Article_foreign Policy India

8/8/2019 Article_foreign Policy India

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his ideas to master complex questions involving power, wealth and law that underlie bothstruggle and cooperation in world affairs."

It was Nehru who influenced Indian intellectuals more. For over 40 years he spoke andwrote ceaselessly on world affairs, in 17 of which he played an active part himself. It

would be worth the while of any scholar to study the Nehruvian image of the worl d andhis understanding of the conditions of foreign policy - first as the country's leading expertand next as the architect of its foreign policy.

Truth to tell, Nehru was not learned in the discipline of international relations or diplomacy. His was the world of an ardent nationalist who saw "these pacts and alliancesand treaties... made in a desperate attempt to steady a quarrelsome and collapsi ngworld". He hated sin.

Professionalism suffered under him. K.P.S. Menon, who served as Secretary in theMinistry of External Affairs (MEA) wrote in his autobiography Many Worlds (Oxford;

page 271) in sheer bliss: "A Foreign Office is essentially a custodian of precedent s. Wehad no precedents to fall back upon, because India had no foreign policy of her own untilshe became independent. We did not even have a section for historical research until Icreated one... Our policy therefore necessarily rested on the intuit ion of one man , whowas Foreign Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Fortunately his intuition was based onknowledge ...." (emphasis added, throughout).

How could the civilian head of a Foreign Office offer frank advice to the political headwhen he himself regards the organisation as no more than a research bureau? Nehruhimself had scant use for expertise in a field he regarded exclusively his own.

After interviewing former members of the Indian Foreign Service, Waner F. Ilchman of the University of California, Berkeley, noted a "tendency for men in the field to writewhat the Prime Minister wished to hear" ( Journal of Commonwealth Political Stu dies ,

November 1966, Leicester University Press).

It would be a mistake to ignore the pre-Nehru legacy which was ably recorded by Dr. N.V. Rajkumar, Foreign Secretary, Indian National Congress, in a compilation prefaced by his essay ( The Background of India's Foreign Policy , All India Congress Co mmittee, New Delhi, 1952). The Congress adopted resolutions on foreign affairs no sooner than itwas born. It was opposed to increased expenditure for "military activity going on beyondthe natural lines of the defence of the country , in pursuance of the Imperial Policy of

Great Britain in its relations with some of the Great Powers of Europe". It should be borne by the British, not Indian, Treasury (1892). In 1897, it denounced "the presentFrontier Policy of the Government of India" as being "a ggressive".

The expedition to Tibet in 1904 was criticised as it "threatens to involve India in foreignentanglements". Just as the Soviet Union published and denounced the secret treaties theTsar had concluded in 1921, the Congress declared " most treaties e ntered into with the


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Imperial Government by neighbouring States as mainly designed by the latter to perpetuate the exploitation of India by the Imperial Power."

At the time of Independence, the Expert Committee (No. IX) on Foreign Relations,comprising representatives of India and Pakistan, drew up (Annexure V) a list of 627

treaties and agreements to which India was then party. The Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904, and "the Indo-Tibetan Boundary Agreement of 1914" (defining the Mc-MahonLine) were among them. By an agreed order made under the Indian Independence Act,1947, (the Indian Independence (Inter-national Arrange-ments) Order, 1947),membership of internat ional organisations devolved solely on India but "rights andobligations under international agreements having an exclusive territorial obligationsapplicable to an area" devolved on the state to which the area came to belong ( Partition

Proceedings , Expert Committees Nos. III-IX, pages 202-294).

While Nehru, the Curzon-democratic, ardently owned up accords the British hadconcluded with Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and, of course, China, the intellectual baggage he

had collected before Independence suffered the impact of power and responsibility. It was battered, but not destroyed. From the late 1920s and increasingly in the next decade, Nehru emerged as the Congress' main expert on foreign affairs, challenged only bySubhas Chandra Bose. Indian studies were few and limited. Even in 1944 Dr. Lanka Sundaram's India in World Politics covered no more than the British Commonwealth, theLeague of Nations, the International Labour Organisation, foreign trade, Indians overseasand Indian representation at the peace conference to come.

