Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1994

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United States Army

AviationSeptember/October 1994 Di9estProfessional Bulletin 1-94-5 Distribution restriction. This publication approved for public release. Distribution unlimited.

A Different Way of Doing Business page 26


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Major General Ronald E. Adams

Army Aviation in TheaterMissile DefenseTheater Missile Defense (TMD)-the integration of oint force capabilities to destroyenemy theater missiles in flight or prior to launch or to otherwise disrupt the enemy'stheater missile operations through an appropriate mix of mutually supportive passivemissile defense, active missile defense, attack operations, and supporting command,control, communications, computers, and intelligence (01) measures.

The location is Southwest Asia,February 1991; the time is 0230hours on a moonless night. Bearcat 06 is an A H ~ 4 Apache company commander leading his teamon a zone reconnaissance about 80miles into Iraq when he receivesthe following call: "Bearcat 06, thisis Tomahawk 02 (Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS});contact Predator 16 (ground laserdesignation team) on FM 40.45 forpossible Scud launcher target."Bearcat 06 acknowledges the call,having been briefed that this wasa contingency mission. "Predator16, this is Bearcat 06, requestSITREP, over.""Bearcat 06, this is Predator 16,I have eyes on target-stationaryenemy launcher behind a bunker,grid NK 564426, alpha code, calllaser on.""Bearcat 06, roger."

At this time, Bearcat 06 entersthe grid in the doppler and the dataentry keyboard and gets a range tothe target of12 kilometers. He decreases his airspeed and lines theApache up for a Hellfire shot. At 8kilometers, he spots a vehicle butcan't identify it yet. "Predator 16,this is Bearcat 06, spot on fo ridentification." Predator 16 lasesthe target, and Bearcat 06 haspositive identification. Thelauncher is tucked in next to acement embankment, which causesthe Apache to get closer tomaintain adequate line of sight.

All of a sudden, the enemylauncher starts to move; Predator16 announces, "I can no longerobserve the target." It's too late.Bearcat 06 reaches 4 kilometerstracking the vehicle, staying aslow as possible; he has a clearshot, lases the target-all constraints met-and launches a H ellfire missile. Some 30 seconds later,the Hellfire slams into the target,setting off a huge explosion."Tomahawk 02, this is Bearcat06; one Scud launcher destroyed,end of mission. "

This hasty engagement is anexample of a TMD scenario, fictional and yet very plausible. ATMD engagement involving Armyaviation can be as simple as justdescribed or a preplanned detailedjoint precision strike mission. TMDis a much-discussed topic thesedays. Who are the players? What isthe mission? Should we develop aseparate TMD doctrine? These arejust a few of the questions involving this complex subject. Onething is certain-capitalizing on itsversatility and mobility, Armyaviation possesses an unparalleledcapability to find, fix, and destroyTMD threats.

The recent tensions in NorthKorea highlight the unmanned tactical ballistic missile (TBM) threat.The risk from an enemy-mannedfixed-wing threat has decreasedwhile the unmanned threat fromTBMs, cruise missiles, and other

u.s. ArmyAviation Digest September/October 1994

unmanned vehicles continues togrow. Both TBMs and cruisemissiles possess many dangerouscapabilities. They have many employment options; offer variouswarhead choices- to incl udenuclear, biological, and chemical;operate over extended ranges; andare relatively inexpensive. Cruisemissiles pose a distinct threat. Theycan be a "poor country's Air Force."I f given $50 million, any adversarycould buy hundreds of "off-theshelf' cruise missiles for the samedollars it takes to purchase fourattack helicopters or one or twofixed-wing fighters. The bottomline is that the TBM and cruise missile threat is real and modernizingat an accelerating rate. Consequently, the Army has been focusing itsresources, structure, and doctrine onthis ever-increasing threat.Theater Missile Defense is a jointissue. It is defined by four pillars:attack operations, active defense,passive defense, and battlefieldmanagement/command, control,communications, computers,and intelligence (BM/C4I).Attack operations involve the useof sensors and weapons to detectand attack threat launchers, missiles,support facilities, and C4I withground and air assets to prevent orreduce the launch of threat missiles.Along with U.S. Air Force aircraft-including the F-15 Eagle/F-16 Fighting Falcon-and thelong-range Army tactical missile


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system (ATACMS), nationalsensors, and intelligence assets,Army aviation plays a key rolein this area, executing deep-attackmissions and armed reconnaissancemissions. Our weapons systemsoperate with less target error thanother attack assets, provide nearimmediate response, and can see,

m a n e u v e ~ a n d s h o o t d e e p . T h e v a ~ied weapons systems complementeach other-the strong attributes ofone compensating for the weak attributes of the other. As an example, a moving launcher may not bean appropriate target for the indirectfire weapon, whereas it can be avalid target for Army aviation.Active defense is conducted toprotect against theater missiles byacquiring and destroying missiles"ensuring negation of warheadeffects for weapons of mass destruct ion-in flight." An example ofactive defense is the Patriot missileas used during Operation DesertStorm. Air Defense Artillery isthe predominant player in activedefense.

Passive defense is the use offorces and elements to deny enemyreconnaissance, surveillance, andtargeting (for example, military intelligence and chemical assets). Itreduces the vulnerability of criticalforces and supporting infrastructureby providing enhanced physicalprotection.Battlefield management/C4/ isthe use of elements and systems thatprovide command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence to support timely and efficientexecution of the TMD mission. C41must become the common base orlink between the other pillars ofTMD. Army aviation cannot nowprovide C41 links to all joint assets,but communications materiel programs are in developmental stagesto overcome deficiencies. TheAirborne Command and ControlSystem (AACCS) console on the2

UH-60 Black Hawk can serve as thecritical link between various sensorsand attack aircraft through digitallinks from joint surveillance andtarget attack radar system (JSTARS) aircraft. Another importantaspect of C41 is immediate andresponsive airspace management.Army Airspace Command and Control integrated into joint airspacemanagement is an essential part ofthe successful employment of Armyattack systems-to include Armyaviation, ATACMS, and unmannedaerial vehicle (UAY) sensors.

The Army, Air Force, and Navyare still discussing roles and missions in developing a joint system.Make no mistake about it , toaccomplish our mission, we willrely heavily on other joint assets.

How about Army aviation's rolein TMD? Here is an example. During the Persian Gulf War, 88 Scudswere launched and about 4,859 sorties were flown against these Scudinfrastructures and forces. As of afew months ago, there were no confirmed kills of mobile Scud launchers; however, we now know thatArmy aviation was responsible forthe destruction of enemy Scudlaunchers by aircraft belongingto the 160th Special OperationsAviation Regiment (SOAR). Thefact is, to kill them, somebody hasto see them-Army aviation cando this and confirm battle damageassessment (BDA).

Army aviation has been aparticipant in recent TMD demonstrations and experimentsour diligent effort must continue.Upcoming TMD experimentssuch as the Advanced WarfightingExperiment (AWE), part of theRoving Sands exercise at Fort Bliss,Texas, in April 1995-are criticalto interservice cooperation and battlelab experimentation in seeking viablesolutions to TMD shortcomings.

Some of the challenges facingArmy aviation are C41integration of

TM D assets to include airspacemanagement, attaining and processing real-time targeting information,range of aircraft, payoff versus riskinvolving deployment decisions,and funding. While the challengesare many, Army aviation-with theAH-64D Longbow Apache andRAH-66 Comanche-brings to theTMD mission significant range, lethality, connectivity, and survivability enhancements. Our digitizationprograms will provide an importantin-flight divert capability to highpriority targets, similar in context tothe example at the beginning of thisarticle. The key to destroying aTMD threat revolves aroundaccurate and timely informationthis is how digitization will pay hugedividends.

The TBM threat is real andundeniable. Mass proliferation ofTBMs poses a serious threat to ourmaneuver forces during many potential contingencies. NUl1l:erouschanges in our Army's force structure, mission, and doctrine have affected the way we do business overthe past years. Theater Missile Defense is an important aspect of thesechanges, and our service leadershave placed a high priority on theTMD mission. Newer systems willenhance our TMD effectiveness,and we may change our tactics, techniques, and procedures based uponmission, enemy, terrain, troops,and time available (METT T) ;however, our deep-attack doctrineprovides a solid foundation for theTMD mission. There is no compromise for protecting the force,and Army aviation has proven-inpeace and in war--to be a majorcontributor in doing just that!

u.s. Army Aviation Digest September/October 1994


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The Aviation Branch, as thenewest member of the combat armsfamily, has validated its inclusion atevery opportunity since official designation in 1983. Operations JustCause and Desert Storm were stunning successes. Many were surprised by the versatility and lethalityof pure aviation forces and theeffectiveness of support for othercombat arms units. Desert Stormwas not only phenomenal in itsscope but also in the apparentsavings of American lives andequipment by not having to gohead-to--head with entrenched armor and mechanized infantry. Notethat Army aviation was employedeffectively and did its job well.

Why is it then, 11 years afterbranch formation with manycombat successes, we are still notviewed as a full partner by the othercombat arms branches? To thosewho disagree, I would suggest morestudy. I also ask you to read on.Attempt to understand my perspective as I have served mostly asthe senior enlisted member in avariety of table(s) of organizationand equipment (TOE) units sincethe branch birthday. My viewpointthat Army aviation is not fullyaccepted is unique and based onday-to--day operations and interaction with other combat arms units.It is also founded on relationships,since 1983, with other first sergeants, sergeants major, an dcommand sergeants major.

