p.59



101GLOBAL OCEAN FOCUSSpecial Edition

➋ Climate change: new challenge to

the law of the sea regime

Ja-Young KimInternational Marine Affairs &

Territory Research Department,

KMI

In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),established by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), issued its

fourth Assessment Report of more than 3,000 pages. The most important

conclusion in this report is that global warming is evident and that its highly

probable cause is a greenhouse effect triggered by increasing concentration

levels of greenhouse gases.

Fueling political and economic frictions

The threat of climate change has emerged as an inter-governmental

political issue, going beyond environmental concerns. The potential effects

of climate change include changes in traditional shipping lanes, access to

resources that were previously deemed technically inaccessible, and changes

in availability of water resources and energy utilization. Because of these

potential effects, countries put climate change on the agenda related to

international security to the UN Security Council in April 2007.

Climate change: new challengeto the law of the sea regime

Source: Telegraph.co.uk






The impact of climate change is still uncertain, but changes in two

respects are well known: continental glaciers continue to melt, and sea level

will rise 0.5 to 1 meter by the end of 21st century. The Hadley Center for

Climate Prediction and Research predicts that the Arctic may melt entirely

within the 21st century. Countries including Russia, Canada, the US, Norway,

and Denmark are now competing for undersea resources in the Arctic Ocean,

triggering excessive political tensions among those countries. The

continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean is believed to hold over 25% of allundiscovered oil and gas reserves around the world, giving rise to heated

competition to secure it.

Rising sea level threatens coastal states

The issues related to thawing of the Arctic ice in which many

countries have a stake have attracted great concern in general. Nonetheless,

resolution of issues concerning the Law of the Sea that arise to coastal states

and low-lying countries has not been adequately discussed.

Sea level is now rising at a rate of about 2mm a year around the

globe and is accelerating. A one-meter rise in sea level would submerge 75%

➋ Climate change: new challenge to

the law of the sea regime

<Reduction in Arctic ice because of global warming>

Source: NASA (http://www.nasa.gov)



103Special Edition

of the low-lying islands in Vanuatu and 80% of the Majuro Atoll of the

Marshall Islands, and inundate residential areas for half of the public. In

addition to this serious threat of flooding, many coastal states may witness a

change in existing coastlines or may be submerged due to the rising sea level.

Such change in coastlines may also lead to emerging issues regarding

coastal states' rights to the maritime zones including their territorial waters

and Exclusive Economic Zones (hereinafter 'EEZ').

Among the potential problems that may be sparked by the receding

or advancing coastlines and complete disappearance of low-lying islands, an

important issue pertaining to the Law of the Sea is whether maritime

boundaries may be subject to continual modification depending on coastline

changes.

Possibility of maritime boundary changes

As defined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter

‘the Convention'), all maritime zones including territorial water, continental

shelf, and EEZ are measured from a baseline. Accordingly, any movement of

such baseline will lead to a change in maritime boundaries. If a base point

such as an exposed rock disappears, it may be claimed that the boundary

based on such point has moved or disappeared.

There are basically four types of baselines regarding which an issuemay be raised owing to the rising sea level: low-tide elevations, fringing

reefs, river banks, and islands. First, under Article 13 of the Convention, if a

low-tide elevation is situated in the territorial sea, the low-water line on that

low-tide elevation may be used as the baseline. If such low-tide elevation is

submerged permanently because of rising sea level, the country concerned

may lose the territorial waters accorded by such base point. Second, in the

case of islands surrounded by reefs, the baseline for measuring the breadth

of the territorial waters is the seaward low-water line of the fringing reefs.



105Special Edition

boundaries are determined. In order to prevent such dispute, it is necessary

to guarantee firm expectations to all countries that have divergent interests

concerning a maritime boundary. The easiest way to resolve potential

disputes arising from rising sea level -- a change of great magnitude -- may

be reducing the possibility of a change in maritime boundary in such ways as

formulation of strict procedures to officially modify a maritime boundary.

