Armor, November-December 1996 Edition - Fort Benning...Production Assistant Mary Hager E-Mail:...

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 02588

“There is something rotten in the state of Russia.”

Through events that would make good theater if only theyweren’t so painfully real, we have seen the once-vauntedRed Army become its own worst enemy. The scene is theembattled and horribly scarred Chechen Republic. The pro-tagonists and antagonists are — well, who really knows?The players are the soldiers of the Russian Army, troopsfrom the Interior Ministry, and the Chechen natives who areoutnumbered, out-gunned, and largely without external sup-port.

Through the heavy door of censorship, we saw or heardtales of terrific gun battles and bombardments where therebels consistently outmaneuvered and outshot a biggerand ostensibly better-organized foe.

What happened to the once respected Red Army whichstood tall on the West German and Czechoslovakian bor-der for so long? What happened to the army that learnedits bitter lessons in the Afghan mountains? Why are ar-mored and mechanized units making such basic mistakesas running into cities without scouts ahead?

Some say that we are finally seeing the real RussianArmy which past propaganda — ours and theirs — builtinto a force more capable on paper than on the ground.Others say it is the logical by-product of a corrupt commu-nistic society that is imploding like a star reaching criticalmass. Those answers are too easy. I think the reasons aremore understandable.

Like the Russians, we were faced with the monumentaltask of downsizing at the end of the cold war. Our nation’shealth demanded we reorganize, consolidate on the objec-tive, and prepare for new missions. We did that, but thank-fully our civilian and military leaders drew us down in ascontrolled a manner as possible.

What lessons should we learn from the Russian Army’sChechen humiliation? First, an army must learn from itsmistakes and not repeat them. The Russians are relearningwhat they had already learned in Afghanistan: a dedicatedhome team has a tremendous battlefield advantage.

Second, that military measures only work in the long haulif the political directions guiding them are clearly under-stood. Recall the tragedy of errors in the relationship be-tween Russian security chief Alexander Lebed and the on-

site field commander. Negotiations with the opposition don’twork well when the politician is saying peace is at hand andthe general is already beginning another armored assault.

Third, we must never abandon the tactics, techniques,and procedures we’ve worked so hard to develop. Adaptthem, yes, but reject outright, never.

Finally, we should never be so smug that we think ourgreat army is immutable.

The army we have today is not the same army we willhave in 2001, nor is it the same army we had in 1991, or1972, or 1945. Those dates mark important times in ourhistory, but they are only a part of what we are today. Yes,our core values remain constant. Doctrine is much thesame. Leadership competencies are constant, but the skilland competency of individual soldiers, their units, and thelarger units they comprise, is changeable. You want proof?Go around the staff table in a tank battalion, or walk downthe motor pool line in a cavalry squadron, and find out howmany of the soldiers and leaders are combat veterans inthat unit, or in any unit at all. The numbers will be small,and this only five years removed from Desert Storm.

As we seem to be near the last step in downsizing, thereare some other things to learn from the Russian experi-ence. When funding cuts are the order of the day, whentraining opportunities decrease rapidly due to resource con-straints, when leaders and soldiers alike feel alienated fromthe population whose bidding they are supposed to be exe-cuting, and when manning levels sink to levels that give toomany junior guys too much responsibility too quickly, some-thing very bad happens. In the business of warfighting, thefirst time your delusions of grandeur are exposed is whenan enemy pops you between the eyes. That is much toolate.

Is there any solace for us? Yes. As the Army’s Chief ofStaff, General Reimer, recently said, we are in goodshape. I believe him. You should, too. We withstood ahistorical downsizing and emerged on the other end of it aleaner, meaner, and even more ready force than before.Feel good about it, because it sure didn’t have to turn outthat way. Look at our once able foe to see how fast andhow far one can sink without a well-executed plan. Driver,move out. Gunner, continue to scan.

— TAB

Stand To

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-96-6

Editor-in-Chief LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY

Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS

Commandant MG GEORGE HARMEYER

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

Disclaimer: The information contained in ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy for each. armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a military letter to the editor-in-chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

Features

7 Building Tanks at Lima by Captain Todd Tolson

15 M1A2s, Smart Ammunition, and Time and Space Theory, Part 11- The Offense by Captain Mike Pryor

18 Last Original M1s Retire From Active Duty

19 Proof Positive (Joint Live Fire Testing) by Thomas Julian and Robert Wojciechowski

22 From the External Gun to the Hybrid Tank by Robin Fletcher

26 The British Tank Detachment at Cambrai by Major David P. Cavaleri

31 Counterreconnaissance: Taking the Fight to the Enemy by Captain Doug Boltuc and Captain Scott Efflandt

35 FM 71-3 Scheduled for Revision 1997 BattalionlBrigade Doctrine Branch seeks your comments

36 Heavy-Light Operations at the National Training Center Getting the Most Out of the Light Force by Colonel Frank Stone

41 New Training Aids Help Soldiers Recognize Dangerous Ordnance by the TRADOC Munitions System Manager's Office

42 Enhanced Mine Detection For Limited Visibility Operations by Sergeant First Class Paul E. Thompson Jr.

44 TWGSSJPGS; Combat Vehicle Gunnery Training Takes a Great Leap Forward by Brigadier General Philip L. Bolte, U.S. Army, Retired

48 Research Pays Off For the Guard: A Device-Based Strategy For Training Tank Gunnery by Dr. Joseph D. Hagman and Dr. John E. Morrison

51 Senior Officer Logistics Maintenance Course

Back The Firing Pin Assembly - An Inside Look Cover by Staff Sergeant Stephen Krivitsky

Departments

2 Contacts 3 Letters 5 Commander's Hatch 6 Driver's Seat

52 Books

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We Need to InvestIn Peacekeeping Vehicles

Dear Sir:

I found COL Charles Lehner’s “BosniaReport” (May-Jun 96) and CPT MatthewMorton’s “Balkan Report II” (Jul-Aug 96) tobe informative and thought-provoking. Myinitial reaction was one of dismay, as bothofficers advocate the acquisition of non-standard vehicles, which would complicatethe logistical and maintenance equations.After further contemplation, however, I havereached the conclusion that the authors areon the right track.

I am not sure how well suited the BV-206S would be to operation in other typesof terrain — and I am more than a littleuncomfortable with the articulated vehicleconcept for general use — but for use indeep snow, the BV-206S seems to haveproved itself. I am a bit puzzled by TomBuonaugurio’s letter in the July-Aug 1996issue, wherein he states, “If a requirementfor the (armored) BV-206S.. .doesemerge...” Inasmuch as these vehicles areused for scouting and patrolling — combatduties — isn’t the need for armor protectionsomewhat obvious? Indeed, why was theunarmored (SUSV) version bought insteadof the BV-206S? (The SUSVs deployed toBosnia were from U.S. stocks stored in It-aly. -Ed.)

The use of the USMC 8x8 LAV alsomakes a great deal o f sense forpeacekeeping operations, if only to mini-mize damage to the road nets. As waspointed out, mission accomplishment andtroop safety depend, to a degree, on thegood will of the local populace, which islikely to be adversely affected if tracked ve-hicles destroy the infrastructure.

I must disagree with CPT Morton’s viewthat the LAV-APC should be used becauseit offers a kinder, gentler image than tanksor M113s. It must be remembered that inpeacekeeping operations, our forces arefunctioning as police. As such, we are thereto preserve peace and order and, like a po-lice officer, we must have the means —and it must be readily apparent that we dohave the means — to inflict death and de-struction on any would-be attacker; theLAV-APC lacks this ability. As was noted inCOL Lehner’s article, the “overwhelmingfirepower image” of the 1st Armored Divi-sion’s tanks effectively underscored U.S.resolve in implementing the peace accords.This “big gun” intimidation factor should beincluded in any peacekeeping force, but inthe form of the LAV-105, rather than theAbrams. The LAV-105 would be muchmore infrastructure-friendly and possessgreater in-country mobility (on those narrowroads and MLC bridges) than the M1A1,with little loss of intimidation value or com-bat power; it would also have commonality

with the LAV-APC CPT Morton proposesfor use by the infantry squads.

During the Cold War, the senior leader-ship tried to avoid involvement in OOTW,considering such operations as distractionsfrom the Army’s only valid reason for being:Warfighting! All of the budget and all of thetraining was dedicated to preparing to fighta major war. With the demise of the SovietUnion, the U.S. Army was effectively with-out a mission. Now the leadership em-braces participation in OOTW, but thebudget is still being spent on equipment fora major war (a low-probability event), whilespending almost nothing on equipment forOOTW (a certainty).

If U.S. soldiers are going to continue toplay the role of international policemen inpeacekeeping operations, they should begiven the right tools for the job. Divert asmall percentage of the funding for projectsthat may never be needed (MLRS, BAT,Crusader, etc.) and buy the BV-206S, LAV-APC, and LAV-105 vehicles that areneeded right now by our peacekeepingforces; in the long term, the “major war”projects will not suffer excessively, and thepeacekeepers will be properly equipped fortheir task.

STANLEY C. CRISTSan Diego, Calif.

Mission Orders ConceptDeserves More Than Lip Service

Dear Sir:

I appreciate the torrent of letters whichfollowed my Jan-Feb 96 article, “Force XXIand the Death of Auftragstaktik.” The re-sponse is exactly the sort of discourse Iwanted to provoke. Personally, I reallyhope that the future which I postulateddoesn’t come to pass. On the other hand,is everything I suggested necessarily“bad”? As professionals, we should regu-larly reassess how we operate to determine(preferably BEFORE we make anychanges) if we are executing to our fullestpotential, and how we might improve stillmore. Different is not always bad. (I haveto continually remind myself of that; I as-sume others do as well.) As a professional,I believe that my future, if not my life, de-pends upon the unrestricted and nurturedleadership abilities of our junior leaders. Inmy mind’s eye, the Orwellian control by su-periors displaced from the battle wouldequate to a death knell for our current pri-macy in military affairs. Independent action,the ability to make decisions, is the fuelwhich our Army thrives upon, especially inthe combat arms. The potential futurewhich I wrote about bodes ill for the devel-opment of the type of leaders I think weneed. Yet I can also see that the same sce-nario could lead to quantum leaps in effec-

tiveness. It remains for greater minds todetermine how this tightrope should bewalked.

My concerns were identified in the article;several others said, “This will never be,”and I would like to agree. But we’ve alsoyet to take into account how the soldiersand leaders after us will fight. Perhapsmore than other generation, those growingup now are unique in their abilities. They’vebeen exposed to technologies which have,as a generation, made them almost a soci-ety apart. How will they fight? The uniquelyAmerian Way of War has always taken ad-vantage of our cultural biases and abilities.How will this new generation fit into ourmold?

Right now, we preach Auftragstaktik (Mis-sion Orders) to the exclusion of all othermethods. We regularly claim to give subor-dinates the chance to use their initiative,especially in tactical matters. Yet at thesame t ime, we produce 20-50 pageOPORDS at the NTC and JRTC. In WWII,a Wehrmacht DIVISION OPORD was nor-mally verbal!!! The best we can managemight be a five-page “matrix” order, andthat is at the battalion level. Truth be told,while we say we want “Mission Orders,” wepractice “Orders Tactics” (Behfelstaktik). Asan Army, we have yet to resolve this dichot-omy. As much as we’d like to say that wepromote initiative and subordinate control,how many have seen an attack at the NTCgo off early, when the battalion commandersaw an opportunity and thought he mightget the jump on the OPFOR ahead ofschedule? How about at company level?Platoon?

I am a strong believer in the concept ofAuftragstaktik; I just have yet to see it inaction. Perhaps when I do, I will also seetrue “maneuver” training at one of the train-ing centers.

ROBERT L. BATEMANCPT, IN

Maneuver Warfare:Change the Culture First

Dear Sir:

I am writing to address, actually add to,Captain Christopher D. Kolenda’s excellentarticle, “Reconnaissance in the Offense‘Command Push’ vs. ‘Recon Pull’” (AR-MOR, July-August 1996). As I write this let-ter, I hope to add flavor to Captain Bate-man’s article, “Force XXI and the Death ofAuftragstaktik.” Good try, Captain Bateman,but auftragstaktik, as it was truly definedand practiced in the German military cul-ture from Gerhard Scharnhorst thruHelmuth von Moltke to Hans von Seeckt’screation of Blitzkrieg, has really never ex-isted in our Army. Our promotion system

ARMOR — November-December 1996 3

tends to punish officers of strong character, the very ones we need in battle.

I must address the cultural foundation our Army must adjust to prior to executing maneuver warfare techniques such as "Recon PulL" It is this institutional foundation which is disregarded or simply not understood when authors, such as Captain Kolenda, address facets of maneuver warfare or advocate borrowing from the Germans' welltried approach to war. Because they lail to address the needed military culture, these authors leave their sincere attempts at making our Army even better open to simple critics on the attrition side of the Army. These critics refuse to change our Frenchbased doctrine and antiquated personnel policies, such as "up or out," which deny us the experience needed to execute this facet of maneuver warfare or the warfare we envision in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations.

Now, more toward what "Recon Pull" really is. As Captain Kolenda states, the U.S.

u.s.

4

Statement of Ownership. Management and Circulation rReQl,wed by 39 USC, 3685!

Army employs the opposite, command push. What we need to adjust to in Force XXI doctrine is where our reconnaissance is pulling the commander, in fact the whole force. When we begin an operation, we do not know where this will take us. We know only that we are going to destroy the enemy. Now the opponents have I':Ilmost replied that one who practices maneuver warfare could carry this to the extreme and have a war that began in Kuwait going to China or somewhere, but we must pre-suppose we have a force of soldiers we can trust. It is not as if we have given them no guidance. It is not as if we have sent the mentally inept to risk their lives for us. If we do that, not only are we morally irresponsible, but we are naive if we expect success. If we are unwilling to enlist the most intelligent members of society, we will not have Force XXI operations. We will have victory only when lucky or against gross incompetence. The issue here is that war is uncertain. The enemy is not likely to do it our way. We need to be constantly exploring

and exploiting.

Our Army must encourage entrepreneurial soldiers as a revolutionary idea. Our Army must tolerate entrepreneurial officers - leaders, soldiers as equally revolutionary. We did not have such an Army in Vietnam, Korea, or World War II, and we have slipped back into this mode now with the drawdown as an excuse. We won World War " and the Gulf War with the old kind of Army employing old "Iine up, tie in the flanks, and overwhelm with firepower" doctrine. Experience since then and against potential enemies shows that it does not work anymore.

Now, let me get back to "Recon Pull." The commander, being pulled along by his reconnaissance, is not some helpless figurehead at the mercy of his subordinates. On the contrary, it is he

who makes the force act as one instead of many disparate and disconnected entities. It is paramount, as Major General Maggart has stated in many of his "Commander's Hatches," that leaders be up there - up front with the fighting infantry or the lead tank. The advanced technology we are now playing with in our Advanced Warfare Experiments, especially in information technology, will delude us. IVIS will be capable of fully informing a commander in a sophisticated command and control vehicle. Not only can he talk to nearly anyone he wants; today, he can see almost anything he wants on a television screen. Yet, this fully informed commander in his C3 vehicle suffers a number of disadvantages.

First of all, he will become removed from the atmosphere of the fronl. We are influenced every second of our lives by whatever atmosphere we are in. As the battleIront has its atmosphere, so does the advanced command vehicle.

The atmosphere is our surroundings - visual, audible, psychological, and moral. A commander cannot know a priori, the atmosphere at the Iront. It is unpredictable, fluid, and electronically untransmittable to that little box. That is, you have to be there to know it, or you will never know it. It only comes through years of experience doing it, making mistakes, and trying it again, something we do not allow. Instead, our officer management system has too many officers in line waiting for their turn in order to be fair. This level of experience is part of what makes warfare an art form, and not a technological solution, as many would like to believe.

The atmosphere of the battlefront may be unleashed aggression, comrades encouraging one another, helping those who are down, sometimes amazing patience for the sake of stealth, and recognition that every soldier counts. The atmosphere of the command vehicle may be anxious unreleased tension, impatience, and dominance by one individual. Influenced by the atmosphere of the command vehicle, the commander is out of touch. His subordinates at the front know it and feel it. At the front, he would make different decisions, more likely to be those his men on the lront would make. At the front, he sees only a narrow slice, but it is a relevant slice. He has a staff that can dwell in the command vehicle and study the rest 01 it. He need not ignore them. Nor need he be held prisoner by them. For even their "board slice" of information is a narrow slice of atmosphere. So the commander seeks and probes, just as do the reconnaissance troops Captain Kolenda speaks 01. He seeks to be at the decisive point. Accepting the uncertainty of combat, he is aware he cannot know in advance where that decisive point will be. Great commanders like Patton, or Rommel, who

Continued on Page 51

ARMOR - November-December 1996

As I complete my tenure as the Chiefof Armor, I would offer these fewthoughts for your consideration as youmove on to positions of greater respon-sibility. After thirty years as a mountedsoldier, they represent my perspectiveon what is important for the future ofthe mounted force.

Armor is the decisive force on thebattlefield because of the skill, courage,intellect, creativity, and spirit of oursoldiers. Equipment, no matter how so-phisticated or deadly, will never replacethe power that well-trained, well-ledsoldiers bring to the fight. We musttrain them to be aggressive, yet cogni-zant of the value of human life. Wemust teach them how to think, not whatto think. And we must give the generalguidance they need to accomplish themission with the latitude to perform totheir full potential. Nothing willsmother the mounted force faster thancentralized leaders who are afraid tooperate with frag orders. Our job asleaders is to set the conditions for suc-cess. We must be technically and tacti-cally competent, and we must be fo-cused on selfless service to country, noton careers. It is far more important toend military service as a focused, dedi-cated, enthusiastic major than to be acolonel bitter over not getting brigadecommand.

While information age technology isboth necessary and appealing, we arepaid to close with and destroy the en-emy. Technology will help us do thatbetter, but it is no substitute for thewarfighting spirit of our soldiers andleaders. In the future, leaders will have

to work hard to instill in their soldiersthe intense desire to move to the soundof the guns. Armor and infantry sol-diers are a unique breed. They have togo where no one else wants to go.They must go where the battle rages,where danger and death are real, wherefear has to be controlled just to survive.Mounted soldiers have to think quicklywhile fighting their vehicles, which aremoving at high speeds over rough ter-rain, sometimes in the dead of thenight, through blowing sands and/ordriving rain storms. They have to do allthis knowing that, in the end, they mayface serious wounds or death.

Decisive battles in the future will notbe fought by technologists in white labcoats using precision guided munitionsto attack targets that are miles away.The preliminaries to decisive opera-tions may be fought that way, but theability of the U.S. Army to dominatethe enemy will hinge on close combat,just as it always has. Closing with anddestroying the enemy will depend onmounted soldiers and leaders who havethe courage, skill, and desire to lookthe enemy in the eye and take himdown. In the flood of technology, andthe many advantages it brings, we mustnot lose the warfighting spirit that hascharacterized the mounted soldierthroughout history.

While leaders today have many war-fighting skills to master, some of whichwe are now just beginning to under-stand, leaders of the future will have tobe as comfortable working with ad-vanced technology as they are with aradio or a compass. The decisive battle-

field will require leaders who are crea-tive, innovative, and versatile. Yet wehave no institutional or unit trainingthat teaches these subjects. We willhave to find ways to teach ourselvesthose skills. Leaders will find it neces-sary to be masters of digital architec-ture, tactical internets, and a host ofother equally complicated applications.Tactics, techniques, and procedures fordigital operations will be different fromthose in practice today. Therefore,while mastering the present, leadersmust keep one eye trained on the cur-rent developments that will transitionto future capabilities. Leaders mustread, talk, and think about the implica-tions of future warfighting now to beready later.

The ability to communicate thoughts,ideas, concepts, and instructions willseparate truly great leaders and unitsfrom the rest. In the final analysis, suc-cess will depend on your ability to for-mulate a vision (end state, concept, orintent) and communicate it on a per-sonal level while setting the conditionswhich make open communicationamong the members of your unit notonly possible, but imperative. Cohesionand team building are impossible in anenvironment where communicationsare restrained. A centralized leader willcertainly achieve short term results,probably very quickly. But ultimatesuccess rests on the contributions ofeveryone in the organization. Everyonewon’t contribute unless they feel freeto speak their minds without fear ofretribution or reprisal. A high perform-

Some Farewell Thoughts

MG Lon E. Maggart Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center



“The Army enlists soldiers but retainsfamilies.”

“Be all you can be, because we needyou in the Army.”

“We do more by 9 o’clock than mostpeople do all day.”

“From the hills of Bosnia to the ricepaddies of Korea, the Armor/Cavalrysoldier sets the example.”

All of these themes have encouragedgood soldiers to reenlist. In the midstof downsizing and the NCO down-grade program, slogans like these couldbecome increasingly valuable to us inthe near future. They can break the ice,provide a rallying point, or further adiscussion of retention.

•• How do we retain quality soldiers?

•• How is the Armor force doing in thearea of retention?

A noncommissioned officer’s respon-sibility is to maintain the integrity andquality of the Armor force. We do thisby putting quality soldiers in the right

positions and providing them with ca-reer advancement opportunities that notonly challenge them, but stimulate theirdesire to continue an Armor career. Weneed to emphasize retention opportuni-ties and include the soldier’s family inthe decision to stay Armor or Cavalry.

This is too critical a task to be shoul-dered by the unit retention NCO alone.We must all stay abreast of current re-tention policies and options availablefor our soldiers. The intent is not to un-dercut the retention NCOs, but to sup-plement their expertise with sound ca-reer counseling.

This counseling can be formal, in themanner taught in PLDC, BNCOC, AN-COC, or in FM 22-101 (Counseling),but a number of other methods exist —back deck counseling, foot lockercounseling, motor pool counseling, orshooting the breeze, just to name a few.

Whatever method you use, the de-sired outcome should be the retentionof quality Armor/Cavalry soldiers.Only through open lines of communi-

cation can we make the soldier and hisfamily aware of all the informationnecessary for a sound, intelligent, andinformed decision on the advantages ofstaying Armor/Cavalry. It is better toretain one quality soldier than to allowtwo less-than-adequate soldiers to reen-list.

Now, how is the Armor force doingon the retention of quality soldiers?The chart is a snapshot of the retentionpicture in CMF 19. As you can see, weare below the Army average on initialreenlistments across the CMF, andslightly below the Army average in19D mid-career reenlistment. The re-mainder of the Armor force is in linewith the Army average.

So, the answer to the problem is rela-tively simple. We must work harder tomaintain quality soldiers during theirinitial enlistment assignments and im-prove on our retention of 19D mid-ca-reer soldiers. We do this by caring forour soldiers and their families, educat-ing them early on about their options,so when reenlistment time occurs thereare no surprises, and placing them inthe best possible position for promotionand advancement through schooling,Soldier/NCO of the Quarter/YearBoards, enrollment in the Excellence inArmor program, and induction into theSergeant Morales or Audie MurphyClubs.

I challenge all of you to heightenyour awareness of retention, and towork diligently to retain those soldierswho will someday replace us as leaders.

CSM Ronnie W. Davis Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Retention —A Need for Concern

6 ARMOR — November-December 1996

19D 19K

ARMY MOS ARMY MOSRETENTION RETENTION RETENTION RETENTION

RATE RATE RATE RATE

INITIAL 35.6% 31.2% 43.5% 39.2%

MID-CAREER 75.3% 75.0% 73.1% 73.1%

CAREER 78.2% 78.2% 73.1% 73.1%

As World War II approached, the U.S.Army developed a plan to utilize in-dustrial firms to manufacture armoredvehicles. The urgent need for these ve-hicles was not fully recognized untilthe Germans’ Blitzkrieg across Europein 1939 and 1940. This situation pre-sented a staggering mission for theArmy Ordnance Department’s new(1941) Tank and Combat Vehicle Divi-sion. In one year, over one million ve-hicles, including 14,000 medium tanks,were to be produced and ready forshipment.1

The Lima Army Tank Plant traces its55-year history back to May 1941,when the Ohio Steel Foundry beganbuilding a government-owned plant tomanufacture centrifugally-cast guntubes. The site was chosen for its prox-imity to a steel mill, five railroads, andnational highway routes.2 Before con-struction was completed, the OrdnanceDepartment redesignated the site as anintermediate depot for modifying com-bat vehicles, to include tanks.

In November 1942, United MotorsServices took over operation of theplant to process vehicles under govern-ment contract. The plant preparedmany vehicles for Europe, includingthe M-5 light tank, the T-26 Pershingtank, and a “super secret” amphibioustank intended for use on D-Day.3 Dur-ing World War II, the Lima Tank Depothad over 5,000 employees, includingmany women, and processed over100,000 combat vehicles for shipment.

Activity slowed during the post-WWII period, and the plant temporar-ily became a storage facility. In 1948,tanks were dismantled and deprocessedthere. Numerous tanks were “canned”and stored in cylindrical gas containerswith dehumidifiers.

When the Korean War broke out, thedepot expanded and industrial opera-tions resumed. Over the next few years,

the facility rebuilt combat vehicles andfabricated communication wiring har-nesses. The Korean truce led to the de-pot’s eventual deactivation in March1959 with little other activity takingplace over the next 16 years.4

In August 1976, the government se-lected Lima Army Tank Plant (LATP)as the initial production site for theXM-1 tank, and Chrysler Corporationwas awarded the production contract.The method of production differedfrom previous armor programs; the hulland turret sections were to be fabri-cated from armored plate, rather thancastings, allowing Chrysler to producea lighter, stronger tank.5 Since this was

a government-owned, contractor-oper-ated (GOCO) manufacturing facilitycontrolled by the Army’s Tank-Auto-motive and Armaments Command(TACOM), the installation was ex-panded and specialized industrial plantequipment purchased. A sister plantwas established in Michigan, the De-

A technician guides the giant cranethat marries the hull and turret of anM1A1 tank. The two major compo-nents move down separate assemblylines — and the hull is test driven asa “convertible” —before this final as-sembly step.

For more than 50 years, this Ohio plant has forged the Army’s heavy metal

by Captain Todd Tolson

Building Tanks at Lima


troit Tank Plant, to assist with the as-sembly of M1 sections fabricated atLima.

On February 28, 1980, the first M1tank rolled out of LATP. It was desig-nated the M1 Abrams, in honor ofGeneral Creighton W. Abrams. Thename, Thunderbolt, recalled the nameAbrams gave to each of his seven tanksin WWII.

One of the original XM-1 prototypetanks is permanently on display in frontof the Patton Museum of Armor andCavalry at Ft. Knox.

In 1982, General Dynamics LandSystems (GDLS) bought Chrysler De-fense Corporation and began producingthe M1 at a rate of 30 tanks a month.By January 1985, the last M1 hadrolled off the assembly line, and pro-duction began on the improved M1(IPM1) the following October. Theplant later transitioned to manufacturethe M1A1, with the first pilot vehiclebuilt in August 1985.6 By the end of1986, the plant’s equipment was in-creased to meet a maximum monthlyproduction capability of 120 M1A1tanks. At that time GDLS employedover 4,000 workers in Lima with over100 TACOM personnel monitoring theproduction and facilities contracts.