I feel I know what acceptance is.I have experienced it. With morethan 26 years of service, most in

aviation units, I can remember onlyone tour in which I felt that my unit(Aviation Brigade, 7th InfantryDivision, Fort Ord., Calif., 1989 to1990) was not "those guys," but instead "one of us." It had to do withshared hardships. It also had todo with an attitude in the brigade in which we all played thegame in training and in combat(Operation Just Cause). Creaturecomforts stayed home when at FortHunter Liggett, Calif.; the NationalTraining Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.;and the Joint Readiness TrainingCen ter [which moved from FortChaffee, Ark., to Fort Polk, La.,in 1993]. Warrant officers were"Hooaah!" Everyone painted up. Allpatrolled. All dug in. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) moved theunits on the ground, and officers/warrant officers flew.

This was certainly influenced byenlightened leadership at both division-now LTG (retired) CarmenCavessa-and brigade (COL Douglas R. Terrell). Battalion commanders (now COL Benton H.Borum, for one) maneuvered theirunits with great success.

All was not roses though, asmany young officers and warrantschose resignation or separationwhile some enlisted soldiers choseexpiration term of service (ETS).Their image of what military serviceshould have been-and what it hadbeen to that point in their careerwas not what they experienced. TaskForce Hawk (Panama, June 1988through May 1990) made life verycomplicated and not much fun: a9O--day rotation to Panama with thetask force, then back in time todeploy for field exercises, and thenanother 9O--day rotation. Families


suffered, and soldiers got tired-butthe mission was completed in aconsistently excellent manner.

Having experienced this onenessafter never having felt it before orsince, I searched for a systemicproblem as to why acceptance wasnot a reality. My conclusion is thatwe in Army aviation purposely setourselves apart. The other combatarms do not do it to us-we are ourown worst enemy in this area.

Nowhere in Army aviation is thismore personified than in th eaviation warrant officer (AWO). I fthe noncommissioned officer is thebackbone of the Army, then the aviation warrant is the heart of Armyaviation. Young aviation soldiers"wanna be" and identify more withAWO atti tudes-and only reluctantly follow their sergeant'sguidance if there are (and aren'tthere always?) differences.

Since the first rated aviationwarrant officers were appointed,their service has been honorable,memorable, and nothing short ofremarkable. They are a blend ofexperience (enlisted who apply andare selected for and who completeflight training), and young peoplenew to the Army (high school toflight school). They are technicallyproficient and are doing somethingthey love to do--fly! The fact thatthey are paid for flying is just icingon the cake for most. Their attitudesare generally laid back, easygoing,and focused on their flying mission.

In war, the aviation warrant hasproven his or her worth, time andagain. Flying artillery spotter, aerialobserver, cavalry, attack, air assault,air mobile, and medical evacuationmissions-they have greatly assistedin making Army aviation the lethal

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combat arm it has proven to be.They also train officers and enlisted soldiers in aviation maintenance and operations skills.Before an d since the AviationBranch became a reality, the aviation warrant officer has consistentlybeen on the forward, leading edge.The aviation warrant personifiesand perpetuates the mystique offl y ing. Recruiters use this image tosuccessfully sell not only Armyaviation but also the Army. Youknow of what I speak: somethingspecial -di f ferent -set apart.Remember the TV commercials!

Keep the preceding paragraph inmind because the next-to--last sentence is where I perceive the rootcause of the difficulties other combat arms soldiers have of seriouslyaccepting aviation as a combatarms brother. They appreciateou r capabilities but do not whollyaccept us because we insist onbeing different.

Consider priorities. Manyaviation warrants consider themselves aviators first, then soldiers.This attitude is pervasive. It is consciously (and even unconsciously)projected to both officers andenlisted soldiers. Reinforcement isfurther continued in branch magazines. It is not wrong that these publications continually emphasize theglory and potential of Army aviation. They were designed to do that.What is not recognized by idea orstory are the challenges faced by themajority of aviation soldiers whomaneuver on the ground around thebattlefield to support those who fly.

Remember also that AviationBranch officers have vivid memories of the first major influence intheir military career-the warrantofficer instructor pilot. Other combat arms officers tell stories of theirfirst platoon sergeant training andgrooming them, but the first vividimage has already been implantedbefore the aviation lieutenant gets4

to his first platoon sergeant. Even bring them to the level of expertisethis contact is not special because and reputation to even be slated formost aviation platoons have senior the division commander's considerlieutenants as platoon leaders. Once ation. Before branch formation, inagain, the young officers (like 1983, aviation-background NCOsthe young soldiers) look for the could be exposed to fields other thanmost experienced person in the pla- pure aviation in which their considtoon-who always happens to be eration and selection for division,the chief warrant officer 3 (CW3), and higher, command sergeantor senior CW2-to help shape their major billets were possible. Theattitudes and behavior. Thus the highest level billet that I personallycycle remains unbroken. know of being filled by an aviation

With this initiation, these same command sergeant major was VIIyoung officers will one day be mak- Corps in Europe in the early 1980s.ing branch decisions. The first crop The high-tech battlefieldoflieutenants (year group 1983) will dominates our daily training. Thebe battalion commanders in a few maintenance side of the branch isyears. They cannot identify with the absorbing the black-box technologyexperiences of the Aviation Branch of the newer aircraft systems whileleaders of today who were branch the operations/air traffic control sidequalified and served tours with other is involved in the computerizationbranches-mostly Infantry, Armor, of the battlefield, Army airspaceand Field Artillery. The assumption command and control (A2C2), newof "soldier-f irst" thinking by these equipment development, and secureofficers is not realistic at this point, data communications.nor could it be expected based on Are we becoming so specializedtheir beginnings. in our focus that we are maintainers,

This further limits their potential operators, air traffic controllers, etc.,to lead the Army at division, or first-then soldiers? We say we canhigher, command. Are not all com- secure our own perimeters, bu tbat arms officers logically supposed when deployed, we immediatelyto be considered for these positions? start looking for infantry supportPlease remember that rated aviators rather than digging in , layinghave commanded divisions and ou t fields of fire, and plottinghave even been selected as the predesignated fire-support targets.Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, but will We fail to ensure that our sergeantsan Aviation Branch officer ever be accept these responsibilities eitherselected for division command? I by only paying these requirementsthink not, unless changes take place lip service (simulating) or leavingand have time to cycle through an officer back (who should be flyofficer ranks from commissioning ing) who usually fails to emphasizethrough retirement. the attention to detail needed to do

While this is "officers' business" these things correctly.and does not directly involve me, I Trust me, in a hostile fiream concerned with Aviation Branch envi ronment , the sergeants will benoncommissioned officers who moving the convoys and will be rehave the potential to serve as sponsible for securing the perimeter.command sergeants major at every Because of our leanness, those wholevel-including the sergeant major fly will have to assist in this effort.of the Army. They will never There will be no other way to prorealize this potential because they tect those multimillion-dollar maare not going to get the variety of chines. The infantry and armor unitsexperiences and exposure that will will be otherwise occupied. We will



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have no priority to them. Theyexpect their combat arms brother(us) to be able to look to our owndefense.

Battalion command sergeantsmajor (CSMs) must be prepared tomove the battalion on the ground.First sergeants and supply sergeantswill be moving back and forthbetween the trains/logistics supportarea and unit, bringing replacementsand food and coordinating(scrounging) fo r all classes ofsupply. Platoon sergeants will movetheir platoons and see that assembly areas are secure and readyto receive the returning aircraft formaintenance, fuel, and rearm.

Units will "lighten up" quicklybecause our most valuable defensivemeasure is our ability to move atnight-and move often. If we haveto learn this on the battlefield, theeducational cost will be expensivein lives and equipment. I f we trainthis way now-and train toughthere will be no surprises.

Our combat arms brethren hearour talk but see us train. They seeour assembly areas and listen to ourrequests for help in securing ourown perimeters. They see the coolers, lawn chairs, etc., brought tofield training-and they shake theirheads. While they acknowledgethey enjoy the ride in the UH-60Black Hawks for air assaults andthey love the power and destructionof th e AH-64 Apaches andOH-58D Kiowa Warriors, theyknow we are not like them. We aredifferent.It is said that a problem shouldnever be raised without havingrecommended solutions. I agree andhave what, I feel, are the onlypossible solutions.Solution 1

Leave everything alone. Changenothing. Just accept the fact that weas a branch will never be fullyaccepted as part of the CombatArms famil y. Sure, they appreciate

us for our lethality, but we will neverbe truly accepted and trusted. Wewill always be "those aviators."Solution 2

Emphasize that we are soldiersfirst in all training. From the topdown, cause more emphasis inevaluations to be on tactical "soldier skills." Aviation officers needto know how to command troops onthe ground because that is wheretheir soldiers will be. I f they are notthere to command, then this knowledge has been given to the first sergeant/platoon sergeant in the formof commander's intent and coursesof action. Emphasize ground defense and maneuver. All battlefieldoperating systems (BOSs) must alsobe considered from the ground perspective. Do nothing to cause us torequire special treatment as in "career tracking" for enlisted or lowering standards for what is considered"command" credit (companies thesize of platoons 10 years ago) forofficers. Ensure that we continue tolook like other soldiers (love thosebattle-dress uniform [BDU] flightsuits) and act/react as they do.Emphasize the noncommissionedofficer 's (section sergeant/platoonsergeant/first sergeant/sergeantmajor/command sergeant major)role in all phases of officer/warrantofficer training. Promote "soldierfirst" thinking and actions at all levels. Cause more ground-maneuverchallenge successes to be recognized.Solution 3

This last possible solution is themost outrageous but is in line withthe expectations of many of ourother combat arms brothers. Designuniquely different uniforms, startour own officer-producing school,pick a name (other than the U.S. AirForce-it's taken), and demand ourrecognition as a separate servicewith different standards and our ownway of doing things. Arrange for aKey-West-like setting to iron outour mission between the Air Force

u.s.Army Aviation Digest September/October 1994

above and the soldiers below.We will then put our hands in ourpockets, let our hair grow (somehave gotten an earl y start), and gloryin our achievements. After all, weknow that, given the opportunity, wewill win any war without any otherservice's involvement.

