The rmored Division as an assault landingforce. The Armred School. May 52.

This DocumentIS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTIONLIBRARY SERVICES

FORT L ENWORTH, KANSAS

DO NT NO. 2146 *12 COPY NO. 1

13 Mar 51DOWNGRADED AT 3 YERR TNTRVAT*.R

THE ARMORED DIVISION AS AN ASSAULT LANDING FORCE

A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED

. ... BY

COMMITTEE 34, OFFICERS ADVANCED COURSE

THE ARMORED SCHOOL

1951 -1952

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ALVA "T. McDANIEL

MAJOR FRANCIS A. COOCH 3rd

MAJOR GEORGE V, LABADIE

CAPTAIN EDWIN VT. PIBURN JR

CAPTAIN JAIES R. PORTA

FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY

May 1952

) ('S< Fl^,^

II B~

TABLE OF COTTNTS

Chapter Page

1 INTRODUCTION ................................ *,. 1

Scope .. ,, .."... .* ..... . ... ........... .. 3

Problems and Limitation of the Study ........... 3Definition of Terms ........... *......... ..... 5

Methods Of Research ........................... 7Outline Of Study .... ,,.. .*........... ... 8

2 ASSAULT LANDI NGS, IORLD WAR II ................. 10

Invasion of North Africa ....................... 12

Sicilian Invasion ~ *.... .. *... ..... *...... 28

Normandy - 6 June 44 ...... ",.. ............ 35Okinawa - 1 April 45 ,.. ........... ..... 45Conclusion ... ,,....... . . ..... ,.. 0f. . .0 . • 51

3 DOCTRINE AND ORGANIZATION .*.........*...*...e... 56

Characteristics of Amphibious Operations ....... 56World War II, Armored Division Organization .... 61Conclusion ........ . *.... .. .. .. .............. 67

4 SPECIAL VETICLE REQUIREM'TTS ... ............ ..... 69

Equipment for the Assault ........................ 69

Conclusions . . ............... ....... .. ..... .,, 82

5 NAVAL RETIREMETS .................. ...... 85Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM-6) .............. 87Ship, Utility (LSU) ............................ 90

Landing Ship, Medium (LSM) ...................... 91

Landing Ship, Tank (LST) ...................... 91

Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) ....... 93

6 ATiPHIBIO{S TRAINING ............................ 99

7 CONCEPT OF EMPLOY1E T ...... ......... .. ... .. 111Organization for Landing "... ..... ...... .. *. 113Formations *.... o..... ............ :......... 115

Conclusion .......... .............. ...... ... 116

APPENDICES .................... .... ,,r......

I. Troop List, TF Red, CC "B", 1st ArmoredDivision, 8 November 42 .................... 118

II. Troop List, TF Green, CC"B" 1st ArmoredDivision, 8 November 42 ......... ......... 119

III. Troop List, CC "A", 2nd Armored Division,10 June 43 ........ ....... .............. 120

IV. Summary, Armored Division Strength andPrincipal Weapons ............ ............. 121.

BILIOGRAPHY ..... . .... ....... .... .......... o ... 123

CHPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The history of American diplomacy and foreign policy

since the founding of our country, has, with few exceptions, been

one of peace. America has rarely been the aggressor. Rather, the

aggressors of the world have come to us. This policy has put us

initially on the defensive in almost every war in which we-have

been engaged. We have had to suffer initial reverses while our

industry became geared to war and our civilian armies were mobil-

iSed and trained. While we are suffering reverses. in the initial

stages of a war, we and our allies are losing ground - ground

which later we must retake, Herein lies the basis of our study -

our necessity for retaking the ground we have lost in the initial

stages of our wars - ground that must be lost because of our be-

lief in the proper conduct of nations.

The retaking of lost ground involves many factors.. One

of the most important of these factors is amphibious warfare.. No

greater example of this can be found than our recent experiences

in World War II, Our Pacific war was a continual succession of

amphibious operations. All of our great land operations in Europe

were preceded by amphibious invasions.. During the war, as our

experience gained on the practical field of battle,.so did our

amphibious doctrine grow, was studied, applied, corrected, tried

again, revised, and tried again., As a result, we have today what

we believe to be sound amphibious doctrine. However, in our World

War II landings, little use was made of our armored divisions as an

r ' } ' T r r

77~"O~&

assault force.. This same omission is apparent in the doctrine

published and available today. Doctrine concerning the use of

armor in an amphibious operation is limited to a few short

sentences. Doctrine pertaining to the use of an armored div-

ision in such a role is, for all practical purposes, non-

existent.

The armored division, a relatively new organization, has

a definite place in our army. In the early days of World War II

its capabilities and limitations were understood by only a few of

our leaders. As the war progressed and experience was gained,

knowledge and understanding of the armored division grew. How-

ever, there remains a general lack of understanding throughout

the army. This misunderstanding applies not only to the armored

divisions but also to armor in general,

This study is not concerned with the overall doctrine of

armor, the above only being mentioned to show the need that exists

for studies on the capabilities, limitations, and uses of the

armored division in various roles. Our mission is to determine

the practicability of the armored division as an assault landing

force.

Armor has a place in the American Army. The armored

division has a definite role to play in any operations we may

undertake in the foreseeable future. With this fact we preface

our study. From here then, let us move to the specialized field

of assault landings. What is the role of the armored division in

such an operation? Given such a mission, hvo should the present

day armored division go about accomplishing this task? These

2

are the questions we shall attempt to answer,

Scope

This study is designed to look into one role in which

an armored division might be employed - that of an assault land-

ing force. We shall here attempt to formulate broad doctrine

which would apply to an armored division given such a role.

First we shall go. into the history of World War II and look at

the few examples where an armored division was employed in an

assault landing. With these few historical examples as a

springboard, we shall project ourselves into the future., Using

the current organization of the armored division as a basis,,we

will determine the practicability of such a mission for the div-

ision and the methods for conducting such a landing, showing:

1. The factors that would determine the employment

of the armored division in such a role;

2, special training required;

3, amphibious vehicles and vehicular equipment;

4. shipping requirements;

5. organization for the landing; and our recoormmenda-

tions concerning the concept of employment.

This is our scope. It will be as was stated above, broad

doctrine - an overall look at the requirements for and practica-

bility of the empl6yment of an armored division as an assault

landing force,

Problems and Limitations of the Study

In undertaking this study, we enter upon a virgin field.

The only document directly concerned with the subject, other than

3

historical examples, that came to light during our research was

sixteen volumes of loading tables for an armored division, These

tables were prepared for the army at Camp Calvin B. Matthews,

California, by the Marine Corps in February 1945.1 The tables are

based both on World *War II armored division organization, and the

capabilities and capacities of World War II landing craft. They

have, therefore, limited application as far as this study is con-

cerned.

Further research brought out that, during World War II,

an armored division as such, never made an assault landing. To

be sure, major elements of armored divisions took part in two

amphibious operations, and separate tank battalions took part in

many landings, but the complete armored divisions was never used.

One other difficulty must be mentioned. Both vehicles

and landing craft for use in future wars are still in the research

and development stage. Many new developments are highly classified.

These two factors make it impossible to determine exactly what

equipment will be available in future amphibious operations. With-

out this definite information, many of the details involved in a

landing cannot be exactly determined. Generalities may be stated.

Assumptiors may be made, but much of the information so necessary

to a division in an assault landing cannot be exactly determined,

Many of the statements that follow in subsequent chapters,

because of the lack of historic example, past research, and know-

ledge of future equipment. Are entirely the opinidn of the

committee. Whe have attemped, wherever possible, to support

conclusions ~iith documentaytion, Where it has not been possible,

we have attempted to draw conclusions which could be supported

by available facts, doctrine, or logical thought.

Definition of Terms

The terms listed below are used quite frequently in

this study. Most of them are military. Even among the military,

however, there is often a difference of opinion as to their exact

meaning. In addition, many have special meanings when used in

connection with an amphibious operation. Therefore, in order to

clarify their meaning as used in this study, we are defining them

below:

1. Amphibious Operation - "A landing made from ships

or craft to achieve an objective on land...The forces involved

depend primarily upon waterborne means for transport to the

objective area, for initial tactical and logistical support, and

for special techniques and equipment used in debarking."2

2. Assault Landing Force - A unit making the initial

landings on a hostile shore.

3. Waves - The order in which troops making an assault

landing move from either one shore to the next or from the ship

to the shore.

4, H-hour - The time at which the first wave reaches

the hostile shore.

5. D-day - The day the assault troops are to land

on the hostile shore.

6. Landing Craft - "A craft which is especially de-

signed for beaching, unloading or loading, and retracting from

the beach. The term generally is applied to non-ocean-going

vessels of less than 200-foot length designed for landing

operations." 3

7. ROT - Regimental Combat Team. Usually consists

of an infantry regiment plus supporting artillery and engineers.

Miscellaneous service troops may be attached.

8, Combat Loading - "The loading of assault troop

units with their essential combat equipment, vehicles, and

supplies in the same vessel, and in a manner permitting imme-

diate and rapid debarkation in a desired priority for the land-

ing attack."4

9. Organizational Loading - "Troops with their equip-

ment and supplies embarked on the same ship but without regard

to the prerequisites of a tactical debarkation."5

10. -Convoy Loading - "The loading of troops, equipment,

and supplies on vessels in the same convoy, but not necessarily

on the same ship."6

1.. Shore to Shore - "The bulk of the landing force

with certain supplies and equipment is transported in landing

ships....from a shore base directly to a landing beach without

transehipmon ' 7"

12. Ship to Shore - "A transshipment of troops, equip-

ment, and supplies from seagoing vessels to smaller landing craft

and the subsequent movement to the landing beach."8

13. Demonstration - "Amphibious demonstrations are

made for the purpose of confusing the enemy as to the location

6

of the main landing. 't 9

14. Raid - "...an operation,......, involving the

temporary seizure of a limited objective, or a swift penetration

of hostile territory to seure information, confuse the enemy or

destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawel up-

on completion of the assigned mission. "l0

15. Occupation- "...a limited operation to seize and

secure a land area for use as an air, naval, or logistical base

to support further operations, or to deny use of the area to the

enemy, 11

16, Invasion - "...a large scale operation to seize

and secure a beachhead from which to launch and support a major

land offensive .... 12

17. LVT - Landing vehicle tracked, An amphibious

personnel or cargo carrier,

18. LVT(A) - Landing vehicle tracked (armored). An

amphibious tank,

Methods of Research

In undertaking this study, our first effort was to deter-

mine our scope. Shortly after beginning the study we attempted

to set it down. As research progressed, the scope, of necessity,

was revised. Many factors, originally thought necessary to be

included, have been dropped. Conversely, factors not originally

considered have been included,

Another factor that 'came under consideration was how deep

we should go into each phase of the subject, After a few weeks,

7

we realized that many factors under consideration could con-

ceivably, in themselves, be the subject of long research studies.

We deceided, therefore, not to cover each phase of the landing

operation in great detail.

During the first four months of the project, all members

of the committee worked as individuals securing as much background

material as possible, Toward the end of the fourth month, a com-

mittee meeting was held in which the chapters to comprise the

study were outlined. At this point, each member of the committee

became a specialist. Each was assigned a particular chapter or

chapters which became his specific project. This step was neces-

sitated because of the broad field of the subject. It was felt

that a combined effort on each chapter would produce too much

diversion of effort. Furthermore, it would allow no one individ-

ual sufficient time to dig as deeply as time would permit into any

particular phase.

This then was our method of research - first, we determined

a scope; second, we outlined the study; third, each member of the

committee assumed responsibility for the preparations of one or two

chapters.

Outline of Study

Following this brief explanation of our study and the

problems involved, the next chapter will be devoted to a discus-

sion of armored participation in several World T ar II landings.

Subsequent chapters will consider the following as they affect

this studys a brief review of amphibious operation doctrine;

8

current armored division organization; vehicular developments

since World War II that affect the armored division shipping

requirements; training; and conclusions and recommendations.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

Combat Loading of Armored Division (Loading

16 volumes), prepared by US Marine Corps (Camp Calvin

21 February 45).

2 FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington:

3FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington;

4FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington:

5FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Nashington:

6FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington:

7FM 100-5, Department of the Army (Washingtor

8FM 100-5, Department of the Army (ashingtor

9FM 17-34, Department of the Army (Washington

10FLl 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington:

12FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington:

12 FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington:

Tables -

B. Matthews,

1951),

1951),

1951),

1951),

1951),

1949),

1941),

1950),

1951),

1951),

1951),

1.

329.

322.

332

324.

, 233,

> 233,

p 71.

4.

4.

3.

_. ^13 _ _ ~_

L:

1:

CHAPTER 2

ASSAULT LANDINGS - WORLD WAR II

We shall now briefly turn back the pages of history to

look at several World War II landings. The past war involved

many.amphibious operations. However, in none was an intact

armored division employed as the assault landing force. Armor

was employed in almost all landings. In two major operations -

TORCH (Invasion of North Africa) and HUSKY (Invasion of Sicily)

major elements of armored divisions were employed. Separate

tank battalions were employed in many landings. Today, these

separate tank battalions are organic to the Infantry Division,

Our study, however, is concerned with the armored division,

So, the lessons for us, are few, Nevertheless, our study would

not be complete, if we did not at least briefly look into some

World War II landings.

Although specific lessons concerning the armored division

are few, many are the lessons concerning armor. It would appear

then, that if we took these lessons concerning armor, put them

together, and looked at the result, we would have a clear pattern

for an armored division. This, at the best, is a half truth.

The armored division is more than just a collection of tanks.

True, the division is built around the tank - everything in the

division is there with one mission - to get the tanks on the

objective. The entire division is geared to this. In the infan-

try division, everything is designed to assist the doughboy in

seizing the objective. For this reason, the sum total of the

10

experiences of separate tank battalions operating with infantry

divisions in assault landings will not add up to complete

armored division doctrine for the same type of operation. The

basic doctrine for and the techniques of employing the armor

in the two divisions is greatly different.

Our review will be short. Each of the four landings we

will discuss - North Africa - Sicily - Normandy . Okinawa -

are subjects for complete studies, Accounts of the last two have

already been published by the Historical Section, Department of

the Army, in lengthy volumes. Three years was spent in the prepa-

ration of "Cross Channel Attack" by Dr. G.A. Harrison, 1 Many other

accounts of all four landings have also been published. Here, we

shall touch each briefly to show the part played by armor, and in

particular, where applicable, the armored division,

Since we are covering these four landings briefly, we shall

make no comment on the manner in which the armor was employed.

Both praise and criticism will be left to more lengthy studies.

Here, we will state facts - the plans and what actually happened.

The critical analysis we leave to others.

The reader has probably wondered why we chose to discuss

only four landings, and why, after choosing but four landings,

we selected the four covered here. To answer the first quostion -

four landings were chosen because time, space, and the purpose

of the study did not permit more. In answer to the second question,

the four landings selected were chosen because (1) both the North

African and Sicilian landings represent the only occasion when

major elements of an armored division have been employed in

an assault landing; and (2) the Normandy and Okinawa landings

represent two of the largest assault operations in two major

theaters during World War II- We could have picked many others,

in addition to or instead of,V tho four we have chosen. But,

within the time available and the scope of our study, these four

appeared to offer the most:

Invasion of North Africa

General: On 8 November 42, the Allies took their first

major step forward, since the fall of Dunkirk in 1940, toward

the defeat of Germany." On that day, landings in North Africa

(Operation TORCH) were initiated. Months of planning had gone

into the operation."

During the spring and early summer of 1942, there was

much discussion of possible courses of action at the highest Allied

levels. 2 The main issue concerned whether we should put all effort

into plans for an invasion of the continent of Europe in 1943 or,

to keep Soviet Russia in the war, we should undertake a major

operation in 19424, On the evening of 30 July 1942, the President

tr4

informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff 'that he wanted to do TORCH..

The next day the information was cabled to General Eisenhower, then

in London,5 He was to take temporary comeand until a final deci-

sion was made on a permanent commander. 6 '

The final TORCH plan involved three major Task Forces.

