ARSOF Operating Concept 2014.10 Pages/ARSOF Operating Concept 2014.pdf · ARSOF OPERATING CONCEPT...

ARSOFOPERATING CONCEPT

2022

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U.S. Army Special Operations Command

1989

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TH ANNIVERSARY − 2014

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26 September 2014

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ARSOF Operating Concept 2022

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UnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommandFortBragg,NorthCarolina28310‐9110

26September2014Commander’s Foreword

FromtheCommandingGeneralUnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommand(USASOC)

Formorethanadecadeofcontinuouscombatoperations,specialoperationsforces(SOF)haveemergedasoneofthemostcost‐effective“weaponssystems”intheU.S.militaryarsenalandamajorsourceofstrategicadvantageforthenation.ThisconceptlooksbeyondthebattlefieldsofIraqandAfghanistan,whereweseeacomplex,ill‐structured,intractablefutureoperatingenvironment.Wenotethemajorglobalsocial,political,informational,andeconomictrendsunderwayandtheconvergingcompetitionbetweennation‐statesandnonstateactors.Theseforcesareintertwinedandcompeteforrelativesuperiorityoverthephysical,cognitive,andmoralsecurityandadequategovernanceofkeypopulations—acompetitionthatwillincreasinglyoccurinmilitarilysignificanturbanterrain.Wenotethatwedonotchoosethedomainswecompeteandfightin—theychooseus.Ouradversariesarepreparing.

TherecentRussianincursioninUkraine,theactivitiesoftheIslamicStateofIraqandtheLevant,socialunrestandcivilwarinpartsoftheAfricancontinent,andChina’suseofcoerciveinfluenceagainstitsneighborsspeaktothechallengesthatirregularwarfareposestoU.S.nationalsecurityinterests.Intheseconflicts,successwilldependincreasinglyonourabilitytoworkthroughlike‐mindedgroupsorgovernmentsandtobeaspreciseaspossibleinourunilateralapplicationofforce.ArmySpecialOperationsForces(ARSOF)areoptimizedtodevelopandaccrueadeepculturalrelationship,aknowledgeofpartnercapabilities,andadecisivesituationalunderstandingwithinagivencountryorregionandarethusuniquelypositionedtooperateinthehumandomainandgeneratepersistentinfluencetocountersuchirregularwarfarethreatstothenation.

Theeffectivenessoftoday’sArmyspecialoperatorsatthetacticallevelisunmatchedinanysettingorenvironment.However,toprovidethenationwiththeexpandedrangeofstrategicoptionsthefuturewilldemand,wemusthoneourcapabilitiesattheoperationallevel—specifically,ourabilitytodesign,plan,andconductdiscretemultiyearspecialoperationscampaignsthatintegratethefullsuiteofSOF;conventionalforces(CF);joint,interagency,intergovernmental,andmultinational(JIIM);andpartnercapabilitieswiththeobjectiveofshapingtheoperatingenvironmenttocounterthreatsandadvanceU.S.interests.

ThisARSOFOperatingConcept(AOpC)emphasizestheimportanceofholisticapplicationsofthetwopillarsofARSOF:specialwarfareandsurgicalstrikes.TheAOpCunderscoresthehumandomainasthepreeminentandnecessarybattlegroundofthepresentandthefuture.And—mostimportantly—itreaffirmstheprimacyofeducating,training,equipping,andsupportingthemosthighlyselected,culturallyastute,andoperationallyproficientoperatorsandteamstoexecutemissionsinafutureoperatingenvironmentthatischaracterizedbyuncertainty.

CHARLEST.CLEVELANDLIEUTENANTGENERAL,USACOMMANDING


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Contents Page

Chapter1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................1

1‐1. FutureOperatingEnvironment...........................................................................................................1 1‐2. TheDominantReality:FiscalAusterityandUncertainty..........................................................1 1‐3. TheThreatEnvironment:Irregular,Hybrid,andDiverse........................................................2 1‐4. SustainingandEnablingARSOF:TheOperatingConcept.........................................................3 1‐5. LinkagetoStrategicLandpower..........................................................................................................5 1‐6. LinkagetotheUSSOCOMSpecialOperationsForcesOperatingConcept.............................5 1‐7. LinkagetoTheUnitedStatesArmyOperatingConcept...............................................................5

Chapter2 TheFutureOperatingEnvironment....................................................................................6

2‐1. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................6 2‐2. AMultipolarWorld...................................................................................................................................6 2‐3. ThreatEvolution........................................................................................................................................7 2‐4. ImplicationsforARSOF...........................................................................................................................7

Chapter3 ProvidingOurNationWiththeWorld’sPremierSpecialOperationsUnits........9

3‐1. Introduction:WhereDoWeStand?...................................................................................................9 3‐2. ProblemStatement....................................................................................................................................9 3‐3. TheCentralIdea.......................................................................................................................................10 3‐4. CommonAreasofEmphasis................................................................................................................13 3‐5. SolutionSynopsis.....................................................................................................................................14 3‐6. ComponentsoftheSolution................................................................................................................14 3‐7. SupportingIdeas......................................................................................................................................19

Chapter4 ARSOFCoreOperations.........................................................................................................21

4‐1. Introduction...............................................................................................................................................21 4‐2. UnconventionalWarfare.......................................................................................................................21 4‐3. ForeignInternalDefense......................................................................................................................22 4‐4. StabilityOperations................................................................................................................................23 4‐5. CounterinsurgencyOperations..........................................................................................................23 4‐6. SupporttoMajorCombatOperations.............................................................................................23 4‐7. Counterterrorism.....................................................................................................................................24 4‐8. CounteringWeaponsofMassDestruction....................................................................................24

Chapter5 Training,Education,andLeaderDevelopment............................................................25

5‐1. Introduction...............................................................................................................................................25 5‐2. General.........................................................................................................................................................25 5‐3. SustainingSurgicalStrike.....................................................................................................................25 5‐4. EvolvingSpecialWarfare......................................................................................................................26 5‐5. CommonAreasofTrainingSupport................................................................................................27 5‐6. OptimizeHumanCapital.......................................................................................................................28


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Contents Page

Chapter6 Conclusion..................................................................................................................................29

AppendixAReferences..................................................................................................................................30

SectionI:RequiredReferences...........................................................................................................................30 SectionII:RelatedReferences.............................................................................................................................30

AppendixBRequiredCapabilities.............................................................................................................33

B‐1. MissionCommand...................................................................................................................................33 B‐2. Intelligence.................................................................................................................................................34 B‐3. MovementandManeuver.....................................................................................................................34 B‐4. Fires...............................................................................................................................................................35 B‐5. Protection....................................................................................................................................................35 B‐6. Sustainment...............................................................................................................................................35 B‐7. Engagement(Influence)........................................................................................................................36

AppendixCSpecialWarfare........................................................................................................................38

C‐1. Introduction...............................................................................................................................................38 C‐2. Scope.............................................................................................................................................................38 C‐3. EvolvingConceptualAspectsofSpecialWarfare.......................................................................39 C‐4. Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................42

AppendixDSurgicalStrike...........................................................................................................................43

D‐1. Introduction...............................................................................................................................................43 D‐2. Scope.............................................................................................................................................................43 D‐3. EvolvingConceptualAspectsofSurgicalStrike..........................................................................44 D‐4. Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................47

AppendixESpecialOperationsForces‐ConventionalForcesInterdependence.....................48

E‐1. Introduction...............................................................................................................................................48 E‐2. ImportanceandDefinition...................................................................................................................48 E‐3. SOF‐SpecificCampaign..........................................................................................................................48 E‐4. SOF‐CentricCampaign...........................................................................................................................49 E‐5. CF‐CentricCampaign..............................................................................................................................49 E‐6. EvolvingCampaigns................................................................................................................................49

Glossary................................................................................................................................................................50

SectionI:Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................50 SectionII:Terms.......................................................................................................................................................51

EndNotes.............................................................................................................................................................55


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Chapter 1 Introduction

1-1. Future Operating Environment

AsARSOFprotectournationtodaywhileshapingtomorrow’soperatingenvironment,nationalleadershipfacesthreevitallyimportantconsiderations.First,fiscallimitationsnowformabasicplanningassumption.Second,beyondthebattlefieldsofIraqandAfghanistan,weseeacomplex,intractablefutureoperatingenvironmentthatisill‐structured.Third,warfare’sfundamentalcharacterandconductcontinuetoevolveasoperationsoccuraroundtheglobe.Therefore,theanticipatedfuturesecurityenvironmentisframedbydiminishingdefenseresourcesandincreasingcomplexityfeaturingagreaternumberandvarietyofthreats.1Asinthepast,landpowerwillprovecriticaltolong‐termoperationalsuccess,asdecisiveengagementstilloccursonland.Inthefuture,theemergingstrategicqualityoflandpowerwillbefurtherenabledbycampaignsoriginatingfromtheleftsideoftheoperationalcontinuum(Figure1‐1).

1-2. The Dominant Reality: Fiscal Austerity and Uncertainty

a. Sincethe11September2001attacks,nationaldefensehasabsorbedatremendousshareofAmerica’sresources.Absentmajorgame‐changers,U.S.citizensareunlikelytosustainthislevelofexpenditure.Throughoutthegovernmentandthejointforce,budgetausterityhasbecomethenorm.2Recognizingtheneedtoembraceausterityactively,U.S.strategicguidancecautionsusthatfutureU.S.forceswillnolongerbesizedforlarge‐scale,prolongedoperations.TheU.S.militarywillbecomesmallerandleaner,butatthesametimewillproveagile,flexible,andbetterprepared,goingsofarastoimprovereadinessinareasthatbynecessityweredeemphasized


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overthepastdecade.3TheU.S.militarythereforeseeksinnovative,low‐costandsmall‐footprintengagementsacrosstheglobeasthecentralfeatureofsafeguardingournation’ssecurity.4

b. ARSOFtoomustrecognizetheimplicationsofincreasingfiscalconstraintandadjusttothenewdemandsofthefuturesecurityenvironment(Figure1‐2).

1-3. The Threat Environment: Irregular, Hybrid, and Diverse

a. AsobserveddailyintheUkraine,inIraq,inSyria,andaroundtheglobe,theemergingoperatingenvironmentcombinesanever‐broadeningarrayofirregularandhybridthreats,toincludestates,nonstategroups,andindependentactors.Inthefuture,ourenemieswillintermingleinfluidcombinationstoopposeU.S.interestsathomeandabroad.Counteringthemwillrequirecampaignsthatmixconventionalandunconventionalapproachesandembracethecyberandinformationenvironment.Whileadversarycentersofgravitywillremainland‐based,thedestructionofenemyunitsandthedominationofterritorymaynolongerbedecisive.Instead,strategiclandpowermustemergefromandenabledurablerelationshipswithlocalsecurityandgovernanceactors,aswellaspopulations.Theserelationshipswillresultinaglobalnetworkofpartnerswhocanprovidepolicymakerswithbetterstrategicoptionstomeetcommonchallenges.5

b. Cooperationinnewanddurablewayswithfriendlystateandnonstatepartnersisthereforethecardinalprincipleoffutureoperations.Establishingandsustainingthiscooperationrequirespreparinglocalpartnerstocollaborateinsharedsecurityefforts.Muchofthatburdenwillfall


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onARSOFoperatorswhomasterthehumandomain.6Indeed,itisaninnateSOFqualitytobothunderstandpopulationswheretheyoperateandthentakemeaningfulactiontoeffectivelyinfluencehumanbehaviortowardachievingoutcomesalignedwithU.S.interests(Figure1‐3).7

1-4. Sustaining and Enabling ARSOF: The Operating Concept

a. Asfiscalausterityandhybridthreatsconverge,theUnitedStatesrequiresaforceofuncommonagilitywhoseoperatorspossessenduranceandwisdombasedonexperienceandmaturity.Fluentinthehumandomainandpracticedin“warsamongstthepeople,”SOFoperatorswillalsobuildandmaintainrelationshipswithregionalpartners,providingournationalleadershipwithflexibleresponsestoanychallenge.8Whenneeded,ARSOFwillalsowieldtimelyprecisionlethalitytoprotectAmericanlivesandinterests(Figure1‐4).

b. Aglobalnetworkincludingjoint,interagency,andinternationalpartnerswillenablethesecapabilities,butthatnetworkitselfisnotenough.TheU.S.militarymustplacesupremevalueinitsoperators,whowillbeconstantlychallengedthroughthemostdemandingeducation,training,anddevelopmentalassignments.Ouroperators’capabilitiesalsorelyonstrongandhealthyfamilies,supportedbythebroaderARSOFandArmycommunity.


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c. ThroughseamlesscollaborationwithallUnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand(USSOCOM)componentsandincooperationwithunifiedactionpartners(UAPs),ARSOFwillcontinuetoprovidejointforcecommanderswithoptimaltoolstoassess,shape,andinfluenceforeignenvironments.Atthesametime,ARSOFwillmaintainaunilateralabilitytoachieve

U.S.objectives.ThisiswhatthedefenseoftheAmericanpeopleandthepreservationofU.S.nationalsecurityinterestsrequire;thisiswhatARSOFwillbe.

d. AsweworktogethertodevelopARSOFoverthenextdecade,theChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffhasremindedusthatwemustthinkdifferentlywithregardtoforcestructure,interagencyoutreach,andmultinationalpartnering.9Consistentwiththisapproach,ARSOFwillembraceintellectualrigorthroughoutourorganizationsandprograms.ARSOFwillspearheadinitiativestohelpUSSOCOMdevelop,combine,andemployemergentSOFcapabilitiesacrossthespectrumofjointforcerequirements.EmbodyingtheSOFethosofaregionallypostured,globallynetworked,ever‐flexibleforce,ARSOFanditsUSSOCOMcomponentswillcontinuetoleadthewayininteragencyandinternationalcooperation.10

e. WehighlightUSASOC’sroleastheproponentforauniqueportionoftheArmy’srangeofmilitaryoperations,withemphasisoncampaignsoriginatingontheleftsideoftheoperationalcontinuumandUSASOC’suniqueFORSCOM‐andTRADOC‐likeresponsibilitywithinthe


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foundationalArmyactivities.TheAOpC2022,insupportoftheUSSOCOMSpecialOperationsForcesOperatingConcept(SOFOC),isintendedforArmySpecialOperationsForcesatalllevels,providingauniqueroadmaptothecollaborativeeffortofsustainingandaugmentingARSOFcapabilities.Acoherentandcomprehensiveconceptfordealingwiththeirregularandhybridenemiesthatwewillcontinuetoface,theAOpCexploreshowARSOFmustfunctioninthebroaderSOFandjointcommunityinsupportofU.S.nationalsecurityinterests.11

1-5. Linkage to Strategic Landpower

Strategiclandpowerisaninitiativethatadvocatesfortheprotectionandadvancementofnationalobjectivesthroughtheimprovedintegrationofjointcapabilitiesduringcampaigning.Thestrategiclandpowerinitiativeproposesthatthejointforceshouldbetteremployforcesthatoperateonlandtogainapositional,political,andpsychologicaladvantagebyunderstandingandinfluencingbehaviorsandperceptionsamongkeypopulationsandactors.Itadvocatesfordevelopingabroaderrangeofstrategicoptionsforpolicymakersacrosstherangeofmilitaryoperations.TheAOpCcontributestotheunderstandingofstrategiclandpowerbydescribinghowspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikeactivitiesworkinconcertwithotherelementsandactivitiesofthejointforcetoachievenationalsecurityobjectives.

1-6. Linkage to the USSOCOM Special Operations Forces Operating Concept

TheSOFOCprovidesavisionofthefuturestrategicenvironmentanddescribesthekeyelementsandcriticalcapabilityareasUSSOCOMwillrequirein2020andbeyond.ThecentralideaoftheSOFOCisthat“SOFconductcoreactivitieswithafocused,balancedapproachthroughsmall‐footprintdistributedoperationstounderstandandinfluencerelevantpopulations.”12USSOCOMwilloptimizeandexploittheglobalspecialoperationsforcesnetwork(GSN)tosupportU.S.Governmenteffortstoenhancestability,preventconflicts,and,whennecessary,fightanddefeatadversaries.13TheAOpCsupportsandimplementsSOFOCbydescribinghowUSASOCwillenableARSOFoperatorstoexecutespecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikeactivitiesasanintegralpartoftheGSN.

1-7. Linkage to The United States Army Operating Concept

TheUnitedStatesArmyOperatingConcept(AOC)describeshowArmyforcesoperatingaspartofjoint,interorganizational,andmultinationalcombinedarmsteamsaccomplishthemissionandwininacomplexworld.Armyforcesarepreparedtodomorethanfightanddefeatenemies;theymustpossessthecapabilitytotranslatemilitaryobjectivesintoenduringpoliticaloutcomes.Armyforcesmusthavethecapabilityandcapacity14toaccomplishassignedmissionswhileconfrontingincreasinglydangerousthreatsandcomplexoperationalenvironments.TheAOpCcontributestotheAOCbyprovidingtheconceptualfoundationforspecialoperationsasanArmycorecompetencyandbyemphasizingthenecessityforbuildingrelationshipsandnetworkswithinterorganizationalandmultinationalpartnerstoaccomplishU.S.nationalsecurityobjectives.


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Chapter 2 The Future Operating Environment

It is virtually impossible to rank, in terms of long range importance, the numerous, potential threats to U.S. national security…

it is the multiplicity and interconnectedness of potential threats and the actors behind them that constitute our biggest challenge.

– James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence15

2-1. Introduction

TheU.S.militaryisatastrategicinflectionpointinitshistory.Weseeafuturethatwilllikelychallengetheeffectivenessofsomeformsofmilitarypowerandcompletelycheckmateothers.Thecessationofadecadeofmajorlandwarfare,anationalsentimenttoavoidlargeexpeditionarycampaigns,andacongressionalmandateforfiscalconstraintallinfluencethefuturedirectionoftheU.S.nationalsecuritystrategy.Futuretrendsandstrategicallygiftedadversariescompetingincognitivespacewilldriveanenvironmentdefinedbyinfluenceinitsbroadestapplication.Inordertoprovidelow‐cost,small‐footprintoptionstoU.S.decisionmakersasviablealternatives,ARSOFmustfirstunderstandandthencontinuallyadapttotheevolvingglobaloperatingenvironment.

2-2. A Multipolar World

a. GlobalTrends2030contendsthatglobalpoliticalleadershipwilllikelybemorediffuse,withnosinglecountryorallianceplayingadominantrole.16ThecountrieswiththegreatestpotentialtosubstantiallyincreasetheirrelativepowerduringtheforecastedperiodincludeChina,India,Russia,Brazil,Indonesia,andTurkey.17ThispredictedmultipolarworldpresentsapersistentchallengeforU.S.nationalleadershipastheyemploytheelementsofpower,includinglow‐intensitymilitaryoptions,inaninternationalenvironmentofdynamicalliancesandadversarialrelationships.

b. Competitionintheglobalcommonswillrevolvearoundmaintainingthesecurityofkeypopulationsinmilitarilysignificanturbanterrain.Thesheermassandscaleofurbanizedhumanitywillbeamplifiedbytheintersectionofinformationallyaware,smartphone‐enabledurbanpopulationsandtheirsatisfaction—orlackofsatisfaction—withlocal,regional,andevenglobalconditions.

c. Inthecomingdecades,failedstatesandungovernedareaswillbecomesanctuariesforextremist,criminal,andterroristorganizationstoflourish.Vacuumsemergingfromtheweakenednation‐statemodelof19thand20thcenturieswillnotelicitnewformsofgovernment,butonlyaproliferationofpreexistingforms.Thesignificantdifferencewillbethegreaterabilityofnonstateactorstodefendthemselves,andtoinfluenceorattackotherpopulations,duetothediffusionofweaponsandcommunicationstechnologiesdowntosubnationgroups.Allthesetrendsspeaktotheemergingstrategicqualityoflandpowerandourcontributiontothiscapability.


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2-3. Threat Evolution

a. Conflictsandwarfarewillpersist.Theadoptionofirregularwarfaretacticsbybothstateandnonstateactorsasaprimarymodeofwarfightingwillbeacommoncharacteristicofconflictsbeyond2022.Thediffusionamongnonstateandsubnationalgroupsofadvancedweaponryandofinformationandcommunicationcapabilitieshistoricallyheldbynation‐stateswillsignificantlyincreasethethreatposedbyirregularformsofwarfare.Forceswillcompeteforrelativesuperiorityoverthephysical,cognitive,andmoralsecurityandadequategovernanceofkeypopulations,whichwillincreasinglyunfoldinmilitarilysignificanturbanterrain.

b. Highlyresilientandadaptableviolentextremistorganizations(VEOs)areexpectedtogrowinnumberandtoexpandtheirspheresofinfluence.Inthefuture,evensmall‐sizedgroupswillhaveaccesstolethalandcyberspaceweaponsabletosignificantlyweakenanumberoftheworld’sgoverningregimes.Thiswillmakeitpossibleforagovernmenttooutsourcemayhem,withahighdegreeofdeniability,whilerelyinguponVEOsthatoperateinundergovernedspacesandplanattacksfromundetectedlocations.

c. Thedeclineoftheregulatednation‐stateorderandtheincreasedprominenceofVEOssuggestthat,overthenextfewdecades,individualempowermentmayprovecriticalasitgivesgreatestmeaningtotheseothertrendsdiscussedhere.Atthesametime,thediffusionofweaponsandinformationtechnologywillencompassgreaternumbersofempoweredindividuals,whilethecyberdomainoffersthemseveraladvantagesoverotherformsofwarfare.Theseadvantagesarederivedfromtheanonymityandrelativelylowcostprovidedtodisaffectedindividualsbycyber‐basedtoolsthatseektocreatehavocwithoff‐the‐shelfequipment.18Evenmoredisturbingisthediffusionofweaponsofmassdestruction(WMD)downtoindividuals.AnthraxattacksintheUnitedStatesdemonstratetheabilityofasinglepersontoemploybiologicalorchemicalweaponsagainstcivilianpopulations.

2-4. Implications for ARSOF

a. WewouldcharacterizetheSOFoperationalenvironmentasacompositeofthedomainswithemphasisonthehumandomainanditsphysical,cognitive,andmoralinfluencesaggregatedwithinagivenoperationalarea.ThisenvironmentwillincreasinglyrequiretheenduringemploymentofSOFcapabilitiesandCF,JIIM,andpartnercapabilitiestocontinuallyshapedesiredenvironmentalconditionstoadvanceU.S.nationalinterests.Thiscomplexoperationalenvironment—withvaryingdegreesofstability,security,governance,intractability,andproblemclarity—willdemandpurposefulcollaborationandnestingofstakeholderplansandexpertisetomaximizedesiredconditionsforU.S.interests.19

b. ARSOFin2022:TheFutureOperatingEnvironmentconcludesthatfuturetrendscanconvergetogenerateastrikinglynonpermissive,actor‐richoperatingenvironmenttypifiedbyhighdegreesofsociopoliticalvolatilityandfragmentation.Inordertobesuccessful,ARSOFmusthavethecapabilitytodealwithawidevarietyofthreatsinincreasinglychallengingenvirons.Doingsowillrequireenhancedmissioncommandcapabilities;adeepunderstandingoftheculture,relationships,andcapabilitiesofpartners;decisivesituationalawareness;andtheabilitytogeneratepersistentinfluencetocounterirregularwarfarethreatstothenation.

c. Dealingwithtransnationalandhybridorganizationsrequiresahighlevelofongoing,real‐timecooperationwithJIIMorganizationsreliantonestablishedresponsibilitiesunderstoodbyallparticipants.Hybridteamsconsistingofmilitary,lawenforcement,andcomposite


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authoritieswillbecomethenewnormtocountertransnationalandhybridthreats.SOFoperationaldesignwillbeoptimizedinthehumandomainandinoperationsnotledbytheDepartmentofDefense(DOD).

d. FutureARSOFoperatorsandteamswillneedtobeevenmoreculturallyastute,better‐trained,andmoreadaptabletoanever‐fasterpaceofoperations.20Irregularwarfare,whichcomprisesmorethanthree‐quartersoftheconflictsintheworldtoday,canbeexpectedtopredominateinfuturedecades.SOFwillthuscontinuetobetheforceofchoicetoconfronttheirregularthreatstotheU.S.homelandandU.S.nationalsecurityinterestsabroad.