In June 1990, all government contractadministration services at Lima wereplaced under the Defense LogisticsAgency, Defense Contract Manage-ment Command, with TACOM as theprocuring activity. During this period,the Marines received over 200 M1A1tanks, and the first Abrams foreignmilitary sales occurred. The plant sup-ported Desert Storm by sending techni-cal experts to Saudi Arabia for M1A1fielding to units previously equippedwith M1s.

The 1990 DOD base closure plan or-dered the Detroit tank plant to reduceits operations, and in August 1991, theLima Army Tank Plant became theonly facility in the U.S. that is ahull/chassis/turret fabricator and finalsystems integrator of the M1.

The first M1A2 tanks rolled out ofLATP in 1992 with upgrade versionsproduced in 1994.

LATP Facilities

The commander of the Lima plant, agovernment-owned, contractor-operatedfacility, is an Army lieutenant colonel.The installation includes 370 acres and47 buildings, it’s own railroad network,and two government-owned railroad lo-

comotives. There is also is a 2-mile testtrack, steam plant, deep water fordingpit, 60% and 40% test slopes, and anadvanced armor technology facility.The main manufacturing building hasover 950,000 square feet of enclosedspace, equivalent to approximately 30football fields. The government ownsall of the real property and over 96%of the plant equipment, to include com-puterized machines, robotic welders,plate cutters, large fixtures, and specialtooling. General Dynamics is undercontract to operate the facility and pro-duce the Abrams with governmentoversight.

U.S. Production

Abrams production originally oc-curred at the earlier mentioned twosites with over 9,000 Abrams havingrolled off the assembly lines of thesefacilities, including those produced fordomestic and foreign sales. Currently,GDLS is under a multi-year Army con-tract to upgrade approximately 600M1/IPM1 tanks to M1A2. The plan isto upgrade 10 tanks a month over afive-year period. The cost of a newM1A2 tank is approximately $4.3 mil-lion.7 Listed at Figure 1 is the currentstatus of U.S. M1 tank production/dis-tribution.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

The M1’s technological and tacticalsuccesses in Desert Storm made thetank the envy of the world armor com-munity and generated foreign interest.Both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait nowown M1A2 tanks produced at LATP. Ina co-production program, M1A1 tankkits (hulls, turrets, components, etc.)are manufactured at LATP and shippedto Egypt for final assembly. Commer-cially, GDLS also produces “special ar-mor” packages for the South KoreanK1 tank. Abrams current foreign mili-tary sales are listed in Figure 2.

Personnel

The government and contractor mana-gerial staffs work together monitoringmonthly production requirements whilemaintaining quality control. A partner-ship environment ensures the highestquality equipment is produced at a faircost to the government. General Dy-namics currently has over 400 employ-

TANKS QUANTITY PRODUCTION DATES

M1 Tanks 2,374 1979-1985

IPM1 Tanks 894 1984-1986

M1A1 Tanks 4,753 (U.S. Army) 1985-1993

M1A1 Tanks 221 (U.S. Marines) 1989-1991

M1A2 Tanks 62 (New) 1991-1992

M1A2 Tanks 206 (Upgraded) 1993-Present (Oct 96)

M1A1 Tanks 18 (AIM XXI) 1996-(Jan 97)

Figure 1

COUNTRY QUANTITY PRODUCTION DATES

Saudi Arabia 315 M1A2 1993-1995

Kuwait 218 M1A2 1994-1996

Egypt 100+ M1A1 (kits) 1990-Present

South Korea 1000+ Special Armor 1984-PresentPackages

Figure 2


ees at LATP to produce the M1. Thereare four military and over 60 civilianpersonnel assigned to Defense Con-tracts Management Command-GeneralDynamics, Lima (DCMC-GD, Lima).Government duties range from contractadministration to production surveil-lance, quality control, and facilitiesmanagement. The commander’s visionis that DCMC-GD, Lima is committedto being a national center of excellencethrough innovative methodology imple-mented by motivated, qualified, em-powerment teams.

M1A2 Manufacturing, Machining, and Assembly

Rolled homogeneous steel plates goin one side of the plant, and 92 dayslater, a new M1A2 comes out the other.

The tank starts out as metal platesthat are 3/8 to four inches thick and 8by 12 feet in length and width. Twodifferent machines cut the plates intotank parts. The oxyacetylene cutteruses a mixture of oxygen and propanegas burning at 3000 degrees Fahrenheitto cut metal plates. The machine is ca-pable of cutting up to six-inch plates atabout one foot a minute. There are twotriple-head burners that have the abilityto make 60-degree angle cuts and ro-tate 360 degrees.

Another machine, a plasma cutter,uses nitrogen gas to cut steel plates upto two inches thick at ten feet a minute.The cutter’s flame burns at over 18,000degrees Fahrenheit, which is over twiceas hot as the sun’s surface. Plates areflame cut underwater to disperse theheat of the flame and to reduce noise.Both the oxy fuel and plasma cuttersare computer controlled, and templatesverify that the cuts are made within tol-erance. After cutting, the plates areground to remove oxide prior to weld-ing.

The turret is fabricated on a precastrace ring. A hydraulic fixture aligns thesix interior steel plates for welding.Three different types of welding areused for the turret: high deposition,pulse, and stick. Welders fill the gapsbetween the plates with enough weldwire to make the weld as strong as theadjoining steel.

The turret must be rotated verticallyand horizontally to weld each joint ona horizontal surface. Normally, it takesseveral passes of weld wire to meetballistic specifications. Overall there is


Above, stacks of steelplates, ranging from aninch to four inches inthickness, will eventu-ally be cut and formedinto M1-series tanks.

At right, the oxyacety-lene cutter, whichslices through steelwith its 3000-degreetorch.

Below, turrets havenow been fabricatedand sent to a securedarea where the specialarmor has been in-stalled.

“Rolled homogeneous steel plates go in one side of theplant, and 92 days later, a new M1A2 comes out the other.”

approximately 500 lbs. of weldwire in the turret.

The turret then goes to the se-cured armor technology build-ing for special armor. EveryM1A2 tank, foreign or domes-tic, has a brand new turretmanufactured from “scratch.”

The M1A2 hull is created similarly tothe turret, except it starts upside-down.The side plates are locked into a fixtureand the floor plates, nose and tail sec-tions are welded in place. The nosesection already has special armor en-closed. There is over 1000 lbs. of weldwire used in hull manufacturing. Thehulls are placed in rollover fixtures androtated horizontally to flame cut theopenings for the final drive, torsionbars, driver’s hatch, and floor holes.

Currently, the plant is only upgradingold M1/IPM1 hulls to M1A2, so hullmanufacturing no longer occurs. TheM1 hulls arrive by rail from AnnistonArmy Depot “sanitized” with all com-ponents and suspension removed.LATP cuts off the left side hull sponsonto install the new sponson that is capa-ble of supporting the improved NBCsystem. The original hull structure andserial numbers remain unchanged. Al-though all hull structures were fabri-cated at LATP, your tank was assem-bled in Detroit if the tank serial numberstarts with a D, and assembled in Limaif it starts with an L.

Machining

Nine large milling machines drill, tap,and cut the top and sides of the manu-factured hull. The torsion bar windows,final drives, and driver’s hatch openingsare all machined to a smooth surface.The hull race ring has 48 holes drilledand tapped to connect it to the turret.

The 15-ton turrets are machined in anupright position and held by a fixture

transported on air pads(hovercraft-like) so theycan be moved by oneperson. The turret’s top,underside, and race ringare all machined in thisfashion.

Appurtenances are thesmall metal brackets thatattach components to thetank. These appurte-nances are tacked andstud welded to the insideof the turret and the hull(sub-turret) floor. Thereare over 800 appurte-nances used in theAbrams: 500 in the hulland 300 in the turret.

Prior to initial painting,the turrets and hulls areshot-blasted with metalparticles to remove rust,markings, dirt, and oil. Shot blastinggives texture to the steel, creating abetter surface for paint adhesion. Thehulls and turrets then receive a primercoat, are dried in an oven, and finallyreceive a base coat of paint.

Assembly

The hull and turret assembly linesmove parallel to each other. Turrets be-gin assembly on fixed stands, wherethe ammo doors are installed. The120mm cannon has already been firedthree times at Aberdeen ProvingGround, Maryland, prior to installation.The turret is then placed on a mobile

dolly, which is pulled down the line byan in-ground conveyor system. Compo-nents, cables, and the assembled turretbasket are added during this period.Fully assembled, the turret is a com-pletely/functional separate unit. Theturret is then independently boresightedto align the sights and check the func-tions of the turret components.

The hull begins assembly on a fixedstand, where the torsion bars, road-wheel arms, and roadwheels are in-stalled. Then the hull rolls down the as-sembly line on its own roadwheels.Rear fuel tanks, hydraulic lines, cables,slip ring, engine, and the track are

New M1s negotiate the 60-degreeslope and the 40-degree sideslope during final testing. At left,an M1’s seals are tested by ford-ing in 4 feet of water. More than600 checks are made by the con-tractor even before the govern-ment’s final acceptance tests.


ABOVE: The entrance tothe new tank plant in1942.

ABOVE RIGHT: In a1952 view, bare casthulls await installation ofsuspension components.Today’s tank hulls arenot castings, but aremade up from plates ofsteel armor.

RIGHT: An impressiveaerial view of the sprawl-ing plant.

BELOW: In a 1950sphoto, several divisions’worth of stored tanksform an almost abstractcomposition in this viewof a large storage area atthe Lima plant.

LIMA VIEWS


added next. Skirts are then attachedand the hull is driven as a “convertible”to ensure that all components are work-ing properly, and that there are no oilor fuel leaks.

Upon completion of the separate hulland turret tests, the structures are “mar-ried” with 48 bolts connected throughthe hull and turret race rings. With theconnection of the slip ring, the compo-nent that communicates all electronicand hydraulic functions between thehull and turret, the vehicle is ready fortesting.

M1 Abrams Test and FinalAcceptance

Before the government begins inspec-tion, General Dynamics takes each M1through extensive testing. The contrac-tor makes over 600 checks to ensuresafe operation. Each tank is driven 30miles on an oval test track with a radargun to verify vehicle speed. The tankthen negotiates a four-foot water ford,drives over a bump course, travels on a40% side slope, stops and starts on a60% vertical slope, and completesprep-to-fire checks. A three-hour NBCtest then verifies that the tank willmaintain an overpressurized conditionfor long periods of time. After GeneralDynamics testing, the contractor turnsthe vehicle over to the government foracceptance.

On a full government inspection, over180 checks are made to guarantee con-formance to specifications. Normally,the government conducts between 40and 60 checks, based on historical dataand recent vehicle faults. Each M1 isdriven an additional ten miles andtested by the quality specialist. If thereare no deficiencies, the government ac-cepts the tank. The vehicle then re-ceives its final coat of paint, has decalsadded, and is loaded on railcars fortransport within the U.S. or to overseasterminals.

New M1A2 Developments

The pulse-jet air propulsion system(PJAS) was added to February 1996M1A2 production vehicles. This sys-tem cleans the three air filters (V-Packs) automatically while movingthrough dust/sandy terrain. With thePJAS system, there is no longer a needto manually clean the V-Packs after ahard day of fighting at the NationalTraining Center (NTC); PJAS willhave cleaned the filters for you.

Several efforts have been made to re-duce the weight of the M1A2. Alumi-num has successfully been used to re-place steel in the bustle rack, oil coolercover, and other parts. Titanium is thelatest metal introduced to the M1A2.Titanium is approximately 40% lighterthan steel at five times the cost. Plansare to substitute titanium for the NBCsponson covers, turret blow-off panels,and Gunner’s Primary Sight (GPS)covers in M1A2 tanks by the end ofthe year.

The Future of Abrams

Modernization is essential for theArmy; a smaller force requires in-creased lethality, and replacement ofobsolete equipment. The Army willspend dollars saved by cutting selectedprograms on developing and improvingcritical systems, to include the Abramstank. The technological advantage dis-played in Desert Storm will be main-tained by supporting soldiers withmodern, advanced weapons.8

M1A2 Domestic

There are two programs that will pro-duce more M1A2s for field units. TheAbrams upgrade program has receivedfunding for five years to upgrade anadditional 600 M1/IPM1 tanks toM1A2s for completion in 2001. TheAbrams Integrated Management 21stCentury program (AIM XXI) willmodernize over 1,200 M1A1 vehiclesstarting in 1998. By 1999, the M1A2Systems Enhancement Program (SEP)will upgrade the M1A2 fleet to a singleenhanced configuration, horizontallyintegrating the Abrams within theForce XXI community with commonhardware/software. Specifically, theM1A2 (SEP) will:9

• Enhance target detection with2nd-generation FLIRs

• Store terrain maps and improvenavigation

• Upgrade vehicle displays to color

• Improve communication withinForce XXI

• Add a thermal management sys-tem to keep electronics cool

• Add an under-armor auxiliarypower unit for extended surveil-lance operations with the engineoff, reducing fuel and batteryuse.

• Provide growth potential for fu-ture technologies

Future Abrams Family of Vehicles

The Army has pushed the commoncomponent chassis approach, using thesame or similar M1 components for allAbrams variants. Current vehicle initia-tives include the Wolverine Heavy As-sault Bridge (HAB). This vehicle is ca-pable of deploying a temporary bridgein combat, and is strong enough to sup-port the Army’s heaviest equipment.Production of over 599 vehicles willstart in the year 1999 with the hullspossibly built at LATP. The Corps ofEngineers is considering an Abramschassis Combat Mobility Vehicle(CMV-Breacher). The Crusader, theArmy’s advanced field artillery system,and the Air/Ground Dual Role DefenseSystem (AGDS, the Sergeant York re-placement), may both be built with amodified Abrams hull.

In June of 1996, the Navy awardedGDLS the contract for the demonstra-tion and evaluation phase of the Ma-rine Corps’ Advanced Amphibious As-sault Vehicle (AAAV), a 37-ton ar-mored personnel carrier designed on anAbrams chassis. This vehicle has athree-man crew and is capable of trans-porting 18 marines from 25 miles outat sea to shore in one hour.10 Produc-tion of over 1,000 vehicles is projectedto start in 2005. These initiatives capi-talize on the benefits of chassis com-monality, reducing developmental, pro-duction, and sustainment cost.

Future Foreign Military Sales

Future foreign M1A2 sales are de-pendent on how the Abrams stands upto the competition. Our Allies all makemodern battle tanks, but none compareto the current M1A2. Primary tankcompetitors to the Abrams are theChallenger II (Britain), Leo 2 Step II(Germany), Leclerc (France), and theType 90 (Japan). The M1A2 outshinesall armored rivals with its many uniquecapabilities and demonstrated superiorperformance.

Overseas opportunities for sales ofover 1,200 new Abrams tanks lookbright in the near future. In addition toits 315 M1A2s, Saudi Arabia has askedfor pricing on another 150 tanks. Egyptrecently contracted for 31 co-produc-tion M1A1 tank kits and asked for pur-


chasing data on another 100 vehicles.Kuwait has the potential for 38 M1A2follow-on orders. During 1995, GDLSdemonstrated the M1A2 in Turkey withstellar results. Turkey is expected topurchase more than 800 tanks initiallyin a co-production arrangement, andthe Abrams is aggressively competingfor the contract.11 There is a potentialfor upgrading an additional 500 M1tanks to M1A1 for sales abroad. FiveEuropean nations have expressed inter-est in obtaining upgraded M1A1s fortheir countries.12 The Abrams may soonbe the standard tank seen all over theworld.

Future Combat System (FCS)

The Future Combat System will be atank radically different from the currentAbrams design. The goal is a vehiclethat weighs no more than 43 tons whenfully combat loaded, operable by atwo-man crew from a safe compart-ment. Other initiatives are an electro-magnetic gun with an eight kilometereffective range, high-power-density en-gines, voice-activated system, and indi-rect vision technologies, giving thecommander a 360-degree “virtual” vi-sion system while sitting inside thetank. Many of these technologies aregoing to be fueled by the commercialindustry; however, there is a concernon how quickly these complex systemswill be available to produce a func-tional combat system at a reasonablecost.13

There are two competing “trains ofthought” inside the Army on how tomove to the next-generation tank (Fig.3). The first school of thought is the“evolutionary” concept backed by theArmy Science Board (ASB). The ASBwants to make incremental improve-ments to the Abrams until the technol-ogy is available to produce the FCS.Their concerns are that while a searchfor new technologies could bring im-provements to the Abrams family, nosuch technology is currently on thehorizon that would make it necessaryand cost-effective to opt for a new tankprior to 2020.14 Additionally, if the tankproduction line stays idle for about adecade, renewing production activitieswould be both very difficult and expen-sive. A “warm” production line must bemaintained or defense contractors andsub-contractors will lose technologicalexpertise and production capability inthis critical sector of the defense indus-trial base.

ASB officials want to initiate two,successive interim Abrams improve-ments after the SEP and prior to intro-ducing the FCS. The next tank couldbe a three-man-crewed M1A2 SEP pre-planned product improvement (P3I)model, which could be fielded in 2003.The P3I package would include ex-tended-range fire control systems, auto-matic target detection, helmet mounteddisplays, battlefield combat identifica-tion systems, autoloaders, and speechrecognition systems, increasing thetank’s lethality by 30 percent. In 2008,industry recommends an Abrams blockupgrade (M1A4), which may include aan improved main gun, hit avoidancecountermeasures system, top attackprotection, countermine system, andengine upgrades. Another 30 percentimprovement in combat effectivenesswould result from those changes.15

A second school of thought is the“leap ahead” concept backed by Ft.Knox’s Armor Center. The Centerdrafted an armor modernization planthat called for a FCS to be developedby 2015 and recommends that no fur-ther M1A2 Abrams production beyond2003. All future research and develop-ment funds would be funneled to thenew tank, making the M1A2 SEP themost advanced tank the Army will fielduntil 2020, before the FCS is fielded innumbers.16

Ft. Knox has recommended that theArmy initiate two studies to examineoperational and industrial-based con-cerns. The armor community’s tacticalconcerns are that units trained onM1A2s may be required to deployoverseas and operate pre-positionedM1A1s. Also, the aging of the Abramsfleet could reduce U.S. deterrent credi-bility in the world. Industrial concernsare the possibility of ceasing Abrams

production at LATP and the adverseimpact on the U.S. production base forarmored systems.17 General Dynamicsbuilds tanks with the support of 146contractors and 400 vendors in nearly40 states. The “leap ahead” option hashigher risk, but is potentially the lowercost option and allows for using allavailable armor funds to achieve a nextgeneration battle tank in the earliestamount of time. A CongressionalBudget Office (CBO) report stated thatcanceling the M1A2 production andpreserving the production facilities in a“mothballed” status could save thePentagon significant dollars over thenext six years.

Recently the Armor Caucus, com-posed of the Army’s senior leadership,concurred with Ft. Knox’s “leap-ahead”recommendation to start developmenton the FCS. However, the program ex-ecutive officer for armored systemsmodernization (PEO ASM) has sup-ported the ASB results and advocatedto the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff, anincremental “evolutionary vs. revolu-tionary” approach to an FCS throughcontinuous improvements to theAbrams tank. The belief is that theArmy should continue to produce tanksat a rate of 120 per year until the forceis ready to begin procurement of theFCS. Additionally all M1A1s andM1A2s should be refurbished throughthe AIM programs with continuoustechnology improvements for theAbrams fleet through 2010. Financially,the Army will eventually have to com-mit to either the Abrams improvementor an FCS development: the servicecannot afford two tank systems.18

Ft. Knox is crafting a modernizationplan in cooperation with PM Abrams,TACOM, and the Army acquisition ex-ecutive’s office to address the future


Figure 3. Tank Modernization Options

needs of the armor force.19 Technologystudies are occurring now to supportthis effort. No matter which path theArmy take towards tank modernization,the FCS will undoubtedly be the mostlethal ground vehicle the world hasever known.

Conclusion

From 1941 to the present, the LimaArmy Tank Plant has established a re-cord of mission readiness and accom-plishment through teamwork with em-ployees, contractors, and the surround-ing community. This effective partner-ship has built a critical industrial basefor national security in Lima, Ohio, in-cluding a reservoir of skilled and flex-ible workers. These workers — Army,contractor, and civilian — produced theM1 Abrams tank along with some ofits predecessors in U.S. tank lineageand contributed directly to military vic-tories from WWII to Operation DesertStorm. They are capable of meetingnew challenges in an equally successfulfashion.20

You now have insight on the past,present, and future production of theM1 tank and Abrams family of vehi-cles. Although there is talk of newtechnology, unmanned machines, andlight armored vehicles, the M1 tankwill be around for at least the next 20years and presumably will be manufac-tured in Lima. The contractor and gov-ernment personnel at the Lima ArmyTank Plant are dedicated to providingyou with the highest quality tank prod-ucts as we move into the 21st century.If you are in the Midwest, try to take adetour to the birthplace of the modernArmor Force, the Lima Army TankPlant.

Notes1Houshower, Hans, Ph.D., The Lima Army

Tank Plant, Fifty Years of Mission Accomplish-ment, American House, Inc., 1995, p. 1.

2Rupert, Barbara, J., The History of the LimaArmy Tank Plant, Lima, Ohio, August 1994, p.3.

3Rupert, p. 3.

4Klaver, LTC Robert P. and Evans, CPTFred, “Lima Army Tank Plant,” OrdnanceMagazine, Fall 1994, p. 7.

5Houshower, p. 6.

6Houshower, p. 7.

7Ross, John, G., “Wizard Warrior,” ArmedForces Journal, June 1996, p. 30.

8West, Togo, Jr. and Reimer, GEN Dennis, AStatement on the Posture of the United StatesArmy Fiscal Year 1997, Office of the Chief ofStaff, U.S. Army, Congressional Activities Di-vision, pp. 32, 37.

9“M1A2 SEP Passes Critical Milestone,”General Dynamics’ Landmarks Magazine, April1996, p. 1-3.

10General Dynamics 1995 Annual Report,General Dynamics, March 1996, pp. 16-17.

11General Dynamics 1995 Annual Report, p.14.

12Briefing made by Mike Dupree, GDLS, atan Abrams Program Review, 19 June 1996, in-formation approved for release by Pete Keating,GDLS.

13Ross, pp. 27, 30.

14Sherman, Jason, “Science Board Study Rec-ommends Continued Upgrades to AbramsTanks,” Inside the Army, May 20, 1996, p. 8.

15Ross, p. 24.

16Sherman, Jason, “Army Commits Funds forFuture Tank Development,” Inside the Army,April 22, 1996, p. 13.

17Sherman, “Armor Caucus blesses Futurecombat System, Directs Technology Review,”Inside the Army, June 17, 1996, p. 12.

18Sherman, Jason, “Longhouser Presses forContinued Tank Production and Improve-ments,” Inside the Army, July 29, 1996, pp. 11-13.

19Sherman, p. 13.

20Houshower, p. 9.


Captain Todd F. Tolson is a1986 graduate of the U.S.Military Academy. He hascompleted AOBC, IOAC, andCAS3 courses. He hasserved as an M1 platoonleader and executive officerfor C/2-69 Armor; HHC XOand assistant S3 for the197th Infantry Brigade(Separate), Ft. Benning, Ga.;S4 of 2-64 Armor, com-mander, B/2-64 Armor, andS3 Air of 1st Brigade, 3d ID,Schweinfurt, FRG. He is cur-rently the operations groupdeputy and lead administra-tive contracting officer forM1A2 U.S. and Foreign Mili-tary Sales contracts at theDefense Contract Manage-ment Command - GeneralDynamics, Lima, Ohio.

In the January-February 1996 AR-MOR, I offered the theory that M1A2swith smart ammunition in the defensecould destroy enemy armored vehiclesat an amazing 11.5:1 ratio. This theo-retical capability is the result of in-creased space and corresponding timeprovided by the Smart, Target Acti-vated, Fire and Forget (STAFF) round’srange, combined with enhanced digitalbattle command. These factors increaseour lethality and situational awarenesson the modern battlefield.

But what happens when we are notdefending? Can we still see a quantita-tive increase in our ability to destroyenemy vehicles offensively? The an-swer again is, yes. An attacking, pureM1A2 company can potentially halt anattacking Threat motorized rifle regi-ment (MRR) in a meeting engage-ment/battle. This is proven in time andspace when we consider several as-sumptions.

METT-T Assumptions

MISSION: An M1A2 company at-tacks in order to halt enemy offensiveoperations in its zone.

ENEMY:

• The attacking MRR is BMP-2 andT-80 equipped, is at 100% strength andexecutes standard Threat meeting battledoctrine.

• The MRR deploys a Combat Re-connaissance Patrol (CRP), a ForwardSecurity Element (FSE), and a motor-ized rifle battalion (MRB) as its Ad-vance Guard main body.

• Threat forces move at a constantspeed of 20 kph (50m every nine sec-onds).

• Threat forces maintain maximumdoctrinal intervals for their formations.

• For the purposes of this article, en-emy air is not introduced.

TIME AND SPACE:

• All tanks in our company fire at aconstant rate of one round every nineseconds.

• On the move, we travel at a con-stant speed of 20 kph.

• We open engagement of the enemyat the STAFF round’s 4km maximumeffective range.

• We want to maintain the maximumdistance possible from the enemy in or-der to enhance force protection.

TROOPS and EQUIPMENT:

• We lead an M1A2 tank company at100% strength.

• Each tank has a combat load of 40STAFF rounds.

• All tanks have a proper boresight.

• No tanks experience a weapon sys-tem malfunction.

• No tanks in the company are lost toenemy fire during the engagement.

• STAFF rounds kill with a constant40% probability of kill (.4Pk) over anydistance out to 4000 meters.

• Enemy locations are constantly re-ported and updated on our IVIS sys-tem.

TERRAIN: We fight on terrain thatis gently rolling, open and wide enoughfor the Threat and our forces to main-tain formations.

Calculations

The assumptions above lead us toseveral key facts. First, attempting toprove the theory in the context of anattack/meeting battle provides us withthe least battlefield time and space. Inthe defense, our static position coupledwith the Threat’s constant 20 kph speedgave us a closing distance and time of50 meters every nine seconds.

When our tank company is also mov-ing at a constant 20 kph speed in theoffense, we close at 100 meters everynine seconds. In order to buy back thebalance of time and space lost betweendefensive and offensive operations, we

PART II - THE OFFENSE

M1A2s, Smart Ammunition,And Time and Space Theory

by Captain Mike Pryor


Pho

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must increase our firepower. Hence, acompany-sized attack.

A second key point concerns target-ing. A .4Pk means we must fire 2.5rounds (in 22.5 seconds) to destroy atarget. Even though STAFF roundsseek out their victim, at least to someextent, we cannot blindly fire down-range believing we will kill targets —enemy vehicles must fall within theround’s footprint. (For the CRP, wehave three degrees of aiming arc at4km in which to find a target; for theFSE and main body, six degrees perMRC-sized element.)

So, once enemy positions are down-loaded onto our IVIS, we need a meansof orienting our main gun in the properdirection.