The Western Task Force, under the command of Major General George

S. Patton was to sail directly 'Ifrom the United States to capture

Casablanca, This force included five Regimental Combat Teams,

one armored combat command and one armored combat team. The

shipping required for transport consisted of 12 combat loaders,

ten auxiliary combat leaders, six cargo ships, and one sea train. 7

The Center Task Force, under the command of Major General

L, R. Fredendall, sailed from the United Kingdom and had the mis-

sion of seizing Oran. This force consisted of three Regimental

Combat Teams (all from the lst Infantry Division), one combat

command from the lst Armored Division, and the 1st Ranger Bat -

talion. The shipping required to transport the force consisted

of thirteen infantry landing ships, seven personnel ships, three

tank landing ships, one gun landing ship, and twenty-three motor

transport landing ships. 7

The Eastern Task Force, under the command of Major General

Charles W. Ryder, Commanding General 34th U. S, Infantry Division,

sailed from the United Kingdom, and had the mission of seizing

Algiers. Once a firm foothold was established, command of this

force was to pass to Lieutenant General Kenneth A. N., Anderson,

Comnunding General 1st British Army. 8

In this study, we will concern ourselves primarily with

the armor of the Western and Center Task Forces, Before going

into the details concerning these two landings, one significant

detail must be brought out. This point involves around the

political background of the landing. It must be remembered that

in all cases, the enemy who would oppose our landings would be

French. The French, allies of the British until their collapse

in the summer of 1940, c~trolled all of that portion of North

Africa in which our landings were to take place. Most French

Officers were torn between their traditional hatred of the

German and their loyalty to their governmamt, regardless of

what form that government took.. The pre-invasion political

intrigue is a subject in itself,. Hovever, no study on this

invasion would be complete without pointing out that the Allied

leaders felt, that, in all likelihood, little or no resistance

to the landings would be met. This very fact made it possible

"to accept certain calculated risks which in other circumstances

would have been unwarranted. The success of the assault phase

makes it apparent that the risks taken were justifield." 9

Center Task Force, The Center Task Force, consisting

of elements of the 12th Air Force s t Infantry Division (/),

CCB, 1st Armored Division, plus attached and supporting service

troops, was ordered to attack at 080100 November 42 to seize

Oran and adjacent airfields. The plan of attack was to land

on three beaches from east to west (Arzew Bay, Les Andalouses,

and Mersa Bou Zedjar) to capture the objective by converging

attacks from the Northeast, West, and South. (Chart No I) Two

RCTts of the 1st Division made the initial assault at Arzew

Bay. Their mission - to secure a beachhead for CCB, protect

the left (West) flank of the Center Task Force, and to capture

Oran. The assault at Les Andalouses was made by the 26th RCT,

1st Infantry Division. The assault at Les Andalouses was made

by the 26th RCT, 1st Infantry Division. The assault at Mersa

4

F .

$

§ 2{

:- ;

Bou Zedjar was made by elements of CCB.10 This landing shall

be studied more in detail later,.

In addition to these main landings, elements of the Task

Force were ordered to sail on coast guard cutters directly into

Oran harbor in hopes for a rapid seizure of the city l l This

force was doomed to failure and suffered by large the greater

casualties of any force during the landing.

CCB, 1st Armored Division. For this landing, CCB was

divided into two columns. The East column was under the command

of Major General (then Brigadier General) Oliver, Commanding

General CCB, and was to land at Arzew Bay after the beach had

been secured by the 1st Infantry Division. The West Column,

Green Force, under the command of Brigadier General (then

Colonel) Robinett, CO, 13th Armored Regiment, was to make the

assault landings at Mersa Bou Zedjar (X-Ray beach).1 0

Let us now turn our attention to each of these columns:

1. Task Force Red (East Column) (See Appendix I for

troop list): Task Force Red was ordered to land at Arzew Bay

(Zebra Red Beach) after the beachhead had been secured by

elements of the 1st Infantry Division. In addition, the column

had several missions which are of interest. They were:

a, dispatch a Provisional Battalion ("RedFlying Column") to seize and secureTafaraoui airfield

b. seize and secure La Senia airfield

c, :seize and secure Oggaz airfield; and

d, assist the 1st Infantry Division in the

capture of Oran by attacks from the South.

1.

All in all, CCB, in Field Order #1 dated 11 October 1942, gave

the Red Column eleven specific missions they were to accomplish.

The "Flying Column" was under the command of Colonel

(then Lieutenant Colonel) Waters and consisted of the following

troops.: 1st Battalion 1st Armored Regiment (-); Company E, 6th

Armored Infantry Regiment; one platoon, Company B, 701st TD

Battalion; one .platoon, Company B, 16th Armored Engineers; and

an attached reconnaissance section. The general plan called

for the column to land as soon as the beach was secured, assemble

in the vicinity of St. Leu, and then, as soon as assembled, move

out to seize Tafaraoui, In addition to seizing Tafaraoui, the

column also had the mission of covering the assembly area of the

remainder of Task Force Red. Once Tafaraoui was secured, the

"Flying Column was to be prepared to move on La Senia airport

and 0ran. 1 2

Prior to the invasion, CCB had been located in the United

Kingdom. On or about 1 October 42, in preparation for embarkation,

elements of the combat command began assembling at various ports

throughout England. The "Flying Column" was combat loaded on

two "Maricabo" boats. Prior to loading, all vehicles of the

Flying Column were waterproofed for a landing in at least 32 feet

of w- ter. 13

At 0051 on 8 November 42, land operations commenced on

Zebra Beach. The landing was unopposed, and at 0221 hours the

beach was reported clear.14 Shortly thereafter, the "Flying

Column" began unloading opposite St Leu (near Arzew),1 3

The first unit to strike out inland was the Reconnaissance

Company (- 1 .Platoon). 13th Armored Regiment. This unit departed

the beach area at 0820,14,and by 0840 had cleared CR 106, three

miles southeast of St Cloud. 1 5 Here they remained throughout the

day protecting the left flank of. the troops at Tafaraoui,16

The "Flying Column" was not much longer in getting started.

The column departed from Tafaraoui at 0835, and, around 1100, after

encountering only ight scattered resistance, was in position to

assault the airport.14 Company B, 1st Armored Regiment (lst

Platoon, Company E, .6th Armored Infantry Regiment Attached) a-s:saulted

from the East. Company A, 1st Armored Regiment assaulted from

the South. Company E, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (-L Platoon)

was ordered to establish roadblocks to the North and Northeast

for the dual purpose of preventing reinforcements from Oran reach-

ing the airport and also preventing the escape of the airport

garrison. 1 7 At 1112 the attack was launched and by 1215, the

airport and 300 prisoners were in the hands of the "Flying Column"14

Meanwhile, Company E, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (-1 Platoon),

on road block duty, had captured, intact, an ammunition train and

guards enroute to Tafaraoui from Oran. 1 8 The road blocks es-

tablished by the company received ineffective artillery fire and

aerial bombardment during the day. 1 9 Tafaraoui was also bombed

by French planes from La Senia, 1 4

Immediately after securing the airport, the "Flying

Columns began to reorganize for a continuation of the attack

toward La Senia. However, the bombing and strafing attacks, the

18

necessity for the guarding of prisoners of war and captured

material, the necessity for the destroying of seceral artillery

batteries, and reports of troops coming up fran the South pre-

vented an assault on La Senia from being launched that day. 1 3

Shortly after daylight on 9 November 1942, the column moved out

for La Senia - but that is another story.

Meanwhile, the remainder of Red Task Force, CCB, spent

the day getting ashore and reorganizing. About mid-morning the

Command Post of CCB was established in the Post Office of St Leu. 1 5

The 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment :(4Company E with

the "Flying Column") completed their unloading at 1130 and were

immediately ordered to move to and occupy the high ground three-

quarters of a mile East of St Leu. Here they remained for the

rest of the day, protecting the beachhead, without enemy contact. 20

2. Task Force Green (West Column - For Troop List,

see Annex II): Task Force Green, under Brigidier General (then

Colonel ) Robinett's command, was ordered to attack the beaches

at Mersa Bou Zedjar (X-ray beach) at 080100 Nov 1942 to seize

and secure the airport at Lourmel. Thereafter, to assist the

Red Force to capture the airfields at Tafaraoui and La Senia,

and to assist in the capture of Aran as directed by The command-

ing General, CCB. 2 1

Colonel Robinett gave the assault mission to the 1st

Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (-Company B and detach-

ments). A "Green Flying Colun , was also organized . This

force, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Todd (killed

in Tunisia on 28 December 1942) consisted of the 1st Battalion,

13 Armored Regiment (-Companies A,. B, and a detachment of Head-

quarters Company), Company B, 6th.Armored Infantry Regiment

(-2 platoons), 2nd Platoon, Company.C, 701st TD Battalion, and

the 1st Platoon (Reinf), Company A, 16th Armored Engineer Battal-

21ion, 2

The assault force was ordered to assault the beaches at

080100 November 1942 with one company on X-ray Green beach and one

company on X-ray White beach.. As soon as the beach was secured,

plans called for the "Flying Column" to land, and, as soon as

assembled, to move out toward Lourmel to secure the airport and

facilities there,. Upon seizure of the the Lourmel airport, the

column was to reorganize and be prepared to advance on Tafaraoui

or La Senia airfields.2 1

Landing operations against Mersa Bou Zedjar started on

7 November 1942 at 2347 hours, There was no opposition any-

where on X-ray beach and at 0346, the beachhead was reported

clear.22 At 0400, Lieutenant Colonel Kern, CO, 1st Battalion,

6th Armored Infantry Regiment radioed the Task F:orce Command .Post

his entire unit was ashore and was proceeding to their final

objectives. 2 3 These objectives were soon secured, and the

Battalion (-Company B) spent an uneventful day securing the

beachhead.2 4

Meanwhile, the remainder, the Task Force began to unload.

The first unit to land, was a platoon from the Reconnaissance

Company, 13th Armored Regiment. On the beach, soft sand was

20.

encountered which slowed down the unloading considerably.

Nevertheless, the "Flying Column" managed to get ashore and

at 0900 hours moved out for Lourmel,2 2

Meanwhile, the Reconnaissance Platoon of the Reconnaiss-

ance Company, 13th Armored Regiment had 'proceeded the'"Fly-+

ing Column" toward Lourmel. This unit met the first resistance

to the landing near Lourmel. However, it was very light, and by

0903 had been overcome. The "Flying Column" occupied Lourmel

without incident at 1125.22

Orders went out almost immediately for the "Flying Column"

to continue the attack to seize La Senia. So, shortly after noon

on 8 November 1942, the column moved out.2 2

The first resistance, an enemy roadblock, was encountered

one mile west of Bou Telis at .1408. This roadblock was destroyed

by 1443, but. two friendly tanks were lost in the engagement.2 2

An enemy roadblock, one machine gun, and one emplaced

75 mm gun were destroyed at 1517 near Brediah.2 2 However, another

vehicle was lost to the column during this attack - a half track-

and the column by-passed Brediah to the South and continued on

their mission to La Senia. La Senia was not to be reached that

day horWver, and the column bivouced for the night in Sabkra,2 5

Summarys. :In- thi.s short review.:t- fthei a.t.ion.t ;,Q.CB: lt Armored

Division, during the TORCH Operation, we have seen haov one major

element of an armored division was given several missions to

accomplish during the assault landing phase. One element of the

combat command landed after the beach had been secured and,

21

after landing, advanced rapidly to seize an objective deep

inland. At that.same time, another element of the combat com-

manad was making its own assault landing, and, after securing

a beachhead, dispatched a mobile Task Force deep inland to seize

an important objective. True, the landings were unopposed, and

only on rare occasions will it be possible to land so easily. Re-

gardless of this fact, the operation does point out several poss-

ible missions for an armored division in an assault landing.

Western Task Force, The Western Task Force, under the

command of Major General G. S. Patton, Jr, sailed from the United

States in October 1942. Their mission - to invade French Morocco

and seize the principal port and city of Casablanca. This in-

vasion involved the longest pre-landing sea voyage in the history

of warfare to that time. In addition, it was necessary for the

convoy to travel through submarine infested waters, Even so, not

one ship of the convoy was lost during the voyage.

The plans called for landings to be made in three places;

(a) at Fedala, thirteen miles northeast of Casablanca; the objec-

tive here was to initiate operations for the capture of Casablanca

from the East: (b) at Safi, 130 miles to the southeast of

Casablanca; the immediate objective of this landing was to land

armor and to prevent the French Troops at Marrakech from re-

inforcing Casablanca; and (c) approximately eighty miles north-

east of Casablanca; here the objective was to seize the Port

Lyautey airfields and to protect the northern flank of the Task

Force.2 6

This study will primarily concern itself with the land-

ings at Safi, for it was here that the greatest amount of armor

was involved.

Safi. Safi, 150 miles South of Casablanca, was assaulted

by Task Force Xray (Blackstone) under the command of Major General

E, N Harmon, Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division. General

Harmon was given the following missions: (a) to secure Safi and

the airport East of the town; (b) to insure the unloading of the

armored units aboard the Sea Train LAKEHURST; (c) to secure

crossings over the Oued Oum Er Rebia River in order to insure

participation of his force in the capture of Casablanca; and (d)

to prevent the garrision at Marrakech from reinforcing Casablanca.2 7

To accomplish the mission, the following troops were put

under General Harmon's command: (a) an infantry landing;.team con-

sisting of the 47th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division and

the 2nd Battalion, 540th Engineers; (b) an armored battalion

landing team consisting of a tank battalion, an armored infantry

battalion (both from the 2nd armored division), and two platoons

of AAA; and (c) the 'Sea Train LAKEHURST carrying a tank battalion

from the 67th Armored Regiment, a detachment from the 56th Med-

ical Battalion and a platoon from Company "B", 443rd AAA Battalion.2 7

This force comprised the bulk of the armor in the Western

Task Force. It was given to General Harmon since the overall plan

envisoned his force moving the 150 miles up the coast to Casablanca

and attacking that city from the rear,2 7 Although a brilliant

attempt was made to accomplish .this mission, rapid conclusion of

an armistice with the French made this plan, in the and,, unnecessary.

23

The Safi garrison, 450 effectives, received an invasion

alert at 0320 on the morning of 8 November 1942, Then, about

0400, under the cover of darkness, the destroyer BERNADOU, carry-

ing Company K, 47th Infantry, entered Safi Bay. At 0428, it was

fired on from the shore by a French 75 battery followed by mach-

ine gun and rifle fire., The destroyer IMERVINE, covering the

BERNADOU, countered this fire and within six minutes, all enemy

fire was silenced. No further opposition from the 75 battery

or the machine guns at the harbor mouth was encountered. Hbw-

ever, at 0430 the BERNADOU ran aground necessitating debarking K

Company over the side. This was done, and that part of the port

(Phosphate dock) was seized without opposition. At 0500, the' de-

stroyer COLE tied up at the Phosphate Dock. L Company, 47th

Regiment, on board, disembarked, relieved K Company of guarding

the dock after which K Company moved to the South of Safi where

they established a roadblock. 2 8

The main assault landings began at 0530 when the light

tanks attached to the 1st Battalion, 47th Regiment landed in the

main harbor area on Green Beach and the 1st Battalion landed on

Blue Beach, about 2000 yards to the North. Immediately after land-

ing the 1st Battalion began to move South toward Safi. At dawn,

just North of the town, the column received machine gun and rifle

fire from French in position on the high ground just East of the

road. This was the initial baptism of fire for these troops, and

after deployinig, they bogged down. However, Colonel Randle, the

regimental commander, took personal charge of the battalion, led

an attack against' the position, and the resistance was quickly

28overcome.2

The only other resistance of note during the day centered

around the French barracks in'Safi. A combination of tanks and

infantry soon eradicated this resistance and the beachhead was

seized by 1000. The final D day objective - a 10,000 yard beach-

head - was secured by 1600 hours. 2 8

The Sea Train LAKEHURST tied up at the Phosphate Dock

at 1400 hours, and within twenty-four hours, all the tanks on

board had been unloaded. 2 8

Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion, 47th Regiment with one

platoon of light tanks attached had made an unopposed landing on

Yellow Beach, eight miles south of Safi, Here, the surf condi-

tions were bad and not until 1400 hours was the entire team on

shore. By night fall, they had moved north without oppositon

and were occupying the south portion of the 10,000 yard beach-

head, An armored team was sent twelve miles east along the road

to Marrakech to cover any threat that might develop during the

night from French troops stationed there. This force occupied its

positions without incident, 2 8

The next day, General Harmon proceeded North toward Casa-

blanca with a large armored force. By skillful maneuver, he had

deceived the French as to his intentions and was well on his way

to Casablanca when the armistice was signed.

