Arms Trafficking

Arms Trafficking

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All RightsReserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in OxfordHandbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 01 May 2015

PrintPublicationDate: Oct2014 Subject: CriminologyandCriminalJustice,OrganizedCrimeOnlinePublicationDate: Dec2013

DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199730445.013.001

ArmsTrafficking AndrewFeinsteinandPaulHoldenTheOxfordHandbookofOrganizedCrimeEditedbyLetiziaPaoli

OxfordHandbooksOnline

AbstractandKeywords

Thisessayprovidesabriefoverviewofarmstrafficking,itsparticipantsandenablingpartners,andtheprospectsofareductioninarmstraffickingthroughvariouslegalmechanisms.ItlooksattwoprominentarmstraffickersViktorBoutandLeonidMinintoillustratethesediscussions.Thetradeinarmsbecomesarmstraffickingwhenthedealsundertakenviolateexistinglawsonthemovementofarms.Theselawsusuallytaketheformofdomesticlicensingrequirementsorinternationalarmsembargoes.Armstraffickingisacomplexmultifacetedcrime,anditcaninvolvenumerousdiscretecrimesoverandabovebreakingarmssanctions,including,butnotlimitedto,fraud,corruption,moneylaundering,smuggling,intimidation,andmurder.Armstraffickingisundertakeninthecontextoftheglobaltradeinarms,madeupoftheformalworldoflegaltradeandtheshadowworldofillegaltransactions.Oftenactorsoperateinbothworlds,andbothcanbemutuallysupportiveinvariousways.Thenumberofcollaboratorsinvolvedinassistingarmstraffickersmeansthatsuccessfulprosecutionofthesetraffickersisincrediblyrare:ofmorethan500UnitedNationsarmsembargoviolations,onlyoneparticipanthaseverbeenconvicted.Theprospectsforanendtoarmstraffickingarebleak.Notonlyareexistinglegalmechanismsflimsy,thereseemstobelittlepoliticalwilltodevelopaninternationalframeworkthatwouldhelplegalauthoritiespursuelaw-breakers.Inaddition,manycountriesarealreadyawashinarms,providingampleopportunityforindividualstoeasilyestablishthemselvesasarmstraffickers.Keywords:armstrafficking,armstrade,shadowworld,corruption,revolvingdoor,underminedemocracy

I.IntroductionandLiteratureReviewThisessayexaminesarmstraffickingandtheorganizedmannerinwhichthiscriminalactivitytakesplace.Theessayisorganizedasfollows:sectionIIprovidesaquicktypographyofthearmstrade,identifyingtwoworldsthatthetradeinhabitstheformaltradeandtheshadowworldofillicitandclandestinedeals.SectionIIIidentifiesthemainmethodsbywhicharmstraffickinghasbeencriminalizedtodate.Itisimportanttonote,here,thatarmsdealingonlybecomestraffickingiftransactionsareconductedthatviolatenationalorinternationallaw.SectionIVfocusesontwonotoriousarmstraffickersViktorBoutandLeonidMinintoillustratepointsraisedinearliersections.SectionVprovidesabriefdiscussionofhowarmtraffickersareabletofindcollaboratorsinmanykeyareas,notablyintheintelligenceandblack-opscommunities.SectionVIlooksatthesuccess(orlackthereof)intracking,arresting,andprosecutingarmstraffickerstodate.Thefinalsectionaddressestheprospectsforwhetherarmstraffickingcanbeeffectivelybroughtundercontrol.

Whilemuchhaspreviouslybeenwrittenabouttheglobalarmstradeintheacademicliterature,fewbooksormiddle-sizetolongpieceshavebeenwrittenaboutthetradeinthepast25years.ThemostcomprehensivestudyofthetradeandarmstraffickingisAnthonySampsonsdefinitiveTheArmsBazaar,whichwasfirstpublishedin1977(Sampson1977).TheArmsBazaarwasaglobalbest-selleranddidmuchtopublicizethemorecontroversial

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aspectsofthearmstrade.Assuch,itservedasaninspirationandguideforTheShadowWorld:InsidetheGlobalArmsTrade,publishedbyoneoftheessayauthors(AndrewFeinstein)in2011.TheShadowWorldisthefirstglobalstudyofthearmstradeandweaponstraffickingsinceTheArmsBazaar.MuchofthisessaydrawsfrommaterialincludedinTheShadowWorldordiscoveredduringtheresearchprocess.AdditionalmaterialwasalsodrawnfromanarticlewrittenbyAndrewFeinstein,Paul(p.445) Holden,andBarnabyPacepublishedbytheStockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute(Feinstein,Holden,andPace2011).

Thisisnottosuggestthatthearmstradeisentirelyuncoveredbyacademicanalysis.SpecialmentionshouldbemadeoftheStockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute(SIPRI),whichpublishesanannualyearbookonthearmstradeaswellasothersubjectspecificreports,andAmnestyInternational,whichpublisheswell-researchedreportsaboutweaponstrafficking.Nevertheless,duetotherelativepaucityofacademicfocusonarmstrafficking,thefollowingessayisdrawnlargelyfromcontemporaneousmediareportage,relevantUnitedNations(UN)reportsonthemonitoringofarmsembargoes,documentsemanatingfromcourtproceedings,andprimaryresourcematerialthatwasgatheredduringtheresearchforTheShadowWorld.

II.ATypographyoftheArmsTradeGlobaldefensespendingissubstantial.In2010,forexample,anestimated$1.62trillionwasdedicatedtomilitaryexpenditure,ofwhichover$700billionwasspentbytheUnitedStatesalone(SIPRI2011). Thisisequalto2.6percentofglobaldomesticproductandequalsroughly$235foreverypersonontheplanet.Expenditureonconventionalarmamentsconstitutesonlyasmallportionofthistotal:anestimated$60billionperyear(Roeber2005).

Thearmstradeishometoarangeofactivitiesstretchingfromlegitimategovernment-to-governmentcontractstoarmstraffickinginvolvingnonstateactorsinsomeoftheworldsleastdevelopedcountries.Whilearmsindustryexecutivesareoftenkeentoemphasizethedifferencebetweenthetworealities,thereissubstantialevidencetosuggesttheexistenceofacontinuumofunethicalbehaviorandillegalitythatcharacterizesthearmstradeinallitsmanifestationstovaryingdegrees.Thereare,ineffect,twoworlds,eachinterlinkedandinvolvingplayersthatmovefromonerealitytoanother.

