ARMYANDPOLITICSBy:ShujaNawaz

Pakistanisaprisonerofitsgeographyandhistory.ItsstrategiclocationatthecuspoftheMiddleEast,thePersianGulf,andSouthAsiaandatthedoorofCentralAsiaandChinagivesitsignificanceontheregionalandglobalscene.Itsproximitytoalargeanddominatingneighbour,India,shapesPakistansforeignanddefencepoliciesontheonehandandinformsitsdomesticdebatesontheother.ThepresenceofnuclearweaponsandmissiledeliverysystemsinbothIndianandPakistanihandsmakes thisanevenmorevolatile region than in thepast.At thesame time,PakistanshistoricalwarswithIndiaconstantlyrevivememoriesofthepastandhavethrustthePakistanimilitaryintothecentreofdecisionmakingonissuesrelatedtoitsforeignpolicy,especiallypolicytowardIndia(Kashmir,specifically)andAfghanistan,aswellasnuclearmatters.Pakistanspoliticalreinshavebeeneffectively inthehandsoftheArmyformorethanthirtyeight years since its independence. The country is wracked by internal divisions betweenprovincesandbetweentheforcesofmodernismandmilitantandradicalIslam.Thesecontinuingwarshavecreatedpoliticaluncertaintyandtumult,leadingtotheassassinationofformerPrimeMinisterBenazirBhutto inDecember2007.The2008electionsgavesomehope,allowing theleading political parties, Bhuttos Pakistan People's Party and former Prime Minister NawazSharifsPakistanMuslimLeague (Ngroup) toreturntopower.Andthe Islamistalliance in theNorthWestFrontierProvincewastrouncedbythePashtunsecular,thoughquitefeudal,AwamiNationalParty.AttheheartofthepoliticalmaelstromisthePakistanArmy,probablythebestorganisedgroupandaveritablepoliticalforceuntoitself,whoseeveryactionandhintcreatesreverberationsinPakistanspolity,UnderitspresentArmyChief,GeneralAshfaqParvezKayani,whohassworntotaketheArmybackintothebarracks,therearemanydoubterswhoseethepoliticiansfacingahugechallengeinrunningthecountryeffectivelyafternineyearsofautocraticrulebyPresident,Pervez Musharraf. They point to the gradual destruction or diminution of institutions: thejudiciary,theconstitution,thebureaucracy,andthelegislature,andtothetransmogrificationofaparliamentarysystemofgovernmentintoapresidentialsystembyMusharraf.Againstthisbackground,cynicspointtopastpromisesbyotherArmychiefswhopromisedtokeeptheArmyoutofpoliticsbutultimatelyassumedpowertofillwhattheyconsideredtobeapoliticalvacuum.TheWeightofhistoryleanstowardsacontinuingroleoftheArmyinPakistanspolity,whether overt or behind the scenes.What ever path it takes, theArmy too faces dauntingchallenges, as it begins the fight against home grown insurgencies. For it too has changeddramaticallyovertheyears.Pakistancame intobeing in1947as themostpopulousMuslimnationon theplanetbut thedebateoveritsnationalidentityhasnotbeenconducteddemocraticallynorconcluded.Ithasalsoyettocraftastablepoliticalsystemthatestablishesthesupremacyoftheciviloverthemilitary,asenvisionedbyitsfounderMohammadAliJinnah,theQuaidiAzam.Itspoliticalpartiestoohaveyet to root their thinking and actions in wellcrafted mandates and manifestos or to allowdemocraticselectionoftheirownleaders:mostarerunonfamilialordynasticlines.Withoutapowerfulbaseof support in the countryasawhole, theyhavenotbeenable toprovide thecounterweighttothehighlytrainedanddisciplinedPakistanArmythatisalltooreadytostepinwhenthepoliticiansfalter.

