Arms Control and Missile Defense
23
Traditionally, strategic offensive arms control and ballistic missile defense have been viewed as mutually exclusive. During the Cold War, the general belief was that anti–ballistic missile (ABM) systems would call into question the abil- ity of the superpowers to successfully survive a first nuclear strike and inflict sufficient damage with a second strike. That is, missile defense could allow one superpower to launch a first strike and then use its defenses to intercept a sec- ond strike with the other superpower’s surviving warheads—thereby undermining deterrence and stability. Furthermore, the thinking was that this situation would result in a dangerous offensive arms race as each side sought to counter the effects of the other’s defenses. That logic had some merit during the Cold War. However, opponents of national missile defense (NMD) continue to cling to the out- dated Cold War rationale and ignore or disre- gard the emerging ballistic missile programs in rogue states as a real threat to U.S. national security. Ardent supporters of missile defense argue that we should abandon the ABM Treaty to deploy missile defense—largely because they want to deploy a global rather than a national missile defense. Neither is correct. The most prudent path is to pursue develop- ment of a limited NMD system to defend against rogue state threats, simultaneously renegotiate the ABM Treaty with the Russians, and continue further strategic arms control negotiations under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process. In fact, the Russians have inti- mated that they might be willing to accept changes to the ABM Treaty to allow for a limited NMD in exchange for even deeper cuts in strate- gic offensive forces. The NMD system that makes the most sense for countering threats from rogue states is a limited ground-based system. Such a sys- tem should provide sufficient defensive capa- bility against threats from rogue states but not pose a serious threat to Russian retaliatory capability. If the United States changed its nuclear doctrine from war fighting to deter- rence, deep mutual reductions in offensive forces to levels below the START III framework agreement (perhaps as few as 1,500 warheads) would still allow the United States to deter Russia and smaller or emerging nuclear pow- ers. Such a reduction combined with a limited land-based NMD would greatly enhance U.S. security. Arms Control and Missile Defense Not Mutually Exclusive by Charles V. Peña _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ Charles V. Peña is an independent consultant on missile defense. Executive Summary No. 376 July 26, 2000
Transcript of Arms Control and Missile Defense
Traditionally, strategic offensive arms controland ballistic missile defense have been viewed asmutually exclusive. During the Cold War, thegeneral belief was that anti–ballistic missile(ABM) systems would call into question the abil-ity of the superpowers to successfully survive afirst nuclear strike and inflict sufficient damagewith a second strike. That is, missile defensecould allow one superpower to launch a firststrike and then use its defenses to intercept a sec-ond strike with the other superpower’s survivingwarheads—thereby undermining deterrence andstability. Furthermore, the thinking was that thissituation would result in a dangerous offensivearms race as each side sought to counter theeffects of the other’s defenses.
That logic had some merit during the ColdWar. However, opponents of national missiledefense (NMD) continue to cling to the out-dated Cold War rationale and ignore or disre-gard the emerging ballistic missile programs inrogue states as a real threat to U.S. nationalsecurity. Ardent supporters of missile defenseargue that we should abandon the ABM Treatyto deploy missile defense—largely because theywant to deploy a global rather than a nationalmissile defense. Neither is correct.
The most prudent path is to pursue develop-ment of a limited NMD system to defend againstrogue state threats, simultaneously renegotiatethe ABM Treaty with the Russians, and continuefurther strategic arms control negotiationsunder the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty(START) process. In fact, the Russians have inti-mated that they might be willing to acceptchanges to the ABM Treaty to allow for a limitedNMD in exchange for even deeper cuts in strate-gic offensive forces.
The NMD system that makes the mostsense for countering threats from rogue statesis a limited ground-based system. Such a sys-tem should provide sufficient defensive capa-bility against threats from rogue states but notpose a serious threat to Russian retaliatorycapability. If the United States changed itsnuclear doctrine from war fighting to deter-rence, deep mutual reductions in offensiveforces to levels below the START III frameworkagreement (perhaps as few as 1,500 warheads)would still allow the United States to deterRussia and smaller or emerging nuclear pow-ers. Such a reduction combined with a limitedland-based NMD would greatly enhance U.S.security.
Arms Control and Missile DefenseNot Mutually Exclusive
by Charles V. Peña
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Charles V. Peña is an independent consultant on missile defense.
Executive Summary
No. 376 July 26, 2000
Introduction
Traditionally, strategic offensive armscontrol and ballistic missile defense havebeen viewed as mutually exclusive.Proponents of the Anti–Ballistic MissileTreaty have argued that the treaty is a corner-stone of strategic stability. Their logic was(and continues to be) that deterrence (andstability) between the United States andRussia (and previously the Soviet Union) isbased on the ability of both sides to have asurvivable second strike capability (common-ly referred to as the doctrine of mutualassured destruction, or MAD).
During the Cold War and before the col-lapse of the Soviet Union, to deter the othersuperpower, each side possessed large strate-gic offensive force arsenals consisting ofland-based intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs)—including a large number withmultiple independently targeted reentryvehicles (MIRVs)—submarine-launched bal-listic missiles (SLBMs), and bombers. Thebelief at the time was that ABM systemswould call into question the ability of nationA to successfully survive a first strike andinflict sufficient damage on an attacker(nation B) with a second strike (that is, theattacker could inflict sufficient damage tonation A’s forces with a first strike so that theattacker’s missile defense system could effec-tively counter a second strike by nation A’sresidual offensive forces).1 As a result, theattacker might have an incentive (especiallyduring a crisis) to launch a strategic nuclearfirst strike—believing that a successfuldefense could be mounted against the retal-iatory second strike by destroying enough ofthe opponent’s warheads with an ABM sys-tem.2 There would also be an incentive foreach side to strike first with more attackingmissiles or warheads against the defenserather than to risk having to penetrate thedefense with far fewer weapons in a secondstrike. Such a situation in which each sidehas incentives to launch a first strike is unsta-ble. The thinking was that a dangerous offen-
sive arms race could occur as each sidesought to counter the effects of the ABM sys-tems3 (because it would be cheaper to deploymore offensive forces than to increase theABM deployment).4
ABM systems were also viewed as creatingdisincentives to reduce and change the techni-cal characteristics of strategic offensive forcesin order to increase the stability of the nuclearbalance—first through the Strategic ArmsLimitation Talks and then the Strategic ArmsReduction Talks (START). The thinking wasthat ABM systems would encourage thedeployment of MIRVed systems—with theirability to carry multiple warheads and decoys(also known as penetration aids, or penaids)—to help overwhelm and fool the ABM systems.MIRVed systems (in particular, land-basedICBMs) were viewed as destabilizing becauseof their tremendous first strike capability andbecause they were lucrative targets—giventheir ability to destroy multiple warheads in asingle silo with a single attacking warhead or afew such warheads. As prime targets, MIRVedmissiles had an increased probability of beinglaunched preemptively in a crisis situation.
The logic of proponents of the ABMTreaty had some merit during the Cold War,but that face-off is over and the powerfulSoviet Union no longer exists. Russia nowhas a smaller strategic offensive force that isolder and less reliable than the former Sovietnuclear arsenal. Russia and the United Statesdo not compete directly in the militarysphere the way the two superpowers did dur-ing the Cold War. And Russia does not posethe same military threat to the United States,Western Europe, and the rest of the world asdid the former Soviet Union.
As a result, an opportunity now exists toreexamine both strategic offensive force armscontrol and ballistic missile defense in thecontext of a post–Cold War world, a newU.S.-Russian relationship, and ballistic mis-sile threats emanating out of Russia. Neitherthe United States nor Russia needs the samestrategic nuclear arsenals they had during theCold War. In 1991 both sides ratified theSTART I Treaty, which has already reduced
2
Traditionally,strategic offensivearms control and
ballistic missiledefense have beenviewed as mutual-
ly exclusive.
strategic warheads from more than 10,000on both sides to fewer than 8,000 and 7,000for the United States and Russia, respectively.Under the START I limits, each side will even-tually be limited to 6,000 warheads. On April14, 2000, the Russian Duma ratified theSTART II Treaty, which would further reduceeach side’s strategic nuclear arsenal tobetween 3,000 and 3,500 warheads. TheUnited States ratified the treaty long ago (butit cannot be implemented until the Senateapproves two protocols). Strategic arsenals atthose low levels would have been inconceiv-able during the Cold War.
At a time when the two nations have madesignificant progress in strategic nuclear forcereductions, NMD should not be viewed onlyin the context of defending against a Russianfirst or second strike. In fact, NMD needs tobe examined outside of this context in lightof threats to the United States from nationsother than Russia. Thus, the possibility existsthat neither strategic offensive arms controlnor NMD should be dismissed out of hand.In the post–Cold War strategic environment,there may be sound national security reasonsfor and a workable path to achieving both.
Strategic Offensive Arms Control
The United States first approached theSoviet Union in 1964 to suggest bilateral armscontrol talks on strategic nuclear weapons.The negotiations known as SALT I began inNovember 1969 and ended in January 1972.The result of those negotiations was the ABMTreaty and the Interim Agreement on theLimitation of Strategic Offensive Arms—bothsigned on May 26, 1972.