Thefirstworldistherespectableworldofstate-sanctionedgovernment-to-governmentcontracts.Usuallythisinvolvestheproduction,sale,anddistributionoflargerconventionalweaponssuchasaircraftandnavalsystems,althoughthereisalsoarobusttradeinsmallarmsandammunitiontobothgovernmentsandindividualendusers.Unfortunately,thisworldisnotwithoutitsownproblems.Inparticular,theformalandlegitimatetradeisofteninflectedwithbriberyandcorruption.

ThisisclearintheexampleofBAESystems,thesecondlargestdefensemanufacturerintheworld.BAEadmitted,duringcriminalproceedingswiththeUSDepartmentsofJusticeandStatein2010and2011,thatithadcreatedasophisticatednetworkofconsultantsandadvisorswhowerepaidroughly135millioninthousandsoftransactionsviaahighlysecretivemechanismbasedintheBritishVirginIslands(USDepartmentofJustice2010).BAESystemsacknowledgedthatthepaymentsweremadeeventhoughincertainsituationstherewasahighprobabilitythatpartofthepaymentswouldbeused(p.446) inordertoensurethatBAESwasfavouredintheforeigngovernmentdecisionsregardingthesalesofdefencearticles(USDepartmentofJustice2010).

WhatwecalltheShadowWorldisconstitutedbydealsconductedinthegrayandblackmarkets.Dealsinthegraymarketareundertakenbyindividualsassociatedwith(ordirectlyemployedby)statesecurityandintelligenceagencies.Whilesomeofthesetradesarenotillegal,theyareundertakeninsecretasexposuremayhavepoliticalramifications.Graymarketdealsofteninvolvetheillegalsaleanddistributionofweaponstoembargoedparties.PerhapsthebestknownexampleofthisformoftradeistheIran-Contrascandal,inwhichtheUnitedStatessecretlysoldweaponstotheIraniangovernmentinanticipationofadealtoreleaseAmericanhostages.PartoftheproceedsofthesaleswereusedtofundtheNicaraguanContras,arebelgroupwhosefundingbyUSintelligenceandsecurityagencieswasspecificallyprohibitedbyCongress(seeWalsh1997).Theblackmarket,meanwhile,consistsofdealsthatareillegalinconceptionandexecutionandareusuallyundertakenbyarmsdealersinamannerthatviolateinternationalconventionsandembargoes.Armstraffickingispredominantlythepreserveoftheshadowworld,althoughitmustbeacknowledgedthatactorsinthisworldcananddoworkinaidoftheformaltrade.

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Armstraffickingcanbedefinedasthesaleand/ordistributionofmilitarymatrielinviolationofnationalandinternationallaworbindinginternationalconventionsandagreements.Whilesomelegislationallowsforprosecutionforarmstrafficking,itisusefultoacknowledgethatarmstraffickinginvolvesarepertoireofoffensesdependingonthenatureofthedealundertaken.Mosttypically,aswedescribeinmoredetailnext,armstraffickingcanandusuallydoesinvolvethefollowingcrimes:

Fraud(falsifyingpermits,billsoflanding,end-usercertificates,andcargomanifests,amongotherdocuments)Corruption(bribespaidtowarlordsandotheractorstosecurebusinessor,inmoreuniquescenarios,bribesflowingintheoppositedirection)Theft(wherearmsareprocuredfromproducersormilitaryagencieswithouttheirknowledgeorpermission,usuallyfacilitatedbycollusiveandcorruptemployees)Moneylaundering(wherethetruenatureofillegalpaymentsmadeandreceivedbythetraffickerisdisguisedandreintroducedintotheformalbankingsystem)Intimidation,assault,ormurder(usuallyininstanceswhereofficialsorotherindividualsattempttoobstructtheprogressofadeal)

Asthissuggests,armstraffickingisarelativelysophisticatedcrime,especiallywhenarmsaredeliveredacrosslargedistancesbyairorseainviolationofinternationalmonitoring.Assuch,armstraffickingreliesontheinputandcollusionofalargenumberofindividualsoperatinginacoordinatedmanner,suggestingthatitshouldbeconsideredaformoforganizedcrime.Activitiesofmembersofarmstraffickingorganizationswouldrangefromactingasmiddlemenorgo-betweensbetweenthearmsproducerandthebuyer;pilotsorcaptainsemployedtotransportcargobyairorsea;individualsresponsibleformoneylaunderingandthesecuringofforgeddocuments;collusivestate(p.447) employeeswillingtoprovidesuchdocumentsorotherformsofassistance(includingnonenforcementofmandatedduties);andmuscleprovidedtoprotecttheorganizationfromnonpaymentorotherthreats.

III.CriminalizationAlthoughitmightsoundtautologous,thetradeinarmsonlybecomesarmstrafficking,bydefinition,whensuchtradeisspecificallyoutlawedbynationallegislationorinternationalagreement.Thus,dealsthatmaybeconsideredunethicalandmakeuseofcriminalelementsarenotconsideredarmstraffickingunlessthatactivityhasbeenspecificallycriminalized.

Thecriminalizationofarmstraffickingtakestwoprominentformsintheinternationalarena.Thefirstandtheonewiththelongesthistoricalrootsiscountry-specificembargoesputinplacebyindividualgovernments.Theseareoften,butnotalways,implementedbymeansofoverarchinglegislationthatallowsgovernmentstoidentifyprohibitedrecipientsintermsofthefoundinglegislation,aswellasseektheprosecutionandconvictionofoffenders.

