Armor Infantry Team in Korea

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r)NE T A N K . 31 EOXES @ C . 5 @ C A L , AMD 11 E?l: A X ANAIT'ISIC 3FTHE ARH3R-INFANTRY T E A H I N KCSEA, 2VNE 1 2 5 2 - 23LP 105E.

A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d tc; t h e F s z u l t y o f t h e V . S . Ar:r yCsmmand And Ge ne ra l S t a f f C ol le ge i r . F E Y ~ ~ S ~f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e r eqyJ i r smen t s f g r t h ed e g r e e

MASTER OF M I L I T A R Y ART A TD Z-CISNCE

R O N A L D 3 OFFUTT, E A J , IJSAB . S . , U ni te d S t a t e s t l i l i t z r y Aca:?eny. - - 7M . S . I A m e r i c a n T e c h n o l o g i c a l Uni ver z i t y, 1 2 7 7

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Name o f C a n d i d a t e : R o n a l d D . O f f u t tT i t l e of T h e s i s : O n e T a n k , 31 Boxes o f .50 C a l ,a n d 11 Men: An A n a l y s i s oft h e A r m o r - I n f a n t r y Team i nK o r e a , J u n e 1950 - J u l y 1952.A p p r o v e d by:

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T h e o p i n i o n s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r et h o s e o f t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r a n d d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l yr e p r e s e n t t h e views o f t h e U . S . Army Command andG e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e o r a n y o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l-a g e n c y . (


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A B STXACTO N E TANK, 31 S@XES OF .50 CAL, AND 11 K E N : A n 3 n ~ ? y s i a :;ft h e A r m o r - I n f a n t r y Team i n Korea, . June 1950, thro-g?.J u l y 1951, by Major Rona ld D. O f P G t t , 1 J . S . ,4i;:17.142 p a g e s .T h i s t h e s i s a n a ly z e s t h e a b i l i t y of t h e Un it ed S t s t e z A?::?t o i n c o r p o ra t e t h e l e s s o n s of h i s t o r y i n t h e evolut ic . : : c.0d o c t r i n e . The a n a l y s i s f o c u s e s o n a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e z xd o c t r i n e and u s e s t a s k forc.9 l e v e l o p e r a t i o n s dL:rizg t h eKorean war t o r e s o l v e t h e a n a l y s i s i s 3 - a .The s t u d y c o n d u c t s a n a n a l y s i s o f ar m or - in fa n t r y d s r t r i z ?f rom i t s co nc ep t i on i n Army m a n u a l s i n 1941 thra* ;dk 1 9 " .C ap st on e d o c t r i n a l m a t e r i a l s u ch as F ie ld Manza? LC' ??- ,- and b a t t a l i o n l e v e l m a n u a l s a r e examine . O:C$rr e l e v a n t d o c t r i n a l m a t e r i a l is i nc lu de d t o c r e a t e a d e t z i *?.?p i c t u r e o f how t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t ea m was t~ :or,- *.-- - - to p e r a t i o n s .U n i t s t r u c t u r e s and t r a i n i n g a r e a l s o examined tz d:.termi::r.t h e a b i l i t y o f c om mi tt ed u n i t s t o i mp l emen t d o c t r i r . 5 .P o b li s h ed d o c t r i n e i s th en compare; t c a c t u a l z r n ~ r - i n l ? . n t r : . 'o p e r a t i o n s dg r i ng '.he K orean War .T h e s t u d y co n c lu d e s t h a t t h e Army e f f e c t i v e l y in,>L:.: e: : :,:l e s s o n s s f Wor ld War I I i n t h e d e v e l a f ne n t tm a r m s r - i : . f r n r - ;d o c t r i n e . R e g ar d l es s J f t h P l i t e r a t u r e x d t k c :mpir.~~t:. t fs e n o i r m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s t h a t d o c t r i z e wzs ' ~ ~ : l s r z : ~ ~ . . ~ .:?f i e l d army f a i l e d t o u n d e r s t s c d a n d i.zF?oae::t I - c z i ia r m o r - i r f a n t r y d o c t r i n e d u r i n g t h e Korea:. a zr. ? :e


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI would l i k e t o e x p r e s s ny g r a t i t u d e t o t h i ; s e n h c ,made t h i s t h e s i s p o s s i b l e .T o t h e Ko re an V e t e r a n who f o u g h t z o t t c t3 f c r g i t t e c .To CSH J o e D . O f f u t t who p r o v i d e d p e r s o n a l i : i z i z h zi n t o t h e A r m y o f 1949 a n d t h e K o re a n War.T o CSM B i l l y Gray who gave ice f o c u s and a d i f f s r e n tp o i n t o f v iew.T o Dr. C h r i s t o p h e r G ab e l w h o t a s k a c h a n c t ,c o n t r i b u t e d a sense of humor, and a g en ui ne d e s i r e t c x s k ?t h e p r o d u c t m e a n in g f u l .T J L i e u t e n a n t Colons1 C h a r l e s 0 . M c K e n n i fc:. hi eo p t i r n i s t i s l e e d e r s h i p and a n i n v a l z s b l e c ; n t r l S u t i c : ; :I

s t u d y s c o h e r e n c e a nd f o c u s .T o my c o l l e a g u e s wi t h whurn maRy ,f tk .? izr::::: i: ??.


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TAOLE OF CONTZNTS

F5,z.eThesis Approval Page _ .Abstract i iAcknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ .Table o f Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Chapter 1. DOCTRINE A N D THE ARMOR-INFANTRY T C M . . . . . . . -Chapter 2. ARMOR I N F A N T R Y DOCTRINE, 1346-1351: . . . . . . . . . - -

FM 100-5, Operations, 1841 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I ?FM 100-5, Operations, 1344 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a_ _FM 100-5, Operations. 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ _FM 7-20, Infactry Battalion, 12-14 . . . . . . . .:-FE 7-2C, Infantry Battelisn. 1 3 5 0 . . . . . . . _ .Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 3. ARMY ORGANIZATION, TRAINING , AN? E G U I F W F T ..31946-1350 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Crgsnisat o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Training I -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .=I:E.;uipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sunmar7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -?.

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C h a p t e r 4 . ACTIONS O N CONTACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E 4F i r s t B l o o d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E4C a s e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52C o n t a c t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1T a s k F o r c e C r o m b e z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74L e s s o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9:O r g a n i z a t i o n s I2 rCommand a n d C o n t r o l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? $

T a c t i c a l R a d i o C o m m u n i c s t i s n s . . . . . . . ,:V i s u a l S i g n a l s C I ?T r a i n i n g a n d S t a n d i n g O p e r a t i n g

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-.>

- ,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ _ _P r o c e d u r e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C h a p t e r 5. DOCTRINAL GARDENS 4 n?,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --.I m p l i c a t i o n s ,7?C o n c l u s i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - LI?

E n d n o t e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I?.:3 i b l i o g r a p h y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I n i t i - l 3 I s t r i b u t i o n List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ._._

. c. _.