SALT IAs its title suggests, the Interim
Agreement between the United States andthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics onCertain Measures with Respect to theLimitation of Offensive Arms was limited induration and scope. The two parties pledged
not to start construction of additional fixedland-based ICBM launchers after July 1,1972. The treaty also limited SLBM launch-ers and ballistic missile submarines. Subjectto the limits of the treaty, the two nationscould modernize their offensive strategicmissiles and launchers.5
At best, the result of SALT I was a holdingpattern in which the Interim Agreement andthe ABM Treaty complemented each other bylimiting competition in strategic nuclearoffensive arms and providing more time forfurther negotiations. Those negotiationswere the SALT II talks, which began inNovember 1972 and resulted in the SALT IITreaty, signed on June 18, 1979.
SALT IIA SALT II agreement was signed by
President Jimmy Carter and General SecretaryLeonid Brezhnev on June 18, 1979. Almostimmediately, President Carter transmitted thetreaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification.However, the treaty met with stiff resistance inthe Senate. In January 1980, in view of theSoviet invasion of Afghanistan, PresidentCarter requested the Senate to delay consider-ation of SALT II. However, later in 1980,President Carter announced that the UnitedStates would comply with the provisions ofSALT II as long as the Soviet Union recipro-cated. Brezhnev made a similar statementregarding Soviet intentions. Had SALT II beenratified, it would have provided for
• an equal aggregate limit on the numberof strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavybombers, and air-to-surface ballistic mis-siles (ASBMs); initially, this ceilingwould have been 2,400; it would havebeen lowered to 2,250 at the end of 1981;
• an equal aggregate limit of 1,320 on thetotal number of launchers of MIRVedballistic missiles and heavy bomberswith long-range cruise missiles; and
• a ban on construction of additional fixedICBM launchers and on increases in thenumber of fixed heavy ICBM launchers.
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An opportunitynow exists toreexamine bothstrategic offensiveforce arms con-trol and ballisticmissile defense inthe context of apost–Cold Warworld.
START IIn May 1982, President Reagan stated that
he would do nothing to undercut eitherSALT I or SALT II, as long as the SovietUnion did the same (and in response, theSoviet Union again agreed to abide by theunratified SALT II Treaty). At the same time,Reagan decided to pursue a different coursein strategic arms control. Instead of trying tolimit strategic arms—that is, ratify SALT IIand pursue a SALT III agreement—PresidentReagan advanced a new proposal for START,which called for deep cuts in land-basedICBMs (in which the Soviet Union was per-ceived to have an advantage).
The START I Treaty was negotiated over aperiod of nine years and signed by PresidentBush and Soviet president MikhailGorbachev on July 31, 1991. With the subse-quent breakup of the Soviet Union just fivemonths later, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia,and Ukraine were recognized as the legal suc-cessors to the Soviet Union for purposes ofthe START I Treaty. START I called for sig-nificant reductions in strategic offensivearms to equal levels:
• 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles• 6,000 accountable warheads• 4,900 ballistic missile warheads
• 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBMs• 1,100 warheads on mobile ICBMs
START IIThe START II Treaty was signed by
President Bush and Russian president Yeltsinon January 3, 1993, in Moscow. The treaty pro-vided that each side must reduce its totaldeployed strategic nuclear warheads tobetween 3,000 and 3,500. Of those, none maybe on MIRVed ICBMs, including heavyICBMs. Thus, all MIRVed ICBMs must beeliminated from each side’s deployed forces;only ICBMs carrying a single warhead will beallowed. No more than 1,700–1,750 deployedwarheads may be on SLBMs. There will be noprohibition on MIRVed SLBMs.6 Table 1 com-pares the limits of START I and START II.
The START II Treaty was presented byPresident Clinton to the U.S. Senate for rati-fication in January 1995 and was ratified onJanuary 26, 1996. Russian president Yeltsinpresented the START II Treaty to the FederalAssembly of Russia for ratification in June1995. As a result of the U.S. missile attacks onIraq in 1998 and the NATO bombing ofYugoslavia in 1999, the treaty met with resis-tance and was stalled in the Russian Duma.But Vladimir Putin, the newly elected presi-dent of Russia, has apparently made arms
Table 1Comparison of START I and START II Limits
START II
START I Phase One Phase Two
Total strategic warheads 6,000 accountable 3,800–4,250 actual 3,000–3,500 actualBallistic missile warheads 4,900 No specific sublimit No specific sublimitMIRVed ICBM warheads N/A 1,200 0SLBM warheads N/A 2,160 1,700–1,750Heavy ICBM warheads 1,540 650 0Mobile ICBM warheads 1,100 START I applies START I appliesTotal strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles 1,600 START I applies START I applies
NMD opponentsargue that the
threat posed byballistic missiles
does not repre-sent a “clear andpresent danger.”
4
control a top priority. As a result, the RussianDuma approved the START II Treaty onApril 14, 2000. The treaty cannot be imple-mented, however, until the Clinton adminis-tration submits and the Senate ratifies twoprotocols associated with the treaty.
Beyond START IITable 2 shows strategic offensive forces of
the former Soviet Union, and Table 3 showsstrategic offensive forces for the UnitedStates. Those tables reveal the significantreductions that have already taken place as aresult of implementing START I (from morethan 10,000 warheads on each side to fewerthan 8,000 warheads on each side), the evengreater reductions that will take place as aresult of START II (now agreed to by both theUnited States and Russia), and projectionsfor START III.
Perhaps the most significant thing to noteis the changes in strategic nuclear force struc-ture as a result of the START process. Prior toSTART I, 60 percent of the Soviet strategicarsenal comprised land-based ICBMs (manyof them—such as SS-18s and SS-19s—wereheavily MIRVed), which were considered themost destabilizing weapons. In contrast,ICBMs made up only about 25 percent of theU.S. strategic force. Reductions underSTART I have resulted in about a 25 percentoverall reduction in strategic warheads.Although the intended reductions of ICBMwarheads have been achieved, those war-heads still compose the bulk of the Russianstrategic inventory (about 55 percent) andhave actually became a slightly larger portionof the U.S. inventory (about 30 percent).
START II will result in significant over-all reductions in warheads and a markedchange in force structure for both Russiaand the United States, and for each nationland-based ICBMs will make up less than20 percent of total warheads. SLBMs willcompose about half the inventory for eachside. Overall, both sides’ forces will be moreor less symmetrical. Those trends wouldcontinue under START III, at even lowerforce levels.
The ABM Treaty
The ABM Treaty is at the crux of the viewthat strategic offensive arms control and bal-listic missile defense are mutually exclusive.The ABM Treaty was conceived and ratifiedas a bilateral treaty between the United Statesand the Soviet Union in 1972. The treatystates that
the United States and the SovietUnion agree that each may have onlytwo ABM deployment areas, sorestricted and so located that theycannot provide a nationwide ABMdefense or become the basis fordeveloping one. Each country thusleaves unchallenged the penetrationcapability of the other’s retaliatorymissile forces.
The Treaty permits each side tohave one limited ABM system to pro-tect its capital and another to protectan ICBM launch area. The two sitesdefended must be at least 1,300 kilo-meters apart, to prevent the creationof any effective regional defense zoneor the beginnings of a nationwidesystem.
Precise quantitative and qualita-tive limits are imposed on the ABMsystems that may be deployed. Ateach site there may be no more than100 interceptor missiles and 100launchers.7
The treaty’s limit was subsequentlyreduced to a single deployment area with 100interceptors and launchers to protect eitherthe national capital or an ICBM launch area.The former Soviet Union chose to deploy itsABM system to protect Moscow, and theUnited States chose to protect the missilefields at Grand Forks, North Dakota, but didnot permanently deploy a system there.
Spurgeon Keeny, president and executivedirector of the Arms Control Association,makes the argument often heard in support
5
The Russianshave given initialindications thatthey might bewilling to amendthe ABM Treatyto accommodateNMD if evendeeper cuts inoffensive forcescan be achievedvia START III.
6
Table 2Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Former Soviet Union: Past, Present, and Projected (warheads)
September July December December1990a 1998b 2007c 2007d
ICBMsSS-11 326 0 0 0SS-13 40 0 0 0SS-17 188 0 0 0SS-18 3,080 1,800 0 0SS-19 1,800 1,063 105e 105fSS-24 890 920 0 0SS-25 288 360 250 100SS-27 0 2 180g 180g
Subtotal 6,612 4,144 535 385
SLBMsSS-N-6 192 16 0 0SS-N-8 280 192 0 0SS-N-17 12 0 0 0SS-N-18 672 624 0 0SS-N-20 1,200 1,200 1,000 600SS-N-23 448 448 448 320SS-NX-28 0 0 96h 96h
Subtotal 2,804 2,480 1,544 1,016
BombersBear 735 716 680 448Blackjack 120 200 120 120
Subtotal 855 916 800 568
Total 10,271 7,540 ~3,000i ~2,000i
Source: Arms Control Association, “Fact Sheet,” January 1999, http://www.armscontrol.org/FACTS/fsuct.htm.