OneofthebestknownpiecesofsuchlegislationistheArmsExportControlsAct(AECA).PassedintheUnitedStatesin1976,itservedtointegrateaseriesofdisparatelawsthatspoketotheissueofcontrollingarmsexports(USDepartmentofState2012b).TheActprovidestheauthoritytocontroltheexportofdefensearticlesandservices,andchargesthePresidenttoexercisethisauthority(USDepartmentofState2012b).Chaptersandsub-chapterscanbeaddedtotheUSlegalcodeidentifyingcompaniesorrecipientswhoareforbiddenfromimportingUSdefenseequipment:onesuchexampleisasub-chapteroutliningcomprehensivesanctionsagainstIran.ThelawoftenoperatesinconjunctionwiththeInternationalTrafficinArmsRegulations(ITAR)thatisfrequentlyupdatedbytheUSgovernment(USDepartmentofState2012a).

TheActmandatestheStateDepartmentsDirectorateofDefenseTradeControls(DDTC)toregulatearmsexport(GAO2005).Inordertoexportarms,thestateoranyprivatemanufacturerorresellerhastoapplyforalicensethatpermitstheexportofequipment.Ifthedealforwhichalicensehasbeenapplieddoesnotmeetthecriteriaandsub-chaptersincludedwithintheAECAand/orITAR,theissuingofthelicenseistobedenied.If,however,thecompanyorindividualwhohasbeendeniedthelicensecontinueswiththetransaction,theyareguiltyofviolatingtheAECAand/orITARandcanbeprosecutedandsanctionsimposedasdeterminedbytheAECA.Inaddition,ifan

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individualorcompanythatexportsarmsfromtheUnitedStateswithoutseekingalicenseintermsofAECAand/orITAR,theyareconsideredinviolationofbothactsandcanbeprosecutedaccordingly. AccordingtoITAR,anyindividualorcompanywhoviolatestheprovisionsoftheregulationsshalluponconvictionbefinedforeachviolationnotmorethan$1,000,000orimprisonednotmorethan20years,orboth.

(p.448) Thesecondformofcriminalizationisregionalandinternationalagreementsthatprohibittheexportofdefensearticlestoindividualcompaniesorarmedgroups.ThemostnotableofsuchagreementsaremandatoryUNarmsembargoes.ThesearebroughtintoforcebymeansofresolutionsissuedbytheUNSecurityCouncil.UNmembercountriesareexpectedtointegratesuchresolutionsintotheirnationallegislationsothatlawenforcementactivitiescanbeundertakenbytherelevantnationalbodythisisnecessaryastheUNhasnocriminalenforcementmechanismsandreliesonindividualgovernmentstoprosecuteindividualsorcompaniesthatviolatethetermsoftheUNarmsembargoes.

TheuseofmandatoryUNarmsembargoeswaslimiteduntilthefalloftheBerlinWall,partiallyduetothefactthattheColdWarandtheuseofvetoesbypermanentmembersoftheUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC)oftenledtodeadlockanddisagreement.OnlytwomandatoryUNarmsembargoeswereputintoeffectbefore1990:UNSCResolution232,whichplacedamandatoryarmsembargoonRhodesiabetween1966and1979(UNSC1966),andUNSCResolution418,whichplacedamandatoryarmsembargoonapartheidSouthAfricabetween1977and1994(UNSC1977).

Since1990,however,therehasbeenaveritableexplosionofUNarmsembargoes.Between1990and2006,forexample,theUNSCagreedto27mandatoryarmsembargoesand2additionalvoluntaryembargoes(Fruchartetal.2007,p.xiii).Currently, thereare13activemandatoryUNarmsembargoesinplace.

ItshouldbenotedthattheothernotablearmsembargomechanismmandatoryembargoesforEuropeanUnion(EU)memberscurrentlyhasadditionalembargoesinplaceagainstcountriesandparties.Thosecurrently underEUarmsembargoesthatarenotunderUNembargoesareBelarus,China,Guinea,Myanmar(Burma),SouthSudan,Syria,andZimbabwe(Table22.1).

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Table22.1MandatoryUNArmsEmbargoes

TargetParty/Country DateImposed EstablishingDocument

Al-Qaedaandassociatedindividuals January162002 UNSCR1390

Taliban January162002 UNSCR1390

CotedIvoire November152004

UNSCR1572

DemocraticRepublicofCongo(nongovernmentforcesonly)

July232003 UNSCR1493

Eritrea December232009

UNSCR1907

Iraq(nongovernmentforcessince2004) August61990 UNSCR661

Iran December232006

UNSCR1737

Lebanon(nongovernmentforcesonly) August112006 UNSCR1701

Liberia(nongovernmentforcessince2009) November191992

UNSCR778

Libya February262011 UNSCR1970

NorthKorea October142006 UNSCR1718

Somalia January231992 UNSCR733

Sudan(Darfurregion) July302004 UNSCR1556

Source:ExtrapolatedfromtheStockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstituteArmsEmbargoDatabase.www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes.

IV.TwoTraffickersinthePostColdWarEra:ViktorBoutandLeonidMininViktorBoutisperhapsthebestknownmodernarmstrafficker.BoutwasborninthesmalltownofDushanbeintheUSSRin1963(Daly2008).HewasremarkablyproficientatlanguagesandenrolledintheSovietUnionsMilitaryInstituteofForeignLanguages(Bout2009).BythetimetheBerlinWallfell,hewasfluentinsixlanguages.

BoutwasmasterfulintakingadvantageofthechaosintowhichthepostColdWarSovietmilitarieswereplungedbyrapidtransition.In1991,hemovedintothefieldofairfreighting,acquiringhulkingtransportplanesonthecheapfromSovietarmyofficialslookingtocashinduringthetumultoftheearly1990s(FarahandBraun2007,pp.3236).Hisfirstpurchasewasthreetransportaircraftforthemeagersumof$40,000each(FarahandBraun2007).DuetothefactthatRussianofficialsoftendeclaredplanesasscrapdespitebeingfullyoperationaltoraisefundsforthemselves,(p.449) Boutwasabletogrowhisfleetto50planes(CoalitionforInternationalJustice2005,pp.1622).

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By1992,Bouthadenteredtheworldofarmsdealing.HisfirstclientwastheNorthernAlliance,whichhadtakenpowerinAfghanistanfollowingtheUSSRswithdrawal(FarahandBraun2007,p.45).In1996,BoutspilotswerecapturedbyTalibanfighters,andhewasforcedtonegotiatetheirrelease.HisnegotiationskillsseemedtoimpresstheTaliban,forwhomBoutbegandeliveringarms.UsinghisbaseinSharjahintheUnitedArabEmirates,Boutwasresponsiblefordeliveringanestimated$50millionworthofarmstotheinsurgents(FarahandBraun2006).