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Chapter 3 Providing Our Nation With the World’s Premier Special Operations Units

In the coming decade, ARSOF will be called upon to provide balanced and fully integrated special operations capabilities to the nation.

Our force must maintain its high degree of professionalism complemented by cutting‐edge training, world class education, and the balanced use

of state‐of‐the‐art and indigenous equipment. Our formations must be organized, postured, and networked

in a manner that enables them to anticipate and prevent or rapidly respond to regional contingencies or threats to the stability of our allies.21

– LTG Charles T. Cleveland

3-1. Introduction: Where Do We Stand?

a. AstheAmericanWayofWarfareadaptstotherealitiesofthe21stcentury,theGlobalSpecialOperationsForcesCampaignPlan(GCP‐SOF)enabledbytheGSNwillplayasignificantrole.Inparticular,theGCP‐SOFwillchangetheprevailingparadigmofwarfare’scharacterandconduct,basedsincethe1980sontheCF‐dominatedsix‐phase(phases0through5)jointconstruct.Theemergingconceptofstrategiclandpowerprovidesauniqueperspectivetothisprocessofchange,asitemphasizesthepopulationitselfasaprincipalsecurityobjective.Thisemphasiswillleadtomilitaryandnonmilitaryforceswhoseabilitytodestroyisaccompaniedbythedecisiveabilitytounderstandpopulationsintheoperationalenvironmentinordertoactmeaningfullytoinfluencehumanbehaviortowardachievingthedesiredoutcomes.ARSOFwillbeuniquelyposturedtooperateinthehumandomainandgeneratepersistentinfluencetocounterirregularthreatstothenation(Figure3‐1).22

b. Justastheparadigmofwarfareisevolving,sotooarethetoolsofwarfare.TowagetheGlobalSOFCampaign,anewsuiteofcapabilitieswillberequired.Toprovideaglimpseofthesecapabilities,Chapter3discussesthecentralideaofmakingboththeGCP‐SOFandtheGSNfundamentalrealitiesthroughspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrike.Chapter3alsoexaminesthosesignificantchangesneededtorestructureARSOFtomeetthedemandsofthefuturesecurityenvironment.

3-2. Problem Statement

HowwillfutureARSOFprovidetheUnitedStateswiththeworld’spremierspecialoperationsunits,capableofprosecutingthemostsensitivespecialwarfarecampaignsandexecutingthemostdifficultsurgicalstrikeoperationsduringaneraoffiscalausterity?


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3-3. The Central Idea

a. USASOCprovidesthenationwithtwoexquisiteanduniquecriticalcapabilities:specialwarfareandsurgicalstrike(Figure3‐1).Throughthesecomplementarycapabilities,ARSOFunitsexecuteactivitiesacrosstherangeofmilitaryoperationstosupportnationalpolicyandspecifictheaterrequirements.ThesetwocriticalcapabilitiesofARSOFcanreducetheU.S.footprintinforeignterritoriesandincreasetheeffectivenessoflarger‐scalemilitaryalternatives.

b. SurgicalStrike.Surgicalstrikeinvolves“theexecutionofactivitiesinaprecisemannerthatemployspecialoperationsforcesinhostile,denied,orpoliticallysensitiveenvironmentstoseize,destroy,capture,exploit,recover,ordamagedesignatedtargets,orinfluencethreats.”23Executedunilaterallyorcollaboratively,surgicalstrikeextendsAmerica’soperationalreachandinfluencebyengagingglobaltargetswithdiscriminatingprecision.Todothis,surgicalstrikeappliesdetailedanalysisandpreciseemploymenttoreduceoperationaluncertaintyandcollateraldamage.

(1) ARSOFunitsneedtoexecutemultiple,synchronized,andsimultaneoussurgicalstrikesindepthagainstinterconnectedandgeographicallydispersedtargetsallwhilemaintainingtheelementofsurprise.Thewaronterrorhasshownthatterroristnetworkstargetedwithdecapitationoperationscanquicklypromotenewleadership.Rather,disablingmultiplenodesandleadershasamuchgreatereffectondisruptingordestroyingtheorganization.Additionally,today’sthreatnetworks


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candisperserapidlywhenwarnedofattacksagainstotherthreatorganizations.Tocountertheevolutionofthreatnetworkconnectivityandsurvivability,ARSOFmustpreventVEOelementsfromgoingtogroundwhenonenodeorleaderisattacked.

(2) Servingregionalandnationalobjectives,futureARSOFunitswillberequiredtoexecutesurgicalstrikesacrossthespectrumofwarandconflictwhilesupportingspecialwarfare.Atthetacticallevel,surgicalstrikeswillservedesiredeffectsbeyondthecapabilitiesofconventionalorsurrogateforces.Attheoperationalandstrategiclevels,surgicalstrikeunitswilloperateeitherinconcertwithotherServicesandcapabilitiesorunilaterallyincomplexordeniedenvironments.Theywillhavetheabilitytoconductforcibleentryoperationsuptotheregimentallevelcombinedwiththeabilitytoprosecuteoneormorefollow‐ontargets.Suchtargetswillcomprisecommand,control,communications,computers,andintelligencenodes;terroristcommandandcontrolnodes;hardenedsitesfromairstrikes;keylogisticalcenters;integratedairdefensesystems;andkeyinfrastructure(forexample,powerandtransportation).Surgicalstrikeunitscanalsoenablespecialwarfare,weakeningtheenemy’sgriponthepopulationthroughdirectactionoperationsagainstcriticalmissioncommandnodesandinfrastructure.ARSOFmusthavecapabilityfordynamicenroutemissionplanningandcommunicationsbetweenaircraft,groundforces,missioncommandelements,andinteragencypartners.

(3) Collaboratingwithinteragencyandmultinationalpartners,ARSOF’ssurgicalstrikeemploysthefind,fix,finish,exploit,analyze,anddisseminate(F3EAD)processtoseize,destroy,capture,exploit,recover,ordamagedesignatedtargetsorinfluencethreats.Astargetingmethodologiescontinuetoevolve,surgicalstrikeunitscanprovideamorediscreet,prioritized,andlethalcapabilitytoremovebadactorsanddisruptthreatnetworkswithminimalcollateraldamage.Suchoperationscomplementspecialwarfareactivitiesconductedinthehumandomain.FutureARSOFsurgicalstrikeunitsmustthereforemaximizeevolvingtechnologicalcapabilitiestoapplytheF3EADtargetingmethodologymorepreciselyandfasterthantheenemycandevelopcountertechnologies.Inparticular,ARSOFmustevolveitscapabilitytointegrateandanalyzeall‐sourceintelligencetoimprovetargetingfromthestrategicleveldowntothetacticallevel,sincedecisivecounterterrorism(CT)requirestimelyandreliableintelligence.

c. SpecialWarfare.Specialwarfareisanumbrellatermindicatingoperatingforceconductofcombinationsofunconventionalwarfare(UW),foreigninternaldefense(FID),militaryinformationsupportoperations(MISO),CT,andcounterinsurgency(COIN)throughandwithindigenouspersonnel.24Withdiscreet,precise,politicallyastute,andscalablecapabilities,ARSOFfrequentlyundertakepoliticallysensitivemissionsoverextendedperiodsoftimeinhostile,austere,anddeniedenvironments.25Here,ARSOF’sdeeplanguageandculturalexpertiseenhanceunitsurvivabilitythroughtherecognitionandunderstandingofemergingthreats.SuchcapabilitiesalsograntArmyspecialoperatorsinfluenceoverthehumandomaininpursuitofU.S.objectives,toavoidconflict,ortobringaboutaquickandenduringvictory.26Likewise,ARSOFoperatorsmustbeproficientinsmall‐unittacticsandinbuildingindigenousforces,alongsidewhichtheywillfightinpermissive,uncertain,andhostileenvironments.27Moreover,successfulspecialwarfarewillrequireARSOF’slow‐signaturecapabilities.


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(1) UnconventionalWarfare.UWisthemostsensitiveofspecialwarfaremissions.WhileARSOF’sSpecialForces(SF)wereoriginallyorganizedtoconductUW,thepredominantformsofconflictinthepost‐ColdWarworldincludefightinginsurgenciesandirregularwarsandtryingtoimposeorderonforeignpopulations.SpecialwarfareismostcomplexwhenconductingtheUWactivity.Unitsmustbeorganized,trained,andequippedtoperformtheirmissionsinanareawheretheenemyisatleastnominallyincontrol.ItfollowsthatARSOFmustpossessuniquelow‐signaturecapabilitiestoexecutethesesensitiveactivities.TheearlyphasesofUWareoftenthemostdifficult.Typically,whiletheresistanceorinsurgencyisinitsinfancy,theadversaryhasthetightestcontroloverboththeterritoryandthepopulation.Thisplacesapremiumontheabilitytooperateinalow‐signaturemannertosuccessfullymeetoperationalrequirements.FutureARSOFmustthereforeimplementanoperationalsurvivabilityprogramdevelopingcriticalskillstoreducemissionandoperatorriskandenableUWinallenvironments.

(2) Extended‐DurationUnconventionalWarfare.Today,executingextended‐durationUWremainsthesignificantspecialwarfarechallenge.28,29,30ARSOFmustrapidlyincreaseUWcapabilitieswhilemaintainingitssuperiorlevelofsurgicalstrikecapabilityinordertomeetfutureconflicts’growingirregularthreats.Indeed,inattainingU.S.strategicgoalsandobjectives,ARSOF’sabilitytooperateinthehumandomainthroughsurgicalstrikeandspecialwarfare,especiallyextended‐durationUW,willbeatleastascrucialaslarge‐scaleconventionalaction.Usingindigenoussecuritysolutionsmayevensurpassdirectmilitaryaction’simportanceduetotheformer’slesserexpenseandgreaterpoliticalacceptability.Hence,theUnitedStatespossessesasingularlyuniqueresponsetoirregularthreatsinARSOF’sabilitytoleaddiscreet,scalableUWcampaignsofextendeddurationbymaximizingunderstandingofthehumandomainthroughcooperationwithUAPs.Inthefuture,theexecutionofextended‐durationUWwillalsorequireARSOFtodevelop,employ,andmanagethemosthighlyqualifiedmilitaryandciviliansupportpersonnel,encompassingagreatervarietyofbranchesandwiderrangeofspecialtiesthaneverbefore.Thesesupportpersonnelmustdeveloprelationshipswithinteragencycounterparts,enablingeffectivesupport,sustainment,andredeploymentofARSOFoperatorsconductingextendedUW.Tomeetthischallenge,ARSOFmustdevelopaprogramtorecruit,assess,train,employ,andmanagethemosthighlyqualifiedsupportpersonnel.Theprogrammustalsoreceivethesameemphasisastheoperatorstheysupport.

d. DefiningCharacteristicsofSpecialWarfareandSurgicalStrike.Specialwarfareandsurgicalstrikearecomplementaryratherthanmutuallyexclusive.ARSOFwillemploysurgicalstrikeactivitiestoshapetheoperationalenvironmentorinfluenceselectedtargetaudiencesinsupportofbroaderstrategicobjectives.Althoughthetypicalstrikecanbeshortinduration,interagencyandhostnationpartnershipscandevelopthetargetandfacilitatepostoperationalactivities—thusaidingtheplanningprocessfocusoncriticaloperationalorstrategictargets—thatincludecounterproliferation,CT,andhostagerescueandrecoveryoperations.Table3‐1comparesthecharacteristicsofspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikeinlightoffourprincipalcriteria:howtheunitviewsthepopulation,howtheunitdealswiththepopulation,thefocusofpreparationoftheenvironment(PE),andthetimehorizon.


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Table 3‐1. Characteristics of Special Warfare and Surgical Strike.

Special Warfare Surgical Strike

Population Viewed As The Environment An Obstacle

Population Dealt With By Engagement Avoid/Control

PE Focus Enduring Network Development Target Centric

Time Horizon Mid to Long Term Short to Mid Term

Speed of Execution Gradual Near Instantaneous

Prime Requirement Patience Speed

Communications Low Signature Robust

Measure of Effectiveness Systemic Change Threat Eliminated

Risk Tolerance Significant Minimal

3-4. Common Areas of Emphasis

a. StrategicCorrelationofPower.WecontinuetointernalizetheJanuary2012marchingordersfromthe38thU.S.ArmyChiefofStaffasweintegrateARSOF’scontributionwithintheArmy’ssuiteofcapabilities.Akeyconsiderationinthecurrentenvironmentwillbebuildingstrategicdepthintermsofhowwesupportthearrangementofmilitaryactionsintime,space,andpurposetomaximizerelativecombatpower.Inthefutureoperatingenvironment,wemustmaximizethestrategicdepthwithinthehumandomainasweaddressitsphysical,cognitive,andmoralaspectsaspartofalargercalculusofastrategiccorrelationofpower.

b. SpecialReconnaissanceActivities.ASOFcoreactivity,specialreconnaissance(SR)isemployedduringbothspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikeinsupportoftheoperationalorstrategicobjectivesofthetheaterspecialoperationscommand(TSOC)andgeographiccombatantcommander(GCC).SRisdefinedas“reconnaissanceandsurveillanceactionsconductedasaspecialoperationinhostile,denied,ordiplomaticallyand/orpoliticallysensitiveenvironmentstocollectorverifyinformationofstrategicoroperationalsignificance,employingmilitarycapabilitiesnotnormallyfoundinconventionalforces.”31Additionally,SRsupportstheexecutionofotherSOFcoreactivities.FutureARSOFmustthereforedevelopandemploycutting‐edgeSRtechnologies,tactics,techniques,andprocedurestosupportsurgicalstrikeandspecialwarfareinallenvironments.

c. PreparationoftheEnvironment.TheDODdefinesPEas“anumbrellatermforoperationsandactivitiesconductedbyselectivelytrainedspecialoperationsforcestodevelopanenvironmentforpotentialfuturespecialoperations.”32AnessentialpreconditionforUW,PEconsistsofthreecomponents:operationalpreparationoftheenvironment,advanceforceoperations,andintelligenceoperations.33

d. SpecialOperationsAviation.ARSOFmusthaveresponsive,dedicated,andspecializedaviationsupportwiththelatesttechnologiesincommunications,navigation,capacity,firepower,range,stealth,andspeed.Supportingrequirementswillentailbalancingstationingrequirementsforglobalreachversustherotationrequirementstosupportongoingefforts.BudgetconstraintswillchallengeacquisitionandupgradingofARSOFairassets,requiringabalanceofcapability,budget,andassetdemand.


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e. RegionallyAlignedForces.Tosupportsurgicalstrikeandspecialwarfaremissions,ARSOFmustincorporateregionallyalignedforces(RAF)intotheTSOC.AstheU.S.ArmyfieldsRAFtotheaterstosupportgeographiccombatantcommands,theseforcesareexpectedtobecomeregionallyengagedandculturallyaware.ARSOFmustdevelopintegratedSOF‐CFsolutionstoachieveGCCobjectivesbasedonthecharacteristicsoftheRAF.SOF‐CFinitiativescouldenhanceintelligence,optimizeresources,increaseoperationalcapability,enablepersistentpresence,andcontributetodecisivesituationalunderstanding.

3-5. Solution Synopsis

FutureARSOFwilloperateinacomplexoperatingenvironment.Theymustbeableto:

• ProvidejointforcecommanderswithscalableARSOFunitscontainingoperatorswithhighlevelsoftacticalskill,languagecapabilities,andculturalexpertise.34

• ProvideunitswithregionalandUWexpertisetosupportinsurgenciesservingU.S.policyobjectives.

• Providepreciseandadvancedasymmetriccapabilitiesthatsupportbothtraditionalwarfareandirregularwarfare.35

• EstablishpersistentanddistributedhumanandtechnicalnetworksthroughtheGSN.36

a. MissionCommand.AcrossthespectrumofSOFcoreactivitiesinthefuture,enablingdistributedmissioncommandwillproveachallenge.Employingsmalltechnologically‐enabledmissioncommandnodes,ARSOFmustmaximizereachbacktothecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS)basewhileworkingwithindigenouspartnersandUAPs.Further,seniorleadershipmustadoptnewexpectationsofthetypeandvolumeofcommunicationsexchangedwithoperationallyengagedARSOFunits.Thesenewexpectationswillinvolveacceptingriskandempoweringjuniorleaderstoexecutemission‐typeorders.

b. MissionAuthorities.ARSOFoperatesinacomplexlegalenvironment.Inthefuture,ARSOFwillcontinuetoconductoperationsunderTitle10Authorities,Title50Authorities,andtheAmbassador’sTitle22Authorities.ARSOFmustbeeducatedtounderstandthescopeandlimitationsoftheseauthorities.Furthermore,ARSOFmustidentifyandperformassignmentsthatwillcomplementdecision‐makers’understandingofARSOFsupportrequirements,aswellasthoseprocessesnecessarytoobtainauthoritiesastheneedsarise.37

c. MissionAlignment.Theefforttosustainthehightempoofoperations(OPTEMPO)inthepast12yearshasledtounitsassumingresponsibilitiesformissionsnottraditionallyalignedwiththeircorecapabilities.DemandingmissionrequirementsandhighOPTEMPOledtoanextensiveoverlapduringthepastdecade.Intheyearsahead,unitsmustfocusonthecoreactivitiesforwhichtheyweredesigned.

3-6. Components of the Solution

TheUSASOCCommander’sprioritiesthatfulfillthevisionandintentofARSOF2022include:

• OptimizeSOF‐CFandinteragencyinterdependence.38

• OperationalizetheCONUSbase.

• DevelopSOFcapabilitiesattheoperationallevel.


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• FacilitateSOFmissioncommand.

a. OptimizeSOF/CFandInteragencyInterdependence.ARSOFmustseektoexpandpartnershipswiththeArmy,joint,andinteragencycommunity.39BybridgingcriticalseamsamongSOF,CF,andinteragencypartners,ARSOFwillcontributeeffectivelytounifiedactioninthe21stcenturyandfacilitatetheblendingofcapabilitiesbetweentheDODandtheinteragency,providingU.S.policymakersacontinuumofoptions.

(1) GlobalSOFNetwork.TheGSNistheUSSOCOMprogramtofurtherSOF,CF,andJIIMinterdependence.Suchinterdependencemustincludeunityofeffortandsharedsituationalawareness;harmonizedfuturedoctrinemanifestedincommonnetworks;andtheestablishmentofmemorandaofagreement/understanding(MOAs/MOUs).Indeed,arecentstudynotedthat“enhancingpartnercapacitywillprovidemoreSOFcapacityacrosstheglobe,greaterinsightregardingconditionsontheground,allowingSOFtomoreeffectivelyshapetheenvironmentandbetterenableU.S.partnerstofacetheirownsecuritythreats.”40

(2) UnifiedActionPartnerships.AttheheartoftheGSNistheprinciple,“Youcan’tsurgetrust.”41TheGSNwillprovidethepersistentperson‐to‐personworkingrelationshipsnecessarytobuildtrustwithindigenousforcesandJIIMpartners.42SuchtrustisincreasinglyimportantgivenareductionofforcesanddecliningDODbudgets,aswellasincreasingcomplexityofconflictswhereSOFmustleveragetheGSN.43SustainingandgrowingtheGSN,andmakingitequallyvaluabletoourallies,willthussignificantlyenhanceARSOF’sglobalpresencewithareducedfootprint,tyingoperationalcapabilitiestotheaterandnationalstrategiesandobjectives.

(3) StrategicLandpowerInitiative.StrategiclandpowerbridgestheseamsamongUAPs.Itisanefforttoconnectinteragencyplayers,militaryservices,andpartnermilitaries.Greaterconnectivitycandirectlycontributetoachievingoverarchingnationalormultinationalsecurityobjectivesandimproveguidanceforagivenmilitarycampaignoroperation.44Second,strategiclandpowerinvestsindevelopingthemilitary’sunderstandingoftheemerginghumandomain.Whiletheeffectsofthehumandomaincanbeveryimportantinconventionalwarfare,theyareoftencriticaltooureffortstomaintainpopulationcontrolortowageconflictinirregularwarfare.Tomaintainrelevance,ARSOFmustremainattheforefrontofdevelopingmultiserviceconceptsinvolvingthehumandomainandstrategiclandpower.45

(4) Law.SmartapplicationoftheCodeofLawsoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica(U.S.C.)cansharpenSOFandinteragencyinterdependence.ARSOFmustunderstandthepartsoftheU.S.C.thatprovidetheauthoritiesforspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikeactivities.Futureoperationshingeonunderstandinglegallimitationsaswellasthemeanstoseekappropriateauthoritieswhenconditionscallforconductofspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrike.Formaximumoperationalflexibility,ARSOFmustdeveloptherequisitebusinesspracticestoinstitutionalizethedesiredcultureandmindsetalignedwiththeU.S.C.LawsneedtobeclearlyarticulatedtoprotectARSOF,especiallyintheconductofspecialwarfareaspectsofirregularwarfare.ImprovedunderstandingofauthoritiesrelatedtotheU.S.C.willpermitcommanderstoplanandconductmissionswhilefullyprotectingfutureoperators.

b. OperationalizetheCONUSBase.TheCONUSbaseprovidesawealthofresourcestoassistARSOFcommandersinforward‐deployedregionsaroundtheglobe.Consideringthetalent


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residentacrossARSOF,U.S.Governmentagencies,nongovernmentorganizations,academia,andthinktanks,thepotentialtoaccessexpertisewithinthehomelandissignificant.OrganizingtheforcetoaccessthiscapabilityisessentialandcangreatlyenhancefutureARSOFperformance.Byestablishingmechanismsandleveraginginformationtechnologyinthefuture,ARSOFwillharnessCONUS‐basedcapacitytosupportTSOCsandregionalorcountrycampaignsandoperations.Likeartilleryincombinedarmsmaneuver,regionallyexpertforcesshouldnotbe“leftinreserve”intheconductofspecialoperations.ThefollowingareessentialcapabilitiestooperationalizetheCONUSbase.

(1) MilitaryInformationSupportOperations(MISO)Effects.InordertoincreasethedepthofoperationalandstrategicinfluencecapacityofTSOCsandGCCswithoutincreasingforwardphysicalposture,ARSOFseekaMISOcapabilitytoharnesstheinfluenceentitiesandinformation‐relatedcapabilitiesresidentinstatesidemilitaryandUAPformations.Actingoffdemandsignalsfromforwardwarfighters,theMISOeffectsgroupwillenableTSOC/GCCinitiativesandoperationsbypullingforwardintellectual,technicalandorganizationalcapabilitiesasawarminfluencenetwork.TheeffectsgroupwillalsocoordinateinternalcollaborativesessionstodevelopinnovativesolutionstospecializedproblemsattherequestofTSOCsandGCCs.

