Arms control treaties

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ContentsArticlesOverviewArms control List of chemical arms control agreements List of weapons of mass destruction treaties 1 1 7 9 12 12 13 13 14 26 33 36 40 44 53 58 65 70 77 80 84 91 92 93 97 98 106 108 110 112 114 130

Treaties1990 Chemical Weapons Accord 2003 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control Anglo-German Naval Agreement Antarctic Treaty System Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Arms Trade Treaty Biological Weapons Convention List of parties to the Biological Weapons Convention Chemical Weapons Convention List of parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty List of parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons List of parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Convention on Cluster Munitions Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Environmental Modification Convention List of parties to the Environmental Modification Convention Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Geneva Protocol Protocol I HiroshimaNagasaki Protocol Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty London Naval Treaty Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty List of parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Nuclear weapons convention Ottawa Treaty List of parties to the Ottawa Treaty Pactos de Mayo Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty List of parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty Second London Naval Treaty SORT Space Preservation Treaty START I START II START III New START Strasbourg Agreement Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Threshold Test Ban Treaty Top Level Group Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament Treaty of Versailles Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany Treaty on Open Skies Verex Washington Naval Treaty Wassenaar Arrangement

139 141 146 152 153 156 163 165 167 168 174 176 177 187 188 190 191 194 195 208 216 219 223 224 229 232 232 236 238 240 242 244 246 248 252

Treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zonesAfrican Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty BrazilianArgentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Moon Treaty Outer Space Treaty Seabed Arms Control Treaty Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty Treaty of Rarotonga Treaty of Tlatelolco

References

Article Sources and Contributors Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

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Article LicensesLicense 265

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OverviewArms controlArms control is an umbrella term for restrictions upon the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, and usage of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction. Arms control is typically exercised through the use of diplomacy which seeks to impose such limitations upon consenting participants through international treaties and agreements, although it may also comprise efforts by a nation or group of nations to enforce limitations upon a non-consenting country. On a national or community level, arms control can amount to programs to control the access of private citizens to weapons. This is often referred to as gun politics, as firearms are the primary focus of such efforts in most places.

EnactmentArms control treaties and agreements are often seen as a way to avoid costly arms races which would prove counter-productive to national aims and future peace. Some are used as ways to stop the spread of certain military technologies (such as nuclear weaponry or missile technology) in return for assurances to potential developers that they will not be victims of those technologies. Additionally, some arms control agreements are entered to limit the damage done by warfare, especially to civilians and the environment, which is seen as bad for all participants regardless of who wins a war. While arms control treaties are seen by many peace proponents as a key tool against war, by the participants, they are often seen as simply ways to limit the high costs of the development and building of weapons, and even reduce the costs associated with war itself. Arms control can even be a way of maintaining the viability of military action by limiting those weapons that would make war so costly and destructive as to make it no longer a viable tool for national policy.

EnforcementEnforcement of arms control agreements has proven difficult over time. Most agreements rely on the continued desire of the participants to abide by the terms to remain effective. Usually, when a nation no longer desires to abide by the terms, they usually will seek to either covertly circumvent the terms or to simply end their participation in the treaty. This was seen in Washington Naval Treaty (and the subsequent London Naval Treaty), where most participants sought to work around the limitations, some more legitimately than others. The United States developed better technology to get better performance from their ships while still working within the weight limits, the United Kingdom exploited a loop-hole in the terms, the Italians misrepresented the weight of their vessels, and when up against the limits, Japan simply left the treaty. The nations which violated the terms of the treaty did not suffer great consequences for their actions. Within little more than a decade, the treaty was abandoned. The Geneva Protocol has lasted longer and been more successful at being respected, but still nations have violated it at will when they have felt the need. Enforcement has been haphazard, with measures more a matter of politics than adherence to the terms. This meant sanctions and other measures tended to be advocated against violators primarily by their natural political enemies, while violations have been ignored or given only token measures by their political allies. More recent arms control treaties have included more stringent terms on enforcement of violations as well as verification. This last has been a major obstacle to effective enforcement, as violators often attempt to covertly circumvent the terms of the agreements. Verification is the process of determining whether or not a nation is

Arms control complying with the terms of an agreement, and involves a combination of release of such information by participants as well as some way to allow participants to examine each other to verify that information. This often involves as much negotiation as the limits themselves, and in some cases questions of verification have led to the breakdown of treaty negotiations (for example, verification was cited as a major concern by opponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ultimately not ratified by the United States). Nations may remain in a treaty while seeking to break the limits of that treaty as opposed to simply withdrawing from it. This is for two major reasons. To openly defy an agreement, even if one withdraws from it, often is seen in a bad light politically and can carry diplomatic repercussions. Additionally, if one remains in an agreement, competitors who are also participatory may be held to the limitations of the terms, while withdrawal releases your opponents to make the same developments you are making, limiting the advantage of that development.

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Theory of Arms ControlScholars and practitioners such as John Steinbruner, Jonathan Dean or Stuart Croft worked extensively on the theoretical backing of arms control. Arms control is meant to break the security dilemma. It aims at mutual security between partners and overall stability (be it in a crisis situation, a grand-strategy, or stability to put an end to an arms race). Other than stability, arms control comes with cost reduction and damage limitation. It is differs from disarmament since the maintenance of stability might allow for mutually controlled armament and does not take a peace-without-weapons-stance. Nevertheless, arms control is a defensive strategy in principle, since transparency, equality, and stability do not fit into an offensive strategy.

History of Arms ControlOne of the first recorded attempts in arms control was a set of rules laid down in ancient Greece by the Amphictyonic Leagues. Rulings specified how war could be waged, and breaches of this could be punished by fines or by war. There were few recorded attempts to control arms during the period between this and the rise of the Roman Catholic Church. The church used its position as a trans-national organization to limit the means of warfare. The 989 Peace of God (extended in 1033) ruling protected noncombatants, agrarian and economic facilities, and the property of the church from war. The 1027 Truce of God also tried to prevent violence between Christians. The Second Lateran Council in 1139 prohibited the use of crossbows against other Christians, although it did not prevent its use against non-Christians. The development of firearms led to an increase in the devastation of war. The brutality of wars during this period led to efforts to formalize the rules of war, with humane treatment for prisoners of war or wounded, as well as rules to protect non-combatants and the pillaging of their property. However during the period until the beginning of the 19th century few formal arms control agreements were recorded, except theoretical proposals and those imposed on defeated armies. One treaty which was concluded was the Strasbourg Agreement of 1675. This is the first international agreement limiting the use of chemical weapons, in this case, poison bullets. The treaty was signed between France and The Holy Roman Empire The 1817 Rush-Bagot Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom was the first arms control treaty of what can be considered the modern industrial era, leading to the demilitarization of the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain region of North America. This was followed by the 1871 Treaty of Washington which led to total demilitarisation. The industrial revolution led to the increasing mechanisation of warfare, as well as rapid advances in the development of firearms; the increased potential of devastation (which was seen in the battlefields of World War I) led to Tsar Nicholas II of Russia calling together the leaders of 26 nations for the First Hague Conference in 1899.

Arms control The Conference led to the signing of the Hague Convention (of 1899) that led to rules of declaring and conducting warfare as well as the use of modern weaponry, and also led to the setting up of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. A Second Hague Conference was called in 1907 leading to additions and amendments to the original 1899 agreement. A Third Hague Conference was called for 1915, but this was abandoned due to the First World War. After the First World War the League of Nations was set up which attempted to limit and reduce arms. However the enforcement of this policy was not effective. Various naval conferences were held during the period between the First and Second World Wars to limit the number and size of major warships of the five great naval powers. The 1925 Geneva Conference led to the banning of chemical weapons (as toxic gases) during war as part of the Geneva Protocol. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, whilst ineffective, attempted for "providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy". After World War II the United Nations was set up as a body to promote world peace. In 1957 the International Atomic Energy Agency was set up to monitor the proliferation of nuclear technology, including that of nuclear weapons. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons technology to countries outside the five that already possessed them: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China.[1] The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and Soviet Union in the late 1960s/early 1970s led to further weapons control agreements. The SALT I talks led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an Interim Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (see SALT I), both in 1972. The SALT II talks started in 1972 leading to agreement in 1979. Due to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan the United States never ratified the treaty, however the agreement was honoured by both sides. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed between the United States and Soviet Union in 1987 and ratified in 1988, leading to an agreement to destroy all missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometres. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention was signed banning the manufacture and use of chemical weapons. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties were signed, as START I and START II, by the US and Soviet Union, further restricting weapons. This was further moved on by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1996 banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes.