ButBoutsmostlucrativemarketwastobeAfrica.Between1994and1998,hewon$325millionworthofcontractstosupplytheAngolangovernmentairforce.Attheverysametime,BoutwassupplyingtheAngolangovernmentsmaincivilwaropponent,UNITA.Boutsplanesmade37deliveriesofweaponstoUNITAfromBulgarianarmssuppliers(BowcottandNorton-Taylor2000;seealsoUNSC2000a).UNITA,atthetime,wassubjecttoaUNarmsembargo.

In2000and2001,BoutsuppliedperhapshismostnotoriousclientCharlesTaylor,thewarlord-presidentofLiberia.LiberiahadbeensubjecttoaUNarmsembargosince1992.Taylorsmilitaryendeavorswerenotoriouslyviolentandincludedsupporting(p.450) thebrutalRevolutionaryUnitedFront(RUF)inneighboringSierraLeone,whichrosetointernationalinfamythroughtheuseofchildsoldiersknownasSmallBoyUnits(Gberie2005).

Boutwasabletoplyhistradebyestablishingconvolutedfrontcompaniesandaircraftregistries.Hisplaneswereregisteredinvarioussemi-failedstatesthatallowedhimtoeffectivelyevadedetection.OnesuchregistrywasLiberiaitself,whereBoutsbusinesspartner,SanjivanRuprah,wasappointedbyTaylorastheGlobalCivilAviationagentworldwidefortheLiberianCivilAviationRegister(UNSC2000b).AndBoutwasalwaysabletorelyonpliantofficialstoprovidehimdocumentsthatwerenecessaryforferryingweaponstotheworldsmostdangerousinflicts.

BoutsourcedmostofhisweaponsfromtheUkraineago-tostateforanyarmstraffickerwhoneededweaponswithoutfacingquestions.In1992,Ukrainesstockpileofweaponswasvaluedat$89billion.Overthenext6years,anestimated$32billionworthofarms,ammunition,andsophisticatedweaponssystemswerestolenandresold(Traynor2001).Oneparliamentaryinvestigationintothetheftseventuallygroundtoahaltin1998afterproducing17volumesofevidence(Traynor2001).

Boutwentundergroundfrom2001onashewaspursuedbynumerouslawenforcementagenciesaroundtheworld.Muchofhissuccessinevadingcapturewasduetohisclosenesstomorethanonecountrysintelligenceandsecuritystructures,aswediscussinmoredetaillater.

BoutcanbeconsideredatypicalpostColdWararmstrafficker,displayingmanydefiningfeaturesoftheillegaltradeinarms.First,hewasabletoestablishcomplexfrontcompaniesandaircraftregistrationschemes.Thelatterwasduetotheopaqueanddisorganizednatureofmanyaircraftregistriesinless-developedcountries.Second,BoutwasabletosourceaconsiderableamountofweaponsfromtheoldEasternBloc,whichafter1990becametheprimarysourceofcheapstockpiledweaponsformanyarmsdealers.Third,hehadatrulyglobalreachduetobothhisaircraftinfrastructureandtheglobalizednatureofthearmstrade.

AnothernotableandtypicalarmstraffickertoemergeinthelastdecadeisLeonidMinin.MininwasborninOdessa,Ukraine,in1947.FirstoperatingunderthenameLeonidBluvstein,MininmovedtoIsraelandthentoamorepermanentlocationinthetownofNorvenich,nearKolninWestGermany(ComandoGeneraledellArmadeiCarabinieri1996).ItisunclearwhatMinindidtosecurehisfinancesinthe1970sand1980s,butbytheearly1990shehadcometotheattentionofinvestigatorsinItalyandelsewhere.In1992,forexample,Russianpoliceinvestigatedhimforinvolvementinsmugglingartworksandantiques(ComandoGeneraledellArmadeiCarabinieri1996).In1997,hewasarrestedonchargesofdrugpossession,afterwhichhewasdeniedentryintoMonaco,wherehehadestablishednumerousenterprises(ComandoGeneraledellArmadeiCarabinieri1996).

AccordingtoaRussiancriminalintelligenceinvestigation,Mininhadbythemid-1990sbecomeamajorplayerinorganizedcrimeandmafiacirclesinUkraine,whichcontrolled,amongotherthings,theexportofoilandnaturalgas.Itwasreportedthatbyearly1990,67percentofalloilexportsfromOdessa(thecountrysmainoilrefining(p.451) andexportingport)wascontrolledbytheOdessaNeftemafija(oilmafia)(ComandoGeneraledellArmadeiCarabinieri1996). TheRussianinvestigationdeterminedthatMininwasoneofthemostimportantmembersoftheNeftemafijaashiscompanies,GalaxyandLimad,werecentraltothetrade.ThemafiamemberswhofellunderMininwerealsoinvolvedininternationalarmsanddrugtrafficking,moneylaundering,extortionandotheroffences(ComandoGeneraledellArmadeiCarabinieri1996).

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In1998,MininleftUkraineafterrumorscirculatedthatindividualswithRussianmafiaassociationshadorderedhisassassination(MonzaPublicProsecutorsOffice2001).AfterachancemeetingduringastayinIbiza,MininagreedtogointobusinesswithFernandoRobleda,aSpanishbusinessmaninvolvedinlogginginLiberia(MonzaPublicProsecutorsOffice2001).TheUkrainian,afterflyingtoLiberiatomeetTaylor(andallegedlyofferingarmsandbribestothepresidentforadditionalforestryconcessions[CentralExaminingCourt2000,2002;MonzaPublicProsecutorsOffice2001]),becameadirectorinExoticTropicalTimberEnterprises(ETTE1998).Overthenextfewyears,MininwouldmakeadecentprofitfromloggingactivitiesinLiberia,despiteinternationalapprobationaboutabusesintheLiberiantimberindustry.MininconductedhisfirstdeliveryofarmamentsonlyaweekafterconvincingTaylortosignoveradditionalconcessionstoETTE.MininapparentlysourcedtheweaponsfromUkraineandhadthemferriedtoNiger(UNSC2000b,p.35,para2011).FromtheNigertownofNiamey,Mininoversawthetransportof68tonsofammunitionandarmsinhisownBAC-11personaljet.Onceunloaded,theweaponsweretransportedacrosstheLiberianborderbyTaylorsforcesintothehandsoftheRUF(UNSC2000b).

