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 ARTICLE XIII: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 

1.  CIR –versus- Central Luzon Drug Corp. GR 159647,

 April 15, 2005

FACTS: “Respondent is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in

retailing of medicines and other pharmaceutical products. In 1996, it 

operated six (6) drugstores under the business name and style ‘Mercury

Drug.’ “From January to December 1996, respondent granted twenty

(20%) percent sales discount to qualified senior citizens on their

purchases of medicines pursuant to Republic Act No. [R.A.] 7432 and its

Implementing Rules and Regulations. For the said period, the amount 

allegedly representing the 20% sales discount granted by respondent to

qualified senior citizens totaled P904,769.00. “On April 15, 1997,respondent filed its Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1996declaring therein that it incurred net losses from its operations. “On

January 16, 1998, respondent filed with petitioner a claim for tax

refund/credit in the amount of P904,769.00 allegedly arising from the

20% sales discount granted by respondent to qualified senior citizens in

compliance with [R.A.] 7432. Unable to obtain affirmative response

from petitioner, respondent elevated its claim to the Court of Tax

Appeals [(CTA or Tax Court)] via a Petition for Review.

ISSUE: Does social justice consecrated in or Constitution justify the 20%senior citizen discount on medicines, without just compensation? 

RULING: While it is a declared commitment under Section 1 of RA 7432,

social justice “cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property

owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to

protection. The social justice consecrated in our [C]onstitution [is] not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who

is not entitled thereto.”[84]  For this reason, a just compensation for

income that is taken away from respondent becomes necessary. It is in

the tax credit that our legislators find support to realize social justice, and

no administrative body can alter that fact.

2.  JACULBE –versus- Silliman University GR 156934, March 16,2007 

FACTS: Sometime in 1958, petitioner began working for respondent’s

university medical center as a nurse. In a letter dated December 3, 1992,

respondent, through its Human Resources Development Office, informed

petitioner that she was approaching her 35 th year of service with the

university and was due for automatic retirement on November 18, 1993,

at which time she would be 57 years old. This was pursuant torespondent’s retirement plan for its employees which provided that its

members could be automatically retired “upon reaching the age of 65 or

after 35 years of uninterrupted service to the university.” Respondent 

required certain documents in connection with petitioner’s impending

retirement. A brief exchange of letters between petitioner and

respondent followed. Petitioner emphatically insisted that the

compulsory retirement under the plan was tantamount to a dismissal and

pleaded with respondent to be allowed to work until the age of 60

because this was the minimum age at which she could qualify for SSS

pension. But respondent stood pat on its decision to retire her, citing“company policy.” 

ISSUE: Is a retirement plan imposing automatic retirement after 35 years

of service even before the statutory retirement age of 65, consistent with theconstitutional guaranty of security of tenure? 

RULING: However, after reviewing the assailed decision together with

the rules and regulations of respondent’s retirement plan, we find that 

the plan runs afoul of the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure

contained in Article XIII, also known as the provision on Social Justice and

Human Rights. According to t he assailed decision, respondent’s

retirement plan “ha(d) been in effect for more than 30 years.” What was

not pointed out, however, was that the retirement plan came into being in

1970 or 12 years after petitioner started working for respondent. In

short, it was not part of the terms of employment to which petitioner

agreed when she started working for respondent. Neither did it become

part of those terms shortly thereafter, as the CA would have us believe.

3.  YRASUEGUI –versus- PAL, GR 168081, Oct 17, 2008, 569 SCRA

467

FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight 

steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight 

standards of the airline company. He is now before this Court via a

petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed.

To buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under

282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the weight 

standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification;and (3) he was discriminated against because other overweight 

employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.

ISSUE: Will obesity justify employment termination? What is the Metorin

Test? Is it valid and constitutional? 

RULING: A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other

conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an

employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be

dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as

prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee

would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.

Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard

for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; (2) the

employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the

accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer

must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order toaccomplish the legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper 

Corporation v. Simbol , this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the

employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably

related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is

factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting thequalification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because

it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.” 

