ARMY AVIATION AND THE MISSION COMMAND WARFIGHTING …

ARMY AVIATION AND THE MISSION COMMAND WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

Art of War Scholars

by

WYATT A. BRITTEN, MAJ, ARMY B.S., The University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, Texas, 2006

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2017

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

ii

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Army Aviation and the Mission Command Warfighting Function

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6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Wyatt Anthony Britten

5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

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12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT This qualitative research in the field of the Mission Command Warfighting Function with a focus on Army Aviation battalions, examines Army and Army Aviation doctrine to assist commanders, staffs, and aviators in the execution of operations. The research explores ways that Army Aviation battalions can train the Mission Command Warfighting Function at home station.

15. SUBJECT TERMS Army Aviation, Mission Command, Mission Command Warfighting Function, Mission Command System, Mission Command Information Systems, Training, Mission Training Complex 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Wyatt A. Britten Thesis Title: Army Aviation and the Mission Command Warfighting Function Approved by: , Thesis Committee Chair Wilburn E. Meador, M.A. , Member Stephen E. Brown, M.S. , Member Gates M. Brown, Ph.D. Accepted this 9th day of June 2017 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Prisco R. Hernandez, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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ABSTRACT

ARMY AVIATION AND THE MISSION COMMAND WARFIGHTING FUNCTION, by MAJ Wyatt Anthony Britten, 82 pages. This qualitative research in the field of the Mission Command Warfighting Function with a focus on Army Aviation battalions, examines Army and Army Aviation doctrine to assist commanders, staffs, and aviators in the execution of operations. The research explores ways that Army Aviation battalions can train the Mission Command Warfighting Function at home station.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The genesis of this study was formed in the worn seats of OH-58 helicopter at the

National Training Center. Both in following attack reconnaissance helicopter platoons

and companies, and in observing aviation task force operations in support of ground

maneuver, there formed an appreciation for the difficulty of creating a shared

understanding of the breadth, depth, and chaos of high-intensity battle. I am grateful to

the Senior Aviation Trainer at the NTC, Colonel Kelsey Smith, for his coaching and

mentorship. I am also thankful for my former battalion commander, Colonel Bernard

Harrington, for the indoctrination of the value of systems and processes. I am grateful for

the Art of War Scholars Program led by Dr. Dean Nowowiejski. The program and my

fellow Art of War Scholars encouraged me through this task. Thanks go to Major John

Bolton for the introduction to the program. I am thankful for numerous professionals

from the Mission Command Center of Excellence, The National Simulations Center, The

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, The Department of Doctrine and Training at the

Army Aviation Center of Excellence, The Army Aviation Directorate of Simulations,

specifically the Director, Mr. Wade Becnel. These professionals were gracious with their

time and knowledge. Their efforts to take the complexity of mission command and make

it manageable for the warfighter is commendable. I am thankful for my committee, Mr.

Bud Meador, Mr. Stephen Brown, and Dr. Gates Brown for their guidance and

encouragement through this research. Thanks to COL Richard Martin for coaching me to

define the problem and connecting me to the Army Aviation enterprise. Lastly, I am

grateful for the love and support of my wife Karrin, daughters Carson and Elliot, and son

Carter. They are my why.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............ iii

ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... vi

ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................... viii

ILLUSTRATIONS ..............................................................................................................x

TABLES ............................................................................................................................ xi

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1

The Research Question ................................................................................................... 2 Assumptions .................................................................................................................... 2 Definition of Key Terms ................................................................................................. 3 Limitations ...................................................................................................................... 5 Scope and Delimitations ................................................................................................. 6 Significance of Study ...................................................................................................... 6 Summary and Conclusions ............................................................................................. 7

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ..............................................................................8

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 8 Relevant Writings ........................................................................................................... 8 Aviation Doctrine ......................................................................................................... 17 Mission Command Center of Excellence ..................................................................... 18 Contribution of this Work ............................................................................................. 23

CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................25

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 25 Information Collection for Research Questions ........................................................... 25 Methodology ................................................................................................................. 27 Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................. 27

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS .................................................................................................28

Introduction, Purpose, and Organization ...................................................................... 28 Types of Command Posts ............................................................................................. 28

vii

Command Post Organization ........................................................................................ 32 Mission Command System ........................................................................................... 34 Personnel ....................................................................................................................... 35 Networks ....................................................................................................................... 38 Information Systems ..................................................................................................... 41 Processes and Procedures ............................................................................................. 44 Operations Process ........................................................................................................ 45 Standard Operating Procedures .................................................................................... 48 Battle Drills ................................................................................................................... 49 Facilities and Equipment .............................................................................................. 50 Training ......................................................................................................................... 51 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 59

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION ........................................60

Introduction, Purpose, and Organization ...................................................................... 60 Summary, Interpretation, and Implications of Findings ............................................... 60 Unexpected Findings .................................................................................................... 62 Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 64 For Further Study .......................................................................................................... 65 Unanswered questions .................................................................................................. 66

GLOSSARY ......................................................................................................................67

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................................................................69

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ACRONYMS

ADP Army Doctrine Publication

ADRP Army Doctrine Reference Publication

AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

AMPS Aviation Mission Planning System

ATP Army Techniques Publication

ATX Aviation Training Exercise

AVCATT Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer

BAE Brigade Aviation Element

BCT Brigade Combat Team

BFT Blue Force Tracker

BFTII Blue Force Tracker II

CAB Combat Aviation Brigade

CAS Close Air Support

COP Common Operational Picture

CPOF Command Post of the Future

CPX Command Post Exercise

CUOPs Current Operations

DCGS-A Distributed Common Ground System Army

DS Direct Support

FM Field Manual

FTX Field Training Exercise

FUOPs Future Operations

JCATS Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation

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JCR Joint Capabilities Release

JCR-L Joint Capabilities Release Logistics

MCIS Mission Command Information System

MCN Mission Command Network

MCS Mission Command System

MCWFF Mission Command Warfighting Function

MTC Mission Training Complex

OC-T Observer Coach Trainer

OSRVT One System Remote Viewing Terminal

PED Processing Exploitation and Dissemination

SOP Standing Operating Procedure

STAFFEX Staff Exercise

TAC Tactical Command Post

UAS Unmanned Aircraft System

VBS3 Virtual Battlespace 3

x

ILLUSTRATIONS

Page Figure 1. Overview of the Exercise of Mission Command .............................................16

Figure 2. Constructive, Virtual, and Live Training Concept Sketch ...............................23

Figure 3. Planning Cells Time Horizon...........................................................................34

Figure 4. Mission Command System ..............................................................................35

Figure 5. Common Operational Picture Mediums ..........................................................44

Figure 6. The Operations Process Underlying Logic ......................................................47

Figure 7. Unit Mission Command Training Progression ................................................54

Figure 8. Army Aviation Gated Training Strategy ..........................................................58

xi

TABLES

Page Table 1. Home Station ...................................................................................................19

Table 2. Main CP’s Primary Functions ..........................................................................29

Table 3. 16th CAB ATX Training Objectives ...............................................................56

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I was an Observer Coach-Trainer (OC-T) at the National Training Center from

September of 2014 to May of 2016. My duties allowed observation of section, platoon,

and company maneuver of attack helicopters working independently and in a combined

arms role with ground forces. The OC-T radio network and observation role created a

unique perspective where I had situational understanding of enemy and friendly

maneuver plans, a real-time observation of the actions by attack helicopters, and a

rudimentary understanding of the aviation task force staff’s read on the battle. Although

the Aviation Training, Analysis, and Feedback Facility didn’t explicitly track the time

gap of understanding between aviators who were in the fight and the aviation task force

staff, my personal qualitative assessment was a general range between fifteen and thirty

minutes from the time of action to the time of information received by the aviation task

force staff. Within the maneuver distances of the National Training Center, thirty minutes

was sufficient time for enemy mechanized infantry to infiltrate friendly lines to attack

and destroy command posts. Army attack aviation’s superior maneuverability provides

brigade, division, and corps commanders an agile and lethal force to reinforce

vulnerabilities and exploit successes. Timely and effective employment of the mission

command warfighting function (MCWFF) is a linchpin in correctly orienting this agile

and lethal maneuver force. Army Aviation commanders and staffs can improve the

MCWFF. They can do this by understanding how to conduct mission command, how

their Mission Command System (MCS) connects forces in the tactical environment and

being aware of ways to train the MCWFF at home station. Attack aviation companies,

2

troops, battalion and task force staffs should understand and execute mission command as

members of the combined arms team. The purpose of this study is to understand how

Army Aviation battalions execute the MCWFF to aid commanders, staffs, and aviators in

its effective application.

The Research Question

This paper will attempt to address an Army Aviation battalion’s capability to

execute the MCWFF. The primary research question asks how does an aviation battalion

execute the MCWFF? Two secondary questions follow. First, how does an aviation

battalion’s MCS facilitate the MCWFF? Secondly, what ways are available to aviation

units for home station training their MCS?

Assumptions

(1) Rotary wing aviation will play decisive roles in unified land operations while

operating across the depth and breadth of the area of operations. (2) The capability to

maneuver long distances, at high speed, and avoid detection will be sought by

commanders to gain marked advantages over enemy forces. (3) Long maneuver distances

will challenge the range and reliability of mission command information systems (MCIS)

to communicate between aviators and their staffs. (4) Airspace will be contested by the

enemy.

Interoperability is a challenge to the Army’s MCISs amongst ground maneuver,

aviation maneuver, and fires platforms. Each branch of the Army is constrained by the

size, weight, and power requirements of MCISs. Space is a constraint on helicopters,

ground vehicles, and foot Soldiers and this limitation will affect the size of systems

3

allocated to each branch. The weight of the MCIS is a concern to helicopters as it affects

center of gravity and decreases the available power margin to the helicopter. The amount

of power that an MCIS requires to operate correlates to the number of power supplies that

must be carried. This requirement may have little consequence to the mounted Soldier,

but it will have a significant effect on the foot Soldier.1

Definition of Key Terms

The Army defines mission command as, “The exercise of authority and direction

by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the

commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land

operations.”2 The Army’s Mission Command Philosophy is a concept of control. Within

this concept, higher commanders issue directives and intent to subordinate commanders.