(2) Civil‐MilitarySupport.GiventheU.S.military’sassignedresponsibilitiesintheareasofstabilityandgovernance,futurejointformationswillneedtoaddresssharedinterestsaspartofaunifiedactioneffort.46Doingsonecessitatesasystemtoprocure,classify,marshal,andemploytheappropriatecivilianexpertisetoexecutestabilitytasks.ARSOFwillthusgenerateintegratedcivil‐militaryplanningcapabilitiestobetterinformTSOCs,GCCs,andchiefsofmission.47ARSOFwillrequirethemeanstocollectandshareTSOC,GCC,DOD,andUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)regionalperspectivesinordertocollectivelylinkresourcestorequirements.48

(3) Civil‐MilitaryAdvisoryCapability.ARSOFmustdevelopabroadercapabilitytoreceiveandshareinformationandcoordinateactivitiespriortotimesofcrisistobetterinformstrategydevelopmentacrossthespectrumofconflict.Therangeoforganizationalsupporttobeprovidedbythiscapabilityrangesfromcountryteamsandpartnernationministriesinhumanitarianassistance(HA)/disasterreliefsituationstoinformingTSOC,GCC,andothercampaignplanningprocessoverthelongterm.Acivil‐militaryadvisorycapabilitywouldbebuiltonfourkeypillars:1)operationalreachbacktorelevantpartners;2)analysisandfusionofcountry‐by‐countrycivilinformation;3)advisoryandplanningsupporttoleaders,namelyU.S.Ambassadorsandmilitarycommanders;and4)standingexpertisefromplankholders,toincludetheDepartmentofStateBureauofConflictandStabilizationorBureauofPolitical‐MilitaryAffairs,USAID,andARSOF.Overthelongterm,thecoordinationprocessshouldinvolvetheentirecivilaffairsandhumanitarianresponsecommunity.

(4) MilitarySupporttoGovernance.GiventheU.S.military’sassignedresponsibilitiesintheareasofstabilityandgovernance,futurejointformationsmustaddresssharedinterestsandenhancehostnationgovernance,security,economicdevelopment,andtheruleoflaw.49Doingsonecessitatesasystemtoprocure,classify,marshal,andemploytheappropriatecivilianexpertisetosupportorleadexecutionofstabilitytasksalignedwithnationalsecurityobjectives.TheabilityofARSOFtoprovidehighlyskilled,deployableciviliantalentwillbevitaltoenablingtheU.S.military’ssupporttogovernancewithinforeigncountriesandwillhighlightthemilitary’ssuccessinemployingRAFtoachievepolicyobjectives.50


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c. DevelopHolisticSOFCapabilitiesattheOperationalLevel.Tomeetthisrequirement,ARSOFmustimproveitscapabilitytodotwothings.First,itmustdesignandplanlong‐duration,low‐visibility,SOF‐centriccontributionstocampaignsthatlinktacticalSOFcapabilitiestostrategicobjectives.Secondly,itmustseamlesslyintegrateSOFoperationswithJIIMoperations.ARSOFmustbeconcernedwithwhatoccursduringsteady‐statesecuritycooperationactivitiesasmuchaswhatoccursduringacrisisresponseorlimitedcontingencyoperation.

(1) CampaignPlanning.Tomeetthechallengesofthefutureoperatingenvironment,ARSOFmustdevelopandprovideexperiencedcampaignplannerstotheoperationalheadquartersofJIIMpartnersinordertomaintainrelationshipsandknowledgeenablingaunityofefforttoexecuteandsupportspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikeoperations.TheUSASOCPlanner’sHandbookmustbecomeanintegralpartoftraining.By2022,ARSOF’soperationalplannersandleaderswillthusneedtoroutinelymeshspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikecapabilitiesthroughrelianceoncognitiveapproachesderivedfromSOFoperationalart.ARSOFmustalsoimprovetheTSOCdirectsupportliaisonelementsbydevelopingsustainmentplannerswhoprepareforthedeliveryofArmyServices.Additionally,ARSOFmustdevelopandassignoperational‐levelcivil‐militaryoperations/stabilityoperationsplannersatTSOCs(Figure3‐2).51

(2) PartnerNationRotary‐WingCapability.The2012defensestrategicguidanceprovidesinstructionstotheU.S.ArmedForceswithspecificguidanceforimprovements.Itemphasizedtheneedtobuildpartnershipcapacityabroadtofocusonsharingsecuritycostsandresponsibilities;emphasizedinnovative,low‐cost,small‐footprintapproaches52;andreaffirmedtheintentofthe2010NationalSecurityStrategytostrengthenthecapacityofpartnernationsecurityforces.Asaresultofthisguidance,ARSOFwilldeveloppartnernationrotary‐wingcapability.

(3) Sustainment.TheUSSOCOMSpecialOperationsForcesOperatingConceptprovidesafuturevisionforcombatsupportoperators.“By2020,eachSOFgroup,regimentandbrigademusthaveafullsetofdeployable,tacticalcombatsupportoperatorspermanentlyassignedorattachedaspartoftask‐organized,multidisciplineSOFteams.Plannedskillsetswillincludeexpertiseincommunications,intelligence,logistics,explosiveordnancedisposal,caninehandling,andtacticalcyberoperations.SOFteamswillroutinelytrain,deploy,andoperatewiththesamecombatsupportoperators.TheUSSOCOMServicecomponentsprovidetheseoperatorswithbasicSOFskillsandtrainthemtoapplytheirmilitaryoccupationalspecialtiestoSOFoperationsandactivities.


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CombatsupportoperatorswillcompleteaninitialextendedassignmentwithaSOFunitandthenreturntotheirparentServicebeforecompetingforrepetitiveSOFassignments.WhenaspecificpopulationislargeenoughtosustainaseparateService“closedloop”careerpath,SOFcombatsupportoperatorsremainassignedorattachedtoSOFunitsfortheremainderoftheircareers.”53

(a) LogisticsCollaboration.Asmembersofthejointforce,ARSOFmustworktoensurethatCFretainessentialcapabilitiestosustainlong‐term,SOF‐ledcampaignsinhostile,austere,anddeniedenvironments.ARSOFmustcommunicatesustainmentneedstothemilitaryServicesandexplorenonstandardmeansofobtainingsustainment.ARSOFmustbefullyinteroperablewithCF,interagencyplayers,andmultinationalpartnersintermsoflogisticssupport,fieldservices,communications,andlong‐termsustainment.Ofnote,duringanextendeddurationUWcampaign,logisticshasbeenobservedashavingthepotentialtobethesinglepointoffailure.

(b) NonstandardLogistics.ThefutureoperatingenvironmentrequiresARSOFtooperateinpoliticallysensitive,austere,ordeniedenvironments.Futurecampaignswillbejoint,long‐durationoperationsthatrequiresophisticatedsupportfromJIIMandlocalforces.Inordertosucceedinthisenvironment,ARSOFmustleveragethefullspectrumoflong‐durationUWsustainmentcapabilities,fromlethaltohumanitarian,thatbothU.S.andpartnerforcesprovide.54MuchofthefootprintinpastoperationshascomeastheresultofthesustainmentcapabilitiesU.S.forcestraditionallybringtotheareaofoperations.55Localprocurementorforegoingdiscretionarycomfortitemsmaybecomenecessary.Tofurtherskillsinnonstandardlogistics,ARSOFmustdevelopeducationandtrainingwhileleveragingothergovernmentagencies’programs.Forexample,selectedlogisticalpersonnelmayattendinteragencysupportcoursestolearnhowtheinteragencysupportstheirpersonnelglobally.

d. FacilitateSOFMissionCommand.

(1) ScalableStructures.AsnotedinARSOF2022,“ThegreatestsinglechallengefacingSOFtodayisoutdatedcommandandcontrolstructures.”56FutureSOFmissioncommandmustbescalable,adaptable,abletospanmultipleechelons,andabletoevolvewithconflicts.SOFmissioncommandmustalsoincorporateallUAPswhileinterfacingwithallexternalUAPstructures.57ModernizedstructuresareessentialforensuringthatARSOFmissioncommandmeetsfutureoperationalenvironmentchallenges,toincludelow‐footprintoperationsandthoseinhostileordeniedareas.58

(2) HybridStructures.PastSOFmissioncommandstructureshavebeenadhoc.59ThefuturenationalsecuritychallengeswillincreasinglyrequireSOF‐centricsolutionsreliantonuniquecombinationsofSOF‐CFcapabilityandSOFoperational‐levelmissioncommand.Newstructuresshouldexperimentwithoperationalanddivision‐levelheadquartersprovidingmissioncommandforlow‐footprintspecialwarfareactivities.ThisexperimentationshouldincludeexploringascalablecommandstructurecapableofconductingglobalspecialwarfaremissionsinsupportofTSOCandnationalobjectives.Surpassingcurrentheadquarterselements,thisstructurerequiresanorganizationtoprovidetheoversightandadministrativesupportthatextended‐durationUWcampaignswilldemand.ThisapproachmaximizesARSOFcapabilitiestooperateinhostileordeniedenvironments.Asalogicalstepindevelopingthestrategiclandpowerinitiative,USASOC,


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theArmy,andtheMarineCorpsshouldexperimentwithhybrid(SOF‐CF)corps‐levelheadquarterstoaddressmanyofthechallengesinherentinirregularwarfare.60Ofnote,theU.S.ArmyconfrontedatremendouscapabilitydeficitatthepointofsuccessduringtransitionsfollowingthecoalitionoccupationofbothKabulandBaghdadin2002–2003.Ahybridmissioncommandcapabilitymustbedefinedbyconsideringorganicpartners,aswellasinteragencyandintergovernmentalplug‐insdesignedtoconductCOIN,HA,FID,andlimitedcombinedarmsmaneuver.Suchahybridmissioncommandstructurecouldtieintothejointspecialwarfarecommandconceptdiscussedabove.

3-7. Supporting Ideas

a. Recruit,Assess,Select,andTraintheArmy’sFinestSoldiers.SOFTruthsincludethefollowing:

• Humansaremoreimportantthanhardware.

• Qualityisbetterthanquantity.

• Specialoperationsforcescannotbemassproduced.

• CompetentSOFcannotbecreatedafteremergenciesoccur.

• Mostspecialoperationsrequirenon‐SOFsupport.61

ThesetruthsrequireARSOFtobethemostwell‐educatedandwell‐trainedforcewithintheDOD.62Theyalsoimplyrecognitionthatawidearrayofknowledge,skills,andabilitiesarenecessaryforsuccessinthefutureoperatingenvironment,thusdrivingUSASOCtoexpandtheculturalandethnicbackgroundsoftheforce.Doingsorequiresongoingattentiontothreecrucialprocesses:recruitmentandselectionoftheArmy’sfinestSoldiers,continualtrainingencompassingformalcoursesandon‐the‐joblearning,andretentiontominimizethelossofhighlytrainedpersonnel.

b. EmphasizeAdvancedClandestineandLow‐SignatureCapabilities.Thecommongroundofspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikeisminimized‐visibilityoperations.Inordertoinfiltrate,exfiltrate,operate,andremainintheoperationsarea,researchanddevelopmenteffortsmustfindthemeanstodefeatormitigatepervasiveurbanandruralsurveillance.63Whereimpossibletoremaincompletelyundetected,ARSOFpersonnelwillneedtoremainunidentifiedthroughevolvingbiometricknowledgeandtechniques.

c. PositionLow‐SignatureOperationsastheDefiningHallmarkofSpecialOperations.SOFOCdiscussestheconceptofthe“invisibleoperator.”64ARSOFwillneedtoexamineboththeaccessionandtrainingofARSOFoperatorsconstantlytoensuretheyarecapableofoperatinginlow‐visibilitymodes.Thisrequirementevokesseveralsubareas:

(1) ARSOFmustdevelopthecapabilitytosupportoperationalconvergenceonselectedlocationsforsurgicalstrikes.Surgicalstrikemissionsmusthavemultipleoptionsforingressandegressofpersonnel.

(2) ARSOFmustmaintainanabilitytocommunicatewithinhostileterritories.

(3) Techniques,technicalmeans,andbiomedicalaugmentationneedtoevolvetorenderARSOFoperatorsandtheirequipmentinvisibletoadversarytracking.Biometricidentificationandtrackingthroughadvanceddataprocessingandcommunications


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technologieshaverenderedpasttechniquesineffective,leavingSOFoperatorsvulnerableworldwide.65

d. InformandInfluencePopulations.ARSOFpossessadiverserangeoflow‐visibility,culturallyastutemeanstoaccesspopulationsandoperateindeniedareasregardlessofthenatureofthehumanpopulation.66Theimportanceofoperatingwithinthehumandomainwillsurpasstheimportanceofdirectmilitaryaction.67Inaddition,ournation’sabilitytouseindigenoussecuritysolutionsislessexpensiveandmorepoliticallyacceptable.ARSOFarecentraltothetasksoffirstunderstandingthehumandomainandthenshapingitinaccordancewithU.S.objectives.TheGSNwillbeadecisiveweaponinpopulation‐centricbattles.Theabilitytoshapeinthehumandomain,liketheabilitytounderstandtheforcesatworkthere,ismosteffectivelyperformedbypeopleontheground.Establishingtrust,whichistheglueofeveryhumanrelationship,isineffectivefromafar.

e. RetaintheTechnologicalAdvantage.ARSOFwillleverageemergingtechnologytocontinuetodevelopinnovative,low‐visibilitymeansand,whenrequired,appropriatelyattributablematerielsolutionsthatenablenewmeansforARSOFtodiscriminatelyengagethemostsensitivetargetsaroundtheglobe.68ThelastdecadeofwarfarehasprovidedtheUnitedStateswithleadingbattlefieldtechnologiesinseveralareas,suchasunmannedreconnaissance.FutureARSOFwillneedever‐more‐capableorganicandnonorganicsystemstosupportthespecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikecapabilitiesthroughthephasesofpremissionplanning,missionexecution,andpostmissionassessment.ThefollowingtechnologyareaswillbecriticaltofutureSpecialOperations.

(1) Successfulingress/egressforsurgicalstrikeandjointforcibleentryoperationsrequiresthecapabilitytodefeatanintegratedairdefensesystem(IADS)thatisactiveinatargetarea.Alternatively,thedisablingofanIADSmaybeaspecialoperationsmissionaspartofalargerconventionalcampaign.

(2) Surgicalstrikeandspecialwarfareforceswillbenefitfromtheemergingspaceandcybercapabilitiesintheexecutionoftacticaloperations.

f. PreserveOperationalMedicalExcellence.Tomitigateriskforitsforces,ARSOFpreserveitsadvantageofhavingthemosthighlytrainedmedicalpersonnelwithinDOD.Itisimportanttocontinuethemomentumgainedinfield‐leveltriageandbattlefieldtraumatreatmentbyincreasingorganicmedicalcapabilitiesthroughdeployable,scalablesurgicalteamsmodeledaftertheJointMedicalAugmentationUnit.69ARSOFmustalsoleverageexistingmedicaltechnology,aswellasindigenouscapabilities.


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Chapter 4 ARSOF Core Operations

Our “new normal” is a persistently engaged, forward‐based force to prevent and deter conflict and, when needed, act to disrupt and defeat threats.

Long‐term engagement is a hedge against crises that require major intervention, and engagement positions us

to better sense the environment and act decisively when necessary. The “new normal,” however, translates into increased demand for SOF.

The pace of the last ten years is indicative of what we expect for the next ten years.70

– Admiral William H. McRaven

4-1. Introduction

ThischapterdiscussessomeofthecoreactivitiesthatARSOFwillperforminthefutureoperatingenvironmentof2022to2030.Thesecoreactivitieswillbetailoredtoidentifytherequiredcapabilitiescriticaltotheexecutionofspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikeoperationsinsupportofregionalandnationalobjectives.71Althoughthischapterwilldiscusseachofthecoreactivitiesindividually,theseoperationsaregenerallyinterrelatedduringexecution(Figure4‐1).

4-2. Unconventional Warfare

a. UWwillbeconductedtoenablearesistancemovementorinsurgencytocoerce,disrupt,oroverthrowagovernmentoroccupyingpowerbyoperatingthroughorwithanunderground,auxiliary,andguerrillaforceinadeniedarea.72JointPublication1,DoctrinefortheArmedForcesoftheUnitedStates,establishestwoformsofwarfare:traditionalandirregular.73Whileapplicableintraditionalwarfarecontexts,UWwillbeemployedwithparticulareffecttoinducechangeinaforeigngovernment’sbehaviorinsupportofU.S.nationalobjectives;toisolate,destabilize,orundermineahostileforeigngovernment;tooverthrowahostileregime;ortoforcethewithdrawalofanoccupyingpowerbysupportingorfomentinganinsurgency.74


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b. TowagesuccessfulUWcampaigns,ARSOFwillneedtoexcelinthehumandomainwhileensuringpersistenthumanandtechnicalpresenceindesignatedareasduringsteadystate.Phase0,Shaping,willbecritical.Persistentpresenceremainsessentialtoconductareaassessments,establishearlywarningsystems,identifyindigenouspersonnelthatsupportU.S.objectives,andestablishtheUWmechanismsandinfrastructureforpotentialoperations.75PersistentengagementandPEactivitieswillminimizethepotentialdemandtoexecutea“coldstart”UWcampaign.ThesepersistentengagementactivitiesrequireARSOFtodevelop,sustain,andleveragetheGSN.76

c. SOF,CF,andJIIMinterdependencewillbecriticaltothesuccessofARSOF’sfutureextended‐durationUWcampaigns,necessitatinginteragencyandintergovernmentalrelationshipsatthenationalandcountryteamlevelstosupporttheGSN.ARSOFwillmaintainpersistentengagementwithinteragencypartnerstocoordinateUWactivitiestomeettheaterandU.S.nationalobjectives.

d. ARSOFwillfaceseveralchallengesinthefutureoperatingenvironmenttoeffectivelyexecutethefullrangeofUWoperations.ARSOFmustdesignandfieldnewcapabilitiestooperateindeniedareas.ARSOFmustdevelopandimplementspecializedtrainingforoperatorstoworkindeniedareas,focusingonenhancedlanguageskills,low‐signaturecapabilities,nonstandardlogisticscapabilitytosupplyresistanceforces,andlow‐signaturecommunicationscapabilities.Further,ARSOFmustdeterminetheoperatorandsupportrequirementsinordertorestructureandprioritizetheemploymentoftheforcewithinfuturemanningconstructs.

4-3. Foreign Internal Defense

Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low‐cost, and small‐footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives,

relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.77

– Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012

a. FIDwillinvolveparticipationbycivilianandmilitaryagenciesofagovernmentinanyoftheactionprogramstakenbyanothergovernmentorotherdesignatedorganizationtofreeandprotectitssocietyfromsubversion,lawlessness,andinsurgency,terrorism,andotherthreatstotheirsecurity.78The2010NationalSecurityStrategyguidestheU.S.militarytostrengthenitscapacitytopartnerwithforeigncounterparts,totrainandhelpsecurityforces,andtopursuemilitary‐to‐militarytieswithabroadrangeofgovernments.79Itemphasizestheneedtosupportongoingeffortsofhostnationgovernments.U.S.policyincludestheindirectuseofmilitaryforceinconcertwiththediplomatic,informational,military,andeconomicinstrumentsofnationalpower.

b. FIDwillrequirepersistent,long‐termengagementtobeeffective.TrustbetweenthehostnationandtheU.S.mustbedevelopedatthehighestechelonsandattheoperatorlevel.Thisactivityrequiresapersistentanddisciplinedapproach.AstheUSSOCOMOperatingConceptstates,“YouCan’tSurgeTrust.”80ARSOFmuststrivetobuildtrust,slowlyanddeliberately,beforeacrisisoccurs.Executedby,with,andthroughthehostnation,FIDefforts,likeUW,mustfocusonthehumandomain,continuetobeinclusiveandbalanced,andevolvetomeetthedemandsofthefutureoperatingenvironment.ARSOFelementswillneedtomaintain


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closecontactwiththeleadagencyintheoperationalregiontoposturethemselvesforrapidrealignmentsofU.S.militarysupport.

4-4. Stability Operations

Stabilityoperationswillinvolvevariousmilitarymissions,tasks,andactivitiesconductedoutsidetheU.S.incoordinationwithotherinstrumentsofnationalpowertomaintainorreestablishasafeandsecureenvironmentwhileprovidingessentialgovernmentalservices,emergencyinfrastructurereconstruction,andhumanitarianrelief.81U.S.defensestrategyenvisagesamovetowardsdispersed,small‐footprintoperationsandemphasizesenablingpartnersinnewways.82Especiallyintheareaofstabilityoperations,thebenefitsofsmall‐footprintoperationsaremultifoldwhenconsideringtheimpactofU.S.forcepresenceontheindigenouspopulationandthewillingnesstoacceptU.S.aidinawar‐tornregion.83TheU.S.defensestrategyentailsalargerroleforSOFtocreatecapablepartnersandtoadvancestabilityoperationsthroughouttheworld.FulfillingthisroleatahigherleveloffinessewillenhancestabilityabroadandprovideamorefavorablereturnonU.S.investment.84,85

4-5. Counterinsurgency Operations

COINwillinvolvecomprehensivecivilianandmilitaryeffortstakentodefeataninsurgencyandtoaddressanycoregrievances.86COINrepresentsatailoredcombinationofARSOF’sspecialwarfarecapabilitiesandwillbecomeamoreprominentoperationalrequirementduringthe2022–2030periodduetoincreasesinundergovernedandungovernedspaces,directcompetitionbetweennonstateactorsandlegitimatenation‐states,andsignificantoff‐the‐bookeconomicactivitybydarknetworks.87ARSOFmustthereforecontinuetoexpanditsunderstandingofinsurgencies,buildonlessonslearnedfrompastconflicts,andevolvedoctrineanditsapplicationatafasterpacethantheiradversaries.

4-6. Support to Major Combat Operations

a. Supportedbyotherinstrumentsofnationalandmultinationalpower,majorcombatoperations(MCO)willpermitaU.S.jointforcetoconductsynergistic,high‐tempoactionsinmultipledomains.Theseactionscanshatterthecoherencyoftheadversary’splananddispositionsandrenderhimunabletomilitarilyopposetheachievementofourstrategicobjectives.88ARSOFsupportsMCObyprovidingGCCswithspeciallytrainedforcesuniquelycompetentinlanguages,cultures,history,governments,andsecurityforcesinareaswhereconflictscanoccur.89ARSOFsupportGCCsecuritycooperationplansbydevelopingrelationshipsandimprovingmutualunderstandingwithpartnercountrygovernmentsandtheirsecurityforces.90ARSOFroutinelyparticipateinmultinationalexercisesandsecurityforceassistancemissionstoreassurealliesandfriendswhiledeterringadversaries.91

b. ThoughsuccessfulMCOwilldefeatenemyforces,theydonotguaranteethatthevictorywillpersist.Infutureconflicts,theimportanceoftheindirectbattlewithinthehumandomainwillsurpasstheimportanceofdirectmilitaryaction.Thefightforatargetpopulationwilltransformintotheprimaryfocusofacampaignandregionalstrategy.BoththekineticandnonkineticcapabilitiesofARSOFareasnecessarytoapositive,enduringoutcomeofMCO.