The landing at Safi, although against only light opposi-

tion, illustrates another mission for which an armored division

25

THE PLAN OF ATTACK

.- . INITIAL OBJECTIVES

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might be used as an assault landing force - to land on a

lightly held beach several miles from the main landing, and

after landing, to move parallel to the coast and attack the

enemy defending the main beachhead from the rear,

Port Lvautey and Fedalah(See Maps 2 and 3). At the

same time the Safi operations were taking place, hndings

were being made at both Port Lyautey and Fedalah. Both were

Primarily infantry landings, Within both Task Forces there

were armored battalion landing teams. Both of these landings

ran into some difficulties, but in the end were successful.

For our purpose, they have little application and will not

be studied,

Conclusion. In concluding the TORCH operation, it

seems pertinent to quote firom the after action recommendations

submitted by the G3, Center Task Force:

... Armored Units. In all future planning it isbelieved that the use of Armored Units should be stressed.The coordinated use of Infantry and Tanks permits maximumexploitation of surprise or early success. Also, the psy-chological effect on the enemy caused by the early appear-ance of tanks cannot be overemphasized. It is futtherbelieved that the inclusion of tanks where practicable willminimize casualties and reduce the time required to reachthe objective. Special types assault craft to transportlarge numbers of tanks, AA guns, artillery, and othertehicles must be made available,2 9 ...

Sicilian Invasion

Introduction (Se Map 4). On 10 July 1943. Allied

Forces invaded the island of Sicily - Operation HUSKY. The

2nd U.S. Armored Division was one of major United States units

employed. Prior to the landing, the division received special

amphibious training at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center

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(FATIC) in North Africa, During this training period, practice

landings were conducted, loading techniques of LCI's, LSTts and

LCT's were studied and vehicles and equipment were waterproofed

and prepared for shipment. In order to acquaint the tank

gunners with the peculiarities of firing from LST, actual gunnery

practice was conducted from the LST's during the practice land-

ings. 3 0

The greatest difficulty encountered throughout this

training period was in unloading the LSTts. This was brought

about by the flat beach gradient of the Mediterranean shore

and the deeper draft of the LST. Both FATIC and naval personnel

attempted to solve this problem, and, although much training

time was lost while this difficulty was under study, a complete-

ly satifsactory solution was never found. 3 1

Final plans for the la nding calle d for the division to

be split into two separate forces. CCA was attached to the 3rd

Infantry Division - JOSS Force - and placed under the command of

Lieutenant General (then Major General) L. K. Truscote. The

division, less CCA but with the 18th RCT attached was to be the

army floating reserve.32

CCA, 2nd Armored Division (See Appendix III for Task

Organization). In addition to CCA -commanded by Major General

(then Brigadier General) Maurice Rose. The JOSS Force consisted

of the 3rd Infantry Division, one ranger battalio, ':idsppeqt-

ing troops. 3 3 The missions of this force were to land in the

LICATA area, capture and secure the port and airfield by dark

of D day, extend the beachhead, and protect the left flank of

30

the operation against interference from the northwest. On its

right flanks it was to maintain contact with II Corps, 3 4

Prior to the embarkation; special floating ramps were

procured to expedite the unloading .of the LST s6 Beside this

difficulty with the beach gradients insufficient troop space

further complicated the loading. This necessitated the separa-

tion of the armored infantry units from their personnel carriers: 3 5

One other technique employed during the embarkation phase

was that of split loading battalion and separate company head-

quarters. Although this increased the loading problem, it was

felt necessary in order that an entire headquarters would not

be lost with the sinking of one ship, 3 6 This split loading paid

off, for on the morning of 11 July 1943 (D / 1), two folke-Wulfe

109ts bombed the harbor at Licata. Two LST's were sunk, one of

which was carrying one half of Headquarters Company, CCA. Al-

though person. el casualties were light, vehicular casualties

were high - 40% loss in Headquarters Company, CCA. 3 7

During the forty-eight hours prior to D day, the Western

Mediterranean experienced one of the worst storms in recent years.

The entire invasion was nearly disrupted and serious damage was

done to the special floating ramps so necessary to the successful

unloading of the vessels. 3 6

At 100245 July 1943, the infantry of the 3rd Division and

the 3rd Ranger Battalion assault landed on the coast of Sicily,

Fc the landing, the 3rd Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment was

detached from CCA and attached to the assaulting infantry..

31

Shortly after daybreak, three companies from the battalion were

debarked and deployed on: the beach assisting the infantry in

mopping up beach resistance.3 8

Elements of the 2nd Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry

Regiment, led the debarkation of the main body of CCA. Shortly

after getting ashore, twelve enemy soldiers were captured near

Licata by Company G of the Battalion. 3 8

The combat command continued to debark throughout the

rest of the day and night. At midnight, General Rose received

orders to attack at 0630 on the morning of 11 June 1943 to secure

Nardo and Canacat$i. By daybreak, two-thirds of the combat

command had debrked and at 0630, the advanced guard passed through

the leading elements of the 3rd Infantry Division. The remaining

one-third of the combat command was ordered to close up on the

main body in company sized groups immediately after debarking.38

2nd Armored Division (-CCA / 18th RCT) The 2nd Armored

Division - KOOL Force - was under the command of Iajor General

Hugh Gaffey. This force ws the floating reserve of 7th Army

and was ordered "to be prepared to land in support of any of

n 32the assaults.-

At 1520, on D day, KOOL Force received orders to land on

Dime Beach just West of Gela,3 9 H hour here had been at 0245

hours 'The command echelon went ashore at. 1700 and made arrange-

ments for assembly areas. 4 0 and at .1900, the 18th RCT and the

1st Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment began to debark.

These units were completely unloaded prior to daylight.

The first tanks to debark were two platoons of Company

I, 67th Armored Regiment which were unloaded at 0200 on the

mornihg of 11 July 1943. However, because of high surf and

congestion on the beach, it was decided not to unload any more

armored vehicles during the hours of darkness, 4 2

Until about noon, 11 July 1943, only four American tanks

were available for combat and in position .to fire on the entire

beachhead. During the early morning, Major General White(then

Colonel), CCB commander, had located these tanks. He ordered

them to take up positions from which they could c over the CCB

command post and the troops in the assembly area. 4 2

The unloading continued all day on 11 June 1943 and was

completed by early morning of 12 June 1943, 4 3

Concerning this landing phase, General White has said

the following:

... A number of tanks were out of actions for a consider-period of time after getting ashore because of two factors:

(a) Somervelt mats (chickens were laid to assistwheel vehicles through deep sand) and

(b) Deep sand.The Somervelt mats became entangled in the tracks

and could only be removed by cutting with large nippers.In avoiding the Somervelt mats successive vehicles movingup the steep sandy hill near the beach bogged down in thesand and generally threw one or both tracks,.., 4 4

While the main body of the division was busily engaged

in debarkation, the 1st Infantry Division, one of the assault

divisions, was receiving a serious counterattack. About 1000

hours, on the morning of 11 June 1943, the division was attacked

by approximately 30-40 German tanks. The enemy tanks succeeded

in breaking through 1st Division position and debouching on the

plain Northeast of Gela 4 4 Here they were engaged and success-

fully repulsed by a- platoon of four tanks from Company I, 67th

Armored Regiment assisted by some 1st Division Field Artillery

and Infantry cannon; This action lasted about two hours when

the enemy withdrew leaving behind fourteen knocked out tanks.

Most of these fourteen tanks were destroyed by the four American

tanks while the losses to our own tankers consisted of four men

wounded,. The defeat of this enemy counterattack was one of the

turning points of the Sicilian campaign. 4 5 The bulk of the 1st

Division anti-tank guns had been lost when the LST on which they

were being transported was hit by a bomb and burned on D day,

If the four tanks had not been present, serious. consequences

would have come of this attack. 4 6

Conclusion. The landings in Sicily point out several

lessons of particular importance to thb armored division. These

are:

1. It is essential that tanks be debarked early in

order to support an amphibious operation. 4 6

.2. Vehicles should be compactly and completely loaded

so that crews can sustain themselves until supply echelons can

become operations.47

3. Unloading ramps are necessary on each tank carrying

ship in order to permit quick unloading of units such as platoons. 8

4, Split loading of units, especially headquarters units

should be practiced to the maximum extert consistent with shipping. 4 9

Normandy 6 June 1944

Introduction. The long awaited assault against Fortress

Etrope began in the early morning of 6 June 1944. Allied Forces,

under the supreme command of General Eisenhower, launched their

initial assault to secure a beachhead on the continent of Eurrsp

Many volumes have and will be written on this operation, the

greatest invasion in all history . For our purpose, we shall

take but a few short paragraphs to see what armor was used and

how it was employed during the initial assault,

No armored divisions were initially employed in the

operation. The first armored division to arrive in France was

the 2nd Armored Division, which began landing on 9 June - three

days after D day,5 0

The use of tanks in the assault was a subject of pro-

longed discussion and experimentation. The final decision was

to empl.oyt'anks as close support artillery - not as an armored

force, Two of the major characteristics of armor - mobility

and shock action - were disregarded. In addition, final plans

did not call for the tanks to make any exploitation off beaches.

This decision was brought about y the feeling that only an

armored gun would have any change for survival on the beach. In

addition, it was felt, that tank cannon would be quite effective

for firing into pillbox embrasures. The planners visualized

the tanks not leaving the beach during threassault phase, but,

rather remaining in and firing from positions hull deep in the

water.51

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With this concept in mind then; a tank battalion was

attached to each of the assault regiments. These tanks were

to lead the attack. They were to get ashore in one of two ways.

Some would be carried a the beach on LCT's and land with the

first infantry waves. Others were to be launched at sea and

"swim" into shore. The "swimmingu tanks were expected to reach

the beach prior to the arrival of the infantry. - 1

These amphibious tanks were commonly called "DD" Tanks.

Later chapters will explain them in more detail.

For the landings, the separate tank battalions were

placed in two armored groups - the 3rd and 6th. These groups

were in turn attached to the ls t Infantry Division (3rd

Armored Group) for the landing on OMAHA Beach and the 4th Infantry

Division (6th Armored Group) for the UTAH Beach landings. The

3rd Armored group consisted of the 741st, 743rd, and 745th Tank

Battalions while the 70th and 746th Tank Battalions made up the

6th Armored Group.52

In turn, the battalions were organized fort he assault

into two echelons - assault and support. The assault echelon

consisted of three medium tank companies. Two were equipped

with the DD flotation device. The third was not so equipped,

but did have a Tank Dozer Platoon attached. The support echelon

consisted of a minimum of battalion command personnel plus a

maintenance section and supply vehicles. It was not planned

for the residue of the battalions to land until about 15 June. 52

During the period 1 March 1944 to 16 May 1944, the 3rd

Armored Group conducted intensive trailing in the employment of

38

LANDING DIAGRAM, OMAHA BEACH(SECTOR OF 1I6th RCT)

EAS GREEN - ; D-----__ RED-_ i- DOG WHITE 000 GREEN

_____Co C (CD) 743 Th Sn Co B (DII) 743 to 90

Co A 743 Th Bn Co A 743 Tk an

Co E ! i6 lot C o F 116 of o0101p lSn

H!O 46 £r Cl 04 ooC Demolitipon 146 Engr CT 146 Enyr CT CControl Soat

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31

of DD Tanks. Then, on 16 May, loading began. On this date,

two companies each from the 70th, 741st, and 743rd Tank

Battalions loaded on LST's - four DD Tanks to a ship. On

30 May, the 3rd Armored Group Headquarters and the remaining

battalions began loading. This loading was completed by 2

June. 5 2 Everyone was ready for the big show.

6 June 1944 (See Map 5). Originally the landings were

scheduled for 5 June, but channel storms necessitated calling

off the operation for that day. By now, the entire wold is

familiar with General Eisenhower's famous decision to go ahead

on 6 June even though the weather was not promising. But this

bad weather, and, as a consequence, rough sea was to play havoc

with our DD Tanks.

In the 4th Division sector, on UTAH Beach, where initial

resistance was unexpectedly light, thirty-two DD Tanks were sup-

posed to la nd in the first wave. However, they landed fifteen

minutes late because of the loss of a control vessel which

struck a mine. But the opposition was so light that there was

no immediate need for them. All but four of these thirty-two

tanks got ashore safely - the four being lost when the LST

carrying them hit a mine.53

On OMAH Beach, the picture was quite different. Here

the 1st Division had an extremely difficult time, Throughout

most of D day, the German LXXIV Corps believed they had stopped

this assault on the beach, 5 4

At H-50, two DD companies of the 741st Tank Battalion

40 -

OPERATIONS OVERLAYPORT LYAUTEY OPERATIONS

+72

RESERVE

II

SREIN

H 3 60 (+DE TS)LURE

OVERLAYOPERATION MAP

1

50,000TO ACCOMPANY FO NR 1

BY COMMAND OF BRIG GEN L K TRUSCOTT

DON E CARLSTONCOLONEL,CAVALRYCHIEF OF STAFF

OFFICIAL:

DAN H BONDMAJ, INFASST C/S G3

TO THIS LINE

MY NORTH

THIS LINE

H -- 2:15

BROWN 2SEIZE HOLDBRIOGE

SOURCE: US LANDINGS IN FRENCHMOROCCO, THE ARMOREDFORCE SCHOOL, APRIL 1943

/'-Sd

NAVAL GUNFIRE

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--- 33

RED CC"B"

SOURCE: FO 1, HQS CCB, 1ST AD, 11 OCT 42ON MF 307, DOCUMENTS SECTION, TAS

26RCT

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were launched 6000 yards off shore. Almost immediately they

began to have difficulty with the sea. Only five of the thirty-

two launched succeeded in reaching shoreS 5 5

On the extreme right flank of the beach, sixteen tanks

were scheduled to land ahead of the infantry (Company "A",, 116th

Infnatry). Only eight survived enemy artillery and reached shore.

These eight were brough in on LST's, it having been decided that

the sea was to rough to launch them. 5 6

On the left flank of the 116th Regiment t s sector, the

situation was not so bad, Here, two companies of tanks were

landed by LST's ahead of the infantry. These companies did

not suffer any losses. 5 6

Meanwhile, in the 16th Regiment's sector (on the left

flank of 116th Regiment), the troops were experiencing what

was probably the most difficult of the landings. Almost all

the DD tanks were swamped and lost. One tank company was

beached from LSTts and almost immediately lost five tanks. As

a result, only one-third of the planned armor support was

initially available to the 16th Infantry. 5 6

Thus, we have seen how on the UTAH Beach, where initially

tanks were not needed because of light resistance, they were

available. On the other hand, on OMAHA Beach where resistance

was stiff, most of the tanks were lost to the surf. In con-

cluding its report on the D-day landings, the 1st Army Armored

Section made the following pertinent statement:

... The use of DD Tanks in their present state of

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Oktnow 1 April. 1945

General. The operation against Okinawa - the first

Japanese "home" island to be invaded58- was one of the last

large battles of World War II. It is the only amphibious

landing from the Pacific Theater of Operations that we shall

study.

A brief statement as to why this battle is being in-

cluded is in order. As will be shown later, initial enemy

resistance was almost non-existant. However, the operation

was one of the largest undertaken in the Pacific Theater during

World War II.

,.,For the assault echelon alone, about 183,000 troopsand 747,000 measurement tons of cargo were loaded intoover 430 assault transports and landing ships at 11different ports from Seattle to Leyte, a distance of 6,000miles59 ..

Not just from the viewpoint of size alone is this battle

important. This plan was-in many respects the culmination of

experience of all previous operations in the Pacific wara "60

There were no armored divisions in the Pacific Theater during

World War II, There were, however, many tank and amphibious

tank battalions. Many experiences of these units are applicable

to this study. Here we have tim~e for but one landing. Thus,

since our time limit was restricted, we attempted to choose

that landing that would offer the most. Okinawa, because

of the factors outlined above appeared to offer what we need-

ed.

Background.. Operation ICEBERG, the plan for the

invasion of Okinawa, marked the beginning of the 'zd for

Japan, United States troops were at last to fight on land

considered by the Japanese to be part of their "home" islands..

On 3 October 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed

that a portion of the Ryukyu Islands be seized.61 Okinawa is

the most important island in this group. Not only that, it

is within the outer ring of Japanese defenses. Once Okinawa

was under our control, Japan had but two choices: (1) surren-

62der or (2) prepare for an all out defense of their home islands.

The landings were to be conducted by the Tenth U.S.