The subordinate commanders are trusted to deviate from the directives, when conditions

at the point of action differ from those anticipated in the planning process, and when the

subordinate commander can act to accomplish the mission within the boundaries of his

higher commander’s intent. This philosophy is rooted in the acknowledgment that Army

operations are executed by humans, and takes advantage of the human potential for

making decisions at the point of action.

The MCWFF is comprised of the systems and processes that define the

operational environment, allow staffs to support their commanders, enable

1 Charles Chamberlain, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 12,

2017.

2 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), Glossary-2.

4

communication of information, receive and issue guidance, with higher, lower, and

adjacent units, to accomplish missions. Mission Command Philosophy is an idea whereas

the MCWFF is the collection of systems and process that executes synchronization,

coordination, and direction. The MCWFF gets work done. The Army defines the

MCWFF as, “The related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities

enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order

to integrate the other warfighting functions.”3

Mission orders are the mechanism through which directives are issued in the

Army. Mission orders follow a format that allocates resources through task organization.

The task organization is the official composition of units that are available for the

conduct of the operation. Mission orders explain the operating environment, provide a

purpose for the operation through the mission statement and provide focus areas in the

commander’s intent. Mission orders describe the concept of the operation, give a

minimum number of tasks to subordinate units for execution, and provide minimal

coordinating instructions. The concept is for the higher commander, supported by his

staff, to macro-manage. The higher commander is not focused on detailed planning so as

not to limit the initiative of the subordinate commander. This is not to imply that the

higher commander issues mission orders and then forgets about the operation. The higher

commander remains engaged to re-allocate resources as necessary to achieve the overall

3 Ibid., Glossary-2.

5

concept of the operation and ensure mission accomplishment.4 The Army defines mission

orders as, “Directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how

they are to achieve them.”5

An MCS is the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems,

processes & procedures, and facilities & equipment that supports the philosophy of

mission command as well as the mission command war fighting function.6

Limitations

This thesis uses unclassified information only. “For Official Use Only” material

was not used in the formation of this body of work. This increases the distribution

breadth for the work but constrains the depth of information to which it will analyze,

describe, and make conclusions from.

The bias of the investigator should be recognized as an aviation practitioner and

observer who watched MCISs fail to connect aviators and staffs within an actionable

timeframe in high-intensity conflict during live simulations at the National Training

Center. This preconceived idea of the effectiveness of MCISs could obscure the

researcher’s in-depth understanding of system capabilities, limitations, and alternatives to

the current systems.

4 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication

(ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-4.

5 Ibid., Glossary-2.

6 Ibid.

6

Scope and Delimitations

This study will assess the efficacy of Army Aviation battalion staffs to execute

the MCWFF and provide actionable information to aviation pilots and staffs at echelons

of command from brigade to section. The application of the MCSs is focused on major

campaigns and operations. Major campaigns and operations are combat actions against

opponents of similar organization and equipment. This does not detract from the study’s

applicability to contingency operations, but the logic is to primarily consider combat

against a near-peer threat in a contested environment. This study will explore ways of

communicating across the breadth and depth of the area of operations with a maneuver

asset that has a deep reach with the ability to exceed line of sight communications.

This study acknowledges that there are interoperability challenges with MCISs

connecting joint and multinational partners; however, this challenge exceeds the scope of

this study and shall be excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, and quite significantly,

there exist great threats to the connectivity of the MCISs, in domains of air, space, and

cyber. Again, these challenges, though significant to the functionality of MCISs, present

too many variables to analyze with the resources available to this study. Therefore, this

study will analyze the efficacy of MCISs while operating under normal conditions.

Normal conditions imply no jamming, spoofing, or atmospheric degradation that would

impair the intended functionality of the MCIS.

Significance of Study

This study will describe how an Army Aviation battalion staff executes the

MCWFF. Through this understanding, commanders, executive officers, operations

officers, and aviation leaders will have a better understanding of how to employ and train

7

their staff. The reader will develop an understanding of the major nodes and linkages of

the MCIS. From this understanding, will flow the logic of how aviators and staffs are

using the systems to fight formations. Finally, this study will describe methods of training

aviation staffs to exercise the MCWFF at home station. The methods provided will help

commanders, executive officers, and operations officers program mission command

training into their training calendar.

The results of this study could help commanders and staffs understand how the

MCIS fits into their mission command process. Additionally, it may prevent an

overreliance on the MCIS for over the horizon communications in the deep zone and

offer solutions to this challenge. Advances in technology throughout warfighting

functions have changed the ways in which the next war will be fought. Army Aviation

should leverage all mission command tools, to include networks, orders, trust, and

acceptable risk. This study could help commanders and staffs leverage the MCSs

strengths and mitigate its weaknesses to achieve overmatch against enemy forces.

Summary and Conclusions

Understanding how Army Aviation employs its MCWFF will allow commanders,

staffs, and aviators to thrive and innovate within their organization. This study will

broaden the reader’s considerations on how Army Aviation battalion staffs execute the

MCWFF. It will challenge the weight that Army Aviation places on MCISs and offer a

way to train battalion staffs at home station. Lastly, from an improved understanding of

Army Aviation mission command, the reader will form questions to ask in the event that

MCISs are not operating in a normal environment.

8

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to understand how Army Aviation battalions execute

the MCWFF to aid commanders, staffs, and aviators in its effective application. The

primary research question asks how does an aviation battalion execute the MCWFF? Two

secondary questions follow. First, how does an aviation battalion’s MCS facilitate the

MCWFF? Secondly, what ways are available to aviation units for home station training

on their MCS? This chapter will discuss the literature that has been written on Army

Aviation mission command and explains the additions that this paper will make to Army

Aviation mission command.

Relevant Writings

Army Aviation Branch is guided by the Army Doctrine Reference Publication

(ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command. This capstone piece of Army doctrine explains mission

command in three chapters. The first chapter explains the exercise of mission command

through the nature of military operations, Unified Land Operations and Mission

Command, and the Army’s approach to mission command. The second chapter describes

the mission command philosophy of by using principles of command, art of command,

science of control, and application of the mission command philosophy. Chapter three

9

explains the Army’s approach to the MCWFF. Three sections are used in chapter three,

the definition and purpose of the MCWFF, MCWFF tasks, and MCSs.7

ADRP 6-0 is foundational to Army Aviation mission command doctrine. To

achieve combined arms maneuver, solely within the Army service, Army branches must

collaborate in their efforts for systems development and to reach the goal of shared

understanding. ADRP 6-0 begins by describing the operational environment of war. The

manual describes the nature of military operations as complex and ever changing. Each

side, enemy and friendly, have their own objectives; and, neither side will remain

stationary to allow the other to execute plans as planned. The human variables do not

allow an algorithm to solve the problem of military conflict. Leaders must be able to

work in complex environments, with a fluid state of operational variables, and utilize

their experiences to anticipate outcomes, and implement timely actions that are more

successful than their enemy.8

The Army’s approach to mission command begins with, “To function effectively

and have the greatest chance for mission accomplishment, commanders, supported by

their staffs, exercise mission command throughout the conduct of operations.”9 Further,

the “exercise of mission command” is defined as how staffs and commanders combine

mission command as a philosophy and as a warfighting function. Mission command

philosophy acknowledges that war is a human endeavor and is filled with the

7 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 6-0, i.

8 Ibid., 1-1.

9 Ibid., 1-2.

10

complexities of human behavior. It trusts in the individual discipline of subordinates and

avoids levying discipline from above. Mission command philosophy is akin to art. There

is not a checklist to follow to be successful at the mission command philosophy. Too

many variables exist to form an equation that will always yield a favorable outcome. In

light of this reality, ADRP 6-0 instead offers principles to follow: trust, shared

understanding, clearly communicated commander’s intent, disciplined initiative, use of

mission orders, and accepting prudent risk are guideposts for leaders. The MCWFF is the

science of mission command. It is a collection of systems and processes that are

observable, measurable, and repeatable. The MCWFF connects commanders and staffs to

higher, lower, and adjacent units. ADRP 6-0 defines Mission Command as a Philosophy

and Mission Command as a Warfighting Function as follows.

As the Army’s philosophy of command, mission command emphasizes that command is essentially a human endeavor. Successful commanders understand that their leadership directs the development of teams and helps to establish mutual trust and shared understanding throughout the force. Commander’s provide a clear intent to their forces that guides subordinates’ actions while promoting freedom of action and initiative. Subordinates, by understanding the commander’s intent and the overall common objective, are then able to adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting opportunities. They are given the latitude to accomplish assigned tasks in a manner that best fits the situation. Subordinates understand that they have an obligation to act and synchronize their actions with the rest of the force. Likewise, commanders influence the situation and provide direction and guidance while synchronizing their own operations. They encourage subordinates to take actions, and they accept prudent risks to create opportunity and to seize the initiative.10

Mission command – as a warfighting function – assists commanders in balancing the art of command with the science of control, while emphasizing the human aspects of mission command. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a

10 Ibid., 1-4.

11

common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions (ADRP 3-0). The MCWFF consists of the MCWFF tasks and the mission command system.11

The MCS is the support network that facilitates operations. This network is built

with personnel, networks, information systems, processes, and procedures, facilities and

equipment. These components are organized in a fashion that allows connectivity of

nodes and supports mission accomplishment. ADRP 6-0 makes a point to state that of the

five components in the MCS, people are the most important. The characteristics of the

personnel and their level of training on the systems, processes, procedures, and facilities

are essential for mission command to function.12

“Control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the

mission in accordance with the commander’s intent.”13 Staffs support their commander’s

ability to exercise control through coordination, integration, and synchronization. While

the overall philosophy of mission command is to allow the subordinate commander

flexibility to accomplish the mission, military operations require mass at decisive points.

Control is the mechanism that allows a higher commander to mass forces at the time and

location that will determine the outcome of an operation. “The science of control consists

of systems and procedures used to improve the commander’s understanding and support

accomplishing missions.”14 It is based upon hard evidence. Rates of march, logistics

consumption factors, capabilities of friendly and enemy troops and equipment, the

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 1-5.

13 Ibid., 2-12.

14 Ibid., 2-13.

12

mathematics of war are the bedrock of the science of control. Information,

communication, structure, and the degree of control comprise the science of control.