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CHAPTER 1

DOCTRINE A N D THE ARMOR-INFANTRY TEAMThe P l a t o o n S e r g e a n t t o l d us t h a t whenwe w e n t o u t w i t h t h e i n f a n t r y , t h a t wewere t o l oa d u p 31 boxes o f . SO c a l andt h a t e a c h t a n k would h a ve t o c a r r ye l e v e n m e n . 1 T a n k CommanderK orea , 1951

I n a s p e e c h g i v e n a t Wins ton -Sa lem, N or th C a ro l i na ,on 20 J a n u a r y 1950, S e c r e t a ry o f t h e Army Gordon G rayde sc r i be d t h e Army i n t h e s e g l o w i n g terms:

. . . t h e Army t o d a y i s a n o u t s t a n d i n gp a r t o f t h e f i n e s t p e ac e t i m e f i g h t i n gf o r c e o ur n a t i o n h a s e v e r h a d . . . . Wel e a r n e d a l o t a b o u t modern a r m i e s d u r i n gt h e war, and we h a v e l e a r n e d a l o t mores i n c e , i n v a r i o u s and c o n t in u i n g s t u d i e sa n d e x p e r i m e n t s . We a r e a p p l y i ng t h e s el e s s o n s a s f a s t a s t he y a r e proven , andt h e r e s u l t s h av e more t h a n j u s t i f i e d t h et ime and e f f o r t t h a t we spend on s u c hm a t t e r s . ?A t t h e same t ime t h i s s pe ec h was p r e s e n t e d , G e n e r a l

Walton Walker , Commander of t h e Ei gh th Army i n J a p a n , b e g a na n i n c r e m e n t a l t r a i n i n g p ro gr a m w hi ch wou ld c u l m i n a t e w i t hd i v i s i o n l e v e l e x e r c i s e s i n J u n e . T h e J u ne t r a i n i n g t e s t s


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would b e t h e f i r s t pl an ne d d i v i s i o n a l e x e r c i s e s i n t h e F arEast s ince Wor ld War 11.3

The i n i t i a l b a t t a l i o n l e v e l exerc i ses r e s u l t e d i nd i s m al p er fo rm an ce s and t h e r e l i e f o f s e v e r a l b a t t a l i o nc om man der s. T he o u t s t a n d i n g pe a c e t i m e f i g h t i n g f o r c e o fS e c r e t a r y Grays a d d r e s s was n o t s t a t i o n e d in J a p a n . 4

I n Montgomery, Alabama, on October 2 5 , 1 9 4 9 ,S e c r e t a r y G ra y s p o k e on t h e r o l e of g ro un d f o r c e s i n modernwar s a y i n g :

T h e I n f a n t r y - T a n k - A r t i l l e r y team i sr e c o g n i z e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o rl d as ane s s e n t i a l e le me nt t o a ny m i l i t a r ys u c c es s ; a nd t h i s team c a n n o t a p p r o a c hf u l l e f f e c t i v e n e s s u n t i l j o i ne d bya d e q u a t e t a c t i c a l a i r s u p p o r t , f i g h t e rand l i gh t -bomber e l e men t s t ho r oug h lyt r a i n e d i n g r o u n d - s u p p o r t m i s s i o n s .Such a c o m b i n a t i o n q u i t e p r o b a b l y w i l lca r r y t h e f i n a l and d e c i s i v e s t a ge s ofany war we m i g h t f a c e f o r s o m e time t ocome. 5Regimenta l t a n k companies of t h e Far E a s t Command

w er e c e r e m o n i a l and o b s o l e t e . L ac k o f t r a i n i n g a r e a s anda u s t e r e b u d g e t s p r e c l u d e d c o m b i n e d arms t r a i n i n g . F a r Eas tAir F o r c e u n i t s c o n d u c t e d l i t t l e o r no t r a i n i n g i n t h eg r ou nd s u p p o r t r o l e . The t i g h t , w e l l - t r a i n e d co mb in ed a rm steam m e n t i o n e d b y S e c r e t a r y Gray was a l s o n o t s t a t i o n e d i nJapan . e

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The r het or i c of t he Secr et ar y o f t he Ar my pai nt s api ct ur e of t he Ar my of 1950 as a dynam c, r obustor gani zat i on r eady f or t he r i gor s of war . I ni t i al combatper f or mance by Amer i can uni t s i n Kor ea pai nt s a di f f er entpi c t ur e exposed t o t he har sh l i ght of r eal i t y . Faced wi t hcr i ppl i ng budget s and a l ack of m ssi on, t he Ar my st r uggl edt o f i nd a r o l e as a par t of t he nat i onal s ec ur i t y pol i c y.

. Si xt y per cent o f t he of f i ' cers on act i ve dut y wer eunder t hi r t y- f i ve year s of age. Enl i st ed men aver aged onl yt went y- t wo year s of age. The Ar my, whi ch had been one oft he l ar gest i n t he wor l d at t he end of Wor l d War 11, hadr api dl y demobi l i zed sendi ng t he c i t i zen- sol di er home. Themass exodus of sol di er s al so meant t hat t he Ar my had l ostval uabl e combat exper i ence. 7

The most i mpor t ant pr ocess wi t h whi ch t he m l i t ar ydi st i l l s and r et ai ns war t i me exper i ence i s t hr ough t hedevel opment of doct r i ne based on l essons l ear ned i n combat .These combat l essons ar e s i gni f i cant f act or s i n t hedevel opment of doct r i ne. I n s pi t e of t hi s r ec ogni t i on, t hei mpac t o f m l i t ar y hi s t or y on doc t r i ne i s of t en over shadowedby ot her concer ns. The emphasi s on f ac t or s such as t hem l i t ar y budget , t echnol ogy, and our per cept i on of t het hr eat , of t en i ndi cat e a shor t t er m appr oach t o the sol ut i or ,of doct r i nal probl ems. Thi s sent i ment i s exempl i f i ed by

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M aj or P a u l H e r b e r t who d e s c r i b e d t h e impact o f t h e Ko re anWar on t h e r e c e n t e v o l u t io n of m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e i n t h i smanner :

The Korean war, t h e U .S. Armys mostr e c e n t exper i ence i n c l a s s i c a lcampa ign ing migh t as well n o t h a v eh a p p e n e d f o r a l l i t s impac t on t h ed o c t r i n e of t h e 1970s.eM i l i t a r y h i s t o r y i s t h e m os t n e g l e c t e d , a n d

p o t e n t i a l l y t h e most i m po r t an t f a c t o r i n t h e e v o l u t i o n o fd o c t r i n e . An examination o f t h e p a s t p e r f or m a nc e o fs o l d i e r s i n c ombat h a s t h e g r e a t e s t p o t e n t i a l f o r makingd o c t r i n e m ore e f f i c i e n t b ec au se it i s t h e f i r s t p l a c e t h a tmen a r e ad de d t o t h e f o r m u l a o f war. T h e r e a re manyexamples, o f t e n q uo te d by b o t h m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n s ande d u c a t o r s , o f f a mo us g e n e r a l s who h a ve sp o ke n e m p h a t i c a l l yo f t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y t o t h e i r s u cc e s s .N ap o le o n, F r e d e r i c k t h e G r e a t , and Ge or ge S. P a t t o n w e r eg r e a t m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s who w r o t e a b o u t , and l e a r n e d f ro mm i l i t a r y h i s t o r y . U n fo r tu n a t e ly , t h i s b e l i e f i s n o tu n i v e r s a l among modern o f f i c e r s . *

The c o n t r i b u t i o n of m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y t o t h e e v o l u t io no f d o c t r i n e c a n b e m ea su re d i n m a n y d i f f e r e n t ways. Themeasure i s most c on vi nc in g when examining r ecen t wart imee x p e r i e n c e an d a n a l y z i n g t h e l e s s o n s l earned by t h e

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p a r t i c i p a n t s . Combat i n f o r m a t i o n , ex am in ed a nd a n a l y z e d ,can then be measured aga in s t s u b s e q u e n t c o m b a t a c t i o n s .F o r c e s u n de r e x a mi n at io n mu st b e s i m i l i a r i n o r g a n i z a t i o na nd f u n c t i o n . T he y m us t a l s o b e e xa min ed w h i l e o p e r a t i n g i nr o u g h l y t h e same e n v i r o n m e n t .

The sum of t h es e exami n a t i on s can u l t i m a t e l y r e s u l ti n a c o n s i s t e n t p o r t r a y a l o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s be tween menand t h e o t h e r f a c t o r s o f war. I t i s h e r e t h a t t h e i n f l u e n c eo f m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y s h o u l d become o b v i o u s a nd p e r s u a s i v e .Th ese r e l a t i o n s h i p s may b e a s s i m p l e a s t h e re q u ir e m en t t oc o n t i n u o u s l y m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy, o r a s co mp le xas a f i r e s u p po r t p l a n f o r a movement t o c o n t a c t . I n e i t h e rcase , t h i s o V e r r h e lm i n g ' h is t o r i ca 1 e v i de n c e s h ou ld bei n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f d o c t r i n e . F a i l i n g t oi n t e g r a t e h i s t o r i c a l e vi de nc e i n t o t h e development ofd o c t r i n e i g n o r e s c o n s i s t e n t e v i d e n c e on how t o succeed i nw a r .

