Army Aviation Digest - May 1960

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - May 1960

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VI TION DIGEST

E D I T O R I A L S TA F FC A P T J O S E P H H P O O L E

F R E D M M O N T G O M E RY

R I C H A R D K T I E R N E Y

D I A N A G W I L L I A M S

ARST

RTICLES

Capt Thomas R. Hill, Arty

SELF-PROPELLED AIRTILLERYLt Col James D Neumann, Inf

CAN YOU TRUST YOURSELF?Brig Gen Carll. Hutton, USA

SUDDENLY

IT S UP TO YOU

TANGLED TRANSMISSIONS.

RAPCON

CAN THE GROUND LOOP BE WHIPPED?Lt Col Jean L. Chase

CROSSWINDS SPELL CROSS CONTROLMaj Byron H. Brite, Arty

FRENCH ARMY AVIATIONMaj Hilaire Bethouart

DEP RTMENTS

TWX

CRASH SENSE

M AY 1 9 6

V O L U M E 6

N U M B E R 5

7

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13

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U S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOL

Maj Gen Ernest F. EasterbrookCommandant

Col Delk M OdenAssistant Commandant

SCHOOL STAFFCol Robert H. Schulz

Directo t of Instruction

Lt Col Jack BlohmCO, USAA VNS Regiment

Lt Col John W. OswaltCombat Development Of/ic

Maj Mark F. FowserActing Secretary

DEPARTMENTS

Lt Col Ritchie GarrisonTactics

Lt Col James B. Gregorie, Jr.Advanced Fixed Wing

Lt Col Harry J. KernMaintenance

Lt Col Thomas J . SabistonPubl ications andNon Resident Instruction

Lt Col G Wilfred JaubertPrimary Fixed Wing

Maj Alvin F. Burch

Rotary Wing

The U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGES r ian official publication of the Department othe Army published monthly under thelupervision of the Commandant, U. S. ArmyAviation School.

rhe mission of the U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGES l is to provide information oan operational or functional nature concerning safety and a i rcraf t accident prevention,training, maintenance, operations, researchand development, aviation medicine andother related data.

Manuscripts, photographs, and other iIlustrations pertaining to the above subjects ointerest to personnel concerned with ArmyAviation are invited. Direct communication

is authorized to:Editor-in-Chief,

U. S.A RMY A VIA rION DIGEST, U. S. ArmyAviation Scllool. For t Rucker, Alabama.

Unless otherwise indicated, material inthe U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGES r mayhe reprinted provided credit l given to theU. S. AUl\IY AVIATION DIGES r and tothe author.

l Ile printing of th i l publication has beenapproved b y the Director of the Bureau otthe Budget, 22 December 1958.

Views expressed in this magazine are nonecessarily those of the Department of theArmy or of the U. S. Army Aviation School.Unless specified otherwise, all p h o t o ~ rure U. S. Army.

DistributIOn:l o he distrihuted in accordance with

reQuirementl Ita ed in DA Form 12.


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The rescent Saber

Old Genghis Kahn and Alexander tooAnd Caesar, Frederick, Hannibal, and

Lee -Through all the centuries thl'Y found

the horseWould furnish all required mobility.

Our World is shrinking. The horseand spur are gone.

The yellow ribbon no longer holdsthe rein.

'Twas first the motor, with wings notfar behind

Supplanting horse with truck and tankand plane.

In 'fifty-six a saber in the skyRevived the thoughts of Cavalry of

oldAnd grew until the Va n derpoolian

sectHad preached his word and had his

concepts sold.

The crescent saber, its long arm'cross the sky,

Displays a freedom the soldier hasnot known

Since Genghis Khan, and others inhis van,

With horse and spur did claim theworld their own.

The Saber in the Sky Grows Longer and Sharper,romises to be a Maior Force of Modern rmy

Less than a year ago theDIGEST carried an article entitled Saber in the Sky, whichintroduced many readers to therevolutionary and thought provoking concepts of armed helicopters and aerial combat reconnaissance. Told were theinitial dreams of Brig Gen Carl1. Hutton (former CG FortRucker) and Colonel Jay D.Vanderpool (former director,

Captain homas R Hill Arty

CDO) and the many obstaclesposed by lack of previous supporting examples, innumerablenonbelievers, and the inevitablelack of funds. The article described the evolution of theconcept in three short yearsfrom an - idea of a few men ofvision t the formation of theexperimen al Aerial C o m b tReconnaissance (ACR) Companyand the far reaching im-

pact of its tactical demonstra

tions.Since then the snowball so

painstakingly pushed to the tophas finally started rolling underits own momentum. The saberis growing longer and sharperand shows promise of soon be-

Captain H ill is presently onTDY to the 3rd rmy Instrum entSchool H e is dual rated

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fast moving, hard hitting unit.I t serves as a flexible means ofsearching out and fixing theenemy, performing most of thetraditional missions of cavalryat an accelerated pace. The

force has the capability of performing varied missions, including covering action, reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, flank protection, reararea defense, anti-airborne , anti-infiltration, and economy offorce.

The unit is the original proposal of the U. S. Army ArmorSchool. I t is a balanced armsforce consisting of command,reconnaissance, troops, weapons, and support 33 officersand 101 enlisted personnel).The tactical forces are 100 percent airmobile in organic airvehicles. The final TOE recommendations of the evaluationare awaiting approval.

Successful employment ofthe ARS troop is based uponcomplete utilization of its unique characteristics and capabilities, and an understanding of

its limitations. t is designedto extend the reconnaissanceand security capabilities of itsparent unit. Normally ARSshould be employed in close coordination with ground units sothat advantages inherent ineach unit can complement thoseof the other. I t can be employed independently for limited periods and indefinitelywhen a part of a larger force.

The basic combat elements ofthe troop are an Aero-ScoutPlatoon, Aero-Rifle Platoon, andAero-Weapons Platoon.

The Aero-Scout Platoon consists of a platoon headquarterswith one reconnaissance helicopter and three scout sectionsof four recon helicopters each.The platoon conducts aerial reconnaissance and neutralizes

2 2HE l ,

RECON )

I III HE l , RECON I

33

A ERIALRE CO N N ISS N E

SE UR ITYTR OOP

ARST

1 1

I I 13 I 10 IHEL , HEL ,

C ARGO , LT ) C RGO , LT I

I 14 HEL , C A RG O , LT ) II 2TOTALS _ 33 OFF I ERS _ IOI ENLISTED P ERSON N EL _ II LIGHT C RG O H fLlCOPTE RS

6 RECONNN ISSANCE He l iCO PT ERS

The organization of RST as originally proposed

enemy forces. The helicoptersare armed with .30 caliber or7.62mm machineguns.

The Aero-Rifle Platoon consists of a platoon headquartersthree rifle squads, and a firesupport squad. Each rifle squadhas a squad leader, two fireteams and a helicopter crew.The fire support squad containsa squad leader, a machinegunteam a rocket team and a helicopter crew. Their mission isto conduct dismounted scoutingand patrolling and, when required, to close with and destroy the enemy. The platoonhas four organic light cargohelicopters, each armed with

.30 caliber or 7.62mm machineguns.The Aero-Weapons Platoon

consists of two rocket sections,each with two light cargo helicopters. The helicopters areheavily armed with rockets andmachineguns. Their mission isto support the troop with airto-ground fire.

A service platoon provides

the necessary personnel andequipment to accomplish maintenance, resupply, and medicalfunctions.

HELICOPTER RM MENT

The weapons kits describedare those in current use a t FortRucker. They have been builtto test the feasibility of arminghelicopters, to aid in developingtactics and doctrine, to trainpilots in techniques of gunneryand to serve as test beds forengineering and troop tests.

Several weapons systemsspecifically designed for helicopters are under developmentby industry. As these kits arecompleted and tested they willbe added to the ACR inventory.

Following are brief descriptions of weapons kits - all designed and manufactured by8305th ACR Company, FortRucker. The weapons andequipment pictured on the H-13E helicopter can be modifiedto fit the H-13H.


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Pictured above and right aretwo of the many early experiments of ACR in the evolutionof H-13 helicopter armament.

Above are two aerial .30 calibermachineguns mounted above a2.75 rocket launcher. Thisproved too heavy and cumbersome, so ACR tried the singlegun without the rockets, showna t the right. Both kit s are onuncushioned mounts which produced :excessive vibration andjarred equipment loose on theaircraft.

Right: the second cushion-mount kit KX-13-A 1-1) develd. It has a charging device for the machinegun arrow)

various safety features. This kit now can be producedmounted on all H-13 helicopters. Weapons: two .30

ber aerial machineguns. Firing: 1,200 rounds per minutegun. Capacity: 500 rounds per gun.

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Developmentof H 13 rma-

ment by CRCo. USAA VNS

Left: the first experimentalproduction model of an aerial.30 caliber gun on a cushionedmount KX-13-A 1 ) . Vibrationwas taken up by absorbers, andACR switched its efforts to thisdesign. Some of these kits arestill in use but are consideredobsolete. These kits are notinterchangeable from one aircraft to another. Note the newtype of amll10 box as comparedto the types in the picturesabove.


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The New lumi-num Kit Mounts

a Variety ofMachineguns

Aerial .30 Cal

M37 Tank Gun

M60 NATO Gun

Right: the M37, .30 calibertank gun mounted on the newaluminum kit. ACR currentlyis working on improvements forthe firing mechanism and elec-trical system. ACR says thismount is too heavy and plansto reduce the weight with a re-fined elevating mechanism. Inthis picture the ammo can has

not been moved to the rear. Itmust be located about two inchesfurther back to fire properly.

Pictured above is the latest suppressive fire weapon kit(KX-13-A 1-2) which is still being developed. This aluminum,interchangeable kit is able to mount anyo ne of three differentguns used in the field. (The recoil system can be adapted to mountany machinegun used today.) T he ammo can a t its new location(lower front) is larger and streamlined to reduce wind drag. Otherfeatures include cockpit controlled elevation mechanism plus limitswitches (arrows). The kit we ghs much less than previous ones.Weapons: aerial .30 caliber (shown here); M60 7.63mm NATOgun, lower left; M37 .30 caliber tank gun, below. Rate of fire

(each gun): M60, 650 rounds per minute; 30 caliber aerial guns,1,200 rounds per minute; M37, 500 rounds per minute. Capacity:650 rounds.