The issue of fixing maritime boundaries concerning a delta is hardly new: it

was raised during the drafting of the Convention. However, most agreementson maritime boundaries are bilateral, and the countries concerned take

different stances. Under the situation, establishment of universal rules by

means of a multilateral agreement or an international organization is

deemed to be very difficult.






The Year 2010, international year of biodiversity

The United Nations designated 2010 as the International Year of

Biodiversity to raise the international community's awareness of the need for

biodiversity protection and sustainable development and to map out concrete

action plans within this year.

In connection with this, marine organisms have garnered significant

interest. Marine organisms account for 50% to 90% of all species around the

world. Accordingly, marine organisms constitute the starting point for

biodiversity protection and utilization. Recently climate change, ocean

acidification, and marine pollution have accelerated the destruction of marine

ecosystems. A series of reports indicate that the rate of biodiversity reduction is

up to 1,000 times the natural decline rate. A reduction in marine species

resulting from destruction of marine ecosystems disrupts the balance of the

global ecosystem. It also eliminates opportunities for development of

bioengineering through use of marine genetic resources. Bioengineeringtechnology, in combination with other state-of-the-art technologies including

IT and NT, has developed at an unprecedented speed. The bio-engineering

market has been growing at an average annual rate of over 11%, and the value

of marine organisms for development of new material, new materials is

estimated at approximately US$26 trillion according to investigation findings.

Therefore, a reduction in marine species may lead to enormous economic

losses. A 2009 EU report forecasts that losses caused by destruction of the

ecosystem will amount to as much as 50 billion euros each year.

Min-Su KimGlobal & Future Research

Division, KMI

Marine biodiversity: trend andchallenges of the internationalcommunity

➌ Marine biodiversity: trend and

challenges of the international

community



107Special Edition

In 2010, efforts to specify a blueprint laid down by the UN have been

gaining momentum. The UNESCO held a meeting of high-ranking officials in

Paris on January 21 - 22, which produced this year's blueprint for biodiversity

protection. The third meeting of the Informal Working Group on the

conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of

national jurisdictionwas held at the UN headquarters on February 1 - 5.

Beginning with its recommendation on implementing IntegratedCoastal Zone Management (ICZM) in Europe in 2002, the EU has emphasized

protection and sustainable use of marine organisms through the 2006 EU

Green Paper on Maritime Policy and the 2007 EU Integrated Maritime Policy

dubbed the 'Blue Book.' On January 19, 2010, it submitted a report titled

‘Options for an EU vision and target for biodiversity beyond 2010.' This report is

designed to reinforce the 'Marine Strategy Framework Directive' issued in June

2008 and finalize a 2020 action plan by positive use of the existing European

Marine Observation and Data Network (EMODNET) and Maritime Spatial

Planning (MSP).

For China, Minister of Environmental Protection Zhou Shengxian said

in the ‘Action in China for 2010 International Year of Biodiversity' held in

Beijing on January 26, 2010 that establishment of a legal mechanism for

biodiversity protection was urgently needed and that the Chinese government

would make every possible effort towards that end.

Popular Name Title Date of Enactment

[Table 1] EU's legal systems related to protection of marine biodiversity

2002

Recommendation on

implementing

Integrated Coastal

Zone Management

(ICZM) in Europe

Proposal for Marine

Strategy Directive

Green Paper

• European Parliament and Council Recommendation concerning

the implementation of Integrated Coastal Zone Management in

Europe

• Communication from the Commission to the Council and the

European Parliament of 24 October 2005, "Thematic Strategy on

the Protection and Conservation of the Marine Environment"

• Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council

establishing a Framework for community Action in the field of

Marine Environment Policy (Marine Strategy Directive)

• Green Paper - Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the Union :A European vision for the oceans and seas