Although theMuslimwayof lifewas amotivebehind the call forPakistan, its earlypoliticalleadershipdidnotgiveanIslamicblueprintforitspoliticaldevelopmentorgoals.Thereasonforthiswas that themovement forPakistanwasnot an Islamicmovementasmuchas itwas amovementbyIndianMuslimstoseekgreatersocialandeconomicOpportunityforthemselves.EarlyNodtoIslamThePakistanArmy,thelargelyMuslimrumpoftheBritishIndianArmy,wasalsosaddledatbirthwiththisparadoxical identity:thesymbolsofIslambutthesubstanceofacolonialforce,quitedistantfromthebodypoliticofthefledglingstate.Itadopted,forinstance,thenumbers786forthe identification of its General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. In Islamic numerology, 786representstheArabicBismillahirRehmanirRahim:the invocationthatMuslims intoneatthestartofanyactionorventureofnote.Thisnumericalcodewasemblazonedonallgatepostsandvehicles,asareminderthatthiswastheArmyofaMuslimcountry.Foritsbadge,itchosetwocrossed swords holding up an Islamic rising crescent and fivepointed star against a greenbackground.ButtheIslamicidentitywasinnameonlyatthatstage.TheseniorechelonsofthePakistanArmyatitsbirthwerestillBritishofficerswhohadoptedtostayonandtheyweresucceededbytheirnativeclones:menwhosawtheArmyasauniqueinstitution,separateandapartfromtherestofcivilsocietyandauthority.ThiswasthedominantculturalethosoftheArmyatthetime.Withtime,thisschismbetweenthecantonmentandthecitypervadedtheArmysthoughtprocessesandseemedtoguide,aswellasbedevil,themilitarysrelationshipwiththeciviliansector.TheArmyinitiallyretaineditslargelymoderateandsecularnature.Pakistanshistory isoneof conflictbetween theunderdevelopedpolitical systemandawellorganisedarmy thatgrew in strengthasa counterweight to ahostile Indianextdoor and inrelationtothepoliticalsystem. InthewordsofformerArmyChief,GeneralJahangirKaramat:Wheneverthereisabreakdowninstability,ashashappenedfrequentlyinPakistan,themilitarytranslatesitspotentialintothewilltodominate,andwehavemilitaryinterventionfollowedbymilitary rule.But,he adds, as far as the track recordof themilitary as rulers in thepast isconcerned,Iamafraiditisnotmuchbetterthanthecivil~ians.1ThemostrecentdirectruleofGeneralPervezMusharrafsupportsthisassessment.Whileitusheredinaperiodoffalsestabilityandostensiblyopenedpublicdiscourse,itstuntedpoliticalgrowthandbadlydamagedtheabilityofcivilsocietytoparticipatefreelyinthepoliticalprocess.Inmanyways,Musharrafwasaliberalautocratwholosthisliberalbearings.OvertimetheArmygainedtherespectofPakistanspopulationfor itsspiriteddefenceofthecountrysbordersagainstapowerfulIndia,andcontinuedtoattractlargenumbersofyouthtoitsranks,but itsdominanceofthepolityofPakistaneventuallyproducedpublicquestioningofitsrole.Throughcoupsand largelyunfetteredaccesstostateresources,theArmywonthebattlebetweenauthority,representedbythestatesvariousinstrumentsofgovernment,andcoercivepower,reflectedintheArmysmilitaryprowess,leavingtheinstrumentsofstateweakenedandunabletofunctionevenwhenthemilitaryreturnedtoitsbarracks.PowerBrokersTheparadoxofpowerthathobbledPakistansslowpoliticaldevelopmentwasthatastheArmygrewinstrengthandsize,itstuntedthegrowthofthepoliticalsystemwhoseleaderseithermadenoattempttorebalancetherelationshipbetweenthestateandthecentreofpower,theArmy,

orworse,invitedtheArmytosettlepoliticaldifferencesamongstthemselves.Successivepoliticalleaders suborned and eviscerated the vaunted bureaucracy and managed to weaken theeducationalsystem, thusdepriving thecountryofalternativegovernancemechanismsandaninformed electorate. The Army meanwhile learned over time to establish patronclientrelationshipswiththebureaucracyandwithIslamistparties,whomitusedinitseffortstofightinternalpopulistleadersinbothEastandWestPakistanandfueltheKashmiriinsurgencyagainstIndianrule.Theresult:apersistentPraetorianstatewithmilitaryorquasimilitaryruleforoverhalfitslifeafterindependencefromtheBritish.Pakistansexistencehasbeenmarkedbyattemptstobuildanationbutwithoutfirstbuildingtheinstitutionalfoundationsthatareneededtoallowastablefederalentitytoevolveinademocraticandpluralisticsetting.Ethnicandregionalstrife,sectarianviolence,andthepersistentintrusionofforeignpowersintotheregioninthepursuitoftheirglobalagendas,allhavecreatedthesettingforunevenpoliticalandeconomicdevelopment.The1999coupthatbroughtGeneralPervezMusharraftopowerresortedtolegallegerdemaintoavoidbeingclassifiedasamartial