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List of treaties and conventions related to arms controlSome of the more important international arms control agreements follow: Washington Naval Treaty, 1922-1939[2] (as part of the naval conferences) Geneva Protocol on chemical and biological weapons, 1925 Antarctic Treaty, signed 1959, entered into force 1961 Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed and entered into force 1963 Outer Space Treaty, signed and entered into force 1967 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed 1968, entered into force 1970 Seabed Arms Control Treaty, signed 1971, entered into force 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), signed and ratified 1972, in force 1972-1977 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed and entered into force 1972, terminated following U.S. withdrawal 2002 Biological Weapons Convention, signed 1972, entered into force 1975 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, signed 1974, entered into force 1990 SALT II signed 1979, never entered into force

Environmental Modification Convention, signed 1977, entered into force 1978 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, signed 1980, entered into force 1983 Moon Treaty, signed 1979, entered into force 1984[3]

Arms control Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed 1987, entered into force 1988 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, (CFE Treaty) signed 1990, entered into force 1992[4] Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed 1991, entered into force 1994, expired 2009 [5] Chemical Weapons Convention, signed 1993, entered into force 1997 START II, signed 1993, ratified 1996 (United States) and 2000 (Russia), terminated following Russian withdrawal 2002 Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel land mines, signed 1997, entered into force 1999[6] Open Skies Treaty, signed 1992, entered into force 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed 2002, entered into force 2003, expires 2012 Convention on Cluster Munitions, signed 2008, entered into force 2010

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Nuclear weapon free zone treaties Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean), signed 1967, entered into force 1972 Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), signed 1985, entered into force 1986 Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia), signed 1995, entered into force 1997 Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa), signed 1996, entered into force 2009 Treaty of Semipalatinsk (Central Asia), signed 2006, entered into force 2008

Other treaties also envision the creation of NWFZ, among other objectives. These are the following: Antarctic Treaty, signed 1959, entered into force 1961 Outer Space Treaty, signed and entered into force 1967 Seabed Arms Control Treaty, signed 1971, entered into force 1972

Pending treaties Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, signed 1996 New START Treaty, signed by Russia and the United States April 8, 2010, awaiting ratification

Proposed treaties Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Nuclear weapons convention Space Preservation Treaty Final document in the framework of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms

Export control regimes Zangger Committee 1971Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 1974Australia Group 1985Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 1987Wassenaar Arrangement, 1996-

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Nonbinding declarations Ayacucho Declaration 1974

Arms Control OrganizationsThis list is incomplete. The intergovernmental organizations for arms control are the following: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) Conference on Disarmament (CD) United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) the now disbanded United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the successor to United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) failed proposal[7] for Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons There are also numerous non-governmental organizations that promote a global reduction in nuclear arms and offer research and analysis about U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Pre-eminent among these organizations is the Arms Control Association, founded in 1971 to promote public understanding of and support for arms control. Others include: Federation of American Scientists (FAS) -- founded in 1945 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists by veterans of the Manhattan Project. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament -- a leading disarmament organization in the United Kingdom, founded in 1957. Peace Action -- formerly SANE (the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy), founded in 1957 Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) -- founded by Bernard Lown in 1961. Council for a Livable World -- founded in 1962 by physicist Le Szilrd and other scientists who believed that nuclear weapons should be controlled and eventually eliminated. Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) -- founded in 1969 by faculty and students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Arms Control Association -- founded in 1971. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation -- founded in 1980 as a sister organization to the Council for a Livable World. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) -- founded in 1981. Alliance for Nuclear Accountability -- a national network of organizations working to address issues of nuclear weapons production and waste cleanup, founded in 1987 as the Military Production Network. Global Zero -- founded in 2008.

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References Randall Forsberg, ed., Arms Control Reporter 1995-2005, Cambridge: MIT Press, 19952004. Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John Disarmament and security since Locarno 1925-1931; being the political and technical background of the general disarmament conference, 1932, New York, Howard Fertig, 1973. Giuseppe Gagliano-Maurizio Boni,Sicurezza internazionale e controllo degli armamenti,New Press 2001[1] Council on Foreign Relations: Global Governance Monitor on Nonproliferation, available at http:/ / www. cfr. org/ publication/ 18985/ [2] The last naval conference treaty was to expire de jure in 1942, but in fact it ceased to be enforced with the start of World War II [3] The Moon Treaty entered into force in 1984, but the great majority of states have neither signed nor ratified it, including the major spacefaring nations [4] PostCold War Amendments to the CFE Treaty were agreed in 1996, but never entered into force. Russia announced its intended suspension of the treaty in 2007. [5] START I was a successor to the expired SALT agreements. [6] The largest producers of anti-personnel land mines, China, Russia and the United States, have not adhered to the Ottawa Treaty on land mines. [7] (http:/ / boudewijndejonge. googlepages. com/ Institutional_governance_OPBW. pdf)

External links National Counterproliferation Center - Office of the Director of National Intelligence (http://www.counterwmd. gov) UN - Disarmament Affairs (http://disarmament.un.org) Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (http://www.armscontrolcenter.org) Council for a Livable World (http://www.clw.org) Disarmament Insight initiative (http://www.disarmamentinsight.blogspot.com) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Research on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (http:// www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/)

List of chemical arms control agreements

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List of chemical arms control agreementsChemical arms control is the attempt to limit the use or possession of chemical weapons through arms control agreements. These agreements are often motivated by the common belief "that these weapons...are abominable",[1] and by a general agreement that chemical weapons do "not accord with the feelings and principles of civilized warfare."[2] The first chemical arms control agreement was the Strasbourg Agreement of 1675 between France and the Holy Roman Empire. This bilateral pact prohibited the use of poisoned bullets in any war between Victims of a chemical attack during the IranIraq War [3] the two states. In the several centuries after that agreement, as chemistry advanced, states developed more sophisticated chemical weapons, and the primary concern in arms control shifted from poison bullets to poison gases. Thus, in the Hague Convention of 1899, a large group of states agreed "to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole objective of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases".[4] The Hague Convention and other early attempts at chemical arms control took place before any significant wartime use of chemical weapons. As such, these agreements were largely hypothetical and their prohibitions were not overly restrictive or precise. Another important feature of all early agreements was that they required reciprocity; in all of the agreements adopted before World War I, states were still free to use chemical weapons against non-signatories.[5] World War I broke out in Europe less than 20 years after the signing of the Hague Convention. During that conflict, chemical weapons were used extensively by all sides in what still remains the largest case of chemical warfare.[6] After the war, arms control agreements in general, and chemical arms control agreements in particular, gained renewed support. After seeing the gas attacks of the war, the general public overwhelmingly supported banning them. In one survey of Americans, 367,000 favored banning chemical warfare while 19 supported its continuation in the future. This public opinion stimulated increased efforts for a ban on chemical weapons.[7] These efforts led to several agreements in the years before World War II, including the Geneva Protocol.[8] World War II was seen as a significant success for chemical arms control as none of the belligerents made significant use of chemical weapons.[] In the immediate aftermath of the war, arms control efforts focused primarily on nuclear weapons given their immense destructive power, and chemical disarmament was not a priority.[9] Nonetheless, chemical warfare began to expand again with gas attacks during the Yemeni Civil War,[10] and allegations of use during the Korean War.[11] Combined with the use of non-lethal chemical agents by the United States in the Vietnam War (including tear gases and defoliants),[12] these incidents led to a renewed interest in chemical disarmament.[13] The substantial use of chemical weapons in the IranIraq War increased the push towards disarmament,[14] finally culminating in the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, a full-scale ban on the use, production and stockpiling of weapons, which took force in 1997.[15]

List of chemical arms control agreements

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List of agreementsAgreement Year Parties Nature of prohibition Ref

Strasbourg Agreement

1675 France; Holy Roman Empire 1874 Never ratified

Prohibited the use of poison bullets in wars between the two states

[3]

Brussels Declaration

Proposed a ban on "employment of poison or poisoned weapons". It was never adopted, but helped lead to the Hague Conventions. Banned "projectiles the sole objective of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases." Banned the use of "poisons or poisonous weapons" Forbade the production or importation of poison gases by Germany

[16]

Declaration of the Hague Convention of 1899 Hague Convention of 1907 Treaty of Versailles

1899 31 states[17] 1907 35 states[18] 1919 Germany; Allies of World War I 1922 Never [20] ratified 1925 137 states[22] 1933 Never [24] ratified 1972 163 states (list)

[4]

[19] [6]

Washington Arms Conference Geneva Protocol

Proposed a ban on all forms of chemical warfare

[21]

Banned the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other Gases, and bacteriological methods of warfare." Proposed an expansion of the Geneva Protocol to provide a precise definition of chemical warfare and prohibit chemical warfare against non-signatory states. Banned all forms of biological warfare. While not a chemical arms control treaty, it was the result of discussions on both chemical and biological weapons and an important stepping stone towards chemical weapons agreements. A group of countries formed to control the export of materials that could be used in chemical and biological warfare. Prohibited shipments of chemical weapons and regulated trade in precursors.