Britain's appeasement of Nazi Germany justifiably invited Indian censures. But there waslittle understanding of the forces at play. In a brilliant article in The Times Of India(February 28, 1982) Nirad C. Choudhuri analysed at length "the ignora nce of

international politics among the new rulers of India". He added: "The most unexpectedaspect of the ignorance was its extent in the two Cambridge men in the Indian nationalistmovement, Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose, who were always talking abo ut theinternational situation. They were also regarded by their political colleagues as expertauthorities on international politics. In spite of all that, not only their knowledge but alsotheir approaches were wholly unreal. Both of them saw it in the light of their personal

predilections, which were shaped by their temperaments and feelings. And their predominant feeling was hatred of British rule in India. In short, their ideas oninternational politics were only a projection of their nationalism, which prevented their seeing any international situation for what it was."

In the first major test which the Congress leaders faced, all of them failed, especiallyGandhi; so did Nehru, who knew better. Only three weeks before the outbreak of theSecond World War on September 1, 1939, the Congress Working Committee (CWC)adopte d a resolution opposing "all attempts to impose (sic.) a war on India", and askingthe Congress governments in the provinces "to assist in no way the war preparations butrather resign from office". The leaders simply did not expect Britain to keep it s word to

Poland and go to war with Hitler if he invaded that country. In 1942, very many expectedJapan to win. The Quit India resolution was not intended to be a call for revolt as it is


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made out to be. It was in truth a warning to the Viceroy to h eed - by inviting Gandhi totalks. He did not expect to be arrested (Maulana Abul Kalam Azad; India Wins Freedom(1988), page 88). Nehru's Prison Diary reflects his bitterness at the misjudgment to whichhe was privy, despite his reservations. His comments on Gandhi were severe to the pointof rejection.

Shortly after Independence, Girja Shankar Bajpai, the first Secretary in the MEA and byfar the finest Indian intellect on foreign policy, made a valiant effort, in an atmospheresuffused with "high morality" to educate the new elite about some enduring verities of theworld order in an essay entitled "India and the Balance of Power" ( The Indian Year Book of International Affairs , 1952; published by the Indian Study Group of InternationalAffairs, University of Madras; pages 1-87). He pointed out that "power exerted withoutregard to moral standards and moral ends is a crime against humanity. But to ignore factthat, over the greater part of the world, politics remains a quest after power, is to do

justice neither to the ideals nor to realities. " He pleaded that "armed power supported byadequate industrial power, constitutes the only safeguard against a threat to a country's

independence... The warning is necessary because, in certain circles, the opinion prevailsthat the present level of exp enditure on India's defence forces is excessive and this is aneven more dangerous assumption - that the only military threat to India comes from

Pakistan ."

Bajpai was not out to seek a confrontation with China. On the contrary, he stronglyadvised Nehru to take up the boundary issue with it in a straightforward manner andresolve it. Nehru preferred K.M. Panikkar's advice to declare India's position unilaterally. Having done that, he refused to negotiate when China raised the issue in January1959. To Nehru, throughout, "our major possible enemy is Pakistan".

Nehru was alive to the need for armed strength and the principle of balance of power.Two decades before Independence, in a much neglected speech at the Kerala ProvincialConference on May 27, 1928, he asked: "But what external dangers will face us when theBritish leave India? We have an Indian army brave and efficient, well-tried in manycontinents. It is good enough to fight for the freedom of the Allies in the battlefields of Europe and it will be good enough to fight if necessary for the freedom of India. Whenfreedom comes, we shall develop our army and strengthen it and make it more efficientthan it is today. We have seen during the Great War how vast armies can grow up in timeof need. The strength of the country depends not only on the defenc e force but evenmore so on the international situation and the balance of power ."

He was certain, well before two blocs appeared on the scene in 1947, that " the other countries could not tolerate that the rich prize of India should fall again to another

power ." Ergo, India needed to be friends with all the major powers; after 1 947; that is,with both blocs. Hence, India's policy of non-alignment.