I n o r de r t o e s t a b l i s h t h e p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s t h a td o c t r i n e c o u l d r e c e i v e from a p r o pe r a n a l y s i s o f m i l i t a r yh i s t o r y , t w o s t e p s m ust b e t a k e n . F i r s t , you m u s t c o n d u c t ap r o p e r a n a l y s i s o f a s p e c i f i c t h e m e o r r e l a t i o n s h i p i nm i l i t a r y h i s t o r y . T h i s a n a l y s i s s h ou ld c o ve r s u f f i c i e n tt i me a nd c omb at e x p e r i e n c e t o r e q u i r e a c ha ng e i n d o c t r i n e .Second, you must r e s o l v e t h e q u e s t i o n , "Do we l i s t e n t o t h e

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l e s s o n s o f h i s t o r y when we d e v e l o p d o c t r i n e ? " , b y e x a mi n i ngb o t h t h e w r i t t e n d o c t r i n a l l i t e r a t u r e a nd t h e p e r f o r m an c e o fu n i t s i n c om ba t. The e x a m i na t i o n o f h i s t o r y t o d e t e r m i n et h e i m p ac t o f warfare on t h e f o r c e s t r u c t u r e and d o c t r i n e o ft h e Army is n o t u n i q u e , n o r i s i t w i t h o u t p r e c e d e n c e . I nt h e 1935 A n n u a l R epor t of t h e Un i t ed S t a t e s Army t o t h eC o ng r e ss , C h ie f of S t a f f f o r 1935, General Douglas MacArthurs a i d :

The f a c t s d e r i ve d f rom h i s t o r i c a la n a l y s i s , h e [ t h e Army O f f i c e r ] a p p l i e st o t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e p r e s e n t a nd t h ep r ox i ma t e f u t u r e , t h u s d e v e lo p i n g as y n t h e s i s o f a p p r o p r i a t e m e t h o d ,o r g a n i z a t i o n , and d o c t r i n e . 1 0

MaH i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s , a s d e s c r i b e d b y Genera l

A r th u r , r e t a i n s r e le v a n ce f o r most s e r v i n g o f f i c e r s . If o c u s e s i t s e x am i n at i o n on s p e c i f i c d o c t r i n a l c o n c e p t s andt r a c e s them t h r o ug h o u t t h e h i s t o r y o f w a r f a r e .

The h i s t o r y o f war o f f e r s many s i g n i f i c a n to p p o r t u n i t i e s t o d e t e r m in e t h e i m pa ct of m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y ond o c t r i n e . O f p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t a n c e i s t h e impact ofm i l i t a r y h i s t o r y on t h e d o c t r i n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f armor andi n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s . Combat l e s s o n s l e a r ne d by s o l d i e r s a s ap a r t o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e am , f or m t h e b a s i s of e f f e c t i v ei m p le m e nt a t io n of b o t h c u r r e n t an d f u t u r e a r m o r - i n f a n t r yd o c t r i n e . The r e l a t i o n s h i p o f a rm or ed an d

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i n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s d u r i n g t h e f i r s t y e a r s o f t h e K o r e a n Wari s e s p e c i a l l y i m po rt an t f o r s e v e r a l r e a s on s .

F i r s t , t h i s i s t h e most r e c e n t e xa mp le o f l a r g eU ni te d S t a t e s f o r c e s i nv ol ve d i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l war w i t hl a rge n um be rs o f a r mo r ed -and i n f a n t r y f o r m a t i o n s . T h e r ea r e , s e c o n dl y , n um erous b a t t l e f i e l d examples o f t h ei n t e r a c t i o n s b et we en a rm or ed a nd i n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s . T he secase s t u d i e s ru n t h e gamut o f t a c t i c a l m i s s i o n s p e r f o r m e d bya r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s i n c om ba t. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e r e a r er e a s o n s t o s t u d y t h e Korean War which a r e even morec o m p e l l i n g .

I n 1950, when t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c om m it t ed g r o un df o r c e s i n K or e a, World War I1 was f r e s h i n t h e memory of a l lAmericans. M i l i t a r y p e r i o d i c a l s o f t h e d ay a r e r i c h i n t h es t u d y o f c o mb at a c t i o n s o f World War 11. C o n t r i b u t i n ga u t h o r s i n c l u d e S .L .A . M a r s h a l l , J . F . C . F u l l e r , H e i n zG u d e r i an , and B. H. L i d d e l l H a r t . T h e i n s i g h t p ro vi de d byt h e s e a u t h o r s on t h e b a t t l e s a nd d e c i s i o n s of World War I1r e i n f o r c e d t h e l e s s o n s a l r e a d y l e a r n ed . 1 1

T h e Army of 1950 was l e d b y c om bat v e t e r a n s . T h e i re x p e r i e n c e i n war s h ou l d have d i r e c t l y i n f l u en c e d t h ed e v e l o p me n t a n d i mp l e me n t a t i o n of Army d o c t r i n e f o r t h eem ployment o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y f o r m a t i o n s . The d o c t r i n a le mp lo ymen t o f U n i t e d S t a t e s Army u n i t s s h o u l d h a v e be e n

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s ou nd , ba s ed on t h e s e f a c t o r s a l o n e . L e s so n s l e a r n e dt h ro u g h h a rd f i g h t i n g a t t h e K a s se r in e P a s s , t h e p u r s u i tf o l l o w i n g t h e b r e a k o u t a t S t Lo , and t h e b a t t l e of t h eB u l g e , p r o v i d e a bedr ock o f no - nons ens e t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n ew hic h s h o u l d h av e f a c i l i t a t e d co mbat o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea.

I n o r d e r t o make a d e f i n i t i v e s t a t e me n t c on c er n in gt h e Army's a b i l i t y t o e f f e c t i v e l y i n t e g r a t e h i s t o r i c a la n a l y s i s i n t o t h e de ve lo pm en t of d o c t r i n e , s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n tareas must be examined.

The f i r s t r e q u i r e m e n t i s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f ah i s t o r i c a l b a s i s f o r t h e employment of a r m o r - i n f a n t r yf o r m a t i o n s . T h i s can be a c c o m p l i s h e d b y t a k i n g a s h o r t l o o ka t t h e d ev el op me nt o f d o c t r i n e t h a t e v o lv e d as a p a r t o fwartime demand. A f o c us e d ex a m in a t io n of t h e d o c t r i n edur i ng W or l d War I1 c a n be o b t a i n e d b y s t u d y i n g t h e A r m yF i e l d S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s , FH 100-5, Ooerations, c i r c a 1 9 4 1and compar ing i t t o t h e same Army manual used i n 1944 and1 94 9. T h i s " b e f o r e a nd a f t e r " compar i son w i l l p r o v i d ei n s i g h t i n t o t h e way t he Amer i can Army p l an ne d t o f i g h t .P r i o r t o W orld War 11, a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e was i n i t si n f a nc y . Fo l l o wi ng World War 11, t h e f u l l impact of t h a tc o n f l i c t s ho u ld have p r of o u nd l y i n f lu e n c e d d o c t r i n e .While t h i s compar i s on w i l l p r o v id e s i g n i f i c a n ti n s i g h t a t h ig h l e v e l s of d o c t r i n e , i t may n o t h a v e b e e n

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r e l e v a n t t o t h e s o l d i e r s a sk ed t o do t h e j o b on t h e g ro un d.F or t h i s r e as o n t h e ex a mi n at i on o f t h e 1944 FM 7-20,

, and i t s c om pa ri so n t o t h e 1949 m a n u a lw i l l a l s o b e c o n du c t ed . A c om pa ri so n of t h e s t a t e d Armyd o c t r i n e f o r t h e employment o f t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n w i l lp r o v i d e a wo rm s- ey e v ie w o f w h at o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d menwere e x pe c te d t o d o a s a p a r t of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y teams.A d d i t i o na l d o c t r i n a l i n fo r m at i o n w i l l b e i n c l u d e d t o d e v e l o pa c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f how t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team wase x p ec t e d t o work t o g e t h e r p r i o r t o t h e Ko re an War.