[23]

World Disarmament Conference Biological Weapons Convention

[]

[14]

Australia Group

1985 41 states

[25]

Declaration of the Conference on Chemical Weapons Use Chemical Weapons Convention

1989 149 states

A gathering of states that reaffirmed the Geneva Protocol. All states agreed to "solemnly [26] [27] affirm their commitments not to use chemical weapons and condemn such use."

1993 188 states (list)

Prohibited the "development, production, acquisition, retention, stockpiling, transfer and [28] use of all chemical weapons." Required states to declare and destroy their chemical arsenals, and provided for the control of chemical weapons precursors.

Notes[1] Croddy, p. xxi [2] Coleman, p. 8 [3] Coleman, p. 7 [4] Coleman, p. 9 [5] Croddy, p. 170 [6] Coleman, p. 45 [7] Croddy, p. 172 [8] Coleman, p. 46 [9] Croddy, p. 175 [10] Coleman, p. 101102 [11] Coleman, p. 89 [12] Croddy, pp. 161162 [13] Coleman, pp. 152153 [14] Coleman, p. 153 [15] Coleman, p. 150

List of chemical arms control agreements[16] "Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels, 27 August 1874." (http:/ / www. icrc. org/ ihl. nsf/ INTRO/ 135?OpenDocument). International Committee of the Red Cross. . Retrieved 2009-04-19. [17] For a complete list see "Declaration concerning Asphyxiating Gases" (http:/ / www. opbw. org/ int_inst/ sec_docs/ 1899HD-SPS. pdf). . [18] For a complete list see "Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land" (http:/ / www. opbw. org/ int_inst/ sec_docs/ 1907HC-SPS. pdf). . [19] Croddy, p. 171 [20] The provisions on chemical warfare were inserted in an agreement of submarines, which did not go into force due to French opposition. [21] Croddy, pp. 172173 [22] For a complete list see "List of States Parties To The Protocol" (http:/ / www. opbw. org/ int_inst/ sec_docs/ 1925GP-SIGS-SPS. pdf). . [23] Croddy, p. 173 [24] The World Disarmament Conference ceased activities in 1936, so the proposed agreement on chemical weapons was never adopted.Coleman, p. 152 [25] Croddy, pp. 180181 [26] Federation of American Scientists. "Geneva Protocol" (http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ control/ geneva/ intro. htm). . Retrieved 2009-04-19. [27] Coleman, p. 160 [28] Croddy, pp. 176-177

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ReferencesGeneral references Coleman, Kim (2005). A History of Chemical Warfare. Palgrave MacMillan. ISBN978-1-4039-3460-4. Croddy, Eric; Perez-Armendariz, Clarissa; Hart, John (2002). Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen. Copernicus Books. ISBN0-387-95076-1. Specific references

List of weapons of mass destruction treatiesA variety of treaties and agreements have been enacted to regulate the use, development and possession of various types of weapons of mass destruction. Treaties may regulate weapons use under the customs of war (Hague Conventions, Geneva Protocol), ban specific types of weapons (Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention), limit weapons research (Partial Test Ban Treaty, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty), limit allowable weapons stockpiles and delivery systems (START I, SORT) or regulate civilian use of weapon pre-cursors (Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention). The history of weapons control has also included treaties to limit effective defense against weapons of mass destruction in order to preserve the determent doctrine of mutually assured destruction (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) as well as treaties to limit the spread of nuclear technologies geographically (African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).

List of weapons of mass destruction treaties

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General Environmental Modification Convention Protocol I and Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions

Biological weapons Biological Weapons Convention Geneva Protocol

Chemical weapons Brussels Convention on the Law and Customs of War (not adopted but relevant language incorporated into Hague Convention) Chemical Weapons Convention Geneva Protocol Hague Convention Strasbourg Agreement Treaty of Versailles Washington Naval Treaty

Nuclear weaponsAnti-proliferation Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Seabed Arms Control Treaty Outer Space Treaty Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

By region African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty Antarctic Treaty Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act

List of weapons of mass destruction treaties

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Weapons limitation Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (not completed) Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty McCloy-Zorin Accords Partial Test Ban Treaty SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) SALT II SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) START II START III (not completed) START treaty (2010) ("New START treaty")

Cooperation 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement Nassau agreement Polaris Sales Agreement Quebec Agreement (with Canada)

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Treaties1990 Chemical Weapons AccordU.S.-Soviet Chemical Weapons Accord

George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev signing the bilateral accord to cease production and eliminate stockpiles of Chemical weapons on June 1st, 1990.

On June 1, 1990 Presidents George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the bilateral U.S.Soviet Chemical Weapons Accord. The Accord is officially known as the "Agreement on Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons". This pact was signed during a summit meeting in Washington D.C.[1]

CriteriaThe bilateral agreement required the destruction to begin before 1993 and to reduce Chemical weapon (CW) stockpiles to no more than 5,000 agent tons each by December 31, 2002. It also required both sides to halt CW production upon entry into force of the accord. Additionally on-site inspections were authorized to confirm that destruction has taken place and data exchanges on stockpile levels would occur to facilitate monitoring. The Accord also included a mutual pledge to support a global ban on CW.

References[1] Chemical and Biological Weapons Chronology (http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ control/ bwc/ chron. htm). .

Chemical Weapons WMD Around the World (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/cbw/cw.htm). United States of America: Chemical Weapons Profile (http://www.idsa.in/cbwmagazine/ UnitedStatesofAmericaChemicalWeaponsProfile_skshrivastav_0110).

2003 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War

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2003 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of WarThe Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War is an international treaty signed in 2003 that aims to limit the impact of cluster bombs and other unexploded devices on civilian populations after a conflict ends. It came into effect on November 12, 2006.

External links Full text of the treaty [1] International Committee of the Red Cross New law aims to end cluster bomb devastation [2] ABC News Online

References[1] http:/ / www. icrc. org/ ihl. nsf/ 385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/ c110d2926d08a892c1256e280056b275 [2] http:/ / www. abc. net. au/ news/ newsitems/ 200611/ s1786678. htm

Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms ControlAgreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control is an agreement signed on June 14, 1996 in Florence, Italy, that limits the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters that the parties to the agreement can possess. As part of the agreement, the parties of FR Yugoslavia (now succeeded by Serbia and Montenegro), the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republica Srpska) and Croatia annually exchange information on and allow inspections of their military holdings. It was signed under the supervision of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

External links Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control [1]

References[1] http:/ / arhiva. morh. hr/ hvs/ SPORAZUMI/ tekstovi/ SSKN-engleski. pdf

Anglo-German Naval Agreement

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Anglo-German Naval AgreementAnglo-German Naval Agreement (A.G.N.A)Exchange of Notes between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the German Government regarding the Limition of Naval Armaments Type Signed Location Condition Signatories Naval limitation agreement. June 18, 1935 London, United Kingdom Ratification by the British Parliament and the Nazi German Reichstag. United Kingdom Germany

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement (A.G.N.A) of June 18, 1935 was a bilateral agreement between the United Kingdom and German Reich regulating the size of the Kriegsmarine in relation to the Royal Navy. The A.G.N.A fixed a ratio whereby the total tonnage of the Kriegsmarine was to be 35% of the total tonnage of the Royal Navy on a permanent basis.[1] It was registered in League of Nations Treaty Series on July 12, 1935.[2] The agreement was renounced by Adolf Hitler on April 28, 1939. The A.G.N.A was an ambitious attempt on the part of both London and Berlin to reach better relations, but it ultimately floundered because of conflicting expectations between the two states. For the Germans, the A.G.N.A. was intended to mark the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance against France and the Soviet Union,[3] whereas for the British, the A.G.N.A. was to be the beginning of a series of arms limitation agreements that were made to limit German expansionism. The A.G.N.A was highly controversial, both at the time and since, because the 35:100 tonnage ratio allowed Germany the right to build a Navy beyond the limits set by the Treaty of Versailles, and the British had made the agreement without consulting France or Italy first.

