Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1966

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1966

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UNITED STATES ARMY FEBRU RY 96

~ T O N GES

AIRMOBILE PATHFINDERS Pg


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Col Francis M. McCullar, author ofLittle Ole Watermaker Mel whichappeared in the October 1965 DIGEST,received the following letter which hebrought to our attention:Dear Col McCullar:I read your recent article on LittleOle Watermaker Mel Having an M.S.degree in Botany and Zoology yourarticle was of interest. Survival, especiallythe utilization of wild plants, has beenmy hobby for some years.It would appear to me that yourtitle Little Ole Watermaker Me " indirectly told a deeper story than thearticle did.Is it not true that the amount ofwater that could be made availablewould be greatly increased by one sav-ng his urine for deposit only along the. and bank underneath the plastic sheet?f it is a case of condensing and evapo-rating, all the impurities in urine shouldbe removed and only distilled waterprovided.

f this is true why was not such asuggestion made in your article? Nicetiesare fine but survival is a matter of lifeand death. I think this is a very important point to make and it couldincrease many times the amount ofdistilled water available.COL. WILLIAM D. DUNCANU. S {\rmy AttacheOttawa, Canada

The suggestion in the letter had beendiscussed by several who experimentedwith the water still at Fort Rucker. Theeditors felt that the point expressed inColonel Duncan's letter would be realizedby the reader from the following sentencewhich appeared in the article: If salt,brackish or polluted water is available,it can be poured into the hole and willbe distilled into drinking water. How-ever, Colonel Duncan's point is welltaken and both Colonel McCullar andthe DIGEST staff feel it should bepassed on to our readers. Incidentally,one who had been discussing this pointduring experiments banteringly observedthat if he were one of several in such asurvival situation he'd want his ownIrivate still.-Ed

FEBRUARY 1966/

Sir:In reference to the article written byLt Col John G. Cleveland, "Professionalism," in your October 65 issue, thearticle was interesting and inspiring,but only to a point. Considering thatthis article won your Monthly Awardtoward the Annual Award Contest, Ibelieve one correction should be madein order to retain the continuity ofthought on "Professionalism." The mistake I'm referring to completely destroyed the theme and professionalismof the article. I lost all confidence inwhat the author was trying to putacross. Now whether this was his mistakeor yours as the publisher, it stilldestroyed the subject. The m i s t ~ e I'mreferring to is on page 4 under theparagraph titled Quality Maintenance.Lt Col Cleveland refers to the mostcurrent and up to date manuals for ouroperators and crewchiefs and mechanics,and he refers to the most important ofthese manuals erroneously. I quoteDA Pamphlet 750-38 the Army Equipment Records System." Of course we allknow that t should be TM 38-750, buthow did this slip by? Was p r o f ~ s s i o n l -ism used in writing and publishing thisAward Winning Article? I hope you seemy point. I believe that anything written on a type of perfection must beperfect in itself. And I believe that professionalism is truly a form of perfection.What can be done now that this mistakehas reached all your readers? How canthe point of the article be rehabilitatedto put across what it was meant to? Isit forever lost to all those readers whodiscovered this error?

2/LT JOHN P. EGANExecutive OfficerHeadquarters and Headquarters Co2d Brigade, 4th Infantry DivisionFort Lewis, Washington 98435

While we readily agree that perfectionis the aim to which professionalismpoints, none of us is perfect. We're surethe lieutenant will agree if he'll rereadpage 4 of the October issue. The colonelrefers to DA pamphlets not technicalmanuals -Ed

ESir:In the December issue of AviationDigest, Major James R. Barkley has anarticle of utmost importance in that hepoints out the correct w y n ASTAPlatoon should be utilized in periods ofdarkness and poor visibility. However,he has lost one cardinal point. In clearweather IR and SLAR will never substitute for results of visual and photographic missions. It is recognized thatimagery will take a short time to develop , but when available it canpositively identify activities and equipment. SLAR will give an indication ofactivity which must be confirmed andif IR is used identifications are possibleonly under optimum conditions. Alsoin fair weather more accurate and mostrapid sightings can be reported by theobserver which each aircraft carries.

Sir:

LT COL JAMES M. SCHROEDER203d Military IntelligenceDetachment (Corps)Fort Hood, TexasI would like to congratulate you onthe fine article in the November 1965issue of the Aviation Digest called "ByThe -Book Sense." It is one of the finestI have ever read. Since it is equallyimportant for our mechanics and pilotsin the Navy, I have taken the libertyto reprint it here at the Naval AirStation, Brunswick and distribute it toall of our people.Thanking you again for your great

interest in safety and perhaps saving ussome problems.

Sir:

R. E ERICSON, Lt, USNAviation Safety OfficerU. S. Naval Air StationBrunswick, Maine

I have recently read with great interest the article entitled Are You Confused?" dealing with MIL-L-22851Alubricants for Army aircraft engines.The author, Major Howard (Rip) Collins, has certainly done an outstandingjob of explaining a most confusingsituation. To someone not versed in thefield of military specification lubricants,the changeover from the MIL-L-6082Continued n page 10


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irlDobilePathfinders

U NTIL RECENTLY mostu. S. Army pathfindertechniques were designed to support small units. But 11th AirAssault Division pathfinders soonfound themselves engaged in largescale (company and battalion)operations.

Proceeding on a live andlearn basis, the division's path-finders worked closely with thepathfinder school at Fort Benning, Ga . to develop new techniques.The biggest change was ensuring that pathfinders were aviationoriented as much as groundoriented. This was accomplishedprimarily by attaching the pathfinders to the aviation units theysupported. Previously pathfinderswere located at Army level.

When the 1st Cavalry Division(Airmobile) was formed the 11 thAir Assault Division pathfinderswere carried over within the aviation group. Organized as a platoon, it consists of a headquarterswith 1 officer and 1 enlisted man,and four detachments, each with2 officers and 13 enlisted men.On the TOE the pathfinder platoon appears under the group'sHq Hq Company.

Ordinarily each pathfinder detachment is attached to one of thegroup's three helicopter battalions to provide direct support,

ichard K Tierney

while the fourth provides generalsupport to the group.

For flexibility the pathfinderdetachments are attached ratherthan organic to the helicopterbattalions. Any detachment canbe instantly pulled from the battalion it supports and redeployedfor short term operations elsewhere. For example, a detachmentmight be needed to support another already committed, or perhaps to set up and operate afixed wing airfield for CV-2s supporting the division. In Air As-sault II maneuvers CV-2 airfieldswere set up 37 times in 30 days.Frequently it was necessary topull pathfinder detachments frombattalions to get ,the job done.

Redeployment of detachmentsis done through the platoon commander, who is chief advisor onthe pathfinders' capabilities anddeployment. In addition to operations, platoon headquarters is responsible for administrative matters, discipline, and training ofpathfinder detachments.

CAPABILITYThe pathfinder platoon provides navigational aid groundfacilities to assist Army aircraft

operating in friendly, enemythreatened, or enemy held areas.Upon receipt of a mission the

pathfinder commander involvedestablishes liaison with the commander of the uni t he is to su pport. f the mission is in support of a helicopter battalion, itis almost certain to be a nighoperation, since rotary wing aircraft can vector themselves or usean observer aircraft to locate theobjective area in the daytime. Toexploit the element of surpriseoffered with night operationshelicopters usually need personnelon the ground for vectoring.While the pathfinder team isalerted and prepares its equipmen t for the mission, the landingand/or pickup zones (LZ or PZ)are selected to support the groundtactical plan. f possible groundaviation, and pathfinder unit representatives make a visual aeriareconnaissance of the objectivearea. f time is short, photograp

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and maps are used. Also, if conditions allow it is helpful to coordinate details of the entire missionbefore embarking.Every effort should be made tobe sure that key pathfinders areully briefed on LZs, PZs and alternates, checkpoints, time schedules, alternate plans, emergencyprocedures, maps, terrain, weather, enemy positions, etc. This isextremely important since thepathfinders vector the troop-carry

ing aircraft. Depending on enemyactivity and other situations, pathfinders must be able to wiselymake an assessment for the COwhether to continue, hold, or abortthe mission as it progresses. Theirdecision h s to be right becauseany mistake could be extremelycostly in lives and materiel-andto the overall tactical situation.

While key pathfinders shouldFEBRUARY 1966

be fully briefed, it must also beremembered that security is aprerequisite to a successful operation. Certain people need be toldonly a minimum amount of information to successfully completevarious phases of an operation.Those who must be fully briefedshould be isolated before the mission for security reasons.Pathfinders may get to the objective by parachuting, swimming,walking, rappelling, or preferablylanding by aircraft. Usually pathfinders received only a short leadtime of 1 3 hours to prepare formissions during Air Assault IImanuevers. Consequently, pathfinders were airlanded about 90percent of the time. Airlandingalso allows more personnel to beplaced into a given area andgreatly reduces assembly problems.

For security the pathfinderspreferably are placed about 1mile from the objective area andwork their way in on foot. f itis necessary to land in the actualobjective area, the enemy may bedeceived by making several diversionary landings.

f secrecy is essen tial , and timepermits, pathfinders can be parachuted into or near the objectivearea (each member of the detachment must be a qualified parachutist). During 1964 maneuversone pathfinder group parachutedinto a swamp within the lines ofan enemy battalion. It tookover an hour to regroup, but thepathfinders were not detected andthe mission was a success.Only enough people are placedinto the objective area to do thejob. Usually three or four peopleoperate most effectively. f neededfor security a squad of infantrymen may accompany the pathfinders, but then the problem ofhauling in big loads arises. SometiVles artillery, armed helicopters,or tactical air support may provide needed securi ty.