The second major a rea t o b e e xa mi ne d i s t h e f o r c es t r u c t u r e o f t h e Un it ed S t a t e s Army p r i o r t o t h e Korean War.T h e f o r c e s t ru c tu re of an Army m u s t r e f l e c t i t s d o c t r i n e o femployment. I f i t d o es n o t , t he n t h e f o r c e s t r u c t u r e i si n a p p r op r i a t e t o c a r r y o u t t h e s t a t e d d o c t r i n e . T h et r a n s i t i o n f ro m t h e A c ti v e D e f e ns e D o c t r i n e o f t h e mid1970s t o t h e Armys c u r r e n t A i r Land B a t t l e D o c t r i n e , is ag r a p h i c example o f f o r c e s t r u c t u r e s s t r u g g l i n g t o k eep upw i t h c o n c e p t s . Today, c u r r e n t d o c t r i n e i s a h e ad o f t h ee qu ip me nt a nd o r g a n i z a t i o n s wh ic h a r e c u r r e n t l y d e pl o y ed i nt h e f i e l d . U n i t s e x p e c t i n g t o i mp le me nt Air L a n d B a t t l eD o c t r i n e m u s t wait u n t i l new e qu ip me nt an d o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r eo n t h e g r o u n d b e f o r e i t can b e e f f e c t i v e l y im pl em en te d.

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O r g an i za t io n s r e l e v a n t t o t h i s s t u d y a r e t h e s t a n da r d1949 i n f a n t r y and arm ored d i v i s i o n s . The e f f e c t s o fd o c t r i n e on t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of b o t h of t h e s e d i v i s i o n s w i l lbe examined i n t h e s t u d y .

An e xa m in at io n o f t h e t e ch n ol o gy a v a i l a b l e f o r t h eemployment of t h e d o c t r i n e i n 1949 will be made. Thee x a m i n a t i o n w i l l b e r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e s t u d y o f t h e e qu ipm entof arm ored and i n f a n t r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s whi ch s i g n i f i c a n t l yim pac ted on t h e i r a b i l i t y t o execu te a n a r m o r - i n f a n t r y teamm i s s i o n . A s a p a r t of t h i s ex am i na t i on of t e c h n o l og y , t h et r a i n i n g c o n d uc t ed b y a rm or ed a nd i n f a n t r y o r g a n i z a t i o n sm us t a l s o b e ex am in ed t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s oft h e a v a i l a b l e e qu ip me nt were r e a l i z e d .o r g a n i z a t i o n s p l a c e a premium on r e a l i s t i c t r a i n i n g . T h i sa l s o r e q u i r e s t h e use o f wa r t i me e q u i p me n t i n a mannerc o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t s wartime p u r p o s e .

A l l m i l i t a r y

T h i s e s s e n t i a l b a c k g r o u n d m a t e r i a l w i l l f o r m ac o h e r e n t p i c t u r e o f t h e e q ui p m en t , o r g a n i z a t i o n s , andd o c t r i n e u se d by Army u n i t s i n t h e e x e c u t i o n of t a c t i c a lm i s s i o n s p r i o r t o t h e Korean War. T h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,t h e i r e q u ip m e nt , a nd d o c t r i n e s h o u l d h av e b ee n ba s ed i nl a r g e p a r t on t h e r e c e n t e x p e r i e n c e o f World War 11. I ts h o u l d a l s o h av e s e r v e d as a s oun d b a s i s f o r any f u t u r ecom bat o p e r a t i o n s b y Un i te d S t a t e s g ro un d f o r c e s . T h e n e x t

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s t e p w i l l be t o v a l i d a t e , t hr ou gh case s t u d i e s , t h e Army'sa b i l i t y o r i n a b i l i t y t o t a k e t h e s e c o n c e p t s a n d a c t u a l l y u s et hem in a t h e a t e r o f w ar .

The e a r l y y e a r s of t h e Korean War provide many cases t u d i e s o f a r mo r - i n f an t ry teams i n comb at s i t u a t i o n s . T he secases i n c l u d e a l l t y p e s o f o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v eo p e r a t i o n s . Combat s t u d i e s p r o v i d e i n s i g h t s a s t o t h eadequacy o f t h e Army's d o c t r i n e a n d i t s a b i l i t y t o implementd o c t r i n e d u r i n g c om ba t. S i n c e t h e World War I1 e xpe r i e nc eo f t h e n a t i o n was so p r o f o u n d , t h e impact o f t h a t h i s t o r y o nt h e Army's d o c t r i n e s h o ul d h av e b ee n a s s i m i l a t e d i n t o Armyd o c t r i n e a f t e r t h e war. T h i s p r ov e n d o c t r i n e s h o u l d h av ebe en v a l i d a t e d i n co mbat a c t i o n s in Korea .

T he e x a m i n a t i o n ' o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e ams and thed o c t r i n e w h ic h was d e v e l o p e d a s a r e s u l t o f World War 11,a nd t h e s u b s e q u e n t use o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s i n Kor ea ,se r v e t wo pur pos es . I t p r o v i d e s a d e f i n i t i v e s t a t e m e n t ont h e a b i l i t y o f U . S . Army l e a d e r s t o d i s t i l l t h e l e s s on s ofm i l i t a r y h i s t o r y an d a d d r e s s t h e i r a b i l i t y t o i n c l u d e t h e s el e s s o n s i n t h e development o f f u t u r e d o c t r i n e .

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CHAPTER 2ARMOR-INFANTRY DOCTRINE, 1946-1950

War i s of v i t a l i mp o rt a n c e t o t h e s t a t e .T h e p r o v i n c e o f l i f e an d d e a t h ; t h e r o adt o s u r v i v a l o r r u i n . I t i s mandatoryt h a t i t b e t h o r o ug h l y s t u d i e d .T h e r e f o r e ; a p p r a i s e i t i n t e r m s o f t h ef i v e f u n d a m e n t al f a c t o r s a nd makec o m pa r i so n s o f t h e s e v e n e l e m e n t s l a t e rnamed. So you may a s s e s s i t se s s e n t i a l s . The f i r s t o f t h e s e f a c t o r si s m o ra l i n f l u e n c e , t h e s e co nd we a t h e r,t h e t h i r d t e r r a i n , t h e f o u r t h command,and, t h e f i f t h d o c t r i n e . 1S u n T z u , The Art of WarSun Tzu end ed t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o h i s p r i m e r o n t h e

a r t of war by l i s t i n g d o c t r i n e a s t h e f i f t h f u nd an en ta ?f a c t o r in war. S i n c e Sun Tzu t r a i n e d t h e c o n c u b i n e s o f t h eKi ng o f Wu i n t h e d o c t r i n e o f h i s a g e , war h a s changedi mm en se ly . The s u c c e s s o f n a t i o n s i n w ar h a s ~ cun f i rm ed hev a l u e o f d o c t r i n e i n t h e employment of l a rg e a r m i e s . I no r d e r t o un d er s t an d t h e c o n t e x t i n whi ch d o c t r i n e isd e ve l op e d, s i g n i f i c a n t h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t s of t h c p e ri o d mustb e e xa m in e d. T h es e e v e n t s p r o v i d e s i g n i f i c a n t b ac kg ro un di n f o r m a t i o n a n d a f r a m e w o r k f o r a n und e r s t an d i ng o f howd o c t r i n e e v o l ve s . 2