May 30, 2002

Oct. 24, 2005

Oct. 24, 2005

Jun. 7, 2006






Marine biodiversity protection in areas beyond the limits of national

jurisdiction is the central issue

Marine biodiversity is being protected with a certain degree of

efficiency in marine areas within the limits of national jurisdiction under

national legal systems. Under these circumstances, the focus of marine

biodiversity protection is shifting to areas beyond the limits of national

jurisdiction including high seas and deep seabeds. As land without an owner is

inclined to become desolate, marine species outside the national jurisdiction of

a country are at greater risk. In this context, countries around the world are

stepping up cooperation to establish a legal mechanism for biodiversity

protection and use in areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

Such efforts date back to the UN General Assembly's resolution in 1970

(A.RES/25/2749). This resolution further specified the concept of common

heritage of mankind suggested by Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta in the22nd UN General Assembly in 1967, and internationally confirmed a need for

an international legal system regulating marine biodiversity conservation and

use in areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

This effort became more tangible in the UN Convention on the Law of

the Sea and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (deep seabed). Following

entry into force of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1994, full-scale



community

Source: Betty Queffelec and two others, ‘Integrated management of marine diversity in Europe: perspective from

ICZM and the evolving EU maritime policy framework'

Blue Book

• Communication from the Commissi on to the European

Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social

Committee and the Committee of the Regions: An Integrated

Maritime Policy for the European Union

• Conclusion from the Consultation on a European Maritime Policy

Oct. 10, 2007

Marine Framework

Directive

• Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the

Council establishing a framework for Community Action in the field

of Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Framework Directive)

Jun. 17, 2008



109Special Edition

discussions on marine biodiversity conservation and use in areas beyond the

limits of national jurisdiction were launched, beginning with the 5th meeting

of the UN Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law

of the Sea in June 2004. The meeting provided a venue where the Informal

Working Group dealing with marine biological diversity beyond areas of

national jurisdiction was created. The Working Group has been convened every

two years since 2006. Its third meeting was held in February 2010. The Working

Group discusses issues that must be resolved from a scientific, technological,economic, legal, environmental, and socioeconomic viewpoint for the purpose

of conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond the

limits of national jurisdiction. High on its agenda are ways to promote

international cooperation.

Human activities in areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction may

be divided into bioprospecting, which represents exploration and research

activities for commercial use of biological resources (medicine, etc.), fisheries,

cable and pipe laying, and development of marine resources including oil and

natural gas. The existing legal systems focus on protecting marine biodiversity

Source: Korea Maritime Institute

Session Period Agenda

[Table 2] Agenda of the UN Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea

-

1st

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

6th

7th

8th

9th

10th

Nov. 24, 1999

May 30 -

Jun. 2,2000

May 7 - 11, 2001

Apr. 8 - 15, 2002

Jun. 2 - 6, 2003

Jun. 7 - 11, 2004

Jun. 6 - 10, 2005

Jun. 12 - 16, 2006

Jun. 25 - 29, 2007

Jun. 23 - 27, 2008

Jun. 17 - 19, 2009

Establishment of the Informal Consultative Process with adoption of the UN

General Assembly Resolution 54/33

Fisheries and marine pollution

International cooperation for marine scie nce and technology and for

combating piracy and armed robbery against ships

Marine environment protection

Navigation safety and marine ecosystem protection

Conservation and management of the biological diversity of the seabed in

areas beyond national jurisdiction

Fisheries and marine wastes in terms of sustainable development

Marine ecosystem management

Marine genetic resources

Maritime security and safetyAssessment of activities for 10 years, centering on the Informal Consultative

Process






based on regulation of such human activities. With the UN Convention on the

Law of the Sea at the center, the International Maritime Organization (IMO),

UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNESCO, etc. enact and

implement related international conventions. The legal systems concerned are

summarized as follows:



community

Source: UN, ‘The International Legal Regime of the High Seas and the Seabed beyond the Limits of NationalJurisdiction and Options for Cooperation for the Establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAS) in Marine Areas

beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction' (November 2005)