My choice would be, of course,Solution 2, but our perceivedspecialness did not happen overnight-nor will it be correctedimmediately. In fact, it began indefense of a belief-the belief thatArmy aviation could perform inmore than just a support role. Theneed for this defense was caused byshortsighted ground commanderswho were unable to understandthe concepts and felt threatened bythe implication.

When considering this article, Italked to many to validate myobservations and perceptions withtheir experiences. They all agreedto the basic premise-that we causeourselves to be different and no taccepted. They also left me withsome additional comments. OneAviation Branch captain said that hetoo had enjoyed a similar experienceto mine in the 7th Infantry Division.His was in a mechanized infantrydivision aviation brigade in Europein the late 1980s. Another felt hewould have been a more effectiveplatoon leader if his sergeant hadbetter emphasized the importance ofsoldier task training. He felt le tdown. I had no argument because Iknow we noncommissioned officerscan always do better. I do believethis officer's aviation branch basiccourse instruction should havebetter prepared him for thischallenge.

This article in no way should beconstrued as a slam on the aviationwarrant or any other group. As theonly advanced individual training(AIT) I ever attended was the 71PFlight Operations Course (now93P), I also feel a parochial interest

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in the future of our branch. Mycareer in the Army and Armyaviation has been blessed and-likethe senior colonels and generals,both active and retired-we seniornoncommissioned officers alsowant our branch to "be all it can be."In this, I have seen it, felt it, and beena part of it. I know what it is like tobe fully accepted by our combatarms brothers. It is something I missand hope to be part of again.

I f reading this has caused you tothink and reconsider, then I haveaccomplished my goal. Only byreview and reflection can we causechange and improvement within ourown personal area of influence.Be safe!CSM Brent H. Cottrell

HHC, 17th Aviation BrigadeUnit #15270APO AP 96205-0043

Issue 16, the March 1994 issueof the Apache Newsletter, had anarticle that described the IHADSS(integrated helmet and display sightsystem) shortage in the Army. Thearticle indicated that "During arecent work group held in St. Louisthe critical shortage of lHADSS wasagain the main subject of discussion." According to the article, "FortRucker has been directed to nolonger allow students to leave theschool with their helmet. Uponarrival at their new assignment, theywill be issued a helmet and alsorefitted."

The Headquarters, Department ofthe Army, message, dated 251700ZApr 94, SUBJECT: AH-64(APACHE) Integrated Helmet andDisplay Sight System (IHADSS)Integrated Helmet Unit (IHU) Ac-countability Procedures, providedfurther directives to units regardingthe accountability of IHADSShelmets. It required units to assume6

accountability and control for allIHUs in their organizations. Property book officers will add alllHADSS IHUs currently on hand inthe unit to the property book. Thenthe lHADSS IHU will be sub-handreceipted to all AH-64 Apache pilots. Unfortunately, the entire message appears to be written by andfor logisticians, with little inputfrom commanders, safety officers,or AH-64 aviators.

Apparentl y this is the logisticalanswer to an IHADSS shortageproblem. While this may seem logical to accountants, it was a bad decision for AH-64 units and aviators.The IHADSS has always beenexpensive. The logisticians lostcontrol over this equipment yearsago. This policy change appears tobe a method of regaining controlover the helmets-at the expense ofunits and aviators.

These "smart guys" obviouslyknow absolutely nothing about theIHADSS-or the AH-64 or theaviators who fly it. The helmetis an integral part of the AH-64weapon system. Without it, the aircraft visionics, weapons, and communications are rendered almostcompletely useless. This helmet isnot like a Kevlar, which can be interchanged frequently. All AH-64aviators know the long hours andextensive work it takes to properlyfit the helmet. They also understandthat even when fitted, it will takemany flight hours to become comfortable in the helmet. A well-fit tedhelmet becomes an extension of theaviator and aircraft. A poorly fittedor uncomfortable lHADSS helmetaffects aircrew safety and aircrafteffectiveness.

One issue the article failed toaddress was "Who would fit eachnew helmet in the unit?" Of course,the book answer is the flight surgeonor ALSE [aviation life supportequipment] technician. Those of usin the real world know that the

Army's ALSE program is broken,without enough personnel or equipment to properly operate-without the additional time-consumingtask of fitting all new personnel withlHADSS. Flight surgeons are alsooverworked, shorthanded, and untrained for this task. In overzealousefforts to regain control over thisexpensive equipment, logisticiansfailed to recognize another issuethat will affect aviation readiness,training, and safety.

I f an aviator leaves Fort Ruckerwithout his or her custom-fittedlHADSS, how can the gaining unitcommander ensure that an appropriate size is available to issue the newaviator upon arrival? The commander may have an inventory ofsmall or medium sizes but may nothave any large or extra-large helmets. What then "supply guys?"According to training circular(TC) 1-214, Aircrew TrainingManual for Attack Helicopter,AH-64, and TC 1-210, AircrewTraining Program Commander'sGuide to Individual and CrewTraining, aviators must be integrated into the commander's aircrew training program within 14days of arrival at a new unit. But ifthe new aviator does not have theproper-size helmet, he cannot fly orfight his weapon system. I know thatthis is a problem because my unithas recently received a new aviatorwithout the lHADSS, and presently,none are available in his size. TheArmy has spent a lot of money training perishable flight skills to aviators. Every day that passes when wecannot fly this aviator equates toskills lost. I f "time is money," howmuch money have we lost alreadybecause of this issue?

This will have yet another impacton AH-64 units. The unit will nowhave to pay for the additional partsnecessary to refit the lHADSS helmet to new aviators. Purchasing newvisors, which must be custom cut for



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each aviator, will cost $888.00 forclear visors and $847.00 for tintedvisors. It will take about three manhours to cut new visors and rebuildand refit the helmet each time it isrefitted to a new aviator. At an esti-mated $16.00 dollars per hour inlabor, this will result in $48.00 oflabor expenses. The total estimatedcost to units for each new aviatorwill be about $1,783.00.I do agree with the article'sstatement that "We can no longerallow unauthorized personnel tohave lHADSS helmets under theirdesks and in the trunks of their cars."These are valuable tools of the tradefor Apache pilots, which cannot bewasted. However, because of thevery nature of its use, getting a dif-ferent helmet at each new duty sta-tion is not an efficient answer. Iunderstand better than most thatthese are times of shrinking budgets.But the only real answer is to pur-chase more IHADSS, continue toissue the lHADSS at Fort Rucker,and then laterally transfer them tothe gaining unit.The helmet will then stay with theaviator as long as he remains in anAH-64 flight slot. Measures can andshould be implemented to ensurethat when an aviator leaves anAH-64 tables of organization andequipment (TOE) slot, he then turnshis helmet in.

The article indicated a newapproach, which would be one stepforward for "bean counters" butthree steps backward for AH-64Apache unit commanders and avia-tors. I only hope the leadership ofthe Army recognizes the importanceof this issue and makes a decisionbased upon operational readiness,not logistical accountability prob-lems. Let's not allow the logistical"tail" to wag the dog!

CW4 Ronald B Ritter Jr.Regiment Safety Officer

Headquarters, 11 th Aviation RegimentCMR #416

APO AE 09140

( . " . . . ..",. ' . .'.,.. - G o ( j ~ s a m ~ r i t a n1" ' : iJviator of ' !

l l b p ~ ~ ~ t i o r i f ! t o v i t : l ~ jI Comfort" i s s o u g h ~\_ ...................... ,: .....::2.., .......... . O. M . : , ~ . . J

In late April 1991, an Americanhelicopter pilot serving in OperationProvide Comfort made a most im-portant telephone call to the UnitedStates. During a brief transmission,he revealed to a Kurdish woman liv-ing in the United States (Mrs. SafiyaDosky) that her daughter Gelawish,trapped in Iraq, was alive and amongthose Kurds forced to move tothe border with Turkey to escapeSaddam Hussein's wrath.

The story had begun some 16years earlier (1975) when Gelawish,then two years old, was taken fromher mother by the Iraqi police andthe mother sent into Iran to find theirhusband and father. The hope of theIraqi government was that the father,a leader in the Kurdish resistanceforces who had escaped to Iran,would return to claim his babydaughter. The father (Mikail Dosky)would likely have been subjected totorture or execution. He wisely didnot return to Iraq, and the familymoved to the United States asrefugees.During the following years, thefamily tried through various chan-nels to have their daughter released.No way was found to do this with-out the likelihood that other familymembers remaining in Iraq wouldsuffer reprisals.

The American helicopter pilot'scall set in motion many behind-thescenes operations that enabledth e girl 's father to go to Iraq by wayof Turkey, locate his daughter, andtake her to the United States tobe reunited with her family.