Upper left: the NATO, M60gun mounted on the newest(KX-13-A 1-2) kit. This weapon originally was mounted as

shown, lower left, but provedtoo heavy and bulky. Some im-provements are being made onthe firing mechanism on thealuminum kit. The NATO gunon the aluminum kit, like theM37, can be removed in aboutfive minutes and fired by . hand.The ammo can in picture a t upper left should e m o v ~backabout 6 inches for proper : firing.


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Right: two .50 caliber machineguns on the H-21. A recoil mechanism from an M3AA mount is incorporated. Themachineguns are so adjustedthat they will have the samepoint of impact as the rockets at1,000 yards. They fire a t a rateof 1,600 rounds per minute andhave a capacity of 105 roundsper gun. A mark-8 sight isused and tracers mark the target for the rockets.

Left and below: these pictures illustrate4.5-inch rocket launchers on the H-34 andH-21 respectively. The tubes are mountedin vertical columns on heavy aluminumplates . Firing is controll ed by the aviator,either in pairs or ripples of pairs. Otherkits being built by ACR are similar to theone pictured here, but are closer to thehelicopter s center of gravity. The rocketsfire a t a rate of four per second and gain

a velocity of 1,050 feet per second. Eachcontains five pounds of TNT and has amaximum range of 9,300 yards. ACR alsois working on an automatic firing systemfor the launchers.

Left: the HU-1A is shownwith a brace of 55- solid propellant missiles. The missilesare directed to their targets bymeans of electrical impulsestransmiHed through t r a n gwires. The 55-11 weighs 63pounds and is 46 inches wide.It has a range of slightly over2 m iles and is capable of defeating any armored vehicleknown today.


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A missile-air offensive fire unit, partan Airtillery Support Group, shown in fiposition. The weapons carrier is unique ina complete firing cycle may be accomplishedfrom the interior of the vehicle, thus allowinthe carrier to move into an area engage a get and withdraw in a maHer of 3 to 4 minu

SelfPropelled irtilleryLieutenant Colonel James D Neumann Inf

UCH HAS BEEN writtenand said about the

needfor increased firepower andgreater mobility, if we are to'survive in any future type ofwarfare. The need for newaerial vehicles to support theInfantry -Armor-Artillery teamin accO'mplishing these objectives is therefore apparent tthe members of our Army andsome of the more farsighted

members of Congress.Tremendous advances have

been made during the past decade in Army Aviation. Newequipment, such as the Iroquois , Caribou, and Mohawk,will soon find its way throughour maze of supply channelsand will finally be issued to ourcombat forces on a world-widebasis. Sophisticated N a v a i d

black boxes are being devel-

oped by industry and the technical services which should giveour aircraft an around-theclock, all weather capability tosupport our combat forces inthe forward areas. Surface

Colo ne l Neumann is deputy di-rector of the Combat D eve lop -ment s Offi ce US VN S F or iR ucker. H e is dua l r ated .

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MAY 1960

bound equipment is being designed and developed concurrently with the development ofaircraft to ensure compatibility when the two meet a t theloading zone.

In spite of these advances,the delivery of accurate andtimely fire upon an enemy target stands as a constant reminder that it alone must precede any victory, whether i t beon land, sea, or in the air. Actually, the combined efforts ofour entire Army establishmentare geared to' the successfulmovement of the infantrymanand his weapons system on. thebattlefield. Al t h o u g h important, all other things are secondary in nature.

To assist the infantryman inthe accomplishment of his vitalmission, I believe that 'offensivefire support (not suppressive)by low performance a e r iweapons systems is a must. Another requirement is the integration of aerial units into thecombat elements of the Infant ry battle group, the combatcommand of the Armored Division, and the Artillery battalion if we are to achieve the necessary battlefield mobility sovital to success in any futurearea of conflict.

Our Army has a 24-hour-aday nuclear capability with the

280mm gun, the 782mm HonestJohn ballistic rocket (30 mirange) and the 380mm LittleJohn rocket (20 mi range)which may be mO ved into position by helicopter and fired inminutes. The heliborne LittleJohn is recO'gnized as a significant step in the right direction.However, a period of 12 minutes elapses from the time theaircraft lands until the LittleJohn is fired and the launcherreloaded into the helicopter.The greater portion of this timeis utilized in unloading, placingthe weapon into firing position,and reloading the launcher intothe helicopter after firing. Thegathering of necessary firingdata and the actual sighting ofthe launcher utilizes but onethird of the total time required.This appears to be a mO st significant accomplishment untilyou compare i t with self-propelled artillery as far back asthe early stages of World WarII. I t was not unusual at all fora SP artillery unit to be movingalong a dusty road and within 5to 10 minutes be firing on anenemy target some 5,000 to8,000 yards away.

The most significant advantage of SP artillery is its ability to move rapidly and to beemployed in a relatively shortperiod of time as compared

with other means. The trendin Army Aviation seems to beaway from the special purposevehicle. HO'wever, in my opinion, and from what I have readabout the future extended battle area, there appears to be adefinite requirement f o r anaerial vehicle with a special offensive function (a machinethat can fight and be maintained in the forward battlearea).

The optimum equipment, ofcourse, would be a weapons system which is designed and developed concurrently with itsair carrier. For the immediatefuture perhaps the a n s w e rshould be an existing weaponssystem with an aerial vehicledesigned around it. The blast,smoke, dust, and flash causedby a recoilless type fractiO'nalyield nuclear carrier, or the firing of a mO re conventionalweapon for that matter, willc e r t a i n y draw counterfirewithin a matter of minutes.Therefore, the ability to moveinto an area, land, fire, and

move - all in a matter of 3 to4 minute&-not only seems tobe highly desirable but a prerequisite to survival.

The term, Shoot and Scoot,as used by O ur artillery rocketlauncher teams in World WarII seems to designate the present requirement.

A step in the right direction - the HU-l armed with the S5-11 anti-tank guided missile system.


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e n

YOUTRUST

YOURSELf

It Couldn't Be Wrong But It Was.Transfer Effect Can Be Deadly

rigadier General Carl I Hutton USA

T WAS a black night. Minewas the only airplane in the

pattern and was shootinglandings - no.t touch and gobut turn and taxi back. Ondownwind O Pposite the touch

down spot, put on carburetorheat, thro.ttled back, slowed theairspeed with a touch of backpressure and nudged the trim.Holding about 70, turned baseand put on 30 flaps. turnedfinal and reduced throttle to.1500 rpm. Controlling rate O fdescent with power, aimed forthe threshold and toggled onthe landing light. Once o.ver

the lights, began ro.undingout, easing off power and lO s-ing airspeed. The m c h i n etouched down with a satisfyingbump and held i t straightthrough the landing roll.

braked i t gently to a stop andtoggled off the landing light,raised the flaps, executed a 180,and taxied back to the end ofthe runway.

There, after another 180,reset the trim put on 30 flaps,pushed the carburetor heat contro.I to Ram, turned on the landing light, opened the throttleand executed a no.rmal takeoff.

After the climb was estab-lished, turned the landinglight off, reduced throttle to2300, and gently raised theflaps. turned left, turned leftagain, and repeated the process.

This had been going on foran hour or so while was having a contest with myself tosee which circuit would be flownmost precisely. By agreementwith the tower, was monitoring the frequency but not call-

General Hutton is Directorof Trwining Federal AviationAgency Washington D. C.

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s

UDENLY

The appro.ach was normaland the aircraft to.uched do.wnin normal 3-point attitude, ro.ll-ing straight down the runway.S U D D E N LY i t gro.undIo.o.ped

I made a normal appro.acht the barrier, cleared the treesand started a normal roundout.SUDDENLY, the bo.ttom fellout and the aircraft landed sohard the right gear failed

The p i I 0 t co.mpleted anormal preflight, started theengine and taxied out. Hecompleted a n o r m a I runupand made a normal takeoff.S U D D E N L Y, the enginestopped

I was flying VFR. SUD-DENL Y the aircraft entered

a clo.ud and I was forced to. go.o.n instruments . . . .

I was making a normal ap-proach t a pinnacle. SUD-DENLY, the aircraft began tosink, even though I applied fullpower

These poor fliers just neverhad a chance. Everything wasgoing alo.ng normally thenbang, SUDDENLY i t happened.Ever read any pilo.ts' statements in accident reports? Themajority are invariably similar.VVhatever got them into tro.u-ble always happened suddenly.And who's to say they're notright? Certainly i t must haveappeared SUDDENLY to them.

Now let's go back and seewhat really happened in each o.f

these accidents.The Bird Do.g pilot's ap-

pro.ach appeared no.rmal t him,although he had lined up forthe center o.f the runway anddrifted to the left side by thetime he started his roundo.ut .The aircraft appeared to rollstraight after touchdown, buthe had landed with drift and agradual turn into the lightcrosswind began immediately.The pilo.t only reco.gnized trouble when the aircraft finallywo.und up into the ground loop.

h is ar t icle w s p r epa r ed byth e Uni t ed S tates rm y B o r d for

vi a t ion Acci d ent R esearc h

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MAY 1960

Often, the lightest crosswind ismore difficult to judge and correct for than a strong, obviouscrosswind.

The Beaver pilot made whathe thought was a normal approach, but in reality he hadconstantly increased his pitchattitude to the point that theaircraft was ready to stallwhen he applied back pressureto round out. The pilot centered his attention on the treebarriers so hard throughout theapprQach that he failed to moni tor t h e aircraft's attitude.True, what he saw did appearnormal. Trouble was, he didn'tdivide his attention enough tosee the abnormal.