aWarhead numbers are based on START I counting rules. Figures include weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan,Russia, and Ukraine. bWarhead numbers are based on START I counting rules. Figures include weapons in Russia and Ukraine only.Although Ukraine returned the last of its strategic nuclear warheads to Russia in 1996, they remain STARTaccountable until the delivery systems have been destroyed. The July 1998 START I Memorandum ofUnderstanding lists Ukraine as possessing 54 warheads on SS-19s, 460 warheads on SS-24s, 200 warheads onBear bombers, and 152 warheads on Blackjack bombers. Belarus and Kazakhstan have returned all of theirnuclear warheads to Russia and have completed the destruction of their delivery vehicles, thereby removingthem from START accountability. cAssumes that START II enters into force but that START III is not successfully negotiated. Figures includeweapons in Russia only and are based on START II counting rules. This means that the number of weaponscounted for heavy bombers will be the number they are actually equipped to carry. dAssumes that START III is successfully negotiated. Under this treaty, the United States and Russia will each bepermitted to deploy 2,000–2,500 strategic warheads.eSTART II permits Russia to download 105 SS-19s from 6 warheads each to 1 warhead. fAssumes that Russia keeps those forces under START III. gAssumes that Russia will achieve and is able to sustain a production rate of about 20 SS-27s per year. hRussia laid the keel for a new class of ballistic missile submarines known as the Borey in November 1996.According to the Office of Naval Intelligence, the submarines will be fitted with a new SLBM, possibly the SS-NX-28. Borey-class submarines are expected to carry at least 12 SLBMs. It is assumed that each SS-NX-28 willcarry 4 warheads. The first of the Borey-class submarines may be operational around 2005, depending on finan-cial circumstances. iThat outcome depends in large part on Russia’s economic situation. Under some scenarios, Russia would deploysignificantly fewer warheads.
Table 3U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Past, Present, and Projected (warheads)
September July December December
1990a 1998a 2007b 2007c
ICBMsMX 500 500 0 0
Minuteman III 1,500 1,950 500d 300e
Minuteman II 450 1 0 0Subtotal 2,450 2,451 500 300
SLBMsPoseidon (C-3) 1,920 320 0 0Trident I (C-4) 3,072 1,536 0 0
Trident II (D-5) 768 1,920 1,680f 1,008g
Subtotal 5,760 3,776 1,680 1,008
Bombers
B-52 2,258 1,644 980h 364i
B-1 95 91 0 0B-2 0 20 336 336
Subtotal 2,353 1,755 1,316 700
Total 10,563 7,982 ~3,500 ~2,000
Source: Arms Control Association, “Fact Sheet,” January 1999, http://www.armscontrol.org/FACTS/usct.htm.
aWarhead numbers are based on START I counting rules, which result in bombers having fewer warheads attrib-uted to them than they actually carry. However, even though all Poseidon submarines have been decommis-sioned, their C-3 SLBMs and associated warheads remain START accountable until the delivery systems havebeen destroyed. bAssumes that START II enters into force but that START III is not successfully negotiated. Figures are basedon START II counting rules. Those rules mean that the number of weapons counted for heavy bombers will bethe number they are actually equipped to carry. cAssumes that START III is successfully negotiated. Under this treaty, the United States and Russia will each bepermitted to deploy 2,000–2,500 strategic warheads.dAssumes 500 Minuteman IIIs, with each missile carrying 1 warhead. eAssumes 300 Minuteman IIIs, with each missile carrying 1 warhead. fAssumes 14 Ohio-class submarines carrying 24 Trident II (D-5) missiles each, with all D-5s carrying 5 war-heads. gAssumes 14 Ohio-class submarines carrying 24 Trident II (D-5) missiles each, with all D-5s carrying 3 war-heads. hAssumes that the United States maintains its entire fleet of 71 B-52 bombers but reduces the bombers’ cruise-missile carrying capacity. iAssumes that the United States maintains its entire fleet of 71 B-52 bombers but reduces the bombers’ cruise-missile carrying capacity.
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of the ABM Treaty: “It was recognized thatdeployment of ballistic missile defenseswould accelerate the arms race since eitherside would deploy additional offensive strate-gic forces to ensure the viability of its deter-rent, and that this could be done at a smallfraction of the cost of the defensive system.”8
The ABM Treaty is often seen as the corner-stone of strategic stability in the U.S. rela-tionship with the Soviet Union and now withRussia.
However, according to Henry Kissinger,President Nixon’s national security adviserwhen the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972and one of its architects, the purpose of theABM Treaty was not so much to preservestrategic stability via MAD as to trade off U.S.missile defenses in exchange for getting rid ofSoviet missile defenses.9 According toKissinger:
Nixon was far from converted to theMAD theory, but faced with aCongress that was gutting the ABMprogram, decided to freeze—andthereby preserve—a nucleus ABMdeployment in return for equivalentlimits on the Soviets’ own ABMdeployment, and to use that decisionto put a ceiling on the Soviet offen-sive buildup.1 0
Supporters of the ABM Treaty argue thatdeploying NMD will halt the current strate-gic offensive arms control process. They fearthat a strategic offensive arms race will resultas Russia tries to build more offensive sys-tems to overwhelm and counteract anydefensive deployment. That rationale wasoriginally put forth during the Cold War;some analysts have argued that it was notvalid even then. They maintain that the ABMTreaty—which limits defenses and thus theresources spent on those defenses—did notstop the Soviet Union from building up itsoffensive forces.11 The implication is that themoney the Soviets saved by not investing inABM systems was poured into a buildup of
offensive missiles.Strategic offensive reductions have accom-
panied the pursuit of missile defenses. At thesame time that START I was being negotiatedand signed, the Bush administration was pur-suing the global protection against limitedstrikes (GPALS) missile defense system.Despite the Clinton administration’s pursuitof a path that could lead to a decision inOctober 2000 on whether to build a U.S.NMD system, the Russian Duma ratifiedSTART II. The Russians have continuallymade clear their objections to any changes tothe ABM Treaty. Sergey Ivanov, secretary ofRussia’s Security Council, stated that deploy-ment of national missile defenses “wouldundermine the entire ABM regime and mightopen a Pandora’s box” that would threatenother arms control agreements. He added, “Ifwe are talking about slightly modifying theABM Treaty and establishing national missiledefense systems, those two things cannot existtogether.”12
After the Duma’s approval of START II,president-elect Vladimir Putin stated that“the ball is in their court”—alluding to fol-low-on START III talks and to Washington’sdesire to modify the ABM Treaty to allow theUnited States to deploy a national missiledefense.1 3The Duma attached a nonbindingamendment to START II that gives Russiathe right to revoke the treaty if the UnitedStates violates the ABM Treaty.
Nonetheless, the door is open for discus-sion of potential changes in the ABM Treatyto permit the deployment of NMD. After theDuma’s vote on the treaty, AlexanderPikayev, of the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, speculated that “Russiamight be willing to give up the anti–ballisticmissile ban in exchange for deeper Americanweapons cuts and a reworking of parts ofSTART II.”1 4 Pavel Podvig, at the Center forArms Control, Energy and EnvironmentalStudies in Russia, stated, “We should takeadvantage of the situation where Americans,at last, want something from us.”1 5
Clearly, the Clinton administrationbelieves that there is room for both arms con-
8
Advocates ofNMD often paint
a “doom-and-gloom” picture of
the threat posedby ballistic
missiles.
trol and missile defense. According to formerU.S. National Security Council staff memberRobert Bell: “It has been our firm belief thatthere is balance and inter-relationshipbetween offence and defence. . . . We recog-nise that the ABM [Treaty] is of fundamentalsignificance to our strategic arms reductionsthrough the START treaties. We see a veryclear relationship and we’re advancing onboth tracks.”1 6Bell acknowledged that rene-gotiating the ABM Treaty will not be withoutits difficulties: “The ABM treaty has beenamended before and there is no reason tothink it can’t be amended again.”17
Before Bush’s electoral defeat in 1992,his administration was making substantialprogress in renegotiating the ABM Treatyto win Russian acceptance of the adminis-tration’s GPALS system (consisting ofspace- and ground-based weapons and sen-sors). Any renegotiation would haveretained the basic aim of the ABM Treaty—limiting defenses so that neither the U.S.nor the Russian strategic arsenal wouldhave been undermined—while permittingsystems to protect against threats frompotential regional adversaries and acciden-tal or unauthorized launches by the majornuclear powers.1 8 The Clinton administra-tion—which was less enthusiastic aboutNMD than were previous administra-tions—dropped the renegotiation upontaking office. Russian receptivity to ABMTreaty renegotiation during the Bushadministration was especially interestingbecause GPALS was a more ambitious mis-sile defense deployment than what is nowbeing proposed by the Clinton administra-tion.
Therefore, despite the recent Russianrhetorical response to proposed changes tothe ABM Treaty, some precedent exists forrenegotiating the treaty to allow for NMD.Although the June 2000 summit meetingbetween President Clinton and Russian pres-ident Vladimir Putin did not result in anagreement to change the ABM Treaty, someinitial progress may have been made. In ajoint statement, the two leaders agreed that
the international community faces adangerous and growing threat ofproliferation of weapons of massdestruction and their means of deliv-ery, including missile technologies,and stress their desire to reverse thatprocess, including through existingand possible new international legalmechanisms. . . . This new threat rep-resents a potential significantchange in the strategic situation andinternational security environ-ment.1 9
According to President Clinton, the twoleaders also “acknowledged that the ABMTreaty perceives the possibility of changes inthe strategic environment that might requireit to be updated.”2 0
NMD
The current debate about NMD has itsroots in the Strategic Defense Initiative. OnMarch 23, 1983, President Ronald Reaganlaunched the SDI program, which wasintended to be “a comprehensive and inten-sive effort to define a long-term research anddevelopment program to begin to achieveour ultimate goal of eliminating the threatposed by strategic nuclear missiles.”2 1 Criticsof the plan quickly dubbed SDI “Star Wars”—referring to the widely popular George Lucasmovie. Some of the proposed systems includ-ed directed-energy (that is, laser) and space-based weapons, as well as other futuristicideas similar to those depicted in the movie.The critics’ implication was that such sys-tems worked in the movie but wouldn’t inreal life.