BackgroundPart IV of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles had imposed severe restrictions on the size and capacities on the armed forces of the Reich. In regards to the Navy, Germany was allowed no submarines, no naval aviation, and no battleships; the total naval forces allowed to the Germans were six heavy cruisers of no more than 10,000 tons displacement, six light cruisers of no more than 6,000 tons displacement, 12 destroyers of no more than 800 tonnes displacement and 12 torpedo boats.[4] Through the interwar years, German opinion had protested these restrictions as harsh and unjust, and demanded that either all of the other states of Europe disarm down to German levels, or alternatively, Germany be allowed to rearm to the level of all the other European states. In Britain, where after 1919 there was much guilt over the alleged excessively harsh terms of Versailles, the German claim to "equality" in armaments often met with considerable sympathy. More importantly, every German government of the Weimar Republic was implacably opposed to the terms of Versailles, and given that Germany was potentially Europes strongest power, from the British perspective it made sense to revise Versailles in Germanys favor as the best way of preserving the peace.[5] The British attitude was well summarized in a Foreign Office memo from 1935 that stated "...from the earliest years following the war it was our policy to eliminate those parts of the Peace Settlement which, as practical people, we knew to be unstable and indefensible".[6] The change of regime in Germany in 1933 did cause alarm in London, but there was considerable uncertainty about what Hitlers long term intentions were. In August 1933, the chief of the Committee of Imperial Defense (CID), Royal Marine General Sir Maurice Hankey, visited Germany, and wrote down his impressions of the New Germany in October 1933. Hankleys report concluded with the words: Are we still dealing with the Hitler of Mein Kampf , lulling his opponents to sleep with fair words to gain

Anglo-German Naval Agreement time to arm his people, and looking always to the day when he can throw off the mask and attack Poland? Or is it a new Hitler, who discovered the burden of responsible office, and wants to extricate himself, like many an earlier tyrant from the commitments of his irresponsible days? That is the riddle that has to be solved.[7] This uncertainty over what Hitler's ultimate intentions in foreign policy were was to colour much of British policy towards Germany until 1939. Equally important as one of the origins of the Treaty were the deep cuts made to the Royal Navy after the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 and the London Naval Conference of 1930.[8] The cuts imposed by the two conferences, combined with the effects of the Great Depression, caused the collapse of much of the British shipbuilding industry in the early 1930s.[9] This would seriously hinder efforts at British naval rearmament later in the decade, and would lead the Admiralty to greatly value treaties which imposed quantitative and qualitative limitations on potential enemies as the best way of ensuring British sea supremacy.[10] The British Empire faced worldwide defense commitments, but lacked both the industrial infrastructure and financial resources to build up a navy capable of being simultaneously strong in both Far Eastern and European waters. It was therefore important that potential enemies place voluntary limitations on the size and scale of their navies.[11] In particular, Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, the First Sea Lord between 19331938, came to argue in favor of such treaties. They promised a highly standardized classification of different warships, and discouraged technical innovations that, under the existing conditions, the Royal Navy could not always hope to match.[12] Admiral Chatfield especially wished for the Germans to do away with their Deutschland-class Panzerschiffe (known in the press as "pocket battleships" to the British), as such ships, embracing the characteristics of both battleships and cruisers, were highly dangerous to Chatfields vision of a world of highly regulated warship types and designs.[13] As part of the effort to do away with the Panzerschiffe, the British Admiralty stated in March 1932 and again in the spring of 1933, that Germany was entitled to "a moral right to some relaxation of the treaty [of Versailles]".[14] In February 1932, the World Disarmament Conference opened in Geneva, Switzerland. Among the more hotly debated issues at the conference was the German demand for gleichberechtigung (equality of armaments) (i.e. abolishing Part V of Versailles) versus the French demand for scurit (security) in armaments (i.e. maintaining Part V as the best way of ensuring French security). The British position was an attempt to play the honest broker, and sought to seek a compromise between the French claim to scurit and the German claim to gleichberechtigung, which in practice meant backing the German claim to rearm beyond Part V, but not allowing the Germans to rearm enough to threaten France. Various British compromise proposals along these lines were rejected by both the French and German delegations as unacceptable. In September 1932, Germany walked out of the conference, claiming it was impossible to achieve gleichberechtigung. By this time, the electoral success of the National Socialist German Workers Party had alarmed London, and it was felt unless the Weimar Republic could achieve some dramatic foreign policy success, Adolf Hitler might come to power. In order to lure the Germans back to Geneva, after several months of strong British diplomatic pressure on the French, in December 1932, all of the other delegations voted for a British-sponsored resolution that would allow for the "theoretical equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations".[15] Germany agreed to return to the conference. Thus, before Hitler became Chancellor, it had been accepted that Germany could rearm beyond the limits set by Versailles, through the precise extent of German rearmament was still open to negotiation. During the 1920s, Hitlers thinking on foreign policy went through a dramatic change. At the beginning of his political career, Hitler was hostile to Britain as one enemies of the Reich, but strongly influenced by the British opposition to the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, Hitler came to rank Britain as a potential ally.[16] In Mein Kampf, and even more in its sequel, Zweites Buch, Hitler strongly criticized the pre-1914 German government for embarking on a naval and colonial challenge to the British Empire, and in Hitlers view, needlessly antagonizing the British.[17] In Hitlers view, Britain was a fellow Aryan power, whose friendship could be won by a German "renunciation" of naval and colonial ambitions against Britain.[17] In return for such a renunciation, Hitler expected an Anglo-German alliance directed at France and the Soviet Union, and British support for the German efforts to acquire Lebensraum in Eastern Europe. As the first step towards the Anglo-German alliance, Hitler had written in