Finally, our closing distance and timecoupled with the .4Pk yields the fol-lowing calculations:

• Engaging the CRP. (See Fig. 1.)

+ This element closes with us at 100meters every nine seconds.

+ It will take one of our platoons tworounds per tank and 18 seconds/200closing meters to destroy them.

+ Since only one platoon is neededfor this engagement, the rest of thecompany can disperse. For near flanksof the other two platoons to remain“tied-in” to the center, engaging pla-toon, the company can maintain a 500meter distance between elements. Thisdispersion only allows the commandervirtual battle command of his company.He cannot “see” his entire element at

all times, but force protection isincreased. So dispersed, ourcompany frontage is approxi-mately 11 kilometers.

+ For all tanks in the platoonto range across the (doctrinal)space occupied by the CRP, wecannot maintain a frontagegreater than 2900 meters.

• Engaging the FSE. (SeeFigure 2.)

+ In approximately nine min-utes, the FSE closes to withineffective range of our company.

+ To achieve company massfor engaging the FSE, we mustshrink our 11 kilometer front-age. A five kilometer frontage

allows us to “see” all of our elements,maintain proper battle command, andmass our fires. Maneuvering to thispoint, flank platoons must move at aninward, approximately 45-degree anglefor five kilometers while maintainingtheir constant speed. This closes thecompany at 4500 meters from the FSE.It also provides us 45 seconds for com-pany/platoon/crew fire commands.

+ We must initially be able to rangehalf-way across the FSE and 100 me-ters deep with our far, flank tanks toprovide appropriate mass. To do so, thecompany is in a looseVee formation, 600meters deep, with 350meters between tanks.

+ It will take ourcompany three roundsper tank and 27 sec-onds/300 closing me-ters to destroy the FSE.

• Engaging the Ad-vance Guard MainBody. (See Figure 3.)

+ In up to anothernine minutes, the Ad-vance Guard mainbody comes into en-gagement range.

+ Our frontage is thesame as when attack-ing the FSE. Each pla-toon engages oneMRC of the AdvanceGuard in a frontal orcross pattern of fire.All tanks can range

across MRC formations and 100 me-ters deep to open the engagement. Ourformation depth, however, shrinks to300 meters.

+ Our company must fire nine roundsper tank (in one minute, 21 sec-onds/900 closing meters) to destroythis element. We close to within 3100meters of the enemy. While this doesnot favor force protection againstATGMs, it is still outside of maximumeffective T-80 main gun range.

+ By doctrine, inability of the Ad-vance Guard to halt our attack dictatesa hasty defense by the enemy and pro-vides us with mission success. We mustnow execute a sequel to our plan thatmeets the higher commanders’ intent.

• End State (based on assumptionsand the scenario above). From the firstround fired, none of our tanks have ex-pended more than 14 rounds, leavingus with enough to destroy about 140more enemy vehicles. Our attack trav-ersed almost 12 kilometers in just un-der 20 minutes.

By comparison, we have just aboutequaled the destruction wrought byH.R. McMaster’s cavalry troop in theBattle of 73 Easting during DesertStorm. However, our round expendi-ture, engagement distances, and situ-

Fig. 2


Fig. 1

ational awareness are quantitatively im-proved.

Capabilities

The above shows us it is possible tolaunch a tank company at a muchlarger, moving enemy force and de-stroy them bluntly in head-to-head con-frontation. This is a non-maneuver war-rior’s dream. But what if commander’sintent stated that our goal is to maxi-mize dispersion for force protectionand attack the enemy throughout thedepth of his formation simultaneouslywithin the capabilities of the company?

We know that the M1A2 companyhas the ability to destroy the AdvanceGuard. We are aware that we havemore space and time when using theSTAFF round’s maximum effectiverange to open engagements. We alsounderstand that the M1A2 provides usthe means to both maneuver withgreater speed and exercise battle com-mand with greater precision.

It is therefore possible for one platoonto attack the CRP, two platoons to at-tack the FSE, and, with artillery sup-port, for the company to place fires onthe Advance Guard main body simulta-neously. After destroying the CRP andFSE, we then mass the company to at-tack the Advance Guard main body.

Time and space fig-ures for maneuver-ing elements in thismanner are a bitmore complicatedto calculate. How-ever, the conditionssurrounding ourtask are no differ-ent.

Our problem then,is one of battlecommand becauseof platoon disper-sion. The companycommander’s bat-tlespace is now tensof kilometers deepand wide for the in-itial attack. Butwithout constantscrolling, his five-by-five kilometerIVIS screen doesnot allow him to

“see” more than the platoon withwhich he maneuvers. A radical rethink-ing of the tools we provide the com-mander for his trade may be in order.

Digital Thoughts

The ability to attack and destroy anMRB(+) with one M1A2 company in14 rounds/under 25 minutes/approxi-mately 16 kilometers is revolutionary.This revolution, as with the platoon inthe defense, raises both observationsand questions about our digital force:

• A first, arrogant thought might be,“Who needs to task organize?” How-ever, a thinking man would call forequipping the infantry with a faster an-tiarmor projectile (LOSAT?) that canbe carried in greater quantity thanTOW missiles. (We will not alwaysfight entirely armored forces on primetanker ground.)

• A distinct depth and frontage corre-lation is evident in offensive calcula-tions: the wider the enemy’s frontageand greater his depth, the narrower (tosome extent) and shallower our com-pany formation must be.

• Capabilities of an M1A2 platoonunderscore the need to train that eche-lon and their leaders to proactivelyidentify when and where to engage in

combat and determine the time andspace needed to complete the task.

• What is the proper training goal forour company or its parent battalion?Our rapid tempo can regularly closeengagements and battles faster thanever before. Theoretically, it is alsopossible that a battalion(-) has the abil-ity to ATTACK to halt an enemy divi-sion’s unwanted incursions. Does thismean company and battalion com-manders conduct operational maneuverfor strategic objectives? How and whendo we begin to teach them to think thatbig?

• As illustrated above, we can spreadelements over vastly greater distances.Would a company commander then notneed the ability to “see” all of his ele-ments in order to properly commandand control them? If he is to “see” eve-ryone, he needs a screen that showsmore than a five-by-five kilometer box.Or, to take a walk on the far side, is atraditional, fighting company com-mander no longer needed? (It is evidentthat the above attack did not need toend with the Advance Guard. The com-pany still has the ability to destroy en-emy forces in great number. The com-mander of this element needs to seedeeper before this fight is over in orderto continue the attack and may not beable to do so if involved in the directfire fight. For a commander to be suc-cessful in this enhanced role, will hehave to remain a platoon leader for amuch greater period of time?)

• While simultaneously attacking theenemy throughout his depth, we disre-gard traditional notions of a companyformation. Two platoons forward andone back constitutes a company Veeformation. But does it remain a viableformation when we spread out overtens of kilometers with platoons alter-nating in defensive and offensive pos-ture? Do we want to do this at so lowan echelon simply because we can?

• How do we test these (and defen-sive) theories other than in the virtualworld? We need a MILES-like systemupgrade that replicates our direct firetime and space capabilities. Addition-ally, the size of the Combat TrainingCenters OPFOR must be increased ap-propriately. The current family ofTADDS also needs modification to rep-licate our true capabilities.

Fig. 3


• We know our speed, shock effect,and stand-off capabilities can carry usthrough the direct fire fight. However,the advent of smart mortar and artilleryrounds presents a real threat to ourforce. Consequently, counterbatteryfires are needed to provide true forceprotection. Could it then be that a firesupport element complete with FIRE-

FINDER Radar and a DS artillery bat-tery is attached down to the companylevel?

• In (defensive or) offensive opera-tions, the enemy’s numerical advantageand subsequent ability to mass fires isfunctionally dislocated by our battlecommand enhancements and STAFFround effective range. The enemy’sbest way to counter this is to eitherseek out our technology for himself ortactically maneuver his current force to

close direct fire distance faster. He alsoneeds to consciously attack our abilityto conduct information operations. If hecannot execute any of these options, avery temporary fix may be to seekmore combat support fires. With noother options, might he use eitherweapons of mass destruction or di-rected energy weapons to meet his

goals?

• Our CSS assets need the abil-ity to cover more distance at afaster speed with larger quantitiesof CLASS III in order to supportoffensive operations. Based onthis (and the earlier defensivetheory), we should use lessCLASS V than we do now.

Conclusion

I believe an M1A2 tank com-pany can theoretically attack and de-stroy an enemy Advance Guard battal-ion (+), halting an MRR attack. Ourability to conduct offensive operationsat greater than a 1:3 ratio in quantita-tively increased battlespace is quiterevolutionary. However, it calls intoquestion many of our long held notionsabout battle command, organization,and doctrine. We must now proactivelyseek answers to these questions if weare to fully exploit digitization. I urgeall soldiers to stress digital capabilities

to their actual and theoretical limits. Inso doing, we can make this warfightingleap a very long one.

I would like to acknowledge appre-ciation for the critique and commentson this article by COL (Ret.) JoeStrickland and 1LT Pete Robertson.

SMART AMMUNITION, Cont’d

XM943 STAFF ROUND


Captain Mike Pryor wascommissioned in Armor fromNew Mexico Military Insti-tute’s Early CommissioningProgram in 1984. He com-pleted his bachelor’s degreein political science from theUniversity of North Texas. Heis a graduate of AOBC (Cav-alry), SC3, TC3, (M60A3 andM1), TLIC, NBC Defense,IMPC, the III Corps MOUTTrainer’s Course, AOAC, andCAS3. He has served as acavalry platoon leader, troopXO, S3 (Air), adjutant, andtroop commander with 1-124Cavalry, TXARNG, and as anS3 (Air) and company com-mander with 1-156 Armor,LAARNG. He is currently theS3, 1-156 Armor, LAARNG.

Last Original M1s Retired from Active DutyThe last original model of the M1tank has been retired from duty inthe active Army, an event markedby a brief ceremony at the BurkeMotor Pool, Fort Knox, on Septem-ber 16.

HHC, 2-81 Armor of the 1st ArmorTraining Brigade used this earlymodel of the M1 to train NationalGuard and Reserve units. It wasthe last active duty unit to carry thismodel in its inventory.

The original M1 revolutionized theArmy’s combat capabilities andmarked a turning point in U.S. tankdevelopment. Its most impressivefeature was its special armor, a

composite “sandwich” of steel andother materials capable of defeatingHEAT rounds in addition to kineticenergy penetrators. The M1 wasfaster and more maneuverable thanits predecessors in the M60 series,while offering a lower, smaller sil-houette. It was constructed of flat ar-mor sections welded together,rather than armor castings, themethod used in earlier U.S tanks(see the Lima Army Tank Plantstory on page 7, this issue).

The earliest M1s were armed withthe M60’s 105mm rifled cannon, aBritish design first adopted to the fi-nal versions of the old M48 series.Subsequent M1s were upgunned

with the German Rheinmetallsmoothbore cannon of 120mm.

Another revolutionary feature of thefirst M1 tanks were their turbine en-gines, replacing the diesels thatpowered the M48 and M60 seriestanks. The engine change, despitea penalty in fuel consumption, re-sulted in much quieter operation, somuch so that soldiers encounteringthe tank in early maneuversdubbed it “Whispering Death.”

The Fort Knox armor unit’s 10 M1sbeing retired from active duty willbe rebuilt as M1A2s. Meanwhile,the unit was to receive M1A2s asreplacements.

The Joint Live Fire (JLF) programwas initiated by the Office of the Sec-retary of Defense (OSD) in March of1984 because there was no formalprocess to test fielded U.S. systemsagainst realistic threats.

The cold war was intense at the time.There was great interest in assuring ef-fective capability, and a need to accu-rately determine the effectiveness ofU.S. systems against the Soviet threat.

The U.S. had been successful in ac-quiring a significant stock of threat sys-tems; we knew what they had, but wedid not know how well their systemsstood up against ours, and vice versa.

The Joint Live Fire program waschartered to focus, through live firingof real munitions, on the vulnerabilityof fielded armored vehicles and combataircraft against actual threat systems,and the lethality of U.S. munitionsagainst those threats.

OSD provides the program funding,buys the test articles, and providestechnical oversight. The Joint TechnicalCoordinating Groups (JTCG) for Air-craft Survivability and Munitions Ef-fectiveness administer the programs.The JTCGs, under guidance fromOSD, directly coordinate test planningand program direction while the indi-vidual services execute and support thetests.

There are two distinct divisions of theJLF program, Aircraft Survivability and

Armor/Anti-armor. The program hasfour primary objectives:

• Establish actual test data on the vul-nerability of fielded U.S. systems toactual threat weapons, and the le-thality of fielded U.S. munitions ormissiles against threat targets.

• Provide insights into necessary U.S.system design changes, such asmoving ammunition storage racksto provide greater protection to thecrew members.

• Develop Battle Damage Assessmentand Repair (BDAR) information toenhance equipment repair in thefield for restoration into the battle.

• Provide insights into lethality andvulnerability modeling and simula-tions that are used in live-fire test-ing of new systems. The informa-tion also helps train soldiers, for ex-ample, by enhancing crew trainingto better report the results of firingengagements at threat systems.

Initially, JLF was a program coveringa selected set of front-line U.S. sys-tems. However, there are numeroussystems which might be involved incombat beyond those selected or in-itially imagined, plus the potential newthreats that are always evolving, so theprogram has continued to meet a never-ending need. Initially, the Navy wasnot involved in the JLF program, butthe program has been expanded to in-clude testing of surface ships.

There have been tests of numerousaircraft and armored systems since theprogram started. Much of the Army’scurrent helicopter fleet (AH-64, UH-60, AH-1S), many Air Force and Navyfront-line aircraft (F-15, F-16, F-18, A-6, AV-8A/B) and several Soviet attackhelicopters and fighters (MI-24, MIG-21, MIG-23) have been tested. Addi-tionally, most of the Army and MarineCorps armored combat vehicles (M1/M1A1, M60, M48, M2/M3, M113,AAVP-7, LAV-25) and several Sovietarmored systems (T-62, T-72, BMP,BRDM) have been tested to determinethe vulnerability of U.S. systems tothreat systems, or the lethality of U.S.weapons and ammunition (M829, M919,M791, TOW, Hellfire, etc.) againstthreat systems.

While the JLF program conceptuallymay have spawned interest resulting inthe Congressionally mandated LiveFire Test (LFT) program, each has itsown area of applicability. The LFT pro-gram focuses on new systems in devel-opment, or systems that have productchanges or improvements that involvevulnerability or lethality. The drivinginterest in LFT is to include live-firetesting early in the system acquisitionprocesses, complete the testing, andidentify appropriate design changesprior to a decision to proceed beyondlow rate initial production. The JLFprogram focuses on fielded systemswhich have raised questions involving

Proof Positive

Joint Live Fire TestingAssesses the Lethality And ProtectionOf Our Own EquipmentAnd Foreign Materiel

by Thomas Julian

and Robert Wojciechowski

A typical target, the BMP 2 is to be tested against the Javelin antitank missile. (Story photossupplied by U.S. Army Test Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.)


live fire exposure, or where threatweapon systems change.

JLF often discovers small changesthat have large impacts on survivability.These items have developed as a resultof JLF, for example:

• Jam-resistant actuators for aircraftwhich are both lighter and moresurvivable

• Shielding of critical components ofa system

• Adding extra wire to improve re-dundancy

• Moving detectors to improve warn-ings

• Modifying software to enhance op-erations

• Revising stowage to save lives

• Shock mounting soft components toprovide durability

• Changing fasteners to create betteraccess

• Fuel management changes to im-prove efficiency

• Changing trigger pull thresholds sosoldiers can better use their equip-ment.

These and many other beneficial im-provements have been the large payoffsfrom small changes brought about fromthe JLF program.

The program offers many benefits notavailable from other sources. As men-

tioned above, funding for the programis provided from the OSD budget, andadministered by the Joint TechnicalCoordinating Groups. OSD also pro-vides the target materials, if the en-counter is a U.S. system lethality inves-tigation. In practice, the service in-volved provides test support from itsown resources as well. The servicemay also provide the U.S. system em-ployed in the test, its ammunition, itsoperating crew, and the range facilitiesand range support.

As new systems arrive on the battle-field, threats change. Fielded systemsare developed, based on the threat en-visioned during early development ofthe system, and no matter how accuratethe attempt at threat definition, the ac-tual threat is always going to be differ-ent from that envisioned. Political align-ments also change as the world situ-ation evolves, as evidenced by the mul-tiplicity of new U.S. interests since thebreakup of the Soviet Union. The endof the cold war has brought new re-alignments, and potential involvementsfor U.S. forces not previously antici-pated, either as combatants or in apeacekeeping role.

Coupled with the changing politicalscene, the reality is that weapon sys-tems placed in the hands of troops nowwill be in use for several decades. Thecurrent U.S. Army truck fleet is run-ning an average life of about 30 years,and counting. The UH-1 helicoptercontinues to be a robust system. Whiletechnology makes great strides, the

service life of our deployed systemswill continue to be extended.

Even though the system must undergoits mandated live fire testing before itcan be produced in quantity for issue, itis likely that the threat facing the sys-tem during its operational life will bedifferent from that it was designed for,or the need for improvements may be-come obvious under actual employ-ment conditions. Questions of surviv-ability and lethality always arise, whichneed to be answered by joint live-firetesting.

JLF also tests foreign vehicles or mu-nitions, to determine the effectivenessof non-U.S. munitions and systems andto discover the pros and cons of a sys-tem’s attributes that make it survivable.An example of this concept might bethe M1 tank series, which has com-pleted its live fire test, but, if a newthreat develops, JLF will test that threatagainst the M1.

In a test in Nevada in 1995, a focuswas on battlefield damage assessmentof threat armored vehicles fired on byU.S. tank guns. The test determinedwhat crews could expect to infer fromthrough-the-sight observation of an im-pact. Aggregated Desert Storm data,from both Army and Air Force sources,based on BDA supplied by U.S. systemoperators, scored more than twice thenumber of Iraqi tanks killed than werepresent in the theater. This was a clearoverestimation of the kills that actuallyoccurred. In last year’s JLF test, two

Javelin missile is placed at preplanned im-pact point prior to test.

The BMP at moment of Javelin warhead ignition. Note armor plate shields around test areato ensure safety.


different tanks, a T-62 and a T-72, plusa BMP armored personnel carrier, werefired on, using actual combat munitionsand gunners. The targets were observedthrough the gunner’s sight of the firingvehicle and through the sight of a com-panion vehicle during the firing. Evenwhen it was clear the target was hit, itwas not possible to determine whethera target perforation (hard kill) had oc-curred. Data was collected, however, tosuggest state-of-the-art signature proc-essing technologies could be employedto provide the crew a positive indica-tion of perforation (hard kill) vs. non-perforation (damaged, but not a kill) inreal time. If a kill determination wasdependent upon the occurrence of aperforation, the JLF test confirmed thatother sensing techniques would beneeded. In addition to the daylightsights, use of thermal sights were alsoevaluated and, although what was seenwas different from the daylight sights,the perforation conclusion still held. Itwas also determined, by placing anearth berm in front of the target, that ahit on the berm looks very similar to ahit on the tank when viewed throughthe sights, and a hit determination islikely to result, even when there actu-ally is none. These JLF test results area very useful source of data in BDAsensing, considerations for future de-velopments of fire control systems andsimulators, and training for tank crews.

Another potential benefit from theJLF program is the opportunity for livefire test exposure of systems catego-

rized at levels less than major systems.LFT is mandated for those systemswhich are considered major systemsbased on the individual unit cost, or theaggregated cost of the production run(as in the case of munitions). In addi-tion to these, there are many systemswhich have potential exposure to com-bat conditions, but which are not re-quired to conduct full-up, full-scale livefire testing by the LFT criteria. Groundsystems, like trucks used to move per-sonnel and supplies, have a potentialexposure to combat conditions, evenwhen their primary use is not to per-form a combat mission. This is espe-cially important in the case of employ-ment of U.S. forces in operations otherthan war. A recent example is the gen-eration of casualties from vehicle expo-sure to mines in Bosnia. Truck designchanges and/or modifications can betested by exposure to potential threatmines, and the JLF program can serveas a helpful means for the productionof data to assist in the design of thesemodifications.

Another potential use of the JLF pro-gram is in obtaining data on the use ofso-called “gray” systems — U.S. orforeign manufactured systems eitherobtained through foreign military sales,or other sources, and employed againstU.S. forces. The political changes men-tioned above, and others like them,could conceivably result in changedloyalties leading to such a result. Thusthe traditional engagement concept of“Blue-on-Red” may well be supple-mented with “Blue-on-Gray,” or even“Blue-on-Blue.” There is, therefore, aneed for data with which to plan em-ployment of U.S. systems against suchtargets, and to consider the possibleneed for protection from them. This ispotentially in the JLF program scope,and should be considered a possibility.

Another important aspect of JLF is todetermine the limits of munitions le-thality and vehicle vulnerability regard-less of the “design requirements.”Some of the most interesting resultshave been related to system perform-ance outside the design envelope. Forexample, tests demonstrated that hitsby overmatching munitions on theBradley by no means guaranteed a“kill.” Further, the crew and systemwould have survived many direct hitson stowed ammunition.

JLF has led to many changes thathave directly affected the safety of U.S.crews, the fightability of systems, tac-tics for utilization in battle, and the de-

signs of future systems. The JLF pro-gram continues to be highly relevant tothe determination of system vulnerabil-ity and confirmation of system lethal-ity.

If you have questions about the le-thality or vulnerability of fielded sys-tems that can be answered by datafrom live fire tests, the Joint Live Firetest program may offer answers. TheOSD office overseeing the program ishappy to discuss previous test data andconsiderations for future testing. Theoffice is eager to assist the armed serv-ices and the defense industry in assur-ing the most capable defense for thiscountry. For additional information,contact:

Deputy Director, Operational Test & Evaluation Live Fire Testing1700 Defense, Room 1C730, The PentagonWashington, DC 20301-1700

PH: (703) 614-5408

or

Army Research Laboratory (ARL)ATTN: AMSRL-SL-ES (Mr. Bely)Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005

E-mail Address: ([email protected])

Mannequin representing BMP crewman af-ter test.


Thomas Julian is a live-firespecialist assigned to the officeof the deputy director, Opera-tional Test and Evaluation (LiveFire Test) at OSD. He hasworked in the testing commu-nity for over 16 years at Aber-deen Proving Ground, EglinAFB, and in the Pentagon. Hehas been involved in armorand aircraft testing at all levels.

Robert Wojciechowski, a lieu-tenant in the USAR, is a staffassistant to the deputy director,Operational Test and Evalu-ation (Live Fire Test). He is ona one-year special assignmentto OSD from the Army Re-search Laboratory (ARL),where he has been involved inthe conduct of numerous ar-mor and anti-armor tests. He isbeing assigned to the Opera-tional Test and EvaluationCommand (OPTEC).

Designs for armored fighting vehiclesare now being put forward which are tobe operated by only two crewmenseated down in the hull.

Both the German E.G.S.1 and theBritish VERDI 22 experimental vehi-cles employ this new system of crew-ing. It has been proposed for a furtherdevelopment of the German Leopard 2Main Battle Tank (MBT)3, and in theUnited States, General Dynamics LandSystems (GDLS) is proposing a lowprofile Future MBT to be operated byonly two hull-seated crewmen.4

Some of the reasons given for thischange in crewing are the need to re-duce the vehicle’s presented frontalarea — particularly that of its turret —so as to reduce the size of target ex-posed to enemy fire; the need to in-crease the passive protection providedfor the crewmen; and the desire to putthe fewest crewmen at risk when theMBT goes into action. A further rea-son, often not sufficiently appreciated,is that by seating the MBT’s two prin-cipal crewmen side-by-side in duplicateforward-facing hull crew stations,either one of them would be able todrive.

This would eliminate the third crew-man, the dedicated driver, convention-ally seated at the front of the vehicle.The resultant vehicle would havesmaller dimensions and the possibilityof better protection. The three functionsof driving, gunning, and commandingwould then be exercised by only twocrewmen, working together. Theycould exchange functions as the tacticalsituation developed. The fact that onlytwo crewmen would then be involvedin the operation of the vehicle, ratherthan a crew of three or even four,should result in an enhanced speed ofreaction.

Image intensification and thermal im-aging night vision devices have beenintroduced into many fighting vehicles

over the past twodecades, so that ithas now becomepossible to maneu-ver and fight 24hours a day.Whether a hand-loaded MBT ismanned by fourcrewmen, orwhether the intro-duction of auto-matic loading al-lows the numberof crewmen to bereduced to onlythree (e.g. Russian T-80 and French Le-clerc MBTs), the vehicle’s crew mem-bers will all have to remain on dutycontinuously and all will becomeequally exhausted. A two-man crew islikely to suffer even more severely dur-ing round-the-clock operations, reduc-ing the time a two-man crew can keepgoing.

If a two-man crew is to be adopted,back-up crews might be one answer,with the off-duty crewmen, transportedand protected in some form of light ar-mored vehicle (LAV) for adequate restand sleep. These LAVs will then haveto meet up with the MBTs so that crewexchange can take place, something noteasily arranged in a war of maneuverin which vehicles will be well dis-persed.

An alternative solution would be tocarry a third crewman, resting andsleeping within the hull of the MBT.The three crewmen, who would all betrained to undertake any task in the ve-hicle, could take turns manning the twoprincipal hull crew stations. Change-overs every four hours, on an agreedschedule, would ensure that the MBTwould always be manned by two alertcrewmen. The size of the hull wouldhave to increase to accommodate thethird resting crewman so, for a given

weight of vehicle, there would be lessprotection.

Loss of Direct “Top Vision”

The MBT’s main armament wouldthen be traversed above the hull-seatedcrewmen, either in an unmanned turretor on an external overhead mounting.An unmanned turret will — like themanned turret preceding it — carry thegun trunnions over the front of the tur-ret ring so the breech can descend intothe hull when the gun is put into eleva-tion. An unmanned turret will provideprotection for the gun and its recoilsystem, and rounds will be supplied tothe breech within the same armor pro-tection. Examples are the AmericanTank Test Bed vehicle of the 1980s5

and Western Design Corporation’s win-ning entry in ARMOR’s 1993 Tank De-sign Contest6 (See ARMOR, July-Au-gust 1993).

On the other hand, with an externaloverhead mounting, the gun trunnionscan be above or even to the rear of themounting’s center of traverse so thatthe breech will not descend into thehull on elevation. Instead, it will movein elevation and depression to the rearof the mounting. Although the externaloverhead mounting is likely to presenta smaller target than the unmanned tur-

From the External Gun To the Hybrid Tank

by Robin Fletcher

TACOM’s Tank Test Bed Vehicle


ret, it offers less protection to the gunand its recoil system, and rounds sup-plied externally to the breech are likelyto be vulnerable. Examples are theGerman VTS experimental vehicle ofthe 1970s, which carried a 105mm tankgun externally above a Marder hull,and the Swedish UDES-19 proposal ofthe 1980s, in which individual roundswere moved to the breech externallyfrom rear hull stowage while the gunremained pointing at the target.7

In the case of a conventionally tur-reted vehicle, whether hand or auto-matically loaded, the commander hasbeen able to look all around directlyfrom the highest point of his vehicle,head out, with raised hatch or throughhis vision cupola, using a wide field ofview through the unity periscope.

