Army Aviation Digest - Oct 1967

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Oct 1967

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UNITED

DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION ACSFORDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYCOL Edwin L Powell Jr .

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COMMANDANT U. S ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLMG Delk M. Oden

ASST COMDT, U S ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLCOL M. H. Parson

DIGEST EDITORIAL STAFFMAJ L J. Herman Jr., Editor-In-ChiefRichard K Tierney, EditorWilliam H. SmithDiana G . WilliamsJohn P. Jones

GRAPHIC ART SUPPORTHarold G. linnHarry A. PickelDorothy L CrowleyAngela A. Akin

DIRECTOR, U S ARMY BOARD FOR AVIATIONACCIDENT RESEARCHCOL Warren R. Williams

USABAAR EDUCATION AND LITERATURE DIVPierce L WigginWilliam E. CarterTed KontosCharles Mabius

RMY VI TION1GESJOCTOBER 1967 VOLUME 13 NUMLEITERSA HOLE IN THE AIRMOBILE CONCEPT, LTC James C CrawfPITCH, POWER AND EXPERIENCE, CW2 Christopher B. ChrA CHANCE TO LIVE, CW2 James L IrwinHAUNTING MISSIONTHE SMOKE GRENADE A COUPLE OF OUNCES OFPREVENTION, CPT James J. DorseyA BOLD STEP FORWARD AT USAPHS, COL E P Fleming, JTHEY COME TO US AS PILOTS, CW2 Robert A HlubinHISTORY OF THE U S ARMY AVIATION TEST BOARD,Jake FortnerCONTROLLED EXPLOSION, MAJ Robert M. Shabram andCW4 Harold L DealFINAL CH-21 MAINTENANCE CLASSBODY ARMOR AND FRAGMENTATION WOUNDSANYBODY SEE THE GROUND TROOPS? CPT William D Swand CPT Curtis J. Herrick, Jr.CRASH SENSE

CHARGE MAJ Lawrence F BeyerAUTOROTATIONS-CAUSE AND EFFECT, H. E Roland, JBRIEFS THAT TEACH, Ted KontosPEARL'SFOG

ARE YOU BOUND FOR RVN?U-21s TO VIETNAM Insi

The mi ss ion of the U . S . ARMY AV IATIO DIG EST is to pr ovid e in formation of an op erat ifun cti onal na tu r e co nce rnin g safe ty and air cra ft acc id e n t prevention , train ing , ma in tenan ce , operesea rch and develop ment , av ia tio n medic ine , and oth e r rela ted data.Th e DIGEST is an o fficial De partment of th e Arm y pe riodi cal p ubl ished mon thly und er th e supof the Comma nd an t, U . S. Army Aviation Schoo l. Vie ws exp ressed herei n ar e not nece ssarily tDepar tm ent of the Army or the U. S . Army Aviati on Schoo l. Ph o tos a re U. S. Ar my unl ess otspec ifi ed . Ma te ri al may be reprin ted pr ovid ed credi t is given t o th e DIGEST and to the authoroth erwise ind i ca ted .Articles, photos , a nd items of in terest on Ar my Avia tion a re invi ted . Direct communica.tio n isized to : Editor -in -Chi e f U.S . Army A viotion Diges t Fort Rucker Alabama.Use of fun ds for prin t ing this pub li cat ion has been appro ved by H ead qu ar ters, Depa rt mentArm y, 29 Dece mber 1964.Acti ve Ar my un i ts rece ive di st rib ut ion und er the pinpoin t di s tr ib uti on syst em as outli ned in AR20 I\la rch 62 and DA Cir cula r 310-57, 4 Ma rch 63. Comp le te DA F orm 12 4 a nd se nd dir ectl y AG Publi cat ions Ce nt er , 2800 Eas tern Boul evard Ba lt im ore , Md . 21220 . Fo r any cha nge in distrequirements merely init ia te a re vise d DA Fo r m 12-4.a t ional Gua rd and Arm y R ese rv e units submi t requirement s th rou gh their sta te adju tant s ge ne

U. S. Army Co rps co mmande rs resp ec tively.F o r th ose not el igib le for offi cia l di s t ribution or who des ire pe rso nal cop ies of th e DIGEST pasc ri pti ons, 84 .50 domes ti c and 5 .50 ov erseas are avai labl e from the Sup erin tend e nt of DocumentsGovern ment Printing Office , Wash ington , D. C. , 20402.


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Sir:The TH-13T, in my opinion, is a finedaytime tactical instrument trainer. Itcosts litde to ol=ierate when compared toother ru.rcraft that are used for the sameor s i m i l ~ purposes, and the training received is comparable to that received inlarger and more expensive aircraft. Iwould, however, prefer to limit thetraining in the TH-13T to daylighthours with a minimum amount of timefor a hrief night orientation.Each student who goes through tactical instrument training is required to flyapproximately 50 hours on instruments-25 in the basic phase and 25 in the advanced phase. Before April 1967 eachstudent was required to fly 5 hours and15 minutes of those 50 hours at night,1 hour in basic and 4 hours and 15minutes in the advanced phase. The student now gets only 4 hours of night instruction in the course. The time in theadvanced phase has been reduced to 3hours.The above being true, the advancedinstrument instructor who had threestudents was required, before April 1967,to give 12 hours and 45 minutes of nightinstruction every 4 weeks. The presentinstructor with three students will average 9 hours per 4-week period. Twelvehours .and 45 minutes or 9 hours permon th per instructor pilot is a lot ofnight time, especially for inst rument instruction under the hood.The instructor pilot who flies theTH-13T for 12:45 or 09:00 flight hoursat night per month has many causes forconcern. He is faced with the normalproblems associated with night flyingplus many others. The following is alist of a few:1) A landing light that is not ad justable in flight., (2) No standby or backup electricalpower source.3) The restrictions of IFR flights.(4) The density of aircraft entering,working around , and departing traffic atthe tactical sites and the base heliport.5 ) The student.Bow do these five problems presentcauses for concern? First, let us considerthe landing light that is not adjustablein flight. The only way you can searchor see with the landing light in flight isto aim or point the aircraft in the direction you desire to look. Then if theOCTOBER 1967

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light was adjusted properly before takeoff, you see a little. f however, it wasnot adjusted properly, it is best that youleave it off. Why, then, s h o ~ l d the instructor pilot be concerned? What happens when the engine quits and he cannot see where he is going?There always exist the possibility ofcomplete electrical failure when no backup power source is available. In theevent of complete electrical failure, theinstructor pilot, with the aid of hisflashlight, should be able to return tohome base and land safely. His aircraft,however, cannot be seen by the manyother instructors flying in the same general area, and he has no communicationcapability. Also, he does not have awritten guarantee that th e engine willnot quit after the generator fails. f itdoes, what action does the instructorpilot take?Instrument flight rules force the inst ructor pilot to allow his student to flyfrom point A to point B as cleared. Hisflight path, in many cases, will be overareas not suitable for forced landings.

f the engine quits in the clay, it wouldbe very hard to make a safe landing insome of those areas. What would happenif the engine should quit over such anarea at night?The density of aircraft working aroundthe heliport and the tactical sites is botha day and night hazard. The hazard ,however , increases at night because ofred uced visibility and the fact that severa l sites do not work at night. Whenone site is off the air more aircraft areforced in to the area around the operational sites, thereby increasing the aircraft density at that site. And as thedensity goes up , the margin of safetygoes down.Finally, there is the student. In manycases the instructor pilot cannot predictwhat the student will do; consequently,he, the instructor pilot, is forced to givemuch at tention to the gauges and thestudent pilot. Going in and out of thecockpit gets a little h airy when you areforced to work in reduced light in alimited area with many other aircraft.. As stated before, these causes for concern are only a few of many. I believethat most instructor pilots, pilots andstudent pilots will agree that the additional training received from hoodednight flights does not equal the addi-

tional risk involved. The only difference,in my opinion, in hooded night flightsfrom hooded da y flights is a red instrument panel.The reduction of advanced instrumentnight time for 4 hours and 15 minutes

to 3 hours is a step in the right direction. When will we take another?

Sir:

CPT JOSEPH E. TAYLOR, JR.Advanced Instrument Flight DivDept of Fixed Wing TrainingFt Ru cker, Ala. 36360

There seems to be a problem in thisarea of interpreting AR 672-5-1, paragraph 108.4. This is in regard to theawarding of the Senior Aircraft Crewman B.adge. Does this require seven (7)years of actual flight status, or does itrequire seven (7) y e ~ s in aviation andduring this time erving as a crewchief,crewmember, technical inspector, ormaintenance supervisor and drawingflight pay at the time of the recommendation?This affects many senior NCOs in thiscommand and your assistance in interpreting this AR will be greatly appreciated.

SSG WILLIAM P. CAMPBELL146th Aviation Company (RR)APO San Francisco 96307 We referred your question to the Ad-jutant General Section, and CPT H. H.Ferguson, Jr., gave the following answer:

1 . In oTder to qualify for the awardof th e Senior Aircraft Crewman Badgean individual requiTes seven years ofactual ' flying status in addition tomeeting the other requirements ofAR 672-5-1.2. Th e fact that an individual seroedin aviation' does not qualify him fo rthe award. The key words are on fly ing status and not in aviation.'3. Also, the fact that an individualis drawing flight pay at the time of theaward has nO bearing, e.g., an individualhas seroed in aviation for ten years asa technical inspector. The first nineyeaTS Was not on fl ying status. The lastyear was on flying status. The individualis not qualified fOT the award until hecompletes seven years, not necessarilyconsecutive, on flying status.