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Anglo-German Naval Agreement Mein Kampf of his intention to seek a sea pact, by which Germany would renounce any naval challenge against Britain.[18] In January 1933, Hitler became the German chancellor. The new government in Germany had inherited a strong negotiating position at Geneva from the previous government of General Kurt von Schleicher. The German strategy was to make idealistic offers of limited rearmament, out of the expectation that all such offers would be rejected by the French, allowing Germany to go on ultimately with the maximum rearmament. The ultra-nationalism of the Nazi regime had alarmed the French, who put the most minimal possible interpretation of German "theoretical equality in armaments, and thereby played into the German strategy. In October 1933, the Germans again walked out of the conference, stating that everyone else should either disarm to the Versailles level, or allow Germany to rearm beyond Versailles.[19] Through the Germans never had any serious interest in accepting any of the various British compromise proposals, in London, the German walk-out was widely, if erroneously blamed on French intransigence. The British government was left with the conviction that in the future, that opportunities for arms limitation talks with the Germans should not be lost because of French intransigence. Subsequent British offers to arrange for the German return to the World Disarmament Conference were sabotaged by the Germans putting forward proposals that were meant to appeal to the British, while being unacceptable to the French. On April 17, 1934, the last such effort ended with the French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou's rejection of the latest German offer as unacceptable in the so-called "Barthou note" which ended French participation in the Conference while declaring that France would look after its own security in whatever way was necessary. At the same time, Admiral Erich Raeder of the Reichsmarine persuaded Hitler of the advantages of ordering two more Panzerschiffe, and in 1933 advised the Chancellor that Germany would be best off by 1948 a with a fleet of three aircraft carriers, 18 cruisers, eight Panzerschiffe, 48 destroyers and 74 U-boats.[20] Admiral Raeder argued to Hitler that Germany needed naval parity with France as a minimum goal, whereas Hitler from April 1933 onwards, expressed a desire for a Reichsmarine of 33.3% of the total tonnage of the Royal Navy.[21] In November 1934, the Germans formally informed the British of their wish to reach a treaty with Britain, under which the Reichsmarine would be allowed to grow until the size of 35% of the Royal Navy (the figure was raised because the phrase of a German goal of one third of the Royal Navy except in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines did not sound well in speeches).[22] Admiral Raeder felt that the 35:100 ratio was unacceptable towards Germany, but was overruled by Hitler who insisted on the 35:100 ratio.[23] Aware of the German desire to expand their Navy beyond Versailles, Admiral Chatfield repeatedly advised it would best to reach a naval treaty with Germany, so to regulate the future size and scale of the German Navy.[24] Through the Admiralty described the idea of a 35:100 tonnage ratio between London and Berlin as the highest that we could accept for any European power, it advised the government that the earliest Germany could build a Navy to that size was 1942, and that though they would prefer a smaller tonnage ratio than 35:100, a 35:100 ratio was nonetheless acceptable.[25] In December 1934, a study done by Captain Edward King, Director of the Royal Navy's Plans Division suggested that the most dangerous form a future German Navy might take from the British perspective would be a Kreuzerkrieg (Cruiser war) fleet.[26] Captain King argued that guerre-de-course German fleet of Panzerschiffe, cruisers, and U-boats operating in task forces would be highly dangerous for the Royal Navy, and that a German "balanced fleet" that would be a mirror image of the Royal Navy would be the least dangerous form the German Navy could take.[27] A German "balanced fleet" would have proportionally the same number of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, etc. that the British fleet possessed, and from the British point of view, this would be in the event of war, the easiest German fleet to defeat.[27] Through every government of the Weimar Republic had violated Part V of Versailles, in 1933 and 1934, the Nazi government had become more flagrant and open in violating Part V. In 1933, the Germans started to build their first U-boats since World War I, and in April 1935, launched their first U-boats.[28] On April 25, 1935, the British Naval attach to Germany, Captain Gerard Muirhead-Gould was officially informed by Captain Leopold Brkner of the Reichsmarine that Germany had laid down twelve 250 ton U-boats at Kiel.[29] On April 29, 1935, the Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon informed the British House of Commons that Germany was now building U-boats.[29] On May 2, 1935, the Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald told the House of his governments intention to reach a naval

16

Anglo-German Naval Agreement pact to regulate the future growth of the German Navy.[30] In a more general sense, because of the British championship of German "theoretical equality at the World Disarmament Conference, London was in a weak moral position to oppose the German violations. The German response to British complaints about violations of Part V were that they were merely unilaterally exercising rights the British delegation at Geneva were prepared to concede to the Reich. In March 1934, a British Foreign Office memo stated "Part V of the Treaty of Versailles...is, for practical purposes, dead, and it would become a putrefying corpse which, if left unburied, would soon poison the political atmosphere of Europe. Moreover, if there is to be a funeral, it is clearly better to arrange it while Hitler is still in a mood to pay the undertakers for their services".[31] In December 1934, a secret Cabinet committee met to discuss the situation caused by German rearmament. The British Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon stated at one of the committees meeting that "If the alternative to legalizing German rearmament was to prevent it, there would be everything to be said, for not legalizing it".[32] But since London had already rejected the idea of a war to end German rearmament, the British government chose a diplomatic strategy that would exchange abolition of Part V in exchange for German return to both the League of Nations, and the World Disarmament Conference".[33] At the same meeting, Simon stated "Germany would prefer, it appears, to be `made an honest woman'; but if she is left too long to indulge in illegitimate practices and to find by experience that she does not suffer for it, this laudable ambition may wear off".[34] In January 1935, Simon wrote to King George V that The practical choice is between a Germany which continues to rearm without any regulation or agreement and a Germany which, through getting a recognition of its rights and some modifications of the Peace Treaties enters into the comity of nations and contributes in this or other ways to European stability. As between these two courses, there can be no doubt which is the wiser".[35] In February 1935, at a summit in London between the French Premier Pierre Laval and the British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald led to an Anglo-French communiqu issued in London that proposed talks with the Germans on arms limitation, an air part, and security pacts for Eastern Europe and the nations along the Danube.[36] In early March 1935, talks intended to discuss the scale and extent of German rearmament in Berlin between Hitler and Simon were postponed when Hitler took offense at a British government White Paper justifying a higher defense budget under the grounds that Germany was violating Versailles, and claimed to have contracted a cold. In the interval between Hitler recovering from his diplomatic cold and Simon's visit, the German government took the chance to formally reject all of the clauses of Versailles relating to disarmament on the land and air. In the 1930s, the British government was obsessed with the idea of a German bombing attack destroying London, and so placed a great deal of a value reaching an air pact outlawing bombing.[37] The idea of a naval agreement was felt to be a useful stepping stone to an air pact.[37] On March 26, 1935, during one of his meetings with Simon, and his deputy Sir Anthony Eden, Hitler stated his intention to formally reject the naval disarmament section of Versailles, but was prepared to discuss a treaty regulating the scale of German naval rearmament.[38] On May 21, 1935, Hitler in a speech in Berlin formally offered to discuss a treaty offering a German Navy that was to operate forever on a 35:100 naval ratio.[39] During his "peace speech" of May 21, Hitler disallowed any intention of engaging in a pre-1914 style naval race with Britain, and stated: "The German Reich government recognizes of itself the overwhelming importance for existence and thereby the justification of dominance at sea to protect the British Empire, just as, on the other hand, we are determined to do everything necessary in protection of our own continental existence and freedom".[23] For Hitler, his speech illustrated the quid pro quo of an Anglo-German alliance, namely British acceptance of German mastery of continental Europe in exchange for German acceptance of British mastery over the seas.[23]

17

Anglo-German Naval Agreement

18

NegotiationOn May 22, 1935, the British Cabinet voted to take up formally Hitler's offers of May 21 as soon as possible.[40] Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador in Berlin, advised London that no chance at a naval agreement with Germany should be lost owing to French shortsightedness.[40] Admiral Chatfield informed the Cabinet that it most unwise to oppose [Hitlers] offer, but what the reactions of the French will be to it are more uncertain and its reaction on our own battleship replacement still more so.[40] On March 27, 1935, Hitler had appointed Joachim von Ribbentrop, who served as both Hitlers Extraordinary Ambassador-Plenipotentiary at Large (making part of the Auswrtiges Amt, the German Foreign Office) and as the chief of a Nazi Party organization named the Dienststelle Ribbentrop that competed with the Auswrtiges Amt was appointed to head the German delegation to negotiate any naval treaty.[41] Baron Konstantin von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister was first opposed to this arrangement, but changed his mind when he decided that the British would never accept the 35:100 ratio, and having Ribbentrop head the mission was the best way to discredit his rival.[42] On June 2, 1935, Ribbentrop arrived in London. The talks began on Tuesday, June 4, 1935 at the Admiralty office with Ribbentrop heading the German delegation and Simon the British delegation.[43] Ribbentrop, who was determined to succeed at his mission, no matter what, began his talks by stating the British could either accept the 35:100 ratio as "fixed and unalterable" by the weekend, or else the German delegation would go home, and the Germans would build their navy up to any size they wished.[44] Simon was visibly angry with Ribbentrops behavior, stated that It is not usual to make such conditions at the beginning of negotiations , and walked out of the talks.[45] On Wednesday, June 5, 1935, a change of opinion came over the British delegation. In a report to the British Cabinet, that they definitely of the opinion that, in our own interest, we should accept this offer of Herr Hitlers while it is still open...If we now refuse to accept the offer for the purposes of these discussions, Herr Hitler will withdraw the offer and Germany will seek to build to a higher level than 35 per cent...Having regard to past history and to Germanys known capacity to become a serious naval rival of this country, we may have cause to regret it if we fail to take this chance....[46] Also on June 5, during talks between Sir Robert Craigie, the British Foreign Offices naval expert and chief of the Foreign Office's American Department and Ribbentrops deputy, Admiral Karl-Georg Schuster, the Germans conceded that the 35:100 ratio would take the form of tonnage ratios, during the Germans would more or less build their tonnage up to whatever the British tonnage was in various warship categories.[43] On the afternoon of that same day, the British Cabinet voted to accept the 35:100 ratio, and Ribbentrop was informed of the Cabinets acceptance in the evening.[46] During the next two weeks, talks continued in London on various technical issues, mostly relating to how the tonnage ratios would be calculated in the various warship categories.[47] Ribbentrop was desperate for success, and agreed to almost all of the British demands.[47] On June 18, 1935, the A.G.N.A was signed in London by Ribbentrop, and the new British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare. Hitler called June 18, 1935 the day of the signing of the A.G.N.A. the happiest day of his life as he believed that the A.G.N.A marked the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance.[48]