At the same time, he is likely to beprovided with a high powered pano-ramic instrument with which to searchfor and identify targets, and he maythen be able to make use of that sameinstrument for target engagement.While using this high powered instru-ment, he will be fully aware that hewill be unable to maintain watch allaround his vehicle and that there willbe a danger that it will be surprised anddestroyed.

A major disadvantage of allowing themain armament to traverse above thehull-seated crewmen is that the com-mander will no longer be able to exer-cise direct “top vision.” He will onlybe able to look around from the hullroof below the level of the gun.8 Whenmoving over rolling country with thegun in an unmanned turret or on an ex-ternal overhead mounting, the gun islikely to be spotted by the enemy be-fore our vehicle commander is in a po-sition to see him.

In the January-February 1996 issue ofARMOR, Don Loughlin, in his article,“The External Gun Turret: Often aBridesmaid, Never a Bride,” points outthis considerable disadvantage. Henotes that such external mountingshave often been proposed but havenever as yet been adopted, principallybecause of the absence of commander’sdirect “top vision.”

Reinstatement of “Top Vision”

One way of overcoming this disad-vantage is by restoring the vehiclecommander’s all-around vision to thehighest point of his vehicle, if not on apermanent basis then at least temporar-

ily. When the articulated UDES-XX-20tank destroyer was under developmentin Sweden9 in the 1980s, the disadvan-tage was recognized and steps weretaken to overcome it — the vehiclecommander, complete with his visioncupola, could be raised and lowered inan armored “capsule.” In this way, hecould reestablish direct all-around vi-sion above the level of the gun. But thecapsule could be only lightly armored,and had to be lowered again for thegun to regain its all-around traverse.

A sensor head offers another ap-proach to obtain commander’s “top vi-sion” indirectly. It would be carried ontop of the mounting. But this changefrom direct to indirect vision may notbe entirely satisfactory. As Don Lough-lin writes in his article, “thermal imag-ing ... can’t replace the human eye inthree respects: resolution, field of view(and the combination of both) and itsmarvelous working with the brain.”

It may be possible to use a tall opticalperiscope, set in the hull roof, to obtainadequate resolution for target identifi-cation, but it will be difficult to usesuch an instrument to lay the gun.Sighting would probably have to bedone by television or thermal imagingfrom a sight head carried on the gunmounting. This would supply a sightpicture to the screens in front of bothcrewmen. It might also be possible to

employ a continuously rotating pano-ramic head, carried above the mount-ing, to record the 360-degree scenearound the vehicle, but it would be dif-ficult to show a wide portion of thatscene to the crewmen if space restric-tions limited each man to a single dis-play screen.

A Helmet Mounted Display (HMD)system, worn by all crew members,might allow a 40- to 60-degree field tobe obtained from the sensor headabove the gun mounting. It would bedirected entirely by head movement —a restricted field perhaps, but quicklyand instinctively traversed.

It can be argued that such indirect vi-sion will soon become essential if Di-rected Energy Weapons (DEW) are in-troduced. If that becomes the case,similar indirect vision will then have tobe provided for all classes of fightingvehicles, whether they are turreted orcarry their guns in fixed mountings. Ifthis were to occur, the indirect visionof an MBT-equipped with an externaloverhead gun mounting, while notwholly satisfactory, would certainly notbe inferior to any other gun mountingconfiguration. In that event, the loss ofcommander’s direct “top vision” wouldno longer be the chief reason to rejectthe external overhead mounting, andcriticism would then be transferred totwo other disadvantages.

Two Swedish conceptvehicles, the UDES-19, at left, seen inmodel form, and the ar-ticulated UDES-20,above, were externalgun designs. The armseen at the base of theUDES-19’s gun pedes-tal was the deviceused to transfer ammu-nition from the hull tothe rear of the gun.


The first of these is that the externalmounting, being above and distinctfrom the hull of the vehicle, will beeasily spotted and identified by the en-emy. The second criticism will be thevulnerability of the gun, its recoil sys-tem, and the mechanism transferringrounds externally from rear hull stow-age to the breech. As Don Loughlinwrites in his article, “Elevated gun po-sition decreases survivability due tohigh silhouette and exposed mecha-nisms.” Clearly, steps will have to betaken not only to counter the vehiclecommander’s loss of direct “top vi-sion,” but also the external mounting’svulnerability. Fortunately, it is possibleto overcome all three of these disad-vantages simultaneously by the adop-tion of an unconventional system ofmounting the gun.

Creating the Hybrid Tank

If we lower the MBT’s long tank guninto a depression running the fulllength of the roof of the hull, the vehi-cle commander would regain his direct“top vision” and the mounting’s vulner-ability would be corrected. Moreover,if such a vehicle were then able to betraversed on its tracks and inclinedback and forth on a controllable sus-pension system, it would be able to en-gage targets with its gun held in itslowered position. Such a vehicle wouldhave to incorporate two very differentvehicle configurations, each havingvery different attributes. Both shouldnow be examined individually in somedetail before they are put together toform the hybrid.

The first configuration is the Swedish“S” Tank, developed in the 1960s andonly now being withdrawn from serv-ice. Traversing was difficult in thisfixed gun tank because of the need toemploy the differential action of thetracks to turn the whole vehicle. ThisMBT concept has not been accepted byother nations. Yet the commander’s di-rect “top vision” is available from thehull’s highest point, the vehicle is com-pact and is in no way prominent and,with the gun and its recoil system con-tained within armor, they cannot beconsidered vulnerable. The “S” Tank’sfront engined layout provides goodprotection for the crewmen at the frontand for the ammunition at the rear, butjust like a conventional turreted tank,the S” Tank displays a large target toenemy return fire when engaging overcover.

Like the “S” Tank, an MBT carryingits gun on a permanently raised exter-nal overhead mounting would be likelyto accommodate the crewmen in afront engined hull, with ammunitioncarried at the rear. The gun would have360-degree traverse for the rapid en-gagement of flank targets, but com-manders’ direct “top vision” would nolonger be available. As already noted,the gun on its mounting would bebound to be prominent, and it wouldalso be vulnerable as would the transfermechanism needed to bring roundsfrom rear hull stowage to the breech.The mechanism’s most difficult taskwould be to reload the gun while it re-mained directed at a flank target, al-though this was, in fact, the solutionadopted by the Swedish UDES-19 ex-perimental vehicle. The mechanism’stask would be eased considerably if thegun were to return momentarily to the12 o’clock position after each shot, asthe rounds would only need to beraised and rammed forward, and wouldnot also have to be traversed aroundinto alignment with the gun.

When moving in open country, thevehicle carrying an external mountingis likely to present the same size targetas the “S” Tank, but when engagingfrom behind a crestline or rise in theground, the size of target exposedwould be very much reduced.

If the permanently raised externaloverhead mounting were replaced by amounting which could be moved upand down, or rather by a “lift-and-turn”mounting which could both raise andtraverse the gun, the vehicle could en-gage targets in any direction once thegun was raised. After firing, the gunwould not only be returned to the 12o’clock position, but would also belowered down into its hull top depres-sion where it would be reloaded by theautomatic loading system carried in the

rear of the vehicle. Once reloaded, thegun could again be raised and trav-ersed.

While the gun is raised, the vehiclecommander’s direct “top vision” wouldno longer be available and the gun,now well above the hull, would be vul-nerable. But this would be so only mo-mentarily, while the gun was actuallybeing fired, and the commander wouldsurely minimize the time during whichthe gun remained raised and exposed.

Operating the Hybrid Tank

The Hybrid Tank would be capable oftwo different modes of operation, em-ployed according to the prevailing tac-tical situation. It would normally beoperated with its gun lowered, givingits commander his vital “top vision”from within his well-protected vehicle.The principal use of the raised gunwould be for the engagement of emer-gency flank targets, but it would alsobe used for firing on the move, or todisplay a much reduced target whenengaging from behind cover.

One set of attributes would then be inuse when the gun was raised and an-other when it was lowered, but whatamounts to a third set would becomeavailable due to the actual raising andlowering of the mounting. Thus, whenengaging from behind a crestline, notonly would the size of target exposedbe minimal, but exposure time wouldalso be short. This makes it difficult forthe enemy to hit the much smaller tar-get, gives him little time to do so —the latter depending on his gunner’sspeed of reaction and the time of flightof his projectile. Moreover, there wouldbe no need for the Hybrid Tank tomove forward to put its gun into actionor reverse to break off the engagement,as is the case with a conventionally tur-reted vehicle. It would simply remain

The low position of the hull-mounted gun in the S-Tank required the tank to be almost fullyexposed when firing over cover.


stationary behind the protective crestand raise and lower its gun as neces-sary.

A Hybrid Tank would have two dif-ferent means of traverse, on its tracksand by the use of its raised mounting,and also two different means of eleva-tion and depression, by means of itscontrollable suspension system andagain by the use of its raised mounting.This would allow engineers to reducethe scope of either system as the otherwould be available to supplement it.For instance, a lengthened hull mightbe difficult to turn on its tracks, but thegun could be traversed on its mountingif necessary, and if the raised mountingwas unable to provide enough depres-sion, the suspension could be “knelt” tosupplement it. In the extreme, the com-plete failure of one system need notlead to the Hybrid Tank becoming un-serviceable; the other system could beused temporarily, although no doubtwith reduced efficiency.

The “lift-and-turn” mounting wouldbe installed behind the crew stationsbut forward of the stowed ammunitionand, just like the vehicle’s power pack,should be able to be removed from thehull as a single unit for maintenance ormodification. With the breech at theextreme rear of the vehicle, recoilwould take place behind it and roundswould be moved out of the rear of thehull before being moved over onto guncenterline to be loaded. The decreasedinertia of the gun in traverse would al-low the rapid engagement of flank tar-gets and, while lowered, the gun wouldbe supported in the hull top depressionto ensure its correct alignment with theautomatic loader. Thus the same load-ing system would reload the gun inwhichever mode it happened to be op-erating with the breech being heldclose to, or actually being brought to,the ready rounds rather than rounds be-ing conveyed to a distant breech.

An alternate that has been suggested10

calls for the lowered gun to be carriedon one side of the hull, or over one ofthe vehicle’s tracks, rather than in ahull top depression. It would be pro-tected from flank fire by armor carriedon the sides of the vehicle. The twocrewmen operating the vehicle wouldthen no longer be separated by the guntube depression in the hull roof be-tween them. They would be able to sitshoulder to shoulder for improved co-operation, and would be able to use



“S” Tank configuration.

External overhead gun configuration.

Hybrid Tank — gun lowered — loading.

Hybrid Tank — gun raised — traversing.

“And therefore I consider that wewere not beaten by the genius of Mar-shal Foch, but by ‘General Tank,’ inother words, a new weapon of war...”

General der Infanterie A.D.H. von Zwehl, DieSchlachten im Sommer, 1918, am der Westfront.

On September 15, 1916, the BritishExpeditionary Force under the com-mand of General Sir Douglas Haig em-ployed tanks in support of infantry op-erations during the Battle of theSomme. In a previous article (ARMOR,November/December 1995), I dis-cussed the decision-making process be-hind Haig’s commitment of tanks atthat time. This article analyzes the Brit-ish development of mechanized doc-trine leading up to the November 1917Battle of Cambrai and the impact ofthe lessons learned from that operation.In the final analysis, the British selec-tively applied certain lessons to imme-diate tactical problems, but failed tograsp the implications of mechanizedoperations for the future.

At the end of September, 1916, Lieu-tenant Colonel Hugh Elles took com-mand of the British Tank Detachment.He was described by his primary staffofficer, Major J.F.C. Fuller, as “boyishand reckless in danger; perhaps a bettersoldier than a strategist, yet one whocould profit from the cooperation of hisadvisors, and one who was universallyloved and trusted by his followers.”1

Historian Douglas Orgill looked be-yond Elles’ personality and wrote thatElles represented a “bridge between thenew military knowledge and the oldsoldierly virtues.”2 Despite Elles’ per-sonal leadership qualities, however,Major Fuller was the one responsiblefor developing doctrine and trainingprograms.

At their first meeting in late 1916,Elles stated that “this show [the TankDetachment] badly wants pulling to-gether; it is all so new that one hardlyknows which way to turn.”3 Ellescharged Fuller with creating a sense of

discipline and esprit de corps in the de-tachment. Fuller regarded this missionas a three-part problem. First, he had toinstill a sense of discipline, which hepursued via a series of lectures on thesubject. Second, he had to instruct theofficers in new doctrine. And third, hehad to reorganize the detachment so asto maximize the use of its equipment.

Fuller was an infantry officer with areputation for being a highly efficientstaff officer. In February 1917, he pub-lished a training manual entitled“Training Note #16,” designed tostandardize all training practices in thedetachment.4 Fuller organized the man-ual in nine sections: detachment or-ganization, operations, tactics, coopera-tion with other arms, preparations foroffensives, supply, communication, re-inforcements, and camouflaging. Call-ing the tank “a mobile fortress, whichcould escort the infantry into the en-emy’s defenses, and from behind whichthey could sally forth and clean up histrenches,”5 he believed that tanks werecapable of a more offense-oriented rolethan had been demonstrated during theSomme operation.

In June, 1917, Fuller produced a docu-ment entitled “Projected Bases for theTactical Employment of Tanks in1918.” In this study, he drew on the re-sults of ineffective tank employmentduring the battles of the Somme (Sep-tember 1916), Arras (April 1917), andMessines (June 1917). Fuller advancedthree points based on his analysis. Thefirst was that the tank’s effectivenesswas related directly to the terrain overwhich it operated. The second was that,if properly employed, tanks were capa-ble of executing a penetration whichcould allow for a breakthrough by fol-low-on cavalry and infantry forces. Thethird principle was that the success ofany tank penetration required a surpriseartillery bombardment not to exceedforty-eight hours in duration.6 Fullerexpanded on Ernest D. Swinton’s con-cepts in his belief that tanks were capa-

ble of more than strongpoint and wireobstacle reduction. “He soon becamethe leading advocate,” wrote B.H Lid-dell Hart, “of the tanks’ wider potenti-alities — as a means to revive mobilewarfare, instead of merely as a mod-ernized ‘battering ram’ for breakinginto entrenched defenses.7

Later in 1917, Fuller proposed an op-eration to British General Headquartersdesigned to test the validity of hisideas. Fuller’s initial recommendationproposed a raid of no more than a fewhours duration, designed to penetrateenemy defenses, capture prisoners, andshake up the defenders. In an August1917 paper entitled “Tank Raids,” hesummarized the objectives of just sucha limited raid as “Advance, hit and re-tire; its objective being to destroy the


The British Tank Detachment at

CambraiLessons Learned and Lost Opportunities

by Major David P. Cavaleri

enemy’s personnel and guns, to demor-alize and disorganize him, and not tocapture ground or hold terrain.”8

Unfortunately, such a plan had littleto recommend it to GHQ; the limitedtactical gains were outweighed by thepotential loss of surprise and vehicles.However, the Third Army Commander,General Julius Byng, read the proposaland recognized its potential. He devel-oped a plan which incorporated Full-er’s basic concepts but which hadmuch larger objectives, especially re-garding the capture of territory.

Byng wanted the focus of the opera-tion to be the communications center atCambrai; once that town was capturedhe could then release his cavalry to thenorthwest to raid behind German lines.Byng’s plan relied on the tanks to

penetrate the defense and assumed thatsuch a break-in would automatically re-sult in a cavalry breakthrough. His planmeticulously prepared for the initialbreak-in, but discounted the fact that atthat stage of the year, he lacked ade-quate reserves to follow through. Evenif the operation was successful in ef-fecting a break-in of the “outpost” and“battle” zones, he would not be able topenetrate into the “rearward” zone tolaunch his cavalry.9

Haig ultimately decided on an ad-vance with limited objectives in the vi-cinity of Cambrai, but not necessarilyfocused on the town itself. He revisedByng’s plan to concentrate on theBourlon Ridge which, if captured,would provide British forces with ex-cellent observation of the “battle” and

“rearward” zones. Unwilling to dis-count completely the possibility of abreakthrough, Haig nevertheless re-tained the option to terminate the op-eration at the end of forty-eight hoursunless clear progress was evident.10 ByOctober, 1917, Fuller had revised hisoriginal “Tank Raids” proposal to in-corporate Byng’s and Haig’s guidance.These new plans featured the tank in aspearhead-type role.

By mid-November 1917, the staff atGHQ had finalized the plans for theCambrai attack. The sector was con-stricted by two canals, the Canal duNord on the left and the Canal de l’Es-caut on the right, six miles apart. Theinitial attack area included a number ofsmall villages and two dominant ridge-lines, the Flesquieres and Bourlon. The


Hindenburg trench system in this sectorwas over five miles deep, completewith dugouts, machine gun posts, wireobstacles, antitank ditches in excess oftwelve feet wide, and supporting artil-lery batteries.11

The Hindenburg Line proper ran in anorthwesterly direction for almost sixmiles from the Scheldt Canal at Ban-teux to Havrincourt. The line thenturned north for four miles to Mouvres.Roughly one mile behind this first linelay the Hindenburg Reserve Line, andan additional three and a half miles be-hind that lay the Beaurevoir, Masnieresand Marquian Lines.12

The final plan called for the tanks topenetrate the Hindenburg Line betweenthe two canals, pass the cavalrythrough the gap, then continue forwardand assist the infantry in seizing Bour-lon Wood and the town of Cambrai.The tanks and infantry would continueto expand the penetration while thecavalry raided support units in the“rearward” zone and beyond.13 Fullerexpressed concern over the suitabilityof the terrain beyond the “battle” zoneand over the lack of reserves availableto exploit any breakthrough, but theplan stood as written.14 The Cambraiplan was a mixture of traditional opera-tion and innovative thinking. The planof attack dispensed with the traditionallong duration artillery bombardmentand instead, the 1,003 supporting artil-lery guns were to conduct a brief sup-

pressive bombardment, concentratingon counter-battery and smoke-screenfire. Once the assault began in earnest,the artillery would shift to the creepingbarrage pattern similar to that designedby General Rawlinson for the 1916Somme operation. The tanks were as-signed the mission of breaching thetrenches and wire obstacles and leadingthe attack, precluding the need for anintense preparatory bombardment.

Byng anticipated a breakthroughwhich would allow the cavalry to passthrough to the “rearward” zone in order“to raid the enemy’s communications,disorganize his system of command,damage his railways, and interfere asmuch as possible with the arrival of hisreinforcements.”15 The final plan re-flected the level of development whichBritish mechanized doctrine hadreached under Fuller; Haig was willingto commit the tanks to a crucial roleand expected them to accomplish morethan obstacle reduction. At the sametime, the exploitation and disruptionrole stayed with the cavalry who re-mained vulnerable on a battlefield re-plete with machine guns and artillery.

Fuller divided the six-mile-wide of-fensive sector into a series of objec-tives, each of which was further subdi-vided, based on the number of strong-points, into “tank section attack areas.”He assigned a three-tank section, alongwith an infantry section, to each attackarea. Each tank carried a bundle of

wood three or four feet in diameter andweighing over one ton. These were af-fixed to the front of each vehicle withchains. The wood was carried to fill inantitank ditches, thereby allowing thetank-infantry teams to negotiate threeditches as they leapfrogged through thedefenses.16

On November 20, 1917, at 0620hours, British artillery commenced asuppressive barrage along the six-mile-wide front. Unlike previous preparatorybarrages, this forty-five minute barragewas predominantly smoke and high ex-plosive. The artillery concentrated onsuppressing the defenders’ artillery andmasking the tanks’ advance. After lessthan one hour, the artillery began thecreeping barrage and the tanks movedforward. The absence of a traditionalpreparatory bombardment probablycontributed to the defenders’ surpriseand to the tanks’ success in breachingthe first defensive lines.

GHQ allocated 476 tanks to Byng’sThird Army for the Cambrai attack.Out of this total, 378 were fightingtanks; 44 were devoted to communica-tions, command and control; and theremaining 54 were assigned resupplyduties. These last tanks each carriedtwo tons of supplies and hauled an ad-ditional five tons on sledges over thebreached obstacle networks. Fuller esti-mated that it would have required over21,000 men to carry a similar resupplyload, which represents a significant


savings in fighting troops who were notdiverted from actual combat duties.17

The tanks were accompanied and fol-lowed by elements of six infantry divi-sions. Waiting behind the safety of theBritish trenches were the five divisionsof cavalry which Byng hoped to launchforward.

The opening stages of the attack weresuccessful. Masked by smoke and thecreeping barrage, the tanks tore holesthrough the wire obstacles and filled inditches with the wood. Less than twohours after the attack began, the Britishcaptured the Hindenburg Main Lineover the six-mile front between the twowoods. By 1130, the Hindenburg Sup-port Line, with the exception of theridge at Flesquieres, was in Britishhands as well. By the end of the day,the BEF had penetrated to a depth ofjust over four miles, capturing over5,000 prisoners, with a loss of just over4,000.18 The first day’s operation dem-onstrated the effects of coordinatedtank, infantry, and artillery tactics oversuitable terrain within the parametersof a well thought-out tactical plan.

But the success of November 20 wasmitigated by several failures. The Brit-ish lost 179 tanks that day to a combi-nation of enemy fire and mechanicalbreakdown. The tank/infantry teamspenetrated to a depth of over fourmiles, but not deep enough to qualifyas a breakthrough into the “rearward”zone. The cavalry divisions in mostsectors never even made it into the bat-tle, and the few cavalry units commit-ted failed to accomplish anything sig-nificant in terms of rear area exploita-tion. In addition, the operation experi-enced several instances of degraded co-ordination between the tanks, infantry,and artillery. The 51st Infantry Divisionfell so far behind the assaulting tanksthat, when the tanks reached the Fles-quieres Ridge, the infantry could notdetect the breaches in the wire.

A short while later, 16 tanks, withoutthe protection of their own infantryteams, were destroyed by a battery ofGerman field guns which were out ofrange of the tanks’ weapons.19 This in-cident illustrates clearly that Fuller’stactics needed refinement. While hehad proven that tanks were capable ofrapid penetration, they were by nomeans capable of independent opera-tions.

Haig terminated the Cambrai attackon November 22, just as he had prom-ised if the offensive failed to result in abreakthrough. He recognized that the

BEF lacked the reserves needed to con-tinue the attack because of the previousdiversion of five divisions to the ItalianFront at Caporetto.20 One week afterthe attack began, he wrote, “I have notgot the necessary number of troops toexploit our success. Two fresh divisionswould make all the difference andwould enable us to break out....”21 Thislack of reserves, combined with thecavalry’s inability to achieve a break-through on their own, convinced Haigto end the attack after only limitedgains. It is clear that no one, with per-haps the exception of Fuller himself,anticipated the extent or rapidity ofsuccess. Swinton reacted to the initialreports on November 20 with this com-ment: “I’m pleased all right, but I’mwondering. I bet that GHQ are just asmuch surprised by our success as theBoche is, and are quite unready to ex-ploit it.” 22

The lack of available reserves re-sulted in the loss of British momentumat Cambrai. The Germans were able tofall back, regroup, and on November30 launch a counterattack to eliminatethe new British salient. The Germansbegan their attack at 0700 with an in-tense one-hour-long artillery bombard-ment, similar to the one used by theBEF on November 20th. Using provensturmabteilung tactics, they succeededin reducing the salient on an eight-milefront in just over three hours. Severalminor successes followed, but theywere unable to execute a rapid or vio-lent breakthrough due to inadequate re-serves, British reinforcements, and gen-eral troop exhaustion. The counterat-tack forced the BEF to withdraw par-tially to stabilize the lines, resulting inpractically no net gain based on thesuccess of November 20th. By Decem-ber 7, the lines had stabilized. The Ger-mans had, between November 20 andDecember 7, lost 41,000 men and 138guns. The British had lost 43,000 men,158 guns, and 213 of their availabletanks.23

In strategic terms, the BEF had gainednothing. But from a tactical and devel-opmental viewpoint, the battle of Cam-brai represents a transition in BEF op-erations. Because of the complete tacti-cal surprise and significant gains madein less than 12 hours, several contem-poraries mark November 20, 1917, as alandmark of sorts in the history of war-fare. Lloyd George later said that thebattle “will go down to history as oneof the epoch-making events of the war,marking the beginning of a new era inmechanized warfare.”24 Haig credited

the use of tanks at Cambrai with mak-ing it possible “to dispense with artil-lery preparation, and so to conceal ourintentions from the enemy up to the ac-tual moment of attack,”25 and statedthat the tanks’ penetration of the Hin-denburg Line had “a most inspiringmoral effect on the Armies I com-mand... the great value of the tanks inthe offensive has been conclusivelyproved.”26 Swinton, not surprisingly,claimed some credit for the success ofNovember 20th. “It has an added inter-est,” he wrote, “in that it was upon thelines here laid down [reference made tohis February 1916 ‘Notes on the Em-ployment of Tanks.’] that the epoch-making Battle of Cambrai wasfought....”27

The combination of surprise, suitableterrain, adequate numbers of tanks, co-ordinated artillery bombardment, re-sourceful preparation and, most impor-tantly, comprehensive planning resultedin a major penetration of enemy lines.The lessons learned in the areas ofeconomy in men per weapon, in menper yard of front, in casualties, artillerypreparation, cavalry personnel, ammu-nition, and battlefield labor were im-portant.28 While there was no denyingthe significance of the event, the Brit-ish failed to convert the early successof November 20th, and Fuller set out todetermine exactly why. Fuller and theGeneral Staff of the Third Army devel-oped a list of lessons learned based onthe Cambrai operation.29 Six of themost significant lessons, several ofwhich remain applicable to present-daycombined arms operations as well, ap-pear below:

1. “Tank units and infantry units mustmaintain close liaison during offensiveoperations.” Haig used the incident atFlesquieres Ridge as an example of thislesson: “This incident shows the impor-tance of infantry operating with tanksand at times acting as skirmishers toclear away hostile guns....”

2. “Keep large reserves of tanks to re-place unexpected losses in any sector.”

3. “The present model tank is me-chanically unable to deal with enemyparties in upper stories of houses.”

4. “Tanks must not outdistance sup-porting infantry — this allows enemyto hide and reappear.” This was a con-tributing factor in the cavalry’s failureon November 20th.

5. “Infantry must not expect too muchfrom tanks — they must assist thetanks with protection — this requirescontinuous combined arms training.”