4.  RC ARCHBISHOP OF CACERES –versus- DAR, GR 139285, Dec

21, 2007

FACTS: Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in

Camarines Sur, with a total area of 268.5668 hectares. Of that land,

249.0236 hectares are planted with rice and corn, while the remaining

19.5432 hectares are planted with coconut trees. In 1985, Archbishop

filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office No. 19, Naga City,

Camarines Sur several petitions for exemption of certain properties

located in various towns of Camarines Sur from the coverage of Operation

Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27. Two of these

petitions were denied in an Order dated November 6, 1986, issued by the

Regional Director of DAR, Region V, Juanito L. Lorena.Archbishop

appealed from the order of the Regional Director, and sought exemption

from OLT coverage of all lands planted with rice and corn which wereregistered in the name of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Caceres.

ISSUE: Can an agricultural land conditional donated to the Arcbishop and 

held in trust & in behalf of the millions of Filipino faithful be ex empted fromCARP? 

RULING: Archbishop cannot claim exemption in behalf of the millions of 

Filipino faithful, as the lands are clearly not exempt under the law. He

should not fear that his followers are simply being deprived of land, as

under both PD 27 and RA 6657, he is entitled to just compensation, which

he may then use for the benefit of his followers. His situation is no

different from other landowners affected by agrarian reform––they are

somewhat deprived of their land, but it is all for a greater good. As

 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of 

 Agrarian Reform recognized the revolutionary character of the

expropriation under the agrarian reform law, we follow such lofty ideal

for the resolution of this case. This grand purpose under the CARL must 

not be hindered by the simple expedient of appending conditions to a

donation of land, or by donating land to a church. This is not to cast 

aspersions on religious organizations, but it is not fitting for them to beused as vehicles for keeping land out of the hands of the landless. The law

is indubitably in line with the charitable ideals of religious organizations

to ensure that the land they own falls into the hands of able caretakers

and owners. As a religious leader, Archbishop can take solace in the fact 

that his lands are going to be awarded to those who need and can utilize

them to the fullest. 

5.  LANDBANK –versus- ORILLA, GR 157206, JUNE 27, 2008

FACTS: Respondents were the owners of Lot No. 1, 11-12706, situated in

Bohol, containing an area of 23.3416 hectares and covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 18401. The Department of Agrarian Reform

Provincial Agrarian Reform Office sent respondents a Notice of Land

Valuation and Acquisition informing them of the compulsory acquisition

of 21.1289 hectares of their landholdings pursuant to the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act [RA] 6657) for P371,154.99 as

compensation based on the valuation made by LBP (petitioner).

Respondents rejected the said valuation. Consequently, the Provincial

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (Provincial DARAB)

conducted a summary hearing on the amount of just compensation.

Thereafter, the Provincial DARAB affirmed the valuation made by thepetitioner.

ISSUE: Does just compensation also embrace payment within a reasonable

time? 

RULING: The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct 

determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also

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payment within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” inasmuch as the

property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately

deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before

actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Put 

differently, while prompt payment of just compensation requires the

immediate deposit and release to the landowner of the provisional

compensation as determined by the DAR, it does not end there. Verily, it 

also encompasses the payment in full of the just compensation to the

landholders as finally determined by the courts. Thus, it cannot be said

that there is already prompt payment of just compensation when there is

only a partial payment thereof, as in this case.

6.   APO FRUITS –versus- LBP GR 164195 APRIL 5, 2011

FACTS: We resolve Land Bank of the Philippines’ (LBP’s) 2nd Motion for

Reconsideration of December 14, 2010 that addresses our Resolutions

of October 12, 2010 and November 23, 2010. This motion prays as well

for the holding of oral arguments. We likewise resolve the Office of the

Solicitor General’s (OSG) Motion for Leave to Intervene and t o Admit 

Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention dated February 15, 2011 in

behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic).