Whatever went wrong in the assessment of one who was aware of these truths? It issimply that he refused to learn and relied on outmoded concepts. He who had scoffed atthe Kellog-Briond global no-war pact of 1928 spoke of its elaboration in the five pri


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nciples of Panch Sheel in 1954 as if they were a panacea or substitute for a boundaryaccord with China. In the 1930s, Britain imposed alliance treaties on Egypt, Iraq andTransjordan before granting them independence. In the 1950s, Nehru could not bringhimself to accept that not all alliances diminished independence and a small ally retainedfreedom of choice if its vital interests were involved. Synghman Rhee defied the U.S.;

Denmark could refuse to allow American troops on its soil; and Pakistan cou ld defy theU.S. for a whole decade (1961-71) and develop closest ties with the U.S.' Asianadversary, China. Nehru's intolerance led to the neglect of South-East Asia.

He had absolutely no concept of local wars, obsessed as he was with a world war.Initially enamoured of an "Asian Personality", he lost all interest in the concept. Nor hadhe any concept of dealing with the smaller neighbours on a footing of equality. B ut byfar his greatest flaw was an intractable approach to conflict resolution. He counselledtalks . But he would not deign to negotiate . The quest for regional ascendancy wascoupled with the quest for great power status. Inconsistencies a bounded. It was badenough to opt for confrontation with China. Worse still, thereafter to neglect the U.S. It

was Sino-American understanding in mid-1962, blissfully overlooked by Nehru, whichenabled Mao Zedong to withdraw his troops from the Taiwan se ctor and send them toaction across the Himalayas in October 1962. In panic, Nehru sought aerial cover fromPresident John F. Kennedy.

Has the nation learnt the lesson from its past? One doubts that. For it continues to betreated to nostrums and dogmas in aid of the same aspirations of old, aspirations toabsolute security so eloquently expressed in the Draft Nuclear Security Doctrine.

What India really needs is an intellectual exercise of the kind Louis J. Halle attempted inhis work. He "felt the lack of an applicable body of theory and concluded that "no

practical and effective foreign policy can be developed merely by the ingeniousimprovisation of clever negotiators, brilliant tacticians, or master chess-players. Such aforeign policy has to be founded on a philosophy that represents a realistic understandingof history. An adequate philosophy is no less important to our statesma nship today thanit was to the statesmanship of our founding fathers. If we are to have an effective foreign

policy we need to base it on a conceptual scheme that reveals and explains the world interms that bear the test of practical application . " Such an exercise cannot begin unless itis realised that the familiar dogmas are of no relevance or worth.

#2775, 8 January 2009Should India Join NATO to Combat Terrorism? Sanjay Kumar Research Assistant, USI-CS3e-mail: [email protected]

Giving India's current diplomacy against Pakistan a new boost, Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh speaking at a conference of chief ministers in New Delhi on 6 January2008 commented, "Given the sophistication and military precision of Mumbai attacks,
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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some official agencies in Pakistan must have supported them." Earlier, in an interview published on 3 January, the famous Mumbai-born novelist of the Satanic Verses, SalmanRushdie termed 26/11 as an act of war by Pakistan.

Armed aggression, according to a UN definition, constitute among other things, sending

by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carryout acts of armed force against another State..(Definition of Aggression, adopted on14 December 1974 by the UN General Assembly). Going by this definition, Pakistan has

been carrying out continued acts of aggression against the Indian state for over twodecades now. The latest terrorist strike on Mumbai has been rightly adjudged an act of war with most security analysts including senior government functionaries agreeing thatan attack of this magnitude could not have taken place without the active connivance of state agencies.

While Prime Minister Manmohan Singh hinted at the involvement of 'elements withinPakistan' for Mumbai attack, he fell short of naming the government agencies which

could have abetted the crime at least in parts. The Mumbai terrorist attack clearly pointsto a nefarious LeT-ISI-Pakistan Army nexus. Speaking to a private TV channel on 5January, India's Foreign Secretary, Shri Shiv Shankar Menon, opined that it was hard to

believe that an attack of this magnitude could have taken place without any one in thePakistani government knowing it.