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4-7. Counterterrorism

a. CTisdefinedasactionstakendirectlyagainstterroristnetworksandindirectlytoinfluenceandrenderglobalandregionalenvironmentsinhospitabletoterroristnetwork.92,93CTwillremainaSOFcoreactivity.CTisacomponentofthesurgicalstrikeformofspecialoperations.94ARSOF’svalue‐addedcapabilityistheconductofoffensivemeasures,nestedwithintheDOD’soverallCTefforts.ARSOFpossessthecapabilitytoconducttheseoperationsinenvironmentsthatmaybedeniedtoCFbecauseofpoliticalorthreatconditions.

b. MaintainingproficiencyinsurgicalstrikeduringaperiodofconstrainedresourceswillchallengeARSOFinthe2022–2030period.ARSOFmustthereforeoptimizetheGSNasaseamlessfluidnetworktoaidinidentifyingandlocatingadversarieswithadequateprecisiontoalloweffectivesurgicalstrikeoperationinanincreasinglyurbanized,digitallynetworkedworld.95Indeed,thiswillrequireARSOFtooptimizeSOF/CF/JIIMinterdependencetoapplyseamlesscombatpoweragainstterroristorganizationswhileminimizingduplicationofeffort.96

4-8. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

a. CounteringWMDandtheirmeansofdeliverywillbeoneofthegreatestchallengestheUnitedStatesfaces.WMDhavethepotentialtoseverelydisruptanddamagetheUnitedStates,itsforces,itsallies,itsmultinationalpartners,andotherfriendlynations.AdversariesmayuseWMDtoinflictcasualtiesoncivilianpopulations,degradetheinstrumentsofournationalpowerorcounterU.S.militarysuperiority.97WMDproliferationnetworksaremultifunctionalandmultidimensional.Theyconsistofstateandindependentnonstateactorswhoaredynamicandadaptiveandwhooperateinsecrecytoavoiddetectionandcounteraction.98

b. Insupportofthejointforce,ARSOFcontributestocounteringWMDbyprovidingascalablepackageofhighlytrainedandspeciallyequippedpersonnelwhoaregloballyresponsiveandcanrespondonextremelyshortnotice.99FutureARSOFwillrelyonthedevelopmentofinnovativemeanstoincreaseorganiccapabilitiestoemploytheF3EADtargetingcycle.FindingandfixingaWMDenemycanbestreamlinedbybuilding,sustaining,andemployingtheGSN.TheGSNenablesanetworkedforceofSOF,CF,allies,andinteragencypartnerswhorapidlyandpersistentlyaddressregionalcontingencies.IncontributingtocounteringWMD,ARSOFmustpossesscapabilityacrossawidespectrumofthreats,rangingfromsophisticatednation‐stateswithadvancedanti‐access,cyber,anddefensivecapabilitiestoVEOsoperatinginsidefailednation‐states.100


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Chapter 5 Training, Education, and Leader Development

5-1. Introduction

ARSOFanticipateafutureoperatingenvironmentwithsignificantchallengestoU.S.nationalinterestsandsecurity.Futureconflictswillbemorecomplex,withincreasingnumbersofnonstateactorsinheavilyurbanareasandwillinvolvefargreateruncertaintythanhasbeenexperiencedintherecentpast.Additionally,duringaneraoffiscalconstraint,ARSOFmayfacechallengesinrecruiting,training,managing,andretainingaforceofoperators.Withthesechallenges,ARSOFmustdevelopinnovativesolutionstotrain,educate,andretaintheworld’spremierSOFandmeetthedemandsofthefuturesecurityenvironment.

5-2. General

a. TrainingmustinstillinARSOFoperatorstheneedtounderstandthreatcapabilitiesandanticipateintentionspurposefullyandcontinuously.ARSOFmusttraintoprevailagainsthybridthreatsthatemployregularforces,irregularforces,andcriminalelementstoachievetheirobjectivesthroughanever‐changingvarietyofconventionalandunconventionaltactics.ARSOFmustremaincognizantofhowthesethreatsmightevolveandanticipatethetrainingrequiredtoneutralizeadversaryadvantages.

b. LanguageandCulturalTraining.ARSOFoperatorsmustreceivecomprehensivelanguageandculturaltrainingtosucceedinthefutureoperatingenvironment.Inaneracharacterizedbywaramidstpopulations,personalinteractionsinthehumandomaindeterminevictoryordefeat.ARSOFoperatorsandleadersmustbeconfidentwheninteractingwithpeopleofdifferentculturalbackgroundsandabletoapplyculturalconsiderationsintheplanningandexecutionofoperations.TrainingmustalsoextendtounderstandingandinteroperatingwithJIIMpartnersasateampriortodeployment.ThegreatertheunderstandingofJIIMculture,themoreeffectiveARSOFwillbeinmaximizingandintegratingJIIMcapabilitiesintooperationalplans.

c. OperationalizetheCONUSBase.Networked,web‐basedtrainingsolutionswillenableARSOFoperatorstorapidlyleveragecapabilitiesofcentersofexcellence,combatsubordinatecommands,andcommandsubordinateunits.Technologymustbeleveragedtoenabledynamictrainingamonggeographicallyseparatedunits.Tooptimizetraining,newcapabilitieswillbeneededinallofthetrainingenvironments:live,virtual,constructive,andgaming.Improvedmanagementoftrainingenablersandtheirsupportingarchitecture,aswellasdeploymentofmobilecapabilities(forexample,roleplayers,instrumentation,andobserver/controllersupport)toincreasetrainingbasesupport,willalsoberequired.

5-3. Sustaining Surgical Strike

a. ThefuturewillinvolvemanyoccasionswherenationalleadershipmayneedviablealternativestoexecutesurgicalstrikesinsupportofU.S.objectives.Maintainingtheedgeinsurgicalstrikecapabilitiesrequiresacontinuousevaluationoftrainingprograms,training,areas,andfacilities.ARSOFwillensurethetrainingprogramsandtrainingareasevolveto


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meetchallengesinfutureweaponscapabilitiesandtechnologicaladvancementsandinstillflexibilityinadaptingtonewtactics,techniques,andprocedures.Thisincludesmoreurbantrainingvenuestoaddressthetrendtowardmegacitiesaroundtheglobe.ARSOFwillleveragenewtechnologiesinvirtualenvironmentsthatallowscenariosimulationstraining.

b. FutureARSOFsurgicalstrikeunitswillrequiretrainingtoexecutemultiple,synchronized,andsimultaneousstrikesindepthagainstgeographicallydispersedtargets.Strikeunitsmustbecapableofconductingstrikemissionsatthetactical,operational,andstrategiclevelsinsupportofnationalorstrategicobjectives.Atthetacticallevel,theymustsupportachievingdesiredeffectsbeyondthecapabilitiesofconventionalorsurrogateforces.Atoperationalandstrategiclevels,strikeunitswillbetrainedtooperateunilaterallyorinconcertwithotherServicesorinteragencypartnersoroperateunilaterallyincomplexordeniedenvironments.Thisincludestheabilitytoconductforcedentryoperationsuptotheregimentallevelandtheabilitytoprosecuteoneormorefollowontargetssuchascommand,control,communications,computers,andintelligencenodes,terroristmissioncommandnodes,hardenedsitesfromairstrikes,keylogisticscenters,integratedairdefensesystems,andkeyinfrastructure.Inthecontextofspecialwarfare,strikeunitscanconductDAoperationsagainstcriticalmissioncommandnodesandinfrastructuretoweakentheenemy’sgriponthepopulation.

c. Futuresurgicalstrikeunitsmustbetrainedcontinuallyontheever‐improvingtechnologiesandtechniquesthatsupporttheF3EADtargetingmethodology.ARSOFtrainingisneededtoimprovethespeedoflethalornonlethaleffects,includingadvancingintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissanceandanalysiscapabilitiestofindandfixthetarget,sustainingasuperbforceforfinishingthetarget,improvingsiteexploitationtechniquesandprocedures,andimprovingthetimelinessofanalysisanddisseminationofexploitedinformation.

5-4. Evolving Special Warfare

a. WhileARSOFmustprovideongoingandevolvedtrainingtoretainthecurrentproficiencyinsurgicalstrikeoperations,greateremphasismustbeplacedonspecialwarfaretoraisethelevelcommensuratewithsurgicalstrikeproficiency.InSOFeducation,asinotherareas,ARSOFwillrebalancetheforceandtenaciouslyembraceindirectoperations.

b. Masteryofthelanguageandcultureofatargetenvironmentisanessentialprerequisiteinspecialwarfare.Thistypeofwarfareworksby,with,andthroughtheindigenouspopulation.Establishingtrustwithinthehumandomainwillrequireanunderstandingofthelocallanguageandanuancedappreciationfortheculturalandpoliticalenvironment.ThisisparticularlytrueforUWbecauseofthedemandsofextendedmissionsindeniedorhostileenvironmentswithminimalcommunicationsorothersupport.ARSOFwillexpandlanguageandculturalimmersiontrainingopportunitiestoleveragemultiplevenuesduringaperiodofconstrainedresources.ARSOFwillalsodevelopadvancedtrainingprogramsfocusingonthepreparationofUWcampaignsandthesurvivabilityofUWoperatorsinpoliticallysensitiveandhostileenvironments.101Additionally,recruitmentinitiativeswillincludeawideethnicandculturalrangeofU.S.citizens,includingfirst‐generationAmericanswithinnateforeignlanguagecapabilityandculturalknowledgeinspecifiedregions.

c. SOFCampaignPlannersandOperational‐LevelCapabilities.Todevelopholisticcapabilitiesattheoperationallevel,ARSOFwilldesignandplanlong‐duration,low‐visibility,SOF‐centriccontributionstocampaignsthatbridgetacticalSOFcapabilitytostrategicobjectives.102TheplanningprocesswillintegrateSOFoperationswithpartneroperationsand


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priorities,includingotherServices,alliesandU.S.Governmentagencies.Thesophisticationneededforthislevelofplanningrequiresformaltraining,education,andincentivesinordertodevelopandretainSOFcampaignplannersandoperational‐levelcapabilities.TheUSASOCPlanner’sHandbookmustbecomeanintegralpartoftraining.ARSOFwilldeveloppartnershipswiththeSchoolofAdvancedMilitaryStudiesandtheArmy’sFunctionalArea59strategicplannersbranchtomatureSOFoperationalartanddesign.CurriculadevelopedforSOFcampaignplannerswillencouragecriticalthinkingskillsandemphasizeinnovativeapproachestocampaigndesign.

d. MilitaryGovernance.ArmyCivilAffairs(CA)unitsrelyonexpertisetoeffectivelyimplementmilitarygovernanceatdistrict,province,state,andnationallevels.Inthefuture,ARSOFwillfillthoseexpertiseneedsinamannersimilartohowtheArmyobtainsmedicalandlegalprofessionals.WorkingwiththeArmy,ARSOFwilldevelopatrainingpipelinefornewdirect‐appointmentofficers.Thetrainingprogramwillbeacombinationofdistancelearningandclassroominstruction.Trainingvenuesmayincludebasicofficerleadershiptrainingtoregionalorientation.Further,anestablishedinstitutetosupportmilitarygovernancemaycontributetodevelopingpolicy,doctrine,andtrainingforthenewmilitaryoccupationalspecialty.

5-5. Common Areas of Training Support

a. Cyber.Toconductspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrike,ARSOFoperatorsmustunderstandhowtheircoreactivitiesareenabledandimpactedbythecyberdomain.ARSOFwilldevelopbasic,intermediate,andadvancedtrainingcapabilitiestofacilitatecyber‐enabledoperations.ThiseffortwillprovideARSOFwitharecognizedabilitytomitigatecyberthreatsandtousethecyberdomainforcoreactivities.Identifying,developing,andmanagingcybertalentwillremainessential.ARSOFwillleveragetheexpertiseofotherInteragencyandDODpartnerstoenhanceitstrainingcapabilities.103

b. Logistics.Trainingforthelogisticssupportfunctionwillneedtoimpartproficiencyintwospecificareas.ThefirstincludesprocessesusedbyCFfortheirequipmentacquisitionsandmaintenancetomaximizecommonalityandminimizecosts.ThesecondfocusesonnonstandardlogisticsforthesustainmentneedsuniquetoSFinareaswhereitisnecessarytoavoidattribution.Thetrainingshouldsupporttheplanning,coordination,integration,andexecutionofallARSOFoperationsandactivities,aswellasthedeliveryoflogisticsinpermissive,uncertain,orhostileenvironments.Suchtrainingwillbeapplicableforbothsurgicalstrikeandspecialwarfarecapabilities.

c. MilitaryInformationSupportOperations.MISOmustbecapableofanalyzingthesocialdynamicsofinsurgencyelementstodetermineappropriateinsurgentstosupportU.S.engagement.MISOeducationmustemphasizetheabilitytodevelopcampaignstomoveanaudiencefromonebehaviortoanotherusingculturallyrelevantstepsandprograms.104Additionally,MISOpersonnelwillbeencouragedtopursueeducationinoperationalresearchandanalysisandcorelabandsocialmediaanalysis,aswellasculturalanthropologyandpsychology.ARSOFwillexplorethepotentialforaninstitutetofosterdevelopmentofsocialtheory,doctrine,andcapabilitiesneededforspecialwarfare.


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5-6. Optimize Human Capital

a. Recruitment.FutureARSOFwillrequireasteadypipelineofspeciallyrecruited,assessed,selected,trained,employed,managed,andretainedpersonneltomaintainexpectedcapabilities.Asthepoolofpotentialrecruitsbecomessmaller,theServices,thegovernment,andtheprivatesectorwillcompeteforthemostqualifiedrecruits.Likewise,careerandfinancialenticementsandthestressofhighoperationaltemposinaustereenvironmentswillexposeARSOFtoincreasedattritionoftalent.ARSOFmustdevelopnewincentivesandrecruitingcampaignstocompeteforthebestcandidatesandtomaintaintrainedoperators.

b. Retention.Thetimeandexpenserequiredtocreate“thebesteducated,trained,andequippedspecialoperationsformationintheworld”makesretainingexperiencedSOFpersonnelmuchmoreimportantthanrecruitingnewpeople.105IntheU.S.military,nonadvancingpersonnelarenotretained.Accordingly,itisahighprioritytomanagethecareersofallgradesofARSOFpersonneltoaffordequalorgreateropportunitiesforadvancementcomparedtolessselectivemilitaryspecialties.

c. TalentManagement.Leaderdevelopmentisadeliberate,continuous,andprogressiveprocesstogrowARSOFoperatorsandArmyciviliansintocompetent,committedprofessionalleadersofcharacter.Leaderdevelopmentisaccomplishedthroughthecareer‐longsynthesisoftheoperational,institutional,andself‐developmentdomains.Ourleaderdevelopmentapproachmustbeall‐encompassingandcontinuous.Inthefuture,ARSOFmustemphasizeaformoftalentmanagementensuringhighlyskilledpersonnelaretrainedattherighttimeandservingintherightpositions.ThiswillprovidetheGCCswiththebestspecialoperatorsintheworld.SuchanapproachwillalsoprovidethebestplannersandadvisorsonspecialoperationsmissionstojointandArmystaffsandotherU.S.Governmentagenciesanddepartments.Defenseleadersandpolicymakerswillthusseeviablealternativesforsmall‐footprintandlow‐exposuresolutionstonationalsecuritychallenges.Thesehighlytrained,culturallyastute,agileSOFteamsandoperatorsalsoprovideuniquecapabilitiestoachieveU.S.objectiveswithsmallcostsandsmallexposure.Throughtheirunderstandingofthehumandomaininmanyofthemostsensitivecountries,ARSOFoperatorsalsosetthefoundationforinformedfutureU.S.policiesanddecisions.


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Chapter 6 Conclusion

Fiscalrealities,politicalconditions,andthechangingcharacterofwarfarewillchallengetheU.S. military’s ability to engage in large expeditionary land wars in the next decade. Incontrast, irregularwarfareand limited conflicts are certain topersist around theglobe andwill influencethe futureof theUnitedStatesand itsallies.Wenote thatmajorglobalsocial,political, informational, and economic trends are underway along with the convergingcompetition between nation‐states and nonstate actors. These forces are intertwined andcompeteforrelativesuperiorityoverthephysical,cognitive,andmoralsecurityandadequategovernance of key populations—a competition that will increasingly unfold in militarilysignificant urban terrain. To prevail in future low‐intensity conflicts, the United Stateswillrequire agile, adaptive, and culturally astute SOF operators and teams—the best educated,trained, and equipped special operations formations in the world.106 U.S. Army specialoperatorsmustprovidethenationwithanexpandedrangeofstrategicoptions,andwemusthoneourcapabilitiestodesign,plan,andconductmultiyearspecialoperationscampaignsthatintegratethefullsuiteofSOF/CF/JIIMandpartnercapabilities.Formorethan60years,ARSOFhaveremainedatthetipofthespearinthedefenseofournation.ARSOFhasmaintainedcontactwiththeenemywhilemakingtangiblecontributionstothenationthroughextraordinarysacrificefromourregimentsandourfamilies.ThefutureofARSOFarebuiltuponthefoundationofpastexperience,customs,traditions,andprovenemploymentconceptsamongthediverseorganizationsthatmakeupUSASOC.ARSOFhavealwaysfunctionedasastrategicbridgingforce,servingastheconnectivetissue:amongindigenousforcesandpopulations,withinourmilitary,andinsidetheinteragencycommunity.Whilethatcannotchange,wearenotcontenttomaintainthestatusquo.Evenwhileinthefight,wemustbecomestudentsofnotonlyouradversariesbutalsoofourpasttobuildonlessonslearnedfrompreviousengagements.Wealsomustgraspthefutureinordertodevelopthetechniquesandstrategiesnecessarytoremaintheforceofchoicefordecision‐makers.Itisimperativethatwebepreparedtomeetthesechallengeshead‐on.

ByembracingthechangesoutlinedwithintheAOpC,wewillbepreparedtothriveinthecomplexoperatingenvironmentofthe21stcentury.Byhoningourspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikecapabilitiesandmatchingthemwithstate‐of‐the‐arttechnologyusedbyeducatedandculturallysavvyoperators,wecanensurethedefenseofournationandaidthatofourpartners.


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Appendix A References

Section I: Required References

TRADOCPamphlet525‐3‐1,TheUnitedStatesArmyOperatingConcept:2016–2028,19August2010.http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525‐3‐1.pdf

UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SpecialOperationsForcesOperatingConcept,May2013.

UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SOCOM2020:ForgingtheTipoftheSpear,2012.

UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SpecialOperationsForces2020:TheGlobalSOFNetwork,2013.

Section II: Related References

ADP3‐05,SpecialOperations,31August2012.http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp3_05.pdf

ADRP3‐05,SpecialOperations,31August2012.http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_05.pdf

Army2020andBeyond:SustainmentWhitePaper,UnitedStatesArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand,30August2013.http://www.cascom.army.mil/PDF/Army%202020%20and%20beyond%20sustainment%20white%20paper%20globally%20responsive%20sustainment.pdf

ARSOF2022,UnitesStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommand,2013.http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF2022_vFINAL.pdf

Clapper,JamesR.,WorldwideThreatAssessmentoftheU.S.IntelligenceCommunity:StatementfortheRecordbeforetheSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,31January2012.http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2014%20WWTA%20%20SFR_SSCI_29_Jan.pdf

Cleveland,CharlesT.(LTG),andStuartL.Farris(LTC),“TowardStrategicLandpower,”Army,July2013.http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/towardsStrategic.pdf

ConceptofOperations(CONOPS)fortheGlobalSOFNetwork2020(GSN2020),JointRequirementsOversightCouncil,29July2013.

FM3‐05.2,ForeignInternalDefense,1September2011.https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_c/pdf/fm3_05x2.pdf

FM3‐05.231,SpecialForcesPersonnelRecovery,13June2003.https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_c/pdf/fm3_05x231.pdf

GlobalTrends2030:AlternativeWorlds,NationalIntelligenceCouncil,December2012.http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf


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Harrison,ToddandMarkGunzinger,StrategicChoices:NavigatingAusterity,CenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments,27November2012.http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2012/11/strategic‐choices‐navigating‐austerity/

IrregularWarfare:CounteringIrregularThreats,DepartmentofDefenseJointOperatingConcept,Version2.0,17May2010.http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/joc_iw_v2.pdf

JointRequirementsOversightCouncilMemorandum020‐10,(S/NF)UnconventionalWarfareJointIntegratingConcept(UWJIC)(U),Version1.0,1February2010.

JointRequirementsOversightCouncilMemorandum098‐11,(S/NF)UnconventionalWarfareDOTMLPFChangeRequestRecommendations(U),5July2011.

JP1,DoctrineoftheArmedForcesoftheUnitedStates,25March2013.http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf

JP1‐02,DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,8November2010(asamendedthrough16July2014).http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

JP3‐0,JointOperations,11August2011.http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf

JP3‐05,SpecialOperations,16July2014.http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf

JP3‐22,ForeignInternalDefense,12July2010.http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_22.pdf

JP3‐24,Counterinsurgency,22November2013.http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf

JP3‐26,Counterterrorism,13November2009.http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_26.pdf

JP3‐40,CombatingWeaponsofMassDestruction,10June2009.http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_40.pdf

MajorCombatOperations,DepartmentofDefenseJointOperatingConcept,Version2.0,December2006.

Odierno,RaymondT.(GEN),JamesF.Amos(GEN),andWilliamH.McRaven(ADM),StrategicLandpower:WinningtheClashofWills,6May2013.http://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/Strategic%20Landpower%20White%20Paper.pdf

OperationalEnvironmentsto2028:TheStrategicEnvironmentforUnifiedLandOperations,TRADOC,August2012.http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/TRADOC_Paper_Operational‐Environments‐to‐2028‐Strategic‐Environment‐for‐Unified‐Land‐Operations_AUG2012.pdf

Robinson,Linda,TheFutureofU.S.SpecialOperationsForces,CouncilonForeignRelations,CouncilSpecialReportNo.66,April2013.http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Special_Operations_CSR66.pdf

Smith,Rupert,TheUtilityofForce:TheArtofWarintheModernWorld,Vintage,NewYork,2008.


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SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21stCenturyDefense,DOD,3January2012.http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf

Szayna,ThomasS.andWilliamWelser,IV,RANDCorporation,DevelopingandAssessingOptionsfortheGlobalSOFNetwork,2013.http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR340/RAND_RR340.pdf

Thomas,JimandChrisDougherty,BeyondtheRamparts:TheFutureofU.S.SpecialOperationsForces,CenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments,2013.http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2013/05/beyond‐the‐ramparts‐the‐future‐of‐u‐s‐special‐operations‐forces/

TRADOC,CivilAffairsCapabilitiesBasedAssessment.1May2012.

TRADOCPam525‐3‐0,TheU.S.ArmyCapstoneConcept,19December2012.http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525‐3‐0.pdf

U.S.ArmySpecialOperationsCommandSilentQuest2013EventReports.

TheWhiteHouse,NationalSecurityStrategy,May2010.http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf


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Appendix B Required Capabilities

B-1. Mission Command

a. FutureARSOFrequireacomprehensiveSOFmissioncommandcapabilityinthejointoperationalenvironmentthatspansmultipleechelons,isscalableandadaptable,incorporatesSOF‐CF,andfullyinterfaceswiththeinteragencycommunitystructuresinordertobeagileandeffectiveandtorespondrapidlyinincreasinglycomplexenvironments.

b. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytostrengtheninteragencypartnershipsandfurtherleveragetheprivatesectorinordertooperationalizeexpertiseresidentingovernmentalagencies,academicinstitutions,andcommercialentitiesthatcannotbereplicatedinsmall‐footprint,forward‐posturedmissioncommandelements.110

c. FutureARSOFrequireexpertiseinSOFoperationalartthatenablesoperational‐levelheadquartersintheirefforttotietacticalcapabilitiestoregionalornationalstrategiesinordertoeliminatetheseamsandcoordinateeffortswithintheinteragencycommunity.111

d. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytoimproveSOFcampaigncoordinationattheNationalSecurityCouncillevelandtoincludeformulating,advocating,andpromulgatingSOF‐centricplansandoperationsforconsiderationtoprovidenationalleadershipoptionstoachieveU.S.objectivesusingsmall‐footprint,low‐visibility,andlow‐attributionactivities.112,113,114,115,116

e. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytosharemissioncommandsystemsandacommonoperatingpicture117(fromSF,CA,PsychologicalOperations[PSYOP],andsoon)thatbridgesSOFandCFmissioncommandinordertorapidlyshareinformation,integrate,andworkwithaspecialoperationsjointtaskforceheadquartersinthejointoperationalenvironment.Allparticipantsshouldbeonacommonnetworkthatprovidesseamlessvisibilityandcrosstalk.118

f. FutureARSOFrequirearangeofsecurecommunicationscapabilities(voice,data,imagery,andvideo)usingtraditionalandnontraditionalmeanstoprovideintegrated,timely,andrelevantinformationinajointoperationalenvironment.119

g. FutureARSOFrequireacivil‐militaryadvisorycapabilitythatcanleveragetheU.S.government’scivil‐sectorexpertisetoestablishglobalcivil‐militarycoordinationinajointoperationalenvironment.

h. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytosynchronizeArmycapabilities,otherServicecapabilities,andcapabilitiesofinternationalexpeditionarypartners,properlyincorporatingandsynchronizingtheeffortsofothergovernmentdepartments,agencies,andU.S.andinternationalnongovernmentagenciesinordertoeffectivelycoordinateoperationsinthejointoperationalenvironment.

i. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytosynchronizespecialwarfareoperationsgloballytoeffectivelyprioritizeanddeconflictspecialwarfareassetsandsupport.

j. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytoseamlesslyintegratetheGSN’ssupporttoTSOCeffortsinsupportofthegeographiccombatantcommandthroughthesynchronizationofregionalactivitiesandplanninginthejointoperationalenvironment.