6. “Tanks used in small numbers areonly ‘frittered’ away. If it is desired tocontinue the advance with tanks on thesecond day, a completely new forma-tion of tanks should be earmarked.”30

Historian John Terraine alluded to thiswhen he stated “the tanks [at Cambrai]had shown their effectiveness forbreaking into even a very elaborate andstrong trench position. Breakingthrough was another matter.”31

In May, 1918, Fuller published an im-portant doctrine study entitled “TheTactics of the Attack as Affected by theSpeed and Circuit of the Medium DTank,” more commonly referred to assimply “Plan 1919.”32 His analysiscalled for the initial penetration of the“outpost” and “battle” zones by tanks.Once into the “rearward” zone, thetanks would seek out the enemy’s com-mand and control systems and artillerysupport, thereby assuming the role ofthe cavalry.33 This plan represented afurther innovation on tactics beyondthose employed in September 1916 andNovember 1917. Fuller advocated thedestruction of systems, rather than theelimination of enemy troop concentra-tions, and believed the end resultwould be the same: the crippling of theenemy’s will and capacity to fight. Hisfuturistic concept was based on thespeed, maneuverability, and firepowercapabilities of the Medium D tank, andhe assumed, mistakenly, that the mili-tary establishment would agree withhim. In order to execute his plan, Fullerrequired a force of over 5,000 tanks, anincrease in Tank Corps personnel from17,000 to 37,000, and a willingness onthe part of the military to replace thehorse-mounted cavalry with tanks.34

Despite the success of November 20,1917, Fuller’s “Plan 1919” was tooradical for the leadership to endorse,and it never progressed beyond thetheoretical stage. What “Plan 1919”represents is the continuing develop-ment of mechanized doctrine. The lim-ited success of November 20th demon-strated the capabilities of tanks; in July1918 at the Battle of Hamel, and later,in August, 1918, at the Battle ofAmiens, the British Tank Corps hadopportunities to demonstrate the poten-tial for tank operational success on anincreasingly greater offensive scale.

The Battle of Cambrai provides a pic-ture of the tanks’ development from in-fantry support weapons with limited of-fensive potential to weapons employedon the point of the offensive. They hadproven capable of clearing a path forthe infantry into the main defensive

zone and demonstrated the potential toadvance further. During the inter-warperiod, mechanized doctrine wouldvacillate between those who believedtanks should remain auxiliary to the in-fantry and those who were willing totake the doctrine to a higher level. In-terestingly enough, it was the Britishwho elected to revert back to the earlyphilosophy, while the Germans, underGeneral Heinz Guderian, explored thepotential for expanded mechanized op-erations. In retrospect, the decision byboth sides is logical. The British hadwon the war using traditional strategiesaugmented by innovative equipmentand tactics, and therefore had little in-clination to change. The Germans, onthe other hand, had lost; their tacticshad proven ineffective on the largescale of the Western Front, and theyhad everything to gain by adoptingnew equipment and strategies.

Notes1J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional

Soldier, (London: I. Nicholson and Watson,1936), p. 88.

2Douglas Orgill, The Tank: Studies in the De-velopment and Use of a Weapon, (London:Heinemann Publishing Co., 1970), p. 31.

3Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Sol-dier, p. 87.

4Ibid., p. 96ff.5Ibid., p. 97.6Ibid., pp. 129-130.7B.H. Liddell Hart, The Memoirs of Captain

Liddell Hart, Vol. 1, (London: Cassell andCompany, Ltd., 1965), p. 87.

8Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Sol-dier, pp. 172-175; see also Trevor Wilson, TheMyriad Faces of War, (New York: B. Black-well, 1986), p. 488.

9Orgill, pp. 35-36; see also Wilson, p. 488.10Wilson, pp. 488-489; see also J.H. Boraston,

Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches, Dec 1915-April1919, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,1927, pp. 152-153.

11Ibid.12Boraston, pp. 153-154.13Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Sol-

dier, pp. 181-182.14Ibid.15Boraston, p. 153.16J.F.C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, (Lon-

don: John Murray, 1920), pp. 136-153; see alsoWilson, p. 489.


18Boraston, p. 157; see also Wilson, p. 490.


20Robert Blake (ed.), The Private Papers ofDouglas Haig, 1914-1919, (London: Eyre andSpottiswoode, 1952), p. 265.

21Ibid.22Ernest D. Swinton, Eyewitness: being per-

sonal reminiscences of certain phases of theGreat War, including the genesis of the tank,(New York: Arno Press, 1972), p. 266.

23Wilson, p. 492; see also David Eggenberger,A Dictionary of Battles (New York: Thomas Y.Crowell Company, p. 1967), p. 73.

24David Lloyd George, War Memoirs ofDavid Lloyd George, (Boston: Little, Brownand Company, 1933), p. 102.

25Boraston, p. 157.26Ibid., p. 173.27Swinton, pp. 171-172.28Arch Whitehouse, Tank, (New York: Dou-

bleday and Company, Inc., 1960), p. 93.29Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Sol-

dier, pp. 218-219.30Blake, p. 269.31John Terraine, White Heat: The New War-

fare 1914-1918, (London: Sidgewick and Jack-son, 1982), p. 242.

32Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Sol-dier, pp. 332-335.

33Robert H. Larson, The British Army and theTheory of Armored Warfare, 1918-1940, (NewYork: University of Delaware Press, 1984), p.90; see also Orgill, p. 89; see also Fuller, Mem-oirs of an Unconventional Soldier, p. 321.

34Orgill, p. 89; see also Fuller, Memoirs of anUnconventional Soldier, Appendix I, pp. 334-335.


Major David P. Cavaleri holdsa B.A. from Eastern NazareneCollege at Quincy, Massachu-setts (1982) and an M.A. in His-tory from the University of Mis-souri at Columbia, Missouri(1993). He earned his commis-sion in 1983 through the OfficerCandidate School at Fort Ben-ning, Ga. He is a graduate ofseveral Department of the Armyschools, and is now attendingthe U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College at Ft.Leavenworth, Kan. He justcompleted serving as an Assis-tant Professor of History at theU.S. Military Academy at WestPoint, New York.

The outcomes of most battles ---- atthe National Training Center or in areal war ---- are usually decided beforea unit ever crosses the Line of Depar-ture (LD). In nine out of ten cases, aunit’s success in the preceding counter-reconnaissance fight is an impressivelyaccurate indicator of who will win theupcoming battle.

According to the Ft. Irwin MobileTraining Team, ‘‘90% of the units thatwin the counterrecon fight win the sub-sequent battle.’’1 Few who have beeninvolved in the practical application ofsuch maneuvers can argue empiricallyabout the truth behind this statement.

Despite the importance of a success-ful counterreconnaissance fight, manyunits fail in their effort. We believe thisis because of the friction generated inthe planning, preparation, and execu-tion of the mission.

To start, we must recognize the natureof the beast, and the source of the diffi-culties. The essence of the problem liesin the lack of definition in how to con-duct the counterrecon fight. There ex-ists no direct method to succeed in thisfight, as evident by the limited publish-ed tactics, techniques, and procedureson the subject.

The armor manuals (FM 17-95 andFM 17-97) describe the concept of sev-eral types of screens, but not the me-chanics of a counterrecon fight. The in-fantry school acknowledges the mis-sion’s importance (FM 7-10 and FM 7-20, FM 71-2), but glosses over the me-chanics of the mission (FM 71-123).The battle against enemy reconnais-sance is a mission in and of itself,which ties together the diverse mis-

sions of subordinate units. The task ofconducting a counterrecon fight incor-porates a screen, hasty attack/defense,zone recon, and the unique executionof tactical logistics, to name a few.

Units grapple with the counterreconfight because of the complex condi-tions under which they conduct it.First, the counterrecon fight immedi-ately follows the completion of anotherviolent, intensive mission, such as anattack or a defense. This means that thetasked units are at a reduced strength,with a non-standard chain of command,and at some level of physical exhaus-tion.

Second, since units normally fight thecounterrecon battle during the planningprocess for a subsequent mission, it isunderway without the benefit of thestaff conducting a full mission analysis.Factors such as these increase the bur-den on the unit commander conductingthe mission.

Our intent here is to lay out sometechniques and procedures that haveproven effective for the authors. Thegoal is to incorporate the following intotraining so that SOPs can be developedto facilitate the efficiency of counterre-connaissance fights. The article is or-ganized to address the ‘‘mission’’ byBattlefield Operating Systems in threeseparate phases: plan, prepare, and exe-cute. Finally, remember that this articleseeks to amplify existing manuals withrefined and proven techniques and pro-cedures. It almost goes without sayingthat the following should be overlaidagainst published doctrine and methodsavailable.

Assumptions

Before continuing, let us identify theparameters and assumptions of this ar-ticle. First, these techniques are appli-cable in conducting a counterreconmission for the frontage of a companythrough regiment; while the numbersinvolved may change, the principles re-main the same.

Second, the anticipated adversary is amechanized/motorized enemy usingvarious Krasnovian tactics; in otherwords, he does what he must to accom-plish his mission.

Third, the unit conducting the coun-terrecon mission is not the main effortfor subsequent missions, and the focusof the higher headquarters is on gener-ating combat power for the followingmission’s main effort. The counterreconunit is organically formed from, andprotecting, a mechanized/heavy force(to include HMMWV-mounted scoutsas applicable). During the execution ofthe mission, the tasked unit has priorityof fires and logistic support. Further,mission execution will be primarilyduring hours of limited visibility.

Last, the applications explained util-ize two separate maneuver elements.These two components are, to borrowan effective term, hunters and killers,and represent a refinement of the con-cept discussed in ARMOR (See ‘‘Hunter-Killer Operations,’’ July-August 1993ARMOR. - Ed.) The most effective ra-tio found to date is one tank section(killer) per scout or surveillance pla-toon (hunter).2 The lethality of the kill-ers has proven to be higher when em-ployed in pairs, across a platoon front-age, under the control of a headquartersrather than as an individual tank in sup-port and control of a specific scout sec-tion. When more than this one surveil-lance platoon (hunter) is used in con-junction with one tank section (killer),a third component is required from out-side these two forces, a mission com-mander. A command and control ele-ment (CP) directs and manages all sys-tems and synchronizes the fight, free-ing the platoon leader to concentrate ondetection and destruction.

Plan

Maneuver: First, all participatingforces should identify the front and rearboundaries of the security zone. Theseborders constitute limits where thefighting forces have the latitude to con-duct operations without the need to fur-ther deconflict terrain. It is imperativethat this front and rear limit be dissemi-nated to friendly elements which oper-ate behind the counterrecon force. Thisprevents friendlies from straying too farforward and, during the executionphase, delineates where subsequentunits assume responsibility for destroy-ing ‘‘leakers.’’ As soon as possible, es-tablish the rear boundary of the coun-

Taking the Fight to the Enemy

by Captain Doug Boltuc and Captain Scott Efflandt

Counterreconnaissance

ARMOR ---- November-December 1996 31

terrecon force. This will allow me-thodical clearance of the sector andprovide control for the subsequentmovement of friendly forces. The iden-tification of subsequent and alternatepositions is imperative. Instinctively,scouts will seek alternate screen linesduring their occupation, but additionalattack and assault positions for thetanks, as well as extra ambulance ex-change points (AXPs), logistics releasepoints (LRPs), and other CSS sites forrelated activities need to be includedduring development of the plan.

Intelligence: The commander of thecounterrecon force needs to develop a‘‘Threat Database’’ during the planningphase (FM 34-130). This tool is madeup of three components: an enemy or-der of battle (OOB), overlaid on thecurrent mission timeline, referencedagainst the enemy’s objectives. To start,establish the order of battle with thenumber of enemy recon elements andfrom which echelon, for example: twodivisional recon patrols followed bythree regimental recon patrols in oursector with a possible air insertion of a15-man patrol on hills in our northernsector (see Figure 1). Next, overlay theOOB onto the enemy’s mission time-line. Depending on when the securitymission begins, some enemy recon ele-ments may already be in your area ofoperations. This obviously impactsmovement techniques and affects theactions of those conducting operationsto the rear. Finally, evaluate these twoitems in terms of the enemy’s objec-tives. Just because the enemy has four

recon patrols doesn’t mean he will as-sign one in each quarter of the sector.This is particularly important whenfriendly assets are stretched thin; a unitcannot do ALL things well, and a toolsuch as this can help one decide whereto assume risk.

While still in the planning phase, con-sider a deception plan for Ground Sur-veillance Radar (GSR). GSR can be apowerful tool, and it can also be an ar-tillery magnet. When planning, specifyits activation times as well as varyingand changing the sectors it covers, andthe positions from which this is done.If used during the day and not movedduring the night, it could easily fall vic-tim to the enemy’s suppression of airdefense.

Fire Support: Establish day andnight indirect fire trigger points for thearea of operation. There is no magicfor this procedure; use the same criteriaand thought process that goes intobuilding an engagement area (see FM17-95-10). Also establish mortar andartillery trigger points separately, basedon the time needed to process a mis-sion and the desired effects from eachsystem.

Additionally, adjust the mortar basicload for the mission. Since we assumethe task will occur during night, in-crease the number of illumination andHE rounds at the expense of smoke.

Battle Command: Establish goodcommo, establish good commo, estab-lish good commo! Enough said about

this subject? Probably not, but we’llmove on.

The observation plan is the heart ofthe whole counterrecon fight. It is fromthis block (the actions of the hunter)that the rest of the mission evolves.Start developing this as soon as possi-ble, beginning at the lowest level. Con-sider what terrain must be seized andwhat may be secured against the antici-pated threat.

Determine what can be observed andwhat advantage dismounted patrols canbring to the sector. As each position ismanned, require a completed sketchcard (similar to a range card) depictingboth observation and direct fire capa-bilities. Platoon leaders ensure coordi-nation with adjacent units and attach-ments. Each platoon leader compilesthese and draws a platoon sectorsketch, forwarding a copy to the unitCP. The CP completes a unit observa-tion plan from all platoon sketches andincludes all combat multipliers (GSR,countermobility, patrol routes andtimes). The extra work spent doing thisearly will make for a less confusingand hectic fight later.

Mobility/Countermobility: Duringthe planning phase, address this BOSby defining with higher when the mainsupply routes (MSR) in sector will beopened and closed. This is especiallytrue when an engagement area is devel-oping to your rear. Nobody wants to besealed forward or forced to travel a cir-cuitous route back. Also define fromhigher what engineer assets are avail-able and when. Frequently, the answeris ‘‘none’’ since the engineers are al-ready supporting the main effort of thesubsequent mission.3

Combat Service Support: If theunit’s SOP does not specifically ad-dress support during the counterreconfight, then throw it away for this mis-sion. Begin by task-organizing early forthe mission. Second, recognize (andforce others to recognize) this is aunique mission and requires some non-standard actions. Move the aid stationforward, and synchronize it with theMSR. Consider having Class III bulkattached to the unit for the duration ofthe mission. Depending on what thefollow-on mission requires, and thelength of time needed to conduct LOG-PAC, it may be simpler (and thus morelikely to succeed) if effort isn’t wastedwith link-up times and compressedtime schedules used in traditional re-

Threat Database, Draft

Figure 1

H-36H-24H-12H-1

Div Recon

CRPsReg Recon

Air Assault

Arty

32 ARMOR ---- November-December 1996

supply methods. Identify and requestthe mission-specific extras needed,such as; night vision device batteries,engineer class V, flares, etc. Simultane-ously request CSS for expected attach-ments, and ensure that the attachmentsare aware of locations of AXPs, LRPs,etc.

Air Defense Artillery: Besides con-sidering the standard parameters ofADA, look specifically at the likely en-emy landing zones (LZ) that are in thesector, or could influence the sector ifthey were used for an enemy airmobileoperation. Then reposition ADA ele-ments to cover air avenues of approachand deny the use of these templatedLZs.

Prepare

Maneuver: As the unit begins itspreparation for the counterrecon fight,it conducts a survivability move, ide-ally at the end of End Evening NauticalTwilight (EENT). For maximum de-ception, have the hunters bound for-ward to set the screen line. If time didnot permit a covert leader’s recon of aforward position, then fall back to asubsequent screen line that was recon-noitered during the advance into sector.The observation plan is compiled forthe final position.

When does the counterrecon fight endand the subsequent mission begin? Ifyou, as the force commander don’tknow, then ask; different criteria foreach mission can exist. It could bebased on time, identification of an en-emy main body, or destruction of spe-cific enemy forces. Decide whichroutes and movement techniques to usewhen it is time to reposition for sub-sequent missions. Above all, dissemi-nate this criteria.

Intelligence: During the preparation,refine the ‘‘Threat Database,’’ similarto the way a doctrinal template is de-veloped to a situation template. At thispoint, it should evolve from a sche-matic into an enemy plan. Overlay theenemy’s timeline to your current loca-tions and define his frontages to spe-cific avenues of approach (see Figure2). Then take this and refine the obser-vation plan. Are the patrols synched towhen we expect the enemy? Are thesectors of observation (both visual andelectronic) appropriate? If not, fix it.

Fire Support: Consider registeringmortars and/or artillery. Consult with

your favorite artillerist to see if this isappropriate for you. For brevity, thedoctrinal diatribe on this subject isomitted.

The leader of the counterrecon fightmust determine the commander’s intentfor fires, both for artillery and mortarsystems. The two weapons are obvi-ously not the same, and can be ar-ranged to complement each other, suchas mortar illumination for artillery ad-justments. Prioritize the mortars for theelement without priority of FA firesand allocate the artillery for the maineffort of the counterrecon force. At thesame time, utilize the observation planand establish applicable no-fire areasfor OPs, patrols, AXPs, etc.

Battle Command: Work to have alertleaders during the critical times by en-suring rest. No other component of aBOS is so selectively ignored as this.To start, as stated in the assumptions,the counterrecon fight is part of alarger operation, and thus it cannot beconducted in a vacuum. Given this,leaders need rest to be a viable compo-nent of the follow-on mission. Allottime during the preparation for leaderrest ---- however little it may be. Like-wise, since there will be a follow-onmission, the commander of the coun-terrecon fight will have to leave sectorto be briefed on following missions.Thus, plan for his absence during aportion of any of the phases. The com-mander is important to this fight, butdo not allow him to be irreplaceable.

The requirement for the commanderto enter and return to sector will affecthis location on the battlefield. His posi-tion should provide redundancy incommo and complement the CP’splacement. Some situations may re-quire the two of them to co-locate.

Mobility/Countermobility: Applica-tion of engineer assets will pay itshighest dividends if done during thepreparation phase of the mission. Ma-neuver forces should utilize vehicle ba-sic load Class IV to emplace hasty ob-stacles (cheap tricks). These obstacles,in addition to their doctrinal applica-tions against the enemy, can serve sev-eral other uses such as: movement con-trol from the rear by closing unneededMSRs, blocking lateral routes, and as aform of deception. If further engineerassets are available, always employthem. Engineers typically work longinto the night, and fratricide becomes aconcern since they quickly become in-discernible as friendlies in a thermalsight. Applying silver duct tape canprovide a field expedient ‘‘CIP’’ panel;it’s especially effective on the sides ofM113s.4

Combat Service Support: Considerpre-positioning Class V, either for theupcoming fight or in anticipation of re-arming for follow-on missions. For ex-ample, extra HE mortar rounds for theevening, and a main gun cache vicinityof the unit’s battle position for the sub-sequent mission.

Use all daylight to rehearse move-ment of medics and recovery vehicles

Threat Database, Refined

Figure 2H-36

H-24H-12H-1

Div Recon

CRPs Reg Recon

Air Assault

Arty

25 0800 SEP

24 0800 SEP

24 1900 SEP 23 2000 SEP

ARMOR ---- November-December 1996 33

if available. Start with the most diffi-cult position (as opposed to the mostlikely) and rehearse ending with theeasiest position. Include in these re-hearsals the evacuation of attachments(GSR, ADA, engineers). No one wantsto waste time during the fight chasing amisoriented medic instead of huntingan enemy scout.

From the aforementioned paragraph,one can see that LOGPAC will be any-thing but standard. Configure it not forwhat is immediately needed but tocarry the unit until its next window forresupply. MREs instead of upcoming‘‘A’’ rations is nothing new for a cav-alry unit. Likewise the standard time-line or LOGPAC window may notwork for this mission. The distance re-quired and the inability to conduct aservice station may mean the LOGPACfor the counterrecon fight must leavethe trains ahead of others and remainforward with the force for an extendedperiod of time. Accept this and adjust.If the SOP won’t work, then it’s betterto adjust the ‘‘standard’’ timeline thanto attempt to meet it by conducting anincomplete LOGPAC and coming upshort later. Develop the CSS timelinefrom an assessment of the impact ofthe event, as compared to the higher’sstandard logistic timeline.

Air Defense Artillery: During thehustle of mission preparation, things inthe periphery are often not assimilated.Do not let this happen with ADA. Bythe nature of their mission, ADA assetsoften work as general support to a

higher unit, regardless of whose sectorthey operate in. Despite the clear re-sponsibility for terrain management,and delineated reporting requirements,the movement of ADA is frequentlynot clearly understood by the maneuverforce, and vice versa. Take the time tofind out what ADA assets are in sector.Then physically identify them and, as aminimum, make FM coordination.

Execute

Maneuver: It’s almost a given withthe quality of today’s soldiers andtroopers that each will understand themission. Not as clearly understood arethe ‘‘On Order’’ and ‘‘Be Prepared’’missions additionally assigned. Definethese and the criteria for each. This, inturn, will make command and controleasier.

As the mission unfolds, seek to fur-ther refine NAIs. Based on the ‘‘ThreatDatabase,’’ adjust or move these in re-gard to the enemy sought. Hand inhand with this, adjust the TAIs. Ideally,we should be able to use the tenets ofFM 17-97/98 to walk the enemy fromthe point of acquisition to destructionusing the depth of our sector. Usingmultiple combat and combat supportmechanisms is integral to having a suc-cessful counterrecon battle; doing thismaintains the integrity and security ofthe screen by not requiring the huntersto engage with direct fire. The piecesused in the elimination of the enemy(the killers) reposition as necessary be-

hind the surveillance unit (the hunters)to maintain flexibility and their secu-rity.

Here it is, the high payoff task for thecounterrecon fight: ‘‘go to ground.’’ Atabout the time when the screen is es-tablished, but certainly not later thanEENT, have everyone go to ground,and stop moving in the sector of thecounterrecon fight; this includes CSS,engineers, etc. Use this time the way adismounted patrol uses a listening halt,after crossing the LD, to adjust to thebattlefield. At the time of the freeze,identify what elements are still movingand get control of them. This alsoserves as a backstop to find forces insector you are not aware of. From thispoint on, all movement in sector iscontrolled by the CP. It approves allmovement (mounted and dismounted)and ensures its dissemination through-out the sector. Movement from higheris monitored by the CP and passed toall attachments and subordinates.

Intelligence: During the execution,keep score off of the ‘‘Threat Data-base.’’ Use this to identify periodswhen contact can be expected andmaximum vigilance is important. Usingthe ‘‘Threat Database’’ as a score card,the CP can have a pretty solid ideawhere the enemy forces are, and thenfocus the hunters to find them (see Fig-ure 3). In a worst case, the counterre-con commander can use this matrix totemplate when an enemy elementmight have penetrated, and accordinglyalert subsequent forces of the possibil-ity of the ‘‘Threat’’ in their sector. Forexample, a ‘‘negative report’’ during atemplated event time may indicate asuccessful enemy infiltration.

Fire Support: As the mission wearson and fatigue develops, remember toupdate no-fire areas as patrols beginand end, and when maneuver and sup-port forces reposition in sector.

The second nugget of learned infor-mation is ‘‘shoot it’’ with indirect! Thecriteria for engagement during a largecaliber mission is different from thecriteria of a counterrecon fight. Let’sface it, at the time of this fight, it’sprobably the only game in town, hencethe indirect assets are not heavilytasked. Assuming the fires are cleared,shoot the target, even if the conditionsfor target effects are not ideal. Regard-less of the precise results, this actionwill take the initiative from the enemy

Threat Database, Scorecard

Figure 3H-36

H-24H-12H-1

Div Recon

CRPs Reg Recon

Air Assault

Arty

25 0800 SEP

24 0800 SEP

24 2000 SEP 23 2000 SEP

destroyed2030, B43

observed2100, B14

destroyed HATK0900, B21,22

not seen

not seen

34 ARMOR ---- November-December 1996

and can force him to a premature action. This sequence, was known formerly as harassment and interdiction fires (H & I fires).

Battle Command: Delineating if two spot reports are in fact two separate spouings or two sightings of the same enemy is one of the hardest leader tasks of the counterrecon fight. Then factor in darkness and the potential for a spot report to be. a sighting of a friendly vehicle moving in sector and the task becomes horrendous. Ground burst illumination can be a tool to sort out these situations. Have our indirect friends fire an illumination round with "burst illum" at impact. Then have observers give their spot reports with a declination from the illumination marking (or have friendly attachments update their position from the source of the ilIum). Plot these updates on the observation plan and confmn or deny the spot reports.

The counterrecon fight is like deer hunting; it is a contest of patience and vigilance. A highly useful tool in maintaining vigilance is to have the troop/ unit CP act as a stimuli throughout the night. To do this, the CP keeps subordinates busy by asking questions and directing activities throughout the night, keeping each one alert and reporting. For example, have observers switch NAIs, or activate other NAIs for specified periods. Regardless of the techniques, the CP keeps all on the net (back to the good commo piece) throughout the mission.

MobiJity/CountermobiJity: If engineers are available at mission execution, consider incorporating them in the dismounted patrol plan, as a counterobstacle force in preparation of upcoming missions (METI-T dependent). Also, ensure that the engineer element reports the status of tasked obstacles to the unit CP, as well as to higher. Additionally, if a FASCAM is to be fired in support of an upcoming mission, have the engineers adjust and observe it rather than distract an element on sur-

. veillance.

Combat Service Support: Because of competing demands across the sector, and the added complexity of darkness, obstacles, and friendlies moving in sector, all CSS tasks will not be possible or equal. Accept this up front and be prepared to assume risk in the CSS arena. When a decision is made to exe-

cute a logistic action, lead that asset to the point of execution. OUf CSS assets simply are not authorized the density of NCOs and commo equipment that many of us take for granted. When the counterrecon fight begins, it is too late to wonder if the moving vehicle is the enemy or a wayward fuel HEMIT. Don't take the chance; lead them to where they need to go.

Air Defense Artillery: Although not doctrinal, if available, consider using the Avenger's mdar in the ground surveillance mode. It can provide a field expedient back-up to confirm or deny a spot report. During the battle, ensure the ADA assets in sector are kept abreast of the tactical situation and changes in friendly air activity.

ADA assets are often in a position where they must share responsibility for their own security. Notice the word "share;" the force conducting the counterrecon fight must work to protect ADA assets in sector, especially from enemy recon units who see ADA systems as a high payoff target.

Conclusion

Ideally, the application of these procedures coupled with integration of proven tactics and doctrine will serve to ensure future successes in the counterrecon fight and, consequently, subsequent battles. As a minimum, we

Doug Boltuc is a 1989 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, and Scott Efflandt is a 1985 graduate of MMI. They currently command Dragon Company and Bandit Troop respectively within the 1 st Squadron. 3d U.S. Cavalry.

hope that this article spurs thought towards better ways to win this fight. It is through similar discourse and discussion that direct fire planning and EA development has evolved to what we enjoy today (see "Direct Fire Planning," ARMOR, Nov-Dec 93). All comments and improvements are welcome, for we share the same goal - to win. Above all else, good hunting.