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4/68

Hole In The Airmobile ConceptPlug It With The Mohawk

D URING THE battle of laOrang and again during theBong Son campaign, it becameapparent that a reconnaissancedeficiency existed within the airmobile division. Although the 1stAir Cavalry Division has an organic OV-1 surveillance platoonof six Mohawks and a cavalrysquadron consisting of three aircavalry troops and one groundtroop, th is deficiency has neverbeen successfully overcome. Asthe pattern of airmobile operations evolved in Vietnam, therecould be no doubt the airmobiledivision must always be preparedto survive in an area either partially or completely surroundedby enemy dominated territory.The necessity to thoroughlyscreen the periphery of the areaof operations was immediatelyrecognized. Early efforts in initialcombat phases to provide th isreconnaissance screen from organic resources proved successful. This success can only be attributed to the small size of theseareas of operation. The cavalrysquadron was able to providecomplete reconnaissance cover-age and screening for these smallareas. This reconnaissance provided the battalion or brigadecommander an up-to-the-minutereport of enemy movement andsightings.As the campaign of westernPleiku province unfolded in October 1965, the tempo of operations rose to maximum intensityculminat ing with the la Orangbattle in November. In this battleall available division combat2

Lieutenant Colonel James C Crawford

power was committed. Intelligence placed nearby three NorthVietnamese regiments and a divisional size control headquarterswith the capability for a coordi nated attack. The area of interestat this time had grown 'far beyond the screening capability ofthe air cavalry squadron. Thethreat posed demanded that a

m ~ x m u m effort be expended toimmediately detect all enemymovement as well as troop locations. The division reconnaissance scope was changed to incorporate Air Force infrared surveillance with the regular organicMohawk IR and SLAR night v-erage.Some training and familiarization of the electronics surveillance qual ified aviators werenecessary initially to acquaintthem with visual reconnaissancetechniques from the Mohawk. All;:lssigned aviators were extremelywell qua lified in the aircraft andin tactical low-level navigation .They undertook the VR programwith enthusiasm, exhibiting ahigh degree of airmanship andcourage. The area to be coveredwas outlined by the division G-2and published in division operations orders . Mohawk aviatorswere briefed by G-2 personnel onlocations of special interest,flight paths and altitudes to beobserved communications procedures to be followed, and thegeneral friendly and enemy situation.Even though only one aircraftcould be committed on a parttime basis, immediate results

were obtained. The movement ononcombatants, indicating possible Viet Cong activity, was detected immediately. Highly suspect areas were plotted fodivision-wide dissemination anaction. Enemy troop sightingwere .mmediately reported .This limited VR program provided the following additionabenefits: rest ricted enemy movement to areas of heavy cover andifficult terrain thereby impeding reinforcement, resupply, anregroupment. Fu rther, it providethe division G-2 with the abilitto immediately verify reportesightings.This first semblance of reconnaissance security around thperimeter of the current area ointerest proved complementarto other information gatherinmediums. Although this basiprogram has been repeated fomany campaigns and operationby the 1st Cavalry Division , it isat best , a stopgap measure whiccan be described as a rob Peteto pay Paul scheme. Nowherwithin the division are there provided the necessary resources taccqmplish this vital combat support mission for the airmobildivision.Use of electronics surveillancequipped 'Mohawks in a visuarole can be justified only asstopgap measure, but the conCOL Crawford is Standardzat ion /Contract Eva luation Divsio } Dept of Fi x ed Wing Tra ining} Ft u k e r ~ la

U S ARMY VI TION DIGEST


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tinuation of thi practice withthese expensive specia lized aircraft can hardly be adopted asroutine. Although there are serious objections to the employmentof OV-ls in the visual role be-cause of exposure to small armsfire at the low altitudes asso-ciated with VR the primary ob-jection stems from the diversion of these aircraft from theirdesigned mission with the sub-sequent deletion of needed elec-tronics information from countrywide intelligence.

Armed OV ls of the Mohawkbattalion, which was organic tothe 1st Cavalry Division's forerunner, the 11th Air ssaultDivision, provided this vital serv-ice. This Mohawk battalion wasdropped, however when the 1stCavalry Division was reorganizedas the Army's first airmobiledivision. Un fortunately, no provision was made for resou rces forOCTO ER 967

a reconnaissance screen of thehuge areas that can become ofinterest to the airmobile conceptin a combat environment such asVietnam.The cavalry squadron providesexceptional reconnaissance forthe division around battalion andbrigade areas. It can do little,however to seal off the overallbattle area even during criticalbattle phases. What is needed isa complement to the cavalrysquadron which can extend thescreen and range far beyond thesquadron's practical limits. Anarmed aircraft with a cruisespeed between 175-225 knots,a three hour on station time, thecapability of slow flight, goodvisibility, toughness, and a sound,versatile communications capa-bility is required for this mission.Today the Mohawk is the onlyArmy aircraft which can accomplish this mission with the de-

sired results. The new family ofarmed helicopters with longerrange increased speed and low-er maintenanee demands mayvery well fill this need. Regard-less of the vehicle designated,responsibility fOr performance ofthis reconnaissance mission mustbe clearly defined, and the neces-sary hardware and resourcesmust e made available. Withoutthis capability the division willsuffer from a lack of immediatehard information or rely heavilyupon outside intelligence whichis seldom timely or accurate.This apparent oversight andreconnaissance deficiency shouldbe eliminated immediately. If theairmobile concept Is to improveand exemplify the boldnessimagined when it was conceivedthere can e no better tonic u..nproviding the division commanderthe long-range vision of mediUmperformance aircraft.


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Perhaps the most direct cause of the accidentwas that a more adequate power check had notbeen performed

HERE WE WERE at 100feet, airspeed 20 knots, rpm6000 and falling like a rock. Theaircraft commander flying ourUH-IB from the left seat, flaredthe aircraft to stop our forwardmovement as we approached theopposi te bank of the canal. Thento improve our condition orshould I say deteriorate our predicament the tail rotor struck theonly piling in the canal for milesaround. Immediately the aircraftyawed right approximately 30-40 before striking the ground andresultant roll-over and total destruction of one aircraft.

N ow let us back up a little inthis tale of woe. Our flight of sixaircraft had taken off from pointA after refueling. We were enroute to point B, about a 10minute flight at 80 knots. Welanded in a trail formation on anarrow road of sorts. As soon aswe landed the junk was pouringon the aircraft-in boxes, baskets,and buckets along wi th six of thelittle troopers and their 81 mmmortar.

Then came our test of airworthiness or flyability you mightsay. We failed that test miserably.Off the ground we staggered, butnot to an altitude of more than6 inches and not for more than10 seconds. Down to the ground4

CW Christopher B Chrobak

we settled, and in spite of hisprotests off went one of the littletroopers. We clawed our way intothe air to 2 feet altitude with aloss of only 200 rpm; 6400 at thistime, no sweat. But the perspiration did begin as we shudderedinto effective translational lift at4 feet , 6100 rpm as we crossedover a double apron of barbedwire enclosing a mine field.

The flight se ttled down in a V,heavy right of four aircraft theremaining two being used tosling-load drums of gasoline.Twenty minutes later as we nearedour destination point C, the anticollision light came on from thelead ship, and we edged left tobecome the last ship of the nowtrail formation. The platoonleader was at the front of the formation his status being not thatof a FNG (friendly new guy) buthis experience not that of an oldtimer either; so we began at 70knots and steep at 1,000 fpm forour formation and loading condition.

Our descent was made from2,500 feet MSL on a left base tothe aircraft s final resting placea soccer field immediately east ofwhat was once a province chief shouse. On short final we fellslightly below the preceding aircraft, never to rise again. The

rpm was bled off to 6000, necessita ting a gradual decrease of poweand resul tan t regain of 6600 rpmthen back to 6000 to get all wecould to attempt to at least slowup our descent. From this poinon you can rely on your memoryor if it is as short as mine youmay reread the first paragraph.

Now to present some excuses: The aircraft commander andI were right out of flight schooand had no experience. This isof course, a factor but not entirelytrue since he had four months incountry and myself three, havingboth accumulated approximately100 hours per month flying exactly this type of mission. Light a fire and kick a tireOverzealousness to complete themission; could also be looked atin the light of laziness. Why doin three lifts what you can maybedo in two. f not deterred bybetter planning and just commonsense, this can almost always develop into a serious if not sometimes fatal mistake. We should have made a moreshallow approach and in a different formation . Maybe the approach could have been a littlemore shallow and in a differenformation. This is to say thaCW Chrobak is now serving inVietnam

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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maybe the bullets would bounceoff, and in landing a V fonnationto the almost adequate field thatwe may not have had the thrill ofroosting on one of the surround-ing buildings.N ow to view some other choicesto the action taken: Refueling at point A couldhave been to a minimum amountto complete only one round trip,i.e., A to B to C to A. Instead of having boxes,baskets, and buckets of junk, itshould have been boxes, basketsand buckets of junk of knownweight. This, of course, would benice, but not very easily accomplished, or for that matter practi-cal under the conditions.N ow to the heart of the prob-lem and probably the most directcause of the resulting accident: A more adequate power checkcould have been perfonned. Useof the go-no-go power check whichsince evolved would have, I amcertain, informed us that we werehunting for a place to crash andit just depended upon where wechose to land. I say which hassince evolved because our aircraft were not placarded as theyall are now, or at least should be,wi th N 2 information. In addi tion,I had never heard of this technique. It just amounted to mypremonition that if you couldhover you could get flying andaccomplish a landing under thesame approximate altitude andtemperature conditions. Perhapsour overzealousness let rotorwashin a formation lan ding and otherimportant considerations slip tothe rear of our minds.So, I say in closing that youdetermine the type takeoff andlanding that s required, be itrunning, nonnal or maximumperfonnance, and then let yourN2 percent rpm decide whetheryou have your I percent, 2 percent, or 3 percent, respectively, togo or no-go.