Army under the command of Liutenance General S. B. Buckner,

Jr. For this operation, Tenth Army consisted of two najor

commands, in addition to air and naval forces - XXIV Corps

under command of Major General J. R. Hedge andIII Amphibious

Corps (Marine) under command of Major General R. S. Geiger.

Attached to the XXIV Corps were two army divisions - the 7th

and 96th. Attached to the III Amphibious Corps (Marine) were

two marine divisions - the 1st and 6th. In addition, under

Army control were the 2nd Marine Division, 27th Army Division

and the 77th Army Division. 6 3

Within the XXIV Corps, coordination of the Tank

Battalions, Amphibious Tractor Battalions, and Amphibious

,Tank Battalions was accomplished through the 20th Armored

Group. 6 4 It is with this group that we are primarily con-

cerned.

FEDALA- BEACHHEAD(DALEPANOATCK

MANSOURI A

SOURCE: fUS LANDINGS IN FRENCH MOROCCO, THE ARMORED FORCE SCHOOL, APRIL 1943

OF ATTACK)(DETAILED PLA N

In January 1945, XXIV1, Corps was engaged in the final

phase of the Leyte operation when orders were received attach-

ing them to 10th Army for the Okinawa campaign. At this time,

20th Armored Group was a part of XXIV Corps. 6 4 Immediately

after receiving the corps order for Okinawa, the Commanding

Officer, 20th Armored Group, directed the amphibious units

within the group to hold show down inspections; to prepare

and submit loading plans; to requisition all shortages; and

to maintain command liaison with the divisions to which-they

would be attached in the assault. These units would come under

operational control of the divisions when they (the amphibious

units) crossed the beach to load. The Tank Battalions of the

group remained with the divisions with whon they had operated

during the Leyte Campaign. 6 5

During this preparation, group headquarters acted primar-

ily in an advisory capacity. Issue of major items of supply to

the Tank Battalions was controlled by the group through

coordination with XXIV Corps special staff. nijor items for the

amphibious units were issued by the Griup S4. In addition, the

Group Commander acted as Armored Advisor to the Commanding

General XXIV Corps.65

Time for training and rehearsal was limited by the

time required for maintenance. The Group had learned from

their experience in the Leyte, Saipan, and Tinian Operations,

that amphibious vehicles, because of their specialized nature,

required more maintenance time to ready them for the assault

after the final rehearsal than any other ground units taking

part in the operation.6 6

Upon completion of the training period, all units of

the Group loaded under division control as the shipping became

available. 6 6 For the operation, the units were attached as

follows 67

7th Inf Div 96th Inf Div

536th Amph Tractor Bn 788th Amph Tractor Bn

718th Amph Tractor Bn 728th Amph Tractor Bn

776th Amph Tank Bn 780th Amph Tank Bn

711th Tank Bn 763rd Tank Battalion

77th Division

773rd Amph Tractor Bn

715th Amph Tractor Bn

708th Amph Tank Bn

706th Tank Battalion

Landings -1 April 1945. The final plan to attack

called for XXIV Corps and III Amphibious Corps to land with

two divisions abreast - a total of four divisions in the

assault. In addition, a demonstration was to be made by

the 2nd Marine Division on the Southeastern side of the island.

(See Chart 7)68 Units were loaded and the assaults made as

shown in Chart 8,69

B hour was set for 0830. The fire support force of

10 battleships, 9 cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 177 gunboats

began their pre H hour bombardment at 0530,. Altogether this

49

was the largest pre-invasion concentration of naval gunfire

in history - a total of 44,825 rounds of five inch or larger,

33,000 rockets, and 22,500 mortar shells were fired in this

preparation. Then at 0745, carrier planes covered the beach

with napalm.70

Meanwhile, the troops and tanks to lead the assault

were readying themselves. Amphibian tanks comprised the first

wave and at 0800 they were flagged across the line of departure,

4000 yards from the beach. Behind them, five to seven waves

of assault troops in amphibian tractors followed.70

The way in was led by gunboats firing rocket, mortars

and 40 mm guns. This concentration was so great that it

averaged 25 rounds in each 100 yards square. Upon approaching

the reef, these gunboats turned aside and the amphibious tanks

and tractors continued to the beach. 7 1

During the entire move the the beach, the only sign of

the enemy was an occasional mortar or artillery shell"... the.

long line of invasion craft advanced as though on a large

scale maneuver s. ... 71

At 0830, the first waves began to touch down- almost

all tn tin. ,7 1 The entire landing was unbelieveably easy. There

had been but little artillery fire, no enemy on the beach, and

only a few land mines. By nightfall, the beachhead was 1 00

yards long and, in places, 5000 yards deep.72 It wasntt until

5 April 1945 that stiff enemy resistance was finally met. The

winning of the island was still a long way off. But a very

deviiite foothold had been secured.

Conclusion

Thus we have seen, in four landings, different methods

for the use of armor in an amphibious operation. First, to

secure an objective deep inland; second, to advance parallel

to the coast and attack enemy opposing another landing from

the rear; third, as the army reserve; fourth, as armored

artillery; and fifth, leading an attack as amphibious tanks.

Armor has a place in an amphibious operation. We

will now determine the role of the Armored Division in an

assault Landing.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER ?

iArmy - Navy - Air Force Journal (Washington: 16 Feb1952),p 749.

Invasion of North Africa

2Gordon A. Harrision, Cross Channel Attack (Washington:Historical Section, Department of the Army, 1951)(hereinafterreferred to as Harrison), p 11

Harrison, p 11

4Harrison,,p. 31

5Harrison,,p 31

6Harrison, p 327 General of the Army D,D. Eisenhower, Commander in

Chief's Dispatch, North Africa Campaign, 1942-1V43, p 6.. . .= -- ,, -- -- . ,-

8 General of the Army DD. Eisenhower, Crusade InEurope (New York:1948), p 83

9Major General J. C, haydon, DSO,, OBE, ImpressionsGained from the Assault Phase of the Operations in North Africabetween 6 November and 23 November 1942, p 1

10F #1, Headquarters CCB, 1st Armored Division, 11October 1942,

llA Short History of the 3rd Battalion, 6th ArmoredInfantry Regiment (Author and date of publication unknown), P2

1F #1, (Headquarters Red Force, CCB, and 251, 111800October 1942

1 31st Bn, 1st Armored Regiment, After action Report(Submitted 31 December 1942)

1 4 Operations Report, TF Red, CCB, 1st Armored Division,

p 1.

151 S-3 Journal, 13th Armored Regiment, 8 November 1942,p 1

6 Opns Report, CCB, 1st Armored Division, as of 082400November 1942.

1 7 A Brief History of the 2nd Battalion, 6th ArmoredInfantry Regiment from October 11, 1942 to 1ay 12, 1943,author unknown, ;p2 (hereinafter referred to as 2nd Bn,6th AIR.)

12nd Bn, 6th AIR, p 2

199 2nd Bn, 6th AIR, p 2

2 0 2nd Bn, 6th AIR, p 3

21FO #1, Green Force, CCB, 1st Armored Division

2 2 0perations Report, TF Green, 2347 hours, 7 November1942 to 1625 hours, 10 November 42.

2 30perations Joura, 13th Armored Regiment, 0400 hours,8 November 19 4 2 , p 1

242 perations Report, 1st Battalion, 6th Armored InfantryRegiment, 8 %ovember 1942.

2 5 Operations Journal, Green Force "Flying Column"

2 General of the Army DD, Eisenhower, Commanderin Chief 's Dispatch, North Africa Campaign, 1942-1943, p 12.

2 7 U.S. Landings in Morocco, Tactics Department, TheArmored School (Fort Knox: 1943) p8

28U.S. Landings in Morocco, Tactics Department, TheArmored School (Fort Knox,: 1943), pages 12,13, and 14.

Compilation of Reports, on Lessons of operation TORCH(APO 512: Allied Force Headquarters, 16 January 1943), p 10

303The 2nd Armored Division in the Sicilian Campaign,Committee -f4, Advanced Class, The Armored School, 1949-50(Fort Knox: May 1950), (hereinafter referred to as Committee

#4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50), p 10

3 1 Committee #4, Advanced Class, 49-50, p 11

323 Report of Operations, 7th US Army in the SicilianCampaign, by the Staff, 7th US Army (APO #758: September,1943) (Hereinafter referred to as Opns Report, 7th Army),p a6

333 Committee #4, Advanced

3 4 Committee #4 ,Advanced

3 5 Committee #4, Advanced

3 6 Committee #4,

373Committee i4,

3 8Committee #4,

3 9 0pns Report,

4 0Committee 4,

4 1Committee #4,

42Committee #-4,4 3Committee 4,

4 4Committee 4

454Committee #4,

4 6Committee #,

4 7Committee 74,

Advanced

Advanced

Advanced

7th Army,

Advanced

Advance d

Advanced

Advanced

Advanced

Advance d

Advanced

Advanced

Class, 49-50,

Class, 49-50,

Class, 49-50,

Class, 49-50,

Class, 49-50,

Class, 49-50,

page 64

Class, 49-50,

Class, 49-50,

Class, 49-50,

Class, 49-50,

Class, 49-50,

Class, 49-50,

Class, 49-50,

Class, 49-50,

33

3

34

35

37

36

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

71

4 8 Cormmittee #4, Advanced Class, 49-50, p 72

49Committee #i4 Advanced Class, 49-50, p 73

5 0Harrision, p 3 1

5 1Hrrrision, p 192

5 2 1st US Army Report of Operations 20 Oct 13 to 1

August 1944, by Staff 1st US Army, p 195 (annex 9 to report).

53 Harrision, p 304

5 4 Harrison, P 305

5 5Harrison, p 309

5 6Harrision, p 315

575 1st US Army, Report of Operations, 20 Oct 43 to1 August 1944, by Staff, 1st US Army, p 201 (Annex 9 to report).

5 8Appleman, Burns,Gugelor and Stevens, The War in thePacific, OkinJaJa: The Last Battle, (Washington: HistoricalDivision, DA, 1948) (hereinafter referred to as Appleman, Burns,Gugeler, and,. tevenst. p 69

59Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 36

60Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 17

° 6 1 Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 4

6 2 Applemnan, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 1

6363 Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 25

Major Daniel E. Westervelt, Armored Group in anAmphibious Operation (Fort Knox: May 1948) (hereinafter ref-erred to as Westervelt), p 1

6 festervelt, p 2

6 6Westervelt, p 4

6 7Westervelt, p 6

6 8Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 30

6 9Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, Chart IV,opposite p 43,

70Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 69

54

7 1Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 70

72 Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 72

Charts And Pictures

Page 36 - Omaha Beachhead (6 June - 13 June 1944) (Washington:Historical Division, War Department, 20 September 1945),

(hereinafter referred to as Omaha Beachhead), p 31

Page 37 - Utah Beach to Cherbour (6 June - 27 June 1944),(Washington Historical Division, DA, 1 October 1947),

(hereinafter referred to as Utah Beach to Cherbourg),p 52

Page 41 - Omaha Beachhead, p 109

Page 42 -Utah Beach to Cherbourg, p 44

Page 47 - Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, Chart IV oppositepage 43.

CHAPTER 3

DOCTRINE AND ORGANIZATION

The tactics and techniques employed in amphibious oper-

ations in World War II varied considerabley as experience was

gained and lessons learned. The strength and composition of

landing forces changed with each operation but one thing became

apparent, the tank was a necessary part of any landing force.

... The position of tanks within the assault force depends

upon...and the nature of the enemy defenses, and beach obstacles.In any case, tanks must either closely follow or be followed closely

by infantry....

...When the terrain is suitable for tank operations and

the beaches are not heavily defended by antitank weapons and anti

tank obstacles, tanks may be in the leading waves....

... When the terrain for tank operations is poor or restricted

or when the beach is heavily defended by antitank weapons and

obstacles, tanks are used in later waves...3

This chapter is concerned with two questions - sihoe the

tank is a necessary part of the landing force in amphibious operations,

why was the armored division not used as an assault landing force

during World War II, and second- is the armored division now suit-

able for such a role? Before considering the armored division

organization, however, the general nature and characteristics of

amphibious operations must be fully appreciated.

The execution of amphibious operations is divided into the

following. general phases:

Planning. Detailed planning is required for the successful

execution of a landing. Planning begins months in advance of the

expected D-Day in order to coordinate the forces required

for the operation. The time required for this phase depends

upon the size of the operation, For example, the planning staff

for OVERLORD (invasion of France) was established under Lieutenant

General Frederick E, Morgan in April 1943 - 14 months before

the actual invasion, Even before the end of 1941 British joint

planners had drawn up an invasion plan for the European cont-

inent called ROUNDUP, This plan bore little. resemblence to the

final OVERLORD Plan but is mentioned here to show the degree

of planning required for an operation of this nature,

Concentrat.ion and special planning, Forces selected

for the operation are concentrated and specialized training is

accomplished to insure the organization of an integrated task

force. Specialized training includes rehearsals under conditions

as near as possible like those to be encountered in the actual

operation.

Embarkation. Troops, equipment, supplies, and vessels

are concentrated at the places of embarkation. The landing force

is combat loaded in assault craft.

Voyage. The landing force is moved from points of

embarkation to the landing area in preparation for the assault.

Landing, Naval and Air units are 'positioned to support

the landing force and begin preparation of the beach area by

naval gunfire and air bombardment. The landing force assaults

the beach and secures beachhead lines,

Consolidation, Reorganization of the assault forces

is accomplished and beachhead lines are consolidated. Major

supply points are established ashore and adequate supplies

are unloaded.

The detailed planning for landing operations is required

because of the special problems created by unfavorable conditions

inherent in such operations. Some of these conditions are as

follows:

1. Tactics and techniques of landing operations are

largely dictated by the availability of suitable ships and land-

ing craft. The strength, composition, equipment, and supplies

employed in an operation must be fitted to the available shipping

space.

2. Organic supporting weapons of the landing force

function only to a limited degree in the early stages of an

operation and fire support must usually be furnished by the navy

and aviation. The use of naval gunfire and close air support

increased the problems of coordination, communications, command,

and preinvasion training since most army units are unfamiliar

with naval fire procedures.

3. Special organization of army units is required to

provide appropriate forces for the landing and to facilitate the

debarkation of intact combat units. Combat units uast be so

organized that they are self sufficient in fire power until

supporting weapons are landed. Automatic weapons and other fires

must be used in lieu of normal artillery support.

4. Suitable beaches and terrain in the objective area

are of vital concern, Favorable beaches are those that permit

the beaching of landing craft and landing ships close to the

58

shoreline to permit rapid debarkation, and advance inland of

troops and equipment without excessive interference from

navigational hazards. Suitable exit routes from the beach in-

land are required to facilitate rapid dispersion of vehicles and

supplies.

5. Enemy strength and dispositions in the objective

area affect the composition of the assaulting forces. Special

equipment may be required to remove obstacles and clear areas

for landing craft. . Heavily defended shores may have pillboxes

constructed on the beach with flat trajectory weapons emplaced

to fire on assaulting troops while still afloat. The presence

of enemy mechanized forces in the objective area requires that

tanks be landed in the early waves to counter the threat and

protect the beachhead.

Many other problems can and do arise in amphibious

operations.. Assault troops may be landed on the wrong beaches.,

Ships may be forced by enemy action to leave the transport area

after landing the assault troops but before supplies and equip-

ment can be. landed., Underwater conditions and strong defenses may

deny certain beaches. Unfavorable tides and weather may prevent

landings. All these factors affect the planning and successful

execution of landing operations, however, certain characteristics

of arrhibi:vs operations tend to favor the attacker and should

be considered here,

Amphibious ope rations are aggressive by nature. The

choice of time and place lies with the attacking force and

require the defender to dissipate his forces in order to defend

the entire coastline or leave certain area lightly defended and

relatively unprotected.

Tactical surprise may be obtained by the attacker. The

enemy can often be deceived as to the true location of the main

landing by the use of demonstrations and feints. Strategic

surprise normally is not possible because of the necessity for

a buildup of supplies and troop concentrations.

The mobility of floating reserves makes it possible for

the attacker to take advantage of success in an unexpected quarter

or to exploit any weakness discovered in the hostile defense.

The most outstanding characteristic of amphibious oper-

ations is shock at the point of contact. This shock is obtained

by the concentration of superior forces and striking in over-

whelming strength at one or more selected points in the hostile

defensive system. The initiative is with the attacker and allws

this concentration of force.