The 26/11 has often been compared to the infamous 9/11 terrorist attack on the US. Thiscomparison is however limited only to the extent of its magnitude and impact, notextending to the manner in which political leadership in both countries responded to therespective terrorist attacks. The US viewed 9/11 as an "armed attack' and invoked thecollective self-defence clause under Article 5 of the NATO charter where an armed attack on one or more of [its members] shall be considered an attack on all," and that themembers may exercise the right of self-defence which includes the use of armed force, torestore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. As a result of the sustainedUS-NATO combined military campaign against terrorists in Afghanistan, Pakistan andelsewhere, the US has not suffered any serious terrorist attack since 9/11.

By contrast, India's response to 26/11 so far has been a subdued one. Having initiallythundered that India retained all options against Pakistan including the military one, thegovernment of India finally recoiled to the oft-repeated diplomatic approach in dealingwith Pakistan. Diplomatic pressure wrought upon Pakistan so far by India in conjunctionwith the US and other countries has had little impact with the result that Islamabadcontinues to remain in a state of constant denial over its involvement in the Mumbaiterrorist strike.

Pakistan's continued refusal to act on the evidence provided by India implicating Pakistan based organizations responsible for Mumbai massacre, is edging India closer towardssome kind of punitive military strikes, at least as a token gesture, to appease publicsentiments ahead of general elections which are scheduled to be held by May this year.With diplomacy not yielding desired results, India will be forced soon to adopt tougher


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measures against Pakistan. Another terrorist strike of this magnitude and India goes towar with Pakistan.

While it is true that the government of India has taken some very effective long-termmeasures on the internal front to combat future terror, the fact however remains that no

amount of defence is plausible against suicide attacks. If India is really serious aboutstopping export-variant terrorism then it will have to combat terror at the place of itsorigin. India's diplomacy needs to be backed by meaningful use of force.

Failure to take unilateral military action against Pakistan stems partly from India'sinability to control surgical strikes spiraling into a full-blown war with Pakistan and

partly from the fact that India is not insulated by any collective security alliance like NATO. India's policy of non-alignment and its ideology does not permit joining anyalliance with a military bias. However, in the changed security scenario, India needs toseriously reexamine its policy of non-alignment, particularly at a time when the world isdominated by a single power.

There is a sizable number of opinion makers in India who suggest that India should join NATO to combat terrorism on a long-term basis. Joining NATO on full-term basis could become problematic for India as it would hurl the country headlong into the Global War on Terror, precipitating greater involvement of Indian troops in Afghanistan andelsewhere. However, there are common grounds for NATO-India convergence such ascontaining China and combating terrorism. Therefore, India needs to open a strategicdialogue with NATO and work towards areas of common security concern on a case-by-case basis.

Towards Regional Stability: Establish an Indo-Pak Nuclear Commission

D Suba ChandranDeputy Director, IPCSemail: [email protected]

Between India and Pakistan, there is little understanding of each others nuclear capabilities and doctrines. There is likely to be an increased international pressure on

both countries, as a part of the renewed efforts towards global nuclear disarmament. Bothregional instability and the likely international pressure calls for an intensive dialogueand innovative approaches.

At the regional level, Pakistan does not consider Indias nuclear doctrine (especially the No-First-Use and Minimum Credible Deterrence) as credible. Rather, Islamabad inPakistan believes that during crisis period, India will not adhere to its NFU. Besides, the

NFU will result in India preparing for a second strike capability, thereby increasing itsnuclear arsenals considerably. According to Pakistan, this makes Indias credible


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deterrence anything but minimal, besides the fact, leading to an arms race. Moreimportantly, Pakistan today believes, that after the Indo-US nuclear deal, India will beable to amass sufficient fissile materials, enabling it to lead the nuclear arms race inSouth Asia, at a considerable pace, leaving Pakistan behind.