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Chance o iveYOU SLOUCH dejectedly onthe skid of your aircraft andglare sullenly at the slowly tumbling grey mass of monsoonweather above. Your original impatience with the weather hasgradually degenerated during themorning to complete indifference.Four hours Seems like four days,but a glance at your watch confirms your original estimate.You move a Iittle and yourright leg feels different somehow.Ha, the only smart part of you hasgone to sleep. With a struggleyou stand up, wobble a little, andthen stretch. A glance at the loadon the cargo floor confirms that itis secure. Twenty-eight rounds of105 mm ammo: quite a load forthe takeoff area available and thedensity altitude. A slight smilecrosses your face because youknow you can handle it. Secretlyyou're sure you can handle almostanything.

These rather pleasant thoughtsare broken by the unmistakablewhup whup of an approachingHuey. One of the gunships is returning from a weather recon inthe valley to see if there is a1}500 foot ceiling yet. The valleyis bad news, but with 1,500 feetwe should be OK.

Twenty minutes later: 1,500feet above the valley entrance.You're the lead element of two,winging your badly needed cargoto a small Special Forces camp.You've picked 70 knots as themost tolerable vibration level forthis altitude, 4,100 feet MSL -an altitude that just clears theclouds. You settle down now forthe 12 minute trip up the valley.OCTOBER 1967

CW ames L Irwin

The crew has been briefed andknows your rules of engagemen tfor defensive firing.You look at the mountains rising almost to your height on eachside of the valley. Not so majesticas the Sierras, but picturesqueand beautiful in their own way.So very quiet and serene everything appears from up here. Likethe jungle below, so lush and richwi th its many shades of green.But, oh how deceiving. You knowthe area is teeming with veProbably a thousand eyes on yourship right now.

What's that?Aroused, startled, you look atyour copilot. You start to ask ifhe heard a shot, bu t before youcan you know the answer. You'reacutely aware now. Only a fraction of a second has passed. Youstart to radio the gunships, yousqueeze the trigger switch hard -then - CRACK - THUD.

"My God " Looks like a solidwall of tracers. The gunner andcrewchief have opened up. Somuch noise - CRACK - THUD.You sense, rather than feel, theship taking hits. The clouds -must get some cover - POW -CRACK - here come the clouds- copilot's checking the gauges- the cloud - final ly - we' re init - thank God for clouds - mustget on instruments. The crewchiefstops firing as the ground slowlydisappears. In the backgroundnow you hear the gunships working.

FIRE You see the glow in thecloud just as the crewchief yellsfrantically into the intercom.Gotta think - must descend -

you steal a quick look to the leftcargo door - it's just behind thedoor - must be the fuel cell. Theradio crackles; it's your wing manreporting that you are on fire.You acknowledge as you lowerthe pi tch. You begin to see theground. There you're out now.The radio again - the gunshiptells you the fire is intense. Autorotate, road to the left. Yeah,there it is, pitch all the way down.We can just make it. Close now,only a few hundred feet to go.A little aft cyclic as the noseslowly drops. Strange, you thinkquickly. There it goes again,slowly - more aft cyclic - justcrossed the river - more aft cyclic.Wait - there isn't any. What'shappening?A 105 round rolls down to thepedestal; there's another one. Thenose is lower now and beginningto accelerate. Somebody screamsa blood-curdling thing, deep

and guttural, changing quickly toa tearing, lacerating gargle. Thenose is past vertical now. Thelush green slides crazily by; the105 rounds are falling all aroundyou. Your body strains againstthe seat belt; you know it's allover with - 30 years. Nothingyou can do. You wai t You feelthe heat - then nothing.Although the details are supposi tion, the incident just describedactually happened. "A tragedy,but that's war," you say. ' 'I'll getit when my number is up." "Thelaw of averages."CW2 Irwin is assigned to the FlightStandardization Division Dept ofRotary Wing Training Ft RuckerAla.

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10/68

Chance To LiveWe 've all heard these commentsbefore. They head a list that has

been called The Seven DeadlyBeliefs. Deadly? Yes. With thisattitude, even if we could rollback the clock, the tragedy of thisflight would occur again, becausewe would not have acted tchange any of its ingredients.

Assuming that the surprise attack could not have been avoided,what then would we change? Let'sreview the situation. The aircraftcaught fire as a result of hostileground fire causing leakage fromthe fuel cell. The aircraft had anexternal fire adjacent to the leftfuel cell. It was intense, but didnot visibly spread. The aircraftwas 1,500 feet above the groundand the pilot executed the onlyemergency procedure available:he entered autorotation. About45-50 seconds later, while still several hundred feet frGm theground, the aircraft suffered catastrophic structural failure as a result of being weakened by fire.The fire had still not visiblyspread. In this case the supporting structure for the tail boom attachment had failed.

What to. change? ' Nell, ourhindsight being what it is, wesee that in all probability the aircraft could not have descendedintact frGm 1,000-1,500 feet regardless of the technique used.Therefore, one obvious solutionwould have been for the crew toseparate frGm the aircraft. By nowyou might have sensed a reluctance to. mention p r cu es inthe same breath with helicopters.In some circles this quickly makesyou the Happy Hour candidatefor a section eight. But let's investigate.

In anticipating some of the opposition's arguments we find theyusually go. something like this:Be impossible to escape fromanyway, with the rotor and all

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or Operate too. low - wouldn'topen anyway or What aboutthe passengers? and on and Gn.

Let's examine some of these ina little more detail.The following are summaries ofsuccessful escapes from helicopters

obtained from the files at U. S.Army Board fGr AviatiGn Acciden t Research:

HOS-l - Pilot and mechanicbailed Gut after rotor head leftaircraft.

HUP-2 - Pilot left aircraft afternose pi tched down to vertical.Engineer wai ted un til too lateand was killed.H-43B - Pilot bailed out afterrotGr blades separated frGm aircraft at 4,500 feet absolute.UNK - Pilot bailed out afterrotors left aircraft at 2,500 feetabsolute.H-21C - Rotor blade struckaircraft. Aircraft broke apart. Pilot bailed ou t.

OH-5 - Aircraft at 6,000 feetabsolu teo RotGr blade slicedthrough cockpit. Aircraft disintegrated. Pilot and copilot madesuccessful parachute descents. CopilGt bled to death on groundfrom massive injury sustainedwhen blade cut through cockpit.

CH47 - Aircraft became uncontrollable after violent evasivemaneuver to avoid collision at2,000 feet absolute. Aircraft wasinverted during oscillation. Pilotbailed out. Copilot bailed outwhen nose was down 90. Bothwere successful.

HRS-l - Engine failed. Cooling fan jammed cyclic control.Engineer bailed out successfullywhile aircraft was in autorotation. No. separation problems wereencountered. Pilot regained use ofcyclic and continued autorotationsuccessfully.

The list is still relatively shGrtand is pGpulated for the mostpart by aircraft of the other services, but it would have been considerably shorter if parachutes

had not been on board. The mosttraditional arguments againstusing parachutes in helicoptersare based on the helicopter'sunique capability to autorotate.The successes listed above oc-curred after autGrGtatiGn was no.IGnger pGssible. These instancesconclusively illustrate that successful emergency escape is possible under even the most adversecircumstances . The OH-5 incident illustrates that the crew maysurvive even after the cabin hasbeen struck by a main blade.

Rare occurrences? Sure theyare. But how many control or related malfunctions have occurredthat might, through circumstances have resulted in loss ofcon trol? From the USABAARWeekly Summary for the weeks3 Jan - 21 Aug 66 for one typeaircraft, the UH-l, we find -

TransmissiGn fai lure 1Transmission oil leaks 10Cracked mixing lever 2Flight control malfunction

or hydraulic loss 30Inflight fire 5Tail rotor loss (left aircraf t) 2Tail rotor failure 24Main rotor blade failure 1And so on for a total of 109 inci

dents of this type.Many of these malfunctionscan be tolerated while flying with

in 1,000 feet of the ground inVFR weather. The aircraft couldprobably be descended to. a landing in 30 t 60 seconds. The samemalfunction at 3,000 to 10,000feet above the ground presentsdifferent problems. Several minutes may be required t descend,even in full autorotation. Theaircraft simply may not remainflyable long enough to reach theground under control.Even a simple engine failurecan take on monumental signific.mce if the weather and terraInare of the wrong type. Aviatorswho have flown the highlands ofVietnam will recall, I'm sure, a



11/68

number of hours spent near10,000 feet, probably on top. Ponder for a moment your actionswhile cruising "on top" of a solidundercast over mountains coveredwith ISO-foot mahogany trees ifyour engine quits. During thesame period noted above 104power failures occurred in UH-Iaircraft.

The Army currently has twoemergency type parachutes in itsinventory that could e used forhelicopter crewmembers and passengers. The first, the 28-foot backtype parachute, is used i n fixedwing Army aircraft. It has a 28-foot nylon canopy and is ripcorddeployed. It weighs approximately 26 pounds complete. Accordingto TM 57-220 it will fully deployin an average of approximately5 seconds at 60' knots. As the airspeed increases the deploymenttime decreases. At 60 knots of airspeed approximately 275 to 300feet of al ti tude would be requiredfor full deployment.