These are the general characteristics and conditions,

favorable and unfavorable, that must be considered in the planning

and execution of a landing operation. There are many details in

addition to the above that must be planned for but will not be

discussed here.

It has been pointed out in the preceeding chapter that

the armored division was not used in World War II as an assault

landing force. The discussion to follow will attempt to show

some reasons why,

ORGANIZATI ON

The armored division of World War II was the result of

six separate reorganizations occurring during the period July

1940-'September 1943.4 Actually, two different organizations were

employed during World War II but only one will be discussed, the

organization prescribed on 15 September 1943, since all but two

were organized under this Table of Organization.

As stated in the initial training directive, 6 August 1940,

the role of the armored division was to conduct highly mobile

offensive warfare through a self contained unit composed of the

requisite arms and services. 5 This statement was amplified in the

Armored Force Field Manual 17-10, which stated: "The role of the

armored force and its t components in the conduct of highly mobile

ground warfare is primarily offensive in character, by self-

sustained units of great power and mobility composed of specially

equipped troops of the required arms and services." By 15 January

1944, FM 17-100, The Armored Division stated the role of the

armored division as follows: "The armored division is organized

primarily to perform missions that require great mobility and fire

power."

The various reorganizations of the division followed four

continuous trends: a decrease in light tank strength, an increase

in the relative strength of the infantry elements of the division,

the elimination of needless command echelons, and the lightening

of the service elements.

Figure 1

lARMOPED DIVISION TO&E 17(Abstract) 15 Sept 1943

Entire division 10,937Div. Hq. 164Tank Battalions (3) 729Infantry Battalions (3) 1001CC Hq & Hq Co, (2) 184Div Trains, Hq & Hq Co, 103Reserve Comd Hq 8Field Arty (3 bns) 1623Car Recon Sq 935Engr Bn 693Med Bn 417Ord Bn 762Sig Co. 302MP Plt 91Div Hq Co 138Band 58Atch Medics 261Atch Chaplains 8

Figures taken from the Army Almanac, Wash D,C., 1950

A study of Figure 1 shois that even though the relative

strength of infantry in the division was improved over the former

organizations, the strength was entirely inadequate for most

operations. A total of three battalions of three rifle companies

could harldy be considered sufficient for a landing operation.

Another weakness oft he division was inadequate service

support. No quartermaster battalion was organic and special

measures were required for service support in normal operations.

A quartermaster truck company was attached to provide this

support in some divisions,

Division artillery consisted of three armored field

artillery battalions, light. No medium artillery was organic

to the division.

In addition to the weaknesses of the armored division,

a serious shortage of ships and landing craft existed throughout

the planning phase.

,*.The Allies did not have enough landing craft andother facilities to mount simultaneously both the cross-channeland the Mediterranean attacks in the strength we wanted 6 ,,,

Whether such a shortage will exist in future operations

is a matter of speculation. . The requirements for landing craft

were not known, at the start of World War II and craft were de-

signed and produced as the need became apparant. Much experience-

was gained at this time and some craft are now available. Research-

and development has continued to the present time as will be -seen-

in later chapters. There is little reason to believe that such-

a serious shortage should exist in future operations,--

These factors no doubt influenced the composition of

landing forces in World War II Certainly the shortage of land-

ing craft suitable for transporting armored vehicles was a

deciding factor in all these operations.:

What has been done since then to correct the weaknesses

of the armored division and is the division suitable for assault

landings? By June 1945 organizational changes were being solid-

ified by the War Department for a new type armored division based

on the concepts of our armored commanders,, It-was realized that

there was a definite pla ce in our armored organization for the

heavy type division to perform missions beyond the capabilities

of the light armored division.

In the new armored division, prescribed in October 1948,

combat effectiveness and service support were increased materially,

(See appendix IV). The armored infantry units were reorganized

to provide four rifle companies in each armored infantry battalioa

and an additional battalion was added to give a total of sixteen

rifle companies compared to nine in the former organization. A

quartermaster battalion was added to provide the much needed

service support to make the division logistically self sufficient

for limited operations. A medium artillery battalion was added

to provide the balance of artillery required for fire support,

Other units added are the heavy tank battalion and an antiaircraft

artillery battalion to bring the total strength of the division

to 15,973.

The division now possesses a balance of arms and services

required for the accomplishment of assigned missions and son

characteristics particularly desirable in a unit employed in

amphibious operations.

A high degree of flexibility is provided in the division

by the combat command-seperate battalion organization. The

seperate battalion is self sufficient administratively with organic

supply, maintenance, and administrative personnel. Battalions

and companies from the battalions may be assigned to the combat

commands for a particular mission -without interference with its

service support ar ability to operate independently. This

flexibility in the formation of combat teams is of particular

importance in landing operations because of the required special

organization for landing, Combat command staffs are accustomed

to having a variety of types of units under their control. The

integration of these units into a fighting team for maximum

efficiency is a daily problem.

One other point that cannot be overlooked. The infantry

and tank soldi rs of the division are trained from the beginning

to take their place as a part of the tank infantry team. Rarely

does the armored infantry battalion fight without attached tanks.

Conversely, the tank battalion rarely fights without attached

infantry. This practice of fighting as a part of a task force

rather than as battalions develops in the individual a ready

ability to fight in any type of organization,

The automatic weapons essential to the early stages of

an amphibious operation are present in the division. The fire

power of the division is tremendous. The following table shows

the number and types of weapons in the armored infantry battalion

compared to those of the standard infantry battalion,

Figure 2

COMPKRISON OF AUTOMILTIC TEAPONS

MG, Cal 30 MG, cal 30 MGG cal 50 BAR SMGlight heavy

Armd Inf. Bn 45 38 9 37 123

Inf Bn, Inf Div 13 4 8 45 0

. . .' . . . .. r - " -- . . . . " - ... . - T . . . . . . . .. . .. . ..

Figures taken from CS 2, The Armored School, Sept 1949 andReference Data Infantry Regiment, The Infantry School, May 1951,

The automatic weapons of attached tanks are added to the

figures above when combined into tank infantry teams,

The armored division operates with radio as the normal

means of communication. This flexible means is required for

effective control of a mobile unit. Adequate communications

equipment is present in the division. For example, the armored

infantry battalion is equipped with 202 radio sets of all types.

of which 169 are suitable for hand carry. Special communications to

control assault units, naval gunfire and air support is essential

in landing operations. The communications equipment of the armored

division meets this requirement.

The armored division is a completely mobile unit. Once

ashore, this mobility combined with the characteristic shock of

the landing would enable the division to quickly expand the beach-

head and capture the assigned objective.

The characteristics favoring the employment of the armored

division in landing operations have been pointed out. Ote problem

exists, however, that should be considered at this time. The

heavy equipment providing the mobility and armor protection presents

a problem when considered in connection with conditions existing in

World War II. A comparision of the total vehicles in the armored

division and the infantry division is given in Fig 3..

This comparis6n points up the fact that although the

armored division has fewer general purpose vehicles and trailers,

it has approximately 1000 more armored vehicles than the infantry

division;, This requirement for shipping space could be lowered

somewhat by the elimination of some nonessential administrative

66

vehicles when combat 'loading and in addition, armored infantry

could land and operate initially without armored personnel

carriers. This, however, would seriously restrict the mobility

of the unit ashore if carriers did not follow closely and the

effectiveness of the division would be neutralized to some

degree.

Figure 3

COPARISTON OF V TTICL'S BY TYPE

Unarmored Armored Trailers(All types) (All types)

InfantryDivision 2334 259 1514

ArmoredDivision 2165 1241* 1358

*Figures include 636 armored personnel carriers and allself propelled artillery.

Figures taken from Instructional Pamphlet CS 2, The Armored School,Sept 1949 and Reference Data Infantry Regiment, The Infantry School,May 1951.

C ONCLUSION

In this chapter an attempt has been made to point out

some of the factors that must be considered before a dedision

can be reqched to employ an armored division as an assault landing

force. Many other factors must be considered - effect of adverse

sea and weather, organization of the force for landing, organ-

ization of shore logistical elements, to name a few. These

considerations are inherent in any amphibious operation and not

special considerations affecting the armored division alone. The

characteristics and capabilities of the armored division of today

must be considered when planning amphibious operations of the

future.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

1 FM 31-5, (War Department, November 1944), p 150

2 :Ibid, p,151

3 FM 60-5, (Department of the Army, February 1951),p 227

4The Army Almanac, (US Government Printing Office, 1950)p 275.

5 Ibid

6Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, (Doubleday& Co, 1948), p 231.

CHAPTER 4

SPECIAL VEHICLE REUIREMENTS

The use of an armored division as an assault landing

force is govetned largely by the type and availability of the

necessary equipment to get the armored vehicles from transport

area over the last three to six thousand yards of water from

naval transports to the beach. In this chapter we will discuss

the various methods and materiel used in the past, that present-

ly available, and some possible future developments that will

get us through this particularly vulnerable stage of an assault

landing.

Equipment for the Assault

Beach landing of armored vehicles has been accomplished

in two ways; (1) transporting tanks to the beach on naval land-

ing craft, or ships and (2), by making the tanks capable of

floating and propelling themselves over this distance.

Craft and considerations involving their use will be

discussed in detail in the following chapter. HoNwever, to

understand the necessity for the development of amphibious

vehicles and related equipment we should remember some of the

advantages and disadvantages in the use of landing ships as a

method of getting armor on the beach. This method requires

less shipping space than when tanks are equipped to float and

allows speedier movement to the beach. The movement to the

beach is easier to control and almost unlimited time can be

spent in the transport area prior to the assault, On the other

69

hand use of our present landing Ships limits almost entirely

the employment of the tank guns during the assault, presents

a large target, and entails the loss of all tanks as well as

the landing Ship itself if sunk. In some instances it requires

a ship of the LSD type to carry the loaded landing Ship to the

assault area.

These and other considerations brought about the develop-

ment of two general types of amphibious equipment to get armor

ashore. Devices were built to make standard tanks float, and

for the primary purpose of amphibious operations, tanks capable

of "swimming" without special attachments were manufactured.

In discussing these vehicles and vehicular equipment we

should first realize what characteristos are desired and then

we will be better able to decide whether these requirements have

been met satisfactorily. Also we must keep in mind that our

purpose in this discussion is to arrive at the best method of

landing an armored division in an amphibious assault.

Starting from the beginning we first want to take up as

little shipping space as possible, We want ease of launching

from the transport, and a certain degree of safety in the water.

Sufficient speed to allow us to accompany assaulting infantry

is required. We must have enough endurance to allow for

necessary assembly in the transport area, movement to the beach,

and. normal operation after landing. Also the vehicle should

be maneuverable in the water. We must be able to fire the tank

gun during the assault. Upon reaching shore the vehicle must be

capable of immediate combat and should be able to discard in a

minimum of time any flotation equipment which hinders its land

operation. These requirements must in no way reduce the

amount of ammunition carried by the vehicle.

With these requirements in mind we will discuss in more

detail what equipment is available or could conceivably be made

available to meet them.

Duplex Drive Tank. One of the earliest developments for

floating standard type tanks was the Duplex Drive of DD tank.

Designed by the British and used in World War II, it consisted

of a medium tank with a collapsible canvas wall built around it

just above the tracks, Propellers were geared to the engine and

it was steered by two rudders. With the addition of waterproof-

ing the tank was able to float and propel itself through deep

water until the tracks contacted the ground. Upon reaching shore

the propellers were disengaged and the canvas wall was collapsed,

allowing the tank to operate normally.

About three times as many DD tanks can be carried in

one landing craft as those fitted with pontoons. The system

does not greatly restrict the mobility of the vehicle and it

enables a tank when so equipped to cross more than one water

obstacle. Preparation for swimming requires very little time62

The vehicles can be used only in comparatively quiet

water as there is danger of being swamped in heavy seas or by

the surf as the tracks make cn.tact with the beach, Due to the

height of the canvas float the main armament cannot be fired

71

tp

Y:

b

while the tanks is in the water. The canvas is also highly

vulnerable to underwater obstacles.

Rigid Flotation Devies. A more rugged type of

flotation device for the M4 medium tank, known as the T-6 was

employed experimentally by Marine and Army tank units during

the Okinawa landing.

...The T-6 consists essentially of six steel pontoons;one pontoon on each side of the tank, one on the bow, one onthe rear, with bow extension and rear extension pontoons whichhinge upward for more compact stowage prior to launching. Thesix pontoons are compartmented by sheet steel partitions intomany sub-compartments; Sub-compartments are filled withplastic foam-to further ensure buoyancy should the pontoons'bec one punctured.

T-6 floated tanks are seaworthy, having been success-fully tested in twelve foot waves. The floated tank isfortythree feet long and therefore provides a fairlystable gun platofrm, enabling a tank gunner employing thegyrostabilizer to deliver accurate fire during the beachapproach. Compared with LVT(A)ts (amphibious tanks), thefloated tank constitutes a more stable gun platform; thehigher velocity and greater accuracy of the stabilizedtank gun in comparision with the LVT(A) howitzer and thetank's heavier armor, are important advantages. Pontoonsare jettisonable form inside the tank on reaching thebeach. Pontoons are remountable and can be reused.

T-6 devices, as used on Okinawa, generally providedadequate flotation but needed further development to im-prove steering, to increase speed above the 42 knots ob-tained by the tank tracks revolving in the water, and toprovide a reverse...

Little modification has been made on this device. It

is now called the M-19 Flotation Device by the Army. Some of

the disadvantages are readily apparent in the specifications-

Its length is 47 feet 8 inches, width 11 feet, and heiaght 11

feet 8 inches (including exhaust and intake stack of waterproofL

Ing kit) when prepared for launching: The front and rear out-

boards can be folded upward for loading, reducing the length

to 33 feet 7 inches and increasing the height only two inches.

The weight of the flotation device is approximately 16 tons.

No improvement has been made in manner of propulsion and the

speed remains about five miles per hour in water.4

The same principle was employed in the development of

the TS swimming device for the M-26 Tank, This model could

probably be adapted very easily for use on the M-46 or M-47

tank.

To compensate for the weight of the M-26 tank it was

necessary to increase the length of the device to 65 feet and

the width to 14 feet. The weight of the device itself is 34,000

pounds. 5 Since this is the latest equipment built along this

line the following extracts from the development report gives

a good picture of its capabilities and limitations.

DESCRIPTION:....The Deive, T8 provides the means for floating the

Medium Tank, M26 as a self-propelled unit. It consists ofmetal floats in four jettisonable assemblies with propulsionfurnished by the vehicle tracks; steering is accomplishedwith two rudders....The rudders are manually operated by acrank handle in the driver's compartment which connect tothe rudders by chain and cable. The vehicle is equippedwith a standard fording kit...PURPOSE :

To provide flotation equipment which will permit theMedium Tank, N26 to negotiate, under its own power, deeprivers and expanses of ocean.HISTORY:

The first test of the equipment was made at APG(Aberdeen Proving Ground,) 25 April 1946,..(The sizeand weight of the device poses a problem in logistics.Assembly under field.caditions would be a major problem.It was recommended.. "No further development work shouldbe carreid on with floating devices of this type for theMedium Tank 1.26, or tther vehicles of equal or greaterweight except as an expedient 5..

The rear extension and the width of the device make

7>1

f T

+44

f3

launching from the landing Ships impossible. They can only

be launched from a ship of the LSD type which actually floats

the tank inside the ship allowing it to move out under its own

power.

The poor speed and maneuverability in water of tanks

equipped with this device might possibly be improved with the

installation of removable propellers geared to each rear track

idler. This would enable the driver to speed up or slow down

either propeller by use of the normal tank steering as is done

with all water craft having two propellers.

LVT!a and LVT (A)s

Amphibious tanks ar Landing Vehicle Tracked (Armored)

while not organic to the Armored Division, might be issued for

the initial assault and used until the standard tanks can come

ashore, or Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalions could be

attached for the assault phase. The initial assault is the

normal mission for units equipped with these vehicles.

LVT's have been used successfully in many amphibious

landings in the Pacific in World War II and as recently as the

inchon landing in Korea. These vehicles are all basically

the same with the exception that the LVT(A)l mounted a 37 mm

gun while the LVT(A) -4)s and 5s mount a 75 mm howitzer. The

4s and 5s are the only type in use by the Army at present. The

primary differences in the LVT(A)4 and the LVT(A)5 are the

addition of a gyrostabilizer and poweroperated turret on the

latter.

: 04 ~

d

V7

LVT(A)'s need no special preparation for swimming.