NMD OpponentsAlthough the NMD program being con-
sidered today bears little resemblance to theSDI program conceived by President Reagan(which sought to defend against a full-scaleSoviet ballistic missile attack), the tenor of thedebate has changed little in the past 17 years.
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Attempting tobuild compre-hensive missiledefenses thatcould threatenthe effectivenessof Russia’s andChina’s futurenuclear deter-rents is likely tobe costly andprovocative.
In fact, opponents often intentionally blur thedistinctions between the old SDI and the newNMD; typical are these comments by formersenator Paul Simon (D-Ill.):
The President and Congress . . .ought to acknowledge that SDI byany name remains nothing morethan a 1990s version of the oldFrench Maginot Line. The MaginotLine didn’t work in World War II,and Star Wars can’t work today, forreasons made clear over the past 10years of congressional and publicdebate. Sadly, we are visiting an issuenow that should have gone away inthe late 1980s.2 2
Even if they acknowledge that NMD isnot the same as SDI, opponents still arguethat the threat posed by ballistic missilesdoes not represent a “clear and present dan-ger.” Andrew Koch, of the Center for DefenseInformation, writes:
While the U.S. media may hype thethreat posed by the SaddamHusseins of the world, Chicago Bullsstar Dennis Rodman has a betterchance of winning the Nobel PeacePrize than these petty tyrants have ofacquiring an ICBM. The fact is,among our potential adversariestoday, only Russia and China haveballistic missiles with sufficientrange to strike even one of the 50states.2 3
Opponents have also previously claimedthat NMD would undermine the arms con-trol process, that is, START. Sen. Carl Levin(D-Mich.) has stated:
Even more important, it [NMD]would undermine our agreementwith Russia, which is that we will notdeploy these systems, and to goahead now and commit, as this bill[Defend America Act] would do, to
the deployment of these systems willcause Russia, we’ve been told directlythis by the Russian leadership, willcause Russia to not proceed with thedismantlement of weapons underSTART I and will cause them not toratify START II and both of thoseagreements result in a great reduc-tion of nuclear weapons. So if wepursued [NMD]—proceed now todeploy this system, we will, in fact, beincreasing the number of nuclearweapons in this world becauseRussia will no longer comply withSTART I, as she’s entitled not to if wego ahead with this illegal system, andshe will not ratify START II.24
However, this argument would seem lesscompelling now that START II has been rati-fied by Russia and the Russians have giveninitial indications that they might be willingto amend the ABM Treaty to accommodateNMD if even deeper cuts in offensive forcescan be achieved via START III.
Inevitably, opponents of NMD cite theABM Treaty as their rationale for not deploy-ing NMD. As Lisbeth Gronlund and GeorgeLewis from the Arms Control Associationargue:
• First, Russian planners will not beconcerned about whether theNMD system would interfere witha Russian first strike against theUnited States, but about how itmight affect Russia’s ability tolaunch a retaliatory attack inresponse to a first strike on Russia’snuclear forces.
• Second, while it is true that Russiacurrently deploys thousands ofnuclear weapons, it is not desirableto create a situation where Russiafeels it needs to retain large forcesto maintain deterrence in the faceof a U.S. NMD system.
• Third, although China is not a partyto the ABM Treaty, it clearly bases its
10
The most ardentsupporters ofNMD seem to
want more thanjust a defense of
the United Statesagainst threats
from rogue states.
nuclear planning at least in part onthe guarantees the treaty provides.
• Fourth, the modified treaty willpermit the infrastructure (in par-ticular, the sensors) needed for amuch thicker nationwidedefense.2 5
They conclude that “the deployment of theplanned U.S. NMD system and the changesto the ABM Treaty needed to permit itsdeployment will eliminate the central securi-ty guarantees that the treaty provides.”2 6
Interestingly enough, Gronlund and Lewisacknowledge “that a limit on the number oflaunchers and interceptors would place anupper bound on the number of warheadsagainst which the NMD system coulddefend”2 7 and that the “system clearly couldnot defend against a large-scale attack.”28
NMD SupportersOn the other side, advocates of NMD
often paint a “doom-and-gloom” picture ofthe threat posed by ballistic missiles. JamesAnderson at the Heritage Foundation statesthat “ballistic missiles are capable of destroy-ing life and property on a massive scale. . . .Yet our country remains naked to these mis-siles.” He further states that “every Americanalready is a hostage to the threat of missile attack.”2 9
The Center for Security Policy (a Washington,D.C., think tank founded and directed byFrank J. Gaffney Jr., acting assistant secretaryof defense for international security policyduring the Reagan administration) accusesthe Clinton administration of a “determina-tion for seven years to resist deploying anational defense against ballistic missileattack”—which has enabled North Korea toblackmail the United States.3 0 The adminis-tration’s resistance to deployment “has madeit possible for even crazed, destitute countrieslike North Korea to try to dictate to ‘theworld’s only superpower’ which security poli-cies and programs the U.S. will pursue.”31
Ardent NMD supporters too ofteninclude Russia and China as threats againstwhich the system must defend. Anderson
states:
North Korea’s is not the only dicta-torship we have to worry about. Iran,Libya, and Syria are among the near-ly two dozen states hoping to gainpolitical and military leverage bydeveloping ballistic missiles. And weshould not ignore Russia and China, twopowerful states with uncertain politicalfutures that already have long-range mis-siles capable of reaching our cities.32
The Center for Security Policy states that the“clear and present danger” includes
recent threats made by CommunistChina to use nuclear weapons toattack the United States in the eventthe man just elected by the people ofTaiwan came to power and the PRCretaliated with force. By all accounts,Russia is about to install a career KGBofficer who nostalgically recalls theSoviet Union and seems bent on restor-ing to their former power its instru-ments of state terror and influence.3 3
Although Russia and China are powerfulstates with uncertain political futures, attempt-ing to build comprehensive missile defensesthat could threaten the effectiveness of theirfuture nuclear deterrents is likely to be costlyand provocative, with questionable effective-ness (especially if the goal is a near-perfectdefense). Robust defense systems, such as theReagan administration’s SDI, that would beneeded to counter the Russian arsenal (andeventually the growing Chinese nuclear force)are currently of questionable technological fea-sibility and would require large quantities ofspace-based sensors and weapons, as well asheavy-lift launch capacity—all of which wouldbe prohibitively expensive. Yet building a robustmissile defense would aggravate the strains inthe U.S.-Russian relationship that resultedfrom NATO expansion and the U.S.-led war inKosovo and the tension in U.S.-Chinese rela-tions that resulted from that same conflict. In
11
A comprehensive,layered systemwould be expen-sive and is unwar-ranted in thepost–Cold Warenvironment. TheUnited Statesdoes not need tobe the world’spoliceman.
addition, building a missile defense explicitly tocounter the offensive deterrents of thosenations would brand them as enemies of theUnited States—a status that they do not cur-rently deserve—and would threaten a return toa Cold War relationship and environment. Inshort, what would probably turn out to be acostly defense with questionable effectivenesswould needlessly sour long-term relations withwhat are likely to be the second and third mostpotent nuclear powers in the future.
Furthermore, the most ardent supportersof NMD seem to want more than just adefense of the United States against threatsfrom rogue states. The Heritage Foundation isexplicit that “a missile defense system shouldbe global in nature.”34 Furthermore, the foun-dation’s Commission on Missile Defenseargues that “the fastest and least expensiveway to build a global missile defense systemwould be to begin by building sea-baseddefenses and then to follow them as soon aspossible with space-based defenses.”3 5
One of the reasons NMD advocates favora sea-based approach (or at least an approachthat explicitly incorporates sea-based inter-ceptors) is that they want to abandon ratherthan renegotiate the ABM Treaty.3 6 If theycan successfully dispense with the ABMTreaty altogether, then they can move for-ward with a more grandiose defensive sys-tem—such as the original SDI or the GPALSsystem that was proposed during the Bushadministration. GPALS, a layered system thatincluded ground- and space-based weaponsand sensors, was designed to intercept a lim-ited ballistic missile attack from anywhere toanywhere. The system was designed to pro-vide limited protection of the United Statesitself (including limited protection against aSoviet or Russian first strike or an accidentalor unauthorized launch), U.S. forward-deployed forces overseas, and U.S. friendsand allies.
Texas governor George W. Bush—thepresumptive Republican candidate forpresident—seems to have endorsed a morefar-reaching version of NMD, similar to hisfather’s GPALS system. At a speech at the
National Press Club, Governor Bush stated:“America must build effective missiledefenses, based on the best availableoptions at the earliest possible date. Ourmissile defense must be designed to protectall 50 states—and our friends and allies anddeployed forces overseas—from missileattacks by rouge nations or accidentallaunches.”3 7He also stated that the Clintonadministration’s limited land-based systemconsisting of only one interceptor site wasinadequate and that the Bush administra-tion would explore whether a space-basedsystem would work.3 8 Governor Bush hadpreviously stated (early in the Republicanprimaries) that he would be willing todeploy NMD unilaterally—even overRussian objections—and abandon the ABMTreaty.