This parachute could be wornby all crewchiefs and door gunners. It does not restrict theirmovements; nor is it unduly uncomfortable over long periods oftime. In UH-I aircraft with removable seat cushions it can alsobe worn by the aviators, and infact fits very nicely in place of theseat back cushion. As in the caseof the gunners, it does not restrictpilot action. Tests have shownthat it can be put on by one person unassisted in an average of20-25 seconds; by using the buddysystem it can be put on in II toIS seconds.Tests were also conducted todetermine the time required forthe crew to leave the aircraft. Thetests were conducted in a UH-IBgunship (M-16) in full Vietnamtrim. Timing was started in simula ted cruise flight configurationby the command "Bailout " Forthe right pilot seat this sequencewas used: jettison door, releaseOCTOBER 1967

The Army is testing b llistics deployed reserve p r chute above)seat belts and harness, pull helmet cord, leave aircraft throughright door opening. Total elapsedtime averaged 10 seconds

From the left seat, the sequencewas essentially the same. However, it was found to be faster topivot across the pedestal and exitfrom the right cargo door. Thiswas necessary due to restrictionsimposed by the sight, collectivelever, and armor plating. Theoverall elapsed time from the leftseat was 12 secondsCrewchief and door gunnercould consistently depart the aircraft in 1 - 3 seconds With a littlepractice, and the added impetusof an actual emergency situation,these times could probably be improved upon.

The later UH-Is with webbedseats are not suitable for the backpack type parachute without relocating the seat tracks. However,the 28-foot chest type parachute,the other parachute available toArmy aviators, could be used asis. This parachute has approximately the same opening rate ordeployment time and weighs only14 pounds. I t could be used by

passengers very easily with littleor no inconvenience. At the aircraft, the crewchief and gunnerwould hand every passenger asimple harness. After the passenger entered the aircraft the parachute could either be clipped onor kept handy.

For the combat assault theywould not be practicable andwould not be used. The chesttype parachute can also be wornby the pilots and although it requires a different combination ofseat/pedal adjustment it is not inthe way.

Of interest also, the nylon chestpack is virtually bulletproof upto .30' caliber size weapon, and itsuses in the survival situation appear to be limited only by theuser s imagination.The Army (USAAVCOM, St.Louis) is currently nearing completion of tests on a new troopreserve type parachute that wouldsuit our operations very well. tis known as the ballistics deployed reserve. It has generallythe same overall dimensions andweight as the existing reserve;however, for the helicopter crew-

9


12/68

Chance o Liveman it offers significant advantages. t will fully deploy in .9 to1 3 seconds. This means one couldsafely jump from a hovering helicopter at 175 feet or with a mini-mum of forward speed from aslow as 150 feet The 24-foot canopy is ejected from its pack at a30 angle by an explosive charge.Because of the angled ejection, itcan be deployed from any bo dyposition. A parachute with thesecharacteristics would make even

y low level escape possible,when used with a suitable harnessof the QAC (quick adjustmentcapability) type.

I t is conceivable that Army rotary wing aviators who have flownfor years without a parachutemight hesitate to resort to its useuntil too late. For this reason,simply strapping a parachute onan aviator's back in itself will not

totally satisfy our quest for increased safety and longevity.Along with issuing the parachutemust come instructions on its useand training in recognizing thesituation that demands its use.

On e possible way to accomplishthe formulation of a use planwould be a seminar held by theaviation unit. The seminar wouldbe comprised of aviators whohave returned from Vietnam whocould, through recall of their pastexperiences and observations, develop a plan that could be used asa cockpit guideline. This couldalso be accomplished by a committee or possibly during amonthly safety meeting. Thepoint is, some thought must bespent on the subject before theemergency t aid the aviator inmaking his decision.

In the recent past, the helicopter has enjoyed a new and monu-mental acceptance, that of thecombat machine. With its new

duties and responsibili ties havecome new risks - risks that havebeen accepted by aircrews without question. As a result of thehazards involved in opera ting inth is new and hostile environment,our losses have un derst andabl y

i n r e When investigatingsome of the losses it becomesqu ickly apparent tha t the autoro-tation will not cu re all helicopterailments. This being the case, theaircrew should ha ve the option ofbailing ou t There have been anumber of instances when, withproper indoctrination and parachutes, the entire crew might haveescaped an otherwise certaindeath. In other instances it wouldhave been possible only for thecrewchief and / or gunner to es-cape.In conclusion there remainsone fund amental question: Howma ny lives do you have to saveto make a safety device worthwhile? .",.,...

Professionalism and YouROFESSIONALISM - canthis term be applied t us asaviators and aviation personnel?

Let's take a closer look at theword defined by Mr. Webster:"Professionalism is the standingpractice or methods of a professional as distinguished from anamateur.

It is easy to comprehend howthis self-attained attribute can beclosely integrated within our zerodefects program. f we exercisethis sense of professionalism consistently in our daily routine, wewill be capable of maintainingzero defects within our individualzones of responsibility.How does this sense of profes-

10

W l David Talbot

sionalism affect us? We all knowthat the mission is of utmost importance and that safety plays amajor role in accomplishing thatmission.

The term "safet y" is thusequally important in our role asavi a tors. For if we fail to performas professionals, how are wegoing t ensure disciplined safetymeasures? It is simple to see thatby combining mission and safetywe can attain the desired results.Therefore the only way we cana ttain professionalism is to thinkand act the part. Professionalismmust remain our never endinggoal.It then becomes our duty as

professionals to use our experience and training in the most effici ent way possible to accomplishthe mission. We cannot afford totake a negative attitude; our decisions and performance affect thelives of many.

We should continually try toinstill upon ourselves a sense ofpride and professionalism. Nomatter how minute the job, weshould constantly strive for perfection. By adding this attributeof professionalism to our list ofcapabilities, it will become the ingredient that will give us the netresult of a worthwhile safety andzero defects program.

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


13/68

I have given the problem considerable thought and Ithink I have come up with a haunting program thatwill work It s one that will terrorize the human whoflies the machine and cause no end of confusion

HE DATE WAS December18, 1903. The time was 2000hours.

Top ghosts of the Haunters, themili tary arm of the Kingdom ofDisembodied Spirits, were in theirred plush seats in the conferenceroom at Haunter 's Barracks,Shadow Island. The conferencehad been hurriedly called by theChief Specter. Some of the ghostspresent had flown all day to makethe meeting and looked tiredfrom the lack of a good day'ssleep.

Suddenly the senior ghostamong the group called, "Attention "

Conversation stopped instantlyand all present stood up. TheChief Specter came into the roomat a brisk walk, his long whiterobe flowing behind him. He wasOCTOBER 1967

followed closely by his chief aid,who was carrying a load of papers.

"At ease, the Chief Spectersaid."Ghostmen of the Kingdom,

we are confronted with an emer-gency. Yesterday, something hap-pened that I'm afraid passed unnoticed by most ghosts and humans throughou t the world . Twohuman brothers by the name ofWright flew a power-drivenheavier-than-air flying machine,which they had built.

"N ow this machine is crudeand the flight was for only a fewseconds. But my soothsayer ran itthrough his crystal ball computerand double checked it on both histea leaf and playing card com-puters. He found that this flightis only the beginning. Soon hu-

mans will be flying in their m a-chines almost as well and as fastas we can.

"This presents a serious problem. f my soothsayer is right,and I feel reasonably sure he is,we will soon be faced with the jobof haunting these machines asthey move along a t many hundredmiles an hour.

Since the flight yesterday, Ihave given the problem consider-able thought and I think I havecome up with a h aunting program that will work. It 's one thatwill terrorize the human who fliesthe machine and cause no end ofconfusion.

"Unfortunate ly, our recruitingdrive h as not produced the num-ber of ghosts we need; so we don 'thave the ghost power to organize


14/68

When he tries to correct the problem he will go back into the original spina separate ghosting division tohandle these new machines. In-stead, I will assign each of you aseparate mission that I hope youcan handle right along with yourregular duties."

He turned to the ghost occu-pying the first seat to his rightand said, "Unearthly, I want yourOgre Division to be in charge ofwhat I call autokinesis. f youwork it right, it will be a most ef-fective weapon. Since humanshave eyes inferior to ours, theyhave trouble seeing at night. Theymust use lights. So, when theystart flying, they will have lightsih their cockpits and on theground to tell them where to landor take off.

"Your division will make theselights appear to move when a hu-man stares at them for say 10 to20 seconds. For the present, any-way, flying machines invented bythe humans will have to use run-ways. As the human starts his ma-chine down the runway and fixeshis gaze on the runway lights,

they will appear to move outwardor diverge. The human, of course,will attempt to compensate forthis movement, and before hegets off the ground he will be offthe runway with disastrous re-sults.

In his enthusiasm, Unearthlyforgot that the Chief Specter wastalking and broke in to say, "AfterI get through with those humansI'll bet they'll never try to flyagain "

"Let's not forget, the Spectersaid, no weapon is perfect. Forevery new weapon developed,someone develops a defense. Thehumans may soon learn not tostare at the lights. And in allprobability they'll learn that whenthey must stare at the lights, theyneed simply to shift their eyesaway periodically. That will nul-lify our light moving technique."

Turning to the ghost next inline, the Chief Specter said, "U n-canny, here is the assignment foryour Vulture Division. I want youto opera te the false horizons. When

one of these humans is flying withno reference to the actual hori-zon, his inferior coordination between eyes and brain will makehim believe that the cloud bankshe sees are horizontal. The im-pression he will receive will be sostrong that it will force him tochange the attitude of his flyingmachine. I want your Vultures tosee to it that few, if any, cloudbanks are horizon tal.

"Of course we can expect thaa few of them will wise up andpay attention to the false horizonscreated by cloud banks. Howeverif they eventually invent an instrument that will keep their fly-ing machines horizontal, we canbe sure that not all of them wilhave the good sense to use it.

"Ghoul, how are you comingwith your disciplinary problemsill the Franjenstein Division? Areyou managing to keep thosedrunkards out of the graveyards?

"Making progress, sir. But theyare still a hard drinking lot.

"Well, here's an assignmen12 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


15/68

they may like. want your division to handle graveyard spins.Once in a while one of those humans will make a high speed rollor spin or a steep bank turn.'V'hen this rotary motion isstopped, want your division tobe right there, ready to slap himwith the sensation of rotating inthe oppos i te direction. He will, ofcourse, try to correct for it andthat will cause him to go backinto the original spin again.