The pathfinder detachmentmight also be augmented withadditional personnel if radiological surveys are needed, major obstacles have to be removed, or i fhelp is needed to carry and operate radios or other equipment notgenerally carried by the pathfinders but needed to accomplishthe mission.

New techniques plus lighterand better equipment evolvedfrom Air Assault Division testsallow each pathfinder detachmentto airland an entire helicopterbattalion-48 aircraft at once or 3separate companies of 16 aircrafteach.

Two PRC-25 radios (eachweighing about 22 pounds) arecarried into the LZ. They have arange of at least 15 miles, whichis a considerable improvementover the PRC-IO which had a

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III'io

Figure

2 MEN, HRT ARADIO BEACON,IR TO GROUND RADIO, LIGHT GUN NO

LIGHTED CODE LETTER OPTIONAL>

NO RECEIVE INITIAL LANDING INSTRUCTIONS.

Figure 2. Homing beacon

range of 8 miles at best. ThePRC-25 enables the release pointRP) and communications check

point CCP) to be placed atgreater distances from the LZthan was possible with the PRC-10 fig. 1).

Other visual and electroniccommunications equipment usedby the pathfinders include HRT-2A homing beacons fig. 2 whichare set up at the RP, anemometersfor measuring wind velocity anddirection fig. 3), glideslope indicators fig. 4), light guns fig. 5),and landing lanterns fig. 6).

SETTING UPUpon arrival in an LZ, the

pathfinders quickly establish acontrol center CC) and beginrunning cross-checks on information obtained from reconnaissancewind, best approaches, etc.).During Air Assault maneuversmajor changes occurred two or

three times before the aircrafarrived.Prior to Air Assault maneuvers

pathfinders used one central control center to handle all of theLZs in an objective area. Each LZwould relay information to aircraft through the main center.N ow each landing area has itsown CC and deals directly withthe approaching aircraft. Such acontrol center can consist of oneman wi th a radio, a flashlight inhis back pocket, and a few flares.

The CCP fig. 1 is usually unmanned and located 8-10 milesfrom the release point. Here approaching aircraft first establishcontact with the CC via PRC-25radio. f the flight is on the deck,radio contact can be relayedthrough an airborne CP or therelease point.

The flight is given landing instructions or can be held up atthe CCP in event pathfinders inthe LZ encounter problems, suchFigure 3. nemometer

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S enemy action. f the mISSIOnproceeds there are about 10 moremiles to cover to the RP. Meanwhile flight leaders and pathfinders can think things over andmake changes if necessary. (Traveling at 90 knots does not leavemuch time for changes. This isone reason 11th Air Assault Division pathfinders moved the CCPand RP farther ou t from the LZ.)

The RP is the final navigational check point. It is mannedby two pathfinders and ideallylocated 5 7 miles from the LZ(fig. I). t is equipped with theHRT-2A beacon, an air-toground radio, the 5E-ll light gun,and (optional) a lighted codeletter system.

The pathfinders try to get theRP within 15-20 of the requiredlanding direction, because flightsin large formations must holdturns as shallow as possible. talso helps if the CCP is located

igure 4. Glideslope indicator

igure 5. ight gun

FEBRUARY 1966

in line as much as possible.At the RP the flight is givenfinal instructions or held up ifnecessary. Once beyond the RP it

is extremely difficult to abort oralter plans. Responsibility for thesuccess or failure of the missioncould easily rest with the pathfinders decisions at the RP.

LANDING AIRCRAFTAs a flight approaches the LZ

one aircraft will have a light on.Observing the light the pathfinders will guide the flight in byvoice contact over the PRC-25(turn right, left, etc.). It is alsopossible to vector the flight in

with the light gun, through useof the control ship, and with theglideslope indicator. When needed, obstacles can be marked withhooded red lights turned on atthe last moment. But it is wiset use as few lights as possible,

thus increasing security andlightening the pathfinders load.

Landing lights are set up in accordance wi th aircraft formationand are color coded to correspondto colors assigned platoons (yellow, white, green, and orange;red should only be used to markobstacles or for emergency conditions).

Pathfinders may establish someassembly area aids (such aslights) for debarking troops. Thisis not usually done since it is aplatoon leader s responsibility toget his troops moving in the rightdirection. However, the pathfinders may remain to assist with airtraffic control, communications,security, etc.

Only a helicopter mission hasbeen discussed. However, pathfinders use much the same general techniques in establishingand operating fixed wing landingzones. Also one pathfinder detachment can set up and operate three low level extraction(LOLEX) sites simultaneously.

Although pathfinders are notusually rated, they have much incommon with Army Aviation personnel. They live and work together and are developing a solidfoundation of mutual trust andadmiration that will greatly enhance the successful employment of the Army s airmobileconcepts. . . . . . .

igure 6. anding lantern

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N PERFORMING their public relations duties, a generalfrequently travels to places notthe usual stomping grounds forthe military. f you are on goodterms with his pilot, sometimesyou can go along.So it was in this case. The general was going to a nearby seasideresort to speak to the local JuniorChamber of Commerce. He wouldarrive there Tuesday morning andleave that afternoon. His U-Spilot was Capt Rick Walters.

When Lt Joe Leber heard thathis friend was flying the general,he immediately convinced himself that he had been working toohard and needed a rest-preferably one by the seaside. Of course,one day was not enough so he lefta few days early and would returnwith Rick.

To cinch the deal, Joe promisedto meet Rick at the airport Tuesday morning and take him swimming while the general made hisspeech.

At the appointed hour Lieutenant Leber was there along withthe Jaycee reception committee intime to see the spirited U-S comein. Rick is a past master at making soft landings, which probablyaccounts for his being selected topilot generals so often. But thistime he outdid himself, landingso lightly you never knew whenhe first touched ground.6

ebernd theMoonshiners

Lieutenant Leber, expecting tosee the beaming, happy face of hisfriend, was surprised by a pairof staring eyes in a face as whiteas the proverbial sheet. The general also looked like someone whohad felt the cold breath of death.What happened? Leberasked.

Come over here, Rick said,grabbing Leber's arm and pullinghim away hom the receptioncommittee.

When they were far enoughaway that they couldn't be heard,Rick said, The General doesn'twant it generally known just yetbut we were shot at on the wayhere.

You kiddin'?No, I'm not. One bullet hit

the windshield right in front ofme. Must have been a glancingblow 'cause it didn't go through,thank goodness.

But who'd shoot at you here inthe United States? Now in Vietnam or

Oh, not that kind of firing.Someone trying to shoot thegeneral?No.. Well, what then?Moonshiners.Moonshiners?Yes, moonshiners. On the way

here we passed over a big woodedarea. You know how the generalis. When he's not on duty he's

hunting. Lives and breathes it.When he saw those woods we justhad to go down close to look fordeer. Then it happened. Didn' thear the gun of course but theairplane was peppered with shotof some kind.

Penetrate?Yes, I took a quick look as wedisembarked, and some of theholes are big enough to put yourfinger into.

What are you going to do?I've got to call back and re

port it. They might have to sendus another plane. Don't think thisone is safe to fly back.He paused for a few seconds asif thinking and then said, Look,Joe, you're good at this sort ofthing. Help me look over thisbird so I can tell them at thepost just what happened. They'llbe full of questions and I don'twant to give them halfcockedanswers.By this time the general and theJaycee reception committee hadgone. Leber went over to the airplane. On the port side there wasno damage. But on the starboardside there were several holes.Most of them were in the forwardbaggage and avionics area. Lieutenant Leber looked at these verycarefully, and as if to confirmRick's statement he put his littlefinger in one of them.

What kind of gun do youU. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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1 408William H. mith

s THE FIGURE 50 begins to come up on thespeedometer of my life, I feel an uncontrollable urge to advise you youngsters just reaching the fateful 40s, hoping to ease you over thebumps a little.

The period between 40 and 50 years is one ofthe most significant of your life and ranks in importance just a iittle short of the years aroundyour 21st birthday. As you enter the 40-50 yearperiod you are an old-young person. As you leaveit you are one of the young-old.

During this 10-year period you will find certainchanges in the attitude of the people around you.The younger generation (anyone 39 or younger)will become solicitous towards you and help youinto the aircraft or offer to do the stooping andbending at preflight. With a wistful look in theireyes they will ask about your retirement plans.They will assume that anyone who has been flyingas long as you must know a lot and will ask youradvice on many subjects.

More and more you will be referred to as anexperienced aviator, but only occasionally willsome inconsiderate person call you an old pilot.Your copilot will ask permission to take over theflying more often and will become very interestedin carrying out the landings.8

Before the 10 years are up you will notice thatyour appearance will be smart only in a baggy

After 4 your waistline will show need for aslenderizing program diet plus exercise

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Moderate exercise s the order of the day

pictures, wartime souvenirs, little black books fullof outdated telephone numbers, and old cigar butts.

Control your waistline by exercising moderately.In this effort keep up with, the youngsters only inthe tales you tell. When you use the stairs run(down only, of course). Buy a new tennis racketand show it to everyone at the office. When theyhave seen it, give it to your daughter as a present(this suggestion gives you double for your money) .At the club dance get up and do the jive, dog,watusi, swim, pony, or whatever is popular at themoment. It doesn't matter if you don't know how.Just jump up and down or shake real good, andyou've got it made. Better still, playa cool gameof billiards.Buy yourself a boat and parade it around thepost every chance you get (this suggestion for thefew remaining bachelors-and married men with nochildren in college) .