On the other hand, India believes, that its doctrine including the NFU and minimumcredible deterrence, is a source of stability. A section within India even believes that the NFU actually provides the space for Pakistan, to engage in overt and covert activities, asIndia will not be the first use nuclear weapons. Regarding the nuclear deal with the US, asection believes, that this agreement has come up with certain military costs (besides theeconomic costs), in terms of opening its nuclear facilities to international inspection.India has made substantial commitments to the international organizations including theIAEA and NSG. Pakistan, however, has got a similar understanding with Beijing, withoutany such commitments.

At the international level, after the relative success of the NPT Review Conference 2010,

one is likely to see an increased international pressure on India and Pakistan; especiallyrelating to certain international nuclear treaties primarily the CTBT and FMCT. Thefact that it will not be easy for Obama to get the CTBT ratified will provide space for India and Pakistan to debate the CTBT or prolong the decision. Unfortunately, the FMCTdoes not provide that space to both countries. Despite the bold statements, it is unlikelythat the two countries would be able to withstand the international pressure. Pakistan isdilly dallying with calling for a FMT (Fissile Material Treaty) instead of an FMCT. Thissuits India, for New Delhi can argue that it will be willing to sign the FMCT, if Islamabad is ready to do the same. Pakistan is afraid that if it signs the FMCT now, it willnot be able to match up with Indias already produced fissile materials.

While the Lahore Memorandum provides space for a nuclear dialogue, and there alreadyexists an earlier agreement on sharing each others nuclear installations, there is not muchtrust between the two countries. The reason is the lack of any meaningful and intensivenuclear dialogue, sustained over a period either at Track-I or Track-II levels. As a partof confidence building, numerous nuclear risk reduction measures have been proposedalready. Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) on the models of US-Russia has been widely discussed in the strategic circles. Undoubtedly, the NRRCsare a welcome suggestion, but are limited and negative in approach. It hopes to establishtwo nuclear centers, which will be technical in nature, providing details/alerts regardingnuclear dangers, accidental use and related issues.

What is needed now, at the Indo-Pak level is a positive, larger institution that providesspace for continuous and intensive interaction on nuclear issues, which remainuninterrupted with other political/militant developments in Indo-Pak level. None of themajor nuclear treaties at the international level are a result of casual one-off meeting, heldover a period of two days. International nuclear agreements are the result of an intensiveinteraction, over a period of years. If India and Pakistan are to have any productivedebate leading to a stable understanding, then the nuclear dialogue needs somethinglarger than a mere NRRC, at the technical level.


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This is where an Indo-Pak Nuclear Commission on the models of Indus Water Commission may be an idea worth pursuing. Indus Water Commission, created in 1960after a prolonged negotiation, which resulted in the famous Indus Waters Treaty (IWT),

provides two Indus Water Commissioners in India and Pakistan. The Indus Water

Commission has met periodically ever since 1960, irrespective of wars and proxy wars,and regime changes. If the IWT is hailed as a major example, of a treaty that havesurvived four wars and numerous proxy wars, it is because that the Indus Water Commission never broke down, and its Commissioners never failed to meet each other.Two positive ideas from the Indus Water Commission are worth borrowing: an exclusivecommission and periodic meeting, irrespective of the prevailing political climate.

The Indo-Pak Nuclear Commission, unlike the proposed NRRC should not be onlytechnical. It could be an ideal forum for the discussion of nuclear doctrines andunderstanding each others anxieties and fears. While the NRRCs will contain twocenters in India and Pakistan, the Nuclear Commission could facilitate regular meetings,

alternatively in India and Pakistan. In fact, the NRRC could be the technical arm of the Nuclear Commission. Such an Indo-Pak Nuclear Commission has the potential to becomea great stabilizer of nuclear relations between the two countries.

Non-Proliferation: What Can India Do?