To anQther Bird Dog pilot,his preflight and run up did intruth appear normal. In fact,he even checked some itemst w i c e because he couldn'tremember w h e t h e r he had

RE RVIEW MIRRORS

ON HELICOPTERS

checked them previously. Andw h y couldn't he rememberwhether he had checked thembefore? The poor guy had beenon duty until 0200 hours thenight before and began preparations for this flight at dawn.At SQme point between the runup and takeoff, he had inadvertently r e c h e d up andswitched the fuel selector tothe off position. The CO wasamazed when the flight surgeonshowed little surprise.

The Otter pilot tuned hisADF to the nearest commercial broadcasting station andcruised merrily along, listeningto some fine jazz. Suddenly, he

found himself on instruments.Of course the frQnt he had tocross lay in such a manner thati t and his flight path made ascissors, and the forecaster hadadvised that he keep his radiotuned to monitor w e t h e r

Installation of rearview mirrors on Army H-19 helicQpterswas declared not feasible afterrecent tests conducted by theTransportation Materiel Command at T ATSA testing facilities at Fort Rucker, Ala.

Following m n y requestsfrom aviators in the field, themirrors were installed. Thetests revealed that vibratiQnwas the main drawback. During flight, the mirror CQuld notbe focused on a selected point

and would not reflect a clearimage. I t could not be locatedin a position where the aviatorcould fully use i t while simultaneously maintaining aircraftinstruments and control.

Glare from the sun Qr lighting devices . offered no problem.The tests were conducted undernormal day and night field operatiQns and under all weather

broadcasts. But who likes tulisten to weather broadcastswhen Satchmo is on the hornwith the Dixieland Five?

The Chickasaw pilot, his aircraft loaded to near g r 0 s sweight for the density altitude,thought he was making a normal approach; it appeared thatthe aircraft suddenly began tosink. His reconnaissance hadconsisted of a 180 turn 500feet above the pinnacle, so howcould he be expected to knowhis approach was downwind?

When your ring opponent isflipping a series of left jabs,avoiding that gloved hand becomes the biggest thing in your

world. In fact, you can thinkof nothing else-unti l his lethalright SUDDENLY explodes inyour face and you wake up towonder why that fool is standing over you and counting8 - 9 - 1 0 "

conditions, with the exceptionof Arctic. The opinion of thetest aviators . was that any advantage gained through utilization of the mirrow was negligible.

Requests for various modifications are not discouraged byTransportation Materiel Command. However, unauthorizedfield modifications should not beattempted without approval ofcommand headquarters. Expenditure of maintenance funds

for field modifications or fieldexperiments will not be approved without proper authorization. These regulations areestablished to preclude a duplication of efforts in tests thatmay be in the process or mayhave been completed a t otherinstallations. Rearview mirrorscurrently are being tested onother helicopters.


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MAY 1960

field. This officer has an intimate knowledge of every act ivity; he knows every personat the field. More important,he knows his visits are expected and welcomed.

Personal Competency. I t isimperative tha t the aviationsafety officer maintain and demonstrate his efficiency as anaviator. To be accepted byother aviators, to gain theirconfidence and respect, he mustbe one of them. At one unit,the aviation s f e t y officermakes i t a practice to fly witheach aviator - not as a checkpilot, but simply to learn andshare their problems. This officer has little trouble gainingaviator support for his projects.

Teamwork. Aircraft accidentprevention is not the result ofwhat the aviation safety officer does. I t is the result ofwhat people do - commanders,aviators, maintenance personnel, weather forecasters, control tower operators, and themany other people who work

directly or indirectly with aviation. Each of these personsneeds a sense of his individualimportance. He wants to knowwhat is going on and how i t affects him. He needs a sense ofresponsibility, a feeling that his

work is important. The aviation safety officer who seeksways to satisfy these needs hastaken a major step toward developing teamwork.

Psychologists tell us tha t the

desire to be an integral part ofsome social group is one of thebasic urges of human nature.An individual derives personalstrength from the feeling thatothers desire and need his presence, from the belief that hiswork is essential to the welfareof the group. He wants to belong to the group, but hedoesn't want to lose his identity. Every person wants individual recognition. If this recognition comes from the groupin which he seeks status, groupties become stronger and theindividual s . stature is enlarged.

Industry learned this lessonin human nature the expensiveway. For years, industrial management issued directives onaccident prevention. Supervisors and foremen enforced thedirectives, ordered the workmen to comply. Accidents con

tinued to happen. I t was impossible to issue enough directivesto cover every possible accident hazard.

Industry learned that drivership was not a satisfactoryway to achieve accident pre-

vention. I t found that peoplecould only be motivated to dothe right thing at the rightt i m e through leadership. I tlearned tha t workers had feelings which could be hurt, drives

which could be frustrated. I tlearned that workers could produce more and have fewer accidents if they followed a plan ofaction which they had conceived or helped to formulate.This was a costly, but valuable,lesson for industry to learn.Once applied, accident s were reduced to a low level and workermorale and efficiency grew.

You, as an aviation safetyofficer, can benefit from thislesson. You can capitalize onthe fundamentals of human nature: group acceptance and individual recognition. How? Getout and meet the people of yourunit-encourage initiative, promote teamwork, recognize individuals for the contributionsthey make, set an example thatwill generate enthusiasm. Ifyou can gain the confidence ofthe personnel in your unit,

make them believe that you'retrying to help them do a betterjob, the basic structure of an

i r c r f t accident preventionprogram will be well established.

It 's up to YOUI

I YOU NOW

Speed at takeoff equals stall speed plus 15 percent?Landing speed of 10 percent excess equals 2 percent increase in landing distance?

Has your transmission been cut off lately? When changing frequencies remember to monitor first, transmit second. Courtesy is sky-high.

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Tangled TransmissionsBird Dog 878 taxiing to run-

way for takeoff.

Cairns, 2394, radiO' check.Roger.202, L-20 on the - (squawk,

break-in) - taxi takeoff.644, hold position.Cairns, this is Army 2104,

6 miles northwest fQr landinginstructions.

Army 2104 - (sq ua wk,break-in) - Bird Dog 104, radiO check.

These radio transmissions oc

curred recently a t the Cairnscontrol tower a t the U. S. ArmyAir Field a t Fort Rucker. Suchneedless radio checks and rudebreak-ins plague the cQntrollersand make their highly sensitivejobs difficult to perform. CQn-trollers at Cairns say tha t poorradio procedure and mannersare the rule rather than theexception. HQW is tower etiquette at your field?

True, much Qf the poO r radiodiscipline at Cairns is becauseQf the many students enrQlledin FO'rt Rucker's Army A viation School. They are eagerfledglings bent on doing theright thing, checking that radiO - making that transmissiQn - and doing it all as soonas PQssible. But, the so-calledpros are alsO guilty.

The picture at Cairns may bemore candid than a t mQst ArmyAir Fields. HO'wever, the samesituation exists anywhere andanytime an aviator presses theradio contrO'I button and blurtsout his message befQre mQnitQring the frequency. He doesnot know i f he is breaking in

n anDther transmissiDn - Qnethat may be Qf vital impQrtance. The careless aviator couldcause an accident or cancel a

one-shot, last-ditch hope of astricken aircraft by blanking

out a crucial transmission.Air traffic in the United

States continues to increase.Army A v i a t i o n cQntributesheavily to the rapid grQwth asis evidenced by the mushrooming training program a t FortRucker.

Last year Cairns AAF handled 194,112 takeQffs and landings, including 10,051 by GCAwhich compares favQrably with

some of the country's top commercial airports.Overall traffic at Fort Ruck

er's t h r e e fixed fields andmany practice strips in 1959was a quarter of a milliQn landings and takeoffs.

Such rapid grQwth adds tothe yak, yak clutter on thefrequencies. For instance, in a30-minute pedod a t Cairns recently there were 146 transmissions Qn one frequency. Ofthese 31 were broken-in on,sometimes by twO or three aviators simultaneously. In another instance, the tower received 17 radio check requestsin 20 minutes.

The professional type aviatoreliminates needless chatter onthe frequencies. He knows thatan unnecessary radio check requires Dnly a few seconds f histime, but that time combinedwith the many others multipliesfast on the controller's end.This cuts sharply into the overall efficiency of the tower.

Stop a moment and considerthe respDnsibility on the controller's shoulders and thecomplex jDb he is performingfor your safety. The follDwingparagraphs taken from a recent

light Safety oundation bulle-

tin illustrate this point.The complexities of air traf

fic control have grown progressively from the single airwayin the IQW frequency spectruminto a multitude of electronicradio paths resembling a giantsnow shoe. Only a short t imeago, aircraft were cleared toone radiO' fix by a center andthen handed Dff to a tower oneat a time. Today there are asmany as 15 different ways tobe cleared into - or out of - abusy airport.

Sometimes five different aircraft approach an airport a tthe same altitude from five different directions simultaneousl y - an unheard-of process 10years ago. Radar has shQrtened separation unbelievably inthe vicinity f majDr terminals;today airplanes whisk throughspace a t three miles per minutewith only three miles separation.

Most f the finer points -if not all - of tower contrO'Imanship must be learned by experience and careful guidancefrom a skilled controller, because the system as we know ittoday is sDmething new. I t hasno parallel; there is no writtendescription. ContrQllers of ten- or even five - years ago areso far behind the present-daygiant that i t is dDubtful that

they could ever catch up withthe pounding pace in a busytower O r center. I t is an endlessly c h a n g i n g dynamicgrowth.

Highly important are the instructions an aviator must begiven when the cQntrDller cannot okay an immediate apprDach clearance. You will real-

n t inu ed on pag e 2

15


18/40

THE

U S AR MY

BOARD

FOR

A AVIATION

ACCIDENT RESEAR CH

H-37 CRASHED AND BURNE D DURING RE-TURN FLIGHT TO HOME FIELD AT NIGHT.ALL 5 CREWMEMBERS ABOARD FATALLY INJURED. WEATHER AT TIME OF ACCIDENTWAS CEILING, MEASURED 400 FEET OB-SCURED AND RAGGED; VISIBILITY 2 MILES .