Unfortunately, this effect willbe greatly reduced if the humanflier will have a good visual reference when he recovers from thespin. But his best defense againstour haunting weapon will be tavoid spinning. Let's just hopehe doesn't find that out.

Turning to the other side of theconference table the Chief Specter said, Supernatural, wantyour Phantom Division to handleleans. The humans can be expected to develop all kinds of in-

anyou handle graveyard spinsstruments to help them in theirflying. Eventually, no doubt, theywill be able to fly almost completely by instruments. want youto fix it so that during instrumentflying if the human does not focushis attention on the instruments,and if the flying machine shouldroll suddenly to the left and thenrecover very slowly, the humanwill feel that the machine is stillbanked to the left. Of course, theflying machine will actually bestraight and level.Banshee, want your Hallucination Division to handle the reversal of figure and background.Your division will make the indicator on an instrument sometimesappear to be stationary and thedial to move. am hoping thiswill make the human flying themachine think the instrument ismoving rather than his machine.

Now that's as far as I've gotten in my haunting plan. havein mind to do something with il-

lusions. There are so many fantastic things we can do with illusions that want time to sortthem all out before they are introduced in the program. For instance, we can make areas ofground fog be mistaken for lakesand ponds, distant clouds overwater and cloud shadows appearto be islands, and low lyingclouds appear to be hills andmountains. We can even makecracks, scratches and dirt on canopies appear to be distant objects.Can you imagine the hilariousconfusion when one of those humans tries to fly out of the pathof a spot on his windshield?

There was an outburst of diabolicallaughter.

Are there any questions?No? Well then, you may re

turn to your posts of haunting.As soon as have made up mymind on illusions will sendthem t you by the usual thoughtwave.

VCOM pro u r mnts hit n w highP ROCUREMENTS by theU. S. Army Aviation MaterielCommand have established an alltime record for the fiscal yearending last June 30, largely in response to urgent requirementsstemming from the war in Vietnam.

Totaling $1,361,500,000, theymark the second straight yearthat AVCOM's purchases of enditem aircraft, repair and replenishment spare parts, maintenanceand support equipment, aerial delivery items, engineering and other services have exceeded the billion-dollar mark. The total forthe year now ended compareswith procurements amounting to$1,227,432,000 during the previous

OCTOBER 1967

fiscal year.Ranking topmost in procure

ments during FY 67 were $206.5million in contracts awarded tothe Bell Helicopter Company ofFort Worth, Texas, for production of the UH-l Huey and of thenewer AH-IG HueyCobra rotarywing gunship.

Other large procurements ofend item aircraft during the sameperiod included the following:CH-47 Chinook helicopter(Boeing-Vertol), $135.6 million;OV-l Mohawk fixed wing reconnaissance aircraft (Grumman) ,$43.2 million; CH-54A FlyingCrane heavy lift helicopter Si-korsky) , $38 million; OH-6A Cayuse light observation helicopter

(Aircraft Division, Hughes Tool~ o . , $28.2 million; U-21A utility fixed wing aircraft (Beech),$23.5 million; U-8 Seminole utility fixed wing aircraft (Beech),$6.8 million; T-41B fixed wingtrainer (Cessna), $3.9 million;0-1 Bird Dog fixed wing observation aircraft (Cessna), $2.8 million; and the TH-55A primaryhelicopter trainer (Aircraft Division, Hughes Tool Co.) , $1.4 million.Also soaring t unprecedentedheights were AVCOM's procurements of aeronautical spare parts.Totaling $643,0'21,672 for theyear just ended, these procurements compared with $525,991,838in FY 66 and $125,098,838 in FY 65.

13


16/68

If you know how to use it , itcan save your life . If youdon t it can kill you

The SmokeGrenade ...

A ouple of unces of PreventionC EASE FIRE Cease fire,Firebird " The pair of rock.ets exploded. As the smoke rose,the voice of the Special Forcesadviser below, weak with relief,came over the FM . "You almostgot me that time, old buddy."

"Sorry about that," I said tomyself, "but that's what you get,old buddy, for not carrying anysmoke grenades."

Sounds kind of callous, doesn'tit? But it was only about thehundredth time I'd run into thesame problem. It's a typical one,14

pt in James J. Dorsey

and if you haven't run into it yet,you are going to. You are goingto scramble to cover some groundunit in heavy contact, and whenyou get to the area, you are goingto find out that they have no wayt mark their posi tion. And thenyou are going to waste time andammunition (while the man onthe ground wastes lives and blood)trying t figure out where thegood guys are . f you are flyinga slick, you are going to havet expose your aircraft at low altitude while you fool around look-

ing for the friendly posItIOn . fyou are flying an armed ship, youare likely to risk the lives of thepeople you are trying to help bymarking wi th your own ordnance.Solution to the problem is simple. It's so simple a lot of peoplenever really appreciate it. Thesolution is knowing what theplain old humble smoke grenade,M 18 or j N M8, can do for you(And what i t can't do .) f youCPT orsey is assigned to theCommand Staff i v i s i o n ~ Deptof a c t i c s ~ Ft R u c k e r ~ Ala

U . S AR MY AVIATIO N DI GEST


17/68

know how to use it, it can saveyour life. f you don't it can killyou. There are a lot of lessonsyou can learn the hard way, iyou want to. But you're going tospend a lot of that time, ammuni-tion, and blood we were talkingabout while you're learning.The first thing you are goingto learn is that there is a reasonthe guy on the ground doesn'thave any smoke grenades withhim. It's not because he is wor-ried that the enemy will capturethem. Charlie already hasplenty of smoke grenades. It's notbecause the ground soldier doesn'twant to carry the extra weightaround, either. WIAs weigh a lotmore than smoke grenades, andthe soldier who won't carry smokegrenades will carry his woundedwillingly, even when he gets moreof them because he can't markfor a strike or medevac. Most ofthe time, it's not even because hehas run out of them. He doesn'thave them because he didn't havethem to start with. What's more,he doesn't see any reason forcarrying them.

It's not his fault. He thinksthat you can see him, because hecan see you. When he steps out ofthe jungle into a clearing, he onlysees one clearing. You may see 30clearings, but he only sees one.He calls it the clearing. Theroad he is on is the road. Theenemy fire may be coming from

the treeline. When you ask himwhich one, he may tell you it isthe one in front of him. Hedoesn't realize that you see manytreelines, many roads, many clear-ings. The world he is fighting inlooks small to you, but it iooksbig to him, and he is getting shotat while you hunt for him. Hedoesn't have time to solve yourproblems. He needs help, he needsit now and fast, and he doesn'tsee what good a smoke grenade isgoing to do.

Don't think it is a simple matterOCTOBER 1967

An error th t cost 6 livesof education. The problem ismuch more fundamental thanmany aviators realize. For exam-ple, during one operation, a Spe-cial Forces sergeant kept tellingan armed helicopter fire teamthat he was right underneaththem, in the clearing." He hadto wait, under heavy fire, untilthe fire team had located him.When the fire team found him, itwas a simple matter to neutralizethe enemy positions, while theadviser kept yelling, ' 'I'm glad youguys are on our side "

There was nothing new or greenabout that soldier. He'd been inthe area for a long time, he knewhe was going to have armed heli-copter support on the patrol, andhe knew he was going to con tactthe enemy. After the operations,he was told he'd made a seriousmistake by not carrying any smokegrenades with him. He laughed.Brave? There are some otherwords for it. He sure wasn'tlaughing when he was pinneddown.You may not be able to explainyour problem to the ground sol-dier. You must understand his.Be prepared. Whenever possible,make sure the ground troops havesmoke grenades; and if markingprocedures aren't covered by SOP,work some out on the spot.You may have a chance to talkto the supported unit commanderon the ground before the opera-tion. Look him over. f you don'tsee any grenades hanging on him,ask him about it. He may have areal supply problem, or he maysimply not realize that he is go-ing to need to mark his positionfor you. Whatever the reason,don't wait for next time." Getsome grenades out of the aircraftand give them to him. You don'thave to buy the grenades out of

your own pocket; spread themaround. The taxpayer didn't buythem so you could have a prettydisplay in the back of your air-craft. He bought them so youcould help the people you aresupporting. Grenades may bescarce, and your boss might havechewed you out for not having aprescribed number and type ofgrenades in the ship. Still, youcan't stop the bleeding by tellingthe ground unit how hard it isto get them.

After you give him the gre-nades, you can work out somepretty effective preplanned sig-nals. f you are covering a truckconvoy, for example, a smokegrenade can tell you immediatelywhen the convoy comes underfire. The smoke can show youwhich side of the road the fire iscoming from, and which vehiclesare being hit. You get neededinformation in a fraction of thetime it takes for a radio trans-mission.

But a smoke grenade is not asubstitute for a radio. t must beused w i t ~ not instead of, radiocommunications. Although pre-planned grenade signals are use-ful, they break down when thingsstart happening on the ground.You can't talk to a smoke grenade.No puff of smoke can tell youwhen enemy fires cease and shift,or what the supported unit is go-ing to do next. You can't ask ithow far behind the leadingfriendly elements it went off. Andwhen night comes, it will tell younothing at all.

The man who throws the smokegrenade must face the hardest factof all: when he marks his positionfor you, he marks it for the enemy,as well. There are times when hecannot mark his position withoutloss. Take away his radio, and you

5


18/68

take away whatever aerial coverhe has.