In1999,Mininconductedtwofurtherdeals.Thefirstwastypicalofmanyarmstraffickingtransactions.Mininhadsourced715boxesofammunition,cartridgepowder,antitankmissiles,RPGlaunchers,andmissilesfromtheUkrainianstatearmsmanufacturer,Ukrspetsexport(Isenberg2004).Anend-usercertificatewasprovided,fraudulently,bytheMinistryofDefenceinBurkinaFasoindicatingthattheweaponsweretobeusedbytheBurkinaFasogovernment(AmnestyInternational2006).OncetheweaponslandedinBurkinaFasoaboardanAntonov124,aportionofthearmsweretransportedtothetownofBoboDissoulou,wheretheyweretransferredontoLiberiabyMinin.Forsupplyingtheend-usercertificate,theBurkinaFasogovernmentretainedashareoftheweapons(AmnestyInternational2006).

MininwaseventuallyarrestedwhilestayinginahotelinItalyin2000.ThepolicehadbeencalledaftersomebodywhowasalsoresidentatthehotelreportedaruckusfromMininsroom.Whenthepoliceenteredtheroom,theyfoundhimcomatose,surroundedbydrugs,diamonds,money,andfourprostitutes.Itwasonlyafterthepolicesearchedhiseffectsanddiscoveredapanoplyofdocumentsthattheyrealizedtheyhadstumbledonamajorarmstrafficker.

Mininwas,likeBout,avariationofthetypicalpostColdWararmsdealer.LiketheRussian,Mininwasabletosourceconsiderableamountsofweapons(andtransportation)fromformerSovietstates(notablyUkraine).And,likeBout,hewaseasilyabletoprocurefraudulentdocumentationtogivealegitimatesheentohisactivities.UnlikeBout,however,Mininwasalsoinvolvedinnaturalresourceexploitation:anactivitythat(p.452) hasalsomarkedthepost-1990period.Manyarmstraffickersareeitherdirectlyinvolvedinsmugglingbotharmsandmineralsfortheirclientsorarepaidinfundsraisedbymilitiaswhohaveseizedcontroloversuchresources.IntheDemocraticRepublicofCongo,forexample,nongovernmentforceshaveusedtheiraccesstoarmstoseizecontroloverlucrativediamondmines(UNSC2002a).Themilitiasuseforcedlabortoextractthediamonds,whicharethensoldontheinternationalblackmarket(UNSC2002a).Thefundsthatareraisedinthiswayareusedtopurchaseadditionalarmstocarryontheirpartofthewar.Armstraffickingandmineralsmugglingthusbecomepartofaself-supportingsystem:acriminalanddevastatingviciouscircle.

V.ProtectorsandCollaboratorsSuccessfularmstraffickingdealsareonlypossibleduetotheinvolvementandcollusionofnumerousactors,fourofwhomarethemostprominent.Thefirstofthesecollusiveprotagonistsisthesecurityestablishments(inparticulartheintelligenceandblack-opsdivisions)ofmanycountries.Thesesecurityentitiesserveanumberoffunctions,including,butnotlimitedto,providingmarketinformationastoprospectiveclients,sourcingweaponsfromsurplusstockforusebyarmstraffickers,and,perhapsmostimportantly,providingprotectionfromprosecutionandconviction.Inreturn,theygetgraydealsdoneand,onoccasion,information.

Manyintelligenceandsecurityagenciesinthedevelopedworldhavemadeuseofarmstraffickersfordealsthatmaybeillegalandcertainlyunpalatableifpubliclylinkedtotheorganizingstate.ThecaseofVictorBoutisinstructive.In2002,Belgium,whichhadinvestigatedBoutforyears,issuedanInterpolrednoticedemandinghisarrestbyInterpolmembers.InlateFebruary2002,firmintelligencewasprovidedtoBelgianandEuropeanauthorities(operatingunderOperationBloodstone)thatBoutwasduetoflyfromMoldovatoAthensaboardhispersonalplane.OperationBloodstoneoperativesplannedtoarresthimashelandedinAthens(FarahandBraun

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2007,pp.102203).WhenBoutsflightdeparted,Britishfieldagentssentanencryptedmessagestatingthattheassetwasenroute.Minuteslatertheplanedisappearedfromradar,reappearing90minuteslaterfaroffcourse.WhentheplaneeventuallylandedinAthens,Boutwasnowheretobefound.OneEuropeaninvestigatorclaimedthatBoutsevasioncouldonlyhavebeenachievedwithUScomplicity(perhapsinanticipationthatBoutcouldprovideusefulintelligenceonhiserstwhileclients,theTaliban):TherewereonlytwointelligenceservicesthatcouldhavedecryptedtheBritishtransmissioninsoshortatime.TheRussiansandtheAmericans.AndweknowforsureitwasnottheRussians(FarahandBraun2007,p.203).BouteventuallysettledinRussia,wherehewasportrayedasthevictimofaUSconspiracybypowerfulpoliticalplayersandprotectedfromextradition.

AnotherexamplewithalongerhistoricalpedigreeisthatofGerhardMertins.AdecoratedformerNazi(Silverstein2000,p.111),Mertinsbecameafigureofillreputewhenhiscompany,Merex,engagedinanumberofshadydeals.MerexhadbeenpropelledintobusinessatthebehestofGehlenOrg,theGermanpostwarintelligenceagencythat(p.453) wouldeventuallymorphintotheofficialintelligenceagencyofWestGermany,theBND(Ascherson1972).GehlenOrgwasstaffedwithanumberofprominentex-NaziswithwhomMertinswasfamiliar.