H-34C BURNED. AIRCRAFT LANDED ONHELl PAD IN HIGH GRASS . GRASS CAUGHTFIRE . NO INJURIES.

U-l A LANDED IN RIVERBED BECAUSE OFLOW FUEL. IT TOUCHED DOWN AND ROLLEDTHROUGH THE STREAM, COLLAPSING THERIGHT GEAR AND HITTING PROPELLER .AIRCRAFT STOPPED IN UPRIGHT POSITION,BURST INTO FLAMES AND WAS DESTROYED .NO INJURIES. SUSPECT FUEL LEAK ASCAUSE FOR LOW FUEL.

H-21C LEFT VERTICAL STABILIZER CAMEOFF DURING NIGHT FLIGHT. PILOTS EXPERI ENCED NO LOSS OF CONTROL ANDWERE UNAWARE OF DAMAGE UNTIL COMPLETION OF FLIGHT. EVIDENCE OF METALFATIGUE OF UPPER AND LOWER STABILIZERFITTINGS .

H-34C MAIN ROTOR BLADES DAMAGED BYCONTACT WITH WIRE DURING STEEP APPROACH TO CONFINED AREA . DARK WIREAGAINST PINE -TREE BACKGROUND DIFFICULT TO SEE.

H-23D INSTRUCTOR PILOT HEARD LOUD

NOISE FROM TRANSMISSION AREA. TACHOMETER NEEDLES SPLIT AND ENGI NERPM ACCELERATED TO 3800 . I P COMPLETEDSUCCESSFUL A U T O R O TAT I V E LANDINGWITH NO FURTHER DAMAGE . SINGLE ROWSPRAG CLUTCH FAILED.

H-13E SKIDDED TO THE RIGHT DURINGLANDING AND MAIN ROTOR STRUCKGROUND. HELICOPTER CAME TO REST ONRIGHT SIDE . PILOT AND PASSENGER SUF -

16

FERED MINOR BRUISES . NO MALFUNCTION .WEATHER NOT A FACTOR.

L-19A TAXIING TO HANGAR FOR HIGHWIND ALERT WAS DIRECTED TO CROSS BE-HIND C-124 . THE GLOBEMASTER ENGINESWERE RUN UP AND L-19 WAS TIPPED OVERDAMAGING LEFT WING AND ELEVATOR .

H-13H FELL THROUGH DURING FLARE FORPRACTICE POWER RECOVERY AUTOROTATION. INSTRUCTOR PILOT AND PILOT SUFFERED MINOR BRUISES. AIRCRAFT DESTROYED .

L-19E THROTTLE RETARDED TO INITIATESIMULATED BOMB RUN. WHEN THROTTLEWAS ADVANCED, MAXIMUM OF 1500 RPMAVAILABLE. PILOT MADE FORCED LANDING ON ROAD WITH NO DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT . THROTTLE SHAFT NUT, NOT SAFETIED WITH COTTER PIN, CAME LOOSE.

H-13E MAIN ROTOR BLADES FLEXED DOWNINTO TAIL BOOM DURING SHUTDOWN INGUSTY WINDS, CAUSING MAJOR DAMAGETO TAIL BOOM AND ROTOR BLADES.

H-13H MAIN ROTOR BLADE DAMAGEDWHEN 1 4- TON VEHICLE WITH WHIP ANTENNA DROVE UNDER OUTER EDGE OFROTOR DISC AFTER LANDING AT FIELD CP oMAIN ROTOR BLADE DAMAGED WHEN ITSEVERED THE ANTENNA .

H-13G STRUCK TREE DURING LANDINGAPPROACH TO UNLIGHTED FIELD AT NIGHT .PILOT SUFFERED MINOR SCRATCHES ANDBRUISES . AIRCRAFT DESTROYED .

L-20A STRUCK RIDGE OF ICE ACROSS RUNWAY DURING LANDING ROLL. MAJOR DA MAGE TO PROPELLER AND RIGHT LANDINGGEAR .

H-23B LOST TRANSITIONAL LIFT OVERRIVER FOLLOWING TAKEOFF AND PILOT


19/40


20/40

c e : o c ) o e oc : . c c ; c c ; \ Y

e G e o o

AN/MPN ll REMOTED

SURVEILL NCE R D R

RRIV L CONTROL

Jlc c e o c .O C C C

\ J c c c c : c c a e

c c oc e COMMUNIC TIONc : . .O o e C C e

C c;; 0 c: c c ' C V( J eo c c c t V c v FLIGHT D T 1

O C Co e e o c c

c c. C 0 C e cl i c c ( 3 0 c C ' c CV V CONSOLE PRECISION

FIN L CO

- - - -

O N 1 JUNE 1960, the addition of Radar to thetitle Cairns Approach Control,and the assumption of toweren route service responsibilityby the Flight Facilities Branchwill mark the accomplishmentof another notable first inArmy Aviation.

18

A year ago, at the outset ofplanning to e s t a b l i s h theRAPCON service at Fort Rucker, the planners saw the immediate need for a centrallocation and for cross-training ofapproach controllers and GCAoperators. C a i r n s ApproachControl is situated in the 125

foot control tower located onCairns Army Air Field. Theradarscope, which provide theheartbeat for any radar controlfacility, are located approximately 1 mile away, on thefar east side of Cairns field.The only communications between the two is by radio, in-


21/40

C OMMUNIC TIO N

CONSOLE

- - PRECISION R D RFIN L CONTROL

REMOTE LIN

MPLIFIER

tercom, or T A 43 field phone.To overcome this gap in com :

munications and coordination,a room on the first floor of theCairns Operations Building wass e l e c t e d to be the RadarRoom. Airfield C o m m a n d(then Airfield Unit) planners,the Center Signal Officer, and

o

o / C V : > - : > cV W' > . ;>.. ;> :> > t

the C e n t e r Engineer madeplans to remotely locate theradarscopes and controls in thatroom. The transmitter and antenna of the Ground ControlledApproach mobile unit, MPNl IB (GCA) were left a t the approach end of Runway 24.

Implementation of this inno-

vation in Fort Rucker Air Traffic Control was not a simpletask. Never before had thisequipment been strewn aboutin such a way. Gilfillan Bro.s.,Inc., fabricated the required

special fittings and equipmenton a one-time basis. Two. runways had to. be cut and conduits laid under them to accommodate approximately 4 milesof special shielded cable. Oneconcrete block wall of the selected radar room was completely removed and a false walland ceiling installed over theentire roo.m.

All o.f the operating positionconsoles were designed locallyby the Gilfillan technica l representative and were manufactured by the Center Signal sectio.n. This will include an elaborately complicated co.mmunications system tha t is beingfabricated by the Signal Maintenance Sectio.n. This type ofRAPCON installation w 0 u dcost more than one-half milliondollars if done by an industrialelectronic contractor. However,through extensive, cooperativeuse of the ingenuity, skill, andtechnical know-how o.f civiliana n d military technicians atFort Rucker, a very pro.fessional installation has been made.For appro.ximately one-twentieth of the quoted cost CairnsApproach Co.ntrol will possessall the radar capabilities ofco.mparable age n c i e s (FAA,USAF, and USN).

A RAPCON service could notbe econo.mically o.perated if theapproach controllers and theradar operators were not oneand the same. For the past sixmonths, Airfield Command hasbeen co.nducting a program ofcross-training the traffic contro.llers to be radar traffic controllers; and the radar operators who previo.usly conducted

19


22/40

M Y 196

A ARGUS

N T R P ~ I S

308 UP

LOWE M

NEW

Dotfed line encloses present ort Rucker approach control

area. Solid line plus dotted line enc loses RAPCON area .

only GCAs have been trainedto control traffic.

The R P C O N unit willcontrol arriving and depart-ing aircraft at Cairns AAF,Hanchey Army Heliport, andDothan Municipal. Aircraft de-parting these fields will be con-trolled by radar until positioned

on Federal Airways a t their as -signed altitudes. This will ex-pedite the movement of all airtraffic in this area, as the re -quired separation between air-craft is reduced when radar isused for positive control.

Th is art icle was prep are d by th eFl ight F aci lit ie s Branch Ca ir nsA F Comma nd Fo r t R uck er

20

In addition to furnishing allthe IFR separation and trafficc o n t r 0' 1 normally expected,Cairns RAPCON will providetraffic advisory service for allaircraft operating i n t 0 andthrough the control area underVFR. Cairns RAPCON will alsofurnish weather radar advisory

service. Present capability willbe sufficient to satisfy all re-quirements for weather advi-sory service.

In addition to assuming aRAPCON status, Cairns Ap-proach Control assumes the re -sponsibility of tower en routeservice for the Cairns controlarea. This means that Cairns

Approach Control will u l l ycontrol and coordinate all airtraffic movement on FederalAirways and that airspace noton airways from an altitude of4,000 feet MSL down to 700

feet MSL in its control area(see map).

All IFR flights a t 4,000 feetor below on flight plans will behanded off a t the respectiveclearance limits to Cairns ap-proach. Two final radar con-trollers enable the RAPCON toh a v e two aircraft on GCAsimultaneously in d i f f e r e n tstages of approach.

This tower en route servicewill include approach controlauthority and responsibility forDothan Munipical Airport, tobe effected by peripheral ra -dios remoted to' that airfield.I t is anticipated tha t Dothan'smonthly traffic count will ex-ceed 100 commercial carrier op-erations and several hundredgeneral aviation operations.

The Cairns RAPCON, being

the controlling agency for allfly through traffic, will nec-essarily log each contact withthose nonstop flights throughthe cO'ntrol area as an IFR orVFR operation. T h i s trafficcount, when added to the localarea traffic count and thoseitinerant flights terminating atCairns, Hanchey or D o t h a nshould add up to an extremelyimpressive total. Cairns Tower

and Approach Control alreadyhas an annual traffic count inexcess of 200,000 total opera-tions and is technically termeda highly complex operation.

t is expected to increase itsoperational count by a largepercentage, making it one ofthe busiest terminal areas inthe United States.