Information is necessary to illustrate the operating environment and from that

understanding, commanders are able to make decisions. Information requirements are any

information that the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations. For

information to answer an information requirement, that information must be accurate,

timely, usable, complete, precise, and reliable. Commanders must consider how they

configure their MCS to account for the increased volume of information and the potential

for misinformation that has come of age in digitally connected battlefields.

Overburdening staffs with the desire for complete information is time-consuming,

normally unreasonable, and can demoralize staff officers. Prioritizing information

requirements is essential to avoiding the pitfall of excessive tasking.15

Communication is important in the conduct of mission command. It is the

pathway to creating common operating picture amongst interested parties. There are

multiple means to communicate: face to face, telephone, e-mail, the internet, radio, etc.

Leaders must choose the best means of communicating for the situation and employ

communication through multiple means to reach the targeted audience. The flow of

information is in all directions. Higher, lower, and adjacent units share information to

collaborate for mission accomplishment. In person contact is normally the preferred

means of communication because non-verbal cues are best-communicated face to face. A

shortcoming of communicating in person is that the principle record is memory.

15 Ibid., 2-13.

13

Memories change over time and this necessitates creating a record of what was said in

verbal exchanges. Records of verbal communication clarify what was said and provide a

record for future analysis of operations.16

Commanders orchestrate the MCWFF through the organization of their MCS. The

MCS supports decisionmaking, manages information, plans operations, and provides the

structure for communicating information with interested parties. Personnel, networks,

information systems, processes and procedures, facilities and equipment are the five

components of an Army MCS. Warfighting is a human endeavor, and in recognition of

this reality, personnel is an important component in the MCS. Their education and

training determine their effectiveness of the other four components of the MCS. People

manage and use networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities

and equipment. The key personnel in the MCS are seconds in command, command

sergeants major, and staffs. Seconds in command are the principal assistant to the

commander and can have the authority of the commander delegated to them. The

executive officer is normally the second in command at the battalion echelon and he must

be ready to assume command at any time. This implies that the commander should

routinely communicate with the second in command to help him understand the situation

in the event that he must take over command. The command sergeant major is the senior

noncommissioned officer in the unit. He advises the commander on enlisted matters and

enforces standards of performance throughout the formation. The command sergeant

major extends the influence of command throughout the formation, provides the

16 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 6-0, 2-14.

14

commander feedback on the morale of the troops, and applies command emphasis at the

point of decisive events. The staff is the final entity that comprises the key leaders of the

personnel component of the MCS. The staff supports the commander by allowing him to

visualize the environment. The staff supports the commander, assists subordinate units,

and informs higher, lower, and adjacent units. Staffs support the commander by

providing him current information on their particular area of expertise. Staffs assist

subordinate units by coordinating resources, processing information, and representing

subordinate units’ concerns to the commander. Staffs collaborate with the staffs of

interested parties to solve problems. Staffs provide the majority of thinking power for the

unit.17 Staffs inform units and organizations outside the headquarters by passing relevant

information quickly. The relevance of information to the receiver is more important than

the completeness of the information. The information should be accurate to minimize

confusion and the staff is responsible for providing context to the receiver. Knowledge

management of databases is a way of sharing information; however, without the human

relaying why the information is important to the receiving headquarters, the information

may be unusable. The staff manages the volume of information that is shared outside of

the headquarters to prevent information overload and analysis paralysis.

The second component of the MCS is networks. Networks connect various parties

that have a need to collaborate towards a common goal. They allow commanders to

communicate and control subordinates in dynamic and static situations. Networks are not

only technological; they can also be social. The commander can create a network of two

17 Ibid., 3-9.

15

people who are acting towards a common objective. Networks help commanders connect

interested parties and move them towards a common goal.18

The third component of the MCS is information systems. Information systems are

hardware based and managed by personnel. These systems are used to collect, analyze,

and disseminate information based on the commander’s information requirements.19

The fourth component of the MCS is processes and procedures. Processes and

procedures organize activities within the headquarters and throughout the organization.

The military decision making process is an example of a process that the staff uses to

understand problems and develop solutions and communicate mission orders to the

organization. A process is not restrictive in nature and allows deviation to get to the

desired end state. A procedure is a detailed list of steps that should be completed in order

to accomplish a task or perform a function. Procedures are prescriptive in nature and

should not be deviated from. Processes and procedures increase the efficiency and

effectiveness of a staff.20

The final component of the MCS is facilities and equipment. Facilities and

equipment are arranged by the commander to accomplish his mission. Facilities range

from vehicles and tentage to hardened structures. Equipment is that which is required to

18 Ibid., 3-10.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

16

sustain the MCS. Examples include vehicles, radios, signal equipment, generators, and

lighting. Information systems are not included in facilities and equipment.21

Figure 1. Overview of the Exercise of Mission Command Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-3.

21 Ibid., 3-11.

17

Aviation Doctrine

Army Training Publication 3-04.1, Aviation Tactical Employment, discusses the

use of various MCSs to supplement standard radio communications. The Command Post

of the Future is the primary means of facilitating current and future operations. Blue

Force Tracker, internet chat programs, and voice over secure internet protocol phones

provide the communication infrastructure to coordinate with aircraft, higher and adjacent

units.22 Digital information networks created a way for the seamless and timely flow of

information between ground and air units displaced across broad space. This media

provides current operational information from a variety of sources to formations prior to

launch. These systems build the situational understanding for the staff and through the

staff’s synthesis of the current operating picture, aid in the placement of aviation

formations at decisive points. When digital systems fail, the staff must be able to quickly

identify the source of the failure, troubleshoot, and simultaneously maintain situational

understanding with analog systems. Electrical or power generation failures,

electromagnetic attacks, environmental and severe weather, higher or adjacent echelon

node failures will degrade or cause the loss of digital systems. In the event of a degraded

network, the staff will transition to analog battle tracking and communication. The degree

of success of the staff correlates to their proficiency in operating with analog systems.

Additionally, the staff must be trained and rehearsed in order to manage the transition

between digital and analog MCSs.

22 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-

04.1, Aviation Tactical Employment (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-3.

18

The Army uses FM 3-52, Airspace Control, as the doctrinal reference for

exercising airspace control and the Army refers to Joint Publication 3-52 as its parent

reference. JP 3-52 defines Airspace control as,

Airspace control increases operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace while minimizing restraints on airspace users. Airspace control includes coordinating, integrating, and regulating airspace to increase operational effectiveness. Effective airspace control reduces the risk of unintended engagements against friendly, civil, and neutral aircraft, enhances air defense operations, and permits greater flexibility of joint operations.23

Airspace management coordinates and synchronizes the missions of various users

to include aviation, fires, and maneuver to reduce risk to friendly personnel and

equipment and enable mission accomplishment. The “big sky, little bullet” concept of

airspace management places aircrews and aircraft in mitigatable risk and is an abdication

of a commander’s responsibility according to JP 3-52 and FM 3-52. While the

commander is responsible for airspace control, his staff supports him in this role.

Aviation staffs manage airspace through coordination with higher, lower, and adjacent

units; and use their MCSs to build and distribute graphics and control measures through

the planning, preparation, and execution phases of the operations process.

Mission Command Center of Excellence

The Mission Command Network Vision and Narrative published by the

Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and Army Capabilities Integration

Center at Fort Eustis, Virginia offers a narrative on how the MCN will “enable our Army

to prepare, educate, train, and fight. Its vision will help the Army drive our training,

23 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-52, Joint Airspace Control

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), vii.

19

organizations, and tactics to a new level of effectiveness.”24 This document asserts that

the utilization of the MCN should facilitate information exchange through voice, video,

email, or platform control that warfighters require at every echelon. The key to achieving

this tenant of Mission Command are training environments that routinely employ MCSs

while deployed and at home station. Home station training critical locations, nodes, and

conditions are described in table 1.

Table 1. Home Station

Source: Combined Arms Center and Army Capabilities Integration Center, Mission Command Network Vision and Narrative (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Government Printing Office, 2015), 10.

Corps and divisions are tactical headquarters that organize units to accomplish

missions. These organizations integrate multiple warfighting functions and require a

command and control network that can communicate through voice and data media to

disparate headquarters, subordinates, and enablers. “The division headquarters must

maintain a common operational picture (COP), create and disseminate orders and

24 Combined Arms Center and Army Capabilities Integration Center, Mission

Command Network Vision and Narrative (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Government Printing Office, 2015), 1.

20

graphics, control and synchronize operations, and share full motion video. This occurs

internal to the command post, across formations, between command posts, and with

Unified Action Partners.”25 The Mission Command Narrative points out that division and

corps headquarters have a unique ability transform into a Joint Task Force Headquarters

to command and control joint and coalition forces and thereby have a need for MCS

interoperability throughout the unified action combined arms team. Division and corps

headquarters must have friendly force situational awareness and possess a COP to

understand the operating environment.26

Over the course of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Army attack aviation

assumed the role of rotary wing close air support (CAS). Army Training Publication

(ATP) 3-04.1 made a point to distance the Army from the CAS mission in April of 2016

when it asserted that, “although the Army does not consider its aircraft a CAS system,

they can conduct attacks employing CAS joint TTP when operating in support of other

forces.”27 Army attack aviation continues to search for balance across the spectrum of

conflict as it juggles combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously

preparing to fight a near-peer threat at combined training centers. The ever-changing

utility of attack aviation that has caused confusion within the Army Aviation community

has bled over to the ways that divisions and brigade combat teams employ attack

aviation. Brigade combat teams are accustomed to direct support (DS) relationships with

25 Ibid., 12.

26 Ibid.

27 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATP 3-04.1, 2-26.

21

attack aviation units. DS is feasible within the framework of contingency operations;

however, attack aviation units will not have an unending DS relationships to brigade

combat teams in major operations and campaigns.28 Most division headquarters have one

combat aviation brigade and three brigade combat teams. Limited resources will prevent

attack aviation from DS relationships with the BCT and aviation will be retained at the

division or corps echelon.

In major operations and campaigns, command and control will likely be held at

the corps and division echelon. Given the agility, lethality, and maneuverability of attack

aviation, corps and division headquarters will use aviation formations to gain and

maintain contact with enemy formations, conduct decisive offensive engagements, pursue

and exploit successes, and rapidly reinforce tactical vulnerabilities. Corps and division

headquarters should retain a direct communication linkage to aviation formations to

rapidly reorient the force; however, while attack aviation is fighting for division and

corps purposes, they will fight alongside brigade, battalion, company, and even platoon

formations at the FLOT. MCSs should connect aviation formations with corps or division

headquarters while permitting information sharing between aviation formations and

friendly elements engaged in combat. Effective MCSs are able to rapidly share battle

assessments on a COP to achieve unity of effort and shared understanding.