Notes

1 As noted by scout platoon leaders attending the course at Ft. Bliss in May 1995.

2True at the NTC and similar open terrain, but arguable at CMTC or forested areas where there are many avenues of approach.

3 As a minimum engineer assets, as part of the main effort. must coordinate with the counterrecon commander before coming forward to prevent fratricide.

4Used effectively during the 3d ACR's Troop ARTEPs, squadron maneuver exercise. and NTC 95-12.

FM 71-3 Scheduled for revision in January 1997 Battalion/Brigade Doctrine Branch seeks your comments

Fill 11-3

FM 71·3, The Armored Mechanized Infantry Brigade, is scheduled for revision in January 1997. We would appreciate your comments and recommendations to improve the final product. Please address specific issues in a "problem, discussion, and recommendation" format. Include page numbers from the current FM 71-3 if necessary,

POC is CPT Riggs at DSN 464·6651 or Commercial (502) 624-6651.

E-mail: [email protected]

ARMOR - November-December 1996 35


“Combat experience from World WarII onward compels the increasinglycomplex integration of combined arms.There is no pure ”heavy" or light sce-nario; the surest way to achieve suc-cess is to balance the array of tacticalforces in accordance with METT-T. Thecombined arms concept requires team-work, mutual understanding, and theright recognition by everyone involvedof the critical roles performed by otherarms. There is no place for parochial-ism or ignorance; success of the mis-sion and the lives of our soldiers willdepend upon the ability to understandand synchronize the light-heavy force."

-MG Blackwell, March 1993

Several times each year at the Na-tional Training Center (NTC), we at-tach a light battalion to a heavy brigadeto conduct a heavy-light rotation. Theaddition of a light battalion to the bri-gade adds significant capabilities to thebrigade combat team, providing thebrigade commander tactical flexibilityhe would not otherwise have. However,along with the added capabilities andincreased flexibility comes the chal-lenge of integrating the light battalioninto the heavy brigade. In this article, Iexamine some of the challenges associ-ated with integrating the light battalion,review some potential employment op-tions, and highlight some additionalconsiderations for employing a lightbattalion with a heavy brigade.

Brigade commanders: as the follow-ing vignettes based on recent rotationsportray, prudent employment of thelight battalion will increase your op-tions and enhance your brigade’s com-bat power. In the offense, the light bat-talion can infiltrate by ground to seizeand hold restrictive terrain, allowingthe brigade to move faster, or air-as-sault deep into the enemy’s rear, dis-rupting his defenses to create an ex-ploitable weakness. Additionally, it can

execute tasks that your heavy infantrymay not be manned or trained to per-form, like attacking in restrictive ter-rain to defeat enemy infantry in pre-pared positions.

At the NTC, brigades face some oftheir greatest challenges in the defense.The light battalion can help here too,by defending in restrictive terrain andallowing you to mass the brigade’sheavy systems along the primarymounted avenue of approach. Let’slook at some examples.

Clearing Restrictive Terrain

In this example, the brigade con-ducted a movement to contact in zone(as shown in Figure 1). The brigadestaff’s analysis indicated initial contactwith enemy reconnaissance elementswould most likely occur at Phase Line(PL) FORD, but that the brigade wouldhave the advantage if it moved beyondFORD and established a hasty defenseon the high ground overlooking PLBARSTOW. The brigade commanderagreed with his staff’s assessment andassigned the light battalion the task ofinfiltrating the night before the brigadeattack to seize and hold the restrictiveterrain along PL FORD at ObjectiveDOG. Success by the light battalionwould mean the brigade could cross PLFORD rapidly and be postured to massfires against the enemy as it crossed PLBARSTOW.

Timely warning orders followed byclose coordination among the brigadeand battalion staffs throughout the bri-gade planning process facilitated paral-lel planning and saved time. Within afew hours after receipt of the brigadeorder, the light battalion commandermet with the brigade commander todiscuss his battalion’s plan.

These were some key elements in thebattalion’s plan: first, since intelligence

indicated that Objective DOG was oc-cupied by at least one enemy divisionreconnaissance team (DRT), the battal-ion planned to infiltrate by company.Infiltration would help the battalionavoid detection and engagement until itcould mass on the objective. Second,the distance from the battalion assem-bly area to Objective DOG exceeded20 km. Since helicopters were notavailable for air infiltration, and the en-emy force-to-space ratio in the objec-tive area was low, the battalion wouldinfiltrate by ground vehicle to a con-cealed point about 10 km from the ob-jective. After dismounting, the battalionplanned to infiltrate by companies to alinkup point. Infiltration by companieswould allow the battalion to continueshould one of the companies be com-promised enroute. Following linkup,the battalion would seize the objective,clear the restrictive terrain, and preparefor the brigade’s forward passage.

The battalion had divided the objec-tive into three intermediate objectivesand planned to seize each sequentially.Sequential seizure would ease com-mand and control, allow the com-mander to rapidly mass the battalion ifrequired, and simplify clearance of in-direct fires. The battalion commanderestimated the dismounted infiltrationwould take 10 hours.

The battalion departed the assemblyarea at 1500 and arrived at the de-trucking point shortly after EENT.Company infiltration to the linkuppoint was challenging but successful.During the infiltration, enemy recon-naissance elements detected the move-ment of one company and called indi-rect fire; however, it was not effectivebecause of the darkness. When at-tempts to report the contact to brigadewere unsuccessful, the battalion relayedthe report through another task force.The companies linked up at 0300, andby 0600 had attacked and destroyed

Heavy-Light Operations At the National Training CenterGetting the Most Out of the Light Force

by Colonel Frank Stone


two division reconnaissance teams inthe objective area. During the attack,efforts to call indirect fires on the en-emy were not effective and resulted ina near fratricide. The battalion clearedObjective DOG before BMNT, and byfirst light, the battalion was establishinghasty defensive positions and preparingfor the brigade’s forward passage.Shortly after 0630, the battalion madeinitial contact with the advancing bri-gade elements when the lead platoonfrom the mech task force took elementsof the battalion under direct fire in an-other near fratricide. Once that was re-solved, linkup was completed, and thebrigade rapidly passed through and pre-pared to mass fires against the enemyas he crossed PL BARSTOW.

In this example, several factors con-tributed to the success of the light bat-talion and the brigade. First, effectiveIPB and rapid course of action devel-opment by the brigade staff allowedthem to provide timely warning ordersto the battalion. Second, because oftheir level of training, the light battal-ion was able to successfully infiltrate atnight, initially by truck, then dis-mounted by companies, and link up toseize the objective. Finally, the battal-ion commander clearly understood histask and purpose — to clear the pass toallow the brigade unimpeded move-ment through the restrictive terrainalong PL FORD.

Some Key Points to Consider

- As outlined in FM 7-20, infiltrationis a preferred form of maneuver usedby light battalions in the offense. At theNTC, light battalions often infiltrate byground or air to seize key terrain todeny its use by the enemy. Prior toyour rotation, consider having the bri-

gade staff review FM 7-20 to becomefamiliar with how to most effectivelyemploy the light infantry battalion inthe offense.

- If you intend for the light battalionto infiltrate the night before the heavyelements of the brigade attack, the timeavailable for them to plan and preparefor the mission will be 12 to 18 hoursless than for the remainder of the bri-gade. This makes timely warning or-ders, parallel planning, and close coor-dination between the brigade and thelight battalion staffs critical throughoutplanning and preparation for the mis-sion.

- Truck moves in the desert are diffi-cult, particularly at night, and a lightbattalion is especially vulnerable if theycross the LD mounted — think aboutoverwatching their movement from theLD with tanks or Bradleys. Have aplan to react should they come in con-tact while mounted.

- The light battalion’s rate of move-ment during a dismounted night infil-tration will probably not exceed 1 kph.

- Communicating over long distanceswith dismounted moving elements re-quires detailed planning. (Transmissiondistance for an AN/PRC 119A is 8km.) You may have to put the brigaderetrans out early to ensure communica-tions with the light battalion as they in-filtrate.

- Clearance of indirect fires is alwaysa challenge — particularly at night. Itis even more difficult if the battalioninfiltrates by company or platoon. Any-one who could potentially call or clearindirect fires must understand the con-trol measures and clearance procedures.

- Recognition signals must be briefeddown to the lowest level to avoid fratri-

cide during linkup or passage. Often,the lead tank or Bradley platoondoesn’t get the word.

Air Assaulting to DestroyEnemy Forces

In this example, the brigade con-ducted a deliberate attack against anenemy battalion. Intelligence indicatedthat the enemy battalion was defendingwith two motorized rifle companies(MRC) forward and one back with afrontage of 11 km as depicted in Figure2. Because the terrain leading up to thebrigade’s tentative point of penetrationafforded no concealment, the brigadecommander believed that once the bri-gade crossed the LD, he could not de-ceive the enemy about where he in-tended to attack.

His preferred course of action thenwas to create a weakness in the enemydefenses with the light battalion thatthe brigade could exploit. To create theweakness, he planned to air assault thelight battalion the night before the bri-gade attack. The light battalion’s mis-sion was to air assault behind the en-emy defenses to attack and destroy thenorthern Motorized Rifle Platoon(MRP) of the northern MRC. Follow-ing destruction of the MRP, the battal-ion would establish a hasty defense.The brigade commander intended to at-tack at first light, link up with the lightbattalion, and then attack the enemybattalion from north to south.

Conducting a night air assault at theNTC is always a challenge and can behigh-risk; for this light battalion it wasboth. The battalion had not conductedan air assault during the rotation, andhad never conducted a battalion levelair assault at night. Additionally, the

Fig. 1 Fig. 2


light and lift battalion commanders andstaffs were unfamiliar with each other’sSOPs, having come to the NTC fromdifferent posts. To further complicatematters, there were not enough helicop-ters available to move the battalion inone lift, and illumination at the time ofthe air assault would be zero. Finally,the brigade staff was not experiencedin planning air assault operations,which slowed the planning and coordi-nation effort.

Planning this mission was a chal-lenge. As the Air Assault Task ForceCommander (AATFC), the light battal-ion commander and his staff workedcarefully along with the lift commanderand his staff to put together the five ba-sic plans necessary to conduct the op-eration. (Five basic plans: ground tacti-cal plan, landing plan, air movementplan, loading plan, and staging plan).The planners from the two battalionsheld an air mission coordination meet-ing to ensure the details necessary forthe air assault were coordinated andwould support the ground tactical plan.When planning and coordination werecomplete, the key leaders and the staffsfrom both battalions attended the AirMission Brief to ensure the details ofthe plan were finalized and understood.In the end, with much hard work, thetwo battalion commanders and theirstaffs pulled the plan together in timefor execution.

The air assault did not go without ahitch. In the darkness, as aircraft werelost due to maintenance and groundfire, the battalion discovered it had noplan to prioritize loads — no bumpplan. In the ensuing confusion, theS3/air lost control of the PZ which re-sulted in loads being lifted in thewrong order and with the wrong equip-ment. Loss of communications betweenthe Pickup Zone (PZ) and LZ, and be-tween the battalion and brigade TOCs,added to the confusion on the LZ asthe battalion commander and S3 triedto figure out what was where, and toreport progress to the brigade com-mander. Loss of communications withthe brigade also hindered battalion ef-forts to get indirect fire support. Fi-nally, failure to coordinate for evacu-ation of casualties on lift aircraftcaused casualties to stack up on the LZand resulted in a high died-of-woundsrate. Darkness and confusion affectedthe OPFOR as well. Instead of reactingvigorously, the OPFOR commandermisread the threat, allowing the lightbattalion to execute its ground tacticalplan and defeat the northern MRP, cre-

ating the weakness the brigade neededto penetrate.

Some Key Points to Consider

- The light battalion and the lift bat-talion cannot plan and execute a battal-ion air assault alone — it must be abrigade effort. Have your staff reviewFM 90-4 Air Assault Operations beforethe rotation, then develop a brigade airassault planning and execution SOP.

- When the light battalion air assaults,the brigade staff must consider howlong they will be on the ground beforelinkup with the heavy forces. Considerhow they will be resupplied if neces-sary and how casualties will be evacu-ated.

- Air assault communications plan-ning deserves your personal attention.Plans must be detailed and provide forredundant communications means. Theenemy will react to the air assault andyou will have to adjust your plans —tough to do without good communica-tions.

- Plans for artillery support, to includeSuppression of Enemy Air Defense(SEAD) and radar zones, require de-tailed planning and rehearsals.

- If the light battalion and the lift bat-talion have not worked together beforethe rotation, take advantage of the timeyou spend in the “Dustbowl” to con-duct air assault training and reviewplanning procedures.

Performing Infantry IntensiveTasks

At the NTC, your brigade may haveto execute missions for which themechanized infantry battalion has in-sufficient dismounted infantry, or forwhich their dismounted infantry is nottrained. Clearing a trench in live firemight fall into this category. As I willdescribe in the following vignette, alight battalion is usually trained to per-form this task, and can enable your bri-gade to move through an enemy posi-tion prepared in restrictive terrain andcontinue the attack.

In this example the brigade had themission to attack along Axis SILVERto destroy an MRB (-) located at Ob-jective BIRD. As depicted in Figure 3,intelligence indicated an enemy MRP;with 3 BMPs, 30 infantry, and rein-forced with a tank, occupying a secu-rity position in the trenchline at Objec-tive ALPINE, astride the axis of ad-

vance. The S2 believed the enemywould withdraw if it sustained 50 per-cent casualties.

Further mission analysis by the bri-gade highlighted several additionalpoints. First, although the terrain lead-ing to the enemy position was too re-strictive for a mounted attack, theBradley battalion did not have suffi-cient infantry to attack dismounted anddefeat the entrenched enemy. Second,division would not allow the brigade tobypass the platoon position. The planto have the light battalion infiltrate toattack and defeat the platoon, and thenpass the brigade through, appeared tobe the most viable course of action.

The light battalion commander andhis staff studied the mission and devel-oped a plan. Twenty-four hours beforethe battalion crossed the LD, the scoutplatoon would infiltrate to the objectivearea to confirm routes, find a positionfor the light COLT, and position guidesat the dismount point. Later, the battal-ion would infiltrate by truck under thecover of darkness along Route BLACK(no air lift assets were available), thendismount and infiltrate two companieson foot over the ridge to a point over-looking the flank of the objective. Thethird company, the battalion TOWs, thesapper platoon, and the battalion mor-tars would infiltrate along Axis SIL-VER, clearing the restrictive terrain asfar as Point C. The light COLT wouldaccompany these elements to observeCopperhead and HE fires on the objec-tive.

The battalion planned a 30-minute ar-tillery preparation, concluding with60mm mortars firing WP as the signalto shift artillery and 81mm fires to therear of the objective. Once the artillerypreparation began, the support elementson each axis would move forward toestablish support-by-fire (SBF) posi-tions. Sixty millimeter mortars and M-60 machine guns would fire final sup-pressive fires from SBF positions be-fore the assault. After the objective wassecure, tactical obstacles in the objec-tive area could be reduced unopposed,and the brigade heavy forces couldpass through.

The brigade commander planned tohave a tank-heavy company team, witha heavy engineer platoon, move for-ward once the assault was complete toassist in obstacle reduction and lanemarking to facilitate the passage.

The attack went well. Led by scouts,the battalion moved well throughout


the night and at dawn was positionedto observe the artillery preparation ofthe objective. The preparation beganwith Copperhead, which destroyed thetank, and continued for 30 minutes. Onthe WP signal from the 60mm mortars,artillery and 81mm mortar fires shiftedto the rear of the objective. The 60mmmortars continued to suppress the ob-jective to allow the SBF elements totake up their positions. Once in posi-tion, the support elements began firingon the objective with M-60 machineguns and TOWs. When TOWs de-stroyed two more BMPs, the remainingarmored vehicle withdrew. As the sup-port element continued to suppress, theassault element attacked and clearedthe trench works. Once the objectivewas secure, heavy engineers movedforward to assist the light engineers inthe unopposed breaching, clearing andmarking lanes through the obstacle forthe brigade’s heavy forces.

Some Key Points to Consider- The light battalion may need help

getting to the objective area. The bri-gade staff should complete a detailedterrain analysis of potential mountedand dismounted routes, and calculateestimated mounted and dismountedmovement times.

- Attacking an entrenched enemy is adifficult task requiring detailed plan-ning and coordination. For the brigadeto support the light battalion, the bri-gade staff must be thoroughly familiarwith the light battalion’s plan.

- In restrictive terrain, the light com-mander’s C2 will be stretched as hetries to maintain stealth and positionsupport, breach, and assault elements.

Avoid the temptation to augment themwith elements that may make theirstealthy movement more difficult.

- The brigade FSCOORD must knowhow the battalion’s 81mm and 60mmmortars fit into the plan.

- Make sure your staff understandsthe light battalion’s breaching capabil-ity and how it intends to breach andmark lanes for passage of the heavyforce. Most light battalions have neverbreached lanes for a heavy force andlight engineers have limited breachingand marking capability.

- If you give the light battalion aheavy team it should be OPCON ratherthan attached. And remember, the light

battalion commander may not have ex-perience at controlling the fires ormovement of a heavy team.

- FM communications between thelight battalion and the brigade TOCwill be difficult in restrictive terrain.The brigade signal officer must be in-volved in the placement of retrans as-sets.

Allowing the Brigade to Mass:Heavy Systems in the Defense

Defense in sector is one of the mostdifficult missions your brigade willface. As described in the followingvignette, the light battalion can contrib-ute by defending in restrictive terrainand allowing you to mass the brigade’sheavy systems along the primary armoravenue of approach.

In this example, the brigade defendedin sector with two balanced heavy taskforces and a light battalion, as shownin Figure 4. The sector was 14 kmwide, and included both open and re-strictive terrain along multiple avenuesof approach. The multiple avenuesavailable to the enemy and his potentialcourses of action presented a signifi-cant challenge for the brigade com-mander and the staff. Having been suc-cessful against the enemy’s reconnais-sance efforts, the brigade expected himto attack in regimental advance guardformation with the lead motorized riflebattalion (MRB) providing combat re-connaissance patrols (CRP) and a mo-torized rifle company (MRC)-sized for-ward security element (FSE). The re-mainder of the lead battalion would

Fig. 3


Fig. 4

form the advance guard main body(AGMB). Two MRBs would form theregimental main body, and the fourthMRB would trail as the regimental re-serve. In all, the brigade expected toface over 150 enemy armored vehicles.

The brigade commander’s conceptwas to defend in depth. The tank taskforce, organized with two mech andone tank company, would defend alongPL BARSTOW to destroy the advanceguard and cause commitment of theregimental main body. The mech taskforce, organized with two mech andtwo tank companies, was the brigademain effort and defended west of PLFORD to destroy the main bodywhether the enemy attacked north orsouth. The light battalion, with a tankplatoon OPCON, would defend the re-strictive terrain at Debnam Pass, deny-ing the enemy this cross-mobility corri-dor. The brigade reserve, a tank com-pany, would be positioned in depth atthe center of sector, oriented on EACLEVELAND. The brigade combatpower was just under 90 percent —about 100 armored vehicles.

On the day of the attack, the brigade’sforward task force destroyed the regi-mental advance guard in EA BOSTONbut was penetrated by the main body.At this point, the regimental com-mander sent one MRB north throughBrown Pass and one MRB as an envel-oping detachment south through theColorado Wadi. He intended for theregimental reserve to follow in thenorth.

The MRB attacking in the northmoved well until it entered EA AT-LANTA, where the mech task force de-stroyed two of its MRCs. Because theenveloping detachment was movingunhindered in the south, the regimentalcommander directed the surviving ele-ments of the MRB in the north (rem-nants of two MRCs) and the regimentalreserve to move south through DebnamPass to join them.

As the two companies moved south,extensive obstacle work, includingMOPMs, and aggressive AT ambusheswith Dragons and TOWs, along withfires from the tank platoon, were effec-tive in destroying both MRCs in EATAMPA. By the time the enemy real-ized the light battalion had denied theDebnam Pass cross-mobility corridor, itwas too late; he had committed hisforce piecemeal.

The brigade reserve and repositionedcompanies from the mech task forcedestroyed the remaining elements ofthe regiment in EAs CLEVELAND

and DENVER. The light battalion hadsuccessfully defended the restrictiveterrain, denied the cross-mobility corri-dor to the enemy, and allowed the bri-gade commander to mass the fires ofhis heavy systems along the primarymounted avenue of approach.

Some Key Points to Consider- The light battalion will require help

digging in. They will normally comewith a sapper platoon to aid in the en-gineer effort, but it has no heavy dig-ging assets. If you OPCON a tank pla-toon or heavy team, the light battalionwill need to get their fair share of theheavy digging assets.

- The light battalion can be a greathelp in the construction of wire andmine obstacles. Normally, they willhave more soldiers to throw into the ef-fort than a tank or mechanized taskforce. However, because they have lim-ited capability to move barrier material,even a short distance, it must be deliv-ered to the obstacle site.

- Discuss in detail your concept, andthe brigade SOP for constructing andfighting engagement areas with thelight battalion commander so you bothhave a common understanding of whatis expected.

- Detailed fire support rehearsals willenhance the light battalion’s apprecia-tion for space, time, and triggers inopen terrain.

- Light battalions have few long rangetank-killing systems; normally fourHMMWV-mounted TOWs. And theirDragons normally have little effect onthe battlefield unless they mass theirfires.

- When properly employed, themodular pack mine system (MOPMS)can be effective against the OPFOR.Coordinate early with the battalion toensure they train on this system andbring the remote control units.

Additional Considerations- The light battalion that joins you

probably has little corporate knowledgeabout what to expect at the NTC. Mostof the key leaders, and very likely theirparent brigade commander, have notbeen to the NTC on rotation. They willarrive eager to learn, and anxious todemonstrate their capabilities, but don’texpect their leaders or soldiers to knowas much as you and yours about howthe NTC operates. In this regard, don’tunderestimate the value of the NTCLeader Training Program (LTP). LTPoffers a great opportunity to get your

team together, and to seriously considerthe capabilities of the light battalionand how they will fight as part of thebrigade.

Additionally, consider following upyour LTP rotation with several videoteleconference sessions to keep eachother abreast of preparation for the ro-tation.

- The light battalion may not knowyour brigade SOP, or understand yourlingo. Consider exchanging LNOs withthe light battalion. In addition to a lightbattalion LNO in your TOC, send anLNO from brigade to work with thelight battalion during the rotation. TheLNO from brigade will help the lightbattalion understand how you intend tofight and facilitate parallel planning.

“Hey, face it. Heavy-light is hard;that’s why we have to do it.” - NTC OC

Heavy-light rotations at the NTC arechallenging, both for the heavy brigadeand the light battalion. However, thebrigade commander and staff that meetthe challenge of integrating the lightbattalion into the brigade combat teamand employ it prudently based on agood understanding of its unique capa-bilities and limitations will enjoy a re-warding training experience. As I de-scribed in the preceding vignettes, alight battalion integrated into the bri-gade scheme will have a significantimpact on the NTC battlefield, both inforce-on-force, and live fire. Brigadecommanders: “Getting the Most Out ofthe Light Force” means understandingthat, with teamwork and mutual under-standing, heavy and light battalions ona brigade team represent a significantcombat capability and afford you capa-bilities and tactical flexibility youwould not otherwise have.


Colonel Frank Stone is a Dis-tinguished Military Graduateof North Georgia College. Com-missioned Infantry, he is agraduate of Airborne, Ranger,IOBC, IOAC, CGSC, and theNational War College. He hasserved in various commandand staff assignments, includ-ing commander, 1-16 Infantry(1st Infantry Division). He iscurrently the Senior LightTask Force Trainer at the Na-tional Training Center.

During Operation Desert Storm(ODS), 148 Americans were killed inaction. Fatalities due to hostile actionresulted from a variety of causes, theleast of which was direct enemy firewhere opposing forces were engaged incombat. Tragically, unexploded ord-nance (UXO) and mines proved moredeadly than Iraqi guns. In fact, some20% of GI casualties were caused bymines and unexploded munitions.

After the Gulf War, soldier reaction tounexploded ordnance on the battlefieldwas identified as a battlefield defi-ciency. General Frederick Franks di-rected the Army to develop and imple-ment an Army-wide UXO training pro-gram. As a result, the U.S. Army Ord-nance Missile and Munitions Centerand School (USAOMMCS) developedinstructional video tapes, a plastic ord-nance training aid kit, common soldiertasks, field manuals, and graphic train-ing aids to support UXO training.

A new training item was suggested bySGM Gary Sampson of the ExplosiveOrdnance Disposal Training Depart-ment, USAOMMCS. His inexpensivesuggestion was to fabricate plastic, vac-uum-formed, two-dimensional ord-nance recognition boards that show theactual dimensions and ordnance colorcodes of mines likely to be encoun-tered. The U.S. Army Missile Com-mand (MICOM) Corporate InformationCenter’s (CIC) Training Support Divi-sion developed the prototype. TheArmy Training Support Center (ATSC),Ft. Eustis, Va., approved a Training De-

vice Fabrication Re-quest and authorizedproduction and distri-bution throughout theArmy. Production of229 sets of Ammuni-tion RecognitionBoards (DVC-T 05-50) began in Decem-ber 1995.

While the Ammuni-tion RecognitionBoard Sets effectivelyaddress many soldierUXO training needs,they do not includespecific regional mineawareness training.Mine awareness pre-vents mine casualties.Operation Joint En-deavor, in Bosnia, hasprovided clear evi-dence of the hazardsof mines and rein-forces the requirementfor mine awareness during peacekeep-ing and peace enforcement operationsand all operations throughout the spec-trum of war. Land mines, used by allwarring parties in the conflict, areamong the biggest dangers facing U.S.forces — there may be 4-6 million an-titank and antipersonnel mines ran-domly laid in mountain roads, fields,forests, and villages in the area.

USAOMMCS and CIC-MICOM col-lected regional mines, mine fuzes, de-lay-firing and booby trap devices from

U.S. and foreign sources to make a setof Mine Recognition Boards appropri-ate to the area.This set, called the MineRecognition Board Set (DVC-T 05-51),was funded for production, and manu-facture of 160 sets began in February1996.

Quantities of both DVC-T 05-50 andDVC-T 05-51 have already been pro-duced and shipped to some ArmyTraining Support Centers (ATSC). Pro-duction and shipments of both sets con-tinues.

New Training AidsHelp Soldiers Recognize Dangerous Ordnance

by the TRADOC Munitions System Manager’s Office

Two examples of the new ammunition and mine recognitionboards now being produced to help soldiers identify andavoid these battlefield killers. While the ordnance looks re-markably real, the vacuum-formed boards are actually thin,lightweight, and easily shipped.


Points of Contact

Ammunition and Mine RecognitionBoard Training Aid Suggestor:

SGM Gary SampsonEOD Training Department, USAOMMCSATTN: ATSK-TERedstone Arsenal, AL 35897-6801DSN 746-4654/2796, COMM (205) 876-4654/2796

Training Aids Manager:

Ms. Juanita DavisU.S. Army Training Support Center (ATSC)ATTN: ATIC-DMFFt. Eustis, VA 23606-5166DSN 927-4771/4772, COMM (804) 878-4771/4772

Ammunition and Mine RecognitionBoard Producer

Mr. Randy PorterUSAMICOM-CICATTN: AMSMI-CIC-OD-TDRedstone Arsenal, AL 35898-7462DSN 645-6078, COMM (205) 955-6078

When clearing routes, mine rollersare among our most important piecesof equipment. They help detect theleading edges of minefields and com-plete the mission in a timely manner.But to complete the mission, the rollermust survive. This article suggestssome ways to enhance the roller tank’ssurvivability.