23/40

n t inu e ro m p g e 5ize the seriousness of a breachin radio etiquette if you are theone who misses delaying-actioninstructions because someonebroke in and drowned out thecontroll er s voice.

Points of conflict must bespotted by the controller several minutes before they occur. He understands these sit-

uations and knows how to correct them quickly. However,he cannot anticipate needlesstransmissions and break-insthat cause delays. An altitudeover a certain fix, if neglectedfor any length of time, can tieup the whole zone and back upor delay traffic for 500 miles inall directions.

The Army Aviator is not a

TANGLED TRANSMISSIONS

true professional until he understands the problems of thecontrollers and makes a sincereeffort to cooperate with them.Let s monitor the frequency before using it, and make transmissions clear and brief as possible. Don t lose your temperwith the controller - remember he s there to help you, andwill - if you let him.

Did Hit the Target or MissY u ompletely

Did one of our authors wound

you deeply by failing to giveyou as complete a picture of thesubject as you desired? We llnever know unless you write.

If the subject you want covered wasn t in this issue, writeus and we ll do our best to seethat i t is included in a futureissue.

Do you have your own ideason how Army Aviation should

be employed on the future bat

tlefield? Does your uni have anew or better way of doing aparticular job? Write and letus know what you think. As aprofess ional in the field offlight, the knowledge you haveshould be passed on to others.

If you want to write but don thave a topic, here are a fewsubjects to titillate your imagination:

Should Army Aviation adopt

a standardization system and,if so, how should i t be implemented and maintained?

How can the Flight SafetyProgram be improved?

Aviation Company Operations on the Atomic Battlefield.

Army Aviation in Support ofAirborne Operations.

Airmobile O p e r a t i o n s atNight.

2


24/40

W HY HA VE SOME pilotsflown the L-19 for years,both tactically and administratively, without experiencingground loops, while other pilotshave ground loops under idealcondit ions? Did pilots who received flight training prior tothe adoption of the L-19 learnsomething that is not taughtnow?

I think the instruction re

ceived by the pilot today ismore complex and probably ofa higher quality than the instruction received during the1942-45 period. However, theapplication of that instructionis not always continued in theunit training program today,nor required as an operationalnecessity. The Cub pilot wastaught road landing techniqueas a student. Directional con

trol was extremely important inthis maneuver. After graduation he found that Engineersupport was nonexistent, andthat the only landing areasavailable were roads or fields.Thus, he was forced continuallyto maintain proficiency in directional control.

Can we conclude that roadlandings are a possible key to

22

the problem? Nearly every pilotwho served in Europe r theFar East during WW2 has landed on a one way elevated carttrail with rice paddies or smallfields on each side. Directiona lcontrol was a must; the pilothad to master this or end up asa forward observer in a frontline foxhole.

Road landings are still taughtin flight training, but wide field

strips and hard-surfaced airfields a t most Army installations have made the daily requirement for absO lute, instantaneous directional control onlanding less important. A littlevariance in directiO nal cDntrolis not of prime concern withspaciO us landing area; therefore, the pilDt gradually becomes less alert.

I t is nDt suggested tha t we

revertto

shDrt narrDW strips tomaintain proficiency in directional control; but large dosesDf the techniques used in thistype of flying should be continually inserted into our unittraining program. You can'tstop a ground loop; you mustprevent i t before it happens.The t 0 u c h d 0 W n must bestraight and clean, without

drift or crab. If not, go aroundimmediately, not a hundred feetdown the runway. The stickmust be all the way back. If younotice YDurself relaxing theback pressure, i t is a dangersign.

Practice until you can keepthe path of the aircraft on anabsolutely straight course downthe centerline. The slightestdeviation shO uld be corrected

quickly. Mark out road stripson practice landing areas topractice; then gradually reducethe width to approximately 18inches wider than your gear.If you can stay within theseboundaries, you have a fightingchance to avoid the ground loop.

To say that the ground loopcan't be whipped is nonsense.There are far toO many ArmyAviato rs who have grown upwith the L-19 and have neverexperienced the embarrassmentof a ground IOO p. Practice tothe pO int Df perfection is theonly answer.

Colonel Chase is Flight Saf etyOffic er of Simmons Army AirfieldCommand Fort Bragg NorthCarolina.


25/40

"AH, SWEET MYSTERY offlight, at last I've found you "Isn't this our feeling once wehave developed the special techniques and skill to face crosswinds with confidence? Loss ofdirectional control resulting inbent airplanes - usually whilelanding - is hardly an econom

ical maneuver, nor is i t onefrom which satisfaction andpride can be derived.

The functions of rudder, ailerons, elevator, tailwheel, andbrakes must be considered inthe crosswind perspective interms of what we are trying todo. Each has its place in thesequence of events for a lightconventional airplane.

To hold the tail and the windward wing down while taxiinga light airplane into a direct orquartering crosswind, the stickis held back and toward thewindward wing. The windwardaileron serves as a spoiler toreduce the lift on the windwardwing, while the downwind aileron serves to increase drag tohelp overcome the weathervan-

Major Byron H. Brite Arty

ing tendency of the airplane.To hold the tail and the wings

down while taxiing a light airplane downwind, the stick isheld forward and in the downwind direction so that the windpushes downward on the elevator and the windward aileron.The need for brakes is minimized if taxiing can be alonga line p ~ r l l e lto the wind.

Now for the takeoff. Useflaps? Yes; we are in the middle of a short strip. Maximumperformance? No; the wind isfairly strong and quarteringfrom the right, and the barrieris no problem for this practicefield. The first obj ective is toroll straight primarily on theright wheel until a good flyingspeed is reached. We know wedo not want to take off threepoint. And if you want to takeoff on bO th main wheels, you llhave t talk to someone else.For my money, you can't do i twithO ut starting toward theboondocks, or really confusingthe airplane. So, it 's from theright wheel for the takeoff.When the tailwheel leaves the

ground is dependent upon thewind velocity-power-weight relationship. Essentially, the airplane must be caused to rollstraight until flying speed is attained. This means correctionfrom d r i f t by lowering thewindward w n g and rollingstraight, by the smooth use ofsufficient opposite rudder andcautious braking.

With the tail wheel straight,feet on the brakes until westart rolling, stick to the rightto star t the right wing downand stick back far enough tohold the steerable tailwheeldown initially, left foot alertedto start coming in with leftrudder (maybe a little leftbrake, too) as she starts toweathervane, we push thethrottle steadily and smoothlyas we release the brakes.Though the airplane is normally a lady, who reacts mostfavorably t the gentle and

Major Br i t e was f o r m e r lyCh1:ef L it e ratur e Division, Deptof P ;NRI , USAAVNS He ispresently Center Informat ion Offi-cer, Fort Ruck er .

23


26/40

akeoff from right wheel

caressing touch, today we arealert f0'r her idi0'syncrasies andperhaps a bad disposition. Thuswe are prepared t0 use smoothbut firm control to show herthat we wear the pants in thisfamily.

As she starts to roll, wewatch her movements carefully,add enough left rudder to keepher n0'se straight (no weather-vaning today, but we don t kickthe rudder either), and easeoff from full right ailer0'n asthe left wing rises to let herride on the right wheel. Nowwhen did that tailwheel get offthe ground? I t must have beenautomatic as we picked upspeed for rudder control insteadof tailwheel control, because weknow we held i t down initiallyfor steering. Actually, we allowed the tailwheel t0 rise aswe felt rudder control becomeeffective. Anyway, with thiswind and a light load we roll

4

only a short distance on theright wheel when, with a goodflying speed, she breaks ground,then we level the wings and setup the climbing crab.

Easy ? You bet; wish wecould do it tha t way every time.

We could have had troublethough if we had ki ked the leftbrake then the right oneabruptly, or if we had held fullright aileron too long, causingovercorrection for drift to thepoint of contact of the rightwing with the ground or of apremature climbing turn to theright. Overcontrol is like a woman with a new hat tha t gotwet - to be avoided.

Since we had good luck withthat takeoff, let s go practicea landing or so on a field s trip.We know the importance of agood reconna issance b e f 0 r elanding in a seldom-used strip.So having made a high and lowreconnaissance, let s t ry a landing in this strip. With thesegusts, our P0'wer approach andcrab will require adjustmentsto maintain a straight trackand the desired angle of descent. I t looks like a good placefor a downdraft on final becauseof that ridge on the windwardside and parallel to the strip.

As we turn from base leg tofinal, we use a power approachfor positive control and here wego. With a right wind, we arecrabbing to the right, natural-ly. We allow a little extra clearance above that tree becauseof our suspicion. Woops Down

a little faster; good thing weallowed for tha t downdraft.Now a little before time toround out (how high or whenis your personal choice), weshift from a crab to a slip before we round out. With theright aileron ready to adjustthe lowered right wing, whichcorrects for drift, and the left

rudder applied sufficiently tohold a straight approach, weare in business.

Our intention is to roll onthat right wheel only longenough to dissipate airspeed topermit easing the tailwheel

down (or we may land on theright wheel and the tailwheel),then to lower the left wheel toground contact. We re a littleabove the strip, S0 we ease offpower and ease back on thestick, still holding tha t rightwing d0'wn and holding herstraight with the left rudder.The right wheel touches. Weroll a little to slow down, comeback on the stick; the tailwheelis down then the left wheel ison. Simultaneously, as speeddissipates, the stick is movedfull rearward and to the rightfor full aileron. Left rudderand brakes are used as necessary, but smoothly to maintaina straight roll. So, that s it.But it s never over until we restopped and parked.

Any secret to the use of therudder, ailerons, elevator, tailwheel, and brakes? N one, except their application with thefinesse of judicious authorityexpressed in proper timing,direction, and degree.

. . . tou hdown on right wheel


27/40

S INCE MAN began to fightopponents have always triedto learn what the other was doing. With this knowledge theytried to be a t the right place a tthe right t ime with a preponderance of force. Consequentlyas soon as man was able to lifthimself above the terrain in anairborne vehicle he began toconsider the military application of this invention.