In your conversation, keep up to date on thelatest expressions. No specific examples are possible here because they change so often.catnap at your desk at lunch time and for goodness' sake don't smoke a corncob pipe.

Well, freshmen 40 lifers there you have it froman old pro. These suggestions won't entirely cureyour age troubles, but follow them and you'll getthrough the next 10 years. I did.eep your desk free of APCs, Turns, family

ettersContinued from page 1Grade 1100 oil to MIL-L-2285IA Type11 oil has posed many perplexing problems to Army Aviators, especially atcivilian and other than Army airfields.As an employee of a large west coastmanufacturer of military specificationlubricants, I can only say that MajorCollins' article is correct in every sense,including his assumptions. His researchinto the problem reflects a great dealof depth and awareness of a rather confusing situation. The article is likewisepresented in a most meaningful anddescriptive manner which can be readilyunderstood by all interested personnel.

Sir:

RICHARD A. DEMMERAviation OfficerHqs 40th Armd Div ArtyCalif Army National Guard

In your December issue, you havetwo consecutive articles outlining correctand incorrect emergency procedures forthe U-6A. Under the heading Emergency Procedures-Right Way, the pilotmakes this statement: the surfacewind was from 240 0 at 10 knots and Ilanded on runway 32. As we toucheddown in a slight right wing low attitude10

to correct for the crosswind, the airplanemade a skip bounce and swerved to theleft. I applied right brake and rudder,but the left turn continued. When itbecame obvious I was going to leave therunway, I applied full power and starteda go-around. I also applied 1ight aileronto raise the left gear, decrease the drag,stop the turn, and allow a relativelystraight takeoff.

Following this bit of aerodynamicgobbledygook, the article goes on toexplain how the pilot allowed time forthe runway to be foamed, then completed an emergency landing-again witha swerve to the left. The cause of theaccident was attributed to a materialfailure of the left main gear rear attaching lug.

As instructor pilots in the U-IAtransition ' program here at Fort Ord,we completed some 15,000 landings andtakeoffs in the last year, the majority ofthese with the prevailing left crosswindwith which our airfield is blessed. Wefind it no mystery that with a rightwing low attitude in a left crosswindthis airplane skipped and swerved tothe left. The only thing amazing aboutthis is that the aircraft didn't ground-

loop and shear both gear. Then, afterthe swerve and skip routine, with thegear on the ground, full power, andright aileron (again), which would onlyaggravate the swerve, and certainly increase the probability of more skips,it is remarkable that this aircraft everdid get off the ground.Granted the procedures following thego-around were proper and fitting, perhaps it would be worthwhile to notethat improper crosswind landing techniques may have contributed to thematerial failure responsible for thisaccident.Thanks for the many fine articleswhich do appear in the Digest, and forthe fine contribution your m g ~ i n emakes to Army Aviation.

CWO GERALD D. ANDREWSStaff Aviation SectionFort Ord, Calif. 93941CWO Andrews and other sharp eyedreaders caugh t this serious error in cross-wind landing technique. However, we'rehappy to note that the error was edi-torial and not pilot induced. The pilotin this accident touched down leftwing low, but the submitting agencyreversed his ailerons.-Ed



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H AVE YOU EVER been inthe frustrating position ofbeing unable to complete yourmission because the destinationfield strip lacked an instrument.approach facility? Sure you haveRemember how hard it was toexplain to that Infantry brigadecommander? Ole Colonel Snorthad a way of making you feel personally guilty about bringing inbad weather, didn t he? That unreasonable old cuss simply couldnot understand why his troopsshould go hungry just becausethe sky was cloudy. Rememberthe last time it happened? Thinkback a little and try to rememberwhat your unit instrument examiner was doing that day. f hewas back at home field waitingfor the weather to break, thenperhaps you should feel guilty.

In the operation of an air lineof communication during exerciseAir Assault II, we in the CaribouBattalion were faced with thisproblem on a greater scale thanwe had ever encountered before.We were expected to keep an entire division resupplied, regardless of the weather or frequentchange of landing sites. Our job

nstrunlentxaIninerForward

jo r a ul L tnsel

was further complicated by theside effects of four tropical storms,bringing extensive rain and lowvisibility into the maneuver area.The ultimate success of our mission rested heavily on one individual: the instrument examiner.

Provided with a UH-IB, theexaminer was attached to the AirAssault Division forward elementsas liaison officer (LNO). In thiscapacity he kept himself, and theCaribou Battalion commander informed of impending assaults andprobable new landing sites for

the CV-2s. These probable siteswere posted on the operationsmap and assigned a number. Athorough map study of the sitearea was conducted, with particular attention to any obstacle orobstruction that would interferewith an instrument approach.Aerial photos of the area werealso requested; however, theywere generally not available. AllDuring Air Assault II exerciseMaj Stansel was S 3 Officer 37thAir Transport Battalion 10thAir Transport Brigade Ft Benning Ga.Pathfinder landing zone controller guides CV-2B pilot to successful IFR approach


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available information on thesenew sites was disseminated toeach Caribou company operationsofficer for posting and study.

The LN O-examiner also studied the map. f possible he reconnoitered the site; however, presence of the aggressor preventedthis in most cases. Based on hisstudy, the LNO constructed aprobable ADF approach procedure, subject to confirmation byactual flight check. The terminalnavigational aid to be used forthe approach procedure was theportable nondirectional beaconNDB) organic to the pathfinderlanding zone control team of theAir Assault Division.

Immediately after seizure of theintended landing zone, the LN 0advised the pathfinders on beaconlocation. Once it was in position,he made a flight check of the preplanned approach. After confirming the approach, or altering itas necessary to meet clearancecriteria, the LNO radioed the information back to the CaribouBattalion S-3 officer via high frequency single side band radio.

Transmission was simplified byusing a checklist with twelvenumbered items. Only the itemnumber was transmitted, preceding the actual information fig.1). A duplicate of this check sheetwas kept in the battalion S-3 shop,and filled in as item numberswere received. This informationwas then transposed into a visualsketch, and reproduced on astandard stencil machine. Copiesof the procedures were dispatchedby helicopter courier to all theCaribou company log base sitesfig. 2).

Of course, this approach wasworthless without the ability toget there. In our case, close coordination with the 72d Air TrafficCompany ATC) Army) solvedour problem. Telephone coordination established routes, altitudes, and missed approach proce-12

Runway Heading: Of?o htl E l e v a t i o n : : k D O MSL)Approach Obstruc t ions: _ - - - - J , M ~ ( ) u . M ~ e . ' - - - Beacon Location: - - - - ~ ~ ~ , ( . ~ 4 . M I . ~ ~ 2 - = - - - Outbound Heading: l : : J I ~ O ~Procedure-Turn Altitude: _ L . . . l . i L f . ~ o t J ~Inbound Heading: Q : L o B u O ~Recommended Minimums: MSL) J8IoL.kO.lol


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SAFE ALTlTUOE 20 NM 2,000 FT

1500WITHIN10NM

PULL UP CLIMB TO 2000 ON 080 0 TRACK SITE NO. 23 NOBMINIMUMS 800 MSL 1 MILE VIS.

igure

routed back to the log base areato refuel and return round thehorn. Under ideal conditions,this arrangement would havegiven us a complete circle ofCaribou extending from the logbase area to the forward si te andback again, wi th an aircraft every10 minutes all the way around.Although this ideal situation wasnever achieved, we managed todeliver enough fuel, rations, ammunition, and miscel laneousitems to support over 400 helicopters and 13,000 troopers. Colonel Snort would have been proudof usAs the air head expanded andconsolidated, the landing siteusually became either a divisionor brigade logistical base, withconventional approach facilitiesand controls, including a GCA.This usually was within 24 hoursof initial occupation. The ATCCompany then extended their air-FEBRUARY 1966

way system to encompass this site.All control responsibility thenpassed from the LN 0 , leavinghim to collapse for a few hoursinto a damp sleeping bag, comforted by the knowledge that hisefforts enabled delivery of over400 tons of supplies under IFRconditions before establishment ofa conventional approach procedureProblems? Sure we had them,but none that couldn't be overcome by training, thorough crewbriefings, and mutual trust between the aviators and the LNOon the ground. After a couple ofsuccessful approaches, one of ouryounger tigers was heard to bragthat he could execute a perfectADF approach using an electricrazor for a terminal fix. Youknow, I believe he could with agood instrument examiner forward

rash Fire RescueInside theircraft

T HERE IS more to crash-firework than putting out afire. The fundamental in everycase is the saving of lives. Insidethe crashed aircraft or possiblyoutside and close to the burningplane are personnel who must berescued. To save lives, trainedhands are needed to effect theirremoval.Proof of this is contained in thesurvivability percentages of foursevere air carrier accidents whichAviation Crash Injury Researchof Cornell University investigated:64% of the people involved inthe four accidents could not moveof themselves and were in need ofassistance.42% had periods of unconsciousness (82% had severe concussions and suffered periods ofunconsciousness lasting from afew hours to 17 days; 10.2% hadmoderate concussions and briefperiods of unconsciousness) .6.4% suffered mild concussions,but at no time were unconscious.These were in a state of shock.44% were injured in theirlower extremities.26% were injured in their upper extremities; some suffered injuries in both areas.Obviousl y crash-fire crewsshould be as well trained to workrapidly and competently insidethe aircraft as they do outside,since they will have to removemany survivors on stretchers-andthe task is made all the more diffi-cult by broken floors, seats tornout, fuselages either on thei r sidesor upside down.