Their tracks are equipped with a double cup welded to each

section which gives better traction in the water, but speed

is still only about 5.7 mph. Being specifically designed for

amphibious operations it has poor cross country endurance,

particularly in regard to tracks. A high silhouette and thin

armor make it vulnerable to anti-tank fire, so after accompany-

ing the infantry to their first objective it is usually used

for artillery support. It is capable of carrying over two and

one-half tons of ammunition which is often in short supply in

the first stages of a landing.

Amphibious tractors of the LVT(4) type are cargo and

persornnel carriers and have the same suspension system and engine

as the amphibious tank, Their cargo compartment is open and the

rear door is a hinged ramp which allows the loading of such

equipment as the 4 ton truck or 105mm howitzer. They are rated

at 8000 pounds capacity but have been known to carry as much as

eight tons in still water. Such a load is, of course, hard on

the suspension system wTvhen operating on land.

Marine units are prosently equipped with LVT3 which

differs only in that it has two Cadillac engines mounted in

the side pontoons instead of the air--cooled engine behind the

drivers compartment as in the LV74. This results in some

reduction of the cargo compartment. 'Neither the radial engine

nor the two Cadillac engines give enough power for the weight

of the tanks and tractors and the loads they carry. 'The

Vehicles cannot be steered at low speeds in the water due to the

track propulsion. Also continual turning causes the brake bands

to heat up and become inoperative.

None of these vehicles have been manufactured since

World War II. Haoever, the Army has one regular battalion and

other Reserve and National Guard battalions consisting of two

companies of tanks and two companies of tractors each. They

are equipped with the LVT(A)4 and LVT(A)5 in the tank companies

and the LVT in the tractor companies.

A modification has been made on the LVT3 by way of a

removable armored cover for the cargo compartment making it

a good armored personnel carrier. It was used as such by the

Marines in the Inchon Landing and for two crossings of the Han

River. This could well be an answer to the problem of armored

personnel carriers not being able to accompany the armored

infantry in the initial assault waves of the armored division,

Deep Fording Kits. As mentioned above all tanks using

either the DD or rigid type of swimming device as well as

those brought ashore by landing craft require the use of deep

fording kits. Such kits are available for all armored vehicles

presently in use and are composed generally of exhaust and in-

take stacks, waterproofing compound and tape. Installation

required around four hours by a crew with proper supervision.

On some vehicles it is necessary to weld adapter plates to the

tank for installation of stacks.5

Deep fording kits allow a tank to be submerged to the

80

top of the turret if so desired4 Those portions of the kit

which inhibit normal operation of the vehicle can be quickly

and easily removed.

Wheeled Vehicles. Wheeled vehicles .needed on an

amphibious assault present no particular problem as they will

necessarily be brought ashore in landing craft. Most recently

developed wheeled vehicles are water-proofed when built and

some are capable of operation while completely submerged.5

If older type vehicles are used, water-proofing kits are avail-

able to make them capable of moving under their own power through

the water between the landing craft ramp and the beach.

Uhderwater Tanks. An article In "Mechanic Illustrated"

envisions an underwater tank mounting a recoilless rifle6 and

may not be as visionary as it sounds according to an unconfirmed

report of an ex-German officer published in "Armor Magazine".

This officer states he was trained in undersea tanks for the

planned invasion of England in World War 11.7

An operation using such undersea tanks would require

extensive reconnaissance of the ocean floor and the beaches.

Also many beaches which might otherwise make good landing areas

would have to be ruled out because of very deep water or be-

cause of the existence of a shelf, or other underwater obstacle.

This would limit even further the normally limited use of

amphibious tanks. If, however, standard tanks could be equipped

economically and with sufficient margin of safety for this type

operation, it would solve some of our problems. There would

be no need to fire the main armament between ship and shore,

shore batteries would have little or no effect during the

most hazardous part of the operation, and certainly there would

be a degree of surprise inherent.

Some problems which would probably arise in such a

vehicle would be those of exhaust and air intake or a special

engine-burning fuel which supplies its own oxygen. Other prob-

lems which would arise are air for the crew, underwater navi-

gation, traction - on soft ocean floor, escape mechanism for crew,

and lowering the vehicle from the ship to the ocean floor. How-

ever, more thought could well be given this subject.

Planned Developments. There is no indication. of any

development or research at present in the U.S. Army toward solv-

ing the problem of ship to shore movement of armored vehicles

under their own power. Report of the Combined Conference on Armor

for 1949 states in effect that for the present the British will

proceed with their development of DD type swimming devices and

the United States will continue to develop the rigid type like

the T8 for all tanks of the light and medium classes, 2 The

Report of Cqmbined Conference on Armor for 1951 states essen- .

tially the same thing with no indication of any progress being

made in the intervening two years. The present plans of the

United States, as far as is known, call for no research toward

the design of an improved amphibious tank,

Conclusions, Due to the great weight of our present

medium tank it is obvious that any rigid device to float them

will necessarily be very large. It is not desirable to modify

the tank at the factory for propellers because of increased

weight and cost, Non-rigid devices have not proved reliable

under fire or in rough water. The problems of speed, endurance;

maheuverability, as well as that of increased shipping space

requirements still remain in the use of the rigid type. They

would probably be very useful on a shore tp-shore operation,

river crossing, or in crossing reefs, but the facts indicate

that an entirely different method should be developed to take

tanks to the beach on a ship to shore assault..

The LVT(A) s while giving the best solution available

at present still la ck speed and maneuverability. They need a

more powerful gun, more armor, and a bigger engine, but this

would cause a corresponding increase in size and weight.

The best solution for the problem of transporting

Armor in an assault landing, we believe, is the further develop-

ment of a new tank landing craft which will eliminate many of

the disadvantages inherent in those presently available.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

1 Report of Operations, 1st U.S. Army, 20 Octcter 1943 to1 August 1944, a report prepared by the Armored Sction lst U.S.Army, P 194.

2 Report of Combined Conference on. Armor 17-24 March 1949

3 Amphibious Operations Empleyment of Tanks, Marine CorpsSchools, Quantico, Virginia, PHIB-18, pp 27, 28, 29.

4 Report of Subcommittee on Automotive Equipment to

Ordnance Technical Committees, 5 MJ 194h 6

Research Developme nt Manual, Combat Vehicles and

Wheeled Transport '.,Vhicle Components, ORDMX-D, Detroit

Arsenal, Centerline, Michigan-

6 "Undersea Tank" Armor, Photographs and Editorial Comment,

January February 1951, LX, p 39

7 Major Charles R. Cawthon, "Amphibious Tapk Experiment",Armor, LX, September October 1951, p 26.

CHAPTER 5

NAVAL REQUIREMENTS

Through the ages Armies have relied upon Navies to

move them from the continent to continent and'to maintain their

supply lines, However, World War II was the greatest period of

Development of the amphibious operation per se. The combined

arems concept of warfare was extended to include joint Army-

Navy command relationships, staff planning, and fire support.

To execute these amphibious operations specialized ships were

required. The necessity for invasion from the sea, beginning

in North Africa and Sicily and continuing through Normandy

against the German; from Guadalcanal almost tlo the main islands

of Japan in the Pacific brought about these developments. These

oraft all shallow draft, flat bottomed, and capable of unload-

in men and vehicles directly onto a beach, ranging in size from

seven foot rubber boats to ships of over 300 feet in length.

Since World War II, there have been many changes in

Army equipment. This is especially true of the Armored Division

where the weight of the medium tanks of its main striking force

have increased by approximately 15 tons. This exceeds or alters

the rated capacities of most of the World War I.I landing craft.

The latest Naval concept of the ship-to shore movement

is based upon dispersion and speed. This is dictate. by the

obvious atomic bomb target that the invasion fleet presents

To gain dispersion, consideration is being given to moving

A2b-AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS

ISe Id TroopCapacity Cargo Capacitv Landina Craft

Type ISymbol | Class Length Beam Draft Max |Cruising I Range Dlsp Off Enl ITons (Combat)l SqFt | CuFt I LCM 8 LCM S LCVP ( LCPL LCPR Cargo Booms NOTESAmphibious Force Flagship AGO Appalachian (4) 459 63 24' 116 kts 15 kts 31,089 @ 15 kts 7,431 105*1 500* ** - I - | - -- 2 | 4 2 4-10T *Varies depending on size of Naval Staff embarked.

Mt McKinley (8) 459 63 24' 16 kts 115 kts 31,089 @ 15 kts 7,234 105* 500*1 ** - - I - I - . 2 4 2 4-10T **Limited number of vehicles and essential equipment.Adirondack (3) 459 63 24' 16 kts 15 kts I31,089 @ 15 kts 6,884 105*1 500*1 ** - - - I - 2 | 4 2 4-10T

c ex WAGC (1) 244 36 16 kts 1,5321 | - ICargo Ship, Attack AKA Arcturus (18) 459 63 27' 17 kts 115 kts 1 1',086 @ 15 kts 6,456 12 160*1 1500 30,000 300,000 1 6 2 15 1 4-35T, 2-10T, 6-5T** *Includes using cots, only 54 regular bunks. *Arneb-AKA 56 has 1-60T boom.Transport, Attack APA President Jackson (1) 492 70 27' 18 kts 10,305 I 1500 500 I

| Crescent City (4) 491 66 26' 17 kts 8,4291 15001 500I( Arthur Middleton (3) 489 70 29' 18 kts 110,812 90 1200 500 21,000 221,000 | 4 - I 18 3 2

Bayfield (6) 492 70 26' 17 kts 15 kts li,630 @ 15 kts 8,100 94 1300 500 15,000 160,000 | 4 - 18 3 2 2-30T, 6-10TS Haskell (57) 455 62 24' 17 kts 115 kts 1,800 @ 15 kts 6,720 86 | 1475 500 13,000 110,000 I 2 - 22 1 1 I1-35T, 8-10T, 6-5T

Hi-Speed Transport APD Charles Lawrence (41) 306 37 13' 24 kts 115 kts i,00 @ 15 kts 1,400 12 151 | 40 900 5,250 - - 4 - I - 2-5T

Crosley (51) 306 37 13' 24 kts 15 kts i,100 @ 15 kts 1,400 12 151 40 900 5,150 - - 4 - - 2-5TEscort Vessel, Control IDEC DE 217 (1) 306 37 14' 24 kts 15kts 5,100 @ 15 kts 1,400 - - - - -- - I_Submarine Transport ASSP Perch (2) 1 312 27 18' 15 kts 13 kts*l 12,000 @ 13 kts*l 1,695 5 110 ] 30 200 1,200 ** I I I I - *Surface **1 LVT in hanger plus 8-LCR 10, 2-LCR 7, 1-4 man rubber boat-8 outboard

I I engines for LR 10.Submarine Cargo Vessel IASSA Barbero (1) 312 27 17' 15 kts 113 kts*l 12,000 @ 13 kts*l 1,525 - - 190 11,400 | **I I *Surface **2-LCR 7, 1-4 man rubber boat.

I I I I(Open well )I(w/Pearl Harbor Deck )I(w/2temp.decks)Landing Ship, Dock I LSD Ashland (8) 458 72 18' 1 15 kts 112 kts I 13,300 @ 12 kts 4,490 20 200 I I 5,6401 - - - 2 1 - 2-35T Typical 3-LSU (Combat Loaded)l(18 LCM (combat loaded )I( 92 LVT

S Casa Grande (3)1 458 72 18' 15 kts 12 kts 13,300 @ 12 kts 4,490 20 200 4b1 5,640* - - - 2 1 - 2-35T or or * orCabildo (9) 458 72 18' 15 kts 112 kts 13,300 @ 12 kts 4,547 20 200 450* 5,640*1 - - - 2 1 1 - 2-35T load characteristics 18-LCM (Combat Loaded)l( 23 LVT or 27 DUKW )]( 108 DUKW )

S Fort Marion (1) 458 72 18' 15 kts 12 kts 13,300 @ 12 kts 4,547 20 200 450* 5,640*1 - - - 2 1 - 2-35T or 41 LVT

SI I I I I I I I I *Cargo Capacity shown is that of 3 combat loaded LSU or 18 LCM.Landing Ship, Tank LST LST-1 (127) 328 50 11' 12 kts | 9 kts 21,000 @ 9 kts I 1,625 14 127 I 500* 13,000 110,000 - 3 1 - 1-3T crawler crane *Loading shown is that required to permit ships to beach. Amphibian vehicles may he carried

LST-1153 (2) I 382 54 13' 13 kts 9 kts 12,263 @ 9 kts I 2,324 17 180 500" 17,800 145,000 - I - 4 - I - 2-7%T in addition. Pontoon causeways, pontoon barges and LSU may be carried in addition but mustSI be launched prior to beaching.

Landing Ship, Medium LSM LSM-1 (159) 204 35 7' 13 kts 12 kts 4,00 @ 12 kts 520 6 51 165 2,900 20,500Landing Ship, Medium (Rocket) LSMR LSMR-188 (48) I 204 35 8' 13 kts 12 kts 3,000 @ 12 kts 840 - -Landing Ship, Vehicle LSV Catskill (2) 454 70 20' 20 kts | 5,177 800" * 9,740 82,750 | - - 14 - - 1-30T *44 DUKW-LVT cannot be carried.

SOsage (3) 458 60 20' 20 kts | 4,626 800 * 9,740 82,750 - - 14 - - 1-30T *21 LVT and 31 DUKW or 1800 troops w/o vehicles.Landing Ship, Flotilla Flagship I LSFF LSFF-367 (25) 159 24 6' 14 kts 12 kts 8,000 @ 12 kts 234 - --Landing Ship, Infantry, Large LSIL LSIL-351 (70) 159 24 6' 14 kts 12 kts 8,000 @ 12 kts 2091 91 200 75 ILanding Ship, Infantry, Mortar I LSIM ILSIL (1) 159 24 6' 14 kts 12 kts 8,000 @ 12 kts 233 - - -

Landing Ship, Support, Large LSSL LSSL-1 (98)1 158 24 6' 14 kts 12 kts 5,500 @ 12 kts 2501 - -- ILanding Ship, Utility LSU LSU-501 (125) 119 33 4' 8 kts 7 kts 1,200 @ 7 kts 158 - - 150 1,800ISubmarine Chaser (173') Control PCC IPCC-289 (7) 174 23 8' 20 kts 115 kts 315 - -II-

PCC-463 (11) 174 23 8' 20 kts 15 kts 315 -Escort, (180'), Control PCEC PCEC-873 (4) 185 33 9' 15 kts 12 kts 640

Chart No. 4-A-2b

| i

RD 7248(C)

directly to the beach with the possible elimination of the

rendezvous area (as referred to in FM 60-10). The assault

waves form in the transport area, possibly out of sight of

land and move directly to the beach past control vessels act-

ing as check points and lines of departure. Further dispersion

is obtained by increasing the size of the transport group

circels and distance between theme.

To obtain speed, control, and maneuverability, it is

envisioned that the Tank-Infantry team will be landed in the

assault by Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel, Landing Craft,

Mechanized, and under the most ideal conditions, by Landing

Ship, Utility and Landing Ships, Medium, The maximum speed

for each of these vessels is approximately 10 knots.

In discussing the shipping requirements for landing

an Armored Division in assault, we will deal with both present

standard and proposed landing craft. A discussion of each of

the landing craft considered usable in the assault phase of

the Armored Division landing followvs.

Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM-6) 2

This vessel was designed during World War II to land

one M-4 medium tank or 68,000 pounds of supplies. It is not

suitable for landing a modern medium tank of the M-46 or

47 type; it is capable, however, of landing any of the follow-

ing Armored Division loads :

1 Light Tank M-24

1 Loaded Half Track

4 Loaded iton Trucks

2 Loaded -ton Trucks with trailers.

Landing Craft, Mechanized (LSM-8) 3

The latest developments in tank landing craft are a

series of LCM-8's known as "H1", " and "U". The most radical

and the one showing the most promise is the LCM (8H). It is a scow-

bowed craft with a ramp; very similar in appearance to the LCMi-6 but

much larger. Its length over all is 90 feet with a beam of 21

feet. The LCM (8H) is capable of carrying and beaching a 70 ton

load at a speed of 10,7 knots. It can carry two TD-24 angle dozers

or two M-4A3E8 medium tanks, or one M-26 medium tank. These loads

have actually been carried in test. Two M-4A3E8 medium tanks are

considered "full load." The main feature of this vessel is that

it is provided with retractable caterpillar treads which enable

it to crawl over bars and land high up on the beach. Its speed

using these traction units is 65 feet per minute. The ramps of all

the "8" series of LCM's are fixed so that embarked tanks can fire

their main armament to the front and flanks. Although not proven

by test, it is expected that a Landing Ship Dock will carry seven

LCM (8H)Is.