On Apri l 2 1794 the firstCompany of Aeronaut was

created in the French Armyunder the command of Monsieur de Coutelle. Althoughthey only had primitive balloons these French Army aviators successfully developedtheir flying skill and were ableto gather accurate informationabout the enemy. The development of balloons continued but

Major Hilaire Bethouart

fixed wing aircraft, introduceda t the start of the 20th century, quickly advanced thecapabilities of observing enemyactivities.

In 1939 the French Armycreated and equipped its firstaerial observation unit withautogyros. The Artillery wasthe first branch to realize thepossibilities of modern aircraftand the growing gap betweenthe Air Force (trying to flyhigher and faster) and theearth-bound requirements ofthe doughboy.

Th.is unit was dissolved during the dark days of 1940.Later, in the North Africancampaign the French Armyartillery units received theAmerican L-4 for artillery fireadj ustment and observation.

Alouette somewhere n Algeria December 958

Many years of war havebeen fought by the FrenchArmy since V-E day. The warsin Indochina and Algeria havefactually demonstrated whatmay be expected from the flying machines of the Army. Experience gained from these twocampaigns led to the expansionof Artillery A via ion units in othe ALAT (Aviation Legere deL Armee de Terre) which issimilar to United States ArmyAviation.

An army always tries to adjust i ts means to its missions.During the past 14 years theFrench Army has been involvedin limited wars or guerilla warfare, which do not have thesame characteristics as a general or nuclear conflict. Consequently without ignoring therequirements for a modern war,

Alouette used as a flying

command post


28/40

MAY 1960

aerial radio relay between twounits if nOormal cOommunicationsare impeded by the terrain.Whatever the difficulty, he informs the commanding officerof the operation; and if necessary, he leads the subordinateunits towards the objective.

H 21 company standing by

Aerial Oobservation is a fulltime job in guerilla warfare.For this reason the Qbserveralthough a pilot, seldom handlesthe stick when performing hismission. Flying in a narrowand high valley of Algeria re -quires all the attention Qf thepilQt. Both pilot and Qbservermust be alert to their own re-sponsibilities when l y i n g,

whether i t is in winter with itscQnstantly strQng winds or insummer with its hazardousflight path caused by heat anddrought. This is especially truewhen flying clQse t o the groundto identify a suspicious point.

the ALAT has been adapted tothe proper needs Qf the actualfight.

What have been the missionsof ALAT in guerilla warfare?

The first (and f or a IQng t imethe mQst important) missiOonassigned to French Army avia-tiQn wa s , Qbservation. The aer-ial Qbserver Qccupies a uniquephysical position. He is ableto see and understand enemyand friendly dispositiQns. Thus,he provides the command withinstantaneous response to ene-my mQvements.

In the jungles of Indochinaand in the wild mountains ofAlgeria, the enemy is almost in -visible t the dOoughbQY Theobserver in his L-19 is Qftenthe Oonly Qne able t o see what isgQing on. He must be versatile.As he searches for the enemy,he discloses an ambush, adj ustsarti l lery fire, calls fQr Air Forcefighters when necessary and

Major B et houart is assigned sFr ench Liaison Offic er with th eUSAA VNS Fort Ruck er

26

marks their targets. Guerillawarfare is tough for the smallunits. Often iSQlated, they donot know when nor where thefight will explode about the m.They must bear nearly all theburden of the cOonflict To them,the aerial Qbserver is Qf the ut -mQst importance. He guidesand supports them; he must bewell aware of the ground ma -neuvers which may be attempt-ed a t any time; must redirecta CQmpany advancing on awrong t rack; and establishes an

The secOond mission of ALATis the assault maneuver byhelicQpter. One Qf the char-acteristics Qf guerilla war isthat yQU don t have a battle

front, per see You may haveto face, a t different places andoccasiQnally a t the same time,well-equipped rebel elements ofvariQus sizes which must bedestrQyed. These rebel troops

H 21 landing n mountains. Notice th t only 1 wheeltouches ground


29/40

generally O'perate in high, broken mO'untainO'us areas. TremendO US stamina, mO'bility, and anintimate knowledge O f thecO'untry are their chief assets.

Most O f the time, guerillerO's will O nly jO in battle whenthey are sure O f withdrawal bynight into an area unsuited fO rtruck, armO'red car, O r tankO'peratiO'ns.

The European sO'ldier wears'himself O ut enveloping by classical means. However, the helicO'pter changes the picture . . .the advantages have been exchanged. When used with suppleness and speed, the transport helicopter allO ws a cO m-

mander greater mO'bility thanhis oPPO'nent. The high cost O ftransport helicO'pters and theparticular methO'ds of combat inAlgeria require certain rules O femplO'yment which may nO t beadaptable in another theater O fO'peratiO'ns.

h e transPO'rt helicoptercO'mpanies, fitted with H-21sand the French-built AIO'uettes ,are often cO upled with an infantry unit that is well trainedand adapted to this kind O ffighting. These units are usually airbO'rne troops-paratrO'O'Pers familiar with shO ck actiO'n.They are well - equipped withlight and powerful armament,and radiO sets. CO mmissiO nedand nO'ncommissiO'ned O'fficersare numerO'us, and their basictraining is adapted to use O fhelicopters.

When the same helicO'ptercO'mpany w 0' r k s frequentlywith the same regiment, newand invisible bO nds are cemented fO r the benefit O f all. Amutual understanding and acO'mmander experienced in employing helicopters is of the utmO st benefit when the battlereaches its climax. Achievement O f the O'bJective will be

Armament fitting H-21 helicopter. Two rocket containerseach with 19 68mm rockets) mounted as shown in picture

below. our 7.62mm machineguns mounted on the front strut.

68mm rocket containers mounted on an H 21. The frontwheel machinegun set shown here has been replaced by the

one shown in picture above.

accelerated in tremendous prO -portiO'ns because the cO'mmander may shrink his O'rders to afew simple wO rds O ver the radiO with the assurance thatthey will be understO'od. Sincethis methO'd has been in use inAlgeria, efficiency O f the helicO'pter companies has been truly multiplied.

Tactical emplO'yment O f DIH(Detachment d'InterventiO'n dHelicoptere) cO mpanies hasbeen varied. After receivingintelligence informatiO'n, DIH

may be emplO'yed to envelO P asuspicious area by helitransport in areas difficult to reach,engage in deceptiO'n maneuvers O r perfO'rm sanies to O b-tain O r to cO'nfirm informatiO'n.FO r maximum efficiency frO mthese valuable units, helicopters in assault maneuvers areseldO m used at the beginningO f an actiO'n when infO'rmatiO'nabO'ut the enemy is still vague.

Before utilizing his helicopters, the commander tries toverify and augment the infO'r-

27


30/40

AloueHe with 2 containers of 36 37mm rockets each.Another version is fiHed with 2 containers carrying 18 7mm

rockets each.

mation with his ground forcesand aerial observation. Whenhe knows the approximate position and number of the enemy and has studied the ter-rain, with particular view toits length, breadth, and height,he will then employ his helicopter companies. He u s e sthem with the same ease andaccording to the same basicprinciples that an armored infantry b t t l i o n commanderwould have employed his half-tracks in 1944.

To be effective, the commander and all subordinatesm u s t thoroughly understandand adopt th e following char-acteristics of the maneuver:rapidity of decision, keen understanding of the t e r r a i nviewed through three dimensions, boldness, imagination.

Fighting guerilla warfare inAlgeria does not monopolize allthe activities of the ALAT.Some Army aviation units arestationed in France and are

used for instruction or for oth-er purposes.

The home of French Armyaviation is located at Dax, asmall city in the middle of theLandes forest, about 500 miless o u t h southwest of Paris.There pilots and observers aretrained in fixed and rotarywhig aircraft.

8

Each of the branch schoolshas its own Army aviationunit, designed particularly tostudy within its branch thepossibilities offered by Armyaviation. There is also an Ar -my Aviation Test Center atSato ry (near Paris) which per-forms technical and tacticaltests on aircraft and equipment proper to Army aviation.

Other units receive specialmissions. One unit conducts , asurvey of the flight and sur-vival conditions in high mountains. Some of the pilots inthis unit have already landedan TL-21 on the rough surfaceof a glacier near Mount Blanca t an altitude of 12,500 feet.

Strictly speak ing , Frenchaviation is not a separatebranch. I t is a versatile inter-branch system forged by experience and led by an Armyaviation staff working at thehighest level.

Reality of everyday combatoften stimulates active brainsand imaginations to , solve problems of operations. This is whyFrench Army aviation has conducted several studies duringthe past years to improve efficiency of the units and security of the crews. The firstseries of studies were concerned with how to suppressthe ground fire before the land-

ing of the first wave of helicopters. There is a ga p betweenthe moment artillery fire is lifted, or Air Force straifing isstopped on the landing area,and the first landing of thecargo helicopters.

Sometimes there will not beany support because speed isof prime importance. Lack ofsupport a t this time must beovercome. If this is not accomplished, helicopters could be destroyed or damaged duringtheir landing approach whenthey are most vulnerable. Af -ter many tests, i t seems thatthe best solution is to arm theAlouette reconnaissance heli

copters with rockets and guided missiles.Even the L-19s were im

proved by arming them withsmoke rockets under the wings.The smoke rockets permit theL-19 pilot to easily mark a tar-get for the ground forces orfighter aircraft.

Varlous studies have beenmade concerning security ofthe crews. The H-21 helicopters have been fitted with auto-sealing tanks; the L-19s havebeen fitted with armored seats;and those which have to flyover the desert receive specialequipment.

French Army aviation hasfaced the realities of combatsince its inception, and hasgrown in spite of all obstacles. I t is not only an essentialcomponent n the daily life ofthe army in the field, but itsunits have often been one ofthe prime determining factorsin the favorable outcome of thefight. At the price of muchhard work and many sacrifices,it has gained tremendous experience in the field of guerillawarfare which should provevaluable to F r e n c h alliesthroughout the world.