The Mission Command Network Vision and Narrative identifies that the MCN

will enable training and education by connecting the operating and generating forces. The

learning infrastructure will enable the adaptive application of live and synthetic domains

28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington,

DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), V-1.

22

through connecting virtual, constructive, and gaming with live training.29 Admittedly, the

full functionality and implementation of this concept is immature; however, it is in

development and may significantly enhance training in coming years. Figure 2, illustrates

how constructive, virtual, and live training on unclassified networks could connect to

existing classified MCISs.

The Army Operating Concept Win in a Complex World 2020-2040 describes how

the Army will fight as a member of the Joint and Multinational force. This document is a

guideline that prioritizes Army capability requirements to strategic objectives. US

Training and Doctrine Command identified that science and technology must focus on

MCISs that give the commander overmatch against enemies. Additionally, the MCISs

should be interoperable with allies and allow synchronization of joint, Army,

interorganizational, and multinational efforts.30

29 Combined Arms Center and Army Capabilities Integration Center, Mission

Command Network Vision and Narrative, 18-19.

30 Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The US Army Operating Concept. Win in a Complex World 2020-2040 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 2014), 37.

23

Figure 2. Constructive, Virtual, and Live Training Concept Sketch

Source: Mission Command Capability Development Integration Directorate. “Constructive, Virtual, and Live Training Concept Sketch,” Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 18, 2017, Photo by author.

Contribution of this Work

There exists an abundance of literature in doctrine, SOPs, and MCCOE

documents on the mission command philosophy and the MCWFF. How then will this

study add to the body of knowledge? First, this work will critically examine how Army

Aviation doctrine aligns with Army doctrine in the mission command domain. Through

this comparison, the reader will gain an understanding of how the Army Aviation

conducts the MCWFF within the Army doctrine framework. The reader will notice the

propensity of the Army Aviation community to focus on MCISs, as the MCS focal point.

24

This study provides a general understanding of the MCISs, networks, and facilities and

equipment that connect command nodes and platforms across the aviation area of

operations. Additionally, this study will describe the functions of personnel within an

Army Aviation headquarters and will identify the systems and processes that are used

within the MCS. Lastly, this study will provide examples of units training the MCWFF at

home station. These examples may help Army Aviation leaders plan unit training that

will train the staff on its MCS and train subordinate echelons how to interface with the

staff.

25

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction


the MCWFF to aid commanders, staffs, and aviators in its effective application. The

primary research question asks how does an aviation battalion execute the MCWFF? Two

secondary questions follow. First, how does an aviation battalion’s MCS facilitate the

MCWFF? Secondly, what ways are available to aviation units for home station training

on their MCS? This chapter explains the steps that were taken by the researcher to collect

information to answer the primary and secondary research questions. Next, the research

methodology is explained with the analytical framework according to which the evidence

will be presented. Lastly, this chapter will explain how the methodology will facilitate the

analysis in chapter 4.

Information Collection for Research Questions

To address the research question, initial information collection was conducted

through observations as an Observer Coach-Trainer at the National Training Center from

September of 2014 through May of 2016. The observations were made from an OH-58C

helicopter in pursuit of Army attack aviation sections (two Apache helicopters), Army

attack aviation platoons (four Apache helicopters), and Army attack aviation companies

(eight Apache helicopters). The observations were made listening to radios that

connected the helicopters, helicopters to aviation task force headquarters, ground

26

platoons, companies, battalions, and brigades. Additional observations were gathered in

after action reviews conducted at the section, platoon, company, and task force echelons.

The Combined Arms Research Library executed research on the researcher’s

behalf. Their efforts produced multiple documents ranging from articles, military history,

past and present doctrine, Masters of Military Arts and Sciences theses, School of

Advanced Military Studies monographs, operations, and reports. The researcher used the

internet to find current relevant Army doctrine and MCIS information from Program

Executive Office Command Control Communications. Additionally, the researcher went

to the Mission Command Center of Excellence Simulations Center and received an in-

person brief on the conceptual framework of MCISs. The researcher also went to the

Mission Command Center of Excellence for an understanding of current systems. The

researcher interviewed the Deputy for Mission Command Network Integration at the

Mission Command Center of Excellence. The researcher interviewed the Tactical

Systems Branch Chief for Mission Command-Command Post at the Mission Command

Center of Excellence. The researcher contacted the TRADOC Capabilities Manager for

Aviation Brigades at Fort Rucker, AL and conducted a telephonic interview discussing

the current MCISs interoperability gaps with Army Aviation platforms. The researcher

interviewed an instructor at the Digital Master Gunners Course at the Mission Command

Center of Excellence. The researcher traveled to the Army Aviation Center of Excellence

and interviewed the Director for the Directorate of Simulations, the Tactics Branch Chief

for the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Doctrine and Collective Branch Chief for

the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, and the Deputy Commander of the Aviation

Center of Excellence.

27

Methodology

This study examines Army Aviation’s MCWFF through the lenses of doctrine and

training. The first step of the research is information collection and a review of the

literature in chapter two. The literature review in chapter two shows information sources

to include doctrine and institutional information. The second step of the research

describes Army Aviation’s MCWFF doctrine at battalion echelon using the framework of

doctrine and training. The analysis draws out areas of omission and opportunity within

doctrine and in institutions. The fourth and final step presents findings, conclusions, and

recommendations in chapter five.

Summary and Conclusion

This study will enable the reader to understand how aviation staffs conduct

mission command. This paper will illustrate how MCSs link aviators and staffs across the

space of the battlefield. Through this understanding, the reader can formulate a plan to

exploit advantages and mitigate shortcomings. Lastly, the reader will understand ways of

training Army Aviation battalion staffs to exercise the MCWFF.

28

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction, Purpose, and Organization


the MCWFF to aid commanders, staffs, and aviators in its effective application. This

paper attempts to address an Army Aviation battalion’s capability to execute the

MCWFF. The primary research question asks how does an aviation battalion execute the

MCWFF? Two secondary questions follow. First, how does an aviation battalion’s MCS

facilitate the MCWFF? Secondly, what ways are available to aviation units for home

station training on their MCS?

First, this chapter will answer how an aviation battalion executes the MCWFF

according to Army and Army Aviation doctrine. Second, it will explain how an aviation

battalion’s MCS allows a battalion commander to execute the MCWFF. Last, this chapter

will describe the ways available to aviation units to train the MCWFF at home station.

This chapter will use Doctrine and Training as the framework to answer the above

questions.

Types of Command Posts

FM 3-04, Army Aviation, is Army Aviation’s capstone doctrinal publication for

describing how Army units will employ aviation. The manual describes two nodes that

are the hub of activity for mission command in an aviation battalion, the main command

post, and the tactical command post. The main command post, much like its name

implies, is the primary hub of information receipt and dissemination for the aviation

29

battalion. When operating alone, without the tactical command post in operation, the

main command post is the location of the commander and from this location, the

commander exercises mission command. “The main command post controls operations,

maintains situational understanding, informs the commander’s decisions, and prepares

and publishes orders and plans.”31

Table 2. Main CP’s Primary Functions

• Communicates and informs subordinate, higher, and adjacent units. • Informs and assists the commander and subordinate commanders. • Prepares and issues fragmentary orders, operation orders, operational plans,

intelligence summaries, intelligence reports, and situation reports. • Operates on a 24-hour basis. • Conducts future planning continuously. • Maintains running estimates continuously. • Maintains situational understanding and a common operational picture across the

Army warfighting functions. • Receives, evaluates, and processes combat information from subordinate units and

higher headquarters. • Maintains the necessary products to further the commander’s situational

understanding. • Processes information into intelligence. • Performs limited PED for UAS and AH-64 sensor data. • Conducts fire support planning. • Conducts airspace control planning and coordination. • Coordinates terrain management. • Coordinates and tracks sustainment requirements (logistics, air and ground

maintenance capabilities, and status). • Makes recommendations to the commander. • Plans and orchestrates briefings, debriefings, and rehearsals.

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-04, Army Aviation (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 2-18.

31 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-04, Army Aviation (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 2-18.

30

“The tactical CP (TAC) is a facility containing a tailored portion of a unit

headquarters designed to control portions of an operation for a limited time.”32 The TAC

is useful for planning operations with higher or subordinate units that are not in proximity

to the Main CP. The minimum warfighting functions for a TAC include operations, fires,

and intelligence with the operations cell as the responsible party for the TAC. The TAC

must have the capability to communicate with higher headquarters, adjacent units,

employed subordinate units, and the main CP. Although the TAC is separate from the

Main CP, it remains dependent upon the Main CP for planning, detailed analysis, and

coordination. The limited scale and scope of the TAC CP’s purpose, lends itself to a

minimal size while remaining maneuverable under its own power. That is to say, that the

TAC has the vehicles necessary to move without outside assistance. The security of the

TAC is resident in its economy of force and maneuverability. The standing operating

procedures (SOPs) of the employing unit provide the guidebook for the normal

composition of the TAC. There is not a “one size fits all” solution for the TAC. The size

and composition of the TAC are directly related to its mission. That mission could be

planning for future operations, controlling operations beyond the reach of the main CP, or

as the element that leads the displacement of the tactical assembly area, just to name a

few.33

32 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander

and Staff Organization and Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 2014), 1-2.

33 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-04, 2-18.

31

A commander can organize his command post into cells (akin to working groups)

to disperse the expertise of his staff and equip them with communications and

information systems that enable it to plan and control operations. The inherent command

posts that are resident in a combat aviation brigade, battalion, and task force are the Main

Command Post, the Tactical Command Post, and the Subordinate Command Post. All

CPs manage information, control operations, develop and disseminate orders, assess

operations, maintain running estimates, coordinate with higher, lower, and adjacent units,

and maintain a common operational picture.34

FM 3-04 alludes to the commander’s location when it states, “the commander

operates from the main CP when not operating from the tactical CP, command vehicle, or

an aircraft.”35 Even though FM 3-04 does not name the command vehicle or aircraft that

the commander is in as command posts, battle staffs should understand the effects that

the commander makes on operations while dislocated from the main CP or the TAC CP.