ISSUE: Should just compensation under the agrarian reform program be

treated differently from the just compensation in any other case of 

expropriation? 

RULING: The constitutional basis for our agrarian reform program is

Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, which mandates:

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian

reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular 

 farm workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively 

the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to

receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the Stateshall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all 

agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable

retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into

account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations,

and  subject to the payment of just compensation.

This provision expressly provides that the taking of land for use in thegovernment’s agrarian reform program is conditioned on the payment 

of just compensation. Nothing in the wording of this provision even

remotely suggests that the just compensation required from the taking of 

land for the agrarian reform program should be treated any differently

from the just compensation required in any other case of expropriation.

As explained by Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion during the

deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission: [T]he term "just 

compensation" is used in several parts of the Constitution, and, therefore,

it must have a uniform meaning. It cannot have in one part a meaningdifferent from that which appears in the other portion. If, after all, the

party whose property is taken will receive the real value of the property

on just compensation, that is good enough.7 

7.  Had. Luisita –versus – PARC, GR 171101, July 5, 2011

FACTS: In 1957, the Spanish owners of Tabacalera offered to sell

Hacienda Luisita as well as their controlling interest in the sugar mill

within the hacienda, the Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT), as an

indivisible transaction. The Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco),

then owned and/or controlled by the Jose Cojuangco, Sr. Group, was

willing to buy. As agreed upon, Tadeco undertook to pay the purchase

price for Hacienda Luisita in pesos, while that for the controlling interest 

in CAT, in US dollars. As of March 31, 1958, Tadeco had fully paid the

purchase price for the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita and Tabacalera’s

interest in CAT. On May 7, 1980, the martial law administration filed a

suit before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Tadeco, et al.,

for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian

Reform so that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. Responding,

Tadeco or its owners alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants,

besides which sugar lands––of which the hacienda consisted––are not 

covered by existing agrarian reform legislations. As perceived then, thegovernment commenced the case against Tadeco as a political message tothe family of the late Benigno Aquino, Jr.

ISSUE: Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which permits stock transfer in lieu of outright 

agricultural land transfer, inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarianreform ingrained in Sec 4, Art XIII of the Constitution? 

RULING: Likewise, Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution makes mention of a

commitment on the part of the State to pursue, by law, an agrarian

reform program founded on the policy of land for the landless, but subject 

to such priorities as Congress may prescribe, taking into account such

abstract variable as "equity considerations." The textual reference to a

law and Congress necessarily implies that the above constitutional

provision is not self-executory and that legislation is needed to

implement the urgently needed program of agrarian reform. And RA

6657 has been enacted precisely pursuant to and as a mechanism to carry

out the constitutional directives. This piece of legislation, in fact,

restates118  the agrarian reform policy established in the aforementioned

provision of the Constitution of promoting the welfare of landless farmers

and farmworkers. RA 6657 thus defines "agrarian reform" as "the

redistribution of lands … to farmers and regular farmworkers who are

landless … to lift the economic status of the beneficiaries and all other

arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution of lands ,

such as production or profit sharing, labor administration and the

distribution of shares of stock which will allow beneficiaries to receivea just share of the fruits of the lands they work." 

8.  STAR PAPER CORP –versus- Simbol, GR 164774, Apr 12, 2006

FACTS: Petitioner Star Paper Corporation is a corporation engaged in

trading – principally of paper products. Simbol was employed by the

company where he Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom

he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the

couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign

pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995. Simbol resigned on

June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy.Comia was hired by the

company on February 5, 1997.and met Howard Comia, a co-employee,

whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them

that pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to

get married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.Estrella was hired on July

29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga (Zuñiga), also a co-worker. Petitioners

stated that Zuñiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company

allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but sheopted to resign on December 21, 1999.6 

ISSUE: Is a corporate policy banning spouses from working in the same

company constitutional? 