lawregimebuteffectivelyoperatedunderatemporary legaldispensationthatallowedittooperatebeyondtheambitoftheconstitutionofthecountry.Thesecondcoup,inNovember2007,byMusharrafeffectivelyallowedhimtoreplacethejudiciarywholesale,muzzlethemedia,andwinreelectiontothePresidencybutintheprocesshehadtoshedhisuniform,openingthedoortoareturntocivilianruleofsorts.TodaysInsurgencyToday, Pakistan is at another crossroads, as apartnerof theWest in the globalwar againstmilitancyandterror.AnditsArmyisoperatinginachangedandhighlychargeddomesticpoliticalenvironment.Itstwoleadingmainstreamparties(thePakistanMuslimLeagueofSharifandthePPPofBenazirBhutto)werelargelyexcludedfromthepoliticalprocessunderMusharraf.Onlyinlate 2007' were their leaders allowed back from exile and reenter Pakistani politics. TheassassinationofBhuttodeprived the countryofapolitical counterweight toMusharraf.AfterdecadesofconflictswithIndia,todayforthefirsttime,PakistansArmyiswagingalargelyfutilewaragainstanunseenenemy:Islamistterroristswithinitsownborder.The eastern front against India is relatively calmer and there ispromiseof someprogress innormalisingties,thoughthatmaybeillusionary,giventhemoodswingsofgovernmentsonbothsides.ButthewesternfrontborderingAfghanistanisawashwithinsurgentactivitySpillingoverfromAfghanistanandalsohomegrown,involvingradicalIslamiststheTaliban,whoareintentonfighting theUnited States in Afghanistan and putting their stamp on the tribal areas of theFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas(FATA)ofPakistan.Forthefirsttimeindecades,thePakistanArmyistodayoperatinginforceinsideitsownborders.TheenemythistimeisagrowingIslamistmilitantmovementknownasTalibanization,aftertheradicalrightwingandfundamentalistformerregimeofAfghanistan.ForeignelementsalignedwithalQaeda,theamorphousnetworkofwelltrainedterroristsbegunbyOsamabinLadenandoperatingintheFATA,whichformthatambiguousregionbetweenPakistansNorthWestFrontierProvince (now renamedKhyberPakhtunkhwaorKP)andAfghanistanseasternborder, theDurandLine.AlthoughtheArmyhasnowtakencontroloftheNuclearCommandandControlSystemthroughtheStrategicPlansDivisionof theArmyHeadquarters,andoversightby theNationalSecurity

CouncilandappearstohavemettheapprovalofstrictWesternreferees,thefearpersistsabroadthatradicalelementsinthecountryorwithinthemilitarymayonedaydecidetousePakistansarsenal of nuclear weapons regionally or resort to proliferation, especially to other Muslimnations.ThefuseforaconstantlybrewingconflictwithneighbouringIndiaistheMuslimmajoritystateofKashmir,representingtheunfinishedpartofthe1947partitionofBritishIndiathathasbeenthecauseofatleastthreewarsbetweenthetwocountries.WhetherthatfusewillbelitorbesnuffedoutliesinthehandsoftheArmy.TheCorporateArmyIncreasingly,thePakistanArmyisseenbymanyasacorporateentitythatfunctionsasthemosteffectivepoliticalpartyinthecountry,protectingitsinterests,sometimesevenattheexpenseofnationalinterests.ArecentstudyofMilbus,ormilitarybusinessinterests,byAyeshaSiddiqainherbookMilitaryInc.focusesonPakistantocharacterisetheroleofthemilitaryaspredatory.While this studydoesnotascribeacquisitionofassets through legalisedmeans solely to themilitary (recognising the prevalence of these actions among the civil sector too), it assignspersonalaggrandisementas themotive forcebehind theactionsofseniorservingand retiredmilitaryofficers.Inacountrywhereacultureofentitlementhastakenholdsincethelate19705,thiscriticismisvalidagainstallactorsonthepoliticalstage,whousestateresourcesforpersonalgain.Overtime,theArmyhasbenefitedfromthiscultureandtheredoesnotappeartobeanymovetorollbackthesystemofprivilegesthathigherranksbringwiththem.NatureoftheArmyPakistanisproudlypointtothefactthattheirsisavolunteerarmywithalonghistoricaltradition.Inmanyways,itisoftentalkedaboutinthesametermsastheArmyofitspoliticalallyandbrothercountry,Tur'key.AsauthorStephenKinzerstatesinhisstudyofcontemporaryTurkey:Turksfeeldeepgratitudeandagenuineconnectiontotheirarmy.Theybelieveitexistsandworksfor them.ButTurkswant toescape from itspoliticalpower,whichhasbecome intrusiveandsuffocating.Theyhavelearnedthelessonsofdemocracyandnowwanttolivebythem.WhilemanymaydebatewhetherPakistanhas truly learned the les~Sonsofdemocracy, thesentimentsinPakistantodayaresimilartothoseinTurkey,whosearmyisoftencitedasamodelforPakistansArmy.Yet