Navigation

(including pollution, inflow

of foreign species, noise,and marine wastes)

Bioprospecting

Marine scientific research

Laying of submarine cables

Marine wastes dumping

Renewable energy

(Including tidal and wind

power generation as well as

ocean thermal energy

conversion)

Open Ocean Aquaculture

Ocean acidification and

maritime treatment of

carbon dioxide

Underwater Heritage

Marine Tourism

(including noise and

marine pollution)

Land-Based Activities

•UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

• IMO Conventions (International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from

Ships (MARPOL) 73/78, Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), International Convention for

the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments) IMO implementation measures: Navigation in Particularly Sensitive Sea

Areas(PSSAs) and compulsory pilotage


•UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Antartic Treaty



1972 Convention for Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and

Other Matter) and the 1996 Protocol

Other applicable regional agreements


• IMO Convention (MARPOL 73/78)


• IMO Convention (MARPOL 73/78)



•2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage


•UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, related local agreements/protocols

Human Activities Major Legal Systems

[Table 3] Human activities and legal systems related to areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction

Fishing

(including illegal/

unregulated/unreported

fishing and fishing tool

dumping)

Marine Mineral Resources

Development

(including physical

destruction, pollution and

noise)

• UN Convention on the Law of the Sea• International Whaling Convention

• UN Fish Stocks Agreement

• FAO Compliance Agreement

• Convention on Migratory Species

• Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

• Other regional fishing agreements

• UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1994 Agreement Relating to the

Implementation of the Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea



111Special Edition

Conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas

beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are being conducted in a three-

pronged manner: (i) assessment of the impact of human activities on the local

marine ecosystem environment; (ii) establishment of an area-based

management system by designating marine protected areas and building a

network of marine protected areas; and (iii) cooperation considering different

capabilities of countries and overhaul of related legal schemes. The key is how

to overcome differences between developing countries and industrializedcountries

Despite these efforts, the biggest hurdle, i.e. a failure to work out an

international agreement on conservation and use of deep seabed resources,

still exists because of divergent views of industrialized countries and

developing countries. Such confrontation is deepening in a situation where

industrialized countries intend to expand their control over the seas beyond

the limits of national jurisdiction including international waters and deep

seabeds on the strength of their advanced science and technology, and

developing countries wish to prevent the oceans from being subject to

exclusive jurisdiction of industrialized countries by invoking the concept of

common heritage of mankind and sustainable development.

From the perspective of Korea, confrontation between industrialized

countries and developing countries is not welcome. Their tug-of-war over useand conservation of deep seabed resources may impede Korea's plan to realize

two objectives, i.e. securing mineral resources and developing the marine bio-

industry, through deep seabed development. Therefore, Korea needs to

proactively participate in the international community's discussions to forge

an agreement, serving as a mediator reconciling the different opinions of the

two parties and endeavoring to reflect its position consistently.






➍ China's Law on Island Protection

to strengthen maritime jurisdiction

China has aggressively pushed recently for integrated island

development strategies in order to expand its maritime territory and bolsterits maritime jurisdiction. It established the ‘Department of Sea Area and Island

Management’ in the State Oceanic Administration in July 2008, investing the

agency with the additional funct ions of ecological protection and

management of uninhabited islands. In 2009, China enacted the Law on

Island Protection for extensive management of uninhabited islands. At

present, China has over 6,900 islands of 500㎡ or larger. There are 6,500

uninhabited islands, accounting for 92% of all islands.

Law on Island Protection enters into full effect

As part of China's adoption of a strategy to bolster its maritime

jurisdiction in earnest, the Law on Island Protection pursued since 2003 was

passed in the 12th session of the Standing Committee of the 11th National

People's Congress on December 26, 2009. It went into force on March 1, 2010.