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B-2. Intelligence

a. FutureARSOFrequirefullintelligencedatafederationandinteroperabilitywithCF,interagencypartners,jointforces,and—tothemaximumextentallowedbypolicy—withmultinationalpartnersinordertoprovideacommonoperatingpictureandpermitinformationexchangeamongstakeholdersglobally.120

b. FutureARSOFrequirethedevelopmentandmaintenanceofanARSOFintelligencecommonoperatingpicture,integratingnationalIntelligence,GCC,SOCOM,TSOC,open‐source,SF,CA,andMilitaryInformationSupport(MIS)informationtoprovideholisticsituationalunderstandingandsupportanalysisoftheoperatingenvironment.121

c. FutureARSOFrequireactivepartnershipsandcloseworkingrelationshipswiththeU.S.intelligencecommunityorganizationsinordertotacticallyexploitandanalyzenationalintelligencecapacities,includingspace‐relatedtechnologies;betterclandestinetagging,tracking,andlocating;andcyberandsocialmediacapabilitiesinconductingspecialoperations.122

d. FutureARSOFrequirecyberspacedomain‐enabledintelligencecapabilitiesthroughestablishmentofopen‐sourcecapability,includingsocialmediaexploitationandanalysis,inordertoenhanceintelligencefusioninthreatnetworkanalysis,humanterrainmapping,sentimentanalysis,trendanalysis,pattern‐of‐lifeanalysis,andpredictiveanalysis.123

e. FutureARSOFrequirecapabilitiestoprovidetimelysocioculturalinformationtoanygloballydeployedSOF(operators,units,headquarters,andcampaignplanners)fromCONUSexperts—includingDOD,U.S.Governmentagencies,andacademia—toprovideneededinformationtocampaignandoperationalplannersandindividualteamsandoperators.

f. FutureARSOFrequireorganicF3EADcapabilityinordertoprosecute,analyze,andexploitassignedtargetsinajointoperationalenvironmentinatimelymanner.

g. FutureARSOFrequireacapabilitytoanalyzeinformationandaccumulateintelligencethatresultfrompeacetimeandwartimeoperationsinordertoincreaseanduseresultantsituationalawarenessandknowledgeoverthedurationofspecialwarfarecampaigns.

B-3. Movement and Maneuver

a. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytomitigateanddefeatadvancedbiometricidentificationandverificationtechnologiestomitigateadversarytrackinginanyenvironment.124

b. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytomitigateanddefeatubiquitousurbansurveillanceandadvancedsurveillanceinordertosurviveandoperateinanti‐access/areadenial(A2/AD)environments.125

c. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytomaneuvertoapositionofadvantageinallenvironmentsinordertoinsertforces,employforces,influencerelevantaudiences,orcontrolordenysignificantareasinordertogenerateorenablethegenerationofeffectsinalldomainsandtheinformationenvironment.

d. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytoexecutepersonnelrecoveryonshortnoticeinordertorecoverpersonnelineverydeployedenvironment.


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e. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytofacilitateindigenousmaneuverinordertoleveragebothsurrogateandpartnerforcecontributionstoachieveU.S.objectives.

B-4. Fires

a. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytoselectivelyengageindividualpersonneloritemsofequipmentwithaman‐portable,low‐signature,low‐visibilityweaponsysteminbothurbanandruralenvironmentsandinallweatherconditionstoeffectivelyexecutespecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikeoperations.

b. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytoobservetheoperationalareaunderalllightandenvironmentalconditionstoconductSOFcoreactivities.

B-5. Protection

a. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytoinfiltrate,operate,andsurviveindeniedareasforanextendeddurationinalow‐visibilityfashion—withaminimalburdenofequipmentbulk,weight,andmass—inordertoexecuteUWoperations.126

b. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytoprovideorganicmedicalcapabilities,toincludedeployable,scalablesurgicalteamsthatwillleverageadvancedmedicaltechnologyinordertomitigateriskforitsforcesduringtrainingandoperationalmissionsworldwide.127

c. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytodevelopandsupportindividualalternatepersonalidentitiesinordertoretaincovertcapabilities,especiallyduringUWactivitiesindenied,hostile,orpoliticallysensitiveareas.

d. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytoleverageandadaptindividualdefensivetechnology,suchasadvancedbodyarmor,inordertoenhancesurvivabilityinhigh‐threatareas,especiallyduringsurgicalstrikeoperations.

e. FutureARSOFrequireanenhancedabilitytolocate,mitigate,andneutralizeimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs)inthreatareastoenhancesurvivabilityduringsurgicalstrikeandspecialwarfareoperations.

f. FutureARSOFrequireunmanned,remotelycontrolledcapabilitiesinthreatenvironmentsinordertolessenexposureofmountedordismountedpersonneltolandminesandIEDs.

B-6. Sustainment

a. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytoprovidelogisticsandsustainmenttospecialoperationsandintegrateCFsustainmentofsizesrangingfromsmallteamstolargeformations,inclusiveofcomponentsandservices,inconditionsrangingfrompermissivetodenied,tosustaintherequiredoperationaltemposinjoint,interagency,andmultinationalenvironments.

b. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytoobtainappropriatelyattributableindigenousweaponsandammunitionforpredeploymenttrainingandoperationsindeniedareasintheconductofcovertorclandestinecapabilities.


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c. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytosustainmultiplesimultaneousoperationsbyTSOCswithdirectsupportbyARSOFliaisonelementstoensureArmyServiceComponentCommandfulfillmentofARSOFrequirementsinlow‐signaturecampaignsandnamedoperations.

d. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytoplan,coordinate,synchronize,optimize,andexecutethedeliveryofnon‐unit‐relatedcargo(suppliesandequipment)andnon‐unit‐relatedpersonnelviaalltransportationmodes(air,ground,andsea)inordertoleveragetheseassetstodeploy,resupply,andsustainspecialoperatorsandindigenouspersonnelandforces.

e. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytoleverageArmyandjointtheaterlogisticscapabilitiesworldwideinordertominimizesustainmentcostsandexpandnonstandardlogisticscapability.

f. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytodevelopandmanagetheadministrationofsupportpersonnelrequiredtosustainoperatorsonspecificmissionsinordertoenablelow‐signatureoperationsunderallconditionsinallenvironments.

g. FutureARSOFrequireasustainmenttrainingcapabilitytobeestablishedwithjointandinteragencypartnerstodevelopprofessionalscapableofsustainingthefullspectrumofspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikeoperationsinallenvironments.

h. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilityoperatecollaborativelywithinanetworkedJointSupplyEnterpriseinordertoidentifyandselectsupplysources,scheduledeliveries,andreceiveandmanagesuppliesandequipmentinthejointoperationalenvironment.

B-7. Engagement (Influence)

a. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytorecruit,train,andeducate—includingin‐countryresidentprograms—SOFoperatorswithnativelanguageabilitiesandculturalknowledgeinallcriticallanguagesanddialectsinordertoplan,advise,andconductnuancedandeffectiveinform‐and‐influenceactivitiesthroughouttheglobe.

b. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytocreateinterdependentrelationshipswiththefullarrayofindigenousandnon‐U.S.entitiesthatimpactitsareaofoperationsinordertocoordinatetheobjectivesandallactivitiesthatimpacttheareaofoperations.

c. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytounderstandanddevelopregionalrelationships,understandculturalandlanguagebarriers,planforandexecutethecontrolandinfluenceofpopulationsandresources,anddevelopprofessionaldevelopmentprogramsthatdevelopregionalexpertisebeforeacrisiseruptstogrowandnurturealliesandtherebycontinueU.S.leadershipandinfluenceintheglobe.

d. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytoapplysubjectmatterexpertiseintheeffectsofMISoperations,toincludemarketing,persuasiveandtraditionalcommunication,anduseofsocialmediaandothercyber‐basedtoolsinordertointegrateandsynchronizelong‐duration,whole‐of‐governmentinfluenceeffortsforeachregionandglobally.128

e. FutureARSOFrequiretheabilitytodevelopaglobalnetworkofhost‐nationrelationships,activitiesandfootprintoffacilitiesandforcesinorderfortheUnitedStatestoretaintheabilitytoinfluenceworldeventslong‐term.


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f. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytoaddresssharedinterestsandenhancepartners’security,governance,economicdevelopment,ruleoflaw,andothercriticalfunctionstonurturepartnerswhoshareoradvanceU.S.interestsandobjectives.

g. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytoconductSOFengagementthatismorepurposeful,moreenduring,andmoreconsistent,withthesamepeopleandunitsengagingovertime(years,notweeks)inwaysthatslowlyanddeliberatelybuildandsustainenduringrelationshipsbasedonmutualtrustandconfidenceinordertoestablishandnurturepartnerswhoshareoradvanceU.S.interestsandobjectives.

h. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytoexecuteadiverserangeoflow‐visibility,culturallyastutemeanstoaccesspopulationsinordertooperateindeniedareasregardlessofthenatureofthehumanpopulation.

i. FutureARSOFrequirethecapabilitytoemploysocialmediamappingthatenablespredictivebehavioralanalysesandbothprecisionandmass‐targetengagementtosupportspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikeoperationswithnoordelayedattribution.


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Appendix C Special Warfare

C-1. Introduction

a. Purpose.ThisappendixprovidesafuturedepictionofspecialwarfareasakeypillarofARSOF.ItalsoprovidesanunderstandingofhowspecialwarfarecapabilitiesmustevolveandbeemployedbyARSOFtosupportfuturenationalobjectives.

b. Definitions.SpecialwarfareisanARSOFcriticalcapabilitythatsupportsjointforcecommandersandtheArmythrough“theexecutionofactivitiesthatinvolveacombinationoflethalandnonlethalactionstakenbyaspeciallytrainedandeducatedforcethathasadeepunderstandingofculturesandforeignlanguage,proficiencyinsmallunittactics,andtheabilitytobuildandfightalongsideindigenouscombatformationsinapermissive,uncertain,orhostileenvironment.”131ARSOFprovideadiscreet,precise,politicallyastute,andscalablecapabilityandassuchtheyfrequentlyundertakepoliticallysensitivemissions.

C-2. Scope

a. FutureSpecialWarfareForces.SpecialwarfareisanumbrellatermthatencompassesawiderangeofSOFcoreactivitiesoroperations132thatemphasizeworkingwithhostnations,regionalpartners,and/orindigenouspopulationsinaculturallyattunedmannertotransformconditionsintheenvironment.133KeytounderstandingspecialwarfareisrecognizingthattheUnitedStatesplaysasupportingrole.SF,PSYOP,CA,SOFaviation,Rangers,andsustainmentpersonnelprovidetheessentialleadershipforU.S.specialwarfareactivities.TheseactivitiesincludeUW,134FID,135COIN,136stabilityoperations,137SR,138andsecurityforceassistance.139However,regardlessoftheactivity,thehostnation,regionalpartner,ortheindigenouspopulationarethekeydriversofsuccess.

b. FutureIrregularThreatsandCapabilities.

(1) Thefuturethreatenvironmentisaworldthatislessconstrainedbyboundariesthaneverbefore.Theadvancesincommunications,cyber,andspacetechnologieshaveexpandedstateandnonstateactors’influenceandactivitiesfromthelocalleveltoachievingregionalandglobaleffects.Nation‐stateswillusesurrogatenetworksregionallyorgloballyinsupportofnationalinterests.VEOsandcriminalorganizationsaredisplayingtransnationalreachandestablishingregionalandglobalnetworkstosupporttheiroperations.Theseorganizationswillcombinedisparatecapabilitiesintohybridthreatsusingoneanother’snetworkswhenmutuallybeneficial.Forexample,narcoterroristorganizationsinSouthAmericancanleverageVEOorcriminalnetworksinAfricatomoveproducttotheEuropeanmarket.TheVEOortransnationalcriminalorganizationinAfricacanprovideprotectionandtransportationformoneybenefitingbothorganizations.

(2) ThepastdecadeofwarhasshownstateandnonstateactorshowtheUnitedStatesoperatesagainstthesetypesofnascentthreats.Asaresult,leadershipintheseorganizationswillbehardertoidentify,astheygenerallyoperateinadecentralizedmanner.TherecenthistoryofU.S.operationshasbeenpredicatedonkillingorcapturing


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leadershipofVEOs,representingacentralizedspider‐likenetworkapproachwhereattackingtheheadofthespider/organizationwilleliminatetheproblemandtheorganizationwilldissolve.Therealityisthattheseorganizationsarebecomingmoreresilientandresemblingadecentralizedstarfish‐likenetwork.Attackingaperceivedcentralizedleaderofanorganizationoftenturnsouttobeanarmofastarfish‐likeorganization.Theorganizationregeneratesbecausetherootoftheproblemwasnotidentifiedcorrectly.Toaddressthesestarfish‐likeorganizations,theU.S.militaryrequiresanestablishedglobalnetworktocounterordestroyaglobalnetwork.FutureARSOFwillcounterthesestarfish‐likenetworksbyexecutingmultipleandsimultaneousoperationsin‐depthglobally.

C-3. Evolving Conceptual Aspects of Special Warfare

a. ExecutingMultipleSimultaneousOperationsIn‐Depth.

(1) Inordertoaddressthethreats,challenges,andopportunitiesofthefutureoperatingenvironment,ARSOFrequirethecapabilitytoexecutemultiplesimultaneousoperationsin‐depthglobally.Asitdoestoday,USSOCOMprovidesglobalintegrationwithsurgicalstrikeoperations.Italsoprovidesstrategicdirectionforongoingspecialwarfareactivities.

(2) Atthetheaterlevel,TSOCsintegratespecialwarfareactivitiesintothedisparateelementsofthevarioustheatercampaignorengagementplans.Theyalsodirectoperationsunlessaspecialoperationsjointtaskforceexiststocoveraspecificoperationsuchasahumanitarianreliefeffort.USASOCmayalsoprovidethenucleusofaheadquarterstoprosecuteaspecialwarfarecampaignthatoverlapsgeographiccombatantcommandboundaries.

(3) ARSOFwillsettheconditionsforsuccessfulspecialwarfarepredominantlyduringsteady‐state.However,ARSOFwilluseindividualsandorganizationscapableofoperatingwithaminimalsignaturetogatheroperationaldataandestablishunilateral,bilateral,andmultilateralmechanismsregardlessoftheenvironment.DoingsowillallowARSOFtomaintaintheinformationedgeoverpotentialadversaries.

(4) Whetherduringatheatercampaignorwithinthenarrowerconfinesofaspecificspecialwarfareactivity,partofSOFoperationalartwillbetoappropriatelyintegratesurgicalstrikecapabilities.Whenacommander—SOForCF—identifiesa“singlepointoffailure”withinanadversaryorganization,ARSOFcanexecuteasurgicalstrikethatcouldcrippletheadversarywhileavoidingcollateraldamageanditsnegativepropagandavalue.

b. NewConceptualApproach.

(1) Drivenbythespeedofchangeinthefutureoperatingenvironment,ARSOFwillexplorenewconceptualapproaches.Distinctconceptchangescanleadtoabetterorchestrationofthetraditionalsevenspecialwarfareactivitiesintoanimprovedtime‐phased,globallyintegrated,regionalcampaign.ARSOFwillenhanceitslegacyoflow‐signature,small‐footprintandbehind‐the‐scenesworknecessarytoexcelinspecialwarfare.ThiswillrunfromUSSOCOMthroughtheTSOCstotheunitsandindividualoperatorsontheground.

(2) AnexampleofanewconceptualapproachisCounterUW.MorethansimplyFID,CounterUWisastrategybywhichARSOFexposesandattacksthestrategyofathreatinsurgency


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primarilythroughanindigenousforce.CounterUWpositsthatterrorismisatacticusedbyanadversarywithinanoverallUWstrategy.Usingelementsoftheirabilitytoconductmultiplesimultaneousoperations,ARSOFortheirGSNpartnersassisttheindigenousforcesincounterorganizingandconductingremote‐areaoperations.ThroughJIIM,ARSOFconnectstheindigenousforceswithlawenforcementandintelligenceinsanctuarycountriestodeprivethethreatofanysafehaven.

(3) MuchasUSSOCOMcurrentlyhastheauthoritytofightVEOswithoutrespecttoGCCboundaries,inthefutureitshouldhavetheauthoritytoconductspecialwarfarecampaignsglobally.Doingsowouldnotrepresentaduplicationofeffort.Currentorganizationsareoptimizedforsurgicalstrike—astheyshouldbe.Theyaddressproblemsprimarilythroughkineticmeans.Specialwarfareconcentratesoninfluencingthehumandomaintoachieveitsendsaspartofapartnershipwithhostnations,regionalpartners,and/orindigenouspopulations.

c. BuildingandLeveragingtheGSN.

(1) TheverynatureofthefutureoperatingenvironmentdemandsthatARSOFcombatstate‐sponsoredorglobalVEOswithaglobalnetwork.Ittakesanetworktofightanetwork.ARSOFleveragesthelocalknowledgeandpresenceoftheindividualcomponentsoftheGSNtoachieveresultswhichmightnotbepossibleindividually.ARSOFrecognizesthatitisbettertosupportthelocalGSNcomponentforarelativelylongtimeasitaddressesaproblemratherthanyieldtothetemptationtostepinandsolvetheproblemwithU.S.forces.

(2) TheGSNcannotdefeatglobalnetworksbyitself.ARSOFwillsynchronizetheeffortsoftheGSNparticipants,RAF,andthenetworksofourJIIMpartners.Suchanapproachwillmakemoreefficientuseofresourcesyetstillallowswift,decisiveactiontopreventorreacttocrisesaroundtheglobe.Also,itwillallowsufficienttimefortheUnitedStatestoactivatereserveforces,ifneeded.

(3) MirroringtheGSN,theregionallyalignedCFestablishtheirnetworkswithotherpartnernationCF,buildingcapabilitiesandthecapacitytodefendtheircountryortoactasanexpeditionaryforceinsupportofglobalchallenges.TheRAFnetworkmustbecoordinatedandsynchronizedwithinatheatertoachievedesiredregionalandglobaleffects.TheadditionofUnitedStatesMarineCorpsgroundforceswillyieldamaturestrategiclandpowernetworkthatcanleverageUAPstoreactinatimelymannertoregionalorglobalissues,reducingtherequirementforlarge‐scaleU.S.combatformations.

d. DevelopingHybridStructures.

(1) Strategic,operational,andtacticalconditionswillcontinuetodriveSOFandCFstructuresandcapabilitiesthatcontinuallyadjusttochangingenvironments.Ahybridforcestructureoftenallowsforthegreatestflexibilitytoreacttocrisisorcontingencyaroundtheworld.FutureARSOFspecialwarfareoperationsmaybeSOF‐specific,SOF‐centric,orCF‐centric.AstheoperationsinnorthernIraqandAfghanistanshowed,ARSOFcantransitionfromSOF‐onlytoSOF‐centrictoCF‐centricveryquickly.Therefore,ARSOFwillemployhybridmissioncommandstructurestoenablethetransition.

(2) AnexampleofaSOF‐centricscenarioisaspecialwarfarecampaignthatwasinitiallyasmall‐footprintoperationrequiringverylimitedCFsupport.Overtime,thecampaign


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expandsintoalargerareathatrequiresmoreCFcapabilitiesforstabilityoperations,whichthehybridmissioncommandstructureintegratesintothecampaignunderSOFmissioncommand.

(3) Futureadversarieswillcontinue,asamatterofcourse,toattackorganizationalweakpoints,ofwhichseamsareaprimeexample.OneofthedistinctadvantageshybridstructuresconveytoARSOFinthefutureistheavoidanceofsuchseams.Buttheadvantagesarenotpurelydefensive.IntegratingSOFandCFcapabilitiesinahybridstructureallowscommanderstoapplycombatpowerpreciselytoattaincountry,regional,orglobalobjectives.

e. OperationalizingtheCONUSBase.

(1) TwoprimaryfactorsdrivetheneedtooperationalizetheCONUSbase.Thefirstistherelativescarcityofnecessaryforcesandexpertise.Thesecondfactor—demand—isafunctionofthepersistentnatureofspecialwarfareandtheglobalnatureoftheproblem.Problemscanariseanywhere,soitrequiresagloballydispersedelementaswellasameansofreinforcingitseffortsasthesituationdictates.

(2) ARSOFCONUS‐basedforcesprovidecontinuousregionalexpertisetoforwarddeployedforcesconductingspecialwarfare.USASOCroutinelyprovidesoperationalplannerexpertisetotheTSOCstomoreeffectivelyplanandexecutespecialwarfarecampaigns.TheARSOFCONUS‐basedforcesusetheirproximitytointeragencypartners,subjectmatterexperts,andacademiatoprovidethebestsolutionstoachieveunifiedaction.

(3) Inordertoaddresstheshiftingsocialandeconomicconditionsofthefutureoperatingenvironment,ARSOFleverageCONUS‐basedcapabilitiesinMISOandCAoperations.DoingsomitigatestherelativescarcityofCAandPSYOPunits.CONUScapabilitiesalsoincludeone‐of‐a‐kindfacilitiesandinstitutionsthatprovideglobalspecialwarfaresupport,recognizingtheirvitalroleinspecialwarfare.

f. ExpandingJIIMCoordination.

(3) CounteringfuturethreatswillrequireacoordinatedandsynchronizedJIIMeffort.Suchanapproachisbothresource‐efficientandoperationallyeffective.ThismaturedJIIMinterfaceidentifiesglobalchallengesearlyandallowsdecision‐makerstheabilitytoaddressthechallengewiththeappropriatetoolstoinfluenceanddeterconflict.Furthermore,thematuredJIIMinterfaceprovidesexpeditionaryactionintimesofcrisis,respondingtohumanitariandisastersoractsofwar.

(4) TomaximizetheoperationaleffectivenessofJIIMcooperation,ARSOFwilluseanimprovedsystemofcommunication.ThissystemismodeledonthenationalresponseframeworkandprovidesacontextforhowtheJIIMcommunityworkstogether.Itconsistsofacommonsuiteofcommunicationsequipment,acommonlexicon,andasetofcommunicationandnetworkprotocols.Italsorecognizesdecisionpointsthatmark,forexample,thetransitionfromanapproachledbytheDODtooneledbytheDepartmentofState.

(5) Todecreasethefrictionattendantwithanycooperativeeffort,ARSOFseeksandobtainsthenecessaryauthoritiestoconductJIIMcooperation.ThiseffortconcentratesprimarilyonTitles10,22,and50oftheU.S.C.Insomecases,thisinvolvesstreamliningauthorities;inothercases,itinvolvesexpandingorclarifyingauthorities.


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C-4. Conclusion

FutureARSOFforcesprovidescalable,regionallyexpertforcescapableofexecutingthemostdifficultspecialwarfarecampaignsinallglobalenvironmentstoaccomplishnationalobjectives.FutureARSOFforcesexecuteglobalspecialwarfarecampaignsthroughgloballynetworkedUAPstoshape,deter,anddefeatadversariesandtobuildUAPcapabilitiesandcapacityforcountry,regional,andglobalobjectives.Successfulspecialwarfarecampaignsintegratesurgicalstrike,JIIM,andCFcapabilitiestoachievedecisivestrategiclandpoweractions.