Reality is relative to perspective. Furthering the aforementioned thought, there are as

many realities as perspectives on a battlefield; those perspectives are only as joined as the

rapid and accurate sharing of information allows them to be. The situation that is

developed inside of the main CP will not be the same as the situation inside of the TAC

CP, or the command vehicle, or the aircraft that are executing operations. When the

commander makes a decision in his aircraft or vehicle, which is not shared with the other

command nodes, the aviation battle staff’s effort may diverge from the commander’s


35 Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 3-04, 2-18.

32

intent. Admittedly, the commander is not a facility or structure, but he is a node for

whom the main CP and the TAC CP exist, and the effects of his decisions from his

location and linkages must be considered for the battalion staff in the mission command

process.

Command Post Organization

Commanders organize their CPs by functional and integrating cells. The five functional cells group personnel and equipment by warfighting function (minus mission command). Integrating cells group personnel and equipment by planning horizon (current operations, future operations, and plans). In aviation formations, flight operations are integral to current operations.36

The Army isn’t prescriptive in how to organize the command post. Doctrine

explains that the commander is responsible for organizing the staff and may do so by

integrating five functional cells (with the exception of mission command) into current

operations (CUOPs), future operations (FUOPs), and plans cells. Section IV of Chapter 1

in ATP 3-04.1 is titled Command Post Organization and posits that commanders can

organize their command posts by function and integration. The paragraph concludes by

stating that “flight operations are integral to current operations.” The only other time

flight operations are mentioned in ATP 3-04.1 is in chapter 8, Personnel Recovery. The

organization and routine functions of flight operations are not described in ATP 3-04.1.

The CUOPs cell provides continuous situational awareness of ongoing operations.

This cell is composed of personnel who are tracking what is going on right now and helps

the commander understand the current environment and visualize desired outcomes.

CUOPs are led by the Operations Officer (S3) and it is his responsibility to maintain


33

situational understanding of the environment and direct the mission within the scope of

his delegated authority from the commander to achieve the commander’s intent.

Generally, the Assistant S3 (AS3) is the executor of the aforementioned responsibilities

and is colloquially referred to as the Battle Captain. This substitution of the AS3 for the

S3 allows the S3 to manage all operations cells. CUOPS is normally fully integrated with

representation from all warfighting functions. The integration of the warfighting

functions into the CUOPs cell facilitates control of current operations, rapid

decisionmaking within the boundaries of delegated authority from the commander, and

immediate planning and synchronization of ongoing operations. The CUOPs cell is

responsible for accurate and timely sharing of information and intelligence with ground

maneuver commanders. Army Aviation staffs use the processing, exploitation, and

dissemination (PED) process for the suitable conversion of information into intelligence.

The Army Aviation staff collects information from their units’ manned and unmanned

aircraft and is responsible for conducting PED with the information that is collected.

Army Aviation lists two cells that could plan operations, future operations and

plans. The first cell is future operations and is responsible for planning mid to long range

operations. The second cell is named plans and is responsible for long-range planning.

The figure below provides a concept of plans cells arranged by time and suggests that

short-range planning, which is in the realm of CUOPS, occurs in the timespan of days to

hours. Mid-range planning, the responsibility of FUOPs, occurs in the range of weeks to

days. Lasty, long-range planning, is a plans function and exists in months to weeks in the

future.

34

Figure 3. Planning Cells Time Horizon

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 2012), 3-4.

Mission Command System

A mission command system is the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations. Commanders organize their mission command system to support decisionmaking and facilitate communication.37

37 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 6-0, 11.

35

Using the framework of the Army MCS, the following sections will analyze how

Army Aviation battalions form and use their MCS in the domains of personnel, networks,

information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment.

Figure 4. Mission Command System Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 3-8.

Personnel

A commander’s mission command system begins with people. Therefore, commanders base their mission command system on human characteristics and abilities more than on equipment and procedures. An effective mission command system requires trained personnel; commanders must not underestimate the importance of providing training. Key personnel dedicated to mission command include seconds in command, command sergeants major, and staff.38

The battalion commander should understand the operational environment in

which his force is operating. The commander’s understanding should encompass the

friendly and enemy situation. The commander relies on his staff for all of the functions

for which he is responsible. He trains his staff so that they are able to continue the

mission in his absence or death. The commander is the catalyst in the operations process

38 Ibid., 11.

36

and is continuously applying pressure in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing

operations.39

Common staff expectations are that each person understands his or her role and

the roles of fellow staff members. A staff officer is expected to understand the current

situation and have the wit to know when they are responsible for processing and

disseminating information. Finally, all staff members should be ready to offer

recommendations to the commander for decision.40

The executive officer is second in line of command behind the battalion

commander. He compels integration and collaboration amongst the staff. The schedule is

a primary vehicle through which the executive officer achieves unity of effort and

mission accomplishment. Though the executive officer has responsibility over many area,

a main concern is logistics. Fuel and ammunition are of critical importance to an aviation

unit, and have the same importance to an executive officer in an aviation battalion.

Finally, the executive officer must maintain situational awareness so that he is prepared

to assume command in the absence or death of the battalion commander.41

The battalion commander has a personal staff that includes a command sergeant

major. A command chief warrant officer is not included in the personal staff of a

battalion commander, though a CAB commander does have a command chief warrant

officer on his personal staff. There are instances in which a battalion commander has


40 Ibid., 1-6.

41 Ibid., 1-7.

37

chosen to name a command chief warrant officer, but that practice is a technique not

declared as a doctrinal practice. The command sergeant major acts in the name of the

commander and extends command influence throughout the formation. He is the primary

advisor to the battalion commander on Soldiers. The command sergeant major assesses

morale, training, and enforces standards throughout the organization. He provides

oversight for protection in tactical assembly areas and exercises control where

necessary.42

Coordinating staff are principle assistants to the battalion commander who work

under the guidance of the executive officer. The human resources officer, or S-1, is

responsible for maintaining a personnel strength assessment for the unit. The S-1

manages replacement operations and conducts casualty operations management. The

intelligence officer, or S-2, conducts intelligence operations to understand the terrain and

strives for predictive analysis to mitigate risk to aviation operations. The operations

officer, or S-3, is responsible for organizing, training, planning, and coordinating

operations for the unit. He must understand the current situation and be ready to take

command. The S-3 monitors current and future operations.43 He also includes a fire

support officer into his section to integrate indirect fires. The logistics officer, or S-4,

manages internal and external logistical support to the organization. He manages aviation

42 Ibid., 1-9.

43 Ibid., 1-11.

38

and ground maintenance support.44 The signal officer, or S-6, does not have a duty

description in the ATP 3-04.1.

Army Aviation doctrine provides a general description of each of the staff

positions. The descriptions provide Army Aviation leaders with a general understanding

of how the system should work. The broad boundaries permit tailoring duty descriptions

to individual unit needs and requirements for mission execution. Army Aviation doctrine

shorts the signal officer duty description. In a time when MCSs are focused on digital

networks, this is an important omission.

Networks

Social and technical networks enable commanders to communicate information and control forces, leading to successful operations. Generally, a network is a grouping of people or things interconnected for a purpose. Commanders develop and leverage various social networks—individuals and organizations interconnected by a common interest—to exchange information and ideas, build teams, and promote unity of effort. Technical networks also connect people and allow sharing of resources and information. For example, LandWarNet (the Army’s portion of the Department of Defense information networks) is a technical network. It encompasses all Army information management systems and information systems that collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect information worldwide.45

Army Aviation battalions are dependent on social and technical networks for

communication within their MCS. Social networks are the arrangement of personnel

connections within and outside of the aviation battalion. Official internal social networks

are organized by the commander.46 The executive officer establishes and monitors liaison

44 Ibid., 1-16.



39

team activities outside of the organization.47 The operations officer conducts liaison

activities with supported and higher units.48 An aviation liaison element, normally

comprised of an aviation officer, a senior warrant officer, and a flight operations

specialist, but tailorable for the needs of a mission, serve as the aviation battalion’s envoy

to higher and supported units for planning, synchronization, and coordination. The cohort

moves between the aviation battalion’s headquarters and the higher or supported unit to

accomplish its functions.49 The aviation liaison element monitors aviation unit location,

fuel and ammunition status (Class III-V), aircraft maintenance status, aircrew availability,

and provides continuous situational reports to the battalion commander and the supported

commander.50 In the composition of the aviation liaison element, aviation doctrine calls

for an “experienced and knowledgeable team.”51 Often times, battalions allocate a first

lieutenant to the position of liaison officer in the operations section of a battalion

headquarters. This officer’s experiences include graduating from flight school and

waiting for a platoon leader position to open in a line company. The first lieutenant is

likely full of energy and optimism, but void of the knowledge and experience necessary

to plan an aviation operation. Based upon the personnel availability, the commander,

executive officer, or operations officer will seek an experienced aviation officer for the

47 Ibid., 1-8.

48 Ibid., 1-12.

49 Ibid., 1-18.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

40

aviation liaison element. The choices for an experienced aviation officer are two assistant

S-3s, the S-2, the S-4, and five company commanders. Assuming an operations section is

organized into a CUOPs and a FUOPs cell, both of the assistant S-3s are gainfully

employed. The S-2, S-4, and company commanders all have functions that require their

attention for the battalion to operate as an organization. There is a rift between the

expectations of aviation doctrine and aviation organization with respect to the aviation

liaison element.

The Brigade Aviation Element (BAE), is a cohort internal to a brigade combat

team (BCT) that assists aviation battalions by incorporating Army Aviation maneuver

into the BCT’s mission planning process. The BAE manages airspace control,

coordinates with Joint air assets, and fires. The battalion commander and operations

officer are fully engaged in the aviation planning process and do not rely on the BAE for

mission planning.52

Technical networks are the pathways that connect maneuvering units and

command posts across the breadth and depth of the battlefield. Given the sensitive nature

of the specifics of this topic, a general explanation will have to suffice for this study.

Aviation is connected by two general categories, systems that require satellites, and

systems that use radios. The systems that use satellites are constrained by their

equipment, training, environmental conditions, and the enemy. Satellite systems provide

connectivity across the entire battlefield and are commonly referred to as over the

horizon communications systems. Radio networks are constrained by the range of the

52 Ibid.

41

radio, terrain, and the ability of the unit to increase the reach of the radio network.