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l o n g r an g e mi s s i l e s , a nd b i o l o g i c a l w ea p on s. " A g g r e s so rn a t i o n s p r o s t r a t e f ro m t h e U ni te d S t a t e s c o u n t e r a t t a c k ,would b e s u b j u g a t e d by t h e " o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e h o s t i l et e r r i t o r y . " G e ne ra l Omar B r a d l ey , t h e Army C hi ef of S t a f f ,i n an a r t i c l e i n t h e May, 1949 , i s s u e of t h e ilitarvRevi ew, d e sc r i b e d f u t u r e c o n f l i c t i n t h r e e p h a s e s . I n t h ef i r s t p h a s e , t h e U ni t e d S t a t e s w ou ld e mp lo y i t s s t r a t e g i cw eap on s a g a i n s t t h e enemy much i n t h e same m a n n e r d e s c r i b e dby S t i l w e l l . In t h e s e c o n d p h a s e , A me ri ca n m i l i t a r y f o r c e swould s e i z e key a r e a s t o p r o v i de b a s e s f ro m wh ich t o s t r i k et h e enemy h o me l an d ; a nd f i n a l l y , i n t h e t h i r d p ha se ,l a r g e - s c a l e g r o u n d a s s a u l t s w ou ld d e s t r o y t h e e nemyh om el an d. T he o n l y b r i g h t s p o t f o r t , h e Army i n t h i sc o n c e p t , was t h e s t r a t e g i c m o b i l i t y o f Army a i r b o r n e f o r c e sw hich c o u l d s e i z e t h e b a s e s n ee de d d u r i n g p h a s e t w o . 3

I n a l l o f t h e s e s c e n a r i o s t h e Army p l a y e d a s e c o n d a r yr o l e . The e xp an de d r o l e o f t h e Air F o r c e and Navy decrease:t h e power a nd p r e s t i g e o f t h e Army. Enamored by t h e powerof t h e a t om i c bomb, t h e Army d e d i c a t e d r e s o u r c e s t o de v el o pt h e i r own d e l i v e r y s y s t e ms a nd d o c t r i n e o f e mp l oy m en t . T h i sf o c u s c au se d d o c t r i n a l i n n o v at i o n i n t h e a r e a o fc o n v e n t i o n a l g ro un d f o r c e s t o l a n g u i s h .

D e m o b i l i z a t i o n o f t h e American A r m y f o l l o w i n g WorldWar I1 was a d e b a c l e . T he c la mm or in g t o " b r i n g t h e b o y s

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home", t r a d i t i o n a l a f t e r e v er y American c o n f l i c t , o c c ur r e daga in a f t e r World War 11. An Am er ic an war m ac hi ne b u i l tw i t h h ar d work and d e d i c a t i o n b y t h e e n t i r e n a t i o n c e a s e d t oe x i s t al m os t o v e r n i g h t . The p e r s o n n e l s t r e n g t h o f t h e Armywas reduced f rom 8 m i l l i o n men and 89 d i v i s i o n s i n 1 945 , t o591 ,000 men and 10 d i v i s i o n s i n 1950. The Army, w i t h ou t t h ep o p ul a r a pp e a l of t h e f i g h t a g a i n s t Nazism o r r e t r i b u t i o nf o r P e a r l H a r b or , was u na b l e t o i n d u c e men t o e n l i s t . I no r d e r t o ma i nt a in f o r c e s t r e n g t h , t h e A r m y l o w e r e d e n t r a n c er e q u i r e m e n t s . G e n e r a l J . Lawton C o l l i n s s t a t e d t h a t t h el ow er m e nt a l and p h y s i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r i n d u c t i o nr e s u l t e d i n an Army w i t h 43% of i t s s o l d i e r s i n t h e l o w e s tmenta l c a t e g o r i e s . 4

A s i g n i f i c a n t b yL pr od uc t of d e m o b i l i z a t i o n was t h eS e c r e t a r y of War's S o a r d on o f f i c e r - e n l i s t e d manr e l a t i o n s h i p s , h ea de d by L i e u t e n a n t G e n e ra l J am es i .D o o l i t t l e . T h e board was convened i n 1946 t o s t u d y t h ei n e q u i t i e s o f w h a t was termed an o f f i c e r - e n l i s t e d man ''(~a::?s y s t e m " . T h e b o a r d i n t e r v i e w e d 42 w i t n e s s e s and r e a da p p r o x i m a t e l y one t ho us an d l e t t e r s . L e t t e r s re vi ew ed b y t h l eb o ar d w e re n e g a t i v e a b o u t t h e Army and i t s o f f i c e r s . I n -,.em a j o r i t y o f t h e s e c a s e s , t h e e x - s o l d i e r had a r i g h t t ocompla in and had been im pro per ly t r e a t e d . Recommendat ionso f t h e b oa rd r e s u l t e d i n t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t r a d i t i s n a l

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o f f i c e r , non com mi ssi oned o f f i c e r , and e n l i s t e d s o l d i e rr e l a t i o n s h i p s . Army l e a d e r s h i p was p a r a l y z e d a n d s e a r c h e df o r a means t o r e e s t a b l i s h a n e n v i r o n m e n t o f m u t u a lo b l i g a t i o nt h e i m p a c t

and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . T . R . F e h r e n b a c h d e s c r i b e do f t h e D o o l i t t l e b o a rd when h e s a i d : 5

d e a d l y t h i n g had b ee n do ne t o t h eArmy, which even t h e Army had n o t y a tf u l l y u n de r st o od . . . . I n making anA r m y o f e i g h t m i l l i o n men, t h e Army hadcommiss ioned many th ou san ds o f men t h a ts h o u l d n e v e r h a v e r i s e n above PFC.B a s i c a l l y , t h e r e were two w ays t o r e ducet h e a b u s e s o f po we r i n t h e s e r v i c e . Onewas t o o v e r h au l t h e o f f i c e r p ro cu re me nts y s t e m , make damned c e r t a i n t h a t n om e r e l y average man c o u l d e v e r b ec om m is s io ne d, and h av e fe w e r o f f i c e r s ,b u t b e t t e r o n e s . The o t h e r way uas t or e d u c e t h e p owe r t o a b u s e a n yb od y. T heD o o l i t t l e b o a r d, p r o ba b l y t h i n k i n g of al o n g p e r i o d o f p l e a s a n t p e a c e t i m e c om ingu p, i n e a r l y 1946 chos e t o recommend t h es e c o n d . I t was a g oo d i d e a . b u t i td i d n ' t work. The company commanders i nJ a p a n had t h e g i r l s r u n i n and o u t oft h e b a r r a c k s , had men t a l k b a ck t o t h e m ,and d idn ' t know w h a t t o d o a b o ut i t . . .. T h a t k i n d of t h i n k i n g had gone o u tw i t h t h e h o r s e , w i t h s a l u t i n g e x c e p t ond u t y , w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t you s h o u ldr e s p e c t a s e r g e a n t . 0

The g r e a t e s t Army i n t h e World i n 1946 was n o t o n l yb e se i ge d by e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s , i t a l s o began t o r o t f r 3 nt h e i n s i d e .

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The Army's b a t t l e f o r f un di ng was l o s t . The r o l e o ft h e Army i n t h e 1949 Depar tment o f Defense was s e c o n d a r y .L o u i s J o h n so n , t h e S e c r e t a r y o f D e f en s e i n March, 1949,a d o p t e d a n a t i o n a l d e f en s e s t r a t e g y ba se d a lm os t e n t i r e l y ons t r a t e g i c a i r p ow er . T h i s d e f e n s e " on t h e c h ea p " a l l o w e dhim t o g e t r i d o f wh at he te r m ed " c o s t l y wa r -b or ne s p e n d i n gh a b i t s " and r e d u c e d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g b el ow t h e c e i l i n g srecommended by Pr e s i d e n t T r u m a n . Army and Navy s t r e n g t h wasd r a s t i c a l l y c u t , w h il e t h a t of t h e A i r F o r c e was i n c r e a s e d .Even w i t h t h e p r i o r i t y o f r e s o u r c e s and men, t h e A i r F o r c ewas a b l e t o f i e l d o n ly 4 8 o f t h e 80 w i n g s t h e y f e l t werer e q u i r e d t o d ef en d t h e n a t i o n . A l l t h r e e s e r v i c e s w erepau pe r s w i t h w or ld w ide mi s s i ons and commi tment s . 7