The AgreementThe terms of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as signed in London on June 18, 1935 read as follows: "Exchange of Notes between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the German Government regarding the Limitation of Naval Armaments-London, June 18, 1935. (1) Sir Samuel Hoare to Herr von Ribbentrop Your Excellency, Foreign Office, June 18, 1935 During the last few days the representatives of the German Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been engaged in conversations, the primary purpose of which has been to prepare the way for the holding of a general conference on the subject of the limitation of naval armaments. I have now much pleasure in notifying your Excellency of the formal acceptance by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the

Anglo-German Naval Agreement proposal of the German Government discussed at those conversations that the future strength of the German navy in relation to the aggregate naval strength of the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations should be in the proportion of 35:100. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regard this proposal as a contribution of the greatest importance to the cause of future naval limitation. They further believe that the agreement which they have now reached with the German government, and which they regard as a permanent and definite agreement as from to-day between the two Governments, will facilitate the conclusion of a general agreement on the subject of naval limitation between all the naval Powers of the world. 2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom also agree with the explanations which were furnished by the German representatives in the course of the recent discussions in London as the method of application of this principle. These explanations may be summarised as follows:(a) The ratio of 35:100 is to be a permanent relationship, i.e. the total tonnage of the German fleet shall never exceed a percentage of 35 of the aggregate tonnage of the naval forces, as defined by treaty, of the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, or, if there should in future, be no treaty limitations of the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. (b) If any future general treaty of naval limitation should not adopt the method of limitation by agreed ratios between the fleets of different Powers, the German Government will not insist on the incorporation of the ratio mentioned in the preceding sub-paragraph in such future general treaty, provided that the method therein adopted for the future limitation of naval armaments is such as to give Germany full guarantees that this ratio can be maintained. (c) Germany will adhere to the ratio 35:100 in all circumstances, e.g. the ratio will not be affected by the construction of other Powers. If the general equilibrium of naval armaments,as normally maintained in the past, should be violently upset by any abnormal and exceptional construction by other Powers, the German Government reserve the right to invite His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to examine the new situation thus created. (d)The German Government favour, the matter of limitation of naval armaments, that system which divides naval vessels into categories, fixing the maximum tonnage and/or armament for vessels in each category, and allocates the tonnage to be allowed to each Power by categories of vessels. Consequently in principle, and subject to (f) below, the German Government are prepared to apply the 35 per cent. ratio to the tonnage of each category of vessel to be maintained, and to make any variation of this ratio in a particular category or categories dependent on the arrangements to this end that may be arrived at in a future general treaty on naval limitation, such arrangements being based on the principle that any increase in one category would be compensated for by a corresponding reduction in others. If no general treaty on naval limitation should be concluded, or if the future general treaty should not contain provision creating limitation by categories, the manner and degree in which the German Government will have the right to vary the 35 percent. ratio in one or more categories will be a matter for settlement by agreement between the German Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in the light of the naval situation then existing. (e) If, and for so long as other important naval Powers retain a single category for cruisers and destroyers, Germany shall enjoy the right to have a single category for these two classes of vessels, although she would prefer to see these classes in two categories. (f) In the matter of submarines, however, Germany, while not exceeding the ratio of 35:100 in respect of total tonnage, shall have the right to possess a submarine tonnage equal to the total submarine tonnage possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government, however, undertake that, except in the circumstances indicated in the immediately following sentence, Germany's submarine tonnage shall not exceed 45 percent. of the total of that possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government reserve the right, in the event of a situation arising, which in their opinion, makes it necessary for Germany to avail herself of her right to a percentage of submarine tonnage exceeding the 45 per cent. above mentioned, to give notice this effect to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and agree that the matter

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Anglo-German Naval Agreement shall be the subject of friendly discussion before the German Government exercise that right. (g) Since it is highly improbable that the calculation of the 35 per cent. ratio should give for each category of vessels tonnage figures exactly divisible by the maximum individual tonnage permitted for ships in that category, it may be necessary that adjustments should be make in order that Germany shall not be debarred from utilising her tonnage to the full. It has consequently been agreed that the German Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will settle by common accord what adjustments are necessary for this purpose, and it will be understood that this procedure shall not result in any substantial or permanent departure from the ratio 35:100 in respect of total strengths. 3. With reference to sub-paragraph (c) of the explanations set out above, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have taken note of the reservation and recognise in the right therein set out, on the understanding that the 35:100 ratio will be maintained in default of agreement to the contrary between the two Governments. 4. I have the honour to request your Excellency to inform me that the German Government agree that the proposal of the German Government has been correctly set out in the preceding paragraphs of this note. I have. & c. SAMUEL HOARE (2) (Translation) Herr von Ribbentrop to Sir Samuel Hoare Your Excellency, London, June 18, 1935 I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of to-day's date, in which you were so good as to communicate to me on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom the following:(Here follows a German translation of paragraphs 1 to 3 of No. 1.) I have the honour to confirm to your Excellency that the proposal of the German Government is correctly set forth in the foregoing note, and I note with pleasure that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom accept this proposal. The German Government, for their part, are also of the opinion that the agreement at which they have now arrived with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and which they regard as a permanent and definite agreement with effect from to-day between the two Governments, will facilitate the conclusion of a general agreement on this question between all the naval Powers of the world. I have, & c. JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Germany".[49]

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French reactionThe Naval Pact was signed in London on June 18, 1935, without the British government consulting with France and Italy, or later, to inform them of the secret agreements which stipulated that the Germans could build in certain categories more powerful warships than any the three Western nations then possessed. The French regarded this as treachery. They saw it as a further appeasement of Hitler, whose appetite grew on concessions. And they resented the British agreeing, for what they thought a private gain, to scrap further the peace treaty and thus add to the growing overall military power of Nazi Germany. Great Britain, as the French contended, had no legal right to absolve Germany from respecting the naval clauses of the Versailles Treaty.[50]