An Enhanced Lighting SystemAt the Joint Readiness Training Cen-

ter at Fort Polk, we have experimentedwith a field expedient lighting systemto improve operations in hours of dark-ness. The Driver’s Thermal Viewer isnot fully fielded yet, and when the in-frared headlights are used, much of theinfrared light is directed back into thedriver’s AN-VVS-2, reducing his visi-bility, and making an already bad situ-ation worse. Current, traditionally-mounted, infrared lights do not aid thetank commander in early visual detec-tion of potential minefields.

We have come up with a simple in-terim fix, which might easily be madeinto a permanent modification, thatcould save lives and equipment. Refer-ring to Figure 1, follow these steps:

• Remove headlights, exposing wir-ing harness.

• Mount headlights to left and righttrunnion pin appendages using 100mile per hour tape.

• Using split WD-1 wire, attach aground wire and the bright light wirefrom the wiring harness to the corre-sponding connections on the headlight.(The bright light wire is marked “D”on the harness, and the ground ismarked “A”). Use electrical tape andplastic to waterproof both the wiringharness and the point where the wire isconnected to the headlights. Secure theWD-1 wire to the frame of the rollerusing zip strips or tape. Leave enoughslack wire hanging at the headlight as-sembly to compensate for roller move-

ment, but don’t leave too much, or theWD-1 may be cut during movement.

• Using an infrared light easily foundin most motor pools, or orderedthrough the supply system, (light, infra-red NSN 6220-00-984-5180), run WD-1 wire from hot and ground on therheostat assembly of the TC’sdomelight. Attach the light to the turretin such a manner that the beam can bedirected to the front of the roller or,better yet, be handheld (Figure 2).(Author’s note: On the M1A2, the tankfire suppression system is on the samewiring harness as the headlights. Wewired the ground directly to the hull, asopposed to using the “A” ground, andhad no problems.)

This addition makes it much easier todrive, allows surface laid mines to bespotted earlier, and picks out areaswhere mines may have been buried. Asa bonus, the tank commander does nothave to spend as much time directingthe driver, because the driver has muchbetter visibility. An enemy observingfrom an overwatch position will alsohave a hard time using night visionequipment because of the brightness ofthe infrared light.

This configuration has been used suc-cessfully by units on rotation at theJoint Readiness Training Centerthrough use of the “Coach, Teach,Mentor,” technique. We believe it to bea viable, field expedient modificationto assist in route clearance operationsin periods of darkness.

Improved DetectionAnd Margin of Safety

Many units get a false sense of secu-rity when using the mine roller to clearor proof a route. There is a margin ofsafety of only 9.5 inches on each sideof the track on an M1-series tank. (Re-fer to Figure 3.) There is a distance of71 inches that is completely unclearedin the center of the two roller assem-blies. When you factor the differing

track vehicle widths (Figure 4), not tomention wheeled vehicles, there isquite a bit of room for error, and sub-sequently for disaster.

What about the Dogbone?The current dogbone and chain as-

sembly between the rollers is designedto defeat tilt-rod fuzed mines. The dog-bone has insufficient mass to pre-deto-nate magnetically fuzed mines. Re-cently, the Army fielded the ImprovedDogbone Assembly (IDA), designed todefeat tilt rod and magnetically fuzedmines. The IDA projects a magneticsignature while rolling or plowing. Westill have multiple impulse pressurefuzes to worry about, but these can bedefeated by running more than oneroller tank in tandem if the unit’s intel-ligence preparation of the battlefieldsays that this type fuze is expected orsuspected.

Mine rollers are an asset that are noteasy to replace, and are best used todetect the leading edges of minefieldsand to proof lanes in obstaclesbreached by other means, such as theMICLIC. The Joint Readiness TrainingCenter believes these techniques usedto employ the mineroller will ensure itssurvivability as well as the survivabilityof all combat vehicles in the column.

Enhanced Mine DetectionFor Limited Visibility Operations

by Sergeant First Class Paul E. Thompson Jr.


Sergeant First Class Paul E.Thompson Jr. is an Armor Ob-server Controller with the JointReadiness Training Center atFort Polk, La. His assign-ments include 2/325 Airborne,1/320 FA in the 82nd AirborneDivision; 428th FA Brigade,2/64 AR in the 3rd Infantry Di-vision; Recruiting Command;and 4/67 AR in the 1st Ar-mored Division.

Fig. 4

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

A - TRACK WIDTH25 in. (.7112m)

B - MINE ROLLER WIDTH44 in. (1.1176m)

C - DISTANCE BETWEEN ROLLERS (Inside) 71 in. (1.8034m)

D - DISTANCE BETWEEN ROLLERS(Outside) 159 in. (4.0386m)

E - DISTANCE BETWEEN TRACKS89 in. (2.2098m)

Z1 - DIFFERENCE (Safety Margin)9.5 in. (.2032m)


“Gunner! Sabot! Tank!”

“Identified!” I responded, somewhatrustily, to the tank commander’s firecommand.

“Up!” shouted the loader.

“Fire,” from the TC.

I had indexed the ammunition, lasedto the target, and laid the crosshairs, al-most like old times.

“On the way!” I announced as I fired.There was a blast and my sight was ob-scured. The obscuration caused me tomiss the tracer, but I saw the impact ofthe long rod penetrator on the targettank.

It all seemed real, but in fact I was ina maneuver area at Fort Hood, attend-ing a demonstration of the TWGSS/PGS, acronyms for the Tank WeaponGunnery Simulation System and Preci-sion Gunnery System, designed for theAbrams tank and Bradley Fighting Ve-hicle, respectively.

Watching the demonstration, my mindwent back over the years I had beenassociated with tanks and gunnerytraining. To “date stamp” me, I remem-bered the Cedar Run Range combatcourse at Fort Knox, where we studentofficer tank commanders had to re-spond to a balloon simulating an air at-tack by climbing out of the M4A3E8Sherman turret and standing on theback deck to fire the .50 caliber ma-chine gun. I remembered commandinga tank training company at Fort Knoxlater, when M48 tank crew traineesfired subcaliber rounds at small targetsa few yards away to get the feel of lay-ing the tank gun, making sure the finallay was always in the same direction toeliminate the effects of backlash. I re-membered that a smart M60 gunnerknew he could increase his chances ofa hit with an inert HEP practice round

by using the telescope, which allowedfor projectile drift, rather than using thecomputer, which did not. I rememberedthe laser gunnery range used in the 1stArmor Training Brigade that allowedgunners to track moving targets andfire, but not much else. And I thoughtof the M1 tank Conduct of Fire Trainerthat places great stress on the tankcommander and gunner as they engagecomputer-generated targets in rapidsuccession.

Each generation of training deviceswas a step in the right direction, andeach capitalized on new technologies,but none by itself met the standards ofrealism that the armor communitywanted. Institutional trainers usingcomputer-generated displays are effec-tive, but the environment is an artificialone. Gunnery devices attached to atank have been useful and provide adegree of realism to a crew in that sol-diers use their own tank, but firing pro-cedures are not complete.

Subcaliber devices have benefits, butthey require at least small firing rangesand leave out many of the requiredcrew duties. Also, each system thatprovides a partial replication of tankgunnery procedures has always in-cluded drawbacks that result in somedegree of negative training.

At last, it seemed as if all the crewduties were accommodated, with theexception of the loader actually loadinga round of ammunition. Dummyrounds can be loaded for additionalloader training. The simulator cable, infact, was routed outside the barrel tokeep the breech free of obstructions.

The realism of the TWGSS was awe-some. Here was a crew, using its owntank under field conditions, and any er-ror in executing firing duties was re-flected in a miss. Targets were at realranges. There was blast and obscura-

tion. Not only was I impressed, but,more importantly, the young tank crew-men, brought up on video games andcomputer technology, were enthusiasticabout what they were experiencing.

My experience with the Bradley andthe PGS was similar. Here I fired boththe 25mm automatic cannon and theTOW missile. Again, the realism wasalmost unbelievable. I saw the TOWmissile heading for the target and sawthe hit.

The RequirementTechnology has opened new possibili-

ties in the past two decades to greatlyimproved training devices for tankcrews. Laser substitutes for actualrounds, video disk training devices, andcomputers have all been incorporatedin devices to train tank gunnery. Atfirst, each device filled a particularvoid, but as technology broadened thehorizons of those responsible for devel-oping requirements for gunnery train-ers, and tank crew training systemsthemselves, the potential to duplicatereality began to be realized. Generally,in tank crew training, two paths werefollowed, dictated by the limits of tech-nology, cost, and imagination. Separatedevices were developed to train gun-nery and to conduct tactical training.

MILES was developed and fielded tobring greater realism to tactical train-ing. Using laser projectors and detec-tors, MILES provides a means of in-flicting real-time casualties on oppos-ing forces. The result has been a majorstep in providing realism in tacticaltraining.

Various gunnery training deviceswere developed for both the Abramstank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle, cul-minating in the 1980s with a Conductof Fire Trainer (COFT) for eachweapon system. The COFTs provide


TWGSS/PGS:

Combat Vehicle Gunnery TrainingTakes a Great Leap Forward

by Brigadier General Philip L. Bolté, U.S. Army, Retired

Abrams and Bradley crews with highlyeffective training. Through the use ofcomputers and instructor monitoring,crews can be faced with a wide varietyof scenarios and challenges. Targetscan be stationary or moving over vary-ing terrain, the firing tank can be mov-ing or stationary, weather conditionscan be changed, fire control systemscan be degraded, and the pace of en-gagements can be changed. The sys-tems offer a true final exam before acrew proceeds to live firing. But theenvironment, although realistic in manyways, is artificial. The crew is in asimulator with computer-generated im-ages. The crewmen are not in theirtank, and they know it.

As early as the 1970s, while theAbrams tank was under development,the U.S. Army armor community wasseeking a gunnery training device thatcould be applied to the tank itself.What the Army wanted was an eye-safe laser simulator, a strap-on device,that could be used for precision and de-graded mode gunnery training on unitvehicles in all terrain and weather con-ditions.

In a search of industry ideas, theArmy program manager for trainingdevices (PM TRADE) contacted theSwedish company Saab for a report ofits newly developed laser simulatorBT41. The resulting “Hit/Kill Study”compared various methods for provid-ing precision gunnery training to crewsto sustain their skill levels between livefire opportunities.

In 1982, two Saab simulators wereacquired by the Army for engineeringtests at Fort Knox. These were laterused in an Armor Center ConceptEvaluation Program (CEP) in conjunc-tion with the newly developed TWGSSconcept. In 1984, the Infantry Center atFort Benning acquired additional BT41systems for a CEP associated with the

PGS requirement for the Bradley Fight-ing Vehicle. Here the requirement wasto simulate both gun and missile sys-tems in training crews. With system re-quirements further defined, in 1986 anadditional CEP was conducted at FortHood using these systems, as well asother simulators, including MILES.The main purpose was to evaluate thetransference of gunnery skills fromsimulation to live fire. As the U.S.Army continued its progress toward theeventual acquisition of a solution to theTWGSS/PGS challenge, Saab wasmeeting with success with foreign ar-mies. In 1988, the German Army se-lected Saab systems to meet its similarrequirement. In September 1992, theU.S. Army selected the new generationSaab simulator, BT46, to meet itsTWGSS/PGS requirement. British se-lection of the same system followedtwo months later. Thus, the majorNATO armies were following a similarpath for combat vehicle gunnery train-ing.

A procurement contract was sub-sequently awarded to Saab. The Armyapproved an acquisition plan to procure2,000 systems for the Abrams andBradley by the year 2001, with the firstunit equipped in 1995. The systems areeventually to be fielded at 25 locations.In addition, procurement and fielding isnow planned for Marine Corps Abramstanks. To date, the program is onschedule and within programmed cost,and the equipment exceeds requiredperformance standards.

When the U.S. Army’s 1st ArmoredDivision deployed to Bosnia, it quicklybecame apparent that Abrams andBradley crews would be unable tomaintain weapon system proficiency inthe environment there. The Army di-verted delivery of more than 60TWGSS/PGS systems to the deployedforce, which should solve the problem.

It is significant to note that TWGSS/PGS also meets the U.S. Army’s Tacti-cal Engagement Simulator (TES) re-quirement by combining a precisiongunnery and maneuver capability withprovisions for extensive after-action re-view.

System DescriptionTWGSS/PGS is an eye-safe laser

simulator strap-on device that providesprecision and degraded mode gunnerytraining, using unit vehicles, in all ter-rain and under all weather conditions.The system requires the vehicle crew toperform all gunnery tasks under fieldconditions, except actual ammunitionloading, and provides accurate firingresults. These are available immedi-ately and for after-action review(AAR). Similar in concept, theTWGSS and PGS have common orgenerally similar components. In thefollowing paragraphs, the TWGSS isdiscussed in detail, with major differ-ences of the PGS discussed later.

TWGSS consists of three subsystems:the firing system, the target system, andthe training data retrieval system.

The firing system, mounted on thetank, includes four main elements: thetransceiver unit; the tracer, burst, ob-scuration simulator; the vehicle inter-face assembly; and the remote systeminterface. Other components includethe control panel, loader’s panel, andturret position sensor. The included tar-get system, comprised of target proces-sor, four retro reflectors, and four hulldeflectors, allows the tank to partici-pate in two-sided engagements, as wellas independently assessing engagementresults.

The transceiver unit, mounted in themain gun muzzle, uses conditionallyeye-safe laser transmitters. A transmit-ter simulates projectiles in real time


At left, a crew installs the TWGSS system to anM1A2 at Fort Hood. It takes 20 minutes. Above, acrew reviews the after-action record that is storedon a laptop computer.

with the correct ballistics and dynamicsof real ammunition, based on actual fir-ing tables, thereby allowing precisiongunnery training. The tracer, burst, andobscuration system simulates in boththe gunner’s primary sight and auxil-iary sight the effects of rounds firedwith the main gun or coaxial machinegun. Tracers are simulated with realis-tic burn times and zooming effects.Bursts on the target or on the groundare simulated, with the size determinedby the type of ammunition and range.Obscuration is shown for main gunammunition and can be programmedby the instructor from 0 to 5 seconds.

The vehicle interface assembly is thelink between TWGSS and the tank. Itreceives and distributes power, moni-tors and injects signals to and from thefire control system, monitors weaponstatus for use in the after-action review,registers the turret/hull relationship, andinjects sound into the intercommunica-tion system.

The remote system interface uses sat-ellite data to determine the position ofthe tank, updating the position every 50meters. The information is stored onthe memory card for use in the after-action review. The unit is made up oftwo components, the antenna that re-ceives satellite signals and the assem-bly that determines vehicle position.

The entire TWGSS assembly can bemounted on a tank in 20 minutes. Thetarget system, which can be mountedindependently on targets, includes fourretro detector units, four hull defiladedetector units, and the target computerunit. It determines whether a projectilehits or misses the target. If the target ishit, the system simulates the effect theprojectile would have on the vehicle.The effect is indicated with strobelights and sound cues in the intercom-munication system. Each round is indi-vidually evaluated, with no considera-tion of cumulative effects. If there is ahit, based on the received coordinatesand a random generator incorporatingactual vulnerability to the round fired,the unit determines whether it is a no-kill hit or a weapon, mobility, or cata-strophic kill. It then triggers the appro-priate visible and sound signals.

The training data retrieval system in-cludes equipment necessary to performthe after-action review of TWGSStraining. It is used to evaluate the effec-tiveness of tank weapon firing engage-ments, whether in a tank weapon gun-nery exercise or in a tactical training

environment. The system consists of alaptop computer unit and memorycards.

Each TWGSS tank has a memorycard installed at the beginning of anexercise. Using the TWGSS controlpanel, the crew or instructor downloadsinformation such as ballistics and targettemplates, as well as ammunition al-lowances, obscuration times, etc. Thememory card then stores the data ontraining events for use in the after-ac-tion review. Three days of data can berecorded on one card.

The laptop computer unit provides thecenterpiece of the after-action review.Each memory card is loaded into thecomputer, and graphics for gunnery ormap views can be displayed. Gunneryresults are also available in the mapview so that gunnery and maneuvertraining results can be integrated. Forfiring engagements, crew membernames and vehicle type are displayed,along with detailed data on time, mo-tion, engagement ranges, hit points, anddamage assessment.

PGS is essentially the same system asTWGSS. It is designed for compatibil-ity with both the 25mm chain gun andthe TOW missile system. For the25mm gun, wide misses can be meas-ured for area fire evaluations. TOWmissile engagements can be simulatedout to the 3,750 meter maximum rangeof the missile system.

As noted earlier, a number of gunnerytraining devices have been introducedin the last two decades, each offeringadvantages, generally related to real-ism, over other devices. Continued pro-

liferation of such devices, however, isnot an acceptable solution to the train-ing challenge. Thus, it is important toexamine how TWGSS/PGS fits intothe overall training environment.

Most important are the relationshipsof the Abrams and Bradley conduct offire trainers (COFT) and MILES withTWGSS/PGS. COFT and MILES areboth widely fielded and have proven tobe effective training systems.

The Abrams and Bradley COFTs, likeTWGSS and PGS, are similar in natureand provide excellent gunnery training.Crews can be faced with a wide varietyof scenarios and firing engagementchallenges over a short period of time,making the use of COFTs efficient.They have been used since introductionto prepare crews for live fire from theirvehicles. Nevertheless, training expertshave recognized the missing bridge be-tween the COFT full simulation andlive fire with full-caliber ammunition.Fielded subcaliber devices, while con-tributing to training, lack realism andinclude at least a degree of negativetraining.

While live firing of full-caliber am-munition is critical to full-up training,the cost of ammunition, the availabilityof ranges, and safety restrictions are,among other factors as well, severelimitations. TWGSS/PGS can be espe-cially useful for night firing trainingwhere live fire at night may be re-stricted because of the proximity of ci-vilian communities. At Grafenwöhr, theU.S. Army’s major training area inGermany, night firing has been cur-tailed, but TWGSS/PGS can provide


Here, the TWGSS system is mounted on a Marine M1A1 at Camp Lejeune, N.C. The Ma-rines use the system for both tactical and gunnery training.

the means to conduct night training, in-cluding gunnery, without disturbing thelocal population.

TWGSS/PGS provides the missingbridge between COFT training and livefire. The system is flexible enough tooffer a range of simulated gunnerytraining that provides a smooth transi-tion to live firing. Realism can beachieved, with the operational tempo oflive fire, without the need to travel todistant ranges and fire service ammuni-tion.

TWGSS/PGS can perform gunnery infour progressive modes: tracking train-ing, scaled gunnery, panel gunnery, andcombat gunnery.

Tracking training teaches crews to layon targets and track moving targets us-ing the actual vehicle fire control sys-tem.

In the scaled gunnery mode, targetscan be placed at close-in ranges, butthe system can be set so that longerranges are simulated. Thus, using one-half scale, a target placed at 500 meterswill appear to the crew and the firecontrol system to be at 1,000 meters.This mode allows the use of areas re-stricted in size, such as many localtraining areas.

The panel gunnery mode allowscrews to prepare realistically for situ-ations similar to those faced on typicallive fire ranges. TWGSS/PGS providesan accurate assessment of the quality ofperformance of the crew.

Because of safety restrictions associ-ated with live fire, in the combat modethe crew is faced with situations morereal than those faced on live fireranges. Gunnery tasks must be accom-plished, with the exception of actualammunition loading, just as they mustbe in combat. Targets react as they doin combat. It is this mode, of course,that can be used in two-sided exercises,with the firing vehicle vulnerable tofire from opposing target vehicles.

MILES has provided the Army withthe ability to train realistically in two-sided maneuvers. How does theTWGSS/PGS fit with MILES? This isan important question, for much of thecost of TWGSS/PGS is associated withqualities that are similar to MILES.

Fortunately, the answer to the ques-tion is that TWGSS/PGS is compatiblewith MILES. Thus Abrams tanksequipped with TWGSS and Bradley

Fighting Vehicles equipped with PGSare able to participate in maneuverswith, for example, dismounted troopsor HMMWVs using MILES compo-nents. The TWGSS/PGS transceivertransmits MILES firing information af-ter a completed TWGSS/PGS simula-tion in order for the laser target inter-face device (LTID) and MILES targetsystems to function. MILES informa-tion is transmitted at the impact pointof the simulated round. TWGSS/PGSequipped vehicles use the retro reflec-tor mounted strobe lights to simulatehits instead of the yellow lights ofMILES.

What this all means is that Abramsand Bradley crews can participate inMILES-based exercises using TWGSS/PGS instead of add-on MILES compo-nents. It means that Abrams andBradley crews, in addition to gainingthe tactical training of a MILES-basedexercise, can practice their gunneryskills at the same time. Thus, there ismuch less difference between trainingand the reality of combat.

TWGSS/PGS has been adopted forthe Abrams and Bradley, but it isequally applicable to other combat ve-hicles, such as the Marine Corps lightarmored vehicle (LAV).

On the subject of compatibility, notonly is TWGSS/PGS compatible withMILES, but there is international com-patibility. As mentioned earlier, theBritish Army and the German Armyhave both adopted Saab systems, as hasthe Swedish Army, and Saudi Arabia isprocuring TWGSS/PGS through theU.S. FMS program. Other countriescan be expected to follow. These sys-tems, modified to meet certain nationalrequirements, are all similar in opera-tion and are compatible. Internationalexercises will be greatly enhanced bythis situation.

The potential for growth of any com-plex training system is important. TheU.S. Army cannot afford to field a sys-tem that may become outdated in sev-eral years. At the aforementioned dem-onstration at Fort Hood, Saab includedthe application of its Gunnery and Ma-neuver Exercise (GAMER) system.GAMER is an add-on system that inte-grates the capabilities of existing sys-tems such as TWGSS/PGS and MILESto provide realistic two-sided combattraining at the small unit level in localtraining areas. A portable system thatcan be carried in a HMMWV and set

up in an hour, GAMER’s add-on com-ponents to existing systems use com-mercial components, including a laptopcomputer and mobile data cellularhardware. GAMER allows the integra-tion of simulated artillery, mine fields,and obstacles into the play. It maxi-mizes the capability of the small unitleader to plan, conduct, and review thetraining exercise. In effect, in about anhour, a local training area can be con-verted into a miniature National Train-ing Center.

Summary

TWGSS/PGS is bringing to the U.S.Army a major improvement in its abil-ity to effectively train combat vehiclecrews in gunnery. Moreover, it pro-vides training establishments and com-bat units the ability to integrate gun-nery and maneuver training. The bene-fits include training time and cost sav-ings, as well as greater realism in train-ing. TWGSS/PGS is as close to livefire training as possible, without incur-ring the disadvantages and costs associ-ated with such training.

Compatibility with the existingMILES equipment and interoperabilitywith other nations’ systems are benefitsthat enhance the attractiveness ofTWGSS/PGS. It is a modern trainingsystem that offers current capabilityand growth potential for the U.S. Armyof the twenty-first century.


Brigadier General Philip L.Bolté was commissioned inCavalry from the U.S. MilitaryAcademy in 1950. He servedin a number of cavalry units,including 3rd and 14th Ar-mored Cavalry Regimentsand the 11th Airborne Re-connaissance Co., and com-manded the 1st Squadron,1st Cav in Vietnam. He is agraduate of the ArmorSchool, Canadian Army StaffCollege, and the Army WarCollege. He retired in 1980from his final assignment asprogram manager, FightingVehicle Systems.

“The benefits include training time and cost savings, as well as greater realism in training.”

As a National Guard armor unittrainer, how often have you faced thequestion of how best to use training de-vices in preparing tank crews for suc-cessful first-run qualification on TankTable VIII (TTVIII)? Sure, guidance isout there,1,2 but time constraints alwaysseem to force compromises.

Well, would you be interested if wewere to show you how to complete thedevice-based portion of your tank gun-nery training program in just three drillweekends, and afterwards be able topredict how many of your crews wouldbe first-run TTVIII qualifiers? TheArmy Research Institute at Boise,Idaho, has developed a device-basedtank gunnery training strategy that willallow you to do just that. In addition,this strategy will eliminate any guess-work in determining the crews to betrained, the devices to be used, thetraining and evaluation exercises to beconducted, and which device to use inorder to maximize the payoff fromyour training time investment.

THE PROPOSED STRATEGY

Pretesting

The strategy, as shown in Figure 1,begins with a 60-75 minute pretest onthe Conduct-of-Fire Trainer (COFT) todetermine each crew’s gunnery profi-ciency.3 The pretest involves the firingof four “gate” exercises (131-134) fromthe COFT’s advanced matrix. You sim-ply add up the scores from each (aftersubtracting “crew cuts”) and divide by4 to arrive at a total pretest score. Thisscore is then plugged into Column 1 of

Table 1 to find a crew’s predicted aver-age TTVIII score (Column 2) and asso-ciated probability of first-run qualifica-tion (Column 3). A crew firing 765 onthe pretest, for example, would be pre-dicted to fire an average score of 700on TTVIII (if fired multiple times) andhave a 50-50 chance of actual first-runqualification.

Depending on the commander’sstandard for his unit’s first-run TTVIIIqualification rate (from Column 3 ofTable 1), some crews will pass the pre-test (device-qualified crews) while oth-ers will not (device-unqualified crews).According to the strategy, you will onlyneed to train the latter on devices.Thus, valuable time is not taken uptraining crews that are already device-proficient.

Training

Having identifiedwhich crews need to betrained, the next step isto determine whichtraining device(s) touse, and which trainingexercises to conduct.According to the strat-egy, training can beconducted on either theCOFT or the AbramsFull-Crew InteractiveSimulation Trainer(AFIST),5 and shouldfocus on only the simu-lated TTVIII engage-ments not performed topretest standard. Thisstandard is determined

by dividing the pretest score (for exam-ple, 765) by 10 (the number of engage-ments fired per exercise). Any engage-ments not fired to this standard (for ex-ample, 76.5) must be trained. To helpyou do this, Table 2 shows the trainingexercises on each device that simulateeach TTVIII engagement.

Except for Engagement A2, the si-multaneous engagement, which re-quires use of the Caliber .50 machinegun not simulated by AFIST, we rec-ommend using AFIST whenever possi-ble because it supports full-crew train-ing. If AFIST is not available, we rec-ommend alternating between or amongthe training exercises shown in Table 2for the COFT. This will add variety andpromote device-to-tank transfer.