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Appendix D Surgical Strike

D-1. Introduction

a. Purpose.ThisappendixprovidesabriefdescriptionofsurgicalstrikeasoneofthetwokeypillarsofARSOF.ItalsoexplainstheneedforARSOFtoevolveandenhanceitsalreadyformidablesurgicalstrikeunitsandcapabilitiestosupportfuturenationalobjectives.

b. Definition.Surgicalstrikeisdefinedas“theexecutionofactivitiesinaprecisemannerthatemployspecialoperationsforcesinhostile,denied,orpoliticallysensitiveenvironmentstoseize,destroy,capture,exploit,recover,ordamagedesignatedtargetsorinfluencethreats.”140CurrentlyARSOFprovidetheworld’spremierstrikeforce,capableofrapidlydeployinggloballyandsuccessfullyexecutingthecompletespectrumofsurgicalstrikecapabilitiesunilaterallyorcollaborativelywithprecision,lowvisibility,andminimalcollateraldamage.ThescopeofasurgicalstrikeoperationcanvaryfromasinglesnipertoaRegimentexecutingtheforcibletakeoverofanenemyairfield.141Thecommoncharacteristicistheprecisionnatureoftheoperationwhencomparedtoconventionaloperations.

D-2. Scope

a. FutureARSOFsurgicalstrikeforcesmustrapidlyplan,prepare,synchronize,andexecutesurgicalstrikemissionsinafluidenvironmentwithinanarrowingwindowofopportunityforplanningandexecutionagainstincreasinglycapableadversaries,asexplainedinthenextsection.

(1) Inaddressingthethreats,challenges,andopportunitiesofthefutureoperatingenvironment,ARSOFrequirethecapabilitytoexecutemultiplesimultaneousoperationsin‐depth,globally.Asitdoestoday,USSOCOMprovidesglobalintegrationwithsurgicalstrikeoperations.Italsoprovidesstrategicdirectionforongoingspecialwarfareactivities.

(2) Atthetheaterlevel,theTSOCswillintegrateallSOFactivitiesintothedisparateelementsofthevarioustheatercampaignorengagementplans.Theyalsodirectoperationsunlessaspecialoperationsjointtaskforceexiststocoveraspecificoperation.USASOCmayalsoprovidethenucleusofaheadquarterstoprosecuteaspecialwarfarecampaignthatoverlapsgeographiccombatantcommandboundaries.

(3) FutureARSOFstrikeforceswillrequireexpandedauthoritiesandglobalresponsiveness,aswellascutting‐edgetechnologies,surrogates,andGSNpartners.Theseactivitiescouldbeconductedunilaterallyorexecutedinsupportof(andoftensupportedby)otherelementsofabroaderjointand/orspecialoperationsforcewithanexusofsituationalawarenessandspecialoperationsexpertiseintheTSOCs.

b. Thefutureoperatingenvironmentwillbecomplexanddemanding.Adversariesandthreatsbeyond2022mayincludeconventionalandunconventionalforces,irregularmilitiasandparamilitaries,terroristgroups,andcriminal/nation/surrogatehybridorganizations.Thethreatmaybenetworkedvicehierarchicalandmaybeindependentofasovereign,


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functioningstate.Threatswillbecomplexandadaptiveandmaybeequippedwithsophisticatedtechnology.WMDtechnologieswillproliferate,andinformationandcommunicationstechnologycapabilitieswillexpandamongactorsofalltypes.Thethreatwilltrytoasymmetricallyopposeoureffortsandwillleverageanincreasinglycomplexandurbanhumandomain.ThreatswilluseA2/ADstrategiestorestrictourglobalposture.Thelasttwelveyearshasshownthatdefeatingnetworked,complex,nontraditionalthreatsrequiresaflattenedmissioncommandstructurecapableofprovidingnear‐real‐timesituationalawarenesstosupportdecentralizedoperations.Theconditionsinthefutureoperatingenvironmentwillmakeitincreasinglydifficulttoengageglobaltargetsdiscriminatelyandpreciselyduetothecomplexityofenvironmentandtheubiquityofmobilecommunications.

D-3. Evolving Conceptual Aspects of Surgical Strike

a. NationalStrategyImplications.Againstthisbackdropofevolvingthreats,theUnitedStatesisenteringaneraoffiscalausteritywiththeexpectationofmilitarybudgetcutsandpersonneldrawdowns.Thisfiscalclimateandthenation’sexperiencesinIraqandAfghanistanhaveshiftednationalobjectivesandglobalengagementsothatmilitarycampaignsarelesslikelytobelarge‐scaleconventionaloperations.Andwhileglobaltrendsandenduringconflictspresentthefutureoperatingenvironmentascomplex,dangerous,andunpredictable,142theUnitedStatesiscurrentlywithoutanyoverallnationalsecuritystrategy.143Theresultisapremiumplacedonhighlyagileandadaptiveforces,especiallyatthelowendoftherangeofmilitaryoptions.

b. InteragencyandIntergovernmentalCoordination.Overthenextdecade,ARSOFwillsustainandevolvetheexistingsurgicalstrikecapabilityintoamorelethal,responsive,andflexibleforcestructurecapableofleveragingtheJIIMspectrumandGSNpartnersandincorporatingadvancedtechnologiestoconductstrikemissionsagainstthemostdifficultoftargetsglobally.TheGSNisaninterdependent,worldwidenetworkofSOFstrategicallystationedandemployedwithenhancedforces,capabilities,infrastructure,andsupport.Inaddition,therearenumerousU.S.interagencyandintergovernmentalpartnersoperatingbothathomeandabroad.ThenumberofARSOFliaisonswiththesepartners,CONUSandoutsideCONUS,isseverelylimitedcomparedtowhattheGSNwillrequire.ThesepartnerscanenhanceSOFregionalunderstandingandculturalawareness.Cross‐pollinationofliaisonsbetweenTSOCstaffsandcorrespondinginteragencyandintergovernmentalpartnerswouldgreatlyfacilitateinformationexchangeandprovidemutualsupportduringtime‐sensitivesurgicalstrikeoperationsconductedinsupportoftheatercampaignplansorcrisisintervention.ThiswouldallowtheTSOCtostreamlineinformationflow,enhancesituationalawareness,andleverageallpossiblenationalassetsduringasurgicalstrikemission.

c. MissionCommandAuthorities.Duringacrisis,theprocesstogainapprovalauthoritiescanbehighlytime‐consuming.Theapprovalprocessmustevolveandbetime‐sensitiveandstreamlined,sufficienttokeeppacewiththerapiddynamicchangesthatwilloccurintheglobalsecurityenvironment.TheTSOCswillrequireenhancedauthoritiesforTSOCcommanderstofacilitateARSOFsurgicalstrikesandactualizetheresponsivenessfromfutureARSOFstrikeunits.

d. StrategicLandpowerConcept.FutureSOFcapabilitiestoexecutesurgicalstrikesmeshwellwithevolvinglandpowerconcepts,includingIntegratedDistributedOperations.Surgicalstrikestodisableanactiveintegratedairdefensesystemmaybepartofalargerconventionalcampaign.RapidadvancementsinA2/ADtechnologies“willlimittheabilityofCFtofly


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combatairmissions,maneuveratsea,gainlodgmentsashore,establishsecureforwardoperatingbases,communicateatlongranges,andsustainthemselveslogistically”andwillthereforedriveanongoingneedforARSOFtounderstandandevolvetokeepviablesurgicalstrikeoptionsaheadofthosedefensivecapabilities.

e. TheAir‐SeaBattleConcept.ThisconcepthasincreasedinrelevanceduetotheshiftofU.S.strategicfocustothePacificandtheMiddleEast.Theconcept’svisionof“networked,integrated,andattack‐in‐depthoperationsrequirestheapplicationofcross‐domainoperationsacrossalltheinterdependentwarfightingdomains(air,maritime,land,space,andcyberspace),todisrupt,destroy,anddefeatA2/ADcapabilitiesandprovidemaximumoperationaladvantagetofriendly,joint,andcoalitionforces.”Whileitminimizestheuseoflandpower,itdoesnoteliminatetheneedforlandforces.Similartothestrategiclandpowerconcept,somefutureA2/ADenvironmentsrequirelandforces—and,specifically,surgicalstrikes—tohelpstripawaysomeelementsofanadversariesA2/ADmechanisms.ARSOFmustworktoremainrelevantinordertoprovidethecapabilitiesneededforSOF‐ledexpeditionarycampaignsinsupportoftheAir‐SeaBattleConcept.

f. Multiple,SimultaneousEngagements.Thewaronterrorhasshownthatdecapitationofaterroristnetworkhaslimitedeffectivenesssincethenetworkwillquicklypromotenewleadership.Ithasalsoshownthatdisablingmultiplenodesandleadershiphasamuchgreatereffectondisruptingordestroyingtheorganization.Threatnetworkstodaycandisperserapidlywhenwarnedofongoingattacksagainstotherthreatorganizations.SequentialactivitiesthuslessentheimpactofoperationsagainstVEOnetworks.Tooptimizeitseffectiveness,ARSOFwilldevelopthecapabilitytoconductsimultaneousattacksagainstmultiple,geographicallydispersedtargets.Thelimitingfactorforresponsetimesisoftenstrategicliftortherequirementtohaveco‐locatedliftassets.ARSOF’ssurgicalstrikecapabilitywillneedtoincludesufficientcapacitytoperformseveralsimultaneousoperationsindifferentlocations,whichwillprecludeotherelementsgoingtogroundwhenonenodeorleaderisattacked.

g. GlobalResponseandEngagement.

(1) SometheatreshaveforwarddeployedARSOFcrisisresponseforces,somehaveforwarddeployedARSOFcrisisresponseforcesonarotationalbasis,andsomeARSOFcrisisresponseforcesareCONUS‐based.ThededicatedstrikeforcesbasedinCONUSincreaseresponsetimestocrisesandrestrictthemilitaryoptionsavailabletodecision‐makersduetotimeanddistance.OrganizingallARSOFcrisisresponseforcesasaforwarddeployedpackageundertheTSOCwouldproviderobustsurgicalstrikepackagesthataregloballyposturedandresponsivetocontingenciesandcapableofsupportingCONUS‐basedassetsduringdeliberateoperations.

(2) ThelikelihoodoftheemploymentofaWMDbynonstateorsurrogateactorsincreasesovertime.WMDproliferationnetworksaremultifunctionalandmultidimensional;consistofstateand,increasingly,independentnonstateactors;aredynamicandadaptiveandcanbetransnational;havedifferingmotivationsanddesiredendstates;andoperateinsecrecytoavoiddetectionandcounteraction.144WMDcounterproliferationandreactionactivitiesarealsoprimaryexamplesofthenecessitytomaintainandleverageGSNandJIIMinterrelationships.

h. PartnerNation,Indigenous,andSurrogateForces.Therearenumerousnationallevelpartnerforces,bothmilitaryandcivilian,withwhomARSOFdoesnotengagenorhavean


46

enduringrelationship.Futuresurgicalstrikeforceswillengagepartnernationsecurityforcesthroughexercisesandothervenuestoincreasemutualunderstandingandcooperationindefeatingthreatnetworks.Thiswillalsoprovideinsightsandawarenessofthepartner’scapabilities,limitations,threats,andsupportingassets.Theserelationshipswillpayoffduringacrisisinterventionorasurgicalstrikewithenhancedsituationalawarenessandtheabilitytosynchronizeandmutuallysupportoperations,ortosupportsurrogatestrikesthatfurtherU.S.interests.ThiseffortcanbesynchedandnestedwithotherARSOFpartnershipbuildingeffortsacrosstheGSN.

i. F3EADRequirements.Surgicalstrikeunitswillusearobustcapabilitytofuseintelligencefunctionsandoperationstoaccomplishnationalandtheaterobjectives.Thesecellswillenablecommanderstoestablishtargetpriorities;anticipateandpredictadversarialactions;identify,locate,andtargetoppositionforces;andperformintelligenceanalysisandexploitation.Thiswillenhanceunderstandingoftheoperationalenvironmentandpossiblethreats,facilitatethedevelopmentofconceptplans/operationplanforfuturecontingencies,andincreaseopportunitiestosuccessfullyexecutetime‐criticalstrikes.OrganicF3EADcapabilityallowsTSOCstooperateinamoreresponsiveandunilateralmannerasrequiredwhenfacedwithacrisisorcontingency.

j. Communications.Surgicalstrikeforceswillusereal‐timesimultaneousTopSecret‐leveltextcommunications“chat”withdozensofparticipants,toincludestrike‐trainedpersonnel,ARSOFregional/countryexperts,U.S.ArmyCF,andapplicableintelligencecommunityexperts.TomaximizetheoperationaleffectivenessofJIIMcooperation,ARSOFrequireasystemofcommunicationsmodeledonthenationalresponseframework.Thisconsistsofacommonsuiteofcommunicationsequipment,acommonlexicon,andasetofcommunicationandnetworkprotocolsinordertoprovidethebasisfortheJIIMcommunityworkingtogether.

k. TechnologyRequirements.

(1) Inthefuture,manytechnologyadvancementswillbereadilyavailabletothepublicandmaybeusedbyadversaries.Jointandcooperativeresearcheffortswillleveragesignificantadvancementsforsurgicalstrikeapplicationsandwilldevelopcounterstoadvancementsbyadversariesinareasincludingthefollowing:

• Cyber.

• Electronicwarfare.

• Directedenergy.

• Informationtechnologies.

• Kineticpenetrators.

• Nonlethalmunitions.

• Sensors.

• Robotics.

• Space.

• Command,control,communications,computers,intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance.

• Unmannedgroundvehicles.


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• Energystorage.

• Low‐visibilitystealthtechnologies.

Andresearchwillcontinueprovidetospecialoperations“theclassics,”suchasadvancedweaponry145andimprovedbodyarmor.

(2) Commandelementsandteamspreparingfor,supporting,andexecutingsurgicalstrikeswillbeabletoreceiveandproduceimageryoftheobjectiveareasworldwide.

D-4. Conclusion

Theoperatingenvironmentbeyond2022willbeuncertain,complex,andmultidimensional,encompassingnumerousvariables.U.S.nationalsecuritystrategyislikelytobedynamicand—whenforceisauthorizedtoachievenationalobjectives—minimizationofcollateraldamageandtheeffectsonnontargetpersonnelandfacilitiesislikelytobecritical.Tomeetthesechallenges,ARSOFmustcontinuouslyevolveasophisticatedrangeofsurgicalstrikeoptionsfordecision‐makers.Doingsowillrequireidentifyingopportunitiestoenhanceconcepts,methodologies,andpartnershipsandadoptingemergingtechnologiesoverthenextdecadetoensurethatARSOFstrikeforcesremainthemostagileandeffectiveintheworld.


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Appendix E Special Operations Forces-Conventional Forces Interdependence E-1. Introduction

ThisappendixtoTheARSOFOperationalConcept2022describeshowARSOFwillintegrateSOFandCFintofuturecampaignstoachievedunifiedlandoperationsworldwide.

Challenge: ARSOF must bridge the critical seams of SOF‐Conventional Force and SOF‐Interagency relationships to effectively contribute

to unified action in the 21st century by partnering with the Army to meet its Title 10 collective training responsibilities.

2022 Vision: ARSOF will create an integrated training environment to improve USASOC’s ability to provide trained and ready operational‐level SOF

to ground combatant commanders worldwide, while promoting increased SOF‐CF interdependence.

– ARSOF 2022

E-2. Importance and Definition

a. Specialoperationsprovidejointforcecommandersandambassadorswithdiscreet,precise,andscalableforcesthroughunilateralactivitiesorworkingwithandthroughindigenousforces.ThelastdecadeofwarhasshowntheimportanceofSOF‐CFinterdependencetoachievetactical,operational,andstrategicobjectives.ThejointoperationalenvironmentandfiscalconstraintsmovingintothefuturewillmakeSOF‐CFinterdependenceevenmoreimportant.

b. Interdependenceisdefinedas“thedeliberateandmutualrelianceofoneunifiedactionpartneronanother’sinherentcapabilitiestoprovidecomplementaryandreinforcingeffects.”146SOF‐CFinterdependenceenablesjointforcecommanderstoselecttheoptimalforcecompositionacrosstherangeofmilitaryoptionstoachievenationalobjectives.Thesizeofthreat,operationalenvironment,andpoliticalsensitivitywilldetermineifoperationsareSOF‐specific,SOF‐centric,orCF‐centric.

E-3. SOF-Specific Campaign

a. FutureSOF‐specificcampaignsoroperationswillhaveasmall‐footprintforcestructureexecutingsurgicalstrikesorspecialwarfarecampaignsthroughandwithindigenousforcesinpoliticallysensitive,hostile,ordeniedareas.Thesecampaignsoroperationswilltypicallyuselethalandnonlethalforcetoaccomplishstrategic,operational,andtacticalobjects.Futuresurgicalstrikesmayhaveunilateraldirectactionmissionsexecutedinalow‐visibilityorclandestinemannertokillorcaptureVEOpersonnel,rescuehostages,interdictWMD,recoverpersonnelorequipment,anddamageordestroydesignatedtargets.147


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b. FutureSOF‐specificspecialwarfarecampaignsmayexecutesmall‐scale,long‐termUWactivitiesthroughandwithindigenouselementstocoerce,disrupt,oroverthrowagovernmentoroccupyingpowerorconductFIDactivitiesinpoliticallysensitiveenvironments.148AnotherelementoffutureSOF‐specificcampaignsissurgicalstrikeandspecialwarfareinterdependenceleveragingeachother’scapabilitiestoachievedesiredeffects.OneexampleisasurgicalstrikeconductedinsupportofaUWcampaignforaspecificdesiredeffect.Inaddition,futureSOF‐centriccampaignsandoperationswillbesynchronizedbytheTSOCandhaveaSOFmissioncommander.

E-4. SOF-Centric Campaign

FutureSOF‐centriccampaignswillbespecialwarfarecampaigns(FIDandUW)andCToperations.149Thethreeoperationswillbesmall‐scale150withthemajorityofthegroundforcesbeingSOF.TheseSOFcampaignsmaybelong‐terminnature,requiringacontinualrotationofforcesintheatertoaccomplishlong‐termU.S.objectives.TheTSOCwillhaveoperationalcontrolofallforces,andaSOFcommanderwillhavetacticalmissioncommandofoperations.AnotheraspectofaSOF‐centriccampaignisCFsupportingoperationswithkeyenablers.CFmayprovideintelligenceassets,forcestoprovidesecurityortrainingwhereSOFhaslimitedexpertise,medicalsupport,transportation,sustainment,andmorecombatpowerasrequired.AfutureSOF‐centriccampaignmaybeapoliticallysensitiveenvironmentsuchasYemen,requiringsmall‐footprintSOFforcesandlimitedCFenablersupport.

E-5. CF-Centric Campaign

FutureCF‐centriccampaignsandoperationswillbeexecutedwhenanoperationisbeyondthecapacityorthecapabilitiesofSOFforces.CF‐centricoperationswillencompassMCO,COIN,andstabilityoperations.151InCF‐centricoperations,CFwillhavethemajorityofforcesontheground,withaCFcommanderexecutingoverallmissioncommand.SOFsupportCF‐centricoperationsbyprovidingspecialoperationscapabilitiestosupportunifiedactionandunifiedlandoperations.SOFsupporttoCF‐centricoperationsmayincludeoperationsandactivitiessuchasexecutingprecisionsurgicalstrikestoseize,destroy,capture,exploit,recover,ordamagedesignatedtargets;executingforcibleentryoperationstoestablishlodgmentforinsertingfollow‐onforces;andtraining,advising,andassistingindigenousforces.

E-6. Evolving Campaigns

FuturecampaignsmayevolvefromaSOF‐specifictoSOF‐centrictoCF‐centricandtransitionbacktoSOF‐centricorSOF‐specificcampaigns.OperationENDURINGFREEDOM–Afghanistanillustratessuchacombinationofthethreeoperations(SOF‐specific,SOF‐centric,andCF‐centric).TheinitialphaseoftheAfghanistanWarwasaSOF‐centricoperationwithSOFelementsinfiltratingandlinkingupwiththeNorthernAllianceforcesexecutinganunconventionalwarfarecampaigntoremovetheTalibanfrompower.The5thSpecialForcesGroupteamssynchronizedandassistedtheNorthernAllianceforceswhileconductingmaneuveronhorsebacktotheeventualliberationofMazar‐eSharif.152TheoperationcontinuedtoevolvewiththeadditionofCFtransitioningintoCF‐centricoperationsandmissioncommand.SOFbecamethesupportingforce,trainingAfghanistansecurityforcesandconductingcounterterrorismsurgicalstrikes.TheAfghanistanfutureforcestructurecouldseeaturnbacktoSOF‐centricandevenSOF‐specificoperations.


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Glossary

Section I: Abbreviations

AOpC ARSOFOperatingConceptARSOF ArmyspecialoperationsforcesA2/AD anti‐access/areadenialCA CivilAffairsCBA capabilities‐basedassessmentCF conventionalforcesCMO civil‐militaryoperationsCOIN counterinsurgencyCONUS continentalUnitedStatesCP counterproliferationCT counterterrorismDA directactionDOD DepartmentofDefenseDOS DepartmentofStateF3EAD find,fix,finish,exploit,analyze,anddisseminateFID foreigninternaldefenseFORSCOM UnitedStatesArmyForcesCommandGCC geographiccombatantcommanderGSN globalspecialoperationsforcesnetworkHA humanitarianassistanceIADS integratedairdefensesystemIO informationoperationsJIIM joint,interagency,intergovernmental,andmultinationalMCO majorcombatoperationMISO militaryinformationsupportoperationsPE preparationoftheenvironmentPOM ProgramObjectiveMemorandumPSYOP PsychologicalOperationsQDR QuadrennialDefenseReviewRAF regionallyalignedforcesSF SpecialForcesSFA securityforceassistanceSOF specialoperationsforcesSOFOC SpecialOperationsForcesOperatingConceptSR specialreconnaissanceTRADOC UnitedStatesArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommandTSOC theaterspecialoperationscommandUAP unifiedactionpartnerUSAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment


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USASOC UnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommandU.S.C. UnitedStatesCodeUSSOCOM UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommandUW unconventionalwarfareVEO violentextremistorganizationWFF warfightingfunctionWMD weaponsofmassdestruction

Section II: Terms

auxiliaryForthepurposeofunconventionalwarfare,thesupportelementoftheirregularorganizationwhoseorganizationandoperationsareclandestineinnatureandwhosemembersdonotopenlyindicatetheirsympathyorinvolvementwiththeirregularmovement.(ADRP3‐05)

clandestineoperationAnoperationsponsoredorconductedbygovernmentaldepartmentsoragenciesinsuchawayastoassuresecrecyorconcealment.Aclandestineoperationdiffersfromacovertoperationinthatemphasisisplacedonconcealmentoftheoperationratherthanonconcealmentoftheidentityofthesponsor.Inspecialoperations,anactivitymaybebothcovertandclandestineandmayfocusequallyonoperationalconsiderationsandintelligence‐relatedactivities.(JP3‐05.1)

combinedarmsmaneuverTheapplicationoftheelementsofcombatpowerinunifiedactiontodefeatenemygroundforces;toseize,occupy,anddefendlandareas;andtoachievephysical,temporal,andpsychologicaladvantagesovertheenemytoseizeandexploittheinitiative.(ADP3‐0)

counterinsurgencyComprehensivecivilianandmilitaryeffortsdesignedtosimultaneouslydefeatandcontaininsurgencyandaddressitsrootcauses.(JP3‐24)

counterterrorismActionsdirectlyagainstterroristnetworksandindirectlytoinfluenceandrenderglobalandregionalenvironmentsinhospitabletoterroristnetworks.(JP1‐02)

covertoperationAnoperationthatissoplannedandexecutedastoconcealtheidentityoforpermitplausibledenialbythesponsor..(JP3‐05)

cyberspaceAglobaldomainwithintheinformationenvironmentconsistingoftheinterdependentnetworksofinformationtechnologyinfrastructuresandresidentdata,includingtheInternet,telecommunicationsnetworks,computersystems,andembeddedprocessorsandcontrollers.(JP3‐12)


52

deniedareaAnareaunderenemyorunfriendlycontrolinwhichfriendlyforcescannotexpecttooperatesuccessfullywithinexistingoperationalconstraintsandforcecapabilities.(JP3‐05)

foreigninternaldefenseParticipationbycivilianandmilitaryagenciesofagovernmentinanyoftheactionprogramstakenbyanothergovernmentorotherdesignatedorganizationtofreeandprotectitssocietyfromsubversion,lawlessness,insurgency,terrorism,andotherthreatstoitssecurity.(JP3‐22)

guerrillaforceAgroupofirregular,predominatelyindigenouspersonnelorganizedalongmilitarylinestoconductmilitaryandparamilitaryoperationsinenemy‐held,hostile,ordeniedterritory.(JP3‐05)

holisticReferstospecialoperationsplanningorexecutionusingsurgicalstrikesinsupportofaspecialwarfarecampaignoroperation,andspecialwarfareactivitiestoreducetheriskandincreasetheprobabilityofsuccessofsurgicalstrikeoperations.

humandomainThetotalityofthephysical,cultural,andsocialenvironmentsthatinfluencehumanbehaviortotheextentthatsuccessofanymilitaryoperationorcampaigndependsontheapplicationofuniquecapabilitiesthataredesignedtofightandwinpopulation‐centricconflicts.(USSOCOMSOFOperatingConcept)

hybridthreatThediverseanddynamiccombinationofregularforces,irregularforces,terroristforces,and/orcriminalelementsunifiedtoachievemutuallybenefittingeffects.(ADRP3‐0)

invisibleoperatorAnoperatorcapableofconductingreduced‐signatureoperationswithnodegradationofcapabilitiesorsupport,regardlessoflocation.(USSOCOMSOFOperatingConcept)

irregularwarfareAviolentstruggleamongstateandnonstateactorsforlegitimacyandinfluenceovertherelevantpopulation(s).(JP1)

low‐visibilityoperationsSensitiveoperationswhereinthepolitical‐militaryrestrictionsinherentincovertandclandestineoperationsareeithernotnecessaryornotfeasible;actionsaretakenasrequiredtolimitexposureofthoseinvolvedand/ortheiractivities.Executionoftheseoperationsisundertakenwiththeknowledgethattheactionand/orsponsorshipoftheoperationmayprecludeplausibledenialbytheinitiatingpower(JP3‐05.1).