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could do it he could too. Thedifference though was that he wasgetting short, having had overa year of flying in Korea, andwas pretty well familiar withKorea flying.

t wasn't too much longer, andthere came the U-6 again. Thistime he said the weather aheadwas just too much for him, thathe had had it, and this time wasreally going back to K 16. Well, Iallowed as how I still wasn't introuble and since I had flown inmuch worse weather, I elected tocontinue south. All the while theceiling was getting lower andlower, but by this time I was inthe flats south of Iri in thevicinity of Kumje and wasn't atall worried. My only problem wasto cross the saddle at Mongnanwhere the railroad goes throughthe tunnel, and I'd have had itmade.

But the wicket began to getsticky. By the time I reached thepass at Mongnan the ceiling haddropped right into the lowest partof the saddle. I decided to makethe 180. My experience of flyingin Europe, especially Germany,was doing me no good.FEBRUARY 1966

There, one could always landon the autobahn or in a clearedfield and wait out any badweather. Here, I was franticallytrying to find a rice paddy largeenough to at least give me achance to make a safe landing.When I realized there wasn't any,I headed to an auxiliary strip, butcouldn't make it as the doors andwindows were rapidly dosing.Pawing over my map I foundAir Force field at Kunsan-K-8-and headed for it. I was flying asclose to the ceiling as I could, myaltimeter was indicating 200 feet,and visibility was less than halfa mile.I hit the coastline just south ofChigyong and started followingit, knowing that I could get lowerand figuring the coastline shouldtake me right to the field.I gave K-8 a call.

Kunsan tower, this is Armytriple 8, 10 miles east your station.Landing instructions please.Over.

Army triple 8 this is Kunsantower. Enter left traffic runway 6;call downwind. Army triple' 8,what are you doing out there?

Kunsan tower, this is Army

triple 8. I am flying east yourstation and want to land at K 8.

O v ~ r .Army triple 8 this is Kunsantower. K 8 is closed; we will try

to pick you upon radar. Wha t isyour altitude and heading?

Kunsan tower, this is Armytriple 8 My altimeter reads 100feet and my heading is westerly,but varying as I am following thecoastline. Over.

Army triple 8 this is Kunsantower. We have you in sight; youare cleared to land runway 6.

At this time I thought I sawwhat looked like a runway justoff my right wing tip.

Kunsan tower, this is Armytriple 8. Was that runway 6 I justpassed? f it is I'll circle 360 0 andla,nd. Over.

Army triple 8, this is Kunsantower. That was runway 6; makean immediate 1800 and land.Over.

When I landed and taxied upto operations a major (the weatherman) met me and wan ted toknow why the X %X#@X I wasflying in that sort of weather. Myonly excuse (to myself) was thatI was trying to impress my newsection with my prowess as anaviator. Of course I brazened itout and put the blame entirelyon the elements, at least for themajor's consumption. Needless tosay, I was lucky to be a guest ofthe Air Force that night.I listened from then on to theyoung pilots who had acquiredtheir experience in the FrozenChozen, and accepted flying inKorea a s something entirely newand different from that which Ihad experienced before.I think the moral of this tale isobvious. It is an example of overconfidence, overextending , and ofan old soldier with an overinflated ego who knew it all. I, forone, certainly learned fast fromthis rather demoralizing experience.

15


18/52

ongCaInp Out for I IR OUTINE, the way it s mostof the time, was the way themorning had started for SergeantKeen. KK, as he is affectionatelyknown around his small unit, hadgone to the lower 48 to pick upa Piper Tripacer he had boughttom a friend in Moses Lake,Wash. He had arisen early thatmorning at Fort Nelson, B.C., inpreparation for his flight to Wat-son Lake, Yukon Territory, andAlaska, but two other pilots wereahead of him as he approachedthe counter with his flight plan.One was flying a fully instru-mented Bonanza, the other aCessna 172. It was agreed uponby the three that the Bonanzaowner would take off first and,as soon as he was well settled oncourse, would radio back aweather report. The Cessna wouldtake off next. KK would be last.

They felt that they would bemaking the best use of theirequipment in this way.

KK felt no trepidation at histrip through the Canadian Rock-ies. f the weather was bad hewould just sit it out. No use inhurrying, he thought; that's howpeople get into trouble in theselight airplanes. While waiting forthe Bonanza to radio back, histhoughts turned to his family.He knew that with any kind ofluck he would be home by even-ing, or noon tomorrow at thelatest.

The radio in the dispatch officecrackled and the voice of theBonanza pilot could be heardloud and clear: This is BonanzaN1646E. No sweat. I'm downtrack about 60 miles. The weatherlooks good. The snow stoppedabout five minutes ago and the

Reprinted from COMB T CREWvisibili ty is getting better. You'llhave no trouble making itthrough the pass.A few minutes later the Cessnaroared down the strip and dis-appeared to the west. After wait-ing a short time KK followed. Heleveled at 3,500 feet and every-thing felt good. He wished he hada bird dog in the plane; theonly navigational aid he had wasthe VOR. The Canadian stationshad range facilities but no omni-range. He knew the whole tripwould have to be navigated bypilotage. He plotted his posi tionon the map, and felt secure nowthat the weather was going to begood. He sighted the Cessna outin front of him and to his left.Soon he heard the Cessna pilotcalling him: Looks like a snow-shower ahead. Think I'll swingback left. KK thought about


19/52

this for a few seconds, then said:It looks clear to the right. Think

I'll check it.Roger, I'll give you a call if I

run into anything was the Cessna's reply.

KK then altered course to 340 .From his knowledge of weathermovement in the area, he knewthat the weather was moving intothe area from the southwest. Hereasoned that the best coursewould be to reverse course andskirt ahead of it. He tried toreverse directions and go back toFort Nelson but the weather hadclosed in behind him. He knewhe was getting off course, and hetook the only action open andflew a heading of 340. For therest of the flight KK kept track ofthe time on each heading he flew.He climbed to 1,000 feet andleaned the engine as much as possible to save the precious fuel.Never once did he lose sight ofthe ground and the landmarks.He knew approximately where hewas at all times, and also knew hewas in a bad situation with about

an hour of fuel remammg.Then it happened- everythingbecame clear, clouds disappeared

and visibili ty was perfect. He immediately changed his course to210. From his approximate position on the map this would takehim to Watson Lake. The fuelindicators were getting low. Lessthan an eighth of a tank of gaswas left.A little later, at about 4 hoursand 30 minutes after takeoff, KKrealized he wasn't going to makeWatson Lake. He estimated hisposition and tried to raise WatsonLake on the radio. There was noanswer. He began broadcastinghis heading, altitude, airspeed,and assumed location in theblind. He wobbled the wings tosee if the needles on the fuelgauges would come up. Theydidn't, not a bit.

KK looked below. He was nowover the western foothill regionof the Canadian Rockies. He hadpassed around the high peaks. Hesaw a river running down a valleybetween two of the hills. Got toget this baby down while I stillhave power, he mused. Thatspot down in the valley beside theriver looks like the best placearound. He set up a spiral descent, keeping the place he hadpicked ou t in sight.

When he was about a t h o ~ s n dfeet from the terrain he leveledout and set up a left rectangularpattern. His best spot turned outto be the ice and snow coveringthe river. This would have to bea full-flap landing. He turnedbase leg. Everything looked good.

He turned final approach and setup the glide path. Everythinglooked okay. Then he saw it Alittle clump of trees was directlyin front of him. Gently he easedthe throttle forward. He wasn'tsure if the engine would take ornot. It did He broke the glideuntil he was sure he would clearthe trees. The wheels toucheddown gently on the crusted snowand ice. He shut the engine downwith the mixture, ignition, andmaster swi tch. Everything wasfine. The aircraft had almostcome to a stop when the snowcrust gave way under the wheels.The gear sheared and the aircraftslid about 2 feet further on thefuselage.

Well, here I am, but where amI? He unfastened his seat belt,opened the door and crawled outof the airplane.

The first sensation he had whenhe emerged from the aircraft wasthe cold wind. He was in fix,but it wasn't as bad as it mighthave been; he wasn't injured. Hehad a survival kit and he meantto use it. He had been throughsurvival schools at Stead AirForce Base, Nev., at Fort Carson,Colo., and at Malmstrom AirForce Base in Montana. He alsohad been a licensed guide inColorado and had done muchpacking in in Montana. Inshort, he was no new kid of the

block when it came to living inthe wilderness.KK's first thought was to keephis feet dry. He was wearingflight crew quick-don boots. Heknew his feet would be soaked

7


20/52

soon unless he did something toprotect them, so he drained someoil from the crankcase of the aircraft engine and worked it intohis boots.