T h e t u r b u l e n c e of t h e world i n t h e y e a r s f o l l o w i n gWorld War I1 s e rv e d t o r e i n f o r c e t h e p e r ce p t i on t h a t Americaf a c e d a s i n g l e wo rl d wi de t h r e a t i n t h e form o f communism.Fol lowing World War 11, communis t expans ion i n G reece l e d t oc i v i l wa r. T he re was t u r m o i l i n I t a l y , again i n s p i r e d t ycommunism. I n 1947, t h e c o u n t r i e s o f t h e e a s t e r n b l o cr e j e c t e d M a r s ha l l P l an a i d , a f t e r b e i ng b u l l i e d b y t h e U S S R .i n s p i t e o f t h e i n i t i a l i n t e r e s t disp layed by some menibers .8

I n J u n e of 1949 , t h e USSR moved t o f o r c e t h e B r i t i s h ,F ren ch , and A mer icans ou t o f B e r l i n by b l oc k ad i ng r a i l linesa nd ro ad wa ys t h r o u g h t h e S o v i e t o c c u p a t i o n z o n e . G e n e r a l

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L u c i u s D . C l a y , t h e Am er ic an m i l i t a r y g o v e r n o r , d e v i s e d t h eB e r l i n a i r l i f t t o s u p p l y t h e c i t y a nd e v e n t u a l l y s u c c ee d e di n l i f t i n g t h e b lo ck ad e . T h i s s e r i e s of c o n f l i c t s b et we enwor ld dem oc ra c i es and an emerg ing communis t empi rec u l m i n a t e d i n S e p te m b er o f 1 9 4 9 . E a r l y i n t h e a u t u m n oft h a t y e a r , t h e S o v i e t Union e x p l od e d i t s own a t o m i c d e v i c ea nd t h e s e c o n d s u p e r p o we r was b o r n . 8

A s t h e U n it ed S t a t e s s e ar c he d f o r a n e f f e c t i v e m e a n st o d e a l wi t h t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b e i ng of t h e w o r l d sl e a d i n g po we r, t h e Army s e a r c h e d f o r a n e f f e c t i v e d o c t r i n ei n t h e A to mi c age:

A s t h e m u s i c s t a r t e d u p i n S e o u l , i nK okura , J apan , Ma jo r General WilliamF r i s h e Dean was t h e g u e s t o f h on or a t a2 4 t h D i v i s i o n H e a d q u a r t e r s c o s t um ep a r t y . W h i c h was one way f o r i n f a n r y m e nt o t r y t o f o r g e t S e c r e t a r y of D ef en seL ou i s Johnson and h i s f a t - c u t t i n g , t h es up er c a r r i e r , t h e S t r a t e g i c AirCommand, and t h e nagging f e e l i n g t h a t i nt h e a t o m i c age f o o t s l o g g e r s m i g h t b eo b s o l e t e . 10

I n s p i t e of t h e t r a v a i l s t h e Army underwent i n t h ey e a r s between World War I1 and Korea , Army d o c t r i n e d i de v o l v e . The e v o l u t i o n o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e i n t h e s ey e a r s can be found i n t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e pt s f o r t h eemployment o f t h e Army as d e s c r i b e d i n t h e F i e l d S s r v i c eR e g u l a t i o n s , FM 100-5, . T h i s m a n u a l , w i t h

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e d i t i o n s p u bl i sh e d i n t h e y e a r s 1 9 4 1 , 1 9 4 4, an d 1 9 4 9 ,d e s c r i b e s t h e d o c t r i n a l employment of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y u n i t s .T he F i e l d M anual f o r t h e em pl oy me nt of t h e i n f a n t r yb a t t a l i o n , FM 7-20, , examined a t t h esame i n t e r v a l s , f u r t h e r r e f i n e s a r mo r -i n fa n tr y d o c t r i n e .A d d i t i o n al d o c t r i n a l l i t e r a t u r e of t h e p e r i o d p r o v i d e si n s i g h t i n t o t h e i nc re a s i ng a w a r e n e s s of t h e combatp o t e n t i a l of t h e ar m o r - i n f an t r y t ea m.

FH 100-5, , 1341

The Army e n t e r e d World War I1 w i t h t h e c a p s t o n ed o c t r i n a l m an ua l, F i e l d S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o ns , FM 100-5 ,- I t was a c o l l e c t i o n o f c o n ce p t s u n t r i e d i nb a t t l e . S i n c e t h e p u b l i s h i n g of t h e manual i n May of 1 3 4 1 ,t h e wo r ld , and th e a rm ie s who had shaped i t , had changed. Ar e v i e w o f t h e ma n u a l, f o c u s i n g on t h e empl oy me nt o fa r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e am s , p r o v i d e s ev i d e n c e o f t h e i m pa ct ~fm i l i t a r y h i s t o r y on d o c t r i n e .

T h e f i r s t no te wo rt hy p o i n t i s r e v e a l e d an page 111 ir.t h e T a b l e o f C o n t e n t s . Armor d o e s n o t e x i s t a s an arm o rs e r v i c e . T he t h r e e p r i m a r y arms o f t h e s e r v i c e a t t h e t i m ewere t h e i n f a n t r y , c a v a l r y , snd a r t i l l e r y . A closere x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e c o n t e n t s f i n a l l y r e v e a l s t h e r o l e o f

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t a n k s i n t h e Army o f 1 94 1 u n d e r o bs c u r e s u b - t i t l e s i n t h eT a b le o f C o n t e n t s . Tank f u n c t i o n s and c a p a b i l i t i e s a r ement ioned as a p a r t o f t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e a rmor edd i v i s i o n s and t h e G e n e ra l H e a dq u a r te r s (GHQ) t a n kb a t t a l i o n s . Tanks a r e a l s o g iv en d o c t r i n a l r o l e s as a p a r tof t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of i n f a n t r y mi s s i o ns and c a p a b i l i t i e s . 1 1

The p r i n c i p l e arm of t h e Army i n 1 9 4 1 was i n f a n t r y .Army d o c t r i n e o f 1 94 1 s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t w heneveri n f a n t r y e l e me n t s fa c e d a f o r c e o f combined arms, t h el i m i t e d f i re p ow e r o f t h e i n f a n t r y m u s t b e a d e q u a t e l yr e i n f o r c e d by t h e s u p p o r t o f a r t i l l e r y , t a n k s , c o m b a ta v i a t i o n , a nd o t h e r arms. T he m an ne r i n w hi c h t h i ss t a t e m e n t is w r i t t e n ' i m p l i e s t h a t i n f a n t r y i n combat wouldf a c e enemy combined arms f o r m a t i o n s a s a n e x c ep t i o n r a t h e rt h a n a s a r u l e . 1 2

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The d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e m i ss i on s and c a p a b i l i t i e s o ft h e c a v a l r y c an b e t r a n s l a t e d i n t o s i m i l a r t a s k s c on du ct edb y a rm or e d f o r m a t i o n s o f t h e p e r i o d w i t h s o m e e x c e p t i o n s .T h e s e e x c e p t i o n s a r e i n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e c a v a l r y as af o r c e ca p a b l e o f o p e r a t i n g i n a l l w ea the r and a l l t y p e s o ft e r r a i n . The m i ss i on a nd c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e c a v a l r y i n tt.e1941 , FH 100-5, , a d d r e s s e s t h e role o fm e ch a ni z at i on i n t h e c o n du c t of s e c u r i t y m i s s i o n s . 1 3

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An e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e r o l e of a r mo re de lemen t s c an b e fo un d i n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e m i s s i o n s a n dc a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e armored d i v i s i o n . The d i v i s i o nc o n s i s t e d o f f i v e s e p a r a t e e c h e lo n s . T he se e c h e lo n s a r el i s t e d as command, reconnaisance , s t r i k i n g , s u p p o r t . an ds e r v i c e . C o n c e p t u a l l y , t h e command a nd r e c o n n a i s s a n c ee c h e l o n s c o nd u c te d t h e same t a s k s a s t h o s e o f an i n f a n t r yd i v i s i o n . The s t r i k i n g B che lon o f t h e arm ore d d i v i s i o nc o n s is t e d of t h e d i v i s i o n s t a nk b a t t a l i o n s .A r m o r e d - i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s were a s s i gn e d t o t h e s u p p o r t i n ge c h e l on and c on du ct e d o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e f o l l o w i n gmanner :