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majorcombatoperationsTheabilityforaU.S.jointforce,supportedbyotherinstrumentsofnationalandmultinationalpower,toconductsynergistic,high‐tempoactionsinmultipledomainstoshatterthecoherenceoftheadversary’splansanddispositionsandrenderhimunableorunwillingtomilitarilyopposetheachievementofourstrategicobjectives.(MajorCombatOperationsJointOperatingConcept)

megacityAverylargecity,typicallyonewithapopulationofovertenmillionpeople.(OxfordEnglishDictionary).

militarydeceptionActionsexecutedtodeliberatelymisleadadversary,military,paramilitary,orviolentextremistorganizationdecisionmakers,therebycausingtheadversarytotakespecificactions(orinactions)thatwillcontributetotheaccomplishmentofthefriendlymission.(JP3‐13.4)

specialoperationsOperationsrequiringuniquemodesofemployment,tacticaltechniques,equipmentandtrainingoftenconductedinhostile,denied,orpoliticallysensitiveenvironmentsandcharacterizedbyoneormoreofthefollowing:timesensitive,clandestine,lowvisibility,conductedwithand/orthroughindigenousforces,requiringregionalexpertise,and/orahighdegreeofrisk.(JP3‐05)

SpecialOperationsForcesTruths1)Humansaremoreimportantthanhardware;2)Qualityisbetterthanquantity;3)SpecialOperationsForcescannotbemassproduced;4)CompetentSpecialOperationsForcescannotbecreatedafteremergenciesoccur;and5)Mostspecialoperationsrequirenon‐SOFsupport.(USSOCOM)

specialwarfareTheexecutionofactivitiesthatinvolveacombinationoflethalandnonlethalactionstakenbyaspeciallytrainedandeducatedforcethathasadeepunderstandingofculturesandforeignlanguage,proficiencyinsmall‐unittactics,andtheabilitytobuildandfightalongsideindigenouscombatformationsinapermissive,uncertain,orhostileenvironment.(ADRP3‐05)

stabilityoperationsAnoverarchingtermencompassingvariousmilitarymissions,tasks,andactivitiesconductedoutsidetheUnitedStatesincoordinationwithotherinstrumentsofnationalpowertomaintainorreestablishasafeandsecureenvironment,provideessentialgovernmentalservices,emergencyinfrastructurereconstruction,andhumanitarianrelief.(JP3‐0)

strategiclandpowerTheapplicationoflandpowertowardsachievingoverarchingnationalormultinational(allianceorcoalition)securityobjectivesandguidanceforagivenmilitarycampaignoroperation.(GeneralRaymondOdierno,GeneralJamesAmos,andAdmiralWilliamH.McRaven,StrategicLandpower:WinningtheClashofWills)


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super‐empoweredindividualBecauseglobalizationhasbroughtdownmanyofthewallsthatlimitedthemovementandreachofpeople,andbecauseithassimultaneouslywiredtheworldintonetworks,itgivesmorepowertoindividualstoinfluencebothmarketsandnation‐statesthanatanyothertimeinhistory.WhetherbyenablingpeopletousetheInternettocommunicateinstantlyatalmostnocostovervastdistances,orbyenablingthemtousetheWebtotransfermoneyorobtainweaponsdesignsthatnormallywouldhavebeencontrolledbystates,...globalizationcanbeanincredibleforce‐multiplierforindividuals.Individualscanincreasinglyactontheworldstagedirectly,unmediatedbyastate.(ThomasL.Friedman,LongitudesandAttitudes:ExploringtheWorldAfterSeptember11)

surgicalstrikeTheexecutionofactivitiesinaprecisemannerthatemployspecialoperationsforcesinhostile,denied,orpoliticallysensitiveenvironmentstoseize,destroy,capture,exploit,recoverordamagedesignatedtargets,orinfluencethreats.(ADRP3‐05)

unconventionalwarfareActivitiesconductedtoenablearesistancemovementorinsurgencytocoerce,disrupt,oroverthrowagovernmentoroccupyingpowerbyoperatingthroughorwithanunderground,auxiliary,andguerrillaforceinadeniedarea.(JP3‐05)

undergroundAcellularcovertelementwithinunconventionalwarfarethatiscompartmentalizedandconductscovertorclandestineactivitiesinareasnormallydeniedtotheauxiliaryandguerrillaforce.(ADRP3‐05)

unifiedactionThesynchronization,coordination,and/orintegrationoftheactivitiesofgovernmentalandnongovernmentalentitieswithmilitaryoperationstoachieveunityofeffort.(JP1)


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End Notes

1 Odierno,RaymondT.(GEN),JamesF.Amos(GEN),andWilliamH.McRaven(ADM),StrategicLandpower:WinningtheClashofWills,6May

2013,p.3.

2 Harrison,Todd,andMarkGunzinger,StrategicChoices:NavigatingAusterity,CenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments,27November

2012,p.iii.

3 DefenseStrategicGuidance,SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21stCenturyDefense,January2012,6,7;UnitedStates

DepartmentofDefense,Overview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2014BudgetRequest,April2013,p.2‐2.

4 UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,Overview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2014BudgetRequest,April2013,pp.2‐2,

4‐18.

5 Cleveland,CharlesT.(LTG),andStuartL.Farris(LTC),“TowardStrategicLandpower,”Army,July2013,p.23.

6 TRADOCPamphlet525‐8‐5,TheU.S.ArmyFunctionalConceptforEngagement,24February2014,p.36.“Thetotalityofthephysical,cultural,

psychological,andsocialenvironmentsthatinfluencehumanbehaviortotheextentthatthesuccessofanymilitaryoperationsorcampaign

dependsontheapplicationofuniquecapabilitiesthataredesignedtoinfluence,fight,andwininpopulation‐centricconflicts.”


8 Smith,Rupert,TheUtilityofForce:TheArtofWarintheModernWorld,Vintage,12February2008,pp.269–416.

9 UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SOCOM2020:ForgingtheTipoftheSpear,2012,p.2.

10 TheJointStaff,Chairman’sStrategicDirectiontotheJointForce,6February2012,pp.5,7,8.


12 UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SpecialOperationsForcesOperatingConcept,May2013,p.3.


14InTheUnitedStatesArmyOperatingConcept,“capability”istheabilitytoachieveadesiredeffectunderspecifiedstandardsandconditionsand

“capacity”isthecapabilitywithsufficientscaletoaccomplishassignedmissions.

15 Clapper,JamesR.,DirectorofNationalIntelligence,UnclassifiedStatementfortheRecordontheWorldwideThreatAssessmentoftheU.S.

IntelligenceCommunityfortheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,31January2012,p.1.

16 NationalIntelligenceCouncil,GlobalTrends2030:AlternativeWorlds.

17 TRADOCIntelligenceG‐2SupportActivity(TRISA),OperationalEnvironments:TheStrategicEnvironmentforUnifiedLandOperations,February

2012,p.15.

18 NationalIntelligenceCouncil,GlobalTrends2030:AlternativeWorlds,pp.59,64.

19UnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommand,SOFCampaignPlanner’sHandbookofOperationalArtandDesign,Version2.0,16September

2014.

20 Theneedsfor“EnhancedEducationandTraining”aswellasfor“IncreasedAdvantageThroughHumanCapitalDevelopment”arediscussedin

Chapter5.

21 UnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommand,ARSOF2022,2013,p.3.

22 Cleveland,CharlesT.(LTG),andStuartL.Farris(LTC),“TowardStrategicLandpower,”Army,July2013,pp.21–22.

23 ADP3‐05,SpecialOperations,31August2012,p.GL‐3.

24 ADP3‐05,SpecialOperations,31August2012,p.9.

25 JointPublication1‐02,DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,8November2010,p.103.Anareaunderenemyor

unfriendlycontrolinwhichfriendlyforcescannotexpecttooperatesuccessfullywithinexistingoperationalconstraintsandforcecapabilities.

26 IrregularWarfare:CounteringIrregularThreats,DepartmentofDefenseJointOperatingConcept,Version2.0,17May2010,p.4.“Inorderto

maximizetheprospectofsuccess,thejointforcemustunderstandthepopulationandoperatingenvironment,includingthecomplexhistorical,

political,sociocultural,religious,economic,andothercausesofviolentconflict.Thejointforcemustadoptcollaborativeframeworksto

understand,plan,act,assess,andadaptinconcertwithU.S.Government(USG)interagencyandmultinationalpartnersandthehostnation.

Adequateframeworksforsuchcollaborationdonotcurrentlyexistinanycodifiedorinstitutionalizedform,althoughavarietyofadhoc

mechanismshavebeenusedandvariousstudieshaveproposedsuchframeworks.”

27 ADP3‐05,SpecialOperations,31August2012,p.GL‐3.


56


29 UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,(S/NF)UnconventionalWarfareCapabilityShortfallReport(U),1October2012,stated“(U)

Analysisofthesecapabilitiesrevealedissues/symptoms/problemsineachcapability.Noneoftheseissuesreflectacompletelackofcapability,

thoughnocapabilityovermatchwasidentified.AnalysisindicatesthatUWcapabilitiessufferfromalackofemphasisrelatedtocurrent

demandsforcounterterrorismandcounterinsurgencyoperations.”

30 JointRequirementsOversightCouncilMemorandum(JROCM)098‐11,(S/NF)UnconventionalWarfareDOTMLPFChangeRequest

Recommendations(U),11July2011.

31 JointPublication1‐02,DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,8November2010,p.342.

32 JointPublication1‐02,DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,8November2010,p.342,paragraph4.

33 JointPublication1‐02,DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,8November2010,p.342,paragraph5(a).

34 UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SpecialOperationsForcesOperatingConcept,May2013,p.4.“TheSOFOperatorisavitalelementof

theGlobalSOFNetworkbutcannotsucceedwithouttheenablingforces,capabilities,andinfrastructurethatalsocomprisethenetwork.”

35 JointPublication1,DoctrineoftheArmedForcesoftheUnitedStates,23March2013.Recognizestwoformsofwarfare:traditionalandirregular.

SOFmustbecapableofaddressingboth.

36 UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SpecialOperationsForcesOperatingConcept,May2013,p.3.“SOFconductstheircoreactivities

throughtheGlobalSOFNetwork:agloballylinkedforceofSOFandtheirstrategicpartners—joint,interagency,intergovernmental,

multinational,non‐governmental,commercial,andacademic.AsdescribedinSOF2020,thisnetworkisa‘livingandlearning’systemthat

remainsagile,responsive,andadaptableasthestrategicenvironmentevolves.Itisnotastand‐aloneorclosedsystem.Rather,itfunctions

withinaninterdependentwebofnetworksoperatedbystrategicpartners.”

37 UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SpecialOperationsForces2020:TheGlobalSOFNetwork,2013,pp.11–12.

38 UnconventionalWarfareJointIntegratingConcept(UWJIC),Version1.0(S/NF),JROCM020‐10,1February2010,p.X.ListedamongKey

RequiredCapabilities“(U)Synchronizejointforceactivitieswithinteragencypartners’andirregularelements”and“Supportinteragency

partnersandirregularelements.”

39 IrregularWarfare:CounteringIrregularThreats,DepartmentofDefenseJointOperatingConcept,Version2.0,17May2010,p.24,paragraph4c.

“Thejointforcewillusefullyintegratedcombinationsofgeneralpurposeforcesandspecialoperationsforces,andDODcombatsupport

agencies(CSAs),usuallyincombinationwithinteragencyandmultinationalpartners,tocapitalizeontheindividualcompetenciesofeach

component.Thesefullyintegratedcomponentswillemploythecapabilitiesidentifiedlaterinthisdocumentundertheguidingprinciples

describedinthissectiontomaximizetheprospectofsuccess.”

40 Szayna,ThomasS.,andWilliamWelserIV,RANDCorporation,DevelopingandAssessingOptionsfortheGlobalSOFNetwork,2013,p.1.

41 UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SpecialOperationsForces2020:TheGlobalSOFNetwork,2013.


43 UnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommand,SilentQuest13‐2,FacilitatedWargame,FinalReport,Version1.2,17October2013,p.5.


2013,p.1.

45 Cleveland,CharlesT.(LTG),andStuartL.Farris(LTC),“TowardStrategicLandpower,”Army,July2013.

46 UnitedStatesArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand,TheU.S.ArmyCapstoneConcept,19December2012,p.31.

47 UnitedStatesArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand,CivilAffairsCapabilitiesBasedAssessment,Gaps2,4,5,11,13,1May2012.

48 Whileitwouldnotcreatethesharedawarenessofthecivilsituationthatishopedfor,95thCAsuggestedthatitwouldbehelpful:Tocombat

thiscapabilitygapattheTSOC,the95thCivilAffairsBrigadecouldreorganizeallowingfortheplacementofaCivilAffairsPlanningTeam(CAPT)

withineachTSOCfromthealignedCivilAffairsBattalion.

49 UnitedStatesArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand,TheU.S.ArmyCapstoneConcept,19December2012,p.31.

50 Areaforfurtherdevelopment:HowdowerecruittheseniorSMEs(districtJudges,CEOsofbanking/financing,orseniormembersofindustry)

toparticipateandbepartoftheforce.Howdowerecruittheexpertise?


52 UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21stCenturyDefense,3January2012,p.3.


54 UnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommand,SilentQuest13‐2,FacilitatedWargame,FinalReport,Version1.2,17October2013,p.5.

55 Athanasiadis,Iason,“NoMoreBurgerKingonAfghanistanBase?SoldiersGrumble,”ChristianScienceMonitor,7April2010.


57


57 UnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommand,SilentQuest13‐2,FacilitatedWargame,FinalReportv1.2,17October2013.

58 UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SpecialOperationsForces2020:TheGlobalSOFNetwork,2013,p.10.“Acommunicationsnetworkis

necessarytosupportthehumanSOFglobalnetwork.Communicationandinformationsharingmustfacilitateinterconnectednessbeyondthe

U.S.‐onlyrealmandimprovepartnernationcapacity,interagencycoordination,andstakeholdersituationalawarenessbyproviding

informationtechnologyinfrastructureandcommunicationsservicestouniteU.S.andpartnernationSOF,plusothermissionpartners.The

command,control,communications,computers,andintelligencenodesoftheGlobalSOFnetworkconsistofCommandandControland

DistributedCommandandControllocations;DistributiveDataCenters,SOFStrategicEntryPoints,andMobileSOFStrategicEntryPoints.”



2013,p.5.


62 UnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommand,ARSOF2022,2013.

63 JointRequirementsOversightCouncilMemorandum020‐10(U)UnconventionalWarfareJointIntegratingConcept(UWJIC),Version1.0(S/NF),

1February2010,p.6.“(U)MilitaryoperationsintheperiodaddressedbythisJICwillbeaidedandsimultaneouslycomplicatedbytechnologies

thatcreateanincreasinglyinterconnectedworld.Theactionsoffuturejointforceswillbemuchmorevisiblethaninthepastandwillbe

interpretedandreactedtoinavarietyofways.Morethaneverbefore,apremiumwillbeplacedonlow‐visibilityoperations,thoseinwhichour

nationalsecurityobjectivescanbeaccomplishedwithminimalU.S.militarypresence.WhiletheUnitedStatesneedstomaintaintheabilityto

conductmajorcombatoperations,italsoneedstobecapableofaddressingincreasinglycommonsituationsinwhichconventionaloperations

wouldbecounterproductive.Insuchcases,thepreferredoptionmightbethefocuseduseofmorediscreetandmodest‐sizedforces,operating

withorthroughindigenousirregularelements.”

64 UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SpecialOperationsForcesOperatingConcept,May2013,p.13.“Reduced‐signatureoperations—

operationsthatareclandestine,covert,orlowvisibility(i.e.,non‐overt)intheirmode—areadistinguishingcharacteristicofSOF.Operators

oftenliveandworkamongnon‐Westernforeignpopulations.Biometricidentificationandtrackingthroughadvanceddataprocessingand

communicationstechnologieshaverenderedpasttechniquesineffectiveleavingSOFOperatorsvulnerableworldwide.However,USSOCOM

continuestoimprovereduced‐signaturecapabilitiessoSOFteamscanoperatelessvisiblythaninyearspast,withoutanyreductionin

capabilities.”




2013,p.1.“Aftertenyearsofwar,theNationisrebalancingitsnationalsecuritystrategytofocusonengagementandpreventingwar.”



70 Thomas,Jim,andChrisDougherty,BeyondtheRamparts:TheFutureofU.S.SpecialOperationsForces,CenterforStrategicandBudgetary

Assessments,2013,p.45.


72 JointPublication3‐05,SpecialOperations,April2011,p.II‐9.

73 JointPublication1‐02,DepartmentoftheDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,8November2010,p.144.Irregularwarfareis

definedas“aviolentstruggleamongstateandnonstateactorsforlegitimacyandinfluenceovertherelevantpopulation(s).”

74 IrregularWarfare:CounteringIrregularThreats,DepartmentofDefenseJointOperatingConcept,Version2.0,17May2010,pp.5,23.

75 FM3‐05.231,SpecialForcesPersonnelRecovery,13June2003,p.1‐18.Thisincludesdevelopingunconventionalassistedrecoverymechanisms

tocontact,authenticate,support,move,andexfiltratetofriendlycontrolisolatedpersons.

76 UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SpecialOperationsForces2020:TheGlobalSOFNetwork,2013,p.19.TheGlobalSOFNetworkis“a

robustandflexibleglobalnetworkofSOF,U.S.governmentpartners,andpartnernations.”

77 UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21stCenturyDefense,January2012,p.3.

78 JointPublication3‐22,ForeignInternalDefense,12July2010,p.ix.

79 UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21stCenturyDefense,January2012,andFM3‐05.2,Foreign

InternalDefense,1September2011,pp.1‐1,1‐2.


58

80 UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SpecialOperationsForcesOperatingConcept,May2013,p.i.

81 JointPublication3‐0,Operations,11August2011,p.V‐4.



84 JointRequirementsOversightCouncil,ConceptofOperations(CONOPS)fortheGlobalSOFNetwork2020(GSN2020),29July2013,p.5.

85 Robinson,Linda,TheFutureofU.S.SpecialOperationsForces,CouncilonForeignRelations,CouncilSpecialReportNo.66,April2013,p.26.

86 JointPublication3‐24,CounterinsurgencyOperations,5October2009,p.GL‐5.

87 Robinson,Linda,TheFutureofU.S.SpecialOperationsForces,CouncilonForeignRelations,CouncilSpecialReportNo.66,April2013,p.26.

88 UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,MajorCombatOperations,JointOperatingConcept,December2006,p.11.

89 TRADOCPamphlet525‐3‐1,TheUnitedStatesArmyOperatingConcept:2016–2028,19August2010,p.25.


91 UnitedStatesGovernment,NationalSecurityStrategy,May2010,pp.40–41.

92 UnitedStatesGovernment,Title10,U.S.C.

93 JointPublication3‐26,Counterterrorism,13November2009,p.v.




97 JointPublication3‐40,CombatingWeaponsofMassDestruction,June2009,p.I‐1

98 JointPublication3‐40,CombatingWeaponsofMassDestruction,June2009,p.xi.

99 USASOCasasubelementofUSSOCOMprovidesWMDexpertiseperJointPublication3‐40,CombatingWeaponsofMassDestruction,June2009,

p.III‐3.

100 UnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommand,ARSOF2022,2013,pp.14–15.

101 SeeUnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,CapabilityDevelopmentandProgrammingGuidance2015–2019(S/NF),31October2012,

p.126;alsoUnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommand,ARSOF2022,p.13.

102 “TheSOFOperationalArtChallengeistobuildcampaignstoShape,Prevent,andWininuncertainandpoliticallysensitiveenvironmentswhere

thethresholdforsignificantforcestructureislimited,whileachievingtherequiredNational‐Strategicendstate,”UnitedStatesArmySpecial

OperationsCommand,SilentQuest13‐2FacilitatedWargame:FinalReport,Version1.0,Draft(S/NF),11October2013.

103 UnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommand,USASOCCyberEnablingConcept,24July2013,p.21.

104 Ceroli,MichaelA.(COL),Commandant,PsychologicalOperationsRegiment,UnitedStatesArmyJohnF.KennedySpecialWarfareCenterand

School,interviewbywritingteam,FortBragg,NC,5November2013.



107 UnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommand,ARSOF2022,2013,p.22.ARSOFwillpossessawidearrayofscalableanddeployable

commandandcontrolnodes,capableofprojectingSOFmissioncommandinthemostaustereandpoliticallysensitiveenvironments,withthe

requisitelevelofexpertise,experience,andarchitecturetoplan,integrate,andsynchronizeSOFoperationsandSOFcampaignsatanyechelon

ofjointcommand,inaninteragencycountryteamenvironmentorwithpartneredindigenousforcesofanysize,includingSOFoperational

headquartersabovetheTSOClevelthataredesignedtoconductSOF‐centriccampaigns(p.22,paragraph5).

108 ComprehensiveSOFMissionCommand:TheparticipantsconsistentlyidentifiedtherequirementtoestablishacomprehensiveSOFmission

commandstructureaspartofthefutureoperatingconcept.TheSOFmissioncommandwillneedtospanmultipleechelons,bescalableand

adaptiveasconflictsescalateanddeescalate,incorporateJointSOFandGlobalSOF,andfullyinterfacewiththeinteragencycommunity

structures(SQ13‐1FinalReport,p.6,paragraph2).

109 Thereisaneedforaclearmissioncommandstructurethatadaptsandevolvesacrossalong‐termSOFcampaign;clearandconcise

communicationofSOFmissioncommandisrequired;thisisespeciallyimportantwhencommunicatingoutsideofthespecialoperations

community(SQ13‐2Quick‐TurnExecutiveSummary,Insight2,p.8,paragraph3).