In a tragic example of whatcan go wrong, an armed helicopter fire team scrambled tocover a Vietnamese company withAmerican advisers. On the way tothe area, the fire team contactedthe company's base camp andfound out rhat the troops were inheavy combat. Their exact location was unknown. They had redsmoke grenades, but no radio.They had instructions to throwthe grenades when they heard thefire team. The fire team foundthem, but too late. The smokewas never thrown, and 60 menwere killed and their weaponstaken by the Viet Congo

During the entire operation, thefire team was within easy rangeof a PRC-IO. No one knows whythey didn't throw the grenades,but a handful of aviators knowthis: all of those soldiers, and oneof their American advisers, aredead today becausethought they didn't need a r'adioas long as they had smoke.

During that operation, then ~ m y showed that he had some

smoke grenades. He usually does.He has radios, too-just like yours.In fact, they used to be yourradios and your grenades. Hespeaks English, too; so well thatit can make the hair stand uponthe back of your neck. f theground unit you are supportingannounces the color before throwing the grenade, y o ~ will oftensee two puffs of smoke coming upthrough the trees. f you land atthe wrong one, you lose. Shoot atthe wrong one, and you loseagain.

There are ways to beat Charlieat his "guess-who" game. They alldepend on coordination with theground uni t One method is toh ~ l V e the ground uni t call thecolor by referring to somethingAmericans associate with a certaincolor. Faith, and you wouldn't16

ueys p npo nt troops in smoke marked areaexpect the shamrocks to be redwould you now? Far out, but ithas worked. Another, most oftenused, is to wait until the smoke isout before calling the color.

Sometimes this method won'twork. The enemy may see thesmoke as quickly as you do, or itmay take its time drifting upthrough heavy trees. The puff ispretty thin by the time it getsabove the jungle canopy, and theaviator may not see the wisp untilCharlie's smoke comes driftingthrough. The best cure of all is awell-understood SOP. In one instance, Charlie made the sad mistake of throwing a color weplanned to use to mark enemypositions. Couldn't have markedhim better if we'd done it ourselves. Poor Charlie.

Remember, though, that theenemy is not the only one whosometimes gets his colors mixedup. Every now and then the people you are covering will get themmixed up. This is especially trueof units with American advisers.The soldier who talks on theradio and the man who throwsthe grenade speak two differentlanguages. The soldier you aretalking to tells the other one tothrow a certain color, and tellsyou what it is. But he is misunderstood, or the soldier throwing the grenade just doesn't havethe color called for, and so yousee a different color come up.This can ha'ppen whenever two

people are involved. An u r g ~ r i situation on the ground just increases the odds that it will happen. Be careful. It's always betteto wait for him to say, "Sorrywrong color than it is for you tohave to say, "Sorry, wrong target.

The wrong target may be struckbecause of another mistake. t irare but very dangerous. Whenyou ask an inexperienced soldier1 one who is caught in a reallybad spot, to mark his position

he may do just that. He markhis own position, no t: that of hileading elements. In open country or paddy, he may be 20meters behind the leading troopsFind out where his lead elementare before you shoot. Look oufor this one whenever you getprecise azimuth and distance tothe target but can' t match themup.

When you get an azimuth indegrees, it means someone is taking the time to figure it ou(When you start receiving azimuths like Northeast, northeast " the operator is excited, under fire, and wants fires in a hurryWhen he gives it in degrees, he ieither very calm or taking hitime, which means the azimuth iusually accurate.) Distances giveby the ground uni t are usuallvery accurate, except at nighwhen fires look closer. At nighyou will not be concerned witmarking by smoke. Since you cagenerally depend on the mapread

U. S ARMY V I T ~ O N DIGEST


19/68

ing ability Df the grDund sDldier,IDDl< Dut when the target plDtfrDm the sniDke dDesn t makesense. SDmething is wrDng. Checkit Dut and YDU will usually findthat the target plDt is accuratefrom the lead elements, nDt frDmthe smDke.

Eventually, YDU will begin toappreciate Dne mDre simple butimpDrtant prDblem: sDmetimesYDU can t see certain cDIDrs verywell. YDU will learn to select cDIDrs accDrding to weather, terrain,and even the time Df day. Thebasic cDIDrs YDU will wDrk wi thare yellDw green, red, viDlet,(M18), and white (HC, AjNM8). The white phDsphDrDus(WP) grenade has certain advantages, but is rarely used fDrDrdinary marking.

In Dne example shDwing pDDrjudgment, an armed helicDpterpilDt throw yellDw smDke to marka landing ZDne in a paddy area.The cDIDr is brilliant, ana hadbeen used successfully in severalpreviDus DperatiDns. However,there was a light fDg in the area,extending up abDut 300 feet. AIthDugh it was very patchy and nODbstacle to landing, a bright earlymDrning sun glared harshly downDn it. The lift aircraft were apprDaching DUt Df the sun. Theflight leader said he had the markin sight, but he didn t. He Dnlythou ht he saw it. He landed atwhat he thDught had been a puffDf yellDw smDke. He was 2,000meters fr.Dm the selected landingZDne, and the trDDps were severalhDurs late reaching their firstDbjective.The armed helicDpter pilDt hadused the wrDng cDIDr. Any DtherCDIDr, except white, wDuld havebeen better under the circumstances. Green wDuld prDbablyhave been the best chDice, becauseit ShDWS up well in glare cDnditiDns.

The green smDke grenade hasmany applicatiDns. It will Dften

OCTOBER 1967

id you expe t red shamrocksprDvide much mDre cDntrast i t h IDse, he may f i ~ it to his advansurrDunding terrain than yellow tage to mark his pDsitiDn anyway.Dr viDlet grenades. Its cDIDr is un- The smDke grenade will enablelike any fDund in nature. It s true the aviatDr to make his strikesthat the plantatiDns and rice pad- that much faster. This doesn tdies are green, but they aren t mean the mDrtars will be eliinithat green. YDU may be surprised nated. It means that mDre immeby hDW easy t is to see a green diate dangers will be hit faster.smDke mark, especially in hazy The decisiDn will depend Dn howearly mDrning cDnditiDns. much damage the mDrtars areViDlet smDke is useful fDr Dther dDing thrDugh the canDpy, andthings besides training. It ShDWS hDW well the ground unit canup well under mDst cDnditiDns, mDve to anDther pDsitiDn.and fits . easily intO preplanned The humble smoke grenade cansignals. It can really get YDU in kill YDU if it gDes Dff inside thetrDuble at twilight, thDugh, when aircraft. The usual reaSDn fDr ait is harder to see than any Df the smDke grenade igniting in theDthers. ship is an accident caused by aUse Df the white smDke grenade crewmember Dr Hfted troops.(He) is limited by the fact that vVhen it gDes Dff, the aircraft imits smDke resembles that made by mediately fills with smDke. YDUexplDsives, incendiaries, and burn- will nDt be able to see Dutside theing paddy chaff. f incendiary am- aircraft, and you will nDt see YDurmunition is nDt being used in the instruments. The cDnditiDn is nDtarea, the WP grenade prDvides a IFR flight; it is blindness. Flyingmark that is hard to miss, especi- in a hard crab will get rid Dfally in darkness. YDU must have sDme of the smDke. The landingradio cDntact when WP grenades will be hard, and will prDbablyare used fDr marking. f YDU dDn t, Dccur befDre the grenade StDpsYDU might find yourself landing burning Dr is kicked out. Don tunder SDme artillery rounds or an press YDur luck . Be sure crewair strike, since this grenade remembers and passengers handlesembles rDunds used fDr marking, smDke grenades , with care, andtargets. that grenades to be used duringAny smoke grenade will last the missiDn are kept where theyIDnger than HE for marking. This can be gDtten rid Df.is true whether you are marking The smoke grenade is oftenyour own pDsition or that of the going to be YDur first indicationenemy. It is even true when YDU that something is happening inare the one being marked with the air Dr Dn the ground. StreamHE. ing from the aircraft YDU are pro-TO stay in the DperatiDnal area, tecting, it will mean enemy fire,

it is necessary fDr the aviatDr to and fire to be returned. BillDwingmake turns. During the turns, he on the ground, it will mean mDremay IDse sight Df a friendly pDsi- enemy positiDns to be struck,tion. In heavy CDver, especially wounded men to be carried Dutjungle, a friendly unit may be rations, water, the ammunitiDnlocated by mDrtar rDunds explDd- for peDple who need it. It s easying Dn top Df them. f the rounds to use. All you do is ptill the pinstDP when the aviator is in a turn, and let the handle fly off. That she may IDse reference to the the easy part. The hard partgrDund unit. f the ground CDm- CDmes later, when you find outmander decides he has nothing to whether YDU used it right

17


20/68

centr lized management and automation -A Bold Step Forward t US PHSColonel E. P. Fleming Jr.Commandant U. S. Army Primary Helicopter School

T o MEET increasing demandsfor Army aviators in Southeast Asia, a rapid expansion instudent training has been accomplished at the United States ArmyPrimary Helicopter School. FromJuly 1965 to July 1967 the month-ly output of student aviators wasincreased from 96 per month to386 per month. By February 1968USAPHS will be graduating 584students from the primary phaseof training each month.During the initial expansionperiod it became apparent theUnited States Army Primary Helicopter School could no longeroperate under a decentralizedtraining management concept.This o n ~ p t had functionedsmoothly when responsibility forall flight training had resteq witha civilian contractor. The expansion resulted in a division of the16 weeks of flight training conducteq by USAPHS into two 8week stages. The civilian o n t ~ -tor retained the responsibility forthe first 8 weeks Primary IStage) . A Military Flight Divisionwas activated and given the responsibility for the second 8-weekperiod (Primary Stage) .