RULING: he questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the

Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the

disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a

showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit 

disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate

business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the

employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based uponstereotypes of married persons working together in one company.  Lastly,

the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in

our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to

labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently

draw inferences from the legislature’s silence41 that married persons are

not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on

a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present 

undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the

questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative.

Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia

resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.

CHREA –versus– CHR, GR 155336

FACTS: Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitionerCommission on Human Rights Employees' Association (CHREA)

challenging the Decision1  dated 29 November 2001 of the Court of 

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the Resolutions2  dated 16

December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC),

which sustained the validity of the upgrading and reclassification of 

certain personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)

despite the disapproval thereof by the Department of Budget and

Management (DBM). Also assailed is the resolution dated 11 September

2002 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration filedby petitioner.

ISSUE: Does the Commission on Human Rights enjoy fiscal Autonomy? 

RULING: Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in Chapter 5,

Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on Distribution of Powers of Government,the constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil Service

Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit,

which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast,

Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to

the other bodies including the CHR. From the 1987 Constitution and the

Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the

class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated

maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one

person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise,

expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what 

is implied. 

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9.  Superindented –versus – Azarcon GR 166435, Feb 11, 2008

FACTS: On September 20, 1990, then DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño filed

various charges5  against those teachers who participated in the

aforementioned mass action. The respondents were one of them and was

later found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service

and were consequently dismissed.7  Aggrieved, respondents appealed

their dismissal to the MSPB which, however, dismissed their appeal for

lack of merit .8 Respondents elevated the MSPB decision to the CSC. In its

resolution,9  the CSC agreed that respondents acted "without due regardto the adverse consequences of their actions which necessarily resulted in

the suspension and stoppage of classes, to the prejudice of thestudents."[10]  The CSC ordered their automatic reinstatement to their

former positions without back salaries. Respondents requested petitioner

to reinstate them at GMHES. On November 22, 1993, petitioner

superintendent informed her co-petitioner that respondents "[could] no

longer be assigned any teaching loads because all teaching positions in

GMHES [had] been filled."13  For this reason, respondent Azarcon was

assigned to A. Lacson Elementary School (ALES)14  while respondent 

Anoñuevo was transferred to Plaridel Elementary School (PES).15 Despite

their respective transfers, respondents retained their permanent statusand grade/subject assignment 

ISSUE: Does the accessibility to quality education justify teacher’s re-assignment? 

RULING: One of the requisites for a transfer or reassignment of a publicschool teacher to be valid, is that the transfer or reassignment was

undertaken pursuant to the exigencies of service. With regard to this

requisite, in Department of Education v. CA,34  we held that the

appointment of teachers does not refer to any particular station or

school.35  They are not entitled to stay permanently in one station36 

because their assignments are subject to the exigencies of the service. The

exigencies of the service, as mentioned in Section 6 of RA 4670, should be

viewed in the light of Section 1, Article XIV of the Constitution whichprovides:

Section 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all

citizens to quality education at all levels and shall takeappropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.

The accessibility of quality education determines the exigencies of the

service. Thus, assignments undertaken for purposes of improving theeducational system and/or making education more accessible are valid.

In this instance, respondents' six-month suspension meant that their

students would have had no teachers for the duration of their suspension.

Hence, other teachers had to be assigned to take over .37  When

respondents requested their reinstatement in the last quarter of 1993

(which was the middle of the school year),38  there was in truth no

vacancy in GMHES. Because there was no vacancy in GMHES, respondents

were reinstated as public school teachers but were assigned to schools

where there were vacancies (particularly ALES and PES). Petitioners

therefore not only implemented the October 20, 1994 CSC resolution but 

also addressed the lack of teachers in ALES and PES. Petitioners' solution

was correct, commonsensical, valid and constitutional. Their collective

acts were geared towards ensuring the accessibility of quality education

to the pupils concerned.

10. Jenosa –versus – USA., GR 172138, Sept 8, 2010

FACTS: 22 November 2002, some students of the University, among them

petitioners, were caught engaging in hazing outside the school premises.

The hazing incident was entered into the blotter of the Iloilo City Police.  