Anglo-German Naval Agreement

21

ImpactBecause of the lengthy period of time needed to construct warships, and the short duration of the A.G.N.A., its impact was limited. It was estimated by both German and British naval experts that the earliest year Germany could reach the 35% limit was 1942.[51] In practice, lack of shipbuilding space, design problems, shortages of skilled workers, the scarcity of foreign exchange to purchase necessary raw materials that Germany lacked, and the lack of steel and non-ferrous metals caused by the Kriegsmarine being third in terms of German rearmament priorities behind the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe led to the Kriegsmarine (as the German Navy had been renamed in 1935) being nowhere close to the 35% limit by the time that Hitler denounced the A.G.N.A. in 1939.[52] However, the requirement that the Kriegsmarine divide its 35% tonnage ratio by warship categories had the effect of forcing the Germans to build a symmetrical "balanced fleet" building program that reflected British priorities.[53] Since in the viewpoint of the Royal Navy's leadership, a German "balanced fleet" would be the easiest German fleet for the Royal Navy to defeat and a German guerre-de-course fleet the most dangerous, in the British viewpoint, the A.G.N.A. brought considerable strategical benefits.[54] Above all, since the Royal Navy did not build "pocket battleships", Admiral Chatfield valued the end of the Panzerschiff building caused by the A.G.N.A.[54] When the Kriegsmarine began planning for a war with Britain in May 1938, the Kriegsmarine's senior operations officer, Commander Hellmuth Heye concluded the best strategy the Kriegsmarine could follow was a Kreuzerkrieg fleet of U-boats, light cruisers and Panzerschiff operating in tandem.[55] Commander Heye was critical of the existing building priorities dictated by the A.G.N.A. under the grounds that there was no realistic possibility of a German "balanced fleet" defeating the Royal Navy.[55] In response, senior German naval officers started to advocate a switch to a Kreuzerkrieg type fleet that would pursue a guerre-de-course strategy of attacking the British Merchant Marine, but were overruled by Hitler who insisted for reasons of prestige that Germany should build a "balanced fleet" that would attempt a Mahanian strategy of attempting to win maritime supremacy through a decisive battle with the Royal Navy in the North Sea.[56] Historians such as Joseph Maiolo, Geoffrey Till and the authors of the Kriegsmarine Official History have agreed with Chatfield's contention that a Kreuzerkrieg fleet offered Germany the best chance for damaging British power, and that Britain did benefit strategically from the A.G.N.A. by ensuring such a fleet was not built in the 1930s.[57] In the field of Anglo-German relations, the A.G.N.A. excised considerable importance. The British expressed hope as Craigie informed Ribbentrop that the A.G.N.A "was designed to facilitate further agreements within a wider framework and there was no further thought behind it".[58] In addition, the British viewed the A.G.N.A. as a "yardstick" for measuring German intentions towards Britain.[59] Hitler regarded the A.G.N.A as marking the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance and was much annoyed when the A.G.N.A was not followed up by what he regarded as the intended result.[60] By 1937, Hitler started to increase both the sums of Reichmarks and raw materials to the Kriegsmarine, reflecting the increasing conviction that if war came, then Britain would be an enemy, not an ally of Germany.[61] In December 1937, Hitler ordered the Kriegsmarine to start laying down six 16-inch gun battleships.[61] At his meeting with Lord Halifax in November 1937, Hitler stated that the A.G.N.A. was the only item in the field of Anglo-German relations that had not been "wrecked".[62] By 1938, the only use the Germans had for the A.G.N.A. was to threaten to renounce the treaty as a way of pressuring London to accept continental Europe as Germany's rightful sphere of influence.[63] At a meeting on April 16, 1938 between Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador to Germany and Hermann Gring, the latter stated it [the A.G.N.A.]had never been valued in England, and he himself bitterly regretted that Herr Hitler had ever consented to it at the time without getting anything in exchange. It had been a mistake, but Germany was nevertheless not going to remain in a state of inferiority in this respect vis--vis a hostile Britain, and would build up to a 100 per cent. basis".[64] In response to Gring's statement, a joint Admiralty-Foreign Office note was sent to Henderson informing him that he should inform the Germans that: "Field Marshal Gring's threat that in certain circumstances Germany might, presumably after denouncing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, proceed to build up to 100% of the British

Anglo-German Naval Agreement fleet is clearly bluff [emphasis in the original]. In view of the great existing disparities in the size of the two navies this threat could only be executed if British construction were to remain stationary over a considerable period of years whilst German tonnage was built up to it. This would not occur. Although Germany is doubtless capable of realizing the 35% figure by 1942 if she so desires, or even appreciably earlier, it seems unlikely (considering her difficulties in connection with raw material, foreign exchange and the necessity of giving priority to her vast rearmament on land and in the air, and considering our own big programme) that she would appreciably exceed that figure during the course of the next few years. This is not to say we have not every interest in avoiding a denunciation of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1935, which would create a present state of uncertainty as to Germany's intentions and the ultimate threat of an attempt at parity with our Navy, which must be regarded as potentially dangerous given that Germany has been credited with a capacity for naval construction little inferior to our own. Indeed, so important is the Naval Agreement to His Majesty's Government that it is difficult to conceive that any general understanding between Great Britain and Germany, such as General Gring is believed to desire, would any longer be possible were the German Government to denounce the Naval Agreement. In fact, a reaffirmation of the latter in all probability have to figure as part of such a general understanding. From the political aspect, the German Navy has we think been to Germany mainly an instrument for putting political pressure on this country. Before the war, Germany would have been willing to cease, or greatly moderate, her naval competition with this country, but only in return for a promise of our neutrality in any European conflict. Hitler has attempted the same thing by different methods, but he has seen one side of the picture as all German politicians have only seen one side of the picture. It is clear from his writings that he was enormously impressed with the part played by the pre-war naval rivalry in creating bad relations between the two countries. From this he argued that the removal of this rivalry all that was necessary to obtain good relations. By making us a free gift of an absence of naval competition he hoped that relations between the two countries would be so improved that we should not, in fact, find it necessary to interfere with Germany's continental policy. He overlooked, as all German politicians have overlooked for many years past, that this country is bound to react, not only against danger from any purely naval rival, but also against dominance of Europe by any aggressive military power, particularly if in a position to threaten the Low Countries and the Channel ports. British complaisance can never be purchased by trading one of these factors against the other and any country that attempts it is bound to create for itself disappointment and disillusion as Germany is doing".[65] At the conference in Munich that led to the Munich Agreement in September 1938, Hitler informed Neville Chamberlain that if British policy was "to make it clear in certain circumstances" that Britain might be intervening in a European war, then the political preconditions for the A.G.N.A no longer existed, and Germany should denounce the A.G.N.A., thus leading to Chamberlain including mention of the A.G.N.A in the Anglo-German Declaration of September 30, 1938.[66] By the late 1930s, Hitler's disillusionment with Britain led to German foreign policy taking increasing anti-British course.[67] An important sign of Hitler's changed perceptions about Britain was his decision in January 1939 to give first priority to the Kriegsmarine in relates in the allocation of money, skilled workers, and raw materials and to launch the Plan Z to build a colossal Kriegsmarine of 10 battleships, 16 "pocket battleships", 8 aircraft carriers, 5 heavy cruisers, 36 light cruisers, and 249 U-boats by 1944 to crush the Royal Navy.[68] Since the fleet envisioned in the Z Plan was considerably larger than that allowed by the 35:100 ratio in the A.G.N.A, the Z Plan made it inevitable that Germany would renounce the A.G.N.A. Over the winter of 1938-39, the fact that it became increasing clear to London that the Germans no longer intended to abide by the A.G.N.A played a role in straining Anglo-German relations.[69] Reports received in October 1938 that the Germans were considering denouncing the A.G.N.A were used by Lord Halifax in Cabinet discussions for the need for a tough policy with the Reich.[70] The German statement of December 9, 1938 that they intended to build to 100% ratio allowed in submarines by the

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Anglo-German Naval Agreement A.G.N.A. plus to build to the limits in heavy cruisers led to speech by Chamberlain before the correspondents of the German News Agency in London warning of the "futility of ambition, if ambition leads to the desire for domination".[71] At the same time, Lord Halifax informed Herbert von Dirksen, the German Ambassador to Britain that his government viewed the talks to discuss the details of the German building escalation as a test-case for German sincerity.[72] When the talks began in Berlin on December 30, 1938, the Germans took an obdurate approach, leading London to conclude that the Germans did not wish for the talks to succeed.[73] In response to the British "guarantee" of Poland of March 31, 1939, Hitler, who was enraged by the British move, stated "I shall brew them a devil's drink".[74] In a speech in Wilhelmshaven for the launch of the Admiral Tirpitz battleship, Hitler threatened to denounce the A.G.N.A. if the British persisted with their "encirclement" policy as represented by the "guarantee" of Polish independence.[74] On April 28, 1939 Hitler denounced the A.G.N.A.[74] To provide an excuse for the denunciation of the A.G.N.A, and to prevent the emergence of a new naval treaty, the Germans began refusing to share information about their shipbuilding,and thus left the British with the choice of either accepting the unilateral German move or rejecting it, thereby providing the Germans with the excuse to denounce the treaty.[75] At a Cabinet meeting on May 3, 1939, the First Lord of Admiralty, Lord Stanhope stated that "at the present time Germany was building ships as fast as she could but that she would not be able to exceed the 35 per cent ratio before 1942 or 1943".[75] Chatfield who by this time was serving as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence commented that Hitler had "persuaded himself" that Britain had provided the Reich with a "free hand" in Eastern Europe in exchange for the A.G.N.A.[75] Chamberlain stated that Britain had never given such an understanding to Germany, and commented that he first learned of Hitler's belief in such an implied bargain during his meeting with the Fhrer at the Berchtesgaden summit in September 1938.[75] In a later paper to the Cabinet, Chatfield stated "that we might say that we now understood Herr Hitler had in 1935 thought that we had given him a free hand in Eastern and Central Europe in return for his acceptance of the 100:35 ratio, but that as we could not accept the correctness of this view it might be better that the 1935 arrangements should be abrogated".[76] In the end, the British reply to the German move was a diplomatic note vigorously disputing the German claim that Britain was attempting to "encircle" Germany with hostile alliances.[76] The German denunciation of the A.G.N.A. together with reports of increased German shipbuilding in June 1939 caused by the Z Plan played a significant part in persuading the Chamberlain government of the need to "contain" Germany by building a "Peace front" of states in both Western and Eastern Europe, and of increasing the perception within the Chamberlain government in 1939 that German policies were a threat to Great Britain.[77]