Assumption of approximately50 percent of the USAPHS training mission by the Military Flight18

Division established a requirementfor an agency to allocate trainingresources impartially to the contractor and Military Flights. ATraining Support OperationsCenter TSOC) was activated on22 May 1966, with the mission ofallocating training resources toensure that USAPHS training requirements were met. TSOC control over training resources included stage fields, training areas,airspace, and aircraft. Assignmentof training resources was responsive to the smallest using unit, theflight.As the school staff prepared forexpansion, an evaluation of theen tire fligh t training program wasmade in an effort to improve thecaliber of training while reducingstudent attrition. This criticalanalysis of the training programindicated that a student wouldprobably have a greater chanceof successfully completing flighttraining if he flew every day.

The study indicated that students in the pre-solo stage oftraining should receive a minimum of one hour of dual flightinstruction during each trainingday. Additionally, it was considered essential that no student,regardless of the stage of training,

fly more than two solo periods insuccession without a period ofdual instruction.

Uniformity of training was considered to be ~ i g h l y desirable soa continuing analysis of the training program could readily isolateareas where poor student performance indicated a need for corrective action. To ensure the desired u ~ i f o r m i t y of traInInga method of monitoring the progress of each student was considered a necessity.Since the Fort Wolters DataProcessing Center had the capability of supporting the USAPHSflight training program, experimental programin,g and systemsanalysis for an automated StudenFlight Training Management System began in November 1966Plans were made for an automaticdata processing ADP) programthat would adjust training resource requirements automaticallywhen adverse weather or maintenance difficul ties resulted in asignificant loss of student training time.

The planned program wouldalso clearly define each student daily flying lesson and provide fodaily monitoring of the accomplishment of that lesson. In fact



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the planned system would be soprecise that it would be possible,at any time, to determine whereeach of the 2,086 students wereflying and what each was doing.

TSOC was redesignated as theTraining Management Center(TMC) and its mission waschanged to management of stu-dent training to ensure that train-ing requirements were met. Thismission included allbcation of alltraining resources in addition tomonitoring and analyzing thetraining accomplished.

On 9 January 1967 the Auto-mated Student Flight TrainingManagement System was inaugu-rated. A thorough orientation andbriefing of all USAPHS personnelpreceded this program and in-cluded the introduction of a newflight training syllabus which ex-pressed the desired concept oftraining.

The Automated Student FlightTraining Management providesthe flight commanders and in-structors with a daily studentschedule which specifies the lessonthe student should accomplish onthe training day. In addition, adaily student < lctivity printout re -flects the student s lesson, gtadeand flying time accomplished theprevious day.

The Daily Student Activity Re-port is supplemented by a TotalStudent Flying Time Reportwhich indicates each student stotal flying time, his last fivegrades and his flying time devia-tion from the flight syllabus. TheCommandant s Report is also ob-tained on a daily basis. This pro-gram keys off the daily and totalflying time of each flight in addi-tion to the number of trainingdays remaining for the flight tocomplete the stage of training,the weather days that the flightcan expect to lose, and the num-ber of aircraft assigned to theflight for the last training day.

The Commandan t s Report isOCTOBER 1967

COL William T. Schmidt right), assistant commandant of the U. S. Army PrimaryHelicopter School discusses student training progress with MAJ James Hegdahl chief,Training Management Center. On wall before them is microfilm viewer which is used toreview student data provided TMC by the Automated Management Systemextremely valuable to the com-mandant and management andsupervisory personnel, because itportrays the accomplishments ofeach flight in residence. This in-cludes the total time flown, timeflown per aircraft, assigned andaverage time flown per student.Additionally, it indicates the aver-age time deviation from syllabusper student, total time remainingto be flown by the average stu-dent, and the time that the stu-dent needs to fly each day to meetgraduation requirements. TheCommandant s Report also indi-cates the number of aircraft bytype that each flight needs on adaily basis to graduate all stu-dents in accordance with theestablished program.

The centralized system of man-agement, using the automatedstudent flight training system as atool, has proved its value atUSAPHS. Improved quality andtimeliness of command informa-tion and management control datahave caused s t u e ~ t flight train-ing to progress uniformly. Stand-ards of training have been raisedbecause supervisors at all levelsare able to check the progress ofeach student on a daily basis. All

indications are that attrition re-sulting from flight deficiencieswill be lowered. Maximum use ofaircraft and facilities has been ob-tained, and higher aircraft avail-ability rates provided by makingmore aircraft available to mainte-nance within predictable timeframes .Systematic planriing for the ef-fects of adverse weather and train-ing holidays has allowed USAPHSto complete training requirementsfor all students, on schedule; whileresorting to weekend flying ononly one occasion since 9 January1967. This record is more signifi-cant since only percent of theflights in residence flew thatweekend.

Through continuing analysis ofthe USAPHS training programand careful evaluation of studenttraining data, USAPHS will con-tinue to elevate its standards oftraining. At the same time im-proved efficiency will result ingreater economy throughout thetraining program. USAPHS train-ing will remain firmly oriented onthe student, steadfast in its de-termination t graduate each classat a higher degree of proficiencythan that of the preceding class.

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They Come To Us As pilotsAnd Leave As Army Aviators i CW Robert A Hlubin

Students in the Department of Tactics at the U. S. Army AviationSchool are assigned to companies operating as regular line units.Four weeks later they are graduated as Army aviators

T HEY COME to us as x p r i ~enced student pilots. Theirtraining: 28 weeks of going toclassrooms a half day and to theflight line the other half, plusanything they can read about l y ~ing in their spare time.

Twenty-eight weeks in basicaerodynamics, navigation, meteorology and maintenance.

One hundred eighty-five hoursworking on hovering, takeoffs, approaches, traffic patterns, forcedlaridings and autorotations, instruments and some confined areaoperations.

After all of this training wenow have a helicopter pilot proficient in his aircraft. But, surely,thousands of dollars worth oftraining were not spent on thisman just to learn this traffic pattern work. Now is where one ofhis most important phases oftraining comes into action, rotarywing tactics and empioyment. Allof the ability is there; now thepilot must learn how to use it tobest advantage. Now everythingwill start to fit into place like apuzzle to be put together to forma picture of an Army aviator.20

In the Department of Tacticsthe student becomes a member ofa company of the 129th i r m o ~bile Battalion. No longer doeshe use the aircraft number as hisradio call sign; rather he is as-signed a tactical call sign. Thecompany that he is assigned tohas a unit nickname or call signthe same as a regular line uni .

There are no instructors in thisphase of training; they are experienced aircraft commanders. Butthen instructors are not neededbecause there are no students,just the new pilots who havejoined our uni .As with every unit the new pilotis given an SOP to be thoroughlyfamiliar wi th and a ba ttalionSOl. Both are in a pocket-sizeform to be carried at all times forready reference.All instruction in the Employment Division is given as missions,rather than just instructor-studentplanning. For the first 12 days themissions are broken down intotraining orders of approximately1 hour and 15 minutes each. Fiveof these training orders are withthe aircraft commander and four

are solo missions. All are distributed in advance.

These training orders have alinformation to accomplish themission, a map overlay of theroutes and units, tactical situation, mission, execu tion and concept of operation, administrationand logistics, command and signal, and movement table. Allanding zones have uni ts located there, and frequencies andcall signs are found in the battalion SOL Landing instructionand local enemy situations areobtained through these units(These locations are usuallymanned by two pathfinders whooperate radios and set up panelsand markings in the landingzones.)All of the maneuvers areplanned into the missions, withthe exception of external loadsnight formation, and contour flying. These are set up so they aredone once with the aircraft commander aboard for demonstrationand practice and then done withjust the two new pilots aboardgiving them the chance to try ion their own.



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Students try their h nds at low level formation flyingcommander and platoon leader asto his part in the operation andhow the platoon as a whole ac-complished their part of the mis-sion. He will also receive reportson how the whole operationworked out as to casualties anddegree of success.

On this FEX the student willperform in all phases of an air-mobile assault. As a member ofthe internally loaded platoon hewill get a chance to carry a 1 400pound actual load into a landingzone in formation. As a memberof the external platoon he willdeliver a 1 000 pound sling loadto an LZ in formation. As a mem-ber of the armed platoon he willget to escort the externally loadedaircraft into hot landing zonesplus recon an area. In these caseshe will receive fire from groundpersonnel firing blank ammuni-tion.

He also makes a formation ap-proach from above 2 500 feet anda return to Home Plate undertactical instrument conditions witha tactical ADF approach andGCA.

The new pilots also get to planand execute airmobile assaultssolo with just a couple of instruc-tors to critique and debrief afterthe mission.

There are also single ship re-supply missions both day andnight solo and a night airmobileassault demonstrated by the air-craft commanders using two com-plete companies and landing inareas lit only by a perimeter ofburning flare pots and fires. Allnight missions are made .to smallfields lighted by pathfinders withHare pots vehicle lights on panelsor just flashlights.

There is also an eagle flight forwhich there is no formal briefing.

The signal is a long blast on thsiren or vehicle horns. All piloton standby at the time scrambl

their aircraft and are briefein flight by the company commander and platoon leaders anperform an airmobile assault.The final climax to Tactics instruction is when the aircraft arreturned to Lowe Field on thfinal day of the FEX. The 129tAirmobile Battalion executedbattalion graduation flyby dow5th Avenue of Fort Rucker. Thflight is done solo wi th directioof the battalion commander company commanders and aircrafcommanders sitting in lead antrail ships only. The companieare in formation with one minutseparation between companies.

This is the day that wives turout to watch the class fly overchildren wonder which oneDaddy farmers stop to look up athe finished product of what habeen scaring their chickens ancattle all month and disinterestebystanders look up and are prouand thankful that this is a U SArmy aviator.

This is also when instructorleave their desks where they havbeen pu tting the finishing toucheto flight records that will bclosed out upon landing of thespilots to look at their finisheproduct what they have accomplished in the past four weekswi th a hidden inner pride. Anthen pride turns to regret whehe remembers that come Mondamornin he will meet anotheclass of students who know nothing but normal takeoffs normaapproaches traffic patterns etcetc. and he has to start workinon this puzzle all over again.