Satellite and radio networks present the enemy with opportunities to influence the

aviation network. The opportunities to influence the aviation network exceed the

classification of the study; however, an understanding of vulnerabilities associated with

technical networks are important planning considerations for commanders and staff

officers.

Information Systems

In order to accurately coordinate, track, and synchronize operations, the main CP S-3 or designated representative (typically the battle captain), employs various mission command systems. The primary means of facilitating current and future operations is through the Command Post of the Future (CPOF). Supporting systems include internet chat programs, Blue Force Tracking hardware and software, and voice over secure internet protocol communication systems. These systems supplement standard radio communications with aircraft during operations and exist to coordinate with higher and adjacent units. Additionally, the one system remote viewing terminal (OSRVT) enables enhanced situational awareness and understanding by providing real-time unmanned aircraft system (UAS) or manned aircraft video to the CP.53

The Army Aviation doctrine above states that the “S-3 or designated

representative (typically the battle captain), employs various mission command systems.”

The use of MCSs in this manner is a divergence from ADP 6-0 which explains an MCS

as “the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and

procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct

operations.”54 The more accurate term to use in this explanation in place of mission

command systems is mission command information systems. “An information system


54 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 6-0, Glossary-2.

42

consists of equipment that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information.

This includes computers-hardware and software-and communications, as well as policies

and procedures for their use.”55 The focus of aviation doctrine is the technology used to

conduct the MCWFF. Instead of considering information systems as components in a

wider apparatus to synchronize, coordinate, and direct combat power to accomplish

missions, there is a disproportionate weight on them as the solution to the MCWFF.

The MCISs an aviation battalion uses are CPOF, Distributed Common Ground

System Army (DCGS-A), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS),

Joint Capabilities Release (JCR), Blue Force Tracker (BFT), Blue Force Tracker II

(BFTII), Joint Capabilities Release – Logistics (JCR-L), One System Remote Video

Terminal (OSRVT), FalconView on the Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS), and

radios. Each of these systems classifies into one of three categories, analog, lower tactical

internet, or upper tactical internet. Analog systems are supportable without power

generation. Printed maps and radios, powered by batteries or vehicle generators, are used

to maintain a COP and control units. Lower tactical internet has limited computing power

and bandwidth. Lower tactical internet systems rely upon satellites for connectivity. As

the situation permits, it is a means of over the horizon communication and provides

mission command on the move. The limited bandwidth of lower tactical internet systems

can cause a slow update to the COP. The upper tactical internet is the only category that

integrates all MCISs. Upper tactical internet is functional subject to environmental

conditions and has extremely limited capability to conduct mission command on the

55 Ibid., 12.

43

move. Figure 5 compares categories of analog, lower tactical internet, and upper tactical

internet.56

A comprehensive guide to employ the MCISs is void from Army and Army

Aviation Doctrine. The Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate does not employ a

technical writer that could explain in an operational narrative how the systems interface

and create the common operating picture for the combined arms team. The onus rests on

the commander and staff who are fielded the equipment to make it work within their

command posts and mobile platforms. In developing future generations of MCISs, there

should be firm governance in place to compel Army branches to field interoperable

systems.

56 Mission Command Digital Master Gunners Course, “Pre-Command Course”

(Brief, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 28, 2016), Slide 5.

44

Figure 5. Common Operational Picture Mediums Source: Mission Command Digital Master Gunners Course, “Pre-Command Course” (Brief, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 28, 2016), Slide 5.

Processes and Procedures

Processes and procedures help commanders organize the activities within the headquarters and throughout the force. Processes and procedures govern actions within a mission command system to make it more effective and efficient. A process is a series of actions directed to an end state. One example is the military decisionmaking process. Procedures are standard, detailed steps, often used by staffs, which describe how to perform specific tasks to achieve the desired end state. One example is a standard operating procedure. Adhering to processes and procedures minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitation as commanders make frequent, rapid decisions to meet operational requirements.57


45

Operations Process

Army Aviation commanders use the operations process to plan, prepare, execute,

and assess operations.58 The main command post provides the functionality for

commanders and their staffs to execute the operations process. The Army provides three

methodologies for planning. The army design methodology, the military decision making

process, and troop leading procedures. TLPs are allocated to commanders devoid of the

staff support to conduct the more involved processes that a staff can accomplish.59

Acknowledging the fluidity of combat, the army provides the rapid decisionmaking and

synchronization process for the execution phase of operations.60

Army design methodology helps commanders understand complex problems. The

process uses critical thinking to allow commanders and staffs to understand the

environment, define the problem, and create an operational approach for solving the

problem. Most problems encountered at the battalion are well defined; therefore, this

process is seldom employed at the aviation battalion echelon.61

The military decisionmaking process is the most common planning methodology

employed in the aviation battalion. This process starts with the receipt of the mission,

progresses to the analysis of the mission, development of courses of action, analysis of



60 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 4-6.


46

courses of action, compare courses of action, the course of action approval, and the

execution order issued to subordinate units. This process facilitates collaboration with

higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. The military decisionmaking process is a

thorough and proven method to develop an understanding for the commander and staff of

the operating environment. Training and repetition improve the quality and speed of this

process.62

The last planning methodology, troop leading procedures, is intended for use by

small unit leaders. Company and troop commanders in aviation battalions lack the staff to

conduct in-depth analysis. Troop leading procedures allow them to quickly develop,

issue, and execute plans. Troop leading procedures begin with receipt of the mission,

issuing a warning order, making a tentative plan, initiating movement, conducting

reconnaissance, completing the plan, issuing the order, and supervising and revising the

plan.63

The rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process is a relatively new term in

doctrine, though not in practice. Doctrine writers codified a process that was happening

ad hoc. The rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process acknowledges that

operational and mission variables are constantly changing, especially during execution.

This reality of combat invalidates the course of action criteria that were applied in the

military decisionmaking process course of action comparison. The rapid decisionmaking

and synchronization process begins with two steps that occur in any order or

62 Ibid., 8.

63 Ibid., 9.

47

simultaneously. Compare the current situation to the order and determine that a decision,

and what type, is required. Then leaders develop a course of action, refine and validate

the course of action, and implement the new guidance.64

Figure 6. The Operations Process Underlying Logic

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), iv.

64 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 5-0, 4-6.

48

Standard Operating Procedures

Standard operating procedures (SOP), also known as standing operating

procedures, are operations that are well defined. Because some operations are well

defined, it is possible to create procedures, practice and improve those procedures, and

align those procedures to specific units.65 In sports terms, a unit SOP is its playbook.

SOPs explain the ways that units operate to accomplish assigned missions and save

leaders’ time in the execution of operations. SOPs preserve the creative problem-solving

capacity of senior leaders and permit them to focus on the most pressing challenges of the

current situation. They create shared understanding amongst organizations and empower

mid and lower echelon leadership. SOPs take advantage of the lessons promulgated in

doctrine, and explain who, when, how, and why tasks should be performed. What to do if

circumstances are different than expected, and who and how to report when tasks are

accomplished.66 The Army published ATP 3-90.90 Army Tactical Standard Operating

Procedures to facilitate the efficient development of effective SOPs. Additionally, the

Army has a secure web-based portal to aid in the development of SOPs and share

examples. Collaboration and effectiveness of a unit SOP can be improved through the

content located on the secure site at https://www.milsuite.mil/wiki/Portal:

Standard_Operating_Procedures.

65 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary

of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), 224.

66 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication 3-90.90, Army Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 2-4.

49

Battle Drills

In sports terms, battle drills are plays out of the playbook. All the players

understand when the play is called what is expected of them. Battle drills are pre-planned,

pre-practiced procedures that permit immediate action without a decisionmaking

process.67 They are techniques repetitively practiced to build teams that have shared

understanding within predicted circumstances. The most expected situations are the

priority for battle drill rehearsal in the operations process. During execution, all members

of the organization are rapidly employed through the use of battle drills.

Army Aviation battalion leaders employ the operations process to solve complex

and simple problems in a range of time from large to small. SOPs assist battalion

leadership by preserving intellectual capital for new problems and empowering mid to

low echelon leadership. Battle drills are techniques that are used when time is too short

for a decisionmaking process and immediate action is necessary to preserve combat

power.

The operations process, SOPs, and battle drills are well known and generally

well-trained processes and procedures. Army Aviation leaders should dedicate more time

in effort to developing living SOPs that reflect the operations process and are inclusive of

their battle drills. A living SOP is routinely used by leaders throughout the unit, easily

adjusted in accordance with the battle rhythm, and is easily accessible through print or

digital media.


50

Facilities and Equipment

Facilities and equipment include command posts, signal nodes, and all mission command support equipment, excluding information systems. A facility is a structure or location that provides a work environment and shelter for the personnel within the mission command system. Facilities range from a command post composed of vehicles and tentage to hardened buildings. Examples of equipment needed to sustain a mission command system include vehicles, generators, and lighting.68

FM 6-0 provides considerations and factors for command posts. Army Aviation

command posts should be able to communicate with higher and lower units. The

command post facilities and equipment must rapidly break down, move, re-establish

systems, and control operations. The factors that contribute to the success of the

command post meeting this end are design and layout, standardization, continuity,

deployability, and capacity and range.69 Communication and coordination amongst cells

are paramount when considering the design and layout of the CP.70 Army Aviation

doctrine omits to describe the facilities and equipment of Army Aviation battalion

command posts. My observations at the NTC from 2014 to 2016 revealed that 19 of 19

Army Aviation task forces used tents to house their main command post. As a general

observation, it took about two to four hours to collapse the main CP and about the same

to re-establish it. Add the time required to move to the next location and it becomes

evident that the brain of an Army Aviation task force is non-operational for a significant

amount of time. This is time lost for planning, preparing, and executing operations with



70 Ibid.

51

the most agile and lethal assets in the Army inventory. MAJ Jaimie Jordahl, the

Command Post Branch Chief at the TRADOC Capability Manager Mission Command-

Command Posts, in an e-mail to the author said the following about mobile CP

development.