The LCM (8W) and LCM (8V) are similar in that they are

capable of carrying a 70 ton load (one tank, embarked well

astern in the well deck to preserve'.tim) at a speed of 10 knots.

They differ in hull shape, one being V-shaped, the other W-

shaped, and do not have the traction mechanism.

V-'--J (9 . yL.J fT ~ \ - 00 IPOR'TABLtESTERN SEC/LWN- -I - ,/f)SN/PS SEC/ON I RO E DO AVIT

HArCH

LANDING SHIP? UTILITY

COCKPITP

77E RINGS ---

0' tO'

-- 186" SLINC SPACIA16

LANDING CR~AFT -MCHANIZED 6

WHEELHOUSE 2-20MM

WINCH

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ORE W

Their over all length is 70 feet compared with the H's 90

feet, giving a template loading figure of nine aboard an

LSD The Landing Ship, Dock at present seems to be the only

practical way of transporting these craft because of their size

and lifting weights (56 tons for the "V" and '"W" and 110,5 tons

for the "H",

Landing Craft, Mechanized are considered appropriate

for landing tanks on histile shores under fire. 'Current Navy

doctrine prefers the use of these craft rather than dealing with

the greater ocean going shipping problem incurred when handling

tanks fitted with "one way" flotation devices. 4 It is expected

that LCM-6 and LCM-8 will land the tanks and reconnaissance

units, fromn -Hour to H plus 60, and, of course, a certain

percentage of them can be used more than once, depending upon

losses.

Ship, Utility (LSU) 5

(Formerly known as LOT-5). A somewhat larger vessel

than the LCM, this vessel is capable of beaching a load of

150 tons, or three medium tanks. Because of its greater

vulnerability, it is expected that this vessel will be used

for landing the Armor of the floating re serve and supply

vehicles. Under the most ideal beach and surf conditions and

light to moderate resistance, it could be used for assault

waves. Typical loads for the LSU are

3 Medium Tanks M-46 or 47

9 Loaded 2 -ton Trucks

9 Loaded Half Tracks

This ship can also be loaded at sea from Landing Ship.,

Tank by lashing the LSU to the open ramp of the TST and open-

ing its stern gate. Thus, any vehicle aboard the LST can be

driven aboard the LSU and taken to the beach. This technique

would be useful in landing reserve tanks "on call." Its. ability

to be used in this fashion and as a lighter to unload transports

and cargo ships makes it most valuable in the supply build up

phase. It is normally carried long distances aboard LSD's or

in special launching racks on LST's.

LANDING SHIP, I DIUi (LSM) 6

Although similar in capacity and use to the LSU, the \

LSM is a larger vessel with accomodations for troops. It is

definitely a sea going vessel. Its speed is 13 knots; range

500 miles. It is capable of. carrying 165 tons of cargo or

three medium tanks; other typical loads would be

6 Motor Gun Carriage I, -37

9 Loaded 22-ton Trucks.

Many of these have been converted to support ships by the

addition of multiple rocket launching racks.

Landing Ship, Tank (LST) 7

The largest ocean going ship that is designed to

beach and land tanks over a bow ramp. Its enclosed tank

deck will hold 10 medium tanks or 500 tons for beaching

purposes. Total pay load is 1,900 tons, but the draft with

this load precludes beaching. Its speed loaded is 9 knots.

04 Vit

WHEErL HOUSE

LCT (f) OR (6)

40 MM 20 MM 40 MM 20 MM 20 MM

~o 20 MM

0 0 0 0 0 0/ OFF E PS MESS 0 p o Q

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C7 CP_ Y O F O o N. C o a c o o E00"; OFF/ ERs c o_ O in o 0 0 c1 c a 0 ra o -0

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40 MM 20 MA/ 0 VV 20 MM 20 MM 20 MM

LANDING SHIP TANK

0' 25"

-s-STORESY -. -GALLEY---

EN/GINE HATCH' OV/R

LANDING SHIP MDIUM

/-4GCM/-0M23'9",r- /4' ELE VAr-OR (OLD rrPE)

J/'6 "X 9' RAMP HArcH

fsT VENTS /-40 MM SINGLE\ ,2-20 M

203 6

It can carry 350 tens of vehicles (no tanks) or cargo as a,

deck load or one LSU in a launching cradle or two LCM(6)'s

Pontoon causeway sections and barges may be carried also but

must be launched prior to beaching. It is envisioned that the

bulk of the Armored Division support, logistical, and reserve

elements would-be carried aboard LST's,

Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) 8

This vessel is designed to land 36 dismounted troops

of 8,100 pounds of cargo. The initial waves of Armored Inf-

antry (without carriers) will be landed in this type craft.

Other typical loads are

1 -ton Truck and Trailer

1 3/4-ton Truck

The normal operating procedure for the ocean going

shipping is to preload the LCMts and LSU's and carry them

aboard Landing Ships, Dock (LSD's), An LSD can carry 14

loaded LCM(6)'s, 3 loaded LSL's, and seven to 9 loaded LCM

(8)s,. The LCVP 1s are carried in davits or stacked on the

deck on the same transports (APAts and AKAts) that carry the

infantry and are loaded in the transport area off shore from

the hostile beach. An APA (Haskall Class) carries 1,581

troops and 22 LCVP's an AKI (Arcturus Class) carriers 1500

tons of cargo, 172 troops and 15 LCVP's.

Standard amphibious practice for landing direct support

artillery is to use amphibious 2-:ton trucks, DUETs, The

DUiKWXs are preloaded with towed artillery pieces and are launch-

ed from an LST as an "on call" wave and unloaded by an A-Frame

Is

Pi; Ii> 8 ~ Li11i

iL9Lli

LP -

led~~~~ :6 I8I' i]t[6.

Fes, M 1 ' °-I

ill7~ '

Tis TI

Is iS S

LLTL

Chart 2

jpiLCV?

6LCM6

}LCM8H

t ILSLST

94

Thiff' BEAC~I

ad winh. on the DUTWat. The Armored Field Artillery of the

Armored Division will be landed later directly cn the beach

from LST s. It is envisioned that Air support, Naval gunfire

and 4.2 mortars will provide sufficient fire support until the

above can be accomplished safely.

The problem of reefs and/or obstacles remains. We

envision it being solved by landing UDT's and/of

engineer breaching teams depending upon the obstacle to be

cleared prior to the arrival of the tank-infantry teams of the

first wave. These breaching teams could be landed under cover

of darkness or by stealth from Perch class submarine Transports

which will carry 115 troops, an' LVT, and eight 10-man rubber

boats, complete with outboard rmotors if needed.

EXPLANATION OF CHART 2

1. The first wave contains four armored infantry rifle platoons

and two medium tank platoons. This represents the assault rifle

platoons and attached tank platoons of two armored infantry rifle

companies (dismounted). They are transported in 8 ICVP's

and 10 LCM (8S)'s.

2, The second wave contains the remainder of both assault

armored infantry companies in 6 LVBPts.

3. The third wave contains the other two rifle companies, 8mm

mortar platoon and command group of the armored infantry battalion,

The only vehicles of the armored infantry battalion brought ashore

up to now are the command half track and two 4-ton trucks. This

wave is composed of 18 LCVP's and one LCM-6,

4, The fourth wave cantains the balance of the assault tank

company and two reconnaissance platoons (mounted) -- one organic

to the armored infantry battalion, the other organic to the same

tank battalion that provided the tank company. The -ton trucks

of the reconnaissance platoons are in 10 LCVPs while their light

tanks and half track are in 6 LCM-6's. There are also seven LSM

(81I) s in this wave.

5. The fifth wave, contains a 4.2 mortar platoon with trans.

portation and extra ammunition in 8 LCVPts,

64 The next three waves are "on call" waves, consisting of

(a) A battalion of towed 105 nm artillery in DUIe's

and one company of AAA (SP)

(b) A company of medium tanks

(c) The half tracks of the armored infantry battalion

loaded with ammunition and ration re-supply for their respective

squads. Those waves would be called in by radio in the order

and at a time specified by Armored Infantry Battalion Command-

ing Officer. These last three waves are all aboard LSTts carry-

ing LSU's. It is hoped that the LST's can be beached on call;

if not, use of the 9 LSU's as lighters is contemplated..

7, It is realized that a large portion of these vessels are

not filled to absolute capacity. This is done to preserve

tactical integrity of units and it is believed that remaining

space aboard craft will be taken up by extra ammunition, Shore

party elements would accompany waves 4 and 5. Their vessels

are not shown,

8, The total ocean going transportation required to move the

armored battalion landing team represented here is estimated

to be:

9 Landing Ships, Tank

3 Landing Ships, Dock

1 APA, Attack Transport

NOTES CHAPTER 5

Reith, George CDR. U.S.N., Member, Joint AmphibiousBoard. Interviewed at U,S.N.,B., Little Creek, Virginia,February, 1952.

2U.S. -Army, FM 60-5 Amphibious Operations ,Battalionin Assault Landing. Washington 25, D.C., 11 p 280

3 Naval Amphibious Test and Evaluation Unit, "Reportof Beaching and Retracting Tests of Experimental LCIMs andLCVP's,. Amphibious Training Command, U,S, Atlantic Fleet,U.S.N.AB., Little Creek, Virginia, 1952

4Peatross, Oscar F., 4Lt Col., MS.M.C., AmphibiousInstructor, The Armored School, Interviewed at Fort Knox,Kentucky, December, 1951,

5Bridwell, ,"i, LCDR,, U.S.N,, Member of JointAmphibious Board, Interviewed at Naval Amphibious Base,Little Creek; Virginia, February, .1952,

5U.S. Army, FM 605 Amphibious Operations,Battalionin assault Lanin Washington 25 , Appenix i ,

6 1bid7 Ibid

7I' id

97.

9 Ib id.

CHAPTER 6

AM~PHIB IOU S TRiAINING

The ultimate goal of the armored division in the

amphibious assault landing is to develop tank-infantry teams

in which the individual members kniow not only their own jobs

but also how to function with other members of the team. These

teams may be as small as an infantry squad with one tank or as

large as an infantry battalion supported by a tank company. The

infantry must be trained to protect tanks from enemy antitank

measures during the reorganization after the landing. The com-

manders of the coabined arms teams must be selected carefully,

because they will initially have complete control of their

teams if committed prior to reorganization of the assault units

ashore.

The discussion of amphibious training herein is based on

the following premises:

1. All individuals must have completed tactical

training in land warfare and technical training in the operation

and care of organic weapons and equipment.

2. That the navy will use its present amphibious

training center for the armored divisions and provide special

courses, conduct shore training, supervise and assist in ship-

board training.

3. .To prepare individuals, units and staffs to per-

form their as signedpfunctions in a coqrdinated amphibious

assault landingi The training must develop individual and

unit proficiency for the unified aggressive assault against

an enemy held beach by the tank-infantry team.

In order to clearly specify what type of training,

special or otherviise, troops of the armored division must have

in order to make an assault landing on hostile shores, we

must first attempt to determine what type of craft or vehicles

they would make the assault landing in. If the requirements

are to swim tanks across the water in a ship-to-shore move-

ment it would also be required that the vehicle must be able

to fire its main armament while afloat. 1 To date no major

power accepts the present DD (Duplex Drive) device on armor

inasmuch as the equipment prohibits the use of the main armament

of the tank while afloat. If landing craft, capable of trans-

porting one or more tanks, were utilized then it is deemod

necessary that the craft be so constructed that the tanks could

fire their main armament over the bow ramps.

Doctrine and techniques as set forth in Field Manuals

17-34, 60-5 and 60-10 clearly outline the necessary training

if landing craft are used in the landin.g. The training time

would and could be cut down because of this especially if

present equipment was used. In the event more modern and larger

landing craft (as outlined in preceding chapters) are so con-

structed and are available then trainining problems would still

be much simpler. However, if the training phase leans towards

the use of amphibious type tanks, then the training problems

100

become much more acute and individual and unit training time

would have to be increased twofold.

Even though landing craft or tanks were used, the

individual training would certainly cover the same subjects.

All units of the armored division, especially the main assault

forces, tank and armored infantry battalions, would be given

the same individual training and schooling. It is recognized

that specialists from all units would attend specialists courses

at amphibious training cetters. The individual training for

units of the division would include; 2

1. Technique of embarkation

2. Requirements of troop life aboard ship and

naval customs

3. Survival at sea

4. Technique of debarkation

5. Conduct during the ship-to-shore movement

6. Method of assaulting the hostile beach. Prior

to conducting water exercises all personnel must undergo train-

ing in survival methods, procedure of using life belts and all

should have a basic knotwledge of how to swim,

Individual crew members, drivers, and maintenance

sections of all units within the armored division will receive

training in the proper method of waterproofing of wheeled and

track vehioles It is possible that the teams from TTU (Troop

Training Units) from amphibious training centers will conduct

such training at the division's hmme station, At the same time

101

the Amphibious Training Command, U.S. Atlantic and Pacific

Fleets are conducting waterproofing courses that are open to

army personnel as individuals or for an entire unit. Like

courses are conducted by the Amphibious Training Commands

for corrmunication personnel and intelligence personnel.

The training schedules at present in effect in the

armored division should be augmented by many subjects embracing

the amphibious movement, The training schedule as outlined in

appropriate Field JManuals seems adequate for the basic training

of the individual; however, for this more specialized use of

the personnel and vehicles of the armored division, the train-

ing schedule would have to include many subjects of amphibious

warfare., Returning to our previous statement of the fact that

it is possible for a landing to be made in landing craft or by

the swinming tank,. we still must be ready to change the train-

ing schedule to fit either case. Subjects necessary for either

type of training that must be included within the training

schedule are:

1.. LANDING CRAPT AND LANDING SHIPS

a.. Physical training,. swimmiing

b.. Introduction to naval -- landing crafts '& landing

awhips

c. Boat:team organization

d.. Debarkation techniques

e... Troop life aboard ship.

f:. Medical treatment and evacuation

102

2,. ST'IP-TO.'SHORE MOVEM4ENT OF TANKS

a. Physical training, swimming

b. Amphibious ship types

c. Driving water, individual, clay and night

d Driving water, formation, day and night

e. Combat firing, water

f. Abandon tank exercises

g. Navigation on water

Much detailed training would have to be spent on that

portion of the training schedule if tanks were used rather than

landing craft to land the armored division. The problems are

ably put forth in this extract from the Report by the Supreme

Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the Operations

in Europe of the A.E.F. to 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945, Page 22:

It was, moreover, not possible in every beach to swimin the amphibious DD tanks upon which we relied to pro-vide fire support for the infantry clearing the beachexits. These were launched at SWORD, UTAH and OMRHAbeaches and, although late, reached land at the twoformnr; at OMA k however, all but two or three founderedin the heavy seas,..,

Unit training for the tank and armored infantry battalions

may begin at the home station and continue at an amphibious traini

ing center unless additional facilities such as adequate landing

craft and a beach area are available near the home station.

Unit training includes instruction in ship-to-shore movements,

boat discipline and assault landing tactics and techniques.

Most important the instruction includes the organization,

composition and formation of tank-infantry teams to further

include-2

103

1.. The formation and tactics of assault waves

2. Boat drills

3. Reduction of beach defense

4, Air support

5, Naval gunfire support

Formations used by the amphibious teams are similar

to those employed on land in unit training: line formations

of platoon or company strength for the initial assault wave

or succeeding waves; column formation of platoons and companies

abreast for the initial wave or succeeding waves; and an

echelon or wedge formation 3 , Platoon and company training should

be conducted until all members of the teams are thoroughly

familiar with the various assault landing formations. Each unit

training phase concerning formations must be .so conducted that

the situation on the hostile shore and the surf would make it

necessary to attack in various types of formations. Control

craft with suitable radios could conduct the phase and through

the radio so chance the situation on shore so that the wave

commander could change his formation. Familiarization of the

different types of formations should be conducted by sand table-

and mock-up drills prior to the actual training in the water.

Control through radios and arm signals is an important fact and

will have to be continually stressed throughout the training.