thereare thosewhoseeacloser resemblance to theArmyof IndonesiaunderPresidentsSukarnoandSuhartowherethedwifungsiordualfunctionsoftheArmybecameentrenched.Armyofficerssawthemselvesassavioursofthecountryandalsodevelopedaroleinrulingthecountryviaarevolvingdoorpolicyunderwhichmilitaryofficersweregivencivilianjobsandthenmovedouttomakeroomfornewofficers.AyeshaSiddiqaattemptstoquantifytheextentofthemilitarysbusinessinterestsinPakistanandcomesupwithafigureof$10billion,Whilehercalculationsareopentodisputeandindeedhavebeenchallengedby themilitary, thegistofherarguments raises relevantquestions: towhatextentisthemilitarysaccesstostateresourcescrowdingouttheprivatesectorandpreventingexpenditure.onothermoreproductivesectors,suchashealthandeducation?Moreimportant,isthismodelsustainable?GeneralKayaniearlyinhistenurerealisedtheneedfortheArmytoreverttoitsprofessionalrootsandbegantodistancehimselffromtheformerChief,Musharraf.ButdisengagingtheArmyfrom

theeconomyandfromcommercialenterpriseswilltaketime.Afterhewon'asecondfullterm,Kayanimayhavethetimetobeabletotacklesomeoftheissuesthatpreviouschiefscouldnot,aboutremovingfatfromthesystemandfightingcorruptionwithintheburgeoningranksofthecivilmilitarybureaucracythattheArmyhasspawned.TheWideFootprintBoththesizeandnatureofthePakistanArmyhaveahugeimpactonthecountryseconomyandsociety.Risingfromarelativelysmallforceatindependence,Pakistantodayhasanarmyofover800,000,includingover550,000regulararmyandtherestasparamilitaryforcesorreserves.ItislargerthantheregulararmyoftheUnitedStates.Itincreaseditsforcesizeevenafterlosinghalfthecountryin1971withtheindependenceofBangladesh(formerlyEastPakistan).Intheprocess,PakistanssecuritythreatfromIndiagrew,forcingittomeetIndiasrapidgrowthofmilitarymightontheonehandandtheappearanceoftheSovietArmedForcesinAfghanistantoitswestinthe1980s.In2005,according toWorldBankdata,defence spendingasapercentageofGrossDomesticProduct inPakistanwas around3.4per cent comparedwith Indias2.3per cent, among thehighestburdensofmilitaryspendingintheworld.AsPakistandevelopsanditseconomygrows,theopportunitycostofitsdefencespendingwillrisedramatically.Thisisahugechallengefortheregime,as itponders itspoliticalfutureontheonehandandthenatureoftheArmythatPakistanneedstoensureitssecurityontheother.Howcanone increasedevelopmentexpenditureorhavea thoroughdiscussionof theoverallbudget?Themilitaryshareofthebudgethasrangedfrom3040percentbutitisstillkeptasaoneline item that is not subjected to any detailed examination or debate in the nationalassembly.Expendituresoneducationaccountfornomorethan1.6percentofGDPandonhealthfor0.5percent(comparedwithdefencespendingat3.4percent,mentionedabove).The issue facingPakistanand itsmilitary today isone thatcon frontsmanyotherdevelopingcountries.Apartfromcrowdingoutothermoreusefulinvestments,therelativelylargesizeofthedefencesectoranditsgradualexpansionintoothereconomicactivities,ashasbeenthecaseinPakistan, Turkey, and Indonesia, for example, creates a host of ills associated with suchenterprises:featherbeddingoroveremployment,heavyandoftenhiddensubsidies,privilegedaccess to scarce resources,and the creationofapowerfulandnew vested interestgroup ineconomicactivities:theservingmilitaryandexservicemen.Thereisnohardfinancialscrutinyorsupervisionoftheseenterprisesor,moreimportantly,overalldefencespending.Thisdistortstheallocationofscarcedomesticresourcesandretardseconomicdevelopment.Accompanyingthiseconomicdominationofthepoliticallandscape,theArmyhasalsostrengtheneditspoliticalstatuswithintherubricofthestatessystemofassigningsenioritytodifferentrepresentativesofgovernment.Armyvs.CivilHierarchyEventwotimeformerPrimeMinisterNawazSharifshookhisheadwhenaskedbymeifheknewabouttheapplicationoftheWarrantofPrecedenceduringhisterms inoffice.Yetthis listthatPakistaninheritedfromtheBritishandthatestablishedtherelativerankingofcivilandmilitaryofficialsforprotocolpurposeshasbeenamajorpathtotheriseofthemilitaryinPakistanisocietyandpolity.Beyondsimpleprotocol,thislistsymbolisestherelativerolesofofficialsfromthecivilandthemilitaryinthenationspolityandprovidedamapoftheirrelationships.TheWarrantof