Piao Wen-JinGlobal & Future Research

Division, KMI

China's Law on Island Protection tostrengthen maritime jurisdiction

Source: Data compiled from materials posted on the webpage of the National People's Congress of the People's

Republic of China

Time Details Remarks

[Table 1] Milestones in Legislation of the Law on Island Protection

Nov. 2003

Aug. 2006

Oct. 2008

Jun. 2009

Oct. 2009

Dec. 2009

Organization of a legislative team of the Environmental and Resources

Protection Committee of the 10th National People's Congress

Deliberation in the 21st session of the Environmental and Resources


Deliberation in the 5th session of the Environmental and Resources


1st deliberation in the 9th session of the Standing Committee of the

11th National People's Congress

2nd deliberation in the 11th session of the Standing Committee of the


3rd deliberation in the 12th session of the Standing Committee of the


Commencement

of drafting

Passage of a draft

Reflection of the State Council's opinions

Passage of

a modified draft

Reflection of opinions from

all walks of life

Reflection of opinions from

experts

Passage



113Special Edition

Comprised of 58 articles in 6 chapters in total, the bill attributes

ownership of uninhabited islands to the state, aims to protect island

ecosystems and prevent reckless development, and provides for stringent

management of special islands including islands on baseline points of

territorial waters.

Chapter Item Major Details

[Table 2] Major Details of the Law on Island Protection

1Generals

(Articles 1~7)

•P-Purport of legislation: protection of the ecosystems on islands and in

surrounding waters, rational development and use of natural resources on

islands, protection of the country's maritime rights, and promotion of

sustainable development in economic and social terms

•Principles of protection: principles of scientific plans and priority protection,

and reasonable development and sustainable use

•Ownership and management of uninhabited islands: Ownership attributed to

the state/ concentrated and coordinated management by the department in

charge of maritime affairs under the State Council

2

Island protection

plan

(Articles 8~15)

•Establishment of an island protection planning scheme encompassing a

national and marginal sea area island protection plan, national island

statistics survey system, island management information system, etc.

3Island protection

(Articles 16~35)

• Imposition of tight restrictions on establishment of buildings and facilities and

prohibition of stone/sand collection and logging under the primary purpose of

strengthening protection of the island ecosystem and preventing destruction

of the ecological environment

•A special fund raised for island protection to be used for island protection,

ecological restoration, and scientific research

•Specific measures concerning review and ratification relating to development

and use of uninhabited islands to be separately determined by the State

Council

•Special protection to be provided to islands for special purposes; scope of

protection for islands located on baseline points of territorial waters, inparticular, to be determined by a provincial-level government and reported to

the department in charge of maritime affairs under the State Council for

registration

4

Supervision and

inspection

(Articles 36~43)

•Mandatory supervision and inspection by the central and local marine

administrative agencies

5Legal liability

(Articles 44~55)•Penalties against violations of the Law

6Addenda

(Articles 56~58) •Definitions of the terms used in the Law and the date of its entry into force






➍ China's Law on Island Protection

to strengthen maritime jurisdiction

Primary purpose of the law is to secure marine resources and reinforce

maritime sovereignty

The grand cause of this bill is to prevent reckless development of

uninhabited islands and to preserve the ecological environment. Practically,

however, its primary objective is to secure resources on uninhabited islands

and in the surrounding Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) through integrated

management and to bolster maritime sovereignty. In other words, China

intends to step up management of uninhabited islands in a bid to gain astronger bargaining position in disputes with neighboring countries over

resources and maritime jurisdiction.

By bolstering management of islands for special purposes including

those located on the baseline points of territorial sea or needed for marine

scientific research, China is expected to manage, in a more stringent manner,

uninhabited islands necessary for determining its sea boundary. On the basis

of the bill, it is very likely that the country will select points in the northern

waters of the Yellow Sea and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea as

additional baseline points of its territorial sea.

Concerns about a possible maritime dispute with neighboring countries

China's enactment of the Law on Island Protection constitutes a part

of its recent efforts to increase its maritime jurisdiction. It is expected that the

country's frictions with neighboring nations over securing marine resourcesand determining a sea boundary will escalate further.