The main landing and the advance inland is the final

part of unit training and emphasis must be. placed on the in-

tegration of the tank infantry teams and coordination of all

104

participating and supporting elements. The tank-infantry

teams are organized and trained to reduce enemy installations

in the immediate beachhead area~ The characteristics of the

available landing craft and naval ships may affect the comp-

osition of these teams. The landing exercises permit a check

on the status of training of the teams'

For the initial phase of waterborne training the team

commanders will have to conditimon the members of the combined

arms team to the continual hazards until each can overcome the

natural fear of becoming trapped in a swamped landing craft or

sinking tank, Exercises should be conducted near the shore and

escort craft should accompany each of the teams for salvage

and emergency rescue.

Commanders and key staff officers would be schooled

in amphibious doctrine so that they can prepare their plans

properly and assist in the preparatinn of joint armor and in-

fantry plans. Staff training for amphibious operations is

completed before unit training is started. tVhen the division

is ready to start unit training the staffs prepare and super-

vise the training exercises. Command post exercises are an

important part of staff training. Further staff instructions

should include :

1, Operation orders

2. Administrative orders

3. Embarkation orders

4. Debarkation orders

105

5. Approach schedules

6, Loading diagrams

7, Naval gunfire plans

8. Shore party plans

Selected staff officers should receive special instructions

in the principles of loading and the necessary coordination

and the details of planning the combat loading and priority

for unloading of the type of ships on which their units are

to be transported, The special instruction includes:

1. Loading diagrams

2, Consolidated unit personnel and tonnage tables.

3. Vehicle debarkation priority tables

Loading plans should c .nformr o the actual assault landing

in order to lend realism to the landing exercises.

Upon completion of the unit training, landing exercises

should be conducted for assault teams of battalion size and

larger, The purposes of these exercises are to test the plans

and to effect the necessary coordination to ensure the success

of the landings. The area selected for these exercises should

be a logical site for landing on a hostile shore. The shore

line selected should offer no hazardous underwater formations

nor strong offshore currents... Areas where live ammunition can

be fired are highly desirable. The exercises should include:

1. Combat loading of troops and vehicles

2. Voyage to exercise area with concurrent briefing

of the tank-infantry teams..

1.06

3. Assembly and organization of landing waves in the

rendezvous area and movement to the line of departure.

4. Assault landing

5. Movement inland by the tank-infantry teams

6, Landing under naval gunfire and air support

7, Final ocitique

Other factors of importance to the teams and the division as

a whole during the landing exercises are:

1. Methods of control and communications

2. Methods of recovery of vehicles in the water

3. Continuous maintenance of vehicles and equipment

4. Medical treatment and evacuation during the ship-

to-shore movement.

The amphibious Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet,

located at Little Creek, Norfold, Virginia and U.S. Pacific

Fleet, Coronedo, California conducts various amphibious train-

ing courses for navy, air forces and army personnel. To attend

courses army personnel request quotas through OCAFF. It is

deemed advisable that officer personnel assigned to special-

ist duties within the armored division be sent to these courses.

The general Amphibious Communications course is designed

for all phases of joint communications applicable in amphibious

warfare, and to familiarize communication officers with the

operation and use of communications equipment used in amphibious

operations, including waterproofing. Instruction will also

107

include ship-to-shore phases, familiarization with tactical

air control parties and shore fire control parties, as well

as communications methods, techniques, doctrines, organization,

and practices in amphibious warfare. Similar courses are con-

ducted for enlisted communication personnel.

The Naval Gunfire Spotters and AssistantSpotters course

prepares troop officers and senior noncomissioned officers as

naval gunfire spotters for duty in troop units. This course

includes map and aerial photograph reading; naval gunfire

communications procedures, equipment and nets; elementary fire

control for gunfire support; extensive conduct of fire; a

brief review of the tactical employment of field artillery

and close air support; and the technique of executing naval

gunfire support. A like course is designed for staff officers

to prepare them for duty with gunfire support groups, troop

divisions and higher echelons in the fields of naval gunfire

support and the coordination of the supporting arcs.

Courses available at the Amphibious Training Command

for composite groups of United States armed forces that personnel

of the armored division could attend are:

1,. Troop amphibious staff planning course

2; Signal waterproofing course

3. 1Wheeled vehicle waterproofing course

108

In the event an armored division was selected to engage

in amphibious training and exercises it seems logical from time,

space, material and equipment involved from both the army and

navy that only elements of the division would be actually

trained at one time...,. Qoe battalion reinforced or elements

of a combat command. This would involve moving the unit or

units selected to a previously designated coastal area with

suitable terrain for onshore and offshore armored operations.

Because of the large amount of equipment and number of vehicles

that would have to be:oved to the coast, it is anticipated that

the amphibious training center would have the necessary vehicles,

equipment and landing craft on hand for the training period.

Much of the training could be completed at the amored division's

home station. However, because of the magnitude and importance

of the ship-to-shore movement training phase, training for

assault teams and staff personnel, would have to be conducted

on the water typical of that the division would be facing in the

event they were to make an amphibious landing. Control,

communications and importance of realism in the ship-to-shore

movement are important enough that this training should not be

simulated if at .all possible.

Conclusion

To properly determine the type of special training the

armored division must hate in order to make an amphibious land-

ing, the conclusions reached in preceding chapters regarding

new equipment must be studied. With present equipment in the

109

hands of the troops, there is no doubt at all that training

doctrines and training equipment used in World War II would

again have to be used. It is always important to remember

that the reproduction of actual conditions is basic in the

education of troops.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6

1Report of combined C nference on Armor, UnitedStates - United Kingdom - Canada. (Fort Monroe,Virginia 17-24 March 1949, Brigadier General BruceC Clarke), p 11

2Catalo of Amphibious Training 1951 (AmphibiousTraining Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet), p 21-32

3Amphibious Operations, Reiiment in Assault Land-in s FM 60-10 (Department, of the Army, January1952), Chapter 3 and 4.

110

CHAPTER 7

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

Conclusions made as a result of this study are of

necessity based on some indefinite factors, Assumptions must

be made on the basis of what is presently known, Past per-

formances cannot be relied upon since, as has been pointed out,

an entire armored division was not employed as a landing force

in World War II and the present organization is not combat

tested. New armored equipment is being developed and per-

formance tests have not been completed. Amphibious equipment

is being produced to handle the heavier loads. This equipment

is still being tested. Atomic weapons are being produced

that will greatly affect all future operations. The princiiles

of war have not changed, however, and can provide the basis

for some conclusions.

The authors believe the arm-ored division of today

could profitably be employed as an assault landing force and

will have a place in large scale amphibious operations of

the future. The division is not expected to replace the

infantry division as the normal landing force, but rather,

will be employed as a part of the corps as a complementary

organization to the infantry division as in all other oper-

ations. Normal terrain limitations will apply possibly to

a greater degree than in other operations but the opportunity

for surprise cannot be overlooked4

.. Surprie .must be sought throughout the action byevery means and by every echelon of command. Surprise maybe produced by...,, by *ariations in the means and methodsemployed in combat, by rapidity and. power of execution;and by the utilization of terrain which appears to im-pose great difficulties.,,

The armored division is not suitable for prolonged

operations in a small beachhead area and missions assigned to

the division must be those that utilize to the utmost the

characteristics of mobility, heavy firepower and shock action.

The division might be employed in conjunction with

airborne forces dropped on critical objectives inland from the

beach area. The employment of the division to effect the

linkup would permit the use of airborne forces at a greater

distance from the beach than has been possible in past oper-

ations and result in a more rapid expansion of the beachhead.

The armored division employed in a secondary land-

ing as an enveloping force could force the rapid expansion of

the main beachhead by conducting a surprise attack on the

flank or rear of the enemy opposing the main landing.

The early seizure of major ports and airfields is

essential to the rapid buildup of supplies and reinforcements

for large:invading forces. Such a mission would be suitable

for the armored division. 'i

The development of atomic weapons byp-ote a.--

xemi es can be expected to force changes in the techniques

employed in furure operations. The c a.centration of great

numbers of ships and ladding craft in a re1aiely small

transport area such as was used in World War II will be im-

possible in the face of an atomic threat. A much greater

dispersion of forces will be required and the transport area

moved further offshore; The result will be increased problems

of control for the landing force both afloat and ashore. The

possibility of assault forces being landed on the wrong beaches

and being widely separated will be greatly increased. In some

cases it may be desirable to employ a highly mobile armored

unit as the landing force to provide armor protection for the

assault troops in the movement to the beach to insure prompt

reorganization ashore, and to insure the rapid expansion of

the beachhead. If the enemy has the capability of employing

atomic weapons against an invading force the concentration of

large numbers of dismounted troops in a small beachhead could

be disastrous.

ORGANIZATION FOR LANDING

The successful accomplishment of anMy o the missions

outlined above would depend upon the degree of surprise ob-

tainedi n the operation and the speed of execution. These

requirements are not peculiar to this type operation alone

nor to the armored division but arc required to a greater

degree than in many other operations. In order to obtain

the speed required, special attention must be given to the

organization and training of the division shore party as

well as the combat engineers required for the improvement

of the beaches. Suitable attachments -would berequired to

113

perform the following functions:

1. Embarkation of troops, .equipment, and supplies.

2. Debarkation and landing of troops and equipment.

3. Conduct of initial assault operations ashore.

4. Control of naval gunfire support.

5. Discharge of cargo from assault shipping.

6. Operation and tactical use of amphibious vehicles.

The attachments required to perform these functions

would depend upon the mission, enemy forces and disposition,

nature of the beaches and types of assault craft available.

Suitable attachments for the division might include the follow-

ing:

1. Division shore party.

2. One or more combat engineer battalions.

3, Naval gunfire ocntrol personnel.'

4. Tactical air control parties.

5. Two or more amphibious truck canpanies (DUKW).

6. One or more amphibious tank battalions.

7. One or more amphibious tractor battalions

8. One or more chemical mortor battalion s.

9. One or more artillery battalions.

Units must be assigned to combat commands as required

to perform the assigned missions, to provide dispersion of

personnel and equipment, and to allow independent operation

of the combat commands for a limited time. A typical combat

command organization might be as follows:

Two armored infantry batt4lions

One medium tank battalion

One armored field artillery battalion

One armored engineer company

One reconnaissance. company

One antiaircraft artillery battery

One armored signal company or detachment

One armored ordnance company or detachment

One military police platoon

One armored medical company

Combat command shore party

Tactical air control. parties

Quartermaster detachment

FOR AT ION

The formation adopted by the division for the assault

landing will be governed by the mission and the distance to

the objective. Missions requiring the division to make the

assault landing and to seize an objective at some distance

from the beach will require the landing to be made in a

column of combat commands. The division' could land on a

comparatively narrow front with the leading combat command

organized infantry heavy to establish the beachhead and pro-

tect the landing of other elements. The following combat

conmmands would be' permitted freedom of action to assemble

rapidly and pass through the leading combat command to seize

the distant objective. Disadvantages of this formation are

115

that a greater period of time would be required to land the

division at a time when speed is essential and during this

time the force would be concentrated in a small beachhead.

Missions requiring a limited objective attack or

seizure of close-in terrain features would permit the division

to attack with two combat commands abreast in the initial

assault. Such a formation would speed the landing of the

division elements and allow greater dispersion of vehicles

and personnel in the beachhead. In this formation forces

would bemore widely dispersed on the beach perimeter and only

a small portion of the units would be uncommitted. This

formation limites the flexibility of the division and would

be effective against light resistance.

CO1NCLUSION

This concept of employment does not differ from the

published doctrine for amphibious operations and the general

principles for employment of the armored division, Basically,

the question of successfully employing the armored division

as an assault landing force depends upon the availability of

suitable shipping and the selection of proper missions that

utilize the .outstanding characteristics of the division. The

power of this unit must be exploited to the fullest in future

ope rat ions.

116

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7

FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations,August 1949, Washington, D.C.

117

APPENDIX I

Troop List,. Task Force Red *

CCB,. 1st Armored Division

8 November 1942

Brigadier General Olvier,. Commanding

Headquarters CCB

Detachment, 141st Armored Signal Company

Detachment, Headquarters 13th Armored Regiment

Reconnaissance, 13th Armored Regiment (1- platoon)

1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment (Reinforced)

2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (Reinforced)

2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment (Reinforced)

27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Reinforced)

Company B, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion (-1 platoon -1 squad)

Detachment, Company E, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion

Maintenance Company, 13th Armored Regiment (-Detachment)

Service Company, 13th Armored Regiment (-Detachment)

Company B, 47th .Armored Medical Battalion (-Detachment)

Company B, 1st Armored Supply Battalion (-1 platoon)

2nd Battalion, 591st Engineer Boat Regiment (-Company F)

106th Separate CA Battalion (AA) (-Battery D)

*From Field Order #1, feadquarters CCB, 1st ArmoredDivision, 11 October 1942.

118

APPENDIX II

Troop List, Task Force Green *

CCB, Ist Armored Division

8 .November 1942

Colonel Robinette, Cor mmanding

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 13th Armored Regiment(-Detachment)

1st Battalion, 13 Armored Regiment

1st Platoon, Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored Regiment

1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (Reinforced)

Battery C, 27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Reinforced)

Company C, 701st TD Battalion

Battery D, 106th C A Battalion (AA)

Company F, 591st Engineer Boat Regiment

Detachment, 141st Armored Signal Company

Detachment, Company B, 47th Armored Medical Battalion

Detachment, Company E, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion

One Platoon, Company A, 15th Armored Engineer Battalion (Re-inforced)

One Platoon, Company B, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion (lessone squad)

* From Field Order #l, Headquarters CCB, 1stArmored Division, 11 Oct 1942.

APPENDIX III

Troop List, CCA, 2nd Armored Division *

Operation HUSKY

10 June 1943

Brigadier General Maurice Rose, Commanding

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, CCA.

66th Armored Regiment

41st Armored Infantry Regiment (less 1st Battalion)

14th Armored FA Battalion

Company B, 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion

Company A, 17th Armored Engineer Battalion

Company B, 48th A rmored Medical Battalion

Company C, Division Maintenance Battalion

Detachment, 142nd Armored Signal Company

* From the 2nd Armored Division in the Sicilian

Campaign, Committee 34, Advance Class 1949-1950,

(Fort Knox: 1950),

120

APPENDIX IV

Armored Division T/0 & E 17

(Abstract) 8 October 1948.

Entire Division- --------------- ....... 15973

Division Headquarters --- -----------------. 189

Medical Detachment --------------------- 7

Infantry Battalions (4) --------------------- 1089

Tank Battalions (4)-------------------------- 677

Heavy (1)---------------------------------- 757

Medium (3)----------

Combat Command, Hq & Hq Co (2)--------------- 113

Reserve Command, Hq & Hq Co (1)-------------- 111

Division Trains, Hq & Hq Co------------------ 100

Field Artillery ----------------------------- 3755

Reconnaissance Battalion -------------------- 829

Engineer Battalion -------------------------- 1095

Medium Battalion ---------------------------- 424

Ordnance Battalion ------------------------- 737

Signal Company --------- ------------------ 374

Military Poliec Company -------------------- 188

Division Headquarters Company --------------- 166

Band ----------------------------------------- 70

Replacement Company ---------------------- 41

Principal Armament

Rifle, cal. 30 - - -- ----- - - --- 3200

Carbine, cal. .30 - - - - - - - - - - - - 6938

Auto Rifle, Cal, 30 - - - - - - - - 167

MG, cal .30 - - - - - - - - - - - -473

MG, cal, 50 - -- - -- - - - - - - - - - - 354

Mortars, 60 mm - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - 51

Mortars, 81 mm - - --- - - - - -. -. - -. - 20

AT Rocket Launchers - - -- - - - - - - - 691

Rifle, 75 m - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3

Carriage, motor multiple gun- - -- - - - - 32

Carriage, motors twin 40 mm - -- -- -- 32

Tank, mediu - - - - - - -- - -- - - - - - 315

Tank, light - --- - --- -- --- ---- 58

Carriage, motor:

105 rmi Howitzer- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 54

155 mm Howitzer - -- - - - - - - - - - - 18

Carrier, HT, 81 mm mortar - - - - - - - - - 12

Vehicle, armored utility - - - - - - - - - - - :636

Vehicles, all types(except boats and planes) - - - - - - - - - -4764

(Less combat types) - - - - - -- - - ------ 3607

122

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------"Report of. Subcommittee on Automotive Equipment to

Ordnance Technical Committee. 25- iay 1945.

127