31/40

PREP RED BY THE UNITED ST TES RMY BO RD FOR VI TION CCIDENT RESE RCH

HURRY HURRY, URRY

COMES THE TIME for sapto s t r t rising. Comesgreen grass and leaves. Comesshort s l e e v e s and bikinis.Comes longer days and patiobarbeques. Comes the turningof a young man's fancy. Andwhere does the Army A viator's fancy turn? Naturally,it turns to the most exciting

time of the year; it turns tocoming MANEUVERS

Maneuvers mean simulatedcombat conditions, the culmination of months of arduoustraining - a chance to demonstrate battle readiness - escape from the routine hum-drum. Maneuvers mean fieldrations, sleeping bags, and longhours of hard work. Maneuvers mean the hopped up"

feeling of release.What do maneuvers mean toYOU? Will you limit yourselfto the abilities of training andexperience? Or will you pullout all the stops and fly withreckless abandon? The SOPcalls for a chopper on the oldman's pad when an a Ie r tsounds. He needs to get a lookat his troop units as they move

out. Will you be the one to tellhim the ceiling's too low? Whatabout that driving rain throughwhich you wouldn't think offlying u n d e r normal conditions? Will you tell him it 's nogo, or will you say, "To heckwith i t ; these are battle conditions " and go despite thosewarning butterflies?

Frequently, during maneu

vers, the best laid plans change

a t a moment's notice. You maybe called on to refuel and getairborne immediately. Shouldyou take the extra time it re -quires to strain drum fuelthrough a chamois, or pour itstraight from the drum, crankher up and leap off?

The Choctaw was refueledstraight from drums, with nochamois or filtering equipment,

and dispatched to p i c k up

Straining delays refueling

29


32/40

Hurry hurry hustle

a Choctaw. After the changewas completed, the servos wereremoved and reinstalled on thenew gear box. Rigging waschecked by inserting riggingpins. The maintenance officer,who was to perform the testflight, made a preflight of theaircraft, with special emphasison those components installedand rerigged. He started theengine and engaged the clutch.With rotor rpm at 2,000, het u r n e d the primary servoswitch off and checked the controls. All appeared normal. Hethen placed the servo switchin the both position andheard a loud noise.

troops in an impact area. Thep i l o t completed his runup,

found everything normal, andbrought the aircraft to a hover.He climbed out and flew directly to the pickup point, wherethe ground party released asmoke grenade to indicate winddirection.

The pickup point was in ashallow bowl at an elevation ofapproximately 5,000 feet. Thepilot began an elliptical pattern for landing because of the

terrain features. He made a180 turn to the left, flewstraight and level for a shortperiod, and began another leftturn. When the i r e r f treached an approximate bankof 20 , the engine failed. Altitude a t this time was an estimated 180 feet and indicatedairspeed was 60 knots. Thepilot lowered collective pitchslightly and initiated a flare.First contact with the groundwas made by the tailwheel atapproximately 25 knots. Theaircraft pitched forward andthe main rotor blade shearedthe tail cone from the fuselage.The aircraft rolled to its rightside and skidded for 10 feet.

Engine failure was a resultof contaminated fuel. There isan old saying: The long way

30

around is the shortest wayhome. An extra few minutes

s p e n t in straining the fuelwould have saved this aircraftand permitted a successful mission. True, a few minutes weresaved at the start. But theChoctaw didn't airlift its assigned troops; nor will this oneever airlift any other troops.

Generally speaking, maintenance in the field is as good asmaintenance anywhere. Thatis, unless the hurry-up hustleof maneuvers leads to maintenance shortcuts.

The maintenance crew hadw 0 r k e d around - the - clockchanging the main gear box on

The pilot asked the crewchief if he knew what thenoise was, got a negative headshake, and continued the cockpit procedure. He placed theservo switch in the auxiliaryoff position and heard an

other loud noise. The collective pitch stick rose rapidly tothe full up position, and theChoctaw left the ground androlled to its left side, causingmajor damage.

The cause of the accidentwas malfunction of the pilotservo valves. Two cc of water

Preoccupation


33/40

were found in the boot of eachvalve.

Paragraph 2-555, TO 1H-34A-2 calls for a hydraulic

mule to substitute the hydraulic pressure required to ac

tivate the servos. Had themule been used in this case,i t would have disclosed themalfunction prior to runup.

F u r t h e r complicating theproblem was a checklist prepared and distributed by another command, which prescribed 2,000 rpm as the setting a t which servos should bechecked. TM 1-lH-34A-1 specifies 1,500 rpm as the setting

for performing this check. Hadthe servO check been made a tthe lower rpm, it is possiblethat lift generated during upward movement of the collective pitch would not have beensufficient to , cause the accident.

Another case of the hurry-upshortcut and an aircraft whichwon't complete its mission.

I t had been a hectic day forthe pilot. Once, he had tried

to take off with the cyclic control friction locked. Anothertime, he had almost taken offwith a funnel and chamois stillin the right gas tank of theSioux. Now, he had one moreresupply mission to completeas soon as the helicopter couldbe refueled.

The grO und crew rolled a 55-gallO n drum up and refueledthe helicopter. The pilot andcrew chief got aboard, fastenedseat belts and shoulder harnesses, and the pilot startedthe engine. Another delay occurred when a mechanic ran tothe aircraft with two packages . for delivery. As the pilotbrought the aircraft to a hoverof approximately 2112 feet, theSioux began to drift to theright. The 55-gallon fuel drum

CRASH SENSE

o one bothered to tell the pilot

had been left standing 2 feetfrom the right skid, oppositethe right fuel tank. The aircraft hit the fuel drum andtipped to the right. A roaringinferno enveloped aircraft andoccupants as the a i r c r a f tstruck the ground. The drumt i p p e d over, and the Siouxcame to rest with the right sidEof the fire wall resting on thedrum and the heel of the right

skid and tail section on theground. An instant later, theaircraft fuel tanks rupturedand supplied more fuel for thefire.

The pilot released his safetybelt, fell into the fire andcrawled out. He had second degree burns over 45 percent ofhis body. The crew chief, unable to release his safety belt,managed to slip beneath it, fellinto the fire and crawled away.He suffered s e c n d degreeburns on 35 percent of hisbody.

I t was discovered that theleft fuel tank cap had not beenlocked securely. This, plus thefact that the pilot had not released the cyclic control friction lock prior to flight and theposition O f the fuel drum a t the

time of takeoff all entered thescene as hurry - up causefactors.

The medical report statedthat the hands and fingers ofthe pilot and crew chief werethe most severely burned portions of their bodies. The extent of burns could have beendecreased had they w r ngloves.

The preoccupation of t h i s

pilot, indicated by his mistakesin earlier flights and those leading to the accident, were clearly a result of the hurry - up,shortcut urge.

The aviation company hadbeen operating its Beavers inand out of a strip for severaldays. When density altitudewas high, the aircraft werebarely able to clear the treesafter t a k e 0 f f Opera ionsagreed to drain the rear tanksand limit the aircraft to fouroccupants. This condition wasbrought to the attention of thepilots, and notices were placedin the aircraft. However, oneBeaver was absent when theplacarding was carried out. Thepilot of this aircraft made histakeoff. As the aircraft clearedthe trees O ff the south end of

3


34/40

MAY 1960

suIt of haste. Rather, it illustrates the point that all portions of every mission shouldbe planned well in advance.

Accident records show thata similar accident involved aSioux. The Sioux, performinga medical evacuation mission,was taking off when a looseparachute billowed up into therotor. The interesting featureof the accident was that theaircraft was approximately 35-50 feet above the ground whenthe parachute tangled with therotor blades. This illustratesthe erratic behavior of looseparachutes when subj ected torotor downwash.

Of rotors and parachute A Bird Dog aviator flew hisbattalion commander to a roadstrip for a rendezvous with thecommander s jeep. Althoughw i n d was blowing directlyacross the road, 10 knots andgusty, the pilot landed. Hedischarged his passenger, fastened down the extra parachute, and made his runup inpreparation for takeoff. He setthe brakes and applied full

power. As the aircraft gainedspeed, he applied forward pressure t hold it on the ground.At this point, a strong gustraised the right wing, causingthe left wing to drop, and theaircraft veered to the left. Theleft wing struck two fenceposts and the aircraft wentthrough a barbed wire fence

the strip, the engine failed. TheBeaver descended into a groveof trees and the right wing wassevered. There was maj or damage to all parts of the aircraft.Fortunately, there were no injuries. The pilot stated thecrew chief informed him thatthe aircraft had been fully serviced. During preflight inspec

tion, fuel was visible in thefiller necks of front and centertanks, but was not visible inthe filler neck of the rear tank.The pilot switched the fuel selector to the rear tank duringthe pretakeoff check and thetakeoff was made with the selector in this position. Beaverfuel gauge needles give approximately the same indica ionwhen tanks are empty as theydo for full tanks.

During the hurry-up hustle,no one remembered to mentionthe decision to drain rear tanksto this pilot.

Helicopters and parachutesare about as compatible as icecream and dill pickles. OneChickasaw pilot discovered thisthe hard way. He was on aradio controlled aerial target

3

RCAT) recovery mission. Helanded the Chickasaw beside anRCAT to make a pickup. TheRCAT parachute, located about20 yards away, billowed up into the aircraft s main rotorsystem. The pilot immediatelyapplied rotor brake, but substantial damage was caused tothe main rotor head.

This same pilot had made 25previous pickups and had landed the same distance away onseveral occasions, with no difficulties. There was no SOPregarding recovery procedure;nor had any particular recovery technique e e n recommended to this pilot.

This accident was not a re -

The battalion commander s jeep was waiting


35/40

into a grain field, dragging thefence wire on its landing gear.The pilot cut his switches andreached to turn off the gas selector. The aircraft nosed overand came to rest inverted.