The snoW was abou t 40 inchesdeep and he was immobilized. Hissurvival training now came intoplay. With the ice saw from thesurvival kit he cut down two smallpine trees. He doubled each oneinto an oval shape and bound theends with cord from one of theairplane seats. He attached hishandy dandy snowshoes with

more cord from the seat to hisboots. Now he could move aboutfairly easily.N ext, he decided to inventoryexactly what there was in the way

of equipment. He opened the survival kit and laid the contents onthe wing of the aircraft. He foundhe had two chocolate bars, fourpemmican bars, four bouilloncubes, two packages of instantcoffee, one package of tea, twosleeping bags, one L-2 summerflying jacket with the distressorange on the reversible innerliner, one civilian dress jacket,one suit of thermal underwear,several pairs of heavy wool sox,one compass, the ice saw, oneswitch blade survival knife, onesignal flare, 43 matches, a I-gallonbucket that had been used to mixair pia n e dope, miscellaneouswrenches and tools in a toolbox,and one MAN OF THE W ORLDmagazine. Not bad at all, he considered.KK s next thought was of ashelter. Hacking pine boughsfrom the scrubby trees nearby hewas able to partially construct alean-to, and got some dry rottenwood with which to make a fire.He drained the gas from thetanks of the aircraft. When hewas through draining, thisamounted to about a teacup. Itwas a good thing he had landedwhen he did; otherwise it wouldhave been a deadstick approach.18

A clump of trees, like the ones hehad passed over on final approach,would have been disastrous without power.Again he was conscious of thetemperature. He checked thethermometer in the aircraft. Itread -10 . The wind made thelow temperature even more miserable. t was just a plain, bonechilling cold.

Darkness wasn't far off. Hethought of the food situation.There wasrt t very much. Hedidn t know how long it would bebefore the rescue party wouldreach him. lIe counted the rations again, and as he was counting he thought, moose and otheranimals survive on grass andtwigs from the t r e ~ s f they cando it, so can I. He found grassunder the trees where there wasno snow. Also, there was grassunder the overhanging bank ofthe river s edge. He gatheredwhat he thought would beenough. Next, he cleaned the onegallon bucket that had containedthe airplane dope. He choppedthe grass into fine pieces andmixed it with about a gallon ofwater obtained by melting snow.KK let the mixture boil over thefire for one hour. The resultswere not delicious, not even tasty,but they were filling. When hewas through drinking the brothhe forced himself to eat the grass.He did not get a great deal ofnutrition but did get rid of thehunger headache that had beenplaguing him. After eating, hebusied himself with stamping ahuge SOS into the snow on theriver. By the time he had completed this, he was thoroughlyexhausted.

That evening KK s thoughtsturned to his family as he sat inhis lean-to. He wondered howlong they would be able to livein their military apartment atEielson. He had no idea howlong it would be before rescuers

would find him, since he was sofar off course. f they gave up thesearch, the authorities at Eielson

Signals used when rescue aircraft isapproaching. ll signals (below andright) are from Polar Manual , U SNavy.

Ou rRece iver_ operating

Pick Us UpA i rc raft_ Ab d o , d

Don tLand Here

YesA ff i rma t i v e



21/52

would move his family back tothe lower 48" . He would misshis daughter's graduation from

Trampled ground to air signals t r usein open areas Brush or any other darksubstance may e used-Iew

Requ ireMed ica l Suppli es

Req u ire Doctor

Req u i reFood a nd Wat e r

Require Clothing

RequireFue l an d Oil

RequireMap and Com pass

Req u ireArms and Amm uni t ion

Require Engineer

Req u ire Signa l Lamp

Aircra f tBad ly Da maged

Unable to Proceed

Wi l l Attem ptTake -off

We ProceedTh is Di rec ti on

Show Direct io nto Proceed

Don t Lan d Here

Land Here Pointing Direction

Yes Aff i rm ative

No Negative

No t Understood

A ll Well

FEBRUARY 1966

high school. Why, when he returned, he wouldn't even have ahouse or a family in Alaska anymore. He would have to findthem. They would worry andwonder if he was all right. It wason this uncomfortable note thathe fell asleep.When he awoke, it was cold;there was no sun. From theclouds, heavy snow was falling.He walked to the airplane andlooked at the thermometer. Itread 25 below zero. For breakfast, he allowed himself nothingbut some more grass broth. Againhe felt filled but not satisfiedwhen he finished.

The next thing to do was tofinish building the lean-to shelter.He took the saw and againstarted cutting boughs from thescrubby trees. He was finishedwith the lean-to a short timebefore noon. It was a good thing,because the snow was really coming down. The skies opened upand deluged him with 8 inchesof snow that day.

His thoughts turned again todistress signals. He had drainedthe oil from the aircraft engineand gathered pine boughs whichwould give off a dense smoke-ifthey would igni eo He began toconsider the equipment on boardthe aircraft. Why not? The landing light, when removed andhooked to the 'aircraft batterywould make an excellent signalling device. He finished dismounting the landing light and batteryin about an hour. He connectedthem and was rewarded with aflash of light. Now he was readyif the searchers Hew over at night.He spent the afternoon lookingfor grass, chopping it, and boilingit. Now was the time to work onthat distress signal. He took hisice saw and cut some more of the10 to 20-foot trees that grewalong the river. He built treeletters some 200 feet high and100 feet across. He sawed down

some 30 trees that afternoon andwas about half finished whendarkness came. Again he fell exhausted into the sleeping bag.Getting to sleep was no problemfor KK. The storm passed thatsecond night.

On the third morning therewas more grass broth. By noon hehad finished building the distresssignal from the pine trees. In all,he had cut 60 trees to build thishuge SOS. They would surely seethat when they flew over.

That afternoon he started thinking of a weapon. The boughs ofthe pine trees gave him an idea.A sling shot He got the rubberfrom the nose gear inner tube. Abough from the pine tree waswhittled down to a forked shape.Cord from the seat and a smallpiece of the plastic material thatcovered the seat finished it. Withthis and his survival knife he wasa formidable foe for anything-ifit wasn't too big.

That night he heard sounds ofanimals around the camp. Theywere close but not uncomfortablyclose. His thoughts turned towhat he would do if a wild animaldid come into camp. He had hisswitch blade survival knife, butthis would not be too much helpagainst a bear or large animal.He decided that a fire would behis best protection. He then fellasleep.

On the morning of the fourthday he awoke to see the sunshining. He breakfasted on achocolate bar square. There wasto be no fire this day; KK hadwasted a match trying to lightthe fire. The mental disciplinefrom the survival training and hisguide experience made him realizethat he could not waste matches.He punished himself by not having a fire. Fortunately the weatherwas now warmer. When hechecked the thermometer in theaircraft it read 25 above zero.

19


22/52

LONG CAMP OUT ~ O R K KHe noticed wolf tracks in thesnow. He followed them and

could see where the animals hadcircled the camp the night before.They had approached to withinabout 100 feet. This was what hadcaused the noise. A fire will bebuilt tonight, thought KK. Hewas struck by the thought of howsilent it was, and decided he mustbe a great distance from his in tended course. He had not heardthe sound of an aircraft in thethree days since he had landed.In fact, the silence was appalling.Winter was still in this area. Theblack and white contrast betweenthe snow-covered mountains andthe valleys was stark and depressing.

He forced these thoughts fromhis mind as he gathered wood forthe fire. He also found some grassfor broth, and by this time duskwas approaching. He fixed thebroth and drank it. Again he atethe boiled grass. Again it wasfilling. He wondered if the wolveswould be back. He didn't have towait long. Out of the shadowstwo canine figures approached.First they employed stealth; thenthey became bold. They circledthe campfire at a distance ofabout 25 feet. KK said nothingand did not move a muscle. Hejust kept watching them. Theyretreated a little, snarling as theywent. They retreated a little more,out of the light of the fire, whenno fear was evidenced by the man.It was an uneasy sleep for Sergeant Keen that night.

The fifth day was spent readingand thinking. KK worried aboutwhether the searchers would belooking for him anymore. Somewhere in his World War II experiences he had heard thatsearches were called off if thevictim was not found after the

fifth day. Tomorrow he wouldstart walking if no rescue aircraftwas heard today.

On the sixth day, KK built apack and put all of his survivalequipment in it. He started walking to the northeast to get out ofthe foothills. He thought he wasgoing downhill. Actually, he discovered later, he was walking uphill. When he discovered that hewas confused concerning the terrain, he was abou t 5 miles fromthe Tripacer. He decided to turnback, and was abou t three-quarters of a mile from the aircraftwhen he decided to set up camp.He had broken through the snowseveral times and was gettingtired. He had also gotten his feetwet when he broke through thesnow. He built a fire. Then hetook off his wet boots and socks,unrolled the sleeping bag and gotinto it to get warm. Darknesscame. KK went to sleep.

On the seventh day SergeantKeen moved back to the Tripacercamp. The day was consumedwhile he read and thought andwai ted. He moved his signallinggear closer to the camp. Againthere were the rou tine chores offire building, gathering grass,boiling it and eating it. As anextra luxury he allowed himselfa square of the chocolate bar. Thetension created by the waitingwas almost more fatiguing thanthe work of building the signalsand the shelter. When dusk camehe was ready to rest. He crawledinto the sleeping bag and fellsound asleep. He was awakenedlate that night by the sound ofan aircraft passing overhead. Hescrambled out of the sleeping bag.In the surprised confusion heforgot about the battery landinglight signal. There were only afew precious seconds. Finally,

after an eternity, he was able toget a pine tree ignited and burning. The aircraft had passed wi thout seeing him.

KK was discouraged when theaircraft missed his signal, but hesoon cheered up when he realizedthat they were searching this areanow and probably would be back.He went to sleep. His thoughts,as he drifted off, were happierthan they had been for a week.