Because of the excitement relatedto the telephone call, the Kurdishmother failed to write down the


name of the helicopter pilot. It ispossible that he is unaware of theresults of his call. The family wouldlike to thank him for his immeasur-able kindness. In addition, I am inthe process of detailing the eventsof this story for possible publication,and would l ike to have contact withthe pilot.

I f you are the missing GoodSamaritan--or have knowledge ofhis identity or whereabouts- pleasecontact me, giving any details youmay have on how to make contact.

t .

Mrs. Carol Hamrick3303 Dogwood DrivePortsmouth, VA 23703

C h l ! ~ ~ ~ f 1 g eA i ; ; ~ ~ a u ; ;

- - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ - - - - ~ ~ - -The Army Aviation Center atFort Rucker, Ala., is gearing up for

the Fourth Annual Air AssaultChallenge, 16-18 November. Unitsfrom worldwide are invited to sendtheir best teams to compete to seewho is the most proficient in allareas of air assault operations.

Contestants-regardless of rank,service, or gender-are invitedto enter, with teams of two eachcompeting against each other.After one day of inprocessing andrefresher training (plus an ArmyPhysical Fitness Test), contestantswill have two days of tests and ex-ams. This year, up to 60 teams willbe able to compete in the challenge.

The champions last year werefrom the 10ist Airborne Division ofFort Campbell, Ky. "We are look-ing forward to seeing who can meettheir challenge this year," said CPTBill Donatucci, commander of DCompany, 1st Battalion, 10th Avia-tion Regiment, 1st Aviation Brigade(Air Assault). Donatucci said thatteams need to get their registrationin to reserve a slot. He added alsothat entries from other services, such

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as Marines and Air Force, wouldmake it more competitive. Femalesare also asked to enter.

The challenge has eight scoredevents. The Army Physical FitnessTest consists of push-ups, sit-ups,and a two-mile run. Contestantsscoring 300 (100 in each event) willreceive an additional point for eachpush-up and sit-up repetition andone point for each six secondsdecreased in the run time maximumscore.

Teams will then be given abase point, landing heading, andstakes to mark a helicopter landingpoint-based on standard distancesbetween markings.

The obstacle course includes aconfidence climb; low belly over;weaver; a swing, stop, and jump;and other obstacles.

The Slingload Inspection eventwill consist of preparation and rigging of four loads. Teams will begiven two minutes to inspect allproblem loads and find up to 16faults.

Participants will then ti e acomplete Swiss rappel seat andclimb the stairs of the 50-foot rappeltower.

The written academic exam willcover all phases of air assault training, including air assault, slingload,and rappelling operations. The examwill have 100 multiple-choicequestions to be completed in 15minutes.

Competitors will be required todemonstrate hand-and-arm signalssuch as "move aircraft upward,""hover," and "cut slingload."

Teammates must finish the12-mile foot march within 10 feetof each other. Team time stops whenthe last team member crosses thefinish line. Contestants will becarrying an Ml6 rifle mockupand a rucksack with prescribedequipment.

The top three teams in thecompetition will receive plaques,8

according to Donatucci. Eachmember of the first-place team willreceive a choice of handguns.Second-place winners will eachreceive a survival knife, andthird-place team members willeach receive a leatherman's tool.

A prechallenge pamphlet andentry information are available bywriting to--

Commander, D CompanyAir Assault School1st Battalion10th Aviation Regiment1st Aviation Brigade (Air Assault)Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5000.The Air Assault School can

also be contacted at 205-255-1118or 9790 or DSN 558-1118 or 9790.The deadline for registration is2 November.

The theme for the SeventhNational Conference on HighPower Microwave (HPM7) Technology is "H PM-Technology inTransition." The conference willbe 31 October-4 November, atthe Naval Postgraduate School,Monterey, Calif. This conference issponsored by the Space and NavalWarfare Systems Command, Arlington, Va., and the Naval ResearchLaboratory, Washington, D.C.

A free short course on HPMeffects assessment will be held withHPM7. The course will run on Sunday, 30 October, 1300 to 1700, andon Monday, 31 October, 0900 to1700, in the conference auditorium(King Hall). To take this course,write in red ink on the bottom ofyour preregistration form "HPMShort Course."

For more information, call theregistration office for the HPMconference a t 804-255-D409 orfax 804-255-D056. Or write to--

HPM Conference RegistrationOffice

P.O. Box 2218Suffolk, VA 23432.

The Research, Development, andEngineering Center at the V.S.Army Missile Command, RedstoneArsenal, Ala.-in cooperation withother agencies-wil l sponsor"Manufacturing Process Development in Photonics." The conference will be 1-2 November, atthe Redstone Arsenal RocketAuditorium, Huntsville, Ala.

For more information, contactSusan T, Caldwell, commercialtelephone 205-895-6343, extension277, or fax 205-895-6581.

The Research, Development, andEngineering Center at the V.S.Army Missile Command, RedstoneArsenal, Ala.-in cooperation withother agencies, including theNight Vision and ElectronicSensors Directorate, V.S. ArmyCommunications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, N.J.-willsponsor a workshop on "HorizontalTechnology Integration," 15-16 November, at the Redstone ArsenalRocket Auditorium, Huntsville, Ala.

More information is availablefrom Susan T. Caldwell at205-895-6343, extension 277, orfax 205-895-6581.



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Restructuring the WarfightingCapability of the United StatesPart I

Lieutenant Colonel Jack A. Kingston, USARU.S. Army War College, Class 1994/DCS

Chairman, National Security Advisory BoardWashington, D.C.Copyright 1994

Part I addresses the historical background, critical components, and existing problems with regard to Ameri-can combat power. Part 2 discusses the concept ofcombined arms and the recommendations and justifica-tions for a simplified, yet optimal, structure for America's Armed Forces.Introduction

Th e origins of the AmericanArmed Forces are founded in theconcepts and doctrine of bothFrederick the Great and Napoleonread Clausewitz and Jomini. In theintervening centuries, the uniquelyAmerican practical application ofthose concepts has resulted in deci-sive tactical and strategic victorieson the battlefield. Consequently,many currently argue that the UnitedStates is now the sole remainingsuperpower whose Army, Navy, andAir Force enjoy an unprecedentedland, sea, and air supremacy.Scope

General Clausewitz's rule for rulesis "Rules are made for idiots." Thisrule governs the obvious limitationsin attempting to determine the rela-tive advantages to a theoretical re-lationship. His rule is certainly true,especially when conceptualizingunder the framework of a new para-digm. Consequently, the statisticscan be readily manipulated. Eachservice's parochial, self-centeredapproach to evaluating roles andmissions demonstrates this fact.Rather than rely on the recitation ofmasses of facts or statistics to prove

COMBINED ARMS

JOINT OPERA TIONSFigure 1

an intuitive concept, this author re-lies on the research of past andpresent correlations in the search fornew relationships and answers thefollowing questions:

What is the status quo; are ser-vice roles and missions traditional?

How have geopolitics (the U.S.Code) affected the current roles andmissions?

What are the components of theconcept of combined arms (FigureI)?

How does the continuum of op-erations and echelons drive thestructure?

What are the current recommen-dations of the Chairman, JointChiefs of Staff (JCS)?

Is there a systematic process andprecedent for change?Historical Background

In 1776 the "Continental" Armyof the United States was the defen-sive ground force. The Navy was

u.s.Army Aviation Digest September/October 1994 9


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confined to the sea and, with theMarine Corps, projected American power internationally.

In 1943, anticipating a massivestrategic victory in World War(WW) II, Brigadier General William F. Tompkins, Special ProjectsDivision, Army Service Forces,advocated the creation of a singleDepartment of War. The Department would be organized intoGround Forces, Air Forces, NavalForces, and a Supply Department.

Tompkins recommended thateach service procure its respectiveequipment. This "would providecentralized control of procurement, supply, and service functions of the three combat forces."Rivalry among the Services

The National Security Act of1947 created the Department ofDefense (DOD) and th e JointStaff. In 1948, despite the effortsof Tompkins and President HarryTruman, Secretary of Defense(SECDEF) James Forrestal wasconfronted with the spectacle thatthe services could not agree ontheir proper functions. He causedthe service chiefs to forge anagreement at Key West, titled the"Functions of the Armed Forcesand the Joint Chiefs of Staff."This agreement has survived intact for four decades as the Functions Directive, DODD 5100.l.

Although Forrestal tried, his efforts were futile because Title 10of the U.S. Code is so general andvague as far as functions that theAir Force is charged only with"offensive and defensive air operations."

Consequently, justifying missions or weapons systems has resulted in disincentives to cooperation and intense rivalry for specific missions. Those missionsinclude strategic bombing, air defense, close air support (CAS) andaviation systems in general.10

CURRENT ALLOCATION - COMBAT POWERDISUNITY OF COMMAND/CONFUSION OF FUNCTION

AIR FORCE

MISSILES AIRCRAFT

....GROUND ; ' I; ' I , ........ SURFACE, ....; ' I , ........, ........

\ AIRCRAFT\ ,MISSILES'Figure 2

Geopolitical Effect on Roles/MissionsOn the other hand, one result ofgeopolitics ( the U S. code) has beento insist on relative parity in devel

oping service doctrine, the allocation of the budget, an d troopstrengths.