Thereafter, dialogues and consultations were conducted among the

school authorities, the apprehended students and their parents. During

the 28 November 2002 meeting, the parties agreed that, instead of thepossibility of being charged and found guilty of hazing, the students who

participated in the hazing incident as initiators, including petitioner

students, would just transfer to another school, while those who

participated as neophytes would be suspended for one month. The

parents of the apprehended students, including petitioners, affixed their

signatures to the minutes of the meeting to signify their conformity.5  Inview of the agreement, the University did not anymore convene the

Committee on Student Discipline (COSD) to investigate the hazingincident.

ISSUE: Is discipline in education specifically mandated by the 1987 

Constitution? Can School authorities impose discipline on students? 

RULING: Discipline in education is specifically mandated by the 1987

Constitution which provides that all educational institutions shall "teach

the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual

values, develop moral character and personal discipline."24  Schools and

school administrators have the authority to maintain school discipline25 

and the right to impose appropriate and reasonable disciplinary

measures.26  On the other hand, students have the duty and the

responsibility to promote and maintain the peace and tranquility of the

school by observing the rules of discipline

 ARTICLE XV: THE FAMILY 

1.  Antonio –versus – Reyes. GR 155800, March 10, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner

was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after

their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4  at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding5  at the

Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December

1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly

died five (5) months later. On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to

have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his

petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that 

respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with theessential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s

incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still

subsists up to the present .8  As manifestations of respondent’s alleged

psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently

lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,educational attainment and other events or things.

ISSUE: Had the Constitution establish the parameters of state protection tomarriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family? 

RULING: But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of 

the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal

aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to

protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper,

and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment 

itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the

case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional

provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been

accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code,

which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal

effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well

as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal

separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition fordeclaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect 

marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of 

marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is.

Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not 

be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in

resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. 

2.  Republic – versus – Orbecido GR 154380, Oct 5, 2005 

FACTS: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.

Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an,

Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,

Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son

Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had beennaturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned

from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then marrieda certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently

live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.Cipriano

thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry

invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was

filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The

Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE: Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one

 party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce

decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewiseremarry under Philippine law? 

RULING: If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the

absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien

spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino

spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the

contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. In view of the foregoing, we

state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 asfollows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipinocitizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating himor her to remarry.

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The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the

celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid 

divorce is obtained abroad  by the alien spouse capacitating the latter toremarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an

American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated

between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien

wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.

Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26

are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino

spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

3.  Rumbaua–

versus- Rumbaua GR 166738, August 14, 2009  

FACTS: The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner’s complaint 

for the declaration of nullity of marriage against the respondent before

the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner alleged that the

respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential

obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: the

respondent reneged on his promise to live with her under one roof after

finding work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her

for his mother’s death; he represented himself as single in his

transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he wascohabiting with another woman in Novaliches, Quezon City.

Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service, as

personal service proved futile.5

  The RTC ordered the provincialprosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties and to

ensure that no fabrication or suppression of evidence would take place.6 Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongson’s report negated the presence of collusion

between the parties

ISSUE: What are the definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code? 

RULING: We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation

and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of 

Appeals where we said:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to

the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and

continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of thecelebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinicallypermanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of 

the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and

wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to

parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)

must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included inthe text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling

or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts… 

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and

the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision

shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,

which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasonsfor his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

4.   Aurelio –versus- Aurelio GR 175367, June 6, 2011

FACTS: Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon

Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely:

Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.4  In her petition, respondent alleged

that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of 

performing and complying with their respective essential marital

obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of 

psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of 

the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be

declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code whichprovides:

 Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time

of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply 

with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall 

likewise be void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

ISSUE: May the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to be waived pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10? 

RULING: This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter

No. 02-11-10, has modified the Molina guidelines, particularly Section

2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required

in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the

Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or

fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion

between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated orsuppressed.16