The Need for a Limited NMDSuch a comprehensive, layered system
would be expensive3 9 and is unwarranted inthe post–Cold War environment. The UnitedStates does not need to be the world’s police-man.40 The United States should not be pur-suing an “interventionist” foreign anddefense policy that requires forward-deployed forces and protects friends andallies. Our primary focus should be on pro-tecting vital U.S. national security interests.According to Ivan Eland, the Cato Institute’sdirector of defense policy studies:
“Activist” foreign policy itself is theproblem. To avoid catastrophic ter-rorist attacks on the Americanhomeland in this new and danger-ous strategic environment, theUnited States must abandon itspolicy of being a military nanny inevery area of the world. The nationmust adopt a policy of militaryrestraint.4 1
A less globally interventionist foreign anddefense policy means that the United Statesdoes not need a global NMD system; instead,a more limited system is needed. A limited
12
A more robustNMD that is aglobal (rather
than truly a“national”) mis-sile defense pro-
vides a shield forcontinued inter-ventions around
the world.
system is warranted to counter the emergingrogue state threat as described by theRumsfeld Commission4 2 and confirmed bythe North Korean test firing of a Taepo Dong1 three-stage rocket in August 1998.According to Robert D. Walpole, senior intel-ligence officer for strategic intelligence pro-grams at the Central Intelligence Agency, “Athree-stage configuration, with a lightenough payload, could well give North Koreathe ability to send warheads across thePacific.”43 As noted in a Cato Institute studyon NMD:
The debate should not be aboutwhether or not to build missiledefenses. A limited ground-basedNMD should be built when the tech-nology is ready. The elements in theClinton administration’s NMD pro-gram can provide the requisite capa-bility to protect against the threatfrom rogue states. Instead, thedebate should be about the natureand capabilities of a limited NMDsystem that will accomplish the mis-sion of protecting the nation againstthreats from rogue states, and do itcost-effectively.4 4
And Eland points out:
A limited NMD system could befinanced by cutting existing[unneeded] defense programs [e.g.,new types of fighter aircraft, newclass of submarines, new aircraft car-riers and associated aircraft]. In fact,a limited NMD system could be pur-sued even if the defense budgetdeclined. Although an attack by arogue state using long-range missilesis not the most likely threat facingthe United States, it is one of the fewthreats to U.S. security in the post–ColdWar era and should receive someattention and limited funds.4 5
The NMD envisioned by its most ardent
advocates and now seemingly supported byGeorge W. Bush is a layered missile defensesystem intended to provide global coverageand protection. In other words, supporters ofNMD use the term “national” in NMD tomean what they perceive to be U.S. nationalsecurity interests around the world—notmerely the United States as a geographicalentity. Such a system is needed because theirapproach to foreign policy relies increasinglyon military interventions around the world—that is, a more robust NMD that is a global(rather than truly a “national”) missiledefense provides a shield for continued inter-ventions around the world.
A more reasonable and prudent definitionof the term “national” should be the UnitedStates as a geographic entity, because what isneeded is a more limited NMD systemdesigned to defend the United States againstlimited attacks from potential regionaladversaries. The purpose of NMD should notbe to protect allies and friends around theworld. Furthermore, a less interventionistforeign policy would also lessen the need forNMD to protect U.S. forward-deployedforces around the world.4 6As the Cato studyon NMD noted:
The threat from rogue states doesrepresent a real danger that couldjustify a limited NMD deployment.That deployment does not have to beextensive or expensive. The threatfrom rogue states is likely to be rela-tively modest (a few ICBMs) andunsophisticated (their missiles areunlikely to have multiple warheadsor sophisticated countermeasures),requiring an equally modestresponse. A limited ground-basedNMD system of 100–300 intercep-tors should provide sufficient defen-sive capability against threats fromrogue states.47
Although the powerful U.S. offensivenuclear forces should deter most leaders ofpotential regional adversaries from launch-
13
What is needed isa more limitedNMD systemdesigned todefend theUnited Statesagainst limitedattacks frompotential regionaladversaries.
ing long-range missiles carrying weapons ofmass destruction against the United States, alimited NMD could act as a backup in therare case that deterrence failed. More impor-tant, a limited NMD could be an insurancepolicy against the more likely threat of anaccidental launch by one of those states.With newly acquired weapons of massdestruction and long-range missiles, thosenations may have no nuclear doctrine, rudi-mentary command and control systems, andpoor safeguards against accidental launches.
Combining Arms Controland NMD
The conventional wisdom—that strategicoffensive arms control and NMD are mutu-ally exclusive—need not be the case. BothSTART I and START II have been ratified,which will result in the reduction of both theU.S. and the Russian strategic nuclear arse-nals to approximately 3,500 warheads. Ifboth sides continue to move toward a STARTIII agreement, warhead levels could be fur-ther reduced to approximately 2,000 (seeTables 1 and 2). According to the WashingtonPost:
Russia’s nuclear arsenal is alreadyheaded toward lower levels because ofdismantlement and obsolescence,especially of the submarines, air-planes, and missiles that deliver thewarheads. By some estimates, at theend of the START II period in 2007,Russia will have fewer than 1,000 war-heads if current trends continue.4 8
“If you assume that the Russian SS-17s, SS-18s, SS-19s, and S-25s have to come out ofthe inventory, do the Russians have enoughmoney to build a new ICBM force of SS-27sup to the START II levels?” Bell asks. “Mostof the assessments I’ve seen are pessimistic.”However, “it’s an academic debate aboutwhether they can or cannot afford to stay atSTART II . . . because I assume we will agree
on START III.”49
Thus, there are significant strategic offen-sive force reductions already, and even fur-ther reductions may be more or lessinevitable. That favorable situation thenopens the door to the possibility of deployinga limited NMD designed to defend againstthe rogue state threat without upsetting thebalance and stability achieved by strategicoffensive force reductions.
The ThreatAs should any weapon system, NMD
should be threat and mission driven. In thepost–Cold War environment, the UnitedStates is no longer engaged in a direct politi-cal-military competition with Russia, whichpossesses the only strategic nuclear arsenalthat might threaten U.S. society. Therefore,reduced tensions mean that the threat of adeliberate large-scale Russian attack using bal-listic missiles is significantly less likely thanduring the Cold War. The Chinese nuclearthreat is much smaller than Russia’s.According to the Natural Resources DefenseCouncil, “China has only a handful of missilesable to go intercontinental distances.”5 0
Furthermore, according to the Department ofDefense, “China increasingly sees ballistic mis-siles as important weapons for regional con-flict or use as psychological weapons.”51 Thus,deliberate—as well as accidental or unautho-rized—launches of ballistic missiles fromeither Russia or China pose an unlikely threat.
The “clear and present danger” is the bal-listic missile threat posed to the UnitedStates by potential regional adversaries. TheRumsfeld Commission concluded:
The newer ballistic missile–equippednations’ [e.g., North Korea, Iran, andIraq] capabilities will not matchthose of U.S. systems for accuracy orreliability. However, they would beable to inflict major destruction onthe U.S. within about five years of adecision to acquire such a capability(10 years in the case of Iraq). Duringseveral of those years, the U.S. might
14
A limited NMDcould be an insur-
ance policyagainst the threat
of an accidentallaunch by one ofthe rogue states.
not be aware that such a decisionhad been made.
The threat to the U.S. posed bythese emerging capabilities is broad-er, more mature and evolving morerapidly than has been reported inestimates and reports by theIntelligence Community.52
And in August 1998, the North Korean testfiring of a Taepo Dong 1 missile—which con-firmed that North Korea could have the abil-ity to send warheads across the PacificOcean—served to further highlight theemerging threat from potential regionaladversaries.
Response to the ThreatThe neo–Cold War paradigm—which uses
Russia as a substitute for the Soviet Union oruses China as a successor threat as part of thejustification for NMD—must be abandoned.The NMD system that makes the most senseto deploy is a limited ground-based systemdesigned to defend against the emergingthreats from potential regional adversaries.5 3
Such a deployment does not have to be exten-sive or overly expensive. The threat is likely tobe relatively modest (a few ICBMs) and unso-phisticated (unlikely to be MIRVed or havesophisticated countermeasures) and requiresonly a modest response. And such a systemwould not pose a threat to deterrence and sta-bility vis-à-vis Russia because it would not belarge enough to defend against a large attack.
The most recent Congressional BudgetOffice cost estimate for an NMD deploymentconsisting of 100 interceptors based in Alaska,a new X-band radar, and upgrade for existingearly warning radars is $30 billion ($4 billionmore than the Pentagon’s estimate of $26 bil-lion).54 That sum includes design, procure-ment, construction, and operations costsfrom FY99 to FY15 (assuming an FY05deployment). That system is representative ofthe type of system needed to defend againstthe rogue state threat. And while such a sys-tem might have some inherent, limited capa-bility against a Russian or Chinese accidental
or unauthorized launch, it would not bedesigned to counter such scenarios.