Presently, all of the services provide striking contradictions; mostnotable, they have thousands of aircraft and aerial weapons:

o The Army and Marine Corpshave boats, ships, and combat andtransport aircraft.o The Army also has ballistic missiles, civil engineers, and a space

command.o The Navy has a ground force andair force but is short on sealift and

troop ships.o The amphibious Marines havetanks, aircraft, and artillery.o All the services have separate

acquisition, intelligence, maintenance, special operations, and support branches.

Operational DysfunctionsOperational dysfunctions are justas prevalent (figure 2):o The Army, Marines, Navy, andAir Force provide CAS.o The Marines and Army both provide heavy combat and airmobileassault.o The Army is developing deep attack missiles while the Air Force

develops $50 million fighters formissions that could be replaced byartillery, mUltiple launch rocket systems, or attack helicopters.

o Of course, the Navy is alwaysready to develop strategic bombingaircraft or super-carrier alternativesto Air Force long-range bombers.

o The ground combat arm has morepilots than infantry officers and cankill more tanks with helicopters thanwith tanks.Wartime InfightingIt is also no secret that there have

been tragic consequences and bitter infighting in wartime, despite the



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overall success of American arms.For example, the first war of theUnited States would have been withFrance in 1799, but the war wasnarrowly averted because ofinterservice rivalry between theArmy and the Navy.

This rivalry was much to the chagrin of President Thomas Jeffersonwho joined the fray:

"[ have always cried, Ships!Ships! Hamilton shobby horse was,Troops! Troops! ..His object was thecommand of50,000 men. My objectwas the defense of my country, andthat alone, which [ knew could beeffected only by a Navy."

Continuing down that rocky road,the Spanish-American War approached disaster when overly independent Naval commanders foolishl y separated the fleet, therebyrisking piecemeal destruction. Thenthey virtually abandoned the Armyat the siege of Santiago. The Armyretailiated by seizing Spanish vessels, not only to injure the enemy,but to infuriate the Navy; both objectives were accomplished.

Subsequent operational disastersrelated to interservice rivalry include, but are not limited to, PearlHarbor, the battle of Leyte Gulf, theSon Tay Raid, the capture of theU.S.S. Pueblo, and, of course,Desert One.Peacetime Interservice Dysfunctions

Ironically, periods of relativepeace have witnessed the outbreakof the most intense and acrimonious interservice feuds. During theArmy Aviation Systems ProgramReview in 1982, General Vessey declared, to 51 flag officers of all services:

"Army aircrews are groundtroops. "

This wa s an example of thedoublespeak and nonsense thatformed the rationale and conceptualframework for developing compre-

THE CHALLENGE TO REORGANIZATION WHAT IS THE FUNCTION?

WHAT IS THE FORM?

SPACE AIR

LAND SEA

Figure 3hensive doctrine, organization, andtraining as well as research, acquisition, testing, and fielding of billions of dollars of equipment.

This insiduous dysfunction andconfusion are unnecessary, considering the normal friction ofwarfighting and several new paradigms: the military technical revolution, the new world order, and thedrastic cutbacks in U.S. NationalDefense spending as directed byCongress and the President.Sim plifying Roles/Missions

The resultant equation involves aleapfrog in precision and lethalitycombined with an uncertain diffusion of the threat, increased missions, and resources that are beingrestricted by one-third. This dynamic confluence of events and capabilities is not unique in the American experience as it is a general syndrome that has followed most wars.

However, the current order ofmagnitude of change and the potential impact on national and international security are unique. I f properly understood, this apparentlynegative situation can be convertedto a positive opportunity and act asthe catalyst for a radical simplification of service roles and missions.

A true revol ution in U.S.warfighting capability will beachieved when the new technology,organizations, and doctrine aremaximized and recombined in a holistic approach to provide both offensive and defensive capabilities.This restructure can be achievedwhen form follows function (figure3).Breaking the Traditional Approach to Change

To be sure many topical conceptsare being published in professionaljournals by the best and the bright-

u.s. Army Aviation Digest September/October 1994 11


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est that advocate change. Some examples are "Profound Change in theArmy"; "Rewinging the Air Force,"or better, "Reshaping the AirForce"; or "Navy's Role Expands,Fleet Shrinks"; and "ArmyAviation's Stellar Plans Hamstrung," etc.

Unfortunately, not one of thesedistinguished leaders can break thetraditional approach to untyping the"Gordian Knot" of interservice rivalry confronted by the new paradigms. The traditional approach isdownsizing in the same old relationships with increased redundancy inroles, missions, or equipment confounding any gains in efficiencies orthe logical pre-eminence of any system, service, or new model.Historical Precedent/Evolution. It is no secret that DOD is one ofthe largest, most diversified,farflung, and, decidely, the mostcomplex of all institutions in theworld. In light of the order ofmagniture and nature of the recommendations of former JCS ChiefColin Powell and former SECDEFLes Aspin, objections and uncertainties arise. Is there a historial basis for such dramatic changes? Canso many changes be effected and, ifso, what is the process? The answeris yes, in all cases.

Consider this evolution in development of the services:

The senior service, the Army, wasfirst supplemented by a coastal/riverine, "brownwater" Navy.

This second service developedinto an international "gunboat"power and evolved into the ultimateblue-water, nuclear Navy completewith intercontinental ballistic missiles/sea-launched cruise missiles,aircraft, and Marine infantry armedwith tanks and heavy artillery plusNaval light infantry commandos or"Seals."

The light cavalry became heavy

12

Dragoons, which reverted to lightcavalry, then "trains."

The light cavalry then becamepack-mule artillery; the horses disappeared, but the cavalry mechanized, then went heavy with tanks,fast with wheels, and even got helicopters to become air cavalry.

The siege/fortress artillery grewwheels. It became highly mobilehorse-artillery, which reverted to armored emplacements. Then itsprouted tracks powered by enginesto become both man-battle tanksand self-propelled artillery, as wellas the rockets of the air-defense artillery and missiles of the ArmySpace Command.

The hallowed infantry itself hasmetamorphosed, through unorganized militia, to minutemen, to Indian-fighters, to mounted infantryto foot cavalry, back to skirmishers,then to sharpshooters, machinegunbattalions, antitank teams, and armored infantry as well as airborne,air-assault, counterguerrilla, "special" forces, and finally, predominately mechanized infantry armedwith miniguns, automatic canons,grenade launchers, mortars, missiles, and rockets.

The Army Signal Corps developed balloons that became lighterthan air "ships," which becamepowered aircraft, which blossomedinto the Air Force, an independentservice complete with missiles, deepspace rockets, airborne l05mm artillery, and airborne light-infantry"pathfinders. "

Co-incidentally, both serviceshave developed a command that operates in space.

Finally, the Army medical service with the artillery's forward observers developed helicopters andspotter air planes into the fourth largest air force in the world with medical evacuation, assault, scout, armedreconnaissance, aerial artillery, attack, electronic warfare, antitank,

and antihelicopter, combat aircraftor "flying tanks."The Systems and the Process

With that as background, the DODuses various human, hardware, andsoftware processes and systems tomanage a myriad of problems: establish strategic direction; determine national policy; provide resources; and coordinate the resultant military capability and plans intoeffective military operations inpeace and war.

The main systems that provide thisframework and constitute the process for effecting change are the JointStrategic Planning System (JSPS);the Joint Operation Planning andExecution System (JOPES); and thePlanning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Theoretically, there is no formal relationshipamong these systems but, in practice, they are closely interrelated.

The JSPS, as defined by Federallaw is the formal means by whichthe Chairman, JCS, with othermembers of the JCS and the commanders-in-chief, carries out hisstatutory responsibilities as the principal military advisor to both thePresident and the SECDEF.Reasons for Korean War/Vietnam War Stalemate

Interestingly, it could be observedthat both the Korean War (the "Forgotten War") and the Vietnam War(the "War Our Boys Weren't Allowed to Fight) were stalemated precisely because they did not ring theelements of a winning strategy intofull effect. The questions remain:Was failure due to -

Fears of an unlimited nuclear holocaust?

A misunderstanding of the impact of geopolitical forces?

Doubt that the conflict might becontrolled regionally within thelow- to mid-intensity spectrum?

u.s. ArmyAviation Digest September/October 1994


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. Interservice rivalry prompted fiveseparate air campaigns?

. Th e fact that the vehicle for effective change was lacking?

The answer may never be known;however, the Persian Gulf War didseem to bring it all together again atfull-speed ahead fo r America'sArmy, Navy, and Air Force, at leastto the layman observer. The consequences of that victory at once reestablished the elements of the winning strategy of WW II. They pavedthe way for bolder and more innovative strides into the future by relying on a military technical revolution and an effective understanding of the past. In short, the statusquo demands change.Analysis of Ongoing Changes

To be sure, the forces of the Army,Navy/Marine Corps, and Air Forceare designed and equipped to deterconflicts through a visible capability to resist aggression against anycountry or vital U.S. interests. Ofcourse, inherent in these forcesshould be the capability to conductmilitary operations at any requiredlevel of conflict, while providingcredible nuclear deterrence, and stilloffer escalation options to the National Command Authority.