Precedence issued by theMinistry of Interior from Karachi in February 1950 ranked the topofficialsofthethenDominionofPakistan,WiththeGovernorGeneralatthehead,followedbythePrimeMinister.Notably,theCommander inChiefofthePakistanArmycameinatnumberfifteen,below,amongothers,thejudgesoftheFederalCourt,thechiefjusticesofthehighcourtsoftheprovinces,anddeputyministersoftheDominion.TheChiefofStaffofthePakistanArmycameinatnumbertwentywhileLieutenantGeneralscameinatnumbertwentyone,followedbyGeneralOfficersCommandingdivisionsatnumber twentytwo,bothbelow federalsecretariesandtheGovernoroftheStateBankofPakistan.Pakistanchangedthiswarrant.defactowhenGeneralAyubKhan,theCinCoftheArmy,wasmadeDefenceMinisterandafterwardswhenhetookoverasChiefMartialLawAdministratorandthenPresident.TodaytheChairman,JCSC,andChiefsofArmy,Air,andNavalStaffarerankedatnumbersix,whileLieutenantGeneralsremainatparwithfederalsecretariesatnumbersixteen.Noneofthecivilianprimeministersinrecentdecadeshasmadeanyattempttochangethisorder.Indeed, all of them have elevatedmilitary officers to levels beyond those envisaged by thefoundersofPakistanandthencomplainedpubliclyaboutthemilitaryassertingitselfinthepolityofPakistan.ProtectingitsOwnAfrequentcomplaintabouttheArmyintodaysPakistanstemsfromitsoverwhelmingpowerandubiquityinallspheresofcivilendeavour,anditsabilitytooperateoutsidetheboundsofnormallegalsystems.Asaresult,whenitsmemberschoosetoignorethelawortakeitintotheirownhands, the first instinctof thehighercommand is tokeep thematteroutof thepublicseye.Concomitantwith this tendency has been the growing power and involvement of the InterServicesIntelligenceagencyandtheMilitaryIntelligenceindomesticpoliticalandcivilissues,aspolicyadvisorsand implementers rather thanprovidingpolicyneutral intelligence formilitarypurposesorconductingcounterintelligenceagainsttheexternalenemiesofPakistan.TheISI,ahighlyeffectivecounterintelligenceentity,cameintoitsownduringtheAfghanJihadbut inrecentyearshasoftenbeencalledarogueagencyorastatewithinastate.Infact, itoftenoperatesatthebehestofthegovernment,civilandmilitary,aligningwithwhatevercentreofpower isdeemedmorepowerfulor supportiveof its functions.Because its rolehasbeenconfusedby itsmasters,whowant it toseernotonlyan intelligence functionbutalsoas thecrafterand implementerofpolicy,ittakestheheatforsomeofitsactionsontheirbehalf.Thecivilian IntelligenceBureau,whichused tobe taskedwith internalsecuritymatters, isnowanappendageof themilitaryagencies.Under theMusharraf regime, itwasheadedbya retiredBrigadier,apersonalfriendoftheChiefofArmyStaffandPresident.UnderthepreviouscivilianregimeofPrimeMinisterSharif,theIBwasusedforpoliticalpurposesandeventhenwasheadedbyaformermilitaryocher.EventheArmysownMilitaryIntelligenceDirectoratewasbroughtintothepoliticalspherebyMusharrafandanumberofhispredecessors.Tomaketheseagencieseffectiveandtoremovefromthemtheopprobriumassociatedwiththeirextralegalactions,theyneedtobesubjectedtopublicscrutinyandcontrolsnotonlywithintheArmysstructurebutalsobyparliament.TodayandTomorrowOvertheyearsthePakistanArmyhasbeenregarded,withsomemerit,asahighlydisciplinedand.trainedforce,relyingonvolunteerrecruitment.ThePakistanipopulationtraditionallyhasshowngreat respect,evenadulation, for its soldiersandofficers.Manyyouth signupvoluntarily for

service intheArmyasofficersorsoldiersfollowingfamilyortribaltraditionsandrecentlyasameansofupwardsocialandeconomicmobility.Itssoldiersandjuniorofficershavetimeandagainshowntheirabilitiesonthebattlefield.ButtheleadershipoftheArmyhasletdowntheforcesand the country repeatedly.Gradually, insteadof respect, feelingsof fear and loathinghavepervadedthepoliticaldiscourseontheArmyanditsroleinthecountryspolity.ThePakistanArmyoftoday,thoughlargeandubiquitous,isillequippedforlowintensityconflictandhassufferedheavilyat thehandsofwelltrainedguerrillas thatmelt into thepopulation.Increasingly, itsassociationwith theAmerican superpower that isdriving thewaragainst theTalibaninAfghanistanpitstheArmyagainstitsowntribes.EventheUnitedStatesisnowputtingpressureonPakistantodomoretoplugthegaps intheporousandrugged1,350mileborderwithAfghanistan,somethingthattherelativelysmallUSandcoalitionforceshavefailedtodofromtheirsideofthedivide.TheterrornetworkhasstruckbacknotjustinFATAbutalsoagainsttheArmyinsidePakistanproper,withanewweapon:suicidebombers.TheArmyfacesalongwaronthisfront.UndergoingChangeTheconditionsthatledtotheweaknessesofthemilitarysystemarenotjustsocietalbutalsoarisefromtherecruitmentpatternsofthePakistanArmythatdefinethenatureofitsofficerclassandotherranks(soldiers).Traditionally,theArmywasapredominantlyPunjabiforce.InBritishIndia,threedistricts:Campbellpur (nowAttock),Rawalpindi,and Jhelumdominated therecruitmentflowsthathelpedIndiasendsome2.5millionsoldierstofightinWorldWarIIonbehalfoftheBritishEmpire.TheNorthWestFrontierProvince(NWFP)graduallybegansupplyingtroopsandofficers,assettledareasPushtuntribesmenjoinedthemilitary.Over time, with the provision of waivers for both physical and educational qualifications,recruitmenthasbeenincreasedfromtheformerlylesswellrepresentedareas.BasedonseparateGHQdataforsoldiersandofficers,Punjabshowsanoveralldeclineinrecruitmentofsoldiersfrom63.86percent in1991 to43.33 in2005,withCentralPunjaboutpacingNorthernPunjab, thetraditionalrecruitmentground,by7,500to5,000recruits in2005.SouthernPunjabhad1,800recruits.TheNWFPandFATAincreasedfrom20.91percentto22.43percent,Sindhrosefrom8.85percentto23.02percent,withruralSindhaccountingforthemajorityoftherecruits(5,095to2,500in2005),Balochistanrosefrom0.49percentto1.52percentin2005with200Urbanto300ruralrecruitsin2005,andAzadKashmirandtheNorthernAreasrising.from5.86percentto9.70percent.Theinductionof4,000BaluchsoldiersintotheArmyonOctober28,2010withthegoalofincreasingthisnumberto10,000isagoodsignofnationalintegration.Comparing the officers commissioned into service during the period 197089 to thosecommissionedbetween19902006revealsachangesintherelativeshareofdifferentpartsofthecountry.ThePunjabrosemarginallyfrom66.46percentto66.93percent,butwithinthePunjab there are notable changes in the home districts of the officers shifting to themorepopulousandemergingurbancentresofCentralandevenSouthernPunjab.Thisisinlinewithrapid urbanisation trends nationwide. These bigger cities and towns are also the traditionalstrongholdsofIslamistpartiesandgrowingconservatismassociatedwiththepetitbourgeoisie.TheZiaperiod(reflectedinthestatisticsfor198089)showsasharpbulgeinallcases,astheArmybecameavisiblymorelucrativeandattractiveprofessionforurbanyouthandameansforupwardsocialmobility.

TheimportanceofthebulgeintheZiaperiodisalsounderscoredbythefactthattheofficerswhojoinedinthatdecadearenowpoisedtoriseintotheGeneralOfficercategory.WhenthecurrentgroupofseniorLieutenantGeneralsretires,mostofwhomwerecommissionedinthelate19608andearly19705,theZiaBharti(recruits)willtakeovertherunningofthePakistanArmy.ApartfrombeinginductedintotheArmyduringthemiddleofZiasIslamistethosandofficialfosteringofreligiousideologyanddogma,thisgroupsufferedatthehandsoftheUSandWesternEuropeanembargoofaidtoPakistanandwaslargelydeprivedoftrainingopportunitiesintheWest.Notonlywas itdeprivedofadvancedoverseas trainingduring its formativeyears,but thisofficercohortwasalsodeniedexposuretotheworldoutsidetilllateintheircareers,bywhichtimetheirworldviewhadformedandinmanycasesbecomeentrenched.ThecurrentcohortofseniorArmyleadersinPakistan,includingtheArmyChief,GeneralKayani,representthelastgroupofofficerswhowereabletotakeadvantageofoverseastrainingintheirearly years andwere exposed towider external influences. The effects of such training andexposurearereflectedinsomeofitsthinkingonnationalissues.PenetrationofCivilSocietyAnother visiblemanifestationofmilitarydominationof the civil sectorduring theMusharrafperiodwasthereemploymentofretiredorevenservingofficersincivilinstitutionsandinthehostofmilitaryownedenterprisesthatprovidesalongertermofemploymentforarmyofficers.Eventoday,militaryofficersheadeducationandtraining institutions inthecivilsector.Allthemajor civil service trainingestablishments, forexample,arenowunder retiredarmyofficers.UnderMusharraf,theyalsoheadeduniversitiesandstateownedcorporations.Some1200armyofficerswere inducted intokey civil slotsduring theMusharrafperiod.Whilemilitary ruleormilitarydominatedrulehassomethingtodowiththis,theroleofthecivilianrulerscannotbedownplayed,fortheyhaveallowedthemilitaryfreeingressintotheirdomainovertheyearsandindeedhaveelevatedthemilitarypresencetothedetrimentofthecivilsector.TheearliestmovesbyGeneralKayanitowithdrawsome300servingarmyofficersfromcivilianpositionswasagoodsignofchangesinthinkingonthisfront.Butmanystillremainintheciviladministration,especiallydominatingtheMinistryofDefence.DefendingtheHomelandPakistanslackofnationalcohesionontheonehandanditslocationinatoughneighbourhooddictatesthatitshouldmaintainastrongdefenceestablishment.However,asassessmentsbytheArmyitselfhaveshown,therearedifferentwaysofachievingsecuritywithoutmakingtheArmyso