It was mid-morning on theeighth day when he heard thesound of an aircraft. It was low,and it passed by without seemingto see him. He igni ted the flareand waited breathlessly. The airplane flew on. Then it happenedWithin 3 hours, KK was rescuedand on his way to Fort Nelson.Later, at Eielson, he was given abrief medical examination andwas found to have lost 12 poundswith no other ill effects.

"I was lucky, he said, luckyto have been through the survivaltraining. I never once lost myhead. This is the most importantthing in a situation as this. I wasalso very fortunate in that I wasnot injured or in shock when Ilanded." Asked what he thoughthis most valuable piece of equipment was, he answered withouthesitation, "It was the ice saw. Iwould want it more than thesleeping bag or the rations.

KK also stated that the onlypiece of equipment he reallymissed was a cord or line. Ofcourse, the USAF flight crewshave these in their parachutes.KK was right when he said, Ifyou just use what you know youwill survive until help comes.For light aircraft fliers, particularly aero club members, emphasis is placed on two points:1 I f you get into weather, turnaround and get out of it; 2 ifyou have to land, do it while youstill have power and can pickyour spot. Above all, keep yourhead and use what you have.

20 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


23/52

N LIGHT of the Vietnamescalation in recent months,I feel justified in repeating myoriginal question from A NewKind of War : Should the decision be taken to fight in Vietnam, the first logical question is,fight with what? So far, ourmilitary effort appears littlechanged from that which proveddisastrous to the French in 1954.

t is true that our economical,psychological, and political policies in Vietnam are considerablydifferent from those of the French.While an improvement in thestability of the Republic of Vietnam government has been notedrecently, I cannot subscribe to theargument that a stabilized government is the first concern in Vietnam and, therefore, must receivefirst priority.

I don't believe there can bestable government unless there isfirst an acceptable degree of lawand order. The same argumentholds true when applied toeconomic, social, and psychologi-cal programs. Without law andFEBRUARY 1966

Maior Frederick L Clapp

order, such programs are deniedthe necessary time to becomeeffective. In the absence of aneffective police force, it becomesthe duty of the military to maintain order, and the success ofthat effort must be the firstpriority.

Although this article is devotedonly to military countermeasures,military measures lone will notprovide a solution in a guerrillawar. Counterinsurgency must beapplied against the total spectrumof insurgency, which includesmilitary, political, economic, so-cial, and psychological programs.

To date the military too frequently has failed in its responsibility to reestablish or maintainlaw and order. Even in thoseinstances where western militaryforces have been successful incontaInIng or defeating communist guerrilla movements, e.g.,Greece and Malaya, the resourcesbrought to bear were completelydisproportionate to the resourcesexpended by the communists.

In the destroyer concept I call

for a troop of 44 men and 5 helicopters. A single troop would beassigned an area of 2,500 squarekilometers and would be expectedto conduct an itinerant sustained type occupation through-out its assigned area.

Two points of contention havebeen raised concerning my troopproposal. The first is that a 44man force is too small, and thesecond is that the idea has alreadybeen tried, with larger forces, inE a g e, Bumblebee, ndHummingbird operations in

Vietnam.I accept the fact that 44 menrepresent little more than aplatoon when considered in thetraditional military sense. How-ever, when considered in light ofthe economy of force potentialmade possible by helicopter mobili ty the same 44 men become amuch more imposing force. ToThe views and opinions ex-pressed herein are the writer'sand are not to he considered asan official expression of theDepartment of Defense.

21


24/52

destroyer troop wouldexpe tits best performance at night

illustrate, assume a single destroyer troop successfully occupiedfor short times ten different,widely separated locations in a 24hour period. The same drill usingground mobile forces would require a separate 44 man force foreach of the ten locations, or 440men. To this figure must be addedthe number of backup personnelrequired t maintain 440 men inthe field. By this equation a 44man destroyer troop becomes considerably more than just anotherplatoon.I consider Eagle, Bumblebee,and Hummingbird operations allto be basically the same. Theoriginal Eagle concept was bold,indicated imagination, and hasresulted in a great deal of valuable information. The destroyerconcept differs greatly in bothmission and method, but doesdraw heavily on the experienceand lessons learned as a result ofEagle. In fact the destroy.er troopis the next logical step in theevolution of helicopter tactics.

The major difference betweenthe two concepts lies in mission.Eagle can be best described as aheliborne combat patrol. Initiallythe mission was either to overflya given area looking for enemyforces to attack, or to land andsweep suspect locations or areaswhere intelligence reports indicatean enemy force might be located.At first, the concept had goodsuccess. However, because of anumber of built-in disadvantages,such operations met with increasing cost in both men and equipment.

To begin with, Eagle was a daylight only operation. A destroyertroop would expect its best performance at night. Any action

against an enemy guerrilla that isbased on an in telligence reportmust be suspect, especially whenthe report is over a few hours old,and the source of the report issubject to possible enemy influence. A destroyer troop would useintelligence reports for little morethan nice-to-know purposes. Atthe same time a troop would bean excellent and reliable sourceof intelligence information.

The proposition of overflyingan area until being fired on oruntil spotting an enemy force toattack leaves a great deal to bedesired. Ground vegetation provides ample concealment in mostareas of Vietnam. Therefore, ifthe enemy does not want to beseen the chances are he won t be.On the other hand, if the enemyfeels he has the advantage andwants to fight, he need only fireon our helicopters and the battleis joined.

In such a situation, all advantage was with the enemy. Theenemy decided where, when andif to fight. He knew almost to theman the strength of an Eagleforce and he knew where it was.

there was any surprise advantage it belonged to the enemy.The strength of an Eagle forcewas normally that of a small infantry company or less. Becauseof its limited strength an Eagleforce had to be selective in areasof operation. Those areas suspected of harboring relativelyheavy enemy forces had to beavoided, and such action was byno means always possible.

Maj Clapp s with the ContractInstrument Division Dept ofRotary Wing Tng Ft Rucker} Ala.

Once committed to a fire fightan Eagle force sometimes foundit had a tiger by the tail. Mostessential information relevant tothe enemy s strength and positionwas denied an Eagle force untilafter contact had been established.When it was fired on, moved tothe attack, and then discoveredthe enemy force was a reinforcedhard core Viet Cong company,the outcome was often disastrous.

Hummingbird and Bumblebeeoperations normally were smallerforces than Eagle and were employed in jungle areas rather thanthe delta country. In addition tothe same disadvantages inherentto Eagle operations, the problemsof Hummingbird and Bumblebeewere further compounded by lackof adequate landing zones injungle areas.A destroyer troop would avoidthese disadvantages because itsmission and method of operationare entirely different. The Eagleconcept envisioned flying to thelocation of an enemy force andimmediately attacking same. Thedestroyer concept would avoid

22 U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


25/52

landing where the enemy is andattempt always to land where theenemy is not. In view of the guerrilla enemy s constant need tokeep moving, it is reasonable toassume that promiscuous inter-diction of likely avenues of movement would adversely affectenemy operations.

Unlike Eagle, a destroyer unitwould fight only when it enjoyedthe advantage. f a detectedenemy force were small, the troopwould destroy it. f the enemyforce were large, the troop woulduse mines and its limited firepower only to the extent necessary to disengage and run. Thetroop would evacuate the area bya preplanned withdrawal roUte.At the same time it would callfor tactical airpower to subjectthe general area of the enemy slocation to bomb and rocket attack.I fully realize there will be adelay time between the requestfor tactical air and the actualstrike. I also appreciate the factthat pilots of the fighter bomberswould not be able to see the

FEBRUARY 1966

enemy because of concealment onthe ground. This simply meansthey will have to be employed asan area weapon, like artillery,rather than point target towhich fighter pilots are more accustomed.

Bomb and rocket attacks undersuch condi tions would miss moreoften than hit, but they wouldnot miss by very far. I, therefore,ask you to imagine the effect onthe morale of an enemy forcethat has been subjected to a nearmiss bombing attack four timesin the past 30 days, and has noth-ing but the next four attacks tolook forward to.

During the conduct of what Icall itinerant occupation or promiscuous interdiction, the major-ity of troop landings will be seenand reported to the enemy. Fivehelicopters do make a lot of noiseand if people are within a fewmiles of where they land, theodds are tha t they are going toknow and report it to the enemy.The odds are equally good thatthese same people will report tothe enemy if the helicopters take

off again. Knowing this, the destroyer concept is designed totake advantage of the fact by mak-ing 1 or 15 landings within afew hours over an area of manysquare miles. A seven man destroyer team would be intention-ally left at one or two of the 15landing si tes.

It then becomes the enemy sproblem to determine which ofthe 15 sites are safe if he wantsto use any of the area. Twological methods are available tothe enemy for making this determination. One would be toassemble a reasonably sized combat force and sweep the area.This would be the method wewould most like the enemy t use,but it would be wishful thinkingto expect him to do so. Thesecond and more logical methodwould be to send one man, orbetter still a small group of non-combatants, through the area tosee if it is occupied.

In such an event the destroyerteam would attempt to avoiddetection by taking maximum advantages of available cover andconcealment. The odds are theteam would avoid detection moreoften than not, but if they werespotted, the team leader wouldrecall his chopper, evacuate thearea in accordance wi th his preplanned withdrawal procedure,and hope for better luck nexttime.