Arguably, historical fact verifiesthe fact that the Armies of the UnitedStates have met this test in the past,however close some of the battleshave been (i.e., Trenton, Bull Run,Kasserine, Suwon). However, a review of the structure, organization,equipment, training, and personnel ,as well as the roles and missions ofthe services, indicates that all of thesehave, in the past, been successfullyadapted to the prevailing circumstances, a lbeit it in a dynamic, oftenradical way.In analyzing the ongoing changes, one

could say that the Armed Forces are atleast half-way to the the optimal force,at least half-way to the ideal design ofroles and missions. When the optimal

PROPOSED REORGANIZATION* FORM MUST FOLLOW FUNCTION* FIVE CLEARLY DEFINED SERVICES:\0 ONE JOINT GENERAL STAFF & SPECIAL OPS

STRATEGICFORCES(SPACE)

AIRFORCES

NAVALFORCES

Figure 4organizational changes are effected,with the technical revolution, a further quantum leap in combat powerwill result. Although the precedentand the process for change exists,at this point, Congressional leaderssuch as Senator Sa m Nunn and civilian experts may be more capableof effecting the required changes.Senator Nunn has, in fact, stunnedthe Pentagon by calling fo r a fundamental restructuring of roles andmissions. He has identified at least10 areas that are fraught with redundancy and duplication of effort. Thissituation requires a "visiting surgeon" like Senator Nunn becausethe uniformed senior leadership of

the departments cannot revisualizeor readily alter their own self-images and role models to accommodate a ne w paradigm.Conclusion

The simplification of service rolesand missions to basic functions is desperately needed to eliminate the redundancy and dysfunction of the current status quo. Part 2 of this article1which will appear in the next issue ofthe Aviation Digest, will list theauthor's recommendations for a simpler, yet optimal, structure fo rAmerica's Armed Forces (figure 4)and discuss the necessary justifications for these recommendations.

"Part of the vision for the future is a process to focus ... control,direct, and understand change--a concept to provide leadership on the way to our vision of the future of the Army. "General Gordon R. Sullivan, CSA

u.s. Army Aviation Digest September/October 1994 13


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Sf;RUTINIZINGSEAD PLANNINGCaptain (P) Peter E. Curry Captain (P) W. Thomas RiceFire Support and Combined Arms Department

IntroductionWe, the authors, are skeptical aboutsuppression of enemy air defenses(SEAD) planning. The Army's currentapproach to preventing aircraft from being shot down seems to miss the mark.At best, Army plans are too rigid. Atworst, planners ignore SEAD all together.

We do not want to comment on SEADtechniques, rather we want to discuss thethought process that allows aviationplanners to arrive at their solutions.Our assignment at the U.S. Army FieldArtillery School (USAFAS), Ft. Sill,Okla., gives us a unique perspective. Wefrequently see a contrast between whatArmy aviators write in aviation publications and what USAFAS teaches. Thisarticle is a summary of our observationsand thoughts on the subject.1\\'0 Approaches in HyperboleRigid and detailed. We have observedtwo main approaches to SEAD. The firstrelies on long, 72-hour time lines, unlimited resources, the devoted attentionof combat support branches, and an enemy who is not smart enough to avoidthe pasting that we've planned. Once wepound him with artillery, and jam hissocks off, he won't dare to shoot back atus. We will fly in, conduct our mission,and fly home with a wall of steel actinglike a beacon to the penetration point.There will be no need for deviation. Theplan will work.Check the block. In the second approach, planners design enough of a14

Tactics BranchU.S. Army Field Artillery SchoolFort Sill, Oklahoma"Skepticism is a hedge against vulnerability"

-Charles Thomas SamuelsSEAD plan to keep those combat training center observer controllers or thehigher headquarters off of their backs.Throw up a few charts, draw a few boxeson some acetate, brief it well, and one is"good to go." The brief is a pain in theneck; however, when we fly, we will dowhat we must to get the job done. Thisplan may work if the aircrews have a lotof savvy and experience. Many timesthough, that is not enough.Too often, the results are the same. Thebattlefield is littered with the simulatedburning wreckage of rotary-winged air-craft. Maybe these units are poorlytrained, do not understand how SEADfits into their plans, or view the battle asa series of formulae that, if followed, assure success.Current SEAD planning is broken

for most units.Our conclusion is that SEAD, ormaybe the way we view SEAD, is "broken." A lack of training may be whyplanners and fire supporters all too often misunderstand SEAD for Army operations. Perhaps this is why ArmySEAD doctrine has changed little in thepast quarter century.

We must abandon the attrition warfareview of SEAD as merely target destruction, and focus on the enemy. In short,we must adopt a maneuver view ofSEAD.SEAD lOl:Down and DirtyTo establish a common starting point,we begin by defining SEAD as it is cur-

rentIy written. Then we will reevaluatethe way Army aviation thinks abou t it.Field Manual (FM) 90- 15 di videsSEAD into three categories: complim en

tary suppression , campaign SEAD, andlocalized SEAD. Complimentary sup-pression refers to aircrew self-defenseand targets of opportunity. CampaignSEAD is the theater- wide plan to reducethe ovemll threat to friendly aircraft despite the mission. It orients on the airwar. Localized SEAD orients on groundmaneuver operations and usually supports operating close to or across the forward line of own troops (FLaT). For ourpurposes, we will focus on localizedSEAD.

Localized SEAD supports combataviation operations throughout th ebattlefield to include such high - risk operations as deep attacks and air assaults.While the speed and shock effect of suchoperations will have a profound influence on the battle, the potential for thesudden loss of large numbers of personnel and valuable weapon systems requires that the commander weigh hisoptions carefully. In most cases, the pay off must be extremely high to justify therisk. The operation, therefore, will likelybe the main effort while crossing theFLaT and flying deep.Given this fact, commanders at corpsand even echelons above corps (EAC)will probably support the division's operations with a myriad of assets. A major challenge for division planners is thedevelopment of a SEAD plan that effectively uses all assets available. By usin g



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the targeting process of decide, detect,and deliver (as described in FM 6-20-10), planners can develop a localizedSEAD plan.Simply stated, this means friendlyforces engage only known (seen/identified) air defense artillery (ADA) targets.While the soldiers in the air might findcomfort in thinking field artillery is blast-ing every possible ADA site, the division does not have the assets to accomplish such a mission. So, even with corpsaugmentation, targeters must carefullyselect radar, command and control (C2),or even specific weapon sites, and targetthem for both lethal and nonlethal fires.

To do this, division planners shouldalways consider corps and EAC assets.Not only does corps have assets such asmultiple launch rocket system, Armytactical missile system, and Army air toattack the enemy, but the corps fITe sup-port element is tied directly into thebattlefield control element (BCE). TheBCE is the Anny liaison to the joint forceair component commander (JFACC).The BCE and theJFACC are both foundin the air operations center, and can pro-vide U.S. Air Force (USAF) assets tosupport the division's intelligence effortand SEAD plan.The JFACC, usually a USAF or U.S.Navy senior commander, conducts campaign SEAD to achieve air superiority.Campaign SEAD has a much larger fo-cus than localized SEAD supportingArmy aircraft. Though each type ofSEAD tends to target different types ofthreat ADA systems, any destruction ofenemy air defense benefits all aircraft,and the JFACC recognizes our mutualinterest in supporting Army localizedSEAD operations. Intelligence and electronic warfare (EW) platforms, as wellas C2 platforms, may be allocated tosupport large deep operations. Thoughnot often available, these systems canprovide the real-time intelligence andtargeting information necessary to successfully fly deep in a high-threat environment.

In summary, intelligence preparationof the battlefield and joint assets can pro-vide the foundation for division plannersto effectively target threat ADA assets.Once targeted. planners can apply organicArmy and joint systems to direct lethal andnonlethal fires against the enemy.

OK ..What's the Problem?SEAD planning sounds simple andstraight forward. However, after reviewing several articles submitted from thefield and observing some examples ofhow units practice SEAD on corps anddivisional exercises, we believe that problems exist in the application and interpretation of SEAD planning by manyunits in the field. We do not intend toaddress the apparent lack of attentionthat SEAD planning generally receives,but rather the perspective from whichArmy planners approach SEAD.Common Myths- SEAD is a separate mission. For theAnny, SEAD is a task within a mission.It is something that is part of, and in support of, a mission.

At the campaign level, SEAD can be aseparate mission. While Army aviationmay participate in this mission, the Armyis not the driving force. Similarly, localized SEAD is a term with some utility tothe other services. They view it as something that supports campaign SEAD.However, we feel that localized SEADis an unnecessary term from the Annyperspective. It is actually a fancy termfor fITe support of air maneuver.

I f SEAD is difficult to understand,aviation made it that way. At the localized SEAD level (corps, division, andbelow), planners try to wedge higherlevel of thinking and execution (theaterlevel, campaign SEAD) into our tactical arena. Anny planners try to put around peg in a square hole.-All battlefields are linear. Most scenarios look at aviation elements tryingto penetrate a deliberate defense with adeliberate deep attack. Planners mentallydraw a line in the sand with "us" on oneside and "them" on the other. It becomesa high stakes game of capture the flag.Review any article. You will most likelysee a clean plan with computer-generated graphics. The plan contains lots oflines, arrows, and charts. It is beautifuland based on "great" enemy intelligence.What happens when the reality of operating in a decentralized war draws near?Operations in Panama and Somalia areprime examples. The "one solution fits all"approxh to SEAD becomes inadequate.-Absolute intelligence of the enemyis possible. With the advent of "won-


drous" technology, planners should knowmore about the enemy than everbefore, butthis does not equate to a complete view ofthe enemy. Our faith in this technologymakes decisionmakers lazy. Americans, es-pecially aviata"s, love gadgets,because theymake life easier. If allowed, these gadgetscan create a seductive, passive, and manytimes false analysis.Human intelligence, such as long-rangesurveillance (LRS) forces, is al ways inthe right place at the right time in training scenarios. In reality, LRS forces mustdo a lot of walking that limits them to avery localized area. Planners tend tounderuse their organic reconnaissance(recon) assets. Too often, we see unitsflying in large formations penetrating theforward edge of the battlefield with re-con aircraft only a few kilometers ahead.This "iron cloud" cannot react effectivel yto enemy actions, and leaves itself openfor too many surprises.Even with the aid of technology, or-ganic assets, and human intelligence re-ports, planners must get into the enemy'shead, and ask the questions, "Why is theenemy in that location, what is his purpose, and is it critical to us?" Aviationbrigades cannot al ways expect to seetimely finished intelligence productsfrom higher headquarters. Aviation unitsmust take some responsibility for theirown intelligence.-The enemy is stolid and unimaginative. There is still a tendency to viewenemy forces as inferior and incapableof using techniques that deviate fromtheir written doctrine. The April 1993"Red Thrust" clearly shows that manyfoes (particularly combat intelligencesystem-type armies) will deviate fromdoctrine.This is particularly true when theymust defend againstU.S. air assault attacks.