The Mission Command Center of Excellence is writing a Command Post infrastructure capability development document. It addresses CP's from BN to Corps to include TAC, Main, and Command Group. The basis of issue plan is focused on Armor, Infantry, Stryker BCTs, all active Divisions, and 3 Corps. Based off guidance from Headquarters Department of the Army the basis of issue does not include functional or multi-functional brigades. Finally, these CP's are not exclusive to any one unit and these capabilities could be expanded to include functional and multi-functional brigades should the funding come available and HQDA approves the fielding. 71

Army Aviation’s combat power, in the form of attack, cargo, reconnaissance, and

utility-aerial platforms is constrained by the facilities and equipment that contribute to the

efficacy of the MCS. Current facilities and equipment are slow to displace and emplace at

the rate that may be necessary to support rapid maneuver. Army Aviation should design

and test vehicle-mounted command post facilities and equipment. These mobile

command posts should support mission command on the move with satellite

communications, mounted MCISs, shelter with radar camouflage, power generation, and

an environmental control system.

Training

Members of the battalion staff are given introductory level instruction on MCIS in

their entry-level training at the Army Aviation Center of Excellence. Depending on the

time elapsed and the quality of the instruction provided at the center of excellence,

71 Jaimie Jordahl, e-mail message to author, April 27, 2017.

52

atrophy of technical skills is expected upon arrival to a unit. The aviation unit assumes

responsibility for individual and collective training to accomplish the unit’s missions. The

task of mission command can be confused in the garrison environment where it seems as

though mission command is being executed. Information from higher headquarters is

coming into the subordinate headquarters. There is some level of analysis and

information is disseminated. Missions and tasks are assigned and accomplished. Plans are

formed and briefed. At the surface, there are plenty of mission command functions being

performed, and this can lull leaders into the belief that mission command is being trained.

There is a critical flaw in this logic. That is the principle of train as you fight.72 The

mission command functions that were previously explained in this paragraph are

examples of mission command on e-mail and phone. E-mail and phone are in the MCISs

and used in tactical operations; but there are several others that are ignored altogether.

CPOF, TAIS, AFATADS, BFT, BFTII, JCR, JCR-L, and radios are either not used at all

or used sparingly. Ignoring these systems in day to day operations causes a loss of

proficiency and understanding how the information systems will be used in the MCS.

About 75 years after Jomini’s Traite de Grande Tactique, his work seemed forgettable.

Not because his tactics were without value, but because those tactics were well studied

and incorporated in most military’s methods of conducting war. It is the principle of

learning and forgetting. Train until a task is second nature and the mechanics cease to be

72 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 7-0,

Training Units and Developing Leaders (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 5.

53

a thought. They just exist. So too should aviation battalion staffs pursue training on the

MCWFF.

While the commander is ultimately responsible for everything that does, or

doesn’t happen in the unit, the chief of staff, more commonly called the executive officer,

has the responsibility of supervising the staff in the main CP.73 As the chief supervisor

and integrator of the staff, the executive officer should have a plan on how to train the

staff. Fortunately for the XO, much of the work of developing a training plan for building

proficiency at mission command has already been completed and there is simulations

support available to provide subject matter expertise to the XO and staff.


54

Figure 7. Unit Mission Command Training Progression Source: Army Aviation Directorate of Simulations, “Enhancing Home Station Training with Live, Virtual, Constructive, Gaming (LVCG) and Mission Command (MC) Enablers” (Aviation Pre-Command Course Brief, Fort Rucker, AL, January 23, 2017), Slide 18.

The Directorate of Simulations at the Army Aviation Center of Excellence created

a mission command training progression. The plan is illustrated in figure 7 above. There

are three terms that require an explanation for this graphic to make sense. First, a staff

exercise (STAFFEX) is a focus on the staff itself. In this action, the staff is trained and

evaluated on the tasks it is required to perform. Second, a command post exercise (CPX)

includes simulated forces that are directed by the commander with staff support and

55

communication amongst the headquarters elements of the organization. Last, a field

training exercise (FTX) is conducted in the field with the full participation of the

organization. Soldiers and equipment are present and placed into operation and missions

are executed against a simulated enemy force.74

The Unit Mission Command Training Progression is accomplished with help from

the mission training complex (MTC) at the unit’s home station. MTCs are facilities

designed and operated to support training at home station. In the crawl phase of the

training progression, the MTC facilitates operator training to refresh or train users on how

to operate MCISs and provides the staff with academics. The staff academics educate the

staff on the expectations of how it will operate. Following the staff academics is the first

practical application with STAFFEX I. STAFFEX I educates the staff on processes and

procedures. The unit is responsible for a TOCEX. TOCEX I is an inventory and layout of

the equipment and information systems that will be used in the mission command

training progression. TOCEX II is the physical setting up of the facilities, equipment, and

MCISs. The next phase is the walk phase. In this phase, the MTC facilitates additional

MCISs training and a second STAFFEX. STAFFEX II gives the TOC staff a chance to

work together, using their MCISs, and learning battle drills. The unit is responsible for

establishing a fully functional TOC with a COP, providing additional staff academics to

reiterate or introduce new techniques, conduct force protection and security training, and

execute staff battle drills. The final phase is the run phase. In this phase, the unit conducts

74 Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSM 3500.03E, Joint Training Manual for the Armed

Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), D-B-13.

56

a CPX. The MTC facilitates the training with objectives to include a communications

exercise, a tactical exercise to meet the commander’s intent, and a fully functional COP.

Army Aviation units can conduct an aviation training exercise (ATX) at their

home station MTC. An example of an exercise where a combat aviation brigade (CAB)

took advantage of their MTC is the 16th CAB. The 16th CAB executed an ATX at Joint

Base Lewis-McChord in January of 2017. The purpose of the exercise was to validate

task force level command teams to prepare for an upcoming deployment to a combat

zone. This brigade level exercise incorporated Live, Virtual, and Constructive Integrating

Architecture. The exercise used JCATS, VBS3, two AVCATTS and incorporated white

box mission command systems to include the task force staff in the training exercise.

Table 3. 16th CAB ATX Training Objectives

1. Exercise realistic aviation scenarios 2. Exercise the CONOP approval process for missions requiring high-risk

approval 3. Validate the Task Force Staff’s ability to plan and synchronize multi-functional

aviation operations, to include time-sensitive target operations 4. Validate information and knowledge management systems and processes 5. Exercise the intelligence process that drives aviation maneuver and enables

timely decision making by air mission commanders 6. Exercise MEDEVAC Operations that focus on the defined processes for both

mission and launch approval 7. Exercise mission command systems utilized in theater and TOC operations that

result in a constant COP across the operational environment 8. Validate unit SOPs, Battle Books, and Battle Drills at echelon.

Source: 16th Combat Aviation Brigade, Aviation Training Exercise, Exercise Summary January 17, 2017–January 20, 2017, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA. Email received by author.

57

The unit mission command training progression described and illustrated above

fits nicely into Army Aviation’s Training Strategy: Training Aviation Warfighters for

Decisive Action published in January 2016. The training strategy emphasizes the

importance of units training the way they will fight. It declares the importance of training

to standard and that “Practice makes permanent, not perfect.” Leaders are encouraged to

make on the spot corrections, reset the training to achieve a repetition to standard, and

when that is not possible, to conduct an after action review to capture the lessons learned

and improve on the next iteration.75 The training strategy states that leaders must use a

crawl, walk, run approach to training; with most of the focus on the crawl and walk

phases of training. The aviation training strategy offers principles of quality training. Of

note among them are that training is driven by the commander, that it is led by leaders,

and that leaders are trained first.76 Lastly, the Army Aviation Training Strategy directs

aviation leaders to, “Execute every training event within a realistic, doctrinally-based

training environment that ties task accomplishment (individual, leader, and collective) to

mission success.”77 With this in mind, aviation leaders should develop ways of training

the MCWFF in the steady state operations of the garrison environment. Consider how to

use the unit MCS in routine garrison operations. There are opportunities to execute

functionality checks on MCISs during battle rhythm events from motor stables to daily

75 Headquarters, Army Aviation Center of Excellence, Training Aviation

Warfighters for Decisive Action (Fort Rucker, AL: Army Aviation Center of Excellence, 2016), 4.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

58

flight operations. Through the repetitive employment of the unit’s MCS, the battalion

staff will build, maintain, and improve proficiency on information systems, processes and

procedures, optimize facilities and equipment, and build understanding of the networks

that link the headquarters and warfighters.

Figure 8. Army Aviation Gated Training Strategy Source: Headquarters, Army Aviation Center of Excellence, Training Aviation Warfighters for Decisive Action (Fort Rucker, AL: Army Aviation Center of Excellence, 2016), 3.

59

Conclusion

Aviation battalions execute the MCWFF through their MCS. The MCS is a

collection of personnel, networks, information systems, process and procedures, and

facilities and equipment. Army Aviation battalion staffs use networks and information

systems to include CPOF, DCGS-A, BFT, JCR, AFATADS, JCR-L, AMPS, OSRVT,

and radios to create a systematic linkage in the tactical environment. These technologies

provide line of sight and over the horizon connectivity to facilitate the MCWFF. Lastly,

aviation battalions have opportunities to build, develop, and improve their MCS through

routine operations at home station. MTCs at Army installations have the personnel,

expertise, facilities and equipment to enhance mission command training at home station.

60

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

Introduction, Purpose, and Organization

The purpose of this study was to understand how Army Aviation battalions

execute the MCWFF to aid commanders, staffs, and aviators in its effective application.

The primary research question asked how does an aviation battalion execute the

MCWFF? Two secondary questions followed. First, how does an aviation battalion’s

MCS facilitate the MCWFF? Secondly, what ways are available to aviation units for

home station training on MCSs? The analysis revealed a bias towards MCISs as the focal

point for the Army Aviation MCS, the need for MCIS integration into combined arms

simulations trainers, and that current facilities and equipment are not compatible with

rapid employment and displacement.

Summary, Interpretation, and Implications of Findings

Army Aviation doctrine confuses terms by using MCSs as the term for MCISs.

ADP 6-0 defines MCSs as, “the arrangement of personnel, networks, information

systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders

to conduct operations.”78 ATP 3-04.1 states that, “the main CP S-3 or designated

representative (typically the battle captain), employs various mission command systems.

The primary means of facilitating current and future operations is through the CPOF.”79

78 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 6-0. Glossary-2.