At present , China is in rows over sea boundaries with eight

neighboring countries: a territorial dispute over islands with five countries

including Vietnam in the South China Sea and over Diaoyutai or Senkaku

Islands with Japan in the East China Sea. Enactment of the Philippines

Baseline Act in March last year and extended continental shelf submission by

Vietnam and Malaysia in May last year regarding the South China Sea are



115Special Edition

indications that another territorial dispute is brewing. In the East China Sea,

Japan stationed a large patrol ship carrying a helicopter in waters near

Diaoyutai Islands in early February last year. In early July last year, Japan

pressed for deployment of its Ground Self-Defense Force troops on Yonaguni

Island, an inhabited island near Diaoyutai Islands, sparking a strong response

from China.

As a result of strengthened management of uninhabited islands,China is expected to beef up its patrol activities. There is a concern that such

situation might exacerbate its maritime frictions with neighboring countries.

Maritime boundary between South Korea and China

South Korea has to finalize its sea boundary with China. By the end of

the previous year, the two nations had held fifteen rounds of talks towards

that end. Bolstered management of uninhabited islands following entry into

force of the Law on Island Protection may support China's claims over

unreasonable baseline points of its territorial waters, firstly. According to the

Korea Hydrographic and Oceanographic Administration, if China's Macaiheng

Island, Waikejiao Island, Haijiao Reef, etc. are acknowledged as baseline

points of its territorial water, South Korea will sustain an estimated loss of

about 9,000㎢ in its waters. Secondly, selection of any additional baseline

points of terr itorial waters in the northern Yellow Sea may affect

determination of Sino-North Korean sea boundary.

In the wake of enactment of the Law on Island Protection, China is

expected to take a series of additional actions necessary for its enforcement.

In particular, the country is likely to formulate the island development,

protection, and management system; special island protection and

management system; and island development and protection plan.

<Disputes in the East and

South China Sea between

China and neighboring

countries>

Source: Korea Maritime Institute



117Special Edition

<Translation of Historical Materials>

1) Sejong sillok jiriji (Geographical Appendix to the Veritable Records of King Sejong) (1432,

1454) Vol. 153/ Gangwon-do/ Samcheok Dohobu (an administrative district)/ Uljin-hyeon

• Usan and Mureung

The two islands are at the heart of the sea due east of Uljin-hyeon.

[The two islands are close enough to observe each other on clear days. During the

Silla dynasty, they were called Usanguk, or a tribal nation of Usan. They are also

referred to as Ulleungdo. It's circumference is about 40 kilometers in all directions...]

2) Goryeosa jiriji (Geographical Appendix to the History of Goryeo) (1451) Vol. 58 Jiri 3/

Donggye/ Uljin-hyeon

• Ulleungdo

[It is located at the center of the sea due east of (Uljin-)hyeon. During the Silla

dynasty, it was called Usanguk, or a tribal nation of Usan. It is also known as

Mureung or Ureung. Its circumference is about 40 kilometers in all directions, and it

surrendered in the 12th year of King Jijeung's reign. ...... Some say that “Usan and

Mureung are originally two separate islands, but they are close enough to observe

each other on clear days.”]

3) Sinjeung Dongguk yeoji seungnam (Augmented Survey of the Geography of Korea) (1530) Vol.

45/ Gangwon-do/ Uljin-hyeon

• Usando · Ulleungdo

They are also called Mureung or Ureung. Both islands are situated at the center of the

sea due east of (Uljin-)hyeon. The three peaks (of Ulleungdo) are so high that they

may reach the sky. The south peak is slightly lower. It is possible to clearly observe

trees on the top of the peaks and sandy plains at the foot of the mountain on clear

days. When sailing downwind, one may reach Ulleungdo in two days. Some say that

Usan and Ulleung were one island originally, and Ulleungdo's circumference is

about 40 kilometers in all directions.

Mi-Rim Yoo International Marine Affairs& Territory Research Department, KMI



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