COFT PretestSCORE

Predicted AverageTTVIII Score

Probability ofScoring ≥ 700

on TTVIII

620 562 10%

669 609 20%

706 644 30%

737 673 40%

765 700 50%

793 727 60%

824 756 70%

861 791 80%

910 838 90%

Table 1. Predicted Tank Crew TTVIII Score and Probabilityof First-Run Qualification for Selected COFT Pretest Scores 4


Research Pays OffFor the Guard:A Device-Based StrategyFor TrainingTank Gunnery

by Dr. Joseph D. Hagmanand Dr. John E. Morrison Figure 1

Regardless of which device is used,we suggest that an easy-to-difficult pro-gression be followed when pretestingreveals that some crews need trainingon more than one simulated TTVIII en-gagement. Table 3 shows the difficultyrankings that we’ve found recently forlive-fire Table VIII engagements.6 Soengagement B5, for example, would betrained before B2, A1 before A3, andso forth. To make sure that tank crewsbecome device-proficient and, at thesame time, don’t pass a training exer-cise by luck, we recommend that theproficiency standard for training exer-cises be set at two successful, but notnecessarily consecutive, criterion per-formances. On COFT, a criterion per-formance is reached when the crew re-ceives an “advance” recommendationfrom the device in the areas of targetacquisition, reticle aim, and systemmanagement. On AFIST, criterion per-formance is reached upon crew receiptof a “pass” recommendation from thedevice for the exercise(s) being trained.

Post-testing

Just because a crew passes the train-ing exercises doesn’t necessarily meanthat it is device-qualified. So, the last

step in the strategyis to post-test yourcrews by havingthem retake thepretest. Those thatpass the post-testare now device-qualified; thosethat fail the post-test must return forfurther training ondevices, as out-lined above.

We’ve designedthis strategy to beused by units overthree (preferablyconsecutive) drillweekends once

pretesting is completed. The hour or soneeded for pretesting should be in-cluded as part of the Tank Crew Gun-nery Skills Test, with Readiness Man-agement Assemblies used if drill timeruns out.

Before the first scheduled drill afterpretesting, pretest scores should becompared against the performancestandard for first-run TTVIII qualifica-tion set by your unit commander (fromColumn 3 of Table 1). This will allowyou to determine which crews are de-vice-unqualified and which engage-ments they need to fire during training.

Similarly, the training results of thisand the next two drills should be re-viewed to select the right training exer-cises for those crews not ready forpost-testing and to post-test those thathave completed training. Once yourcrews are all device-qualified, by virtueof passing either the pre- or post-test,on-tank training should begin, probablywith TTV2,7 or with Combat Table I.8

Regardless of where you start, on-tanktraining is important because it allowscrews to experience the different as-pects of gunnery not practiced or simu-lated on devices (for example, open-hatch target acquisition, tank move-

ment, and weapon recoil effects) butimportant for successful TTVIII quali-fication.

Conclusions

What will this strategy allow you todo in the future that you can’t do now?For starters, you will be able to sched-ule your device-based training timemore efficiently by targeting onlycrews in need of remediation. You willalso know which devices to use andwhich exercises to conduct when train-ing is needed. And lastly, because de-vice performance standards are keyedto expected live-fire outcomes, you willknow when crews have receivedenough device training to warrant tran-sition to the tank, and what the ex-pected result will be on your unit’sfirst-run TTVIII qualification rate.

After all, tank gunnery training on de-vices takes time. Although this time isscarce, we think that the strategy justdescribed provides the tools you needto use it wisely. Let us know what youthink.

U.S. Army Research Institute1910 University DriveBoise, Idaho 83725

PH: (208) 334-9390FAX: (208) 334-9394E-mail: [email protected]

Notes1U.S. Army Armor School. (1990). Armor

Training Strategy (ST 17-12-7). Fort Knox,Ky.: Author.

2Department of the Army (1993). Tank Gun-nery Training (Abrams) (FM 17-12-1-2). Wash-ington, D.C.: Author.

3Use of AFIST for pretesting must await de-velopment of validated performance standardssimilar to those now available for COFT (seeNote 4).

TTVIIIExercises

COFT TrainingExercises

AFIST TrainingEngagements

A1 113, 117 6AT1

A2 101, 111 —

A3 102, 106 6AT2

A4 102, 106, 110 6AT3

A5S 102, 106, 110 6AT4

A5A 102, 106, 110 6AT5

B1S 103, 107, 119 6BT1

B2 105 6BT2

B3 110 6BT3

B4 102, 106, 110 6BT4

B5 113, 117 6AT1

B5A 105 6BT5

Table 2. COFT and AFIST Training Exercises for TTVIII Engagements

EngagementA3 B3 A2 A1 B2 A4 B4 B5 A5S A5A B5A B1S

Most Least

Difficulty Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6.5 6.5 8 9 10 11 12

Table 3. Difficulty Rankings of TTVIII Engagements


common displays and controls mountedbetween the two crew stations. Also,the roof of the hull, not having a cen-tral depression, could be better pro-tected against top attack weapons.

Conclusions

• The relocation of two crewmen tofixed hull crew stations will separatethem from their main armament,which will then either be carried onan unmanned turret or on an exter-nal overhead mounting.

• As pointed out by Don Loughlin,the commander will then no longerbe able to exercise direct “top vi-sion” from the highest point of hisvehicle, and the external overheadmounting will be both prominentand vulnerable. No wonder that ithas been often proposed and just asoften rejected.

• But, if the introduction of a ‘lift-and-turn’ mounting were to allow thecharacteristics of the fixed gun “S”Tank to be combined with those of asimilar front-engined vehicle carry-ing its gun on an overhead mount-ing, the resultant hybrid would beable to employ the characteristics ofeither of these configurations ac-cording to the prevailing tacticalsituation. Such a Hybrid Tank wouldalso only display a small target, foronly a short time, and without anyvehicle movement when engagingfrom behind a crestline.

• With the three main disadvantagesof the external overhead gun mount-ing thus corrected, and with advan-tages gained when engaging frombehind cover, the Hybrid Tank mightwell form the basis of our futuremain battle tank.

Notes1Robin Fletcher, “The Arming of Crew-in-

hull AFVs,” Military Technology, 7/1995, p. 32for a photograph.

Hermann Sitterberg, Division K.G., B.W.B.,Military Technology, Special Issue “B.W.B. -Defence Procurement in Germany,” 1994, p. 41for a description.

2Robin Fletcher, “Crew-in-hull A.F.V. Con-cepts,” Military Technology, 10/1994, p. 27 fora photograph.

Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artil-lery, 1994-95, p. 220 for a description.

3Rainer Glass and Rolf Hilmes, “ShapingGermany’s Leopard 2 Tank for the Future,” In-ternational Defense Review, 5/1995, p. 62.

4Barbara Starr, “GDLS briefs U.S. Army onlow-profile tank,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28February 1996, p. 5.

5Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Technology ofTanks, Jane’s Information Group, 1991, p. 398for a photograph.

Dr. Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D. Ba-con, “Ammunition Loading Systems for FutureTanks,” ARMOR, March-April 1995, p. 17 for adescription.

6Western Design Corporation, “We have awinner!,” First Place in ARMOR’s Tank DesignContest, ARMOR, July-August 1993, p. 7.

7Ogorkiewicz, p. 124 photograph and descrip-tion.

8Rolf Hilmes, Main Battle Tanks - develop-ments in design since 1945, translated by Rich-ard Simpkin and published by Brassey’s De-fence Publishers, 1987, scope and limits of fu-ture tank development, p. 108.

9Ogorkiewicz, pp. 119 and 274 for photo-graphs and p. 395 for a description.

10Board on Army Science and Technology ofthe National Research Council (U.S.) in theirreport, “STAR 21: Strategic Technologies forthe Army of the Twenty-First Century,” Na-tional Academy Press, 1992, pp. 80-81.


Robin Fletcher was commis-sioned in the WestminsterDragoons in 1941 and laterserved in the Special Opera-tions Executive and 2d Spe-cial Air Service Regiment. Af-ter the war, he attended thetechnical staff officer’s courseat Shrivenham, spent twoyears on tank design at Chob-ham, and returned to Shriven-ham to lecture on tank arma-ment. After leaving the serv-ice, he raised crops in Kenyaand cattle in Ireland. His arti-cles on armor have been pub-lished in International DefenseReview, Soldat und Technik,Military Technology, and otherjournals.

THE HYBRID TANK, Continued from Page 25

4From “Device-Based Prediction of TankGunnery Performance,” by J.D. Hagman andM.D. Smith, Military Psychology, 8, 59-68.Copyright 1996 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associ-ates, Publishers. Reprinted with permission.

5Snyder, S.J., “The Guard Unit Armory De-vice Full Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer(GUARDFIST-1),” ARMOR, March-April1996, pp. 40-43.

6Hagman, J.D. (1994). Performance analysisof Table VIII tank gunnery engagements (Res.Rep. 1669). Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Re-search Institute for the Behavioral and SocialSciences.

7Shaler, M.D. (1995). Compressed gunneryprogram for Abrams Tank battalions: Trainer’shandbook. Project SIMITAR.

8U.S. Army Armor Center (1995). Enhancedmounted brigade training strategy. Fort Knox,Ky.: Author.

Dr. Joseph D. Hagman is asenior research psychologistat the U.S. Army ResearchInstitute’s field office atGowen Field, Idaho (208-334-9390). He received aPh.D. in engineering psy-chology from New MexicoState University. His re-search interests are in hu-man learning and memory,and more recently, in soldierperformance on armor-re-lated simulation and trainingdevices.

Dr. John E. Morrison is aresearch staff member atthe Institute for DefenseAnalyses (IDA) (502-366-5836). He received a Ph.D.in experimental psychologyfrom Tulane University. Be-fore joining IDA, he workedfor 11 years at HumRRO’sRadcliff office and beforethat for 5 years at ARI’s FortKnox field office. His currentresearch interests are in theapplication of cognitive psy-chology principles to appliedtraining problems.

Commander's Hatch (Continued from Page 5) MG Harmeyer Selected As New Chief of Armor

ing unit works at the speed of every brain in the organization. Active listening is very difficult, especially so for young leaders eager to be in charge. Take a moment to listen to your NCOs and soldiers. They often have something important to say.

The final point has to do with an understanding of the resource environment in which the Army will operate for the next several years, barring an unforeseen war. It is wishful thinking to believe that the Army will return to a time where there are enough soldiers and dollars to accomplish every task. The future will be full of hard choices. One of them will be the decision to either bunker in and wait for better times or to plan for success. Choose the latter. The key to planning for success is first to define it in writing, then to build the steps necessary to achieve

it. No matter what the process is, and I think Army Perlormance Improvement Criteria CAPIC) is better than the others, each of you will have to spend an enormous amount of time figuring out what it costs to perlorm each element of your mission. Unless you know specifically what each activity costs, you will never be able to trade off inefficient or unnecessary activities for those that are cn tical.

These are interesting times. There is much to learn and much to do. Exciting things. Take a second along the way to enjoy life. Your time in the military will be over all too soon, and none of you will want to look back on your service and say it wasn't a fun, productive, pleasant time in your life. There is more to the Army than constant work and worry. Find the time to discover what those things are.

Major General George Harmeyer, a Vietnam and Desert Storm veteran with more than 30 years service in Armor and Cavalry units, was to assume command of the U.S. Army Armor Center on 29 October. Previously the commander of Seventh Army Training Command, he has also served as V Corps chief of staff and as assistant commander of the 3d ID (Mech).

He commanded 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Div. during Desert Storm, and was a troop commander and S3 Air in the 4th ID during the Vietnam war. Much of his career has been focused on training, as commander of the Operations Group at the NTC and at the training support division of the ODCSOP, the Pentagon.

His introductory "Commander's Hateh" will appear in the January-February 1997 issue of ARMOR.

LETTERS (Continued from Page 4)

always seemed to know where the decisive pOint would be, and appeared there as if by a sixth sense, spent more of their time searching, realizing they were not at the decisive point, then moving on, exploring the front until they found it (this ability was only gained through commanding long enough to gain it).

A second disadvantage suffered by the commander in the rear command vehicle is that he loses time, despite what we are attempting to do by overwhelming him with instant information from hundreds of sources. (We feel this will take the place of experience.) Precious time! Information takes time to get to him accurately! More time is lost while he and his staff, doing things by consensus as we practice daily in peacetime, make a decision. Now, unless he has made his command vehicle and himself irrelevant by telling his soldiers to act without waiting (which is probably the best thing to tell them if he is going to remove himself from the fighting), more time is lost while they wait for his perfectly-formatted orders to be transmitted via IVIS.

A third disadvantage is the loss of confi· dence he will surely suffer if he is not seen by the soldiers who bear the real burden of combat. The commander may be the most noble man in the world, the hardest worker, the most intelligent. the bravest, but if they do not see him, they will not trust him, and they will gripe about his indolence. We mistrust what we do not see.

The soldiers doing the fighting need to know their commander is there, sharing the risks. A close camaraderie like no other known in the world is formed by those who fight and bleed together. The commander

has a choice, becoming a part of that brotherhood or staying apart from it.

The bottom line in "Recon Pull," or just executing the style of warfare Force XXI is calling for, is trust. We must go back and define our culture which creates trust and not subtle dangers which exist in our evaluation systems and promotion boards. Trust is important in any style of fighting. But Force XXI, which calls for decentralization in a multitude of engagements. will depend

on it. Without trust there can be no Force XXI operations. It simply will not work. The conoepts that both Captains Bateman and Kolenda touch upon, Commander's Intent, Auftragstaktik. and Recon Pull. are impossible without it!

MAJ DONALD E. VANDERGRIFF OEC

Alexandria, Va.

Synopsis: Senior Officer logistics Management Course

The Senior Officer Logistics Management Course (SOLMC) is specifically designed to update battalion and brigade commanders, primary staff officers. and DA civilians working in the logistic field. The course encompasses maintenance, supply, readiness, transportation. as well as hands-on experienoe with vehicles, unit level logistics computer, ammunition, medical, communication, NBC, missile and quartermaster equipment. The course is open to officers of all branches in the rank of major or higher in the Active, Reserve, and National Guard components, U.S. Marines Corps, and Allied Nations. DA civilians in the grade of GS-11 or higher are also eligible to enroll. The one-week course is conducted 10 times each fiscal year at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Class quotas may be obtained through normal U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command channels. Any problems encountered obtaining class quotas or information about the course should be directed to the SOLMC Branch Chief, DSN 464-8152/3411 or commercial (502) 624-815213411. Class schedules for Fiscal Year 97 are shown below.

Ciastl

97-01 97-02 97-03 97-04 97-05

Class Dates

18-22 Nov 96 27-31 Jan 97 24-28 Feb 97 17-21 Mar 97 14-18 Apr 97

97-06 97-07 97-08 97-09 97-10

12-16 May 97 16·20 Jun 97 21-25 Jul 97 18·22 Aug 97 15-19 Sep 97

ARMOR - November-December 1996 51

Hazardous Duty by David H. Hack-worth (COL, USA, Ret.) with TomMathews. William Morrow and Com-pany, Inc., New York. 328 pages.$25.00.

This book claims, “America’s most deco-rated living soldier exposes the real truthabout the U.S. military.” I will not disputeColonel Hackworth’s personal valor, nor thenumber of his decorations. But the “truth”he presents is heavily flavored by his own“unique” perspective.

This book is a rambling collection of warstories, heavily flavored with profanity (be-cause that’s how soldiers talk), inter-spersed with barbs against “The System,”the Military-Industrial-Congressional Com-plex, and anyone who generally does not fitinto his idea of a soldier. COL Hackworthhas visited every operation and fight in thelast decade, from the Gulf War to Bosnia.He has talked with the leaders and thetroopers involved. He lavishes praise on hisidea of “real warrior-studs” and heaps dis-dain on “Perfumed Princes,” soldiers whodo not measure up to his idea of selflessservice.

But this book does perform a service tothe Army and the Defense Department. Hedid make me think, although I had to chokeback my disdain for his operating proce-dures and his repeated “concern” for thetroops — concern repeated so often as tomake you wonder about its sincerity.

The really unfortunate thing about thisbook is that when COL Hackworth doesmake a worthwhile observation, for exam-ple the problem of mines in Bosnia, heleads his worthwhile point with, to use hisvernacular, profane horses#$% which ef-fectively disguises his point. One thing I’velearned in the 20 years I’ve served is tomake a point with selective profanity, butonce you’ve proven you’re a hard-core war-rior, let the profanity go. The book is satu-rated with the words and phrases we usein the motor pool and the TOC. So what,Colonel, make your point based on experi-ence, which I do not doubt you have.

COL Hackworth also makes “new” sug-gestions for the restructuring of the De-fense Department, which are by and largerevarnished trite ideas from the extreme lib-eral wing of the Democratic Party. Theauthor’s new ideas are: do away with theU.S. Air Force and combine the Army andMarine Corps. These sad, old ideas ob-scure some very salient ones he gatheredin his interactions with our troopers, likeputting money into R&D for new body ar-mor, lightweight commo gear, and stream-lining of the acquisition procedure.

COL Hackworth also points out that ourcivilian leadership’s dearth of military expe-rience, in either political party, requires mili-tary planners and leaders to more fully ex-plain the depth of the commitment to mili-tary operations other than war, in additionto the real gun fights of the future. We allunderstand his examples, like the fact thata battalion on MFO duty really ties up onebrigade of troopers in the preparation, exe-cution, and recovery/retraining cycle. I ama planner right now, and believe me, Ispend sleepless nights thinking about thebattalions we have in Bosnia, Kuwait, andthe Sinai, and how we’ll get those troopersout when we have to fight. Good point,Colonel; we owe it to our civilian leaders tomake them understand the application ofmilitary power.

So, should you buy this book? My answeris a qualified yes. The point of reading is toexpand your range of thought, and thisbook does make you think. It is really un-fortunate that COL Hackworth obscures hispoints with “barracks talk” and rambles onabout meeting with former Vietnameseenemies, then shifts back to his travelogueof trouble. His “truth” is not so clear to me;it sounds at times like a rehash of Gabrieland Savage’s Crisis in Command, from thelate 1970s, and I know we are not that badoff, yet. I really think COL Hackworth needsto write a book on how to fight the dirtylittle wars he believes we will be facing inthe future — and by the way, I believe heis correct here. This would be a real contri-bution to the Army, more important thanchasing generals and looking for faultswhere there might not be any.

Just so COL Hackworth does not think Iam one of those who has sold his soul tobecome a “Perfumed Prince,” I’ll note herethat I probably won’t command a battalionand, therefore, will not be promoted anyhigher. But Colonel, I still call them like Isee them.

LTC KEVIN C. BENSONThird U.S. Army

A Quick and Dirty Guide to War,Third Edition by James F. Dunniganand Austin Bay, William Morrow andCompany, Inc., New York, 1996. 690pages. $27.50, hardback.

This is not a book to be read from coverto cover, rather one to have close at handwhile watching the evening news or read-ing the daily paper. It covers the world inmajor geopolitical pieces going into just

enough detail to provide the reader thebackground (geography, history, local poli-tics) and agenda of all the key players. Itcertainly does not disappoint readers inter-ested in numbers and predictions. Eachchapter provides charts with empirical datathe authors have developed from wargam-ing. The authors use this data as a majorcomponent of their predicted outcomes; thefirst edition was 80 percent accurate andthe second edition 72 percent correct.

The book would be better served with theaddition of more maps in greater detail.The index provides quick access to moreinformation on today’s third page story be-fore it becomes Newsweek’s cover story.The only major deficiency is the lack of anydocumentat ion to explain where theauthors got their information. The unstruc-tured bibliography provides a few clues, butcoupled with the lack of documentation, itis impossible for the reader to find outmore information on some of the more in-teresting lines like “...some Brazilians fearthat the United Nations intends to ‘interna-tionalize’ control of the Amazon....” WhichBrazilians? The authors cheat readers outof the opportunity to evaluate the quality ofthe research material and, more impor-tantly, the ability to further their under-standing of a situation by picking up thetrail of knowledge where the authors leftoff.

The book meets its stated goal to providereaders a brief synopsis of the world’s warsand possible situations that could easily be-come wars, and explains what we shouldexpect from them in the future. Armor andcavalry officers should consider this bookfor their professional libraries. With luck,there will be a fourth edition around theturn of the century with an accompanyingCD ROM diskette filled with the magazineand newspaper articles the authors used intheir research, not to mention more mapsand pictures.

CPT MATTHEW MORTONFt. Polk, La.

Arrogant Armies: Great MilitaryDisasters and the Generals BehindThem by James M. Perry, John Wileyand Sons, Inc., New York, 1996. 314pages. $27.95.

James Perry’s Arrogant Armies is a jour-nalist’s survey of military catastrophe. Hissubjects are General Braddock, famous forthe Braddock Massacre; Charles V.F. Town-shend, who surrendered a British Army in


BOOKSOf “Warrior-Studs” and “Perfumed Princes”

Iraq during World War I; and other foolish,vain, and arrogant officers who led armiesto catastrophe in the last two hundredyears. Perry’s style is pithy and revealssome predisposition to regard soldiers asarrogant and empty headed. Perry makesno pretensions about his qualifications orhis motives. A political writer, he is expert inhis field, but argues that understanding thehistory of these kinds of events is criticaland important not only for journalists, but tobe well informed. He expresses the hopethat this book might encourage young peo-ple that history is worthwhile and exciting.In this attempt, he is successful.

Perry recounts the unfortunate results of11 failed military campaigns clearly andconcisely, and tells the story in such a wayas to develop a sense of foreboding, evenif the reader is familiar with the campaign.Perry also lays out the policymakers’ role inthese outrageous affairs. Sending troops tosalvage failed policy has a long tradition.Because most of these campaigns involvedoperations overseas, logistics failures alsocontributed to the disastrous events Perrydescribes.

Flawed policies and operations at the endof enormously long supply lines contributedto failure in campaigns from 18th centuryNorth America to Morocco in the early 20thcentury; but Perry’s central thesis is that“arrogance, contempt for the enemy, badintelligence...and incompetent political lead-ership,” were the chief causes of militarycatastrophe from Braddock to Mogadishu.Mogadishu! — Yes, Mogadishu. Perry usesthe events in Mogadishu to remind us thatthe elements of military catastrophe remainwith us today. His conclusion is irritating,because it is compelling and chilling, andbecause it could happen again. Arrogance,contempt for the enemy, bad intelligence,and flawed policy are not the province ofhistory alone. All of us who would leadtroops should read Perry and consider theimplications of his argument.

COL GREGORY FONTENOTCdr, 1st Bde Combat Team

1st Armored DivisionDubrave, Bosnia

Inside the Blue Berets: A CombatHistory of Soviet and Russian Air-borne Forces, 1930-1995 by Steven J.Zaloga, Presidio Press, Novato, Calif.,1995. 339 pages. $24.95.

Steven Zaloga is the author of numerousbooks on the Soviet and Russian military.Additionally, he writes regularly for Jane’sSoviet Intelligence Review and has writtenand produced several video documentaries

on military technology. His look at the So-viet, and now Russian, airborne demon-strates his expertise and provides tremen-dous insight for the military scholar.

The value of this book is stated clearly inthe book’s introduction: “The Russian Armymay no longer be ‘The Threat,’ but the BlueBerets [Russian Airborne soldiers] are likelyto figure prominently in the headlines overthe next decade. The Blue Berets are Rus-sia’s power projection muscle in these [cur-rent] conflicts. This book aims to establishRussia’s legitimate claim as one of the pio-neers of airmobile forces and to explainhow the tradition is changing the face oftoday’s Russian Army.”

In the early 1930s, the Soviets led theworld in the development of paratroopersand airborne tactics. Zaloga goes to greatdetail in recounting the early Soviet experi-mentation in this futuristic style of war.Most of these tests and trials, to includetheir use during World War II, were disas-trous, but the author’s descriptions revealnumerous lessons. They add detail to anarea little studied or written about.

Zaloga explains how the Soviets devel-oped their airborne forces as a strategicasset, working directly for the Soviet Gen-eral Staff. This fact, and the fact that allairborne forces were mechanized in the1950s and 1960s, demonstrates differ-ences between the Soviet paratrooper andhis U.S. Army counterpart.

The author’s description of the develop-ment of the Soviet airborne force as a rapiddeployment or shock force is outstanding,and it allows the reader to understand whythe Soviets maintained such a large air-borne force, and why they mechanized it.An entire chapter discusses airborne armortactics and armor systems. The Soviets,from the inception of the airborne conceptin the 1930s, planned to use armor forcesas part of the airborne operation. Usually,these forces were airlanded following theseizure of an airfield. This leads to a dis-cussion of the development of an airbornearmored vehicle and airlift to move theseand other armor assets.

The author also includes brief discussionsabout the other Soviet special operationsunits: Spetnaz, Soviet Naval Infantry, andNaval Spetnaz. This, and the discussionsof the use of airborne and special forcesduring the war in Afghanistan and the Mos-cow coup attempts in the early 1990s,bring the reader up to the present day andalso bring this work into focus. Zaloga’s en-tire development shows that the new Rus-sian airborne units are the ones with whichU.S. Army forces will most likely interact aseither friend or foe. The work also takes oncurrent significance as the author tracesthe careers of several prominent individualsthrough their time in the airborne corps, to

include General Alexander Lebed (Russian“National Security Advisor”) and GeneralPavel Grachev (ex-Russian Defense Minis-ter).

This book is well written, providing foreasy and enjoyable reading. An extensivebibliography is included. The informationpresented has importance, not simply toscholars, but to Armor/Cavalry soldiers aswell. The men and units discussed are“players” on the world military stage. Addi-tionally, the Russian airborne’s use of ar-mor in rapid deployments poses interestingquestions in light of the recent decision tocancel acquisition of an Armored Gun Sys-tem. I recommend this book to anyone in-terested in the Russian (Soviet) Militaryand Airborne/Special Operations.

CPT BRIAN L. STEEDFort Knox, Ky.

Sheridan: A History of the Ameri-can Light Tank, Vol. 2 by R.P. Hunni-cutt, Presidio Press, Novato, Calif., 340pages. $80.

Dick Hunnicutt’s series of books onAmerican armor are well known to armorprofessionals as authoritative, heavily illus-trated, and of extremely high quality. To-gether, they offer the definitive coverage ofthe development of U.S fighting vehicles.

What makes them so special is the levelof detail. The author not only covers themajor tanks that have been in the Army’sinventory, but also the many test projectsand prototypes that led up the final design,along with the variants that followed. Thetext is accompanied by many outstandingpictures that make it easier to follow. Manyof these pictures have never been publish-ed before, a tribute to Hunnicutt’s incredibleeffort in contacting sources and gatheringtruly unusual photos.

His latest title is a bit misleading. Actually,the book is not so much a history of theSheridan’s development, but of all light ar-mor projects in the post-WWII era, includ-ing the M41, experimental T71 and T92 de-signs, the Sheridan, and the Armored GunSystem, may it rest in peace. This volumepicks up where his earlier, Stuart: A Historyof the American Light Tank, Vol. 1, left off.

Despite the price in an era of overpricedbooks, this one is a bargain. Paper andprinting are of the highest quality, and thebinding is definitely reference-book class.These qualities set off a really first-rate ef-fort.

JON CLEMENSARMOR Staff


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Armor, November-December 1996 Edition - Fort Benning...Production Assistant Mary Hager E-Mail:...

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