By definition, any NMD deploymentwould be beyond the bounds of the ABMTreaty as it currently stands. But since theultimate purpose of the treaty is to preservenuclear stability and deterrence between theUnited States and Russia, there is no reasonto automatically assume that the Russianswould not accept any modifications to thetreaty to allow NMD. Such acceptance wouldrequire that the United States provide con-vincing evidence that the NMD system wasdesigned to protect against only relativelysmall attacks (for example, 20 warheads)from potential regional adversaries and thatit would not be designed to defend against amuch larger Russian strike.
Clearly, an expansive global system ofspace-, sea-, and ground-based weapons andsensors (as envisioned by many NMD advo-cates) would indeed be perceived by theRussians as threatening to deterrence andstability. And such a system is not warrantedby the threat from potential regional adver-saries. On the other hand, a limited ground-based NMD deployment would hardly repre-sent a serious threat to Russian strategicnuclear capability and therefore would notundermine deterrence and stability.
Renegotiating the ABM Treaty with theRussians to allow deployment of NMDwould probably be easier if the United Statesstopped engaging in actions that are clearlyantagonistic to Russia (and are also not vitalto the core national security interests of theUnited States)—for example, expansion ofNATO and the bombing of Iraq andYugoslavia. In addition, in ratifying STARTII, the Duma “called on Russia to cancelSTART II if the United States [stations]nuclear weapons on the territory of newNATO members.”5 5 Such deployment ofnuclear weapons would also prevent anychanges to the ABM Treaty to allow deploy-ment of NMD.
Also adversely affecting Russian willing-ness to renegotiate the ABM Treaty to allowfor an NMD deployment is the heated
15
The threat is like-ly to be relativelymodest requiresonly a modestresponse.
rhetoric of the most ardent NMD propo-nents. A “hard-line” stand against the treatyand Russia certainly will not help. But battlelines are already being drawn. After theDuma’s approval of START II, JohnCzwartacki, spokesman for Senate MajorityLeader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), said: “One thingis certain: We’re not going to be blackmailedinto leaving the American people exposedand with no ability to provide a national mis-sile defense.”56 Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) hasvowed to block approval of any arms controlagreement—including changes to the ABMTreaty that would allow for deployment of alimited NMD system—that PresidentClinton might negotiate during his finalmonths in office. Senator Helms has stated,“Any modified ABM Treaty negotiated bythis [Clinton] administration will be DOA,dead on arrival, at the Senate ForeignRelations Committee.”5 7
Finally, changes to the ABM Treaty toallow deployment of NMD may hinge onSTART III and the ability to achieve evendeeper cuts in strategic offensive force arse-nals. According to Daniel Williams of theWashington Post: “In preliminary exchangesover START III, the United States suggestedceilings as high as 2,500 warheads whileRussia pressed for limits of 1,500.”5 8 StevenMufson of the same newspaper noted that“Russia wants a new round of cuts to pareback deployments to about 1,500 in exchangefor ABM treaty modifications.”5 9
Targeting IssuesThe question is whether NMD advocates
would be willing to accept even deeper cuts inoffensive forces as a condition for a nation-wide missile defense capability or whetherthey simply want to do away with the ABMTreaty rather than accept NMD within theconstraints of a modified treaty. Accordingto Mufson, current American military think-ing is that the United States “must maintainbetween 2,000 and 2,500 nuclear warheads tohit enough targets to effectively deter anyoneelse from using nuclear weapons and tomaintain a three-legged nuclear force on
land, sea and air.”60 John Pike of theFederation of American Scientists arguesthat
we’re still stuck in a MAD [mutualassured destruction] world with theRussians. . . . There are a lot of peopleat Strategic Command who contin-ue to believe that we need to haveabout 3,000 warheads to keep Russiain a deterred frame of mind. Thereare clearly a lot of their counterpartsin Moscow who feel that they stillneed to have a very robust laydownwith high damage expectancies on alot of targets in order to be able tosleep well at night.6 1
Again, that Cold War thinking of the U.S.and Russian militaries and the nuclear policycommunity will need to change if trueprogress is to be made in both arms controland national missile defense. During theCold War, part of the reason a large numberof warheads were required was that bothsides pursued a war-fighting targeting strate-gy, which dictated the need to hold at risk alarge number of so-called high-value targetswith high probability (and high confidence)of inflicting damage. (For example, typicallya minimum of two cross-targeted warheads—that is, warheads from different launchers—against each target was thought to be neededto achieve a high probability of kill.) But theUnited States is no longer engaged in directmilitary competition with Russia. Therefore,we do not need the same targeting require-ments for effective deterrence. In thepost–Cold War era, not only is the number ofpure military targets likely to be smaller, butwe may also be able to move away from“counterforce” targeting to fight a nuclearwar and toward “countervalue” targeting todeter an attack. That is, we may not have totarget all of the so-called high-value militarytargets (nuclear and conventional) that arecurrently listed in the Strategic IntegratedOperating Plan (U.S. plan for fightingnuclear war). Although the SIOP is classified,
16
A limited ground-based NMDdeployment
would hardly represent a seri-
ous threat toRussian strategic
nuclear capabilityand therefore
would not under-mine deterrence
and stability.
experts say that the Pentagon still maintainsabout 2,300 warheads on alert to hit military,leadership, and industrial targets in Russiaand specifies that the United States shouldbe able to destroy 80 percent of the 2,300 tar-gets. Of those warheads, 1,100 are aimed atnuclear sites, 500 at conventional militarytargets, 500 at defense factories, and 160 atleadership targets. In addition to the 2,300warheads, experts also say that DoD keepsabout 500 spare warheads on alert.6 2
The United States could reduce the totalnumber of military targets and shift awayfrom a purely military targeting strategy—putting more emphasis on hitting economictargets for the purpose of deterring Russia.Far fewer warheads are needed to deter anuclear war than to fight one. If a changefrom a war-fighting to a deterrent nuclearstrategy is pursued, then 1,500 highly surviv-able warheads would probably be sufficientto deter each side—as well as other nuclearpowers (that possess, at most, only tens ofweapons that can strike the United States).For a START III agreement, even 2,000 war-heads—as a potential compromise numberbetween the upper end of the U.S. military’spreferred range of 2,000–2,500 warheads andthe Russian proposal of 1,500 warheads—should be more than sufficient for deter-rence. And accepting deeper cuts in a STARTIII agreement would be a clear signal that theUnited States was not attempting to achievea strategic nuclear advantage over Russia—thus making it easier for Russia to agree tothe proposed NMD deployment.
Strategic Nuclear ForceStructure
A reduction to as few as 1,500 warheadson each side also raises the question ofwhether a strategic offensive nuclear triad ofland-based ICBMs, sea-based SLBMs, andbombers needs to be maintained. During theCold War, the rationale for the triad was thathaving three distinct basing modes and typesof delivery vehicles complicated Soviet attack
planning and ensured sufficient U.S. forcesurvivability to inflict a second strike on theSoviet Union. Land-based ICBMs provide thecapability to kill hard targets (hardenedenemy missile silos and command facilities)and are under the most secure control of theNational Command Authority, but as fixedtargets (that is, the missiles are housed inmissile silos) they are relatively more vulnera-ble. Sea-based SLBMs can also kill hard tar-gets and are more survivable but are notunder the same secure control of the NCAand are not viewed as being able to belaunched as rapidly as ICBMs. The bomberforce is considered moderately survivable(based on its alert status) but does not havethe same ability to kill hard targets as ICBMsor SLBMs. However, bombers are the only legof the triad that can be recalled in a crisis sit-uation; once a decision has been made tolaunch ICBMs or SLBMs, there is no way tostop them.
If the United States were to change itsstrategic nuclear force structure to a so-calleddyad (two legs rather than three), two possi-bilities exist. With either option, the UnitedStates would keep the bomber force becausebombers can be recalled in a crisis situationand because long-range bombers capable ofcarrying conventional heavy payloads mightbe needed to project power to overseas the-aters of operations—maybe even from basesin the United States.63
The question would be whether to retaineither the ICBM or the SLBM force.Compared with an equivalent SLBM force,ICBMs have the advantage of very securecommand and control and lower operatingcosts. But fixed, silo-based ICBMs are rela-tively more vulnerable to attack. Moreover,relatively vulnerable ICBMs may be subject toa “use or lose” decision in a crisis situation(that is, a leader could be faced with the deci-sion of launching ICBMs before confirma-tion of an attack—usually defined as the det-onation of incoming warheads—or riskingthe destruction of the ICBMs by waiting forconfirmation).
On the other hand, SLBMs are highly sur-
17
If a change froma war-fighting toa deterrentnuclear strategyis pursued, then1,500 highly sur-vivable warheadswould probablybe sufficient todeter each side.
At very low war-head levels (that
is, START II andbeyond), scaling
back to a dyad ofnuclear forces
may be more effi-cient and cost-effective than
maintaining thecurrent triad.
vivable (when deployed at sea) but have lesssecure command and control than ICBMs(which makes their response times longer).And SLBMs are relatively more expensivethan ICBMs because their costs include theprocurement and operation of nuclear sub-marines—with the associated manpower andinfrastructure for nuclear propulsion. At verylow warhead levels (that is, START II andbeyond), scaling back to a dyad of nuclearforces may be more efficient and cost-effec-tive than maintaining the current triad. Evenwith a dyad, the United States would contin-ue to have redundant and complementaryforces to complicate the attack planning ofany adversary and ensure the survivability ofthe force.