The i n f a n t r y e l em en t of t h e s u p p o r te c h e l o n i s t r a n s p o r t e d i n armoredp e r so n n e l c a r r i e r s . I t r e m a i n s m o b i l ea s l o n g a s t h e s i t u a t i o n p e r m i t s . Whena s s i g n e d t h e m i s s i on o f f o l l o w i n g t h es t r i k i n g e ch el on , i t f o l lo w s c l o s e l y ;p r e p a r e d t o o ve rc om e t h e r e m a i n i n gh o s t i l e r e s i s t a n c e i n t h e a reas o v e rw hi ch t h e t a n k s h a v e p a s s e d , t o o cc u pya nd h o ld t h e gr ou nd g a i n e d , o r t o c o v ert h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t a n k u n i t s d x r i n gt h e c o ur s e o f t h e a t t a c k . P r i o r t o t h ea t t a c k by t h e s t r i k i n g ec h el o n , i t mayb e u se d t o d e v e lo p t h e e n e m y s i t u a t i o nw i t h a s e c o n d a r y a t t a c k suppor t ed bya r t i l l e r y , combat a v i a t i o n , e n g i n e e r s ,a n d , w h e n necessary by some of thet a n k s . 14

I t i s c l e a r f r o m t h i s e x t r a c t o f t h e ma nu al t h a t t h ed o c t r i n e f o r t h e employment o f a rm or and i n f a n t r y e l e m e n t s

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d i v i s i o n . The r e c e n t h i s t o r y o f t h e F r en c h and B r i t i s hd e f e a t s a t t h e h and s o f G e r m a n a r m o r e d f o r m a t i o n su nd ou bt ed ly c a l l e d f o r a c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e role o farmor i n our own 1941 Army D o c t r i n e .

A s ec on d r e v e a l i n g p o i n t i n t h e 1941 manual was t h ef a i l u r e o f t h e d o c t r i n e d e s i g n e r s t o as s ign a r m o r t h ep r i m a r y a n t i t a n k r o l e o f t h e Army. T he y c h o s e i n s t e a d t og i v e t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o a n t i t a n k g u n s o r g a n i c t o combatu n i t s and t a nk d e s t r o y e r s . 1 7

T h e 1 9 4 1 , FM 100-5 , , r e p r e s e nt e d t h eA me ri ca n A rm y' s b e s t g u e s s of t h e ma nn er i n w h i c h war c o u l db e s u c c e s s f u l l y c o n d u c t e d . W hi le f l a w ed t o some d eg re .e ,h i s t o r y h a s shown t h e b a s i c c o n c e p t s c o n t ai n e d i n t h i sm an ua l t o b e s o u n d .

T h e b a s i c d ra wb ac k t o t h e 1941 v e r s i o n o f FM 1 0 0 - 5 ,- was t h e i n a b i l i t y o f t h e d o c t r i n e w r i t e r t o d ra won t h e h i s t o r y of war t o i n f l u e n ce h i s d o c t r i n e . I t i s t r c et h a t t h e b a s i c ma ch in es , which d om in at ed t h e b a t t l e f i e l dd u r i n g World War I1 w er e p r e s e n t d u r i n g World War I . b u t t h adynamic growth i n t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s c r e a t e d n ov e l i . o n c a p t ~of employment . I t c an a l s o be s a i d t h a t t h e c o n c ep t s o f" b l i t z k r i e g " and t h e r o l e o f a i r po we r e x i s t e d p r i o r t o t h ew a r . T h e s e i d e a s w er e immature an d r e q u i r e d t e c h n o l o g i c 3 1a dv an ce s t o r e ac h t h e i r f u l l m a t u r i t y .

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American d o c t r i n e w r i t e r s had t o f u r t h e r s y n t h e s i z e t h e s ec o n c e p t s a n d s h a p e t he m i n t o a n Am er ic an way o f w a r .

FM 100-5, Oosrations, 1344

The 1944 v e r s i o n o f FM 100-5, , h a d t h eb e n e f i t o f t h r e e y e a r s o f war i n i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n y e td i f f e r e d v e r y l i t t l e f r o m t h e 1341 e d i t i o n . The m a j o r i t y o ft h e m a n u a l i s a n a l m o s t v e r b a t i m c op y o f t h e 1 34 1 v e r s i o n ,t ho ug h w i t h some s i g n i f i c a n t e x c e p t i o n s .

Al though a rmor i s s t i l l n o t a n arm, t h e mechan izedc a v a l r y b e g i n s t o a b s o r b some o f t h e t r a d i t i q n a l armorm i s s i o n s s u c h a s r e c on n a is a n ce and s e c u r i t y . T h e m i s s i o n sand c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h i s t y p e of Army o r g a n i z a t i o n i n d i c a t et h e i n c r e a s i n g i n f l u e n ce o f m e c h a n i z a t i o n on Armyd o c t r i n e . l a

The d o c t r i n e w r i t e r s o f t h e 1944 m a n u a l r e t a i n e dt h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t h e i n f a n t r yd i v i s i o n t o b e a ug me nt ed b y o t h e r members o f t he ccmbinedarms t eam when f a c i n g a c om bi ne d a rm s f o r c e .

The mi s si o n and c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e h o r s e c a v a l r yr em ai ne d t h e sa me , and t h e m is s i on a nd r e s p o s i b i l i t i e s c ft h e m e c ha n iz e d c a v a l r y g r e w . Even w i t h t h e gr o wt h i n t n e

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- ank u b l i s h e d i n 1944 . T h e b a s i c t e n e t s oft h e d o c t r i n e were s t a t e d i n t h i s manner:

S uc ce ss i n b a t t l e can b e a s s u r e d o n l ywhen there i s c o m p l e t e c o o p e r a t i o n o fa l l arms. No one arm w i n s b a t t l e s .S u c c e s s is a t t a i n e d w h e n each arm,w e a p o n , a n d i n d i v i d u a l i s employed t oa f f o r d t h e maximum s u p p o r t t o t h er e m a i n d e r i n t e g r a t e d so a s t o a c h i e vet h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e enemy. S in cet a n k s and i n f a n t r y a r e l i n k e d so c l o s e l yone t o t h e o t h e r , i t i s n e c e ss a r y t h a tt h e d o c t r i n e , p ow er s, and l i m i t a t i o n s ofb o t h - b e u n de r s t o o d by a l l . 2 2

The ma nu al c o n t i n u e s t o d e s c r i b e i n d e t a i l t h e b a s i ca r mo r - i n fa n tr y r e l a t i o n s h i p s , m i s s i o ns , and c a p a b i l i t i e sw hi ch h av e b ee n d i s c u s s e d p r e v i o u s l y . The m a n u a l was a l s osupp lemen ted by a s e p a r a t e m a nu al w h i ch c o n t a i n e di l l u s t r a t e d p ro bl em s o n t h e employment of t a n k s w i t hi n f a n t r y .