PR ChariResearch Professor, IPCSemail: [email protected]

India is rightly considered a leader in the spheres of nuclear disarmament, non- proliferation, and similar efforts to establish a safer world. Official spokespersons haveuntiringly informed the world about Indias contributions here, e.g. Espousing the causeof general and complete disarmament, cessation of nuclear testing, and shunning theexport of nuclear materials, equipment and technology. This salubrious record informedthe United States in 2005 to negotiate the Indo-US nuclear deal and hammer it throughthe skeptical Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008, thereby making India an exception to theinternational norm of not cooperating with non-signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Further, India had challenged its basic premise by explodingnuclear devices in 1974 and 1998, setting itself forth as a nuclear weapon state. In truth,Indias policies underwent a subtle change after China exploded its first nuclear device inOctober 1964. Thereafter, Indias declarations continued to exhort the need for nuclear

disarmament. But, secret efforts proceeded within its relevant establishments to derivenuclear weapons that culminated in the nuclear test series in May 1998. In other words,India distinguished between hortatory words and pragmatic actions, which drive externalcommentators to distraction.

National security interests have guided its refusal to enter the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty, although the official reasons offered for its abstention are the inequalityembedded in that Treaty, dichotomy between obligations and rights, inadequate


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commitment of the nuclear haves to eliminate their nuclear stockpiles and so on.President Obama has provided a new thrust now to the non-proliferation debate by

pledging to strive for a global zero, reduce the salience of nuclear weapons for nationalsecurity, provide a new content to nuclear safety and security norms, declare a lessqualified no-first-use doctrine and so on. Consequently, a readjustment in Indias non-

proliferation policy is indicated, since pursuit of its time-honoured ploy of rhetoric andinaction is no longer defensible.

So, how could India balance its legitimate national security interests with pursuing amore credible non-proliferation policy? A conference to debate this precise question washeld in Washington last month, bringing together specialists in nuclear politics andforeign affairs from the United States and India. It was appreciated that India cannot jointhe NPT without it being amendeda practical impossibility and that India would not

join that Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state on political considerations. Consequently,a major conclusion of that conference was that India should participate more fully in thenonproliferation system by entering the international export control groups and other

arrangements that have been designed to restrain and control the spread of sensitivetechnologies. In practice, this requires India and the United States to: Agree in principle to bring India into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); the MissileTechnology Control Regime (MTCR); the Wassenaar Arrangement (relates to theconventional arms trade); and the Australia Group (deals with chemical and biologicalagents); Harmonize Indias export control lists with that of the Wassenaar Arrangement and theAustralia Group. This has been achieved in respect of the NSG and MTCR guidelines; Begin consultations with members of these export control regimes to explore how Indiamight join them; and Address the impediments (political and legal) to India joining the Proliferation SecurityInitiative (PSI).

The advantages to the United States and India from the success of these initiatives hardlyneed belaboring. India has been recognized, incidentally by the Indo-US nuclear deal to

be a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology. Indias entry into theseregimes to formally join the global efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weaponsand, more broadly, weapons of mass destruction, would consolidate its responsible statecompliment. Moreover, India has traditionally been a votary of nuclear non-proliferation,despite not entering the NPT, joining the regimes to constrain nuclear proliferation would

be a significant gesture. Indias entry into these regimes would also serve the Americanobjective of revitalizing non-proliferation by drawing India within its discipline that

possesses advanced nuclear technology, and technologies relevant to the manufacture of other weapons of mass destruction. This is especially important since India is widely

believed to be on a growth trajectory that would make it among the worlds mostadvanced technological nations. Further, Indias inclusion within the PSI would draw itsnavythe most powerful among the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean and among thelargest in the world, into the global counter-proliferation strategy being pursued by theUnited States.


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Naturally, much diplomatic hard work lies ahead for the United States and India toachieve these objectives and bring India into these international export control regimesthat would strengthen the overall non-proliferation system. The reward would be morerobust export control regimes and a more substantive contribution by India to their success.

Should India give up its NFU Doctrine?

Ali AhmedResearch Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysesemail: [email protected]

Suba Chandran has on this website made out a case for jettisoning the No First Use. Inorder for readers to make up their own minds, this article lays out a case for retaining the

pillar of the doctrine as hither-to-fore.