large andburdensome that itdwarfs and stifles economicdevelopment. There are soundmilitaryreasonsforreevaluatingthenature,size,andorganisationoftheArmytoo.Today,Pakistanhasalargeconventionalarmy,taskedwithdefendingeveryinchofitsborders:ahostileoneon theeastagainst Indiaand inthewestagainstAfghanistan,withapotential forunrestontheIranianfrontier,iftheinternalinsurgencysituationinthatneighboursBalochistanprovincebecomesacrossborder issue. Internally,theArmyneedstoreorient its trainingandforcestructurenotonlytocopewithexternalthreatsbutalsotocombatinternalinsurgencies,startingwiththecurrentsituationinFATA.ItneedsspecialisedunitsandtraininginlowintensityFourthGenerationwarfareandtoindoctrinateofficersandsoldiersbothintheprinciplesofsuchwarfare,whereideasnotweaponsalonematter.LookingAhead

ItisimportantfortheArmytohelpcreateastablenationalpolitybysubjectingitselfinpracticetocivilianoversightandcontrol. Itneedstoensurethat itdoesnotbecomethe instrumentofcivilian dictatorship by subjecting itself towider parliamentary controls and oversights of itsoperations.Thisshouldextendtoratificationofseniorappointmentsoftheservicechiefs,theproposedregionalcommanders,andtheChairmanoftheJCSC.Itmustalsobepreparedtoexposemoreofitsexpendituredetailstoscrutinybygovernmentandparliament.Onitsside,civiliangovernmentneedstoensurethatitfollowstheconstitutionfullyanddoesnotinvolvethemilitary inpoliticaldisputes.Aspastexperienceshows,whenpoliticiansruntotheArmyChiefforhelp, itupsetsthebalanceoftheciviliansystemofgovernmentandeventuallybringstheArmyintopower.While themilitary has an advantage over the civil in employing force, it has a comparativedisadvantageinbuildingpoliticalloyaltyfromacivilianbase.Thereasonistheirlackofabilitytofosterandsustainopendebateanddiscussiononkeyissues.Thecultureisstilllargelytopdown.Fewmilitaryregimeshavesucceeded inconstructingmasspolitical;whentheytried,theyhaddifficulty inadjusting toopenparticipationby themasses.Themilitary systemofordersandobediencedoesnoteasilyadjusttothenoiseofdemocracyanddissent.ThePakistaniexperiencecertainlysupportstheseviews,althoughsuccessivemilitary leaders, includingMusharraf,havefeltthattheycanbuckthistrend.Inthefaceofhostility,Pakistansdefenceliesinasmaller,highlymobile,andpowerfulmilitary,relying on a nuclear and conventional weapons system, and the capability of delivering adamagingriposte.Butanevenbetterdefenceliesincreatingapowerful,pluralisticpolityresidinginastrongeconomy,builtonasocietythatvalueseducationandthewelfareofitspopulation.TheImmediateChallengesIn thenear term, theArmyChief,GeneralKayani,andhiscommanderswill faceanumberofchallenges,notleastofwhichistheconstanttussleforpoweratthecentrebetweenthecoalitiongovernmentheadedbyPresidentAsifAliZardariandthemainoppositionofMr.Sharif.Hismainfocuswill remain the counterinsurgency campaign and its followup in the frontier badlandsborderingAfghanistanandinSwat.Byallaccountshehaspressedhiscolleaguestomovequicklytopreparethelogisticalgroundforantiterroroperationsinthoseareas.ButitwillbeimportantforhimtoallowtheciviliangovernmenttomakethepoliticaldecisionsontheuseoftheArmyinthatmodeandtodefinethecollaborationwiththeAfghanandUnitedStatesgovernments.ThiswillbeahardtransitionforanarmythathasbeenusedtoindependentlyworkingwithitsforeignpartnersunderMusharraf.EquallyimportantwillbetheneedforKayanitorecognisewhattheUS under the thinkingGeneralDavid Petraeus has come to learn the hardway in Iraq thatcounterinsurgency operations are 90 per cent political and economic and only 10 per centmilitary.Ultimately,counterinsurgencycampaignsarewonbystrongpolicingandtheisolationofmilitantsfromthepopulationbygoodgovernanceandprotectionfromwithincommunitiesbystronganddedicatedpoliceforces.Themilitarycanonlyaddressthesymptomsnotthecausesofinsurgency.Norisitequippedforcounterterrorism.Theciviliangovernmentfailedinitsfirstfewyearstosetup an adequateNationalCounterTerrorismAuthority. Itwillneed tomakeup for lost time.Moreover,astrongcivilmilitarypartnershipwillbeneededforpostmilitaryoperationsinFATAandSwatandMalakand.Noneisevidentasyet.