61

The focus of aviation doctrine is the technology used to conduct the MCWFF. This

partiality to information systems disproportionately weights them as the solution to the

MCWFF; instead of considering them as a piece of a wider apparatus to synchronize,

coordinate, and direct combat power to accomplish missions. Lastly, favoritism of

information systems increases the risk to the MCWFF in contested environments and

harsh climates.

ATP 3-04.1 does not provide a duty description for the communications officer.

The communications officer is responsible for establishing radio and internet systems but

specific tasks to this officer were omitted from this piece of aviation doctrine. The

implication is that Army Aviation has not thought through how to employ the

communications officer in the MCS.

Army and Army Aviation doctrine is void of a reference that describes how to

employ its information systems across multiple branches at echelon. The challenges to

creating such a publication are many. A writer with the technical expertise, tempo of

technological advancement, and providing flexibility to commanders are valid reasons

not to produce such a document. The onus, as in most Army doctrine, falls to the

commander to solve the problem. The challenge is not a simple one to disentangle with

the information systems available to aviation commanders.

Army Aviation doctrine expects a knowledgeable and experienced officer for an

aviation liaison element; however, the organization of an Army Aviation battalion

allocates an unknowledgeable and inexperienced officer in the form of a first lieutenant

to the position of liaison officer. Headquarters that receive an aviation liaison are

expecting an officer with the experience and knowledge to assist them in planning and

62

executing operations; however, aviation is not resourcing its organizations with the

officer that has the qualifications to meet the expectation.

The Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (AVCATT), is limited in its

ability to incorporate MCIS training. The simulator does not allow staff to train on their

equipment with the form and function that the staff will use in combat. Effects of this

omission are that the staff misses an opportunity to train in the execution phase of the

operation and the aviators miss the chance to interact with the staff. A possible effect of

practicing without staff participation, is that the aviators diminish the importance of

reporting to their higher headquarters. Aviators’ understanding of the coordination

necessary at higher headquarters is slight to non-existent and staff understanding of their

role in a fight is on par with the aviators. This practice is contributing to echelons fighting

large-scale operations without an understanding of how they fit into the fight

Unexpected Findings

First, given the number of users of information systems within the Army, a

complete publication from an authoritative source on the employment of these systems is

void from the Army’s body of knowledge. The scope and scale of technical writing, the

pace of technological advancement, the resources required, and the leadership focus

necessary to publish such a document are among the obstacles to creating a concept of

employment. A common theme amongst the leaders at the combined arms doctrine

directorate, the Army Aviation directorate of training and doctrine, and the deputy

director of simulations at the aviation center of excellence, was to permit Army Aviation

commanders to organize their information systems in a manner that supported their

mission. In spite of the fact that combat training centers have a grading metric to evaluate

63

Aviation units on the employment and effectiveness of their information systems, Army

Aviation doctrine does not provide a process of employment. Given the importance of

information systems in the current fight, the omission of the communications officer’s

roles and responsibilities in aviation doctrine was a surprise.

Second, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, the Directorate of Training and

Doctrine, and the Director of Simulations at the Army Aviation center of excellence, may

be wise to avoid investing a large amount of time and resources into developing a

concept of employing the current MCISs. Some adversaries have the ability to use the

emissions from these systems to target command posts. The information systems in their

current configuration prevent rapid dispersion in the event of location compromise to

enemy fires. The information systems require facilities that are large, cumbersome, and

are devoid of immediate mobility. For these reasons, the current concept of employing

information systems within an MCS in a contested operational environment, will likely

face devastating consequences.

Third, the Directorate of Simulations at the Aviation Center of Excellence has

limited collaboration with MTCs. Each MTC is responsible for their own creation and

conduct of training exercises. A common training scenario, created and tested at the

Aviation Center of Excellence, is not available for rapid sharing to the force. There are

technical and resource constraints that are obstacles to achieving this objective. The case

is made that each unit has its own training plan that needs attention. However, this is a

missed opportunity to leverage the resident expertise at the Aviation Center of Excellence

and achieve unity of effort and action across the aviation enterprise for common training

deficiencies.

64

Fourth, at the outset of the research for this paper, the military problem that I

wanted to solve was that the US Army had attack helicopters on a separate digital

information system than US Army ground forces that failed to coordinate forces.

Additionally, the information systems were the conduit of added chaos from an

overbearing staff that eagerly injected itself into gunfights in the pursuit of understanding

the tactical situation. As my research progressed, I discovered that interoperability

amongst Army information systems is an uber-complex problem with no end in sight.

Realizing that further understanding the technical and force management challenges that

exist to overcoming interoperability between information systems would likely fall short

of a solution for exercising the MCWFF for an aviation battalion, the focus of my

research changed. But the surprising fact that the proprietary nature of information

systems creates an obstacle for integrating the systems with one another remains a huge

problem. The procurement process moving forward should give the Army full ownership

of information systems that it is purchasing to allow engineers to achieve integration and

interoperability without incurring financial obligations to multiple companies in the

process.

Recommendations

For the Directorate of Training and Doctrine at the Aviation Center of Excellence:

MCS is used in ATP 3-04.1 when the meaning of MCS is MCIS. Align the MCS and

MCIS terms in ATP 3-04.1 with ADP 6-0 Mission Command.

For the Directorate of Training and Doctrine at the Aviation Center of Excellence:

Add a duty description for the communications officer in the next release of ATP 3-04.1.

65

Describe how the communications officer should be used in a decisive action

environment.

For the Mission Command Center of Excellence: Recognizing that the MCISs in

their current form are in the twilight of their lifecycle, work with Combined Arms

Doctrine Directorate to publish an ATP for the next generation of MCISs, the Command

Post Computing Environment, describing a concept of employment across branches of

the Army.

For the Army Aviation Center of Excellence: Change the table of organization for

liaison officers to O-3 to provide aviation battalions with the type of officer that is

described in ATP 3-04.1.

For the Army Aviation Directorate of Simulations: Add the ability for aviation

battalion staffs to use their MCISs with the AVCATT.

For the Mission Command Center of Excellence: Future MCISs should be Army

property. Proprietary systems present fiscal roadblocks to integration in future

environments.

For Further Study

First, is the Army Aviation MCWFF feasible in future battle? The current

paradigm is composed of a battalion headquarters with a robust amount of personnel;

networks dependent on abundant satellite bandwidth; information systems that are

challenging in terms of interoperability, usability, and transportability; slow planning

processes and procedures; and facilities that require hours to set up, collapse, move, and

by their opaque construction limit the situational awareness of the personnel inside. How

can Army Aviation expand its strength as a highly maneuverable asset, and create agility

66

in its command posts? Are helicopter command posts a feasible solution? How can

vehicles be configured to conduct the MCWFF, be mobile, and share information across

the warfighting functions? What is the minimum number of personnel that aviation units

need to sustain MCWFF operations? How can we use unmanned vehicles to decrease our

reliance on satellite communications and build an affordable, reliable network? How can

we integrate the functions of multiple information systems into a common system

throughout the Army and Joint force?

Unanswered questions

The primary research question asked how does an aviation battalion execute the

MCWFF? Two secondary questions followed. First, how does an aviation battalion’s

MCS facilitate the MCWFF? Secondly, what ways are available to aviation units for

home station training on MCSs? This paper answered each of these questions to the

extent allowable by the classification of the study. Within the question of “how does an

aviation battalion’s MCS facilitate the MCWFF?” there is necessary analysis needed for

deeper understanding in personnel, information systems, and facilities and equipment. A

clearer analysis of what tasks are required to be performed within doctrine versus the

allocation of personnel has impacts on how a battalion staff is organized and employed.

A more comprehensive technical analysis of MCISs interoperability capabilities,

limitations, and reach would benefit aviation leaders. Lastly, an examination of facilities

and equipment could reveal how current material doesn’t support the future operating

environment as described by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mark Milley, in his

2016 AUSA speech.

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GLOSSARY

Airspace Control. Capabilities and procedures used to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace.80

Airspace Control System. An arrangement of those organizations, personnel, policies, procedures, and facilities required to perform airspace control functions.81

Airspace Coordinating Measures. Measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces.82

Airspace Management. The coordination, integration, and regulation of the use of airspace of defined dimensions.83

Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer. The simulator that enables unit collective and combined arm air-to-ground training for AH-64, UH-60, CH-47, UH-72 and OH-58 aircrews within the Live, Virtual and Constructive Integrated Training Environment.84

Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation. A simulation system used for training and experimentation by the Department of Defense to simulate terrain effects and large numbers of entities participating in interactive scenarios.85

Information System. Equipment that collects, processes, stores, displays, and disseminates information. This includes computers-hardware and software-and communications, as well as policies and procedures for their use.86

80 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-52, GL-3.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid., GL-4.

83 Ibid.

84 US Army, United States Army Acquisition Support Center, “Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer,” accessed April 14, 2017, http://asc.army.mil/web/ portfolio-item/peo-stri-aviation-combined-arms-tactical-trainer-avcatt/.

85 Randy Jones, Thinking Opposing Force for Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (Wright-Patterson AFB: Air Force Research Laboratory, 2003), 1.


68

Mission Command. The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.87

Mission Command System. The arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations.88

Mission Command Warfighting Function. The related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a command to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions.89

Mission Orders. Directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them.90

Warfighting Function. A group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives.91

Virtual Battlespace 3. A desktop tactical trainer and mission rehearsal software system.92


88 Ibid., 11.

89 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), 5-3.


91 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0, Glossary-9.

92 Bohemia Interactive, “Virtual Battlespace 3,” accessed April 21, 2017, https://bisimulations.com/virtual-battlespace-3.

69

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Headquarters, Army Aviation Center of Excellence. Training Aviation Warfighters for Decisive Action. Fort Rucker, AL: Army Aviation Center of Excellence, 2016.

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———. Field Manual 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014.

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———. Army Techniques Publication 3-04.1, Aviation Tactical Employment. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016.

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———. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, The US Army Operating Concept. Win in a Complex World 2020-2040, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014.

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———. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016.

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Interactive, Bohemia. “Virtual Battlespace 3.” Accessed April 21, 2017. https://bisimulations.com/virtual-battlespace-3.

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———. “Fire Support Command and Control.” January 25, 2016. Accessed September 24, 2016. http://peoc3t.army.mil/mc/fsc2.php.

———. “Future Network.” February 1, 2016. Accessed September 24, 2016. http://peoc3t.army.mil/c3t/future-network.php.

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