In A New Kind of War Isaid: Normally, the helicopterswould remain immediately withthe troop while on the ground.When personnel are intentionallyleft in an area, or the helicoptercannot land due to terrain, pri-

Landing and taking off at 10-15 sitesover several square miles and within afew hours confuses the enemy) denieshim secure terrain, restricts his mobility especially when one or two 7-mandestroyer teams are left at one or moreof the sites23


26/52

mary and alternate pickup areaswould be designated beforehand.

I have been challenged on twopoints in this statement. The firstis that the helicopters cannot beshut down outside of securedareas because the VC will destroythem. Here, I think the correctanswer lies in wh4t constitutes asecure area. The five helicopterswould always be together whileon the ground anq. a minimumof 30 men would be available forsecuring the area. Two helicopters would carry AN jPPS 4 shortrange radar sets for use during allground time. Personnel would beplaced in pairs around the perimeter of the landing zone tomaintain a listening watch, andantipersonnel mines would beextensively employed.

At the first sign of enemyactivity, the area would be evacuated. Normally, evacuationwould be to a location alreadyoccupied by one of the troop'sseven man destroyer teams. Suchaction would be equally possibleat night. If due to terrain, nolanding site were available formany miles, the ships might flyto or operate from one of ourlarge bases. This would be a lastchoice, but it would be an available course of action. f suchaction were to take place, theleader of any team left in an areawould be advised to predicate hisactions on the assumption thatpickup could require as much astwo hours and to act accordingly.

The second question raised atthis point concerned methods tobe used in placing teams on theground and extricating them whenlanding sites are not available. Adestroyer troop would use amethod of rappelling only to theextent necessary to land limitednumbers of men in otherwise inaccessible areas. The same methods would be unsatisfactory if themission required the landing oflarge numbers of men.24

The object of the destroyermovement through ince

Standard rappelling methods tion capabilities have been emproved inadequate during testing ployed. In fact, what continues tobecause of difficulty in deploy- be cal led Eagle operations havement of ropes in heavy vegetation for more than a year been reconand the requirement that rappel- naissance elements for muchlers use both hands for guiding larger, heliborne or immediateand braking during descent. reac tions forces. The arrival of anThese problems were corrected by airmobile division in Vietnamthe simple expediency of rappel- will most surely greatly increaseling into the top of the tallest our immediate reactiol1 capabilitree in the area and then climb- ties. However, before our expectaing down the tree to the ground. tions result in too much over-

This procedure employs the confidence, we should review thes t ~ n d r d Swiss saddle system, position.but all descent and braking is Large heliborne forces arecontrolled by a rope master, who basically a daylight only operaretains the free end of the rappel- tion. Most guerrilla work is atling rope inside the helicopter. night. Like much of the underAs a result, there is no need to developed areas of the world, welldeploy the rope and the rappeller over half of Vietnam is inacceshas both hands free for making sible to large heliborne operationshis way into the top of the selected due to ground vegetation. A reactree. Extrication is accomplished tion force is defensive by natureby loading back into the heli- in that its reaction is predicatedcopter from the top of a tree by on an enemy action. As such, ita 7 foot rigid metal ladder which becomes subject, on a granderis easily attached to the skid of a scale, to the same disadvantageshovering helicopter. that affected the original EagleI know the above procedures concept.sound difficult and dangerous. The concept of reconnaissanceHowever, this simply is not true. forces finding and of immediateDuring demonstrations of the re- reaction forces fixing and destroyloading procedure at Fort Bragg, ing a guerrilla force is a fine tacwe frequently loaded volunteers tic only if it can be made to work.from the audience into helicop- So far the tactic has been sinters from the tops of 80 foot trees. gularly unsuccessful. It has re-

l t has been suggested that de- peatedly been tried employingstroyer troops might be used for forces up to several battalions,gathering intelligence and per- and ~ e p e t e d l y the results haveforming reconnaissance duty, but been negligible in relation to thethe real need is for large, im- resources and effort expended inmediate reaction forces capable carrying out the operation.of closing with and destroying the Most enemy casu4lties duringguerrilla once he has been located. such operations are a result ofOf course, such immediate reac- airstrikes, not ground action. Like .



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t is to neutr lize guerrillnd rocket tt ck

ground operations air actions areequally discouraging when measured in terms of results versus resources expended. On many oc-casions enemy confirmed casualties have numbered less than onekilled per fighter sortie flown.This phenomenon can only bethe result of inadequate intelligence concerning the enemy forcesand a failure to appreciate theextraordinary logic of guerrillatactics.

The guerrilla has been described as a coward because hewill run rather than fight, andhas even been known to abandonhis f ~ i l y to the gentle ministra-ions of an advancing enemy. Asunchivalrous as such actions maybe, they do prevent what wouldotherwise be the annihilation ofthe entire guerrilla force in question .Terrain in underdevelopedareas lends itself very well toguerrilla retreat whenever necessary. Guerrilla tactics dictate thatarea evacuatiol1 plans be available at all times. Due to groundconcealment the guerrilla canavoid being spotted from the airif he wants to, and he moves sooften that any other intelligenceas to his location is normally toolate to be of much value.

From the communist guerrillapoint of view there is no suchthing as a significant terrain.Therefore he is seldom willing tomount a determined defense ofany given piece of real estate. Asa result, when the guerrilla findshis area infested with 2,000 or3,000 enemy troops, he can easilyFEBRUARY 1966

deploy 50 or 100 snipers to delaythe enemy advance while the bulkof his forces evacuate the areaaccording to plan. It is seldompossible to block this evacuationbecause of ample concealment inthe area. I maintain that it is notreasonable to expect to engage aretreating guerrilla with a forcegreater than 20 men. This isbecause a larger force can enjoylittle hope of deceiving a retreating guerrilla as to its locationwhich means the advantage ofsurprise is lost.

We cannot expect a retreatingguerrilla to attack a blockingforce if he has any other choice.

; whole tactic is predicated ona oiding contact whenever helacks the advantage. Indeed whyshould he fight? After our 2,000or 3,000 men have thrashed aboutin the bush for a few days, wewill evacuate the area and theenemy wins it back by default.In the meantime we have exhausted our troops, expended tonsof ordnance both air and groundand we have killed or captured70 or 80 of the enemy. We havealso lost a number of men becausewe cannot expect 100 snipers with3,000 potential targets to be altogether ineffective.I believe large immediate reaction forces, which are, in effect,nothing more tp.an tactical airassaults, would prove highly successful against a conventionalground force but not a guerrillaenemy. The objective of the guerrilla is to employ mobility concealment and surprise for however long is required to provide

a political situation conducive tocomplete communist takeover.Normally such a favorable political climate can be expected immediately following an overwhelming military victory, sllchas that enjoyed by Hanoi at DienBien Phu in 1954.

Dien Bien Phu was a deliberateattempt on the part of the Frenchto draw the Vietminh forces intoopen battle in place of the gllerrilla tactics on which they hadhitherto concentrated. The fortress was to be supplied by air andthe French were confident theycould stand up to any onslaught.Dien Bien Phu is now history andwe know the Navarre Plannamed for the French commanderin Indochina was wrong.

Had Dien Bien Phu had accessto the sea for resupply, or hadthe French forces in Indochinaincluded an air assault division,I doubt that Dien Bien Phuwould have ever oq urred. Thepreponderance of advantagewould have been with the Frenchnot the Vietminh and the communist guerrilla never revealshimself until he is sure of theadvantage. By virtue of this fact,the communist would have continued with guerrilla tactics untilthe balance of advantage hadshifted further to his favor.

The concept of employingthousands of conventional troopsto defeat a guerrilla movement isbased on the proposition thatwith such overwhelming power itis possible to close with and kill,or capture the enemy guerrillathus ending the war. I feel thisconcept cannot work, simplybecause troops in large numberscannot find the enemy. In addition, such a policy is very expensive and can result in nothingbut unqualified disaster for anygovernment lacking access to theUnited States mint. Even the resources of the American treasurybecome questionable if the com-

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munist elect t perpetrate two orthree simultaneous Vietnams atother locations in the free world.

Contrary to the mass conventional force theory, the destroyerconcept is based on the assumption that it is not possible to killor capture all members of a guerrilla movement; In fact, it is noteven desirable. The object of thedestroyer theory is to neutralizea guerrilla movement through incessant ambush harassment andbomb and rocket attack. Guerrillaopera tions and tactics are particularly vulnerable to this typetactic because of the constant needto keep moving.

Unlike the overland movementof conventional forces, guerrillaforces must move to assemblyareas in small groups by manydiverse rou tes. Much of this movement is at night, is time consuming, and should be extremelyvulnerable to destroyer tactics.Guerrilla assembly areas arealways located within a reasonable distance of intended objectives. Attack follows as soon aftercompletion of assembly as is possible. This is because the guerrillamust avoid maintaining large concentrations of troops at any givenlocation for very long periods.

Now let s consider a hypotheti-cal situation. Assume a destroyertroop working a given area madecontact at 2300 hours with a smallnumber of men moving along anobscure route. When challenged,the men bolted. In the ensuingfight one of the enemy was caphired and was persuaded to tell the location of an assembly areaat which his group was due toarrive at dawn.At this point the conventional-ist theory dictates that largenumbers of heliborne troops,abundantly supported with tactical air, converge on the suspectedarea in an attempt to close withand kill, or capture, the enemy.Such a plan requires time, during26

which there is a very good chancethe pending attack would be compromised to the enemy. The hopeof retaining the element of surprise would be questionable inei ther respect, and the effortwouldn t be worth it if we suffered so much as one casualty.