In1966,MertinsarrangedadealtosellsurplusGermanF-86aircrafttoPakistan,thenunderaNATOembargoduetotensionsbetweenPakistanandIndia.Whenthedetailsofthedealwereleakedtothemedia,MertinsfacedconsiderablecriticisminhisnewhomesofSwitzerlandandAmerica.Remarkably,itlateremergedduringlegalproceedingsthatMertinsPakistandealhadoriginallybeenapprovedandarrangedbyGermanintelligence(Spiegel1975,1987;Silverstein2000,p.120).

Nevertheless,UScongressionalhearingswereconstitutedtoinvestigatethedeal.Atthesametime,theFBIinvestigatedwhetherMertinsandhiscompanyshouldbedeclaredforeignagentsashewasworkingfortheGermangovernment.However,itemergedthatMertinshadbeenworkingcloselywithUSArmyIntelligence,whichintervenedtopreventMertinsbeinglistedpubliclyasanagentasitcouldjeopardizehiscontinueduse(Silverstein2000,pp.123and130).Mertinsthushadbothbeenpromptedtogointobusinessasanarmstraffickerandhadhisidentityprotectedbytwoofthemostpowerfulintelligencecommunitiesinthedevelopedworld.

Thesecondprominentcollaboratorisorganizedcrime,inparticularthoseelementsoforganizedcrimeinvolvedininternationalsmuggling.Smugglingbyitsnatureinvolvesthetransportofgoodsinamannerthatevadesdetection.Armstraffickerscan,ifneedbe,turntoexistingsmugglingnetworkstoassistintransportingweapons.Inaddition,organizedcrimenetworksoftenpossesssophisticatedmeansoflaunderingfundsraisedfromillicitactivity,helpingarmstraffickersbothreinjecttheirearningsintotheformaleconomyandraisecleanmoneyforfurtherarmspurchases.

Agoodexampleofthelinkamongarmstrafficking,organizedcrime,andthesecretiveworldofintelligenceisthatofInternationalBusinessConsult(IBC).IBCwasamultifunctionalfrontcompanysetupin1992byRogerDOnofrioandMichelePapa(RegioneCarabinieriCampania1995).DOnofrioheldjointUS-ItaliancitizenshipandwaswidelyconsideredtobeaCIAagentwhohadretiredfromservicebythelate1980s.MichelePapa,meanwhile,alawyerbasedinCatania,hadmadehisnamebyactingasasemi-officialrepresentativeforLibyainItaly(Magnuson,Thomas,andOgden1980;LeMonde1984).Inthelate1970s,PapabecameahouseholdnameafteritemergedthathehadtappedupBillyCarter,thebrotherofthenUSPresidentJimmyCarter,toprovidelobbyingservicesforLibyainWashington.CarterwassoaggressiveinhislobbyingeffortsthathewasforcedtoregisterasanagentoftheLibyangovernment.WhenitwasdiscoveredthatBillyhadbeengivenaloanof$220,000fromLibya,itpromptedfiercedisapproval,comingtobecharacterizedasBillygateintheUnitedStates(Magnuson,Thomas,andOgden1980).

In1992,DOnofriotraveledtoLiberia,wherehemetwithCharlesTaylorandsuggestedtohimthatIBCcouldbeofservice.Tocementtherelationship,TaylorandtheRUFwarlordIbrahimBahweregiven50percentofthesharesinIBC(RegioneCarabinieriCampania1995;RepublicofLiberia2009,para.113115).IBCwassooninvolvedinsmugglingdiamondsoutofLiberiaatTaylorsrequest,aswellasimportingweaponsfortheRUFandTaylorsforces.

(p.454) Toassistinturningdiamondsintomoneythatcouldbeusedtopurchaseweapons,IBCturnedtoDennisAnthonyMoorby,whoranacompanybythenameofSwiftInternationalServicesinCanada. Moorby,whowasincidentallynamedbyGermanauthoritiesasanagentofGerhardMertinsMerex,wassuspectedbyItalianandCanadianpoliceservicesofbeingaprominentmoneylaundererfortheinfamousGottifamilyandtheGambinoclan

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(RegioneCarabinieriCampania1998,p.308).Inonedeal,IBCmadeuseofthediamondmoneylaunderedbyMoorbytopurchasearmsfromtheBulgariancompanyKintex.Usingexistingsmugglingnetworks,theweaponsweretransportedintoLiberiadisguisedasaloadoforangesandolives.

Thethirdcollusivegroupistheformalarmstrade.Armstraffickersarealltooeasilyabletosourceweaponsfromproducerswhoareconsideredtobelegitimatedefenseenterprises.Incertaininstances,thereisnodistinctionbetweenproductionandtrafficking:individualshavebeenknowntowearbothhats.HeinrichThometisonesuchindividual.In1991,ThometenteredintobusinesswithKarlBruggertoformBruggerandThomet(B&T)Switzerland. B&Twonlicensestoproducearangeofweaponsandactasasalesarmforcompaniesinneed.Thometeventuallysoldhissharesinthecompany.Morerecently,hehasbeenaccusedofsmugglingarmsintoandoutofZimbabweandwasonceunderinvestigationbyUSauthorities,whosuspectedhimoftransportingweaponsfromSerbiatoIraq(Lawson2011).ThometiscurrentlyontheUSStateDepartmentsDefenseTradeControlswatch-listandhasrelocatedtoMontenegro.

Inaddition,armstraffickersandbrokersarefrequentlyemployedbymembersoftheformaldefensetradetoactasaconduitintomarketswherelesssalubrioussalesmethodsareexpectedanddelivered.Thisprovidesarmstraffickersbothanextrastreamofincomeandafurtherentryintothecozyenvironmentpopulatedbythedefenseindustryandgovernmentsecurityagencies.JohnBredenkampandBAE,ViktorBoutandJoederHovsepianandUScontractorsareexamplesofthispractice(Feinstein2011).

Thelastcollusivegroupistheglobalbankingsystemand,inparticular,banksandcompanyregistriesoperatinginoffshoretaxhavens.Thesehavensprovidethenecessarysecrecyforarmstraffickerstolaunderfundsanddisguisetheiractivities.Inaddition,theyprovideafirewallthatoftenpresentsaninsurmountableobstacleforinvestigatingauthoritiesastraffickersdevelopawebofobscureandmisleadingcompanystructuresaroundtheworld.Indeed,theexistenceofoffshoretaxhavens,andthefailureofbankstoproperlydisclosesuspectedcriminalactivity,isperhapstheprimaryreasonwhysofewarmstraffickersareeversuccessfullyarrestedandconvicted.