WithouttheArmyssupport,giventhecurrentpowerbalanceinPakistan,theciviliangovernmentwillnotbeabletomovequicklyonresolvingissueswithadominantandpotentiallyhegemonicIndiatotheeast.Kayanirecognisestheneedforpeaceandopenbordersbutheisalsoawarethathecannotmovetoofaraheadofthegeneralpublicsentiment. IndiatoowillneedtoshowanopenmindednessthathasbeenabsentinitspublicdiscourseonKashmiroropenborders.Formany in Pakistan, there is deepseated fear of India swamping Pakistan economically andculturally.However,Kayaniappearstobeamanofinnerconfidence,hencethequietthatmarkshisdemeanour.UnlikeMusharrafsonestep forward, twostepsbackapproachonkey issuesrelatingtoIndia,hecouldwell leapfroghistorybytakingthoseboldstepsforwardthatmattermostandsticktothem.ThiswouldhelptheciviliangovernmentgainconfidenceindealingwithIndiaandopeningbordersinduecourse.Withaciviliangovernment inchargeagain,theroleofthe181willneedtobetempered.TheArmyHighCommandwillwanttofavourgreateroversightofthe181bythecivilauthorityandevenparliament,withtheinvolvementofthemilitary.IfKayanisstudiedsilenceintheepisodeinvolvingthebrowbeatinginArmyHouseinMarch2007andsubsequentarbitraryremovaloftheformerChiefJusticebyMusharrafisanyindication,hecouldendupfavouringareducedpoliticalroleoftheISI,allowingittoconcentrateonimportantCounterintelligenceOperations.HismainfocusthoughwillbereturningtheArmytoitsprofessionalrootsandkeepingitoutofpolitics.Asstatedearlier,thecompositionofthePakistanArmytodaybetterrepresentsthesociety inwhichitoperatesthantheArmyatindependence.Itisalsomoreprofessionalandbettertrainedthaneverbefore.Asitexpandsitsmembershipintootherlessrepresentedareasandprovinces,itcanbecomeatruenationalarmyandregainitspositionoftrustanddevotion.Ifitdoesnot,andifthecivilianpoliticiansalsofailtopayheedtothechangesaroundthem,thentherisingtideofconservatismmaybetransformedintoaradicalIslamistwavethatwillsweepbothcivilsocietyandthePakistanArmy,withresultsthatareentirelypredictableandnotwhatPakistannor itsneighboursand friendsdesire.The longerthecountryremainsundermilitarydomination,thegreaterthechanceofstatefailure.The latest recruitment statistics indicate that Pakistans Army today is no longer the samehomogeneousforceofthepastwithitslimitedrecruitmentbase.Itnowreflectsabroaderrangeofthecountrysrapidlyurbanisingpopulation.Theemergenceofnewmediaandpublicdiscoursehasalsochallengedthemilitarysabilitytocontrollifeinthecountrywithanironhand.WhiletheArmyremainsaconservative institutionatheart, it isnotyetabreedinggroundforlargenumbersofradicalIslamiststhatmanyfear.IslamthoughremainsavisibleforceinPakistanisocietyandintheArmytoday.KeepingtheIslamistsatbayremainsadauntingtaskbutitneednotbeusedonlyasascaryscenariotogainWesternsupport.AprogressivePakistanneedstoprovideopportunitiesforitscitizenstoleadtheirliveswithoutfearoftheradicalforcesofIslamthatarevyingforpowertoday.Moreimportant,giventhedominantroleoftheArmyinPakistanspolity,ifPakistanistomature,thrive,andsurviveasasuccessfulstateandanation,theArmyneedstotakeabackseatandallowthepoliticiansandcivilsocietytomaketheirmistakesandallowtheothercritically importantelementsofsociety:media,businesses,professionals,lawyers,etc.,tofunctionunfettered.Theseare the challenges thatboth theArmyand civil society inPakistanmust surmount throughareturt1todemocraticnormssothattheycanfulfilltheirpromisestothecountryandwinthelongwaragainstinsurgentsandterrorists.