We also are seeing a "Son of DesertStorm" mentality thnt views all enemiesas confused, disorganized, stationary,and generally dim-witted. America'spotential adversaries will read our battlereviews and take steps to actively counterour SEAD plans. The idea that "the enemy would never do that: it's not doctrinal," is irrelevant and dangerous to assume.Other Handicaps-Highly centralized planning. A highdegree of centralized planning oftentranslates into centralized execution with

15


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little "bottom up" refinement. To takeproper advantage of intelligence from allsources, SEAD plans are contrived at di-vision level or higher. Planners attemptto process, analyze, and develop planswith the aviator in mind. All the aviatormustdo is follow the plan. Unfortunately,units tend to doggedly adhere to theseplans that were developed hours before,separately from their air maneuver plan.The plan becomes a script with littleroom to ad lib.These operations are always communications intensive. Centralized execution requires extensive coordination toeffect changes, and loses the benefits offlexibility and timeliness. The result is ahighly cumbersome system that does notdeal well with the realities of combat.Unable to alter routes and penetrationpoints quickly, aviation units miss themark too often and must fight under un-favorable conditions.Unrealistic expectations of the firesupport system in SEAD. While the artillery is not the only means available toSEAD, it may be all that is available.Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 de-fines suppression as, "to temporarily de-grade the performance of a weapon sys-tem below the level needed to fulfill itsmission."Suppression must be understood. Theeffects of suppression are temporary atbest. To suppress a target effectively, ar-tillery must explode within 100 to 150meters of the target. Small arms, heavymachineguns, and shoulder-fired ADAsystems are very difficult to target. Historically though, these are the veryweapon systems that are most effectiveat destroying helicopters. Even if planners could target these systems, the ar-tillery available to support most operations has neither the number of tubes,the logistical support, nor the range toeffectively suppress even a small portionof the threat ADA.Like it or not, aviation does not haveany direct support CDS) artillery. Division planners allocate fire support assetsbased on the mission. Human nature issuch that few ground maneuver brigadecommanders will easily give up "their"habitually associated DS battalion. Theidea that aviation is a maneuver arm isstill relatively new, and not universallyaccepted in the field. In any case, avia-16

tion units are more likely to have a gen-eral support artillery unit temporarily as-signed as DS. Such an arrangement requires a lot of coordination and practice.Aviation, like the rest of the Army, hastrouble telling fire supporters the objective for frres. We have seen units tell firesupporters to "shoot anything thatmoves," which leaves them with no realscheme or focus. The concept of a rolling wall of steel leading aircraft deep isas insupportable as it is ineffective. Particularly with the depth of the modembattlefield, "blowing up dirt" is not lo-gistically supportable.EW assets provide electronic frres thatcan be a dual-edged sword. Commanders must use suppression through jamming judiciously. Given the mobility ofmost systems, suppression is more easily briefed than executed.

The most fundamental error in theArmy's current approach to SEAD is toview localized SEAD as a battle of attrition rather than as fire support for airmaneuver. Fire supporters and even aviation commanders seem to rely exclusively on firepower, and focus on thenumber and type of ADA systems theycan target and destroy. The current ap-proach to localized SEAD suffers fromexcessive rigidity and a high rate of consumption of limited resources.A Solution: Adopt A Maneuver View

ofSEADObjective. The objective of any military operation (at the theater or operationallevel) is to break the enemy's willto fight or resist by destroying his centerof gravity. All else is subordinate, andour actions at the tactical level must support this objective. Planners do this byidentifying the enemy's critical vulnerabilities and focus combat power to attack them. To protect his weakness, theenemy must react to our hard push. Ourforces must push him onto the horns ofa dilemma by acting faster than he canreact.

As far as SEAD, the normal solutionof creating or blasting a gap in theenemy's air defenses is the worst solution for helicopter operations. The optimum solution is to launch preemptiveattacks before the enemy can establish acohesive defense. Another good solutionis to slip b>, and avoid the ADA strengths

all together. Usually, a longer but lightlydefended air route is preferred to whatwe do now. This is the use of maneuverover frrepower. Currently, planners tendto take the most efficient (shortest) routesand force a gap. Such an approach in-evitably leads to predictability, and re-quires a heavy concentration of frres onenemy ADA systems. Our objective,however, is not usually the enemy ADA.Enemy ADA rarely constitutes his centerofgravity. Their destruction costs timeand resources that hamper our efforts tostrike at the main objective.Recon must be deliberate, aggressive,and properly supported. Recon effortsfrom corps to company should overlap.The corps may identify a weak area, buta company-level unit will locate the ac-tual gap. In maneuver warfare, gaps arekey planning factors and should be ex-ploited ruthlessly. Ideally, our recon willfind the gaps. As a last resort only, wecan create them.

In brief, the corps intelligence networkwill find the enemy acquisition radars,among other systems, and push the re-con forces to the gap. The company performing the recon will then locate theactual gaps between the guns or missiles,and pull the main body through. Themaneuver view, then, relies on intelligence, recon, and maneuver to a greaterdegree than firepower to protect aircraftfrom enemy ADA systems.Optimize fire support. Some criticsof maneuver warfare say maneuver ad-vocates make too little mention of thevalue of frrepower. On the contrary, frre-power is essential to maneuver success.The difference is the way maneuver ad-vocates look at firepower. The numberof kills is not as important as the effectof the fires on the enemy forces."Maneuverists" do not seek targets to de-stroy unless they support thecommander's intent.Massed, timely frres on proper targets(radar, C2 centers, and communicationnodes) allow air maneuver to avoid thethreat ADA and successfully attack itsobjective. Planners must focus the fullweight of their lethal and nonlethal fireson the threat ADA's criticalvulnerabillity, whatever it may be. Onceproperly focused, both the SEAD planning process and the operation itself ismore effective. If units are fast and smart



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enough, many enemy guns or missiles sion. This creates a dependency on thecan be avoided. Using flres to rapidly flre plan to blast a hole and restrict mamaneuver, we can create a dilemma for neuver through the avenue that it hasthe enemy. Faced with two bad choices-- created. The cart leads the horse.remaining to be cut off or moving and Do not blame the JFACC, it is "our"risking destruction-we have entered the airspace. By "our" airspace, we meanenemy's decision cycle. aviators must fly, fight, and survive in-Fit SEAD into the "big picture." this arena. Army aviators have an interThough planners should concentrate on est in taking responsibility for the conthe vulnerabilities of enemy ADA, they trol measures that apply to them. Themust guard against tunnel vision when JFACC recognizes the Army operates inplanning SEAD. SEAD is a means to the ground regime, and usually allocatesan end, not the end itself. An armor airspace to the Army from the surface tobattalion's destroying the enemy's rear a coordinating altitude. Army aviationunits may be the action that unhinges has influence here.the enemy's defense. SEAD may be ir- Do not blame our manuals. FM 100-relevant beyond this point in the battle, 103, "Army Airspace Command andbecause effective enemy resistance, along Control in aCombat Zone," states manywith critical ADA assets, has collapsed. times that, from the division rear areaConversely, striking our objective may forward, effective Army airspace comdeal the enemy's death blow. Destroy- mand and control (A2C2) emanates froming the enemy's resistance by any means the maneuver plan.just may be the best SEAD program ofall. Hovering helicopters can gain andPlanners have to keep the maintain contact with the enemy. Aviacommander's intent always in mind . If tion units remain in the area, maneuverthe aviation brigade's attack or air as- ing to gain positional advantage on thesault is the division's main attack, then enemy. This requires aviation commandevery unit's action must relate to it. In ers and planners to speak the languageother words, significant assets should be of maneuver. From the ground maneuallocated to support the operation. Other ver brigade rear boundary forward, thecombat operations would be designed to factors ofmission, enemy, terrain, troops,support it. Likewise, if the aviation and time available drive rotary-wingbrigade's operation is not the main at- operations. The A2C2 control measures,tack, then its supporting attack must as- such as safe air flight routes, high densist the main attack. We must never lose sity airspace control zones, restrictedsight of how our actions, both fire and operations zones, etc., do not mean muchmaneuver, impact the main attack. Fire to combat staffs trying to engage the enand maneuver from all areas of the battle- emy. Obstacle plans, axes of advance, nofield can suppress enemy airdefense. The fire areas, and other combined arms meapoint is, it does not matter who sup- sures mean more. These allow more flexpresses the threat ADA as long as it hap- ibility.pens. One weakness is planners simply do-Control measures should support not talk to the appropriate ground commaneuver, not hinder it. Effective SEAD manders or do not communicate well.requires a flexible maneuver plan. How- In other cases, planners do not coordiever, Army aviation control measures do nate with the appropriate unit. Notice,not support maneuver planning or flex- we said coordinate, not ask permission.ibility. This is especially true in ourdeep Aviation must meet them half wayattack scenarios. Pick up any manual or though. Any time aviation units maneuarticle on the subject. You will find veroversomeoneelse'sground,theyaresweeping air axes for the .attack. Axes actually conducting a passage of lines.are, by definition, permissive in nature A passage of lines requires coordination,but, because of the way we view airspace, and planners should use many of thethey have become restrictive. These air same considerations as two ground maaxes have evolved into very low, low- neuver units. Within a division, unitslevel transit routes. Aviation has boxed should use standard procedures for thisitself into a strike close air support mis- information exchange.sion profile instead of a maneuver mis- -Accept the/act that combat has manyu.s. Army Aviation Digest September/October 1994