I t is doubtful that this pilotwould have attempted a roadlanding under these wind conditions i the old man hadnttbeen aboard and his jeep wait-ing below. But he was and i twas and

INSTRUCTOR PILOT

. . . instructor pilot waslate in applying corrective action. Aircraft landed hard

. . . instructor pilot allowedstudent to autorotate aircraft

Too liHle too late

too low for power recovery atlow airspeed

. . . instructor pilot failedto monitor go-around point.Aircraft landed long

The common denominator ofthese three excerpts was the

same for 36 other major Armyaircraft accidents during 1959.Instructor pilots face perhapsthe most demanding challengeof all teachers. In no otherfield a r e training mistakeslikely to cause such costly andsomet imes f a ta I r e s u I t s .Whether the instructor pilot'sjob is to teach all phases offlight maneuvers to student av-

he P was concerned about another aircraft

iators, or to incr ease and main-tain proficiency of currentlyrated aviators, a fundamentalpart of this , training is to n-still good flying habits, both byexample and by instruction. Ifhe fails in either respect, he islaying the groundwork for fu -ture accidents.

Instructor pilots must exer-cise good judgment in dealingwith students. Students pick upand retain the flying habits oftheir instructors. Incorrect proced ures will be magnified by

students inexperience.A heavy - handed instructorpilot can destroy a student sconfidence. P e r m i t t i n g toomuch leeway, he may encourage dangerous habits. The IP sjob is to maintain the properbalance between these two extremes.

An IP faces a different problem in teaching a rated pilot.He knows his student has the

basic knowledge and ability tofly the aircraft, but he doesn timmediately know how wellqualified the pilot may be. Therated pilot's experience levelcan cover a wide range, andconsiderable instruction m a ybe necessary for him to become really proficient. This iswhere the IP s judgment mustcome into play.

During a training period, aninstructor pilot and studentwere making a normal climboutin a Raven. At an altitude of

150-200 feet, the IP called fora simulated forced landing. Ahigh rate of descent was setup by the student. The IP didnot check rotor rpm during thedescent. The student made aninitial slow application of pitchabout 10 feet above the ground.The IP followed through, adding the remaining pitch. Hisaction came too late and theaircraft made a hard landing,

Cockpit confusion


36/40

MAY 1960

causing major damage to theone-inch drive shaft, brace assembly, and spring assemblies.The Raven bounced and the instructor made a power recovery and landed without furtherdamage.

Aviators are a 1 w a y s cautioned to keep a sharp lookout.However, a b n o r m a l concerncaused one accident. The IPand his student were making ahigh reconnaissance of a confined area a t an altitude of 500feet. The IP cut the power andcalled for a simulated forcedlanding. The student S-turnedthe Raven toward the confinedarea, making a left and then a

right turn on final. During thedescent, the instructor clearedfor other aircraft. He becameso preoccupied with anotheraircraft that he failed to monitor the autorotation. As a result, when power recovery wasbegun, the Raven was too low.I t was also too slow for a safeautorotative touchdown, a n dthe hard landing caused themain rotor blade to flex into

the one-inch drive shaft. Thetail boom was buckled aft ofthe cardan joint. Fortunately,neither occupant was inj ured.

Cockpit confusion has causedmany accidents. There's the

ow far should you let th student go

story about the airline captainwho noted that his copilotseemed depressed. He told thecopilot to cheer up. The copilotthought the captain said gearup, and the four-engine transport settled to the runway onits belly. An example closer

to home is the IP and pilot inan Otter who were training inthe use of the glide scope light.The pair m a d e several approaches before dark to familiarize themselves w i t h the

strip. f t e r nightfa ll, theywere able to clearly see the red,green, and amber lights of theglide scope and completed several landings. Surface w i n dwas calm and landing was tothe northwest. Takeoff wasmade to the southeast to avoidan unlighted fire tower to thenorthwest.

The unexpected

The last approach was normal, but the aircraft floateddown the runway during roundout. Ready with the brakes,the IP remarked, and the Ottertouched d o w n with brakeslocked in a 3-point attitudeabout 350 feet from the approach end of the runway. Theaircraft skidded for 270 feet

and nosed over. As i t pitchedforward, loose equipment in thecargo compartment r a i n e ddown on the pilots. If he hadn'tmentioned the brakes, chancesare the pilot would have madea normal stop.

4

After a student completed asimulated forced landing andclimbout in a Bird Dog, theinstructor took the controls,


37/40

telling the student he d demonstrate how it should be done.Instructing the student to givehim a simulated power failuresomewhere on climbout h emade a running wheel landing

on a road strip, took off andbegan the climbout. At 100feet altitude, 60 mph airspeedand with 30 flaps the studentcut the power. The instructorimmediately lowered the noseand put power back on. Theengine didn t respond immediately and the aircraft strucktrees, then fell to the groundand burst into flames.

CRASH SENSE

The instructor was momentarily stunned, but he recovered in time to get out and pullthe pinned student free. Theaircraft was a total loss.

o margin for error

The importance of being understood can t be emphasizedenough. A breakdown in communications has contributed toits share of accidents. Thepilot on a local checkout withthe unit IP, made an approach

to runway 24. Wind was from315 at 6-10 knots. The pilotused 45 flaps and made a rightwing-low touchdown. He lostdirectional o n t r I after ab 0 u n c e and the Bird Dogground-looped into the wind.

verestimating ability

The aircraft came to rest approximately 165 from the runway heading, after bucklingthe left gear and incurring major damage.

The technique attempted inthis landing was correct. However, reaction of the pilot incorrecting for the loss of directional control was slow and inadequate. This illustrates afew of the problems an instructor pilot can expect to encounter. Had this one been alertand taken control during thebounce he might have salvaged the landing.

Overestimating a pilot s ability during transition traininghas caused headaches for many

IPs. Shooting touch and golandings in an L-26 the IPpulled the mixture control onthe right engine just after theybecame airborne at 25 to 50feet altitude. The pilot had justmade a power reduction whenhe lost power on the simulatedengine-out operation on takeoff. He immediately loweredthe nose advanced both pro-

5


38/40

MAY 1960

No tie down ropes

peller cQntrQls to full rpm, advanced bQth thrQttle cQntrQls,and visually checked landinggear and flap indicatQrs. Hethen clQsed the thrQttle Qf theleft engine instead Qf the right.

The instructQr pilQt realizedthe errQr immediately and advanced the clQsed thrQttle. Theengine did nQt develop PQwerimmediately and the aircraftsettled to ward t h e runway.When i t was apparent the aircraf t CQuid nQt remain airbQrne, the pilQt placed the aircraft in a slight nQse-high attitude to reduce landing impact.The aircraft suffered substantial damage to the bQttom Qfthe fuselage.

An IP initiated a demQnstratiQn 180 autQrotatiQn in aShawnee a t 900 feet. His intended touchdown PQint wasbetween the markers O f a strip.During the final stage O f autO'

rQtatiO'n, the r ight horizO'ntalstabilizer struck a cO ttO nwO Qdtree, 4" in diameter, 26 feetabQve the grQund. The aftrQtQr blades shattered O n impact with this tree and O'thertrees in the immediate area.Six Qther trees were cO'ntacted,cQntinuing destructiQn O f theaf t rO'tor blades and causingminor damage to the forward

36

rO'tor blades. This IP left nOmargin fQr errO'r. CQntributingfactors were an excessivelywide turn on final and late applicatiO'n Qf corrective actiQn.

The list goes Qn and on, prQV-ing what many have knO'wn allalQng: the jQb O f IP is nOcinch Yet, many IPs cO'ntinueteaching a wide variety Qf students flight after flight andyear after year, withQut mishap to themselves or students.DO these IPs have SQme secretformula, sO me magic crystalball to tell them when a student is prQficient O r warn themto take cQntrQl? UnfO'rtunately, such crystal balls are nO tavailable a t QM, nO r can youpurchase Qne frQm the PX. Theonly real secret is nO secret atall. The answer lies in thestandards and limitatiQns theIP impQses O n himself and hisstudents. Standards O f per

fQrmance should always be seta t the highest PO'ssible levelfor bO th the beginning and experienced IP. Limitations areanO'ther matter. Just how farshould yO U permit a student tostray frQm desired perfQrmance? The wise fledgling IPwill set his limits fairly clQse,ensuring his ability to cO pewith the unexpected. As he

builds experience and maturesin judgment, he will learn toanalyze his students' capabilities more accurately and cansafely extend those limits.

If yO U have recently been as

signed as a new IP, Qur hatsare O ff to yO U. The IP has themost richly rewarding jQb inall aviatiQn. The PQsitiQn yQUQCCupy in the eyes O f yQur students, the visible day-by-dayresults Qf your efforts, and thegratitude yQU will receive bringthe kind Qf satisfactiQn thatyQU will find in nO Qther assignment.

Remember: STANDARDSAND LIMITATIONS

FOR THE W NT OF ROP

The Otter pilot taxied intothe ramp and parked to refuel.The surface wind was gusting20-38 knO'ts frQm the west. Heset the parking brakes andchO'cked the wheels, but CQuidnQt tie i t dQwn because therewere nO tie-dQwn rQpes. He leftthe aircraft to lO Qk fO r sO merQpe. In the meantime, a gaSQ-line truck drQve up and prepared to refuel the Otter. Asudden gust Qf wind caused theaircraft to jump its chQcks andweathercock clQckwise. As theOtter swung arQund, i t struckthe fuel truck's left frO'nt fender and damaged the left sideQf the fuselage.

FQrtunately, this was a veryminQr accident and i t CO st O nly

235 to' repair the aircraft. But

i t requires very little imaginatiQn to picture what CQuid happen when an aircraft slams into a fuel truck loaded withthQusands of gallons of gasoline.

Sufficient tie-down ropes area must fO r all parking ramps.They should be inspected frequently and r e p 1 c e d whenthey show excessive wear.


39/40

rmy

N ARMY-WIDE Aeromedical Symposiumwill be held at the San Carlos Hotel, Pensa-

cola, Fla., June 7-8-9. Sponsored by the UnitedStates Army Board for Aviation Accident Research, the symposium is designed to orientstaff surgeons and hospital commanders onaeromedical factors in aircraft accidents. Approximately 100 Army medical officers areexp

Army Aviation Digest - May 1960

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Transcript of Army Aviation Digest - May 1960