No First Use, simply stated, is that India would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict. Its nuclear resort would be retaliation only. The logicunderlying this is has several dimensions political, military and diplomatic.

India is a reluctant nuclear weapon state. This is in keeping with Indias strategic culture.On its political necessity internally, NFU serves the purpose of placating that part of the

political spectrum that finds nuclear weapons possession and use, horrendous.Externally, India needs the weapons to deter other states from threatening India or restricting its strategic autonomy. These weapons are thus seen as political weapons, notmeant for war-fighting. This is made explicit by the NFU postulate.

Militarily, India does not need to rely on nuclear weapons, either in the India-Pakistan or in the India-China conflict scenario. On both fronts, it is a status quo power and does nothave an aggressive intent. It has adequate capability for conventional self-defence. On thePakistan front, its conventional posture has acquired an offensive edge with Cold Start.While it has adequate conventional advantage over Pakistan to be able to operationalizethe doctrine, it is making up for shortfalls in firepower etc. On the China front, it ismoving towards active deterrence from a dissuasive deterrence posture, through theraising of formations and by creating infrastructure. There is little scope for nuclear use,since their introduction would neutralize Indias conventional advantage on the Pakistanfront and be of little use in face of the asymmetry with China.

The moral and political high ground is proving to be of increasing importance in conflict.Both the US and Israel, who have fought conventional wars and faced an asymmetriccounter recently, have had to exert to defend their case. Even though militarily effective,diplomatic shortfalls have made any gains ambiguous. Consequently, it can be reckonedthat first use of nuclear weapons would place any state in considerable disadvantage onthis score. The state would require proving the need for breaching the long standingnuclear taboo. This could have unaffordable diplomatic and political costs. Instead,responding to a nuclear strike through nuclear means would be easily defensible.


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One circumstance in which first use makes sense is in preempting enemy first-strikelevels of nuclear first use. This would amount to an attempt by the enemy to degradeIndias nuclear retaliatory capability to such an extent that retaliation is ruled out or madenegligible. There are two ways to cope with this: one is going first through first strike

doctrines as launch on warning, launch through attack etc; and second, deterring through punishment based on a second strike capability.

The former is more destabilizing since it requires higher alertness levels that can bemistaken by the enemy as first strike preparedness; thereby increasing his propensity, if any, for first strike. It lends itself more readily to vertical proliferation since acompetition in numbers develops to make the first strike effective. It is argued thatwaiting to receive the grievous blow may prove fatal. The problems are two: first is thewell known one of misperception and accident; the second is that a first strike in

preemption need not prove effective. The enemy would retaliate with strikes designed tohurt with the fewer weapons he has left. Therefore, first strike makes little sense,

especially when the opponents have already acquired second strike capability levels of nuclear ordnance.

India favours the latter. It is in the process of acquiring a second strike capability basedon a triad of delivery means and sufficient numbers as to preclude successful first strike.An arms race need not necessarily result if measures that lend credibility, such as suitable

basing, hardening, mobility, command and control arrangements and deception, are takenalongside. Further, misperception is precluded. Nevertheless, second strike, to quoteGeneral Sundarji, needs also to be sensibly defined.

The argument so far has been that nuclear first use makes little sense for India. This doesnot necessarily mean that India needs to subscribe to NFU. It need not launch nuclear weapons first. It need not make a declaration to that effect. The critique that Indiasunilateral NFU would be received with skepticism by its adversaries is understandable.However, their strategic assessment on Indias intent would lead them to the argumentsmade here that first use has no gains for India. Therefore, even if India was to withdrawfrom NFU, its doctrine would continue as retaliation only.

Nevertheless, making this explicit helps preclude the use them-lose them dilemma brought on as suggested by Thomas Schelling by the logic: He thinks we think he thinkswe thinkhe thinks we think he will attack; so he thinks we shall; so he will; so wemust. The NFU helps mitigate edgy nuclear thresholds.


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