uncertainties. The battlefield is a chaotic place, and maneuver warfare embraces this chaos. One way to accelerateour reaction time is to employ missionorders when planning SEAD.Mission orders place trust in subordinate leaders to make appropriate changesto plans within the framework of thecommander's intent. The intent providesthe vision from which to operate, but itis the man on the spot and under firewho must make the decisions. He is theone with the most real-time intelligence.This concept is crucial when one considers the operational tempo under whichaviation units operate. Aviators have lesstime to wait for orders from higher headquarters, because our windows of opportunity to exploit fleeting situations closerapidly. Our units are always "burninggas." A good, simple plan executed nowis better than a perfect plan executedtoo late.SUMMARYThe aviation community needs tolook again at SEAD. Our plannersshould take a more active role in thedevelopment of localized SEAD. Planners should--Focus on critical air defense vulnerabilities,-Allocate significant recon efforts tofind the gaps in ADA,-Understand the capabilities ofall combined arms that can suppress enemyADA,-Understand SEAD is not a separateoperation and weave SEAD into themaneuver plan,-Be flexible so as to enhance the SEADeffort.Commanders and trainers should reduce dependency on clean, linear battlefields and accept the chaotic battlefieldwhere lines, charts, and matrices areonlyaids. The competence of frontline leaders' making real-time decisions is thekey to success.We should not look at SEAD as a separate, distinct, or phased operation, butrather as a means to enhance aviationmaneuver. SEAD is a continuous process involving all arms that must capitalize on the fleeting opportunities ofcombat. We must attain notonly a physical agility, but a mental agility to operate on today's battlefield. 17


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INTRODUCTIONAccording to multiservice night

and adverse weather combat operations, Tactical Air Control Pamphlet50-44, "Night complicates all aspects of combat operations, and presents challenges, problems, opportunities, and risk."

Before the Gulf War, night CAShad not been actively pursued withinthe U.S. Air Force (USAF). NightCAS/air interdiction had been dedicated almost exclusively to specialoperations forces (SOF) contingencyoperations. However, during DesertShield, the need for night CAS, onthe conventional battlefield, becamevery apparent. Aggressive nightCAS training programs were implemented for both pilots and tacticalair control party (TACP) personnel.

This training raised serious questions concerning such issues as target a ~ q u i s i t i o n , friendly position,and terminal control by GFACs. Amyriad of different "field expedient"techniques were developed to sup-18

port the night CAS mission. Unfortunately, very little information onnight CAS filtered into the post-wartraining publications (MCM 3-1,TheAirLandSea Bulletin, WeaponReview, etc.).CHALLENGES

Fighter/attack aircraft enjoy a significant advantage during night operations. The aircraft are less vulnerable to optically sighted, surfaceta-air threats. However, darknessalso limits the pilot 's ability to visually acquire targets and friendly positions. Generally speaking, as thethreat intensity decreases, target acquisition improves. Likewise, as radar-guided surface-ta-air missilesand antiaircraft artillery intensifies,accurate night CAS employmentdecreases.

Positive identification (ID) of target locations and friendly positionsnot only is the most important task,but also the most difficult task on afluid battlefield. When this task is

combined with night operations, itcan be virtually impossible for thepilot to distinguish who's who without the assistance of a GFAC. TheGFAC must be able to provide target and friendly positions, using thebest means available. An accuratetarget ID improves the probabilityof a successful first-pass attack bythe fighters. In addition, an accuratemark reduces the risk of fratricide.MISSION PLANNING

Successful night CAS operationsrequire extensive mission preparation by both the fighter/attack crewsand the TACP personnel. Pilotsshould address how tactics, formations, interflight deconfliction, terrain, and contingency plans are affected directly by night operations.TACPs require detailed integrationwith all available fire support element assets.

Tactical Air Control Pamphlet 50-44 lists the following planning factors:

Location of friendl y forcesu.s. Army Aviation Digest September/October 1994


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Method of target and aircraft ID Availabili ty of mortars or artilleryfor target illumination and suppres

sion of enemy air defense (SEAD)Infared (IR) and laser capability

of CAS aircraft Laser designation capability of theTACP or fire support teamAircraft support for illumination

with aircraft flares (LUU-I orLUU-2 from OA-IOThunderooltIIorU.S. Marine Corps (USMC) OV-10 Bronco)

Friendly and enemy air defensesystems

Deconfliction of airspace controlareas and other procedural controlmeasures used to prevent fratricidefor direct and indirect fire support.TARGET ACQUISITION

With few exceptions, conventionalbrigade/battalion size units possessthe organic assets necessary to markand/or illuminate a target duringhours of darkness. These assets include flares, artillery, and laser designators. The TACP selects and integrates the assets that best suit thefighter/attack aircraft's capabilities.The illumination flare is currentlythe most commonly used asset fortarget acquisition. Hares can be firedfrom artillery, mortars, or naval gunfire. The flare can be set either to"air-detonate" for airborne illumination, or can be se t to "grounddetonate" to impact the ground andbum for about I 0 to IS minutes. Airreleased flares (LUU-I, LUU-2)also can be dropped by an airborneforward air controller fighter orflare-ship. Higher threat environments may preclude this type of naredelivery.

Ground-detonated (GND) flaresserve as excel lent target marks, andcan be used as a common referencepoint (a CAS bullseye) for the fighters. The GND flares allow additionaltargets to be located by referencingthe target to the flare by cardinal direction and distance. GND flares do

no t affect night vision devices(NVDs) to the same degree as airborne flares. In addition, GND flaresdo not offer the enemy an illumination source that can be used to hisadvantage.

Artillery and mortars also can deliver white phosphorous (WP) orhigh-explosive-type rounds to impact in the target area. This type ofmark also serves as SEAD for thefighters. WP is an excellent heatsource; however, if the fighter is using a forward looking infared (FLIR)system, the WP smoke can obscurethe target area.

Laser-designating devices are, byfar, the most accurate means to marka target or friendly location. Laserdesignators allow for target acquisition without the use of conventional illumination devices. TACPswith access either to the laser targetdesignator, or the ground/vehiclelaser locator-designator equippedwith NVD/thernlal sights, can ensure positive target ID/mark. Aircraft equipped with the laser spottracker (LST), or pave penny pod,can acquire the laser spot and attackwithout "visually" identifying thetarget. Aircraft equipped either withself-orpod-


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anyone except by the aircraft atwhich the light is being aimed. Thelight can be "aimed" at the aircraftwith NVDs. This type of mark isseen easily by fighters in a lowthreat, wheel-type formation. TheLPL-30 and PIM also can be usedin a similar manner.

IR strobe lights also can be an effective mark; however, when usedas the "only" mark, the strobes aredifficult for the fighter to detect. Astrobe can be enhanced by placingit beneath a piece of thin white fabric. This fabric should be suspendedfrom the side of a vehicle orvegetation. The fabric enhances the flash.The fabric must be shielded fromdirect enemy observation.Friendly locations also can be identified to the fighters with an accurate grid or latitude/longitude position. Currently, al l TACPs areequipped with the global positioning system (GPS). The GPS allowsa TACP to accurately fix its position. This infonnation can be passedby secure voice, or Have Quick ultra high frequency radio, to the fighters. This will allow the pilots to builda "picture" of the battlefield, and toincrease the pilots' situational awareness (SA). Pilots must understandwhich grid is the target area andwhich grid is the friendly position.Grid information is meant to increase SA; it nonnally should notbe used as the only means of "marking" friendly positions.TERMINAL CONTROL

One of the most difficult tasks forthe GFAC is the safety offriendlies .Night operations present the GFACwith many of the same challengesfaced by the pilots. Those challengesinclude visual acquisition and depthperception, which directly affectwhen clearance to employ ordnanceis given to the fighters. In addition,aircraft capabilities (LST, FLIR, orNVD) affect how the GFAC willemploy the fighters in the target area.20

The GFAC must establish positivecontrol of night CAS operations.Thorough mission preparation is amust if the GFAC expects to maintain SA during the operation. I f thesituation penni ts, the GFAC shouldreconnoiter the observation positionand general area of operations. Selection ofinitial points (IPs) will dictate attack geometry. The IPs willallow the GFAC to have some ideawhere he can expect to visually acquire the fighters before employmentof ordnance. A thorough reconnaissance will help in the visual acquisition of the fighters. Mandatoryradio calls from the fighters, (Departing IP, I m

Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1994

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