I n a d d i t i o n t o s h o r t s t u d i e s on e mploymentc o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r a r m o r - i n f a n t ry t ea ms i n t a c t i c ss i t u a t i o n s i n a E u r o p e a n c o n t e x t , FH 17-36, W t r v T a n kTesm examined the u s e o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t ea ms i n v o l v ed i r ;j u n g l e w a r f a re . T h i s m anual a l s o c o n t a i n s some p r a c t i c a lg ui d an ce f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o t a n k s when ac t ing a s i n f a n t r yt r a n s p o r t e r s . 2 3

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FM 100-5 , O p e r a t i o n s , 1 9 4 9

T he 1 94 9 v e r s i o n o f t h e F i e l d S e r v i c e , FM 100-5,- shows a c o n t i n u i n g e v o l u t i o n i n t h er e l a t i o n s h i p s be tween t h e v a r i o u s arms. T h e m i s s i o n s a n dc a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s t a t e s c a t e g o r i c a l l yt h a t i n o r de r f o r i n f a n t r y o p e r a t i on s t o be d e c i s i v e , t h ei n f a n t r y m u s t b e r e i n f o r c e d by t h e a r t i l l e r y , a rmo redc a v a l r y , a nd e n g i n e e r s . The 19 49 v e r s i o n r e o r ga n i z e d t h earms a n d s ho w s t h e r e p l a c e m e n t o f t h e h o r s e a n d m e c ha n iz e dc a v a l r y w i t h an arm c a l l e d t h e " ar mo re d c a v a l r y " . T hea r m o r e d c a v a l r y arm com bined t h e m i s s i o n s and c a p a b i l i t i e sof t h e c a v a l r y and t h e t a n k b a t t a l i o n s o f t h e arm oredd i v i s i o n .o f t h i s n e w arm also s u p p o r t e d a combined arms c o n c e p t :

The d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e m i ss i on s and c a p a b i l i t i e s

I t c o n c e n t r a t e s i t s f i r e power a t t h ed e c i s i v e a r e a of a c t i o n t o l e a d ,a ccom pan y, o r s u p p o r t i n f a n t r y i n t h ep e n e t r a t i o n o f t h e e ne my 's d e f e n s e s , andd e s t r o y enemy p e n e t r a t i o n s . 2 4I n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n d o c t r i n e i n t h e 1949 v e r s i o n s t a t e s

t h a t t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n m u s t b e c a p a b l e o f a b s o r b i n gd i f f e r e n t arms i n o r d e r t o a c c o mp l is h t h e i r a s s i g n e dm i s s i o n . M e n t i o n was made o f t h e heavy t a n k b a t t a l i o n , nfiwo r g a n i c t o t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n , and t h e i n c r e a s e d combat

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s u s t a i n a b i l i t y t h a t t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n g a ve t o t h e i n f a n t r yd i v i s i o n . A l s o , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n d o c t r i n a l l i t e r a t u r ea t t h i s l e v e l , p r o v i s i o n s w ere made f o r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f" m ob i le t a s k f o r c e s " made up o f v a r i o u s arms. T h e m i s s i o no f t h e m o b i le t a s k f o r c e was t o c o nd uc t o p e r a t i o n s i ns u p p o r t of t h e a t t a inment o f d i v i s i o n o b j e c t i v e s . Thear mo re d c a v a l r y a l s o assumed t h e pr i m a ry a n t i t a n k r o l e oft h e a rm y. I n de p en d en t t a n k b a t t a l i o n s and t a n k d e s t r o y e rb a t t a l i o n s d i s a p p e ar e d . T h e i r f u n c t i o n s and o r g a n i z a t i o n sbecame a n o r g a n i c p a r t o f t h e a rm or ed an d i n f a n t r yd i v i s i o n . 2 5

The b a s i c u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e of t h e mu tu al s u p p o r to f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s as a s u c oe s s fu l t a c t i c a l i n g r e d i e n t ,was a l s o a b a s i c premise o f t h e 1 94 9, FM 100-5, -

When examining t h e t h r e e v e r s i o n s o f t h e F i e l dS e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s , FM 100-5, ODerations t h e r e i s c l e a re v i d e n c e o f t h e e v o l u t i o n o f t h e d o c t r i n a l e mplo yment ofa r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e am s . A r m o r- i n fa n t ry o r g a n i z a t i o n s b eg an 3sd i s t i n c t o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i th d i f f e r e n t m i s s i on s in 1941, ande vo lv ed i n t o t h e m u t u a l s u p p o r t i n g , c o m p l i m e n t a r yo r g a n i z a t i o n s d e s c r i b e d i n t h e 1 9 4 4 , a nd 1 94 9 v e r s i o n s . I n1949 , Army d o c t r i n e r e q u i r e d t h e use o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t a a m sa s a p a r t o f com bined a rm s t ea ms t o a c h i e v e d e c i s i v e a c t i o n .

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W hi le t h e b a s i c g r o un dw or k f o r t h e e mp lo ym en t o fa r m o r - i n f a n t r y teams had b ee n e s t a b l i s h e d by 1 9 49 ,s i g n i f i c a n t m i su n d er s t an d i ng s of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p be tweena r mo r a nd i n f a n t r y had a l s o become e n t r e n c h e d .

D o ct r in e f a i l e d t o p r ov i de a c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e d v iewo f a r m or - in f a nt r y r e l a t i o n s h i p s . T h i s can b e seen i n t h ed e s c r i p t i o n o f a rm or e mp lo ym en t. T h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h em i ss i on a nd c a p a b i l i t i e s of i n f a n t r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n a l lt h r e e v e r s i o n s o f t h e m a n u a l , makes imprope r us e o f t h e t e r m" t a n k s " . T a n k s a r e l i s t e d i n t h e same v e i n a s mach ineguns ,m o r t a r s , and a n t i t a n k g u n s. They a p p e a r t o b e t h o ug h t of a sa s i n g l e weapon, and t h e v a l u e o f t h e combat e f f e c t i v e n e s so f a rm or p l a t o o n s , c o mp a ni es , a n d b a t t a x i o n s a s s i g n e d a s au n i t t o i n f a n t r y c om pa ni es , b a t t a l i o n s , o r r e g i m e n t s , seemst o ha ve be en l o s t . I n t h e 1 9 41 v e r s i o n , t h e m i ss i o n andc a p a b i l i t i e s o f a rm or o r g a n i z a t i o n s a l s o b e g i n s w i t h t h ei m p l i c a t i o n of t a n k s as a s e p a r a t e s y s te m , b u t ev o l v e s i n t ot h e e mp lo ym en t o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s by 1 3 4 9 . T he d i r e c tr e s u l t of t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f d o c t r i n e were t w od i f f e r e n t vi e ws on t h e employment of a r m o r - i nf a n t r y t e a mwhich was t o h av e g r a v e c o n se q u en c e s d u r i n g t h e K ore anWar.26

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FM 7-20 , I n f a n t r v R a t - , 1944

The F i e l d S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s , FM 100-5, - cp r e s e n t a h i g h l e v e l view o f t h e r e q u i re m e n t s and s t r u c t u r eo f Army d o c t r i n e . B a t t a l i o n a nd r e g i m e n t a l commanders f ro m1 94 6 t o 1 9 50 were much more concerned w i t h t h ei m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f Army d o c t r i n e a t t h e i r l e v e l s . Armyd o c t r i n e f o r t h e employment of t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i c n isd e s c r i b e d i n F i e l d Manual 7 - 20 , InL m t rv Battalion T h i sm a n u a l d e s c r i b e s t h e r o l e , m i s s io n s , and c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h ei n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n . An e x am i n at i on o f t h i s manual , a s i te v o l v e d fr om t h e 1 94 4 v e r s i o n t o t h e v e r s i on u t i l i z e d p r i o rt o t h e d e p lo ym e nt of American c o m b a t t r o o p s i n Korea , w i l lt r a c e t h e e v o l u t i o n of t h e a r m o r - i n fa n t r y t eam d o c t r i n e a tt h e l e v e l a t which i t was t o b e i m p le m e nt e d .

T he 1 9 44 v e r s i o n o f FH 7-20 h a d t h e b e n e f i t o f t h r e ey e a r s o f c om ba t i n i t s d e v el o pm e n t. The r e l a t i o n s h i pb et we en t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n a nd a t t a c h e d a rmo r e le m i t i tsi s c l e a r :

T an ks a s s i s t t h e i n f a n t r y by d e s t r o y i n go r n e u t r a l i z i n g h o s t i l e a u to m at icw ea po ns , r e s e r v e s , c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n gt r o o p s . . . . and by dominat ingo b j e c t i v e s u n t i l t h e i n f a n t r y sa t t a c k i n g e c h e l on a r r i v e s and i sp r e p a r e d t o d e fe n d t h e p o s i t i o n . z 7

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p l a t o o n " o r " co mp an y. " T h e p ar ag ra ph f u r t h e r s p e c i f i e s t h a ti n f a n t r y c o m p a n i e s w i l l r e c e i v e " ar mo r p l a t o o n s " an di n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s " ar mo r co mp an ie s" a s a t t a c h m e n t s t o f o r ma combined arms t eam.32

The se co nd i m p o r ta n t