The destroyer approach to thisproblem would be different. Thesuspected assembly area would besubjected only to bombing attack.In fact, we would ask for B-52sand a 500 ton operation, if possible. f immediate reaction heliborne forces were available, theymight be used, but only to reinforce possible enemy objectives invicinity of the guerrilla assemblyarea. In this event, even if thebombing attacks failed, the enemywould still be forced to call offhis intended attack because thereinforcements would shift thebalance of advantage, inclUdingsurprise, away from the guerrilla.

At this juncture, imagine theposi tion of the guerrilla commander. He commands a 1200man force of hard core and irregular troops. He has just been sub-jected to a heavy bombing attackwhich missed him by a half mile,but it s very possible the bombersmay soon return. His forces areall carefully rehearsed in aplanned early evening attack on a400 man enemy garrison 7 milesaway. He is convinced that his planis at least partially compromised inview of the bombings. To furtherruin his day, he learns his intended objective is being reinforced by an unknown numberof enemy regulars. At this point,he rules out the attack and ordersevacuation of the assembly area.The evacuation, or disassembly,must be accomplished in the samemanner as was the assembly. Theguerrilla force breaks up intosmall groups. The men begin tomake their way back to theirjungle redoubts or to the villageswhere they live or are garrisoned.

In the meantime, DestroyeGroup Headquarters, having anticipated this enemy action, hasnot been idle. Two destroyersquadrons consisting of five troopseach, which normally operate in

r e ~ s up to more than 200 milesfrom the enemy assembly areahave been contacted. Group hasassigned squadron quadrants ofresponsibility ranging to within3 miles of the suspected enemyassembly area. By daylight ten 44man troops have commencedinterdiction operations along alllogical enemy withdrawal routesstemming from within 3 milesand up to 15 miles of the sus-

Destroyer troopthe premise thmobility m xi

rnent surprueit s possible to

w y from gpected enemy location.

This operation will last for atleast 48 hours. Then the troopsinvolved will return to theirnormal assigned areas of p r ~ -tion. Will the operation be a success? By conventional standardsit will not, because the enemyforce will not be killed or captured to the man. By destroyerstandards the operation will be asuccess even if our teams neversee a guerrilla. This is because theenemy s intended attack will beprevented, and if the guerrilla issuccessful in avoiding ten destroyer troops he can only do soat considerable inconvenience.



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The odds are the enemy couldnot avoid all of our teams working the area, which means thatsome of the guerrillas would bekilled. What happens if the guerrilla moves in larger bands andis therefore more than a matchfor a destroyer team? In such acase the des troyer team runs.After all, the guerrilla holds nofranchise on the right or abilityto hide in a jungle. Pursuit atsuch a time would be very unlikely, in that the enemy himselfis running.

f the size of the enemy forcewarranted tactical air attack, co-ordination should not be too diffi-

ene ,,.cult to arrange. Otherwise thetroop has eight airmobile 7.62mg to liven up the enemy area.Again, neither tactical air nor atroop s machineguns stand a fairchance of being effective, but theydo not have to be. Place yourselfin the position of the individualguerrilla. You are scared, tiredand hungry. You failed in yourobjective and you know it. Youhave almost walked into an ambush twice in the past 2 hours;you have repeatedly heard helicopters, jets, bombs, and gunfiresince you departed the assemblyarea. Imagine the war stories such

man might tell if and when heFEBRUARY 1966

makes it back to his village undersuch circumstances. Such warstories become rumors, bad rumors for enemy morale.Are we going t send a force

into the area bombed by ourB-52s? Maybe, in a week or so.We will know soon enough if thebombs were effective. f they were,destroyer teams will encounterenemy wounded being evacuatedfrom the area. Indeed, t attemptentry immediately following theattack would be foolish, since itwould force the guerrilla commander to meet our entry withsnipers and result in unnecessarycasualties. Our objective was todisrupt the enemy s plan andcause him to move. Of course, wewould like to score with ourbombs and we can't be so unlikelyas to miss all the time. However,in either respect, the bomberscould be expected to accomplishour intended objectives.

t is to be hoped that constantharassment of the guerrilla movements will, in time, force theenemy to give up overt guerrillaactions. This should lead tocovert and passive type resistance.Once this goal is attained, thepossibility of a stable governmentbecomes more a reality. Withstable government, the prospectsof success for economic and socialprograms are greatly increased.

The destroyer troop concept isbased on the premise that throughsuperior mobility, maximum useof concealment, surprise, andtactical airpower it is possible totake the initiative away from aguerrilla enemy. Constant harassment all over the country shoulddemoralize the guerrilla and causehim t lose confidence in both hisleaders and the movement. Thetheory is that seven men and ahelicopter can succeed where a700 man force would fail. f true,it would be fully possible to reverse the currently accepted position, that it is necessary to out-

number the guerrilla by a 10 to 1ratio. Successful employment ofthe destroyer concept could reasonably result in the much moresatisfactory ratio of one antiguerrilla for every 100 guerrillas.

It has been said that air assaultorganizations are fully capable ofemploying destroyer tactics. Iagree. However, I feel it would beequally true to say that any groupof aviators and infantrymenequipped with helicopters can employ the tactic, if they are firsttrained in the procedures.I have said that there are fewprinciples that apply to destroyertactics, and that the aviators andinfantrymen who would make upa destroyer troop would requireonly limited additional training.I still feel the principles are fewand the training is simple, butboth are very essential.

All military science becomesa matter of simple prudence, itsprincipal object being to keep anunstable balance from shiftingsuddenly to our disadvantage andthe proto-war from changing intototal war. I'm sure when Clausewitz wrote that statement he didnot have guerrillas in mind. N onetheless, I feel his quotation findsample application in SoutheastAsia today. For hundreds of years,armies have been seeking an adequate solution to guerrilla tactics.In view of the communist threatduring the past 20 years, westernarmies have devoted a great dealof attention to the guerrilla problem. Even so, we seemingly haveyet to find an answer.

In my opinion, surely there isas much reason to believe that thedestroyer concept will work as tobelieve that it will not work.

In view of the current buildupof tens of thousands of men andthe expenditure of hundreds ofmillions of dollars in Vietnam,surely we can afford what the testing of one destroyer troop mightcost.

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Oh my, another personal survival kitarticle" "Sure made up a survival kit btltdon't recall where put it It's not my job to make up a survivalkit. That's the Army's responsibility "

Passport to SafetyCaptain John J. Spisak Member of the Survival Escape andEvasion Committee Dept. of Tactics USAAVNS Ft Rucker Ala.

T OO OFTEN the experiencedand overconfident aviatordisregards his shortcomings orthose inherent in the aircraft thathe operates. He fails to realizethat he can become a statistic andneed medical, emergency, or survival assistance.

Contrary to popular opinionthe standard aeronautic first aidkit which we check for a safetyseal during preflight is not a survival kit and it was never intended to be used this way. It isa first aid kit and only that.

Each crewmember needs to havean individual personal survival28

ki t as part of his regular flyinggear. t is quite possible thatstandard issue kits may be lost orabandoned or not even be carriedin the aircraft. Therefore thispersonally prepared kit must becapable of replacing rather thansupplementing the standard kit.

The kit must be compact andlightweight to ensure that it doesnot use excessive cockpi t or cargospace or exceed weight limits ofthe various aircraft flown by theaviator fig. 1 . It must be adaptable for use in the terrain andclimatic conditions to be encountered. The flight gear worn by

the individual aviator and his personal preferences will determinethe exact contents of the kit.Obviously, the contents of eachkit will vary to some degree, butthe primary items for consideration will include:

Medical needs-bandages disinfectants, painkillers.Game procurement - cutting

edge, snare wire, gill nets,fish line and hooks.

Cooking and heating needs -fire starter tinfoil, matches,water containers purificationtablets.



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Foods-soups, sugar, food seasoning, morale factors i.e.,candy, soluble coffee or tea).Navigation aids-compass, tactical maps.Signaling - flashlight, flares,

mirror.The real crime of it all is the

Figure 1. Survival kits are bulky andawkward and fit uncomfortably in {lightsuits. Usually two are carried Whichincreases d iscomfort.

Here s a new way to be sureyou ll always have a survivalkit with youaviator s act of omission in hisfailure to carry the survival kiton every flight in which he participates.Even though these prepared orhomemade kits are lightweight,durable, waterproof and compact,they present an awkward andbulky mass when stuffed into theflight suit or jammed into theflight jacket. The one item acrewman does have which is theideal carrier for this kit is thehelmet cover or helmet bag. Withonly a minimum of time andexpense this bag can be altered toaccommodate the kit.

Modification is made by cuttinga piece of fatigue cloth as shownin figure 2 and sewing it to thehelmet bag. The resulting pocketsare large enough to accommoda te

the PSI-2 or the newly developedSurvival Evasion, and Escape KitSEEK) . These extra pockets canbe used to carry additional maps,a flashlight, or a signaling devicesuch as the Mark 13 flare. Whenthe helmet bag must be turnedin for any reason, the modification can be removed withoutdamage to the bag.

Final modification fig. 3 isthe snaplink or other devicewhich will enable the airman toattach the bag to a D-ring on theparachute. The bag, minus thehelmet, now becomes an easilystowed package which will be accessible to the crewman and at

Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1966

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Transcript of Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1966