VI.AShockingTrackRecord:LawEnforcementandEvasionDespitethehigh-profilenatureofthearmstradeandtheinfamyofnotablearmstraffickers,thetrackrecordoflawenforcementisexceptionallypoor.Thisisparticularly(p.455) clearwithreferencetomandatoryUNarmsembargoes.Despitearound502violationsofembargoesbeingtrackedandreportedbyUNmonitoringteams,onlytwocaseshaveevercometocourt,withonesuccessfulconvictiontodate.

Lawenforcementofficialswhoseektoprosecutearmstraffickingfaceanuphillbattleforanumberofreasons,threeofwhicharemostnotable.Theprimarydifficultyisthatofjurisdiction,whichfrequentlypreventsnationalgovernmentsfromprosecutingtheirownnationalsasthecriminalactivityhasoccurredabroad.ThecaseofLeonidMininisillustrative.Aswesaw,Mininwasarrestedin2000inaseedyhotelinItalyinpossessionofhundredsofincriminatingdocumentsthatdetailedhisdealsinLiberia.Afterbeingsuccessfullyprosecutedfordrugpossession,Mininsprosecutor,WalterMapelli,turnedtothearmstraffickingcharges,forwhichhehadmountainsofevidence:enoughtohaveMininretainedinpretrialdetention.

However,in2002Mininsuccessfullyappealedtohavethepretrialdetentionoverturned(AmnestyInternational2006,pp.6063).ThematterwasappealedallthewaytoItalyshighestcourt,whichruledthattheItaliancourthadnojurisdictionoverthematter.MininwasnotItalian(despitelivingthereforyears),nonegotiationshadtakenplaceinItaly,andthearmshadnottransitedthecountry.TheUNarmsembargoagainstLiberiadidnotsufficeasaframeworkforprosecution,indicativeofhowsomecountriesoftenfailtointegratemandatoryUNarmsembargoesintotheirnationallegislation(AmnestyInternational2006).Mapellicomplained,afterlosinghisfinalappeal,thatjurisdictionisonestepbehindcriminalitytoday,becausecriminalityisoperatinggloballyandcontinuestodosoallthemore.Whereaseachstateisveryjealousofitsownsovereigntyanditsownprerogativeswithinitsborders,theconsequenceofthisisthateachstateonlyseesonelittlesegmentofthewholebusiness(Brunwasser2002).

Thesecondproblemisthatthecloserelationshipbetweenmanyarmstraffickersandstateintelligencenetworkshelpstoprotectthetraffickersdespiteoverwhelmingevidencethatmaybepresentedagainstthem.InViktorBoutscase,forexample,hewasabletoevadearrestforclosetoadecade,firstviasuspectedUSinterferenceand,

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later,throughtheprotectionprovidedbyRussianpoliticalplayers.BoutwasonlyarrestedwhenhewasluredoutofhisprotectiveshellbyasophisticatedinternationalstinglaunchedbytheUSDrugEnforcementAdministration(DEA),whoseagentsarrestedBoutinThailandin2008(Tatty2008).ItisassumedhewasnolongerusefultotheUnitedStates,andtheDEAwaskeentoshowsuccessintheubiquitousWaronTerror.

Eventhisprosecutionfacedhurdles,despitethesubstantialresourcesavailabletotheDEA.BoutappealedagainstanextraditionrequestfiledbyUSauthoritieswhowantedtoprosecutethetraffickerforagreeingtosupplyweaponstotheColumbianrebelgroupFARC.Inthis,BoutwasloudlysupportedbyleadingmembersoftheRussianpoliticalelite,leadingthepresidingjudgetoworryaloudaboutpoliticalinterference(BangkokCriminalCourt2009).AfterthefirstextraditionrequestwasrefusedbytheThaijudge(onthebasisthatThailanddidnotrecognizeFARCasaterroristgroup),asecondextraditionrequestwasdulyfiled(BangkokCriminalCourt2009).Itwasonlyin2011,inhighlycontroversialcircumstances,thatBoutwasfinallyextraditedtotheUnitedStates,wherehewasswiftlyconvictedonthechargespresented.Andwhereitwasconveniently(p.456) overlookedthathehadundertakenflightsintoBaghdadonbehalfoftheUSDepartmentofDefenseanddefensecontractorsbetween2003and2005,whentheInterpolwarrantwasactive(FarahandBraun2007).

Thelastproblemisasimpleone:armstraffickingmostoftentakesplaceinsituationsofwarorimminentconflictandhas,especiallysincethefalloftheBerlinWall,beenmostprofitableinfailedorsemi-failedstates.Insituationsofsuchchaosanddisruption,detectingarmstraffickers(especiallyiftheyareusingsophisticatedevasiontechniques)isdifficult.Inseverecases,thenumberofviolationsissooverwhelmingthatitcanpromoteasenseofinertia.Takethisparagraphfroma2002UNreportonthearmsembargoinSomaliathatvirtuallyadmitsdefeatinthefaceofatideofarmstraffickers:Therehavebeennumerousandregularviolationsbyindividuals,factionsandpoliticalleaders,localandregionaladministratorsandoutsidestateactors.Infact,theviolationsaresonumerousthatanyattempttodocumentalloftheactivitieswouldbepointless(UNSC2002b).

Takentogether,jurisdictionalissues,thedifficultiesingatheringevidence,andtheprotectionaffordedarmstraffickersbynationalsecurityagenciesmaketheprosecutionandconvictionofarmstraffickersexceptionallyrarephenomenon.