Conclusion
There is no reason to assume that armscontrol and ballistic missile defense aremutually exclusive. Indeed, despite theClinton administration’s desire to amend theABM Treaty to permit deployment of a limit-ed NMD system, START II was finally rati-fied by the Russian Duma (although the U.S.Senate must still approve two protocolsadded to the treaty and ratified by theDuma), and initial progress is being made ona START III agreement. Although Russia hasbeen initially resistant to amending the ABMTreaty, it also clearly recognizes the threatthat is driving the U.S. rationale to deployNMD. After their June 2000 summit meet-ing, President Clinton and President Putinagreed on a joint statement that “makes clearthat there is an emerging ballistic missilethreat that must be addressed, but we havenot agreed on how best to do so.”64 And therehave been some early indications that Russiamight be willing to modify the ABM Treatyto permit NMD in exchange for deeper cutsin offensive arms beyond START II.65
Given what has been accomplished todate in the START process, the key issue ishow to proceed with NMD without endan-gering future arms control agreements.
Those accomplishments in arms controlmake some of the key criticisms of NMDopponents appear less valid. For example:
• A limited NMD system designed todefend against rogue state threats frompotential regional adversaries—that is,a land-based system consisting of 100or 200 interceptors to defend againstsmall-scale attacks—would not affectRussia’s ability to launch a retaliatoryattack in response to a first strike onRussia’s nuclear forces.66 Even withdeep cuts in the number of warheads(that is, to the levels of START III),force structures will be SLBM heavyand thus highly survivable. Thus,Russia would retain enough warheadsto overwhelm a limited defense.
• A limited NMD system would not cre-ate a situation in which Russia felt itneeded to retain large forces to main-tain deterrence in the face of a U.S.NMD system.6 7 An NMD systemdesigned to defend against attacks of,at most, tens of warheads would not beable to successfully defend against alarger-scale attack (hundreds of war-heads), which the Russians couldmount even under the low warheadtotals of START III. Therefore, therewould be no inherent incentive or needfor larger Russian offensive forces, espe-cially because Russian missiles areequipped with sophisticated counter-measures (for example, decoys) that canovercome defenses.
Although ardent supporters of NMDargue that the United States should abandonthe ABM Treaty to deploy NMD (largelybecause they want to deploy a comprehen-sive, global rather than a national missiledefense), that is not the most prudent path tofollow. That course would endanger recentaccomplishments in arms control (START II)and certainly prohibit any future reductionsof offensive weapons (START III). Havinglower numbers of warheads on alert status
18
would substantially reduce the risk of anaccidental nuclear attack.68 The lower inven-tory levels also mean that fewer nuclear war-heads would be available to be stolen or soldto potential regional adversaries (that possi-bility is a particular concern for the aging andinsecure Russian nuclear stockpile). In addi-tion, in response to a unilateral withdrawalfrom the ABM Treaty, the Russians could sellpotential regional adversaries the counter-measures to defeat any NMD system, refuseto help stem the proliferation of Russianweapons of mass destruction to potentialregional aggressors, or maintain large num-bers of nuclear weapons on alert.
Instead, the United States should pursuedeployment of a limited NMD system todefend against intentional or accidental mis-sile attacks from potential regional aggres-sors while simultaneously renegotiating theABM Treaty with the Russians. That conclu-sion does not imply that the ABM Treaty issacrosanct or the cornerstone of strategic sta-bility. Rather, it simply acknowledges thatconcerns about stability and deterrence vis-à-vis Russia are legitimate and cannot beignored. And to simply ignore the ABMTreaty and Russian concerns would needless-ly antagonize Russia at an inopportune time(much as the United States did by expandingNATO)—potentially throwing away the gainsof START II (and START III). Of course, anyrenegotiation would have to retain the basicaim of the ABM Treaty—limiting defenses sothat neither the U.S. nor the Russian strategicarsenal would be undermined—while permit-ting systems to defend against potentialregional adversaries.
If, after earnest negotiations, the Russiansstill resolutely refuse to amend the ABMTreaty to allow for a limited NMD deploy-ment against those states, then, and onlythen, should the United States considerabandoning the treaty. A previous CatoInstitute study on NMD noted:
In the final analysis, U.S. leadersshould not permit the ABM Treatyto be an insurmountable obstacle to
NMD, if such a system can be shownto be in the best interest of U.S. secu-rity and to be cost-effective. Unlikethe Constitution, the ABM Treaty—or any treaty—should not be consid-ered a cornerstone of America’s polit-ical institutions and a way of life. Atreaty should be retained only aslong as it serves the security interestsof the American people.6 9
The NMD system that makes the mostsense against the threat from potentialregional adversaries is a limited ground-based deployment of 100, or a few hundred,interceptors. Such a system should providesufficient defensive capability against inten-tional and, more likely, accidental missileattacks from those states. And such a systemwould have some inherent capability againsta small Russian or Chinese accidental orunauthorized launch but would not bedesigned to counter those specific scenarios.Furthermore, according to the Cato study:
Deploying a limited ground-basedNMD system would not upsetnuclear deterrence or stabilitybetween the United States andRussia. Even if the NMD systemwent beyond the bounds of the ABMTreaty (as is likely), it would not posea direct threat to Russia. If the NMDsystem were designed to protectagainst relatively small attacks (forexample, 20 warheads), it wouldhardly represent a defense capabilitysufficient to allow the United Statesto launch a nuclear first strikeagainst Russia with the expectationthat it could successfully defendagainst a Russian retaliatory strike.70
Therefore, it is possible to achieve a “balance”between strategic offensive arms control, theABM Treaty (as a reflection of legitimate concernsabout stability and deterrence between the UnitedStates and Russia), and national missile defenseagainst the emerging threats. But such a balance
19
Although ardentsupporters ofNMD argue thatthe United Statesshould abandonthe ABM Treatyto deploy NMD,that is not themost prudentpath to follow.
will not be achieved without dispensing with theoverheated political rhetoric on both sides of theissue. Arms control advocates cannot continue to“cry wolf” about missile defense’s endangeringthe arms control process. Missile defense advo-cates cannot continue to ignore and dismiss theABM Treaty. And, perhaps most important, wemust view NMD in the context of a more“restrained” and less interventionist Americanforeign and military policy. Adopting such a poli-cy should not be construed as “isolationist”;rather, it should be recognized that the UnitedStates should not be the world’s policeman, thatfriends and allies are responsible for their owndefense, and that not every crisis around theworld involves a core U.S. national security inter-est. Therefore, we do not need an NMD systemthat is global in nature (as advocated by manyNMD supporters). Rather, we need a limitedNMD designed to protect the United Statesagainst limited attacks from emerging potentialregional aggressors.
Reducing U.S. offensive forces below cur-rent START II and proposed START III levelsmight provide the incentive for Russia toaccept U.S. efforts to deploy a limited land-based NMD. Lowering the number of offen-sive warheads could reduce the chance of acci-dental nuclear war by shrinking the numberof warheads on alert status and reducing thenumber of Russian warheads that could bestolen or sold to emerging nuclear powers. Ifthe United States changed its nuclear doc-trine from war fighting to deterrence, mutualreductions in offensive forces that allowed theUnited States to keep as few as 1,500 war-heads would deter Russia and smaller oremerging nuclear powers. Such a reductioncombined with the deployment of a limitedland-based NMD system would greatlyenhance U.S. security.
Notes1. James Woolsey, former director of the CentralIntelligence Agency, Comments at the HeritageFoundation conference “Defending America:Meeting the Urgent Missile Threat,” March 23,1999. Woolsey noted that, during the Cold War,the fear among U.S. policymakers was that robust
Soviet missile defenses would allow the SovietUnion to strike first and then absorb a secondstrike from U.S. residual forces with minimaldamage.
2. Ivan Eland, “Abrogation of the ABM Treaty,”Nexus 4, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 59.
3. David B. H. Denoon, Ballistic Missile Defense in thePost–Cold War Era (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,1991), p. 5.
4. Fred Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon (New York:Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 349, 351; and StrobeTalbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the NuclearPeace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 103.
5. The U.S. Senate had ratified the START IITreaty on January 26, 1996, but the treaty as rati-fied by the Duma contains two protocols (agreedto by President Clinton and then–Russian presi-dent Boris Yeltsin in 1997) that must be approvedby the Senate before the treaty is formally adopt-ed. One protocol would clarify the differencebetween long-range strategic and short-range tac-tical weapons; the other would extend the timeframe for meeting the START II goals from 2003to 2007.
6. Treaty between the United States of Americaand the Russian Federation on Further Reductionand Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,January 30, 1995, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ acda/factshee/wmd/nuclear/start2/start-95.htm
7. Treaty between the United States of Americaand the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics onthe Limitation of Anti–Ballistic Missile Systems,May 26, 1972, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html. Emphasis added.
8. Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr., Remarks at conference on“National Missile Defense, the ABM Treaty and theFuture of START II,” Brookings Institution,Washington, January 27, 1999, http://www.armscon-trol.org/ACT/novdec98/trnd98.htm.