110MilitarySupporttoGovernance.GiventheU.S.military’sassignedresponsibilitiesintheareasofstabilityandgovernance,futurejoint

formationswillrequirethecapabilityandcapacityto“addresssharedinterestsandenhancepartners’security,governance,economic

development,ruleoflaw,andothercriticalfunctions,aspartofunifiedaction”(UnitedStatesArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand,TheU.S.


59

ArmyCapstoneConcept(FortEustis,19December2012,p.31).Thisnecessitatesasystemtoprocure,classify,marshal,andemploythe

appropriatecivilianexpertisetosupport,orifrequired,leadtheexecutionofstabilitytasksnecessarytosupportprevent,shape,andwin.AU.S.

militarydevelopedsystemcanleverage,underTitle10authorities,thekeycivilianskillsrequiredtobuildpartnersandtheircapacitiesinthe

absenceofotherU.S.Governmentdepartmentsandagenciesduetoeitherstaffingorsecurityconstraints.TheReportoftheDefenseScience

BoardTaskForceonInstitutionalizingStabilityOperationswithinDOD,2005,addressedtheseconcernsandprovidedtwopertinent

recommendations:“First,establishanorganizationcapableofgeneratingandleveragingour‘fifthforce’provider—theprivatesector.Second,

directlyrecruitprofessionalswiththerequisiteskillsandexperienceintotheArmy’sReserveCivilAffairs.”

111 SOFOperationalArtasanARSOF2022EnablingConceptisdefinedasforcesthatprovideexpertisetoenableoperationallevelheadquartersin

theirefforttotietacticalcapabilitiestoregionalornationalstrategies(USASOCFuturesBrieftotheU.S.ArmyChiefofStaff,30January2013).

112ARSOF2022:FosterthedevelopmentofARSOFoperationalandstrategicplannerswiththerequisiteexperienceandeducationtocontributein

positionsofincreasinginfluenceinJoint,Army,Interagency,andSOFoperationalheadquarters(ARSOF2022,p.22,paragraph4).

113 CareerprofessionalARSOFoperatorsneedtoattainsufficientrankandpositiontobeabletopresentspecialwarfareorsurgicalstrikeoptions

atthelevelwheredecisionsaremade(AOpCStudy,p.5‐25,paragraph5‐9.c).ThecurrentPentagonsituationshort‐changesthenational

leadershipanddisservestheAmericanpeoplebecauseSOFsolutions—whichmayormaynotbeapprovedbythenationalleadership—arenot

madeavailablefortheirconsideration.SomeinsightfulhistorianwillspeculateonthepossibledifferencesinAfghanistan2001–2014ifthewar

hadremainedaSOF‐supportedinsurrectionbytheNorthernAlliance,withthefocusonthefractioushumandomaininthatcountry,as

opposedtothecostofU.S.livesandresources—andthelong‐termresult—fromtheconventionalcampaignwhichwasexecuted.Asimilar

comparisonoftheenduringresultsbetweenoftheconventionalcampaigninIraqversusapopulation‐centeredwarofinfluence—while

obviouslyspeculative—couldprovidesimilarinsights(AOpCStudy,p.5‐25,paragraph5‐9.c[1]).

114 AseniorARSOFofficerneedstobeassignedattheJointStaffJ‐5,notonlyforinclusionofSOFannexesandsupporttomajorconventional

campaignplans,butespeciallytoensuredevelopmentofplansforavarietyofquick‐responsesurgicalstrikeoperationsandfortheinitiationor

escalationofspecialwarfarethroughouttheworld(AOpCStudy,p.5‐25,paragraph5‐9.c[2]).

115 ThemostseniorARSOFofficersareneededwheredecisionsaremadethathavegreatimpactstothecountry.KeybilletsthroughoutDODneed

tobefilledbythosebestabletounderstandtheavailability,limitations,andadvantagesof—

(a) Surgicalstrikeoptionsusedinisolationagainsthigh‐valuetargets.

(b) Surgicalstrikeoptionsusedtoopentheoption‐spaceforlarger/conventionalmilitaryoperationsifsodirected.

(c) SurgicalstrikeoptionsusedinconcertwithCFinmajorcampaigns.

(d) Surgicalstrikeoptionsasatoolwithinlong‐termspecialwarfarecampaigns.

(e) InformationandcivilaffairscampaignstoachieveU.S.objectivesinacountry/regionwithoutkineticwarfare.

(f) UWasamechanismtoprepareabattlespaceforconventionalcampaigns.

(g) InformationandCAcampaignstoallowU.S.combatsuccessestopersistafterkineticwarfareconcludesandconventionalU.S.forcesare

withdrawn.

(h) Optionsforsupportedregimestoresistanddefeatterroristandinsurgentgroups.

(i) Specialwarfare(bothinsupportofexistingregimesandinsupportofinsurgentforces)asthebestmechanismtounderstandthepolitical,

economic,andculturalterrainwithinmostofthenationsontheglobe,andtherebyinformthenation’sforeignpolicy(AOpCStudy,p.5‐26,

paragraph5‐9.c[3]).

116 ExamplesofthesekeypositionsincludetheViceJ‐3onJointStaff,theDeputyDirectorofSpecialOperationsJ‐3ontheJointStaff,XOtotheJCS

Chairman,andtheXOtotheSecretaryofDefense.Officersshouldbegroomedtoeffectivelyfillthesepositionswiththeobjectivetoinform

decisionsandensureSOFoptionsareavailabletotheactualnationaldecision‐makers(AOpCStudy,p.5‐26,paragraph5‐9.c[4]).

117 EffectiveexerciseofauthorityanddirectionwillrequirethatUSASOCdevelopanintegratedARSOFmissioncommandarchitecturethat

incorporates,analyzes,anddisplaysacommonoperatingpicturefromSF,CA,andMISO(AOpCStudy,p.3‐32,paragraph3‐5.d[6].

118 Successfulsynchronizedoperationsinthefutureenvironmentwilldepend“ontheSOFinformationenvironment—anintegrated,multilevel,

globalinformationtechnologyinfrastructure”(UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand,SpecialOperationsForcesOperatingConcept,p.12).

Equallyimportantisthatthecommunicationnetworkmustbecompatiblewithothercommunicationsystemsensuringacommonoperating

pictureanddatabasemanagementenablingthe“push”and“pull”ofinformation(AOpCStudy,p.3‐38,paragraph3‐6.n).

119 TacticalCommunicationsincludestheeffortsneededtokeeppacewiththerapidevolutionofcommunicationsmeansandmethodssufficientto

alwaysprovideacovertcommunicationscapabilityto/fromARSOFwithindeniedandsensitiveareas(AOpCStudy,p.3‐37,paragraph3‐6.m).

Thefutureoperatingenvironmentrequiresnewmethodsofcommunicationtooperateinadeniedarea.Thesuccessofcommunicatinginthe

futureenvironment“dependsontheSOFInformationEnvironment—anintegrated,multilevel,globalinformationtechnologyinfrastructure.”


60

(AOpCStudy,p.3‐38,paragraph3‐6.n).InnovativewaysforARSOFoperatorstouseindigenouscommercialcommunicationinfrastructure

securelyandclandestinelymustcontinuallyevolve.Whilecommunicationsarealwaysminimizedinclandestineoperations,ARSOFoperators

mustlearntouseciviliannetworkstocommunicatewithlow‐signatureapplications(forexample,Internet,cellularsystems,andsoon)and

willneedtoleverageadvancedtechnologyprovidingtheirownreduced‐signaturesystemswithlowprobabilitiesofdetectionand

interception.”(JimThomasandChrisDougherty,BeyondtheRamparts:TheFutureofU.S.SpecialOperationsForces,p.100)(AOpCStudy,p.

3‐37,paragraph3‐6.m).SomekeyattributesforfutureARSOFcommunicationsinclude“range,bandwidth,wide‐areacoverage,lowprobability

ofdetectionandintercept,andresistancetojamming.”Equallyimportantisthatthecommunicationnetworkmustbecompatiblewithother

communicationsystemsensuringacommonoperatingpicture(COP)anddatabasemanageenablingthe“push”and“pull”ofinformation.Also,

ARSOF2022outlinesasystemthatprovideslow‐visibility,reliable,secure,andseamlessvideo,data,imagery,andvoiceservicesthatprovide

integrated,on‐the‐move,timely,andrelevantinformation(ARSOF2022,p.25,paragraph6d).

120 ThisincludesthecapabilitytoanalyzeandsharemultiplelevelsofclassifiedinformationacrossallnodeswithintheGSNandwithJIIM/UAP.

121 ThisintelligencecommonoperatingpicturemustfeedtheoperationsprocessandbeaccessiblebySOF,CF,interagencypartners,andjoint

forcesgloballyandatthetacticaledge.

122 SupportofARSOFbythenationalintelligenceagenciesalsoevolvedduringtheOperationENDURINGFREEDOM/OperationIRAQIFREEDOM

campaignsandmustnotreverttobacktoself‐relianceandagencystove‐pipedassistanceinthefuture.ARSOFwillcontinuetorequireaclose

workingrelationshipwiththeintelligencecommunity“totacticallyexploitnationalintelligencecapacitiesincludingspace‐relatedtechnologies,

betterclandestinetagging,trackingandlocating,cyber,andsocialmediacapabilities.”Additionally,theintelligencecommunityisneededto

“increaseadvancedtechnologyandtoolsandsubstantiallyincreaseintelligencesupport,executingmassandprecisioninfluencemissionsinall

environments”(ARSOF2022,p.27,paragraph6g).

123 Additionally,ARSOFrequirecyberspacedomain‐enabledmilitarysourceoperations/counterintelligenceactivities,andcryptologicexploitation

ofcyberspacedomaincommunicationarchitectures.Thesecyberspacedomain‐enabledintelligencecapabilitiesmustadapttorapidlyemerging

technologicaladvancementstokeeppacewithcommercialcyberdomainadvancementsandadequatelymanageattribution.

124 ARSOFwillneedtostayabreastofthecapabilitiesinvolvedinperforming,mitigating,anddefeatingbiometricidentification.Techniques,

technicalmeans,andbiomedicalaugmentationcapabilitiesneedtoevolvetorenderARSOFoperatorsandtheirequipmentinvisibleto

adversarytracking.“Biometricidentificationandtrackingthroughadvanceddataprocessingandcommunicationstechnologieshaverendered

pasttechniquesineffective,leavingSOFoperatorsvulnerableworldwide”(SpecialOperationsForces2020,p.13,paragraph5.4).

125 Animportantcharacteristicofthefutureoperatingenvironmentistheexplosionofinformationandcommunicationtechnologies(ICT)(cell

phone)cameras—oftenincludingvideoaswellasstillpictures—availableandinuseineveryurbanlocation.

126 ClandestinecapabilitiessupportallofthecoreARSOFmissionstoavaryingdegree.DODdefinesclandestineoperationsoractivitiesasthose

“sponsoredorconductedinsuchawayastoassuresecrecyorconcealmentofthatoperationoractivity”(JP1‐02,DepartmentofDefense

DictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,8November2010,p.56).Clandestinediffersfromcovertinthatemphasisisplacedonconcealment

oftheoperationoractivityratherthanonconcealmentoftheidentityofthesponsor(JP3.05.1,JointSpecialOperationsTaskForceOperations,

andUSSOCOMDirective525.16,PreparationoftheEnvironment).

127 ARSOFmustcontinuetobuildonitsabilitytotrainandemploythemosthighlytrainedmedicalpersonnelwithintheDODtomitigateriskfor

itsforcesduringtrainingandoperationalmissions.Additionally,itisimportanttocontinuethemomentumgainedinfield‐leveltriageand

treatingbattlefieldtrauma.Thisincludestheimperativesto“increaseorganicmedicalcapabilityincludingtheestablishmentofdeployable,

scalablesurgicalteamsmodeledaftertheJointMedicalAugmentationUnit”andto“leverageexistingtechnologysuchasfreeze‐driedplasma.”

128 “ManandresourcetheMEG[MISOCEffectsGroup]andUWSTA[UnconventionalWarfareSocialTheoryAcademy]appropriatelyasstand‐alone

organizationsundertheMISOC[MilitaryInformationSupportOperationsCommand].EnabletheMEG…UWSTAcontinuesresearch,theory

developmentandtesting,andpolicyformulationfortheuseoftheInternet,socialmedia,andemergentmeansofsingularandmass

communicationtechnologiesandcapabilities”(ARSOF2022,p.21,paragraph3).

129 Leveragepartnercapabilitiesforcampaigncontinuityandconsistency.GeneratingandapplyingSOFcombatpowermustbeapproachedfroma

campaignperspective.Thereisapremiumplacedonmaintainingaconsistentpresenceforward,butUSASOCisnotcurrentlyorganizedtofight

thatway.USASOCmustleverageexistingcapabilitiesfromitspartners(thatis,U.S.governmentagencies,academia,surrogates,andindigenous

organizations)tobreakstovepipesandbuildoutitsnetworkofresources(SQ13‐1FinalReport,pp.21–22).

130 TheUSSOCOMGSNmodelneedstoconsidertherequiredlevelofforcesarrayinsupportofellipsemanagementtoenabletheforcegeneration

tobeabletosustainsteady‐state,long‐termengagements,aswellashavecapacityavailabletorespondtocontingencyoperations.(SQ13‐2

FinalReport,p.D‐1,paragraph5.a.3).



61

132 FM3‐05,ArmySpecialOperations,9January2014,p.2‐1.SOFcoreactivitiesareUnconventionalWarfare,ForeignInternalDefense,Security

ForceAssistance,Counterinsurgency,DirectAction,SpecialReconnaissance,Counterterrorism,PreparationoftheEnvironment,Military

InformationSupportOperations,CivilAffairsOperations,CounterproliferationofWeaponsofMassDestruction,andHumanitarian

Assistance/DisasterRelief.ADRP3‐05SpecialOperations,31August2012,p.2‐1,definescoreactivitiesasSecurityForceAssistance,Direct

Action,SpecialReconnaissance,MilitaryInformationSupportOperations,CivilAffairsOperations,PreparationoftheEnvironment,Hostage

RescueandRecovery,InterdictionandOffensiveWeaponsofMassDestructionOperations,andSpecialOperationsForcesSustainmentand

coreoperations(tailoredcombinationsofspecialwarfareandsurgicalstrikecapabilities)asUnconventionalWarfare,ForeignInternalDefense,

Counterinsurgency,Counterterrorism,CombatingWeaponsofMassDestruction,StabilityOperations,andSupporttoMajorCombatOperations

andCampaigns.

133 FM3‐05,ArmySpecialOperations,9January2014,p.1‐10.

134 JP3‐05,SpecialOperations,18April2011,p.II‐9.UWis“activitiesconductedtoenablearesistancemovementorinsurgencytocoerce,disrupt,

oroverthrowagovernmentoroccupyingpowerbyoperatingthroughorwithanunderground,auxiliary,andguerrillaforceinadeniedarea.”

135 JP3‐22,ForeignInternalDefense,12July2010,p.ix.Foreigninternaldefensesupportsthegeographicalcombatantcommander(GCC)orjoint

forcecommanderthrough“participationbycivilianandmilitaryagenciesofagovernmentinanyoftheactionprogramstakenbyanother

governmentorotherdesignatedorganizationtofreeandprotectitssocietyfromsubversion,lawlessness,insurgency,terrorism,andother

threatstoitssecurity.”

136 JP3‐24,Counterinsurgency,22November13,p.GL‐5.COINis“comprehensivecivilianandmilitaryeffortsdesignedtosimultaneouslydefeat

andcontaininsurgencyandaddressitsrootcauses.”

137 JP3‐07,StabilityOperations,29September2011,p.vii.Stabilityoperationscanbedefinedasthe“variousmilitarymissions,tasks,andactivities

conductedoutsidetheUnitedStatesincoordinationwithotherinstrumentsofnationalpowertomaintainorreestablishasafeandsecure

environment,provideessentialgovernmentalservices,emergencyinfrastructurereconstruction,andhumanitarianrelief.”

138 JP3‐05,SpecialOperations,p.GL‐13.Specialreconnaissanceis“reconnaissanceandsurveillanceactionsconductedasaspecialoperationin

hostile,denied,orpoliticallysensitiveenvironmentstocollectorverifyinformationofstrategicoroperationalsignificance,employingmilitary

capabilitiesnotnormallyfoundinconventionalforces.”

139 JP3‐22,ForeignInternalDefense,p.GL‐11.Securityforceassistanceis“theDepartmentofDefenseactivitiesthatcontributetounifiedactionby

theU.S.Governmenttosupportthedevelopmentofthecapacityandcapabilityofforeignsecurityforcesandtheirsupportinginstitutions.”


141 JP3‐18,JointForcibleEntryOperations,27November2012.p.GL‐5.Referredtoasa“JointForcibleEntry”operation.

142 DescriptionofthefutureoperatingenvironmentisinChapter2.

143 Petit,BrianS.,GoingBigbyGettingSmall:TheApplicationofOperationalArtbySpecialOperationsinPhaseZero(Denver:OutskirtsPress,2013),

p.x.

144 JP3‐40,CombatingWeaponsofMassDestruction,10June2009,p.xi.

145 Advancedweaponrywouldespeciallyincludehighaccuracyatextremerange.

146 TRADOCPamphlet525‐8‐5,U.S.ArmyFunctionalConceptforEngagement,Version0.89Draft,January2014,p.13.Theconceptfurtherstates

that“integrationandinteroperabilityaresubsetsofinterdependence.”TheUnitedStatesArmyOperatingConcept,Version0.7Draft,16

November2013,p.18,describesinterdependencerequiring“coordinationandsynchronizationofplanning,enhancedbytheexperiencesof

bothforcesandeliminationofbarriersbetweenheadquarters.Conventionalandspecialoperationsinterdependenceisachievedatallechelons

toincreasestrategic,operational,andtacticaleffectiveness.”

147 ThesurgicalstrikekillingOsamabinLadeninAbbottabad,Pakistan,providesanexamplewithintheCTmissionsetofaSOF‐specificmission.

148 TheSpecialForcesOperationWHITESTARinLaosfromApril1961toOctober1962providesanexampleofSOF‐specificspecialwarfare

operations.TheSpecialForcesmobiletrainingteamsconductedsmall‐scaleFIDoperationswiththeRoyalLaotianarmyandUWoperations

withMeoandKhatribestocombatthePathetLaocommunistinsurgency.Finlayson,Ken,“OperationWhiteStar:PreludetoVietnam,”Special

Warfare15,no.2(June2002),p.48.

AnotherexampleofaSOF‐specificspecialwarfarecampaignistheElSalvadormissionduringthe1980s.SFadvisorswerecappedat55

soldiersprovidingtechnicalandtacticalassistancetoSalvadorianarmybrigadescombatingtheMarxistFarabundoMartiparaLiberacion

Nacional(FMLN)insurgency.TheSFadvisorstrainingandexpandingtheinitialconstabularyforceofabout12,000mentoa60,000‐manarmy

overaperiodof12years,andtheconstanthumanrightstraining,madeamoreeffectiveandlegitimateElSalvadorianarmythatturnedthe

tideandledtotheFMLNsigningapeacetreatywiththeSalvadoriangovernmentin1990.SeeBurton,PaulS.,andRobertLeeWilson,“7thSF

GroupProvidesTwoDecadesofExcellenceinLatinAmerica,”SpecialWarfare15,no.2(June2002),p.42;Pedrozo,Frank,interviewedby


62

SpecialWarfare,“Interview:SpecialForcesinElSalvador,”SpecialWarfare6,no.4(October1993),pp.37–38;andBurton,PaulS.,andRobert

LeeWilson,“7thSFGroupProvidesTwoDecadesofExcellenceinLatinAmerica,”SpecialWarfare15,no.2(June2002),p.43.

149 OperationENDURINGFREEDOM–PhilippinesprovidesanexampleofaSOF‐centricspecialwarfarecampaigntotrain,advise,andassist

PhilippinesecurityforcesincounterterrorismoperationstargetingtheAbuSayyafGroup(ASG)andJemaahIslamiya(JI)terrorists.TheJoint

SpecialOperationsTaskForce–Philippines(JSOTF‐P)manningwaspredominatelySOF,withCFprovidingsupportincampsecurity,

intelligence,logistics,andtraininginareaswhereSOFhadlimitedcapabilities(forexample,105mmartilleryexpertise).Inaddition,theJSOTF‐

Ptrained,equippedandadvisedthenewPhilippineArmyNationalCounterterrorismForcecoinedtheLightReactionBattalionwiththreeLight

ReactionCompaniestoexecuteCToperations.

AnotherSOF‐centricoperationisthespecialwarfarecampaignexecutingcounternarcoticsandcounterinsurgencyoperationsinColumbia

againsttheFuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia(FARC).SOF’slineofoperationsupportingtheexecutionofPlanColumbiawas

“strengtheningthearmedforcesandpolicetoupholdtheruleoflawandrestoresecuritythroughoutthecountry.”TheSOFengagements

between1999and2001werelimitedtotheColumbianNationalPolicecounternarcoticselementsandtheColumbianArmyTacticalRetaining

Center.TheU.S.governmentauthorizedadditionalU.S.forcesinColumbia,andSOFexpandeditsroleandsupportinthecreationofthe

ColumbianSpecialForcesCommandandaJointSpecialOperationsCommand.SOF’ssuccessinColumbiacanbehighlightedbytheColombian

specialoperationsforcesexecutingahostagerescueoperationon2July2008.TheoperationrecoveredthreeAmericanhostages,aColumbian

presidentialcandidate,andelevenpoliceandsoldiersfromtheFARC.SeeTeicher,DarioE.,“TheColombianWarandtheNarco‐Terrorists

Threat,”inTheHomelandSecurityPapers:StemmingtheTideofTerror,ed.Ritz,MichaelW.,RalphG.Hensley,Jr.,andJamesC.Whitmire

(MaxwellAirForceBase,AL:USAFCounterproliferationCenter,2004),p.31;andPetit,BrianS.,GoingBigbyGettingSmall:TheApplicationof

OperationalArtbySpecialOperationsinPhaseZero(Denver:OutskirtsPress,2013),pp.128–129.

150 TheJointSpecialOperationsTaskForce–Philippinesexecutingaspecialwarfarecampaignhasanestimated470personnel,withthemajorityof

personnelassignedSOF,andhaveconventionalenablingforcesinasupportingrole.DepartmentoftheArmy,“TheArmyasofDEC.26,”Army

Times,6January2014.

151 OperationDESERTSTORMandOperationIRAQIFREEDOMprovidetwoexamplesofCF‐centricoperationssupportedbySOF.DuringDESERT

STORM,CFcomprisedthemainefforttoexpelIraqiforcesfromKuwait,withSOFtrainingKuwaitiforces,advisingcoalitionforcesduringthe

operation,andconductingdeepreconnaissanceoperationsinIraq,contributingtotheoverallsuccessofthemission.Likewise,inOperation

IRAQIFREEDOM,CFwerethemaineffortlaunchingfromKuwaitmovingnorthtoseizeBaghdad.SOFwasasupportingeffortinnorthernIraq,

partneringwiththeKurdstoconductoperationsagainstnorthernIraqiforceswiththepurposeofholdingthoseforcesfromreinforcing

Baghdad.AfterthefallofBaghdad,SOFcontinuedasupportingroletoCFincounterinsurgencyoperations,trainingIraqisecurityforcesand

conductingaCTmissionagainsthigh‐valuetargetsandterroristgroups.

152 Personnelof3rdBattalion,5thSpecialForcesGroup,“TheLiberationofMazar‐eSharif:5thSFGroupConductsUWinAfghanistan,”Special

Warfare15,no.2(June2002),pp.34–35.

ARSOF Operating Concept 2014.10 Pages/ARSOF Operating Concept 2014.pdf · ARSOF OPERATING CONCEPT...

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