VII.ProspectsandPredictionsThemedium-andlong-termprospectsforareductioninarmstraffickingareslim.Manyoftheproblemsidentifiedhereremainunresolved:jurisdictionalissuesarestillanobstacle,asistheexistenceoftaxhavensandcomplicitbanks.Inaddition,securityandintelligenceagenciesthroughouttheworldhavenotprovidedanyindicationthattheywillreducetheirrelianceonblack-opsandcounterinsurgency.Equallyimportantisthefactthatmanyoftheconflictsthatsurvivedandthrivedonthebackofarmstraffickingremainaliveanddevastating:conflictintheDRC,forexample,providesavirtualfree-for-allforarmstraffickersduetothefactthatwarringpartieshavealmostuntrammeledaccesstorichmineralresources.

ArmstradeactivistspinnedmuchhopeonthecreationofastronginternationalArmsTradeTreaty(ATT).However,afterextendednegotiationsattheUnitedNations,thetreatythatwasfinallyadoptedbytheGeneralAssemblyinAprilof2013isextremelyweak.Itaddressessomeoftheissuesthatfacilitaterampantweaponstraffickingwhileignoringothers,includingcorruption.Fatally,thetreatycontainsnoenforcementmechanismswhatsoever.Therefore,acountrycouldratifythetreatyanddoabsolutelynothingtoapplyorenforceit.Infact,inatleastoneinstance,acountryhasproposedweakeningtheirarmsexportrequirementstoconformtothetreaty.

Butperhapsthebiggestproblemfacingthosewhowishtoreducearmstraffickingisthefactthattheworldissimplyawashinweapons.InmanyAfricancountries,forexample,amassivesurplusofeasilyavailablearmsmeansthatsettingupinbusinessasanarmstraffickertakeslittlemorethanmotivationandasenseofmoralambiguity.IncountriessuchasSomalia,open-airarmsmarketshaveproliferated,whereanybodycanpurchasepowerfulweaponsforpaltrysums.InnearbySudan,decades(p.457) ofconflicthasmeantthatvirtuallyeveryadultmalehasaccesstosomeformofsmallarms.Thus,eveniftheexportofweaponsfromthedevelopedworldisstridentlycurbed,armstraffickerswillstillhavereadyaccesstotheirstockintrade.Suchisthelegacyofaworldinwhicharmstraffickershaveoperatedwithneartotalimpunityfordecades.

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ReferencesAmnestyInternational.2006.DeadonTimeArmsTransportation,BrokeringandtheThreattoHumanRights.ACT30/08/20006.(August).pp.606..London:AmnestyInternational.

Ascherson,N.1972.TheArmsExportControlAct.OurManinPullach.NewYorkReviewofBooks.(June1).http://pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/aeca.html.

(p.458) BangkokCriminalCourt.2009.Judgment:OffenseAgainstActonExtraditionintheMatterBetweenThePublicProsecutor(Thailand)andMr.ViktorBout.(August11).BlackCaseNo.3/2551.https://reportingproject.net/PeopleOfInterest/documents/Viktor%20Anatolyevich_Bout,_Charges_850.pdf

Bout,V.2009.TimesTopics.NewYorkTimes.(August11).

Bowcott,O.,andR.Norton-Taylor.2000.VictorBout:AfricasMerchantofDeath.Guardian(UK)(December23).

Brunwasser,M.2002.LeonidEfimovichMinin:FromUkraine,ANewKindofArmsTrafficker.PBS/FrontlineWorldInvestigativeSeries:SierraLeoneGunRunners.(May2002).http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/minin.html.

CentralExaminingCourt.2000.StatementofFernandoRobleda.Madrid.(June6).

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CoalitionforInternationalJustice.2005.FollowingTaylorsMoney:APathofWarandDestruction.WashingtonDC:CoalitionforInternationalJustice.

ComandoGeneraledellArmadeiCarabinieri.1996.MininLeonidEfimovic.Annesso1.Roma:UfficioCriminalitOrganizzata(March17).

Daly,J.2008.TheDeadlyConvenienceofViktorBout.ISNETHZurich.(June24).

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Notes:

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(1).Worldmilitaryspendingreached$1.6trillionin2010,biggestincreaseinSouthAmerica,fallinEuropeaccordingtonewSIPRIdata.http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2011/milex.

(2).Thisfigurevariesconsiderablyfromyeartoyear;thetradeinsmallarmsisworthapproximately$4billionayearandhasanimpactfarbeyondthismonetaryvaluebecausesmallandlightweaponsareeasytouseandmaintainandareabundantlyavailable(StohlandGrillot2009).

(3).Foradetaileddiscussionofcorruptionintheglobalarmstrade,seeFeinstein,Holden,andPace(2011).

(4).22USC2778ControlofArmsExportsandImports.http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2778.

(5).SeeActmentionedinpreviousnote,paragraphC.

(6).AsofMarch2012.

(7).AsofMarch2012.

(8).ExtrapolatedfromtheStockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstituteArmsEmbargoDatabase.http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes.

(9).NotethatthisisalsovariouslyspelledasNaftnaMafija.

(10).AgreementNo.002ABetweenSwiftInternationalBusinessServicesCanadaInc.(Montreal),BattistoElmo(Milan)andIBCInternationalBusinessConsult(Monrovia),undated;AgreementNo.002ABetweenSwiftInternationalBusinessServicesCanadaInc.(Montreal),BattistoElmo(Milan)andIBCInternationalBusinessConsult(Monrovia),February25,1994(signedDennisMoorby,BattistoElmoandDr.RudolfMeroni);AgreementNo.001ABetweenSwiftInternationalBusinessServicesCanadaInc.(Montreal),BattistoElmo(Milan)andIBCInternationalBusinessConsult(Monrovia),March2,1994,signedDennisMoorby,BattistoElmo,Dr.RudolfMeroniandCarloGaleazzi.DocumentsgatheredandcollatedbyItalianpoliceunderauspicesoftheChequetoChequeinvestigation.

(11).http://www.bt-ag.ch/index.php.

(12).DiscussionwithProfessorJamesStewart,formerappealscounsel,OfficeoftheProsecutor,InternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia,andleadingacademicianintheareaofcorporateresponsibilityforinternationalcrimes.

AndrewFeinsteinAndrewFeinsteinisaformerAfricanNationalCongressMemberofParliamentinSouthAfricaandcurrentDirectorofCorruptionWatchUK.PaulHoldenPaulHolden,CapilanoUniversity

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