9. See Eland, “Abrogation of the ABM Treaty,” p. 60.
10. Henry Kissinger, “The Next President’s FirstObligation,” Washington Post, February 9, 2000, p. A21.
11. That argument was made by Henry Kissinger,Ed Meese, and Sven Kraemer in comments at theHeritage Foundation conference, “DefendingAmerica: Meeting the Urgent Missile Threat,”March 23, 1999.
12. Quoted in Bradley Graham and Steven Mufson,“Groundwork Is Laid for Possible Summit,”Washington Post, February 19, 2000, p. A17.
20
Reducing U.S.offensive forces
below currentSTART II and
proposed STARTIII levels might
provide theincentive for
Russia to acceptU.S. efforts to
deploy a limitedland-based
NMD.
13. Martin Nesirky, “Putin Hails Russian Duma’sSTART-2 Vote,” Reuters (Moscow), April 14,2000, http://www.reuters.com/news.
14. Quoted in Daniel Williams, “Putin Wins Vote onSTART II,” Washington Post, April 15, 2000, p. A16.
15 Quoted in ibid.
16. Bryan Bender, “Interview, Robert Bell, SeniorDirector for Defense Policy and Arms Control, USNational Security Council,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,August 18, 1999, p. 40.
17. Ibid.
18. Robert Joseph and Keith Payne, “BallisticDefense: The Need for a National Debate,”National Defense University Forum no. 37, July1995, p. 4.
19. David Hoffman and Charles Babington,“ABM Issue Unresolved As Summit Ends,”Washington Post, June 5, 2000, p. A10.
20. Ibid.
21. Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation onNational Security,” March 23, 1983, http://www.reagan.com/plate.main/ronald/speeches/rrspeech0a.html.
22. Paul Simon, “Star Wars or Maginot Line?Contract to Bankrupt America,” CongressionalRecord, January 6, 1995, p. S572.
23. Andrew Koch, “Don’t Sink Billions to Deflecta Hypothetical Threat While Ignoring the RealDangers,” Insight on the News Online, Center forDefense Information, May 25, 1998, http://www.cdi.org/issues/bmd/symposium.html.
24. “Star Wars—The Sequel,” PBS OnlineNewshour, June 4, 1996, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/star_wars_6-4.html
25. Lisbeth Gronlund and George Lewis, “Howa Limited National Missile Defense WouldImpact the ABM Treaty,” Arms Control Today,November 1999, http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/nov99/lgno99.htm.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. James H. Anderson, America at Risk: TheCitizen’s Guide to Missile Defense (Washington:Heritage Foundation, 1999), p. 4-5. Emphasis inoriginal.
30. Center for Security Policy, “The Face ofBlackmail to Come—It’s Time to DefendAmerica,” Decision Brief no. OO-D 8, January 24,2000, http://www.security-policy.org/papers/2000/00-D8.html.
31. Ibid.
32. Anderson, p. 89. Emphasis added.
33. Center for Security Policy, “Protect AmericansNow,” Decision Brief no. OO-D 25, March 20,2000, http://www.security-policy.org/papers/2000/00-D25.html.
34. Heritage Foundation, Commission on MissileDefense, “Defending America: A Plan to Meet theUrgent Missile Threat,” March 1999, p. 43.
35. Ibid.
36. Some of the more ardent NMD advocates do notfavor an NMD deployment within the framework ofthe ABM Treaty even if the treaty were amended toallow one. For example, Baker Spring states: “Someproponents of missile defense fear that theAdministration’s discussions with Russia on armscontrol could be used as a means to draft a new agree-ment with Moscow that would alter the ABM Treatyto allow the deployment of the system the Presidentchooses. This is a legitimate fear, since such an agree-ment would hobble the U.S. missile defense effort. Thetreaty’s restrictions would continue to impose limitson the capabilities of the defense architecture that areso severe that the system developed would not justifythe expense.” Baker Spring, “The President’sImportant Choice on Missile Defense,” HeritageFoundation Backgrounder no. 1355, March 31, 2000,p. 5.
37. Quoted in Terry M. Neal, “Bush Backs WiderMissile Defenses,” Washington Post, May 24, 2000,p. A4.
38. Ibid.
39. The Congressional Budget Office had previ-ously estimated that a GPALS-like system consist-ing of 300 ground-based interceptors, 500 space-based interceptors, 20 space-based lasers, andSMTS satellites would entail $60 billion in acqui-sition costs (including $3 billion to hedge againsttechnical risk). See Ray Hall and David Mosher,“Budgetary Implications of H.R. 3144, theDefend America Act of 1996,” CongressionalBudget Office, 1996.
40. Barbara Conry, “U.S. Global Leadership: AEuphemism for World Policeman,” Cato InstitutePolicy Analysis no. 267, February 5, 1997.
21
41. Ivan Eland, “Protecting the Homeland: TheBest Defense Is to Give No Offense,” Cato InstitutePolicy Analysis no. 306, May 5, 1998, p. 35.
42. For a more detailed discussion of the threatfrom potential regional adversaries, see RumsfeldCommission, Report of the Commission to Assess theBallistic Missile Threat to the United States(Washington: Government Printing Office,1998); and Charles V. Peña and Barbara Conry,“National Missile Defense: Examining theOptions,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 337,March 16, 1999.
43. Quoted in Bradley Graham, “N. KoreanMissile Threat Is Reassessed,” Washington Post,September 25, 1998, p. A31.
44. Peña and Conry, pp. 19–20.
45. Eland, “Abrogation of the ABM Treaty,” p. 71.Emphasis added.
46. For a more detailed discussion of theater mis-sile defense for protection of U.S. expeditionaryforces deployed to overseas theaters of operations,see Charles V. Peña, “Theater Missile Defense: ALimited Capability Is Needed,” Cato InstitutePolicy Analysis no. 309, June 22, 1998.
47. Peña and Conry, pp. 18–19.
48. David Hoffman, “Russia Set to Ratify STARTII,” Washington Post, April 11, 2000, p. A16,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/exussr/A51028-2000Apr10.html.
49. Quoted in Bender, p. 40.
50. William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and JoshuaHandler, Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments1998 (Washington: Natural Resources DefenseCouncil, 1998), p. 45.
51. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation:Threat and Response (Washington: U.S. Depart-ment of Defense, 1997), p. 10.
52. Rumsfeld Commission, p. 5.
53. Peña and Conry, pp. 18–20.
54. Geoffrey Forden and Raymond Hall, Budgetaryand Technical Implications of the Administration’s Plan forNational Missile Defense (Washington: CongressionalBudget Office, April 2000), http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1984&sequence=0&from=7.See also Eric Planin and Roberto Suro, “Cost ofMissile Shield Is Double Pentagon Estimate, CBOSays,” Washington Post, April 26, 2000, p. A10. Thecost estimate for an initial NMD deployment has
steadily increased. In 1996 the Department ofDefense estimate for 100 interceptors at an unspeci-fied location was $10 billion, and the CBO estimatefor 100 interceptors at Grand Forks, N.Dak., was$14 billion. See Hall and Mosher. In 1998 DoD esti-mated a cost of $11 billion for the deployment of 20interceptors in Alaska ($9 billion to deploy them inGrand Forks, N.Dak.), which was subseqeuntlyincreased to $13 billion. See John Donnelly, “NMDCost Estimate Up 30 Percent since Last Week,”Defense Week, January 19, 1999. The current CBOestimate also shows that adding 150 interceptors inthe continental United States would increase thesystem cost to $49 billion; an additional $10.6 bil-lion would be needed to construct and operate 24low-orbit infrared satellites for the detection of war-heads and discrimination of them from decoys.Thus the total cost (development, procurement, andoperation) could be as high as $60 billion for a land-based NMD system.
55. Williams, p. A16.
56. Steven Mufson, “Protocols May Draw SenateFire, Spur Bid for Broader Arms Pact,” WashingtonPost, April 15, 2000, p. A17.
57. Helen Dewar and John Lancaster, “HelmsVows to Obstruct Arms Pacts,” Washington Post,April 27, 2000, p. A24.
58. Williams, p. A16.
59. Mufson, p. A17. Emphasis added.
60. Ibid.
61. Quoted in Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, “The Role of the ABM Treatyand National Missile Defense,” proceedings ofthe START II, Missile Non-Proliferation, andMissile Defense seminar, February 14, 1996, p. 35.
62. Walter Pincus and Roberto Suro, “How LowShould Nuclear Arsenal Go?” Washington Post, May12, 2000, p A4; and Jonathan Landay and StevenThomma, “U.S. Military Rejects Moscow Call toCut to 1,500 Warheads,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May24, 2000, p. 2.
63. For a more detailed analysis of bomber rolesand missions, see Williamson Murray, “TheUnited States Should Begin Work on a NewBomber Now,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no.368, March 16, 2000.
64. Hoffman and Babington, p. A1.
65. Mufson, p. A17.
66. Gronlund and Lewis.
22
67. Ibid.
68. According to Frank von Hippel and Bruce Blair,dramatically reducing the risk of accidental launchentails de-alerting warheads that are currently in excessof the START II levels until the treaty can be imple-
mented. Frank von Hippel and Bruce Blair, “A LongerNuclear Fuse,” Washington Post, June 6, 2000, p. A27.
69. Peña and Conry, p. 4
70. Ibid., p. 19.
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