But looking up at the flybyalso what has inspired this instructor to write and let the resof you aviators know what ware doing at the U ni ted StateArmy Aviation School.

22 U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGES


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By 1946 it became evident that a need existed for a test organi-zation in Army aviation. Consequently a Ground Aircraft ~ s tSection of Army Field Forces Board No. 1 was established atFt Bragg N. C Above the YH 18 on display while undergoingtests Board No.1 in 1950

History of theU S Army Aviation Test Board

HE ARMY HAS been testingaircraft and associated equip

ment almost since the inventionof the airplane. Army aviation aswe know it today was born earlyin 1942 as a result of tests whichwere recommended by MG Robert . Danford. Hjs recommendation stemmed from an articlewritten and published in the FieldArtillery Journal in May 1941.The article was written by MAJWilliam W. Ford on the use of

OCTOBER 1967

Jake Fortner

light, commercial type airplanesin Army maneuvers.

This test was preceded by anassembly of officers, enlisted menand civilians at Fort Sill, Okla.,in January 1942 for training inpreparation for the test. The ci-vilians were used as flight in-s tructors and to supervise themaintenance of 24 standard J3Cubs which had been paintedolive drab and provided for thistest.

Pilot training which includedaircraft maintenance training wascompleted on the last day ofFebruary 1942. Two separate unitsof officer and enlisted pilots re-ported for tests-one to the 2ndInfantry Division at Fort SamHouston Texas and the other tothe 13th Field Artillery BrigadeMr. Fortner is chief technical ad-visor and Chief Plans and Pro-grams Office U S Army AviationTest Board Ft Rucker Ala.

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at Fort Bragg, N. C.. Boards were appbJ-pted to observe the tests, and their reportsto the War Department highlyrecommended organic aviation forfield artillery units. These recommendp.tions resulted in the birth,on 6 June 1942, of today s Armyaviation when the War Departmerit actually established aviationorganic to field artillery uni ts.

The Department of A.ir Training was organized at Fort Sill,Okla., as a part of the Field Artillery School. Even though the primary mission of the departmentduring World War II was to fulfill the expanding wartime needfor this new Army capability, itsoon b ~ c m e apparent that testing of aircraft, aircraft use, andequipment associated with aircraft use was a necessi ty i f thisnew Army capability was to befully exploited. Such tests rangedfrom a small, simple tool comparative evaluation of differentmanufacturers aircraft.

For example, a maintenanceproblem existed where the pushrod housing entered the rockerbox on the old 65-hp Continentalengine, because this particularpoint leaked oil almost continuously. Sergeant Martin, a machinist then assigned to the Department of Air Training designed and fabricated a specialtool to alleviate this p i o b l e m ~Testing of this prototype toolproved . its effectiveness and Sergeant Martin then had a full-timejob manufacturing the special tool.

Another example of ideas andtests resulted from . the thoughttqat the Cub could rapidly laywire for a telephone communication network. A device whichwould hold a standard reel of telephone wire was designed andbuilt by Sergeant Martin . Withthis fairly simple device, it wasproved that wire could be laideffectively from a Cub.The enthusiasm of aviators to24

try new horizons resulted in determining whether the old L 4could be used to drop bombs.However, some question existedas to the amount of lateral control that would remain if a bombwere hung under each wing of theaircraft and only one wasdropped. Therefore, the Department of Air Training installedtwo bomb racks with two emptybomb cases at the juncture of thelift struts to each wing. Startingwi th a small amoun t of weigh t ineach case, the aircraft was flownand one case was dropped. Weightwas gradually added to the casesand the procedure was repeateduntil maximum weight was obtained without losing lateral control of the airplane. The exactresults, insofar as maximumweight is concerned, are not remembered, but it was proved thata reasonable amount of weightcould be handled asymmetricallybY .the L-4.Of course, the Army was looking ahead and thinking in . ermsof additional types of aircraft foruse by the field artillery. One ofthe tests conducted by the Department of Air Training was acomparison of various types oflight aircraft to determine themost suitable type for field artilleryobservation.

Movement of personnel and aircraft on TDY to more desirabletes t si tes was also necessary for theDepartment of Air Trairiing. Asa .result of Army liaison pilotoperations in Europe and thePacific, some q :lestion exis ted asto whether light aircraft couldsuccessfully evade searchlights atnight and, therefore, evade beingspotted and shot at by antiaircraftbatteries. As a result, a test wasordered at Fort Bliss, Texas; toprovide information o.n this subject. The results of this test indicated that the L-4 and L 5 coulddo little to avoid searchlights atnight.

Suffice it to say that activitieother than those of training bythe Departmen t 6f Air Trainingindicated a need for a test organization in Army aviation. Therefore, iri : 1946 a Ground ~ i r c r fTest Section of Army Field ForceBoard No. 1 was established aFort Bragg, N ~ In addition tothe Ground Aircraft Test Section, the Board had other divisions, nameiy Airborne Test Division, Communication and Electronics Test Division, and FieldArtillery Test Division.

Nine years l ~ e r in June 1954the Field Artillery Service TesDivision and the Army AviationService Test Division were movedto Fort Sill, Okla., and this groupwas reconstituted Board No. Iwh.ich exists today as the U SAi Iny Arti llery Board. The Coinmunication and Electronics Service Test Division and the Airborne Service Test Division remained at Fort Bragg as BoardNo.5, which also exists today athe U S . Army Airborne, Electronics and Special Warfare Board

In October of 1954, the JArmyAviation Service Test Divisionwas again moved-this time toCamp Rucker, Ala., where thArmy Aviation Center was beinorganized. At this time the uniwas placed under Board No. 5 aFort Bragg for adininistrativepurposes.Early in 1955 it became apparent that the division was beirig swamped with a tremendouamount of testing r e q u ~ r e d byArmy aviation due to an increasin scope, size, and importance oorganic aviation within the ArmyA decision was made to expandthis division into a full boardand on 1 August 1955, Continental Army Command BoardNo. 6 was organized as a Classactivity at Fort Rucker, AlaColonel Robert R. Williams wadesignated as the first president

At about the same time, actioU. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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was being taken which resulted inthe establishment of two additional Class test activities at FortRucker . under their respectivetechnical services-the U. S: ArmyTransportation Aircraft Test andSupport Activity ' (USATATSA)and the U. S. Army Signal CorpsAviation Test and Support Activity (USASCATSA). These activities had similar missions of performing logistical t esting for theirrespective technical agencies andprovi4ing specialized supply andmaintenance support to BoardNo.6.

In January 1957, Board No.6was redesignated as the U. S.Army Aviation Board. As a resultof reorganization of the Army in1962, the Board became a part ofthe U. S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) under the direct jurisdiction of U. S. ArmyTest and Evaluation Command

USATECOM) at AberdeenProving Ground, Md. In addition,USAMC directed that the threeaviation test activities at FortRucker be consolidated.Consolidation with USATATSAwas accomplished in September1962. However, reorganization wasnot completed until April 1963at which time USASCATSA alsowas consolidated with the board.By then the Gorps had beendropped from the name and thedesignat ion was USASA TSA. Inthe interim, on 1 DecemberOCTOBER 1967

1962, the U. S. Army AviationBoard was redesignated the U. S.Army Aviation Test Board(USAAVNTBD) .

Space will not permi t a rehashof the tremendous number ofprojects that have been handledby the ~ m y Aviation ServiceTest Division and later by theUSAAVNTBD. These can behighlighted by pointing out thatafter the Army developed its first~ i r r f t (the L-15) specificallytailored for Army use, the testactivity at 'Fort Bragg found itunsuitable . A finished arti cle competition was held in 1947 at FortBragg which resulted in the se-lection of the ~ - 1 7 as the firstmISSIOn support aircraft. TheL-19 (0-1) Bird Dog came intobeing for the Army as a result ofa finished article competition ofoff-the-shelf aircraft at Fort Braggin 1950. Over 3,000 of these aircraft were purchased by the Army.The Bird Dog is still in use as afixed wing trainer and for observation and fire c o ~ t r o l missionsin Vietnam., . As an indication of the increasein size and scope of the AviationTest Board, USCONARC BoardNo.6 i 1 1956 operated on an annual budget of approximately$58,000. The current annual budget of the Aviation Test Boardexceeds $6,000,000. Today theboard is organized in to threebasic elemeIlts: c o m ~ a n d support

and test. The various unitsthroughout the board are hardware oriented for testing of aircraft, aircraft armam,ent, avionicequipment, and associated equipment such as maintenance workstands, shelters, personal e q ~ i p -ment, etc.The number of active projectsassigned to the Aviation TestBoard generally exceeds 100 withsomething less than 50 percent ofthese normally in test phasewith the others being either inthe planning or reporting phase.Projects range from test of smallitems such as p?-rticular type C fspark plug to major effort typetests such as flying three CH-47Ahelicopters for 10,800 hours at arate of 150 hours per month perhelicopter. This latter test hasbeen very instrumental in proving dynamic components of theCH-47A and extending the servicelife of such components' in aircraft deployed to Vietnam.The future of the Aviation TestBoard will be con trolled by thefuture of Army aviation. Test ofnew equipment is essential forprogress of Army aviation. Suthtests are oriented and will continue to be oriented toward providing Army aviators, mechanics,and support elements with thebest possible hardware in theworl4 consistent with the Army'soperational requirement for aviation.

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CONTROLLED EXPLOSIONMaior Robert M. Shabram CW4 Harold L Deal

The booming flying hours at the Aviation School and Cent

Army Aviation Digest - Oct 1967

Documents

Transcript of Army Aviation Digest - Oct 1967