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Notes[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 35-36. League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 161, pp. 10-20. Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 37 Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 20. Gilbert, Martin The Roots of Appeasement page 57. Medlicott, W.N. Britain and Germany, Athlone Press: London, United Kingdom, 1969 page 3. Document 181 C10156/2293/118 Notes by Sir Maurice Hankely on Hitlers External Policy in Theory and Practice October 24, 1933 from British Documents on Foreign Affairs Germany 1933 page 339. [8] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 11-12. [9] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 12-13. [10] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 13-15. [11] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 11-12 & 14-15. [12] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 15-16 [13] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 15-16 & 21 [14] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 21. [15] Weinberg, Gerhard The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe page 40; Doerr, Paul British Foreign Policy 1919-1939page 128. [16] Jckel, Eberhard Hitler's World View page 31 [17] Jckel, Eberhard Hitler's World View page 20 [18] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 22

Anglo-German Naval Agreement[19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 21 Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 23 Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 24 Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 24. Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris page 556 Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 26. Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 26-28 Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 68-69 Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 69-70 Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 29-30 Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 33 Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 33 Medlicott, W.N. Britain and Germany page 9. Dutton, David Simon page 187. Dutton, David Simon page 187 Dutton, David Simon page 188 Haraszti, Eva Treaty-Breakers or "Realpolitiker"? page 22 Messerschmidt, Manfred Foreign Policy and Preparation for War from Germany and the Second World War page 613 Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 31-32 Weinberg, Gerhard The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe page 212. Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 34 Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 34.

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[41] Bloch, Michael Ribbentrop pages 68-69 [42] Bloch, Michael Ribbentrop page 69 [43] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 35. [44] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 34; Bloch, Michael Ribbentrop page 72. [45] Bloch, Michael Ribbentrop page 72. [46] Bloch, Michael Ribbentrop page 73. [47] Bloch, Michael Ribbentrop pages 73-74. [48] Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris page 558; Hildebrand, Klaus The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich page 39. [49] Document 121 [A5462/22/45] from British Documents on Foreign Affairs Series 5, Volume 46 Germany 1935 edited by Jeremy Noakes, London: Public Record Office, 1994 pages 181-183. [50] Shirer p.249,250 [51] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 57-59. [52] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 60. [53] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 68-69. [54] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 68-70. [55] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 71. [56] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 71-72. [57] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 73. [58] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 37. [59] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 184. [60] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 48 & 190. [61] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 48 & 138. [62] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 155. [63] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 155-156. [64] Haraszti, Eva Treaty-Breakers or "Realpolitiker"? page 245. [65] Haraszti, Eva Treaty-Breakers or "Realpolitiker"? pages 248-249. [66] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 156. [67] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 70-71 & 154-155. [68] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 74 & 164-165. [69] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 165. [70] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 167-168. [71] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 169. [72] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 170. [73] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 170-171. [74] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 178. [75] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 179. [76] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany page 181.

Anglo-German Naval Agreement[77] Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany pages 180-181 & 184.

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References Bloch, Michael Ribbentrop, Crown Publishers Inc: New York, New York, United States of America, 1992. Dutton, David Simon A Political Biography of Sir John Simon, Aurum Press: London, United Kingdom, 1992. Gilbert, Martin The Roots of Appeasement, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, United Kingdom 1966. Haraszti, Eva Treaty-Breakers or "Realpolitiker"? The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935, Akademiai Kiado: Budapest, Hungary, 1974. Hildebrand, Klaus The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, London: Batsford, 1973. Kershaw, Sir Ian Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris, W.W. Norton: New York, New York, United States of America, 1998. Jckel, Eberhard Hitler's World View A Blueprint for Power, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America, 1981. Maiolo, Joseph The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-39 A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War, Macmillan Press: London, 1998, ISBN 0-312-21456-1. Medlicott, W.N. Britain and Germany: The Search For Agreement 1930-1937, Athlone Press: London, United Kingdom, 1969.

Messerschmidt, Manfred Foreign Policy and Preparation for War pages 541-718 from Germany and the Second World War The Build-up of German Aggression, Volume I, Clarendon Press: Oxford, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom, 1990. Shirer, William. "The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940." Simon and Schuster, New York, 1969. Watt, D.C. "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgement" pages 155-175 from Journal of Modern History, Volume 28, Issue #2, June 1956. Weinberg, Gerhard The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933-36, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, Illinois, United States of America, 1970.

External links The Anglo-German Naval Agreement 1935 (http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/ tech-089_Anglo_German_Agreement_1935.htm)

Antarctic Treaty System

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Antarctic Treaty SystemThe Antarctic Treaty

Signed Location Effective Condition Signatories Parties Depositary Languages

December 1, 1959 Washington D. C., USA June 23, 1961 ratification of all 12 signatories 12 48 Government of the United States of America English, French, Russian and Spanish Antarctic Treaty at Wikisource

The Antarctic Treaty and related agreements, collectively called the Antarctic Treaty System or ATS, regulate international relations with respect to Antarctica, Earth's only continent without a native human population. For the purposes of the treaty system, Antarctica is defined as all of the land and ice shelves south of 60S latitude. The treaty, entering into force in 1961 and currently has 48 signatory nations, sets aside Antarctica as a scientific preserve, establishes freedom of scientific investigation and bans military activity on that continent. The treaty was the first arms control agreement established during the Cold War. The Antarctic Treaty Secretariat headquarters have been located in Buenos Aires, Argentina, since September 2004.[1]

The Antarctic Treaty SystemInternational Ownership Treaties Antarctic Treaty System Law of the Sea Outer Space Treaty Moon Treaty International waters Extraterrestrial real estate

The main treaty was opened for signature on December 1, 1959, and officially entered into force on June 23, 1961.[2] The original signatories were the 12 countries active in Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 195758. The 12 countries had significant interests in Antarctica at the time: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United

Antarctic Treaty System States. These countries had established over 50 Antarctic stations for the IGY. The treaty was a diplomatic expression of the operational and scientific cooperation that had been achieved "on the ice".

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Articles of the Antarctic Treaty Article 1 The area to be used for peaceful purposes only; military activity, such as weapons testing, is prohibited but military personnel and equipment may be used for scientific research or any other peaceful purpose; Article 2 Freedom of scientific investigations and cooperation shall continue; Article 3 Free exchange of information and personnel in cooperation with the United Nations and other international agencies; Article 4 The treaty does not recognize, dispute, nor establish territorial sovereignty claims; no new claims shall be asserted while the treaty is in force; Article 5 The treaty prohibits nuclear explosions or disposal of radioactive wastes; Article 6 Includes under the treaty all land and ice shelves but not the surrounding waters south of 60 degrees 00 minutes south; Article 7 Treaty-state observers have free access, including aerial observation, to any area and may inspect all stations, installations, and equipment; advance notice of all activities and of the introduction of military personnel must be given; Article 8 Allows for jurisdiction over observers and scientists by their own states; Article 9 Frequent consultative meetings take place among member nations; Article 10 All treaty states will discourage activities by any country in Antarctica that are contrary to the treaty; Article 11 All disputes to be settled peacefully by the parties concerned or, ultimately, by the International Court of Justice; Articles 12, 13, 14 Deal with upholding, interpreting, and amending the treaty among involved nations. The main objective of the ATS is to ensure in the interests of all humankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord. The treaty forbids any measures of a military nature, but not the presence of military personnel.

Other agreementsOther agreements some 200 recommendations adopted at treaty consultative meetings and ratified by governments include: Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora (1964) (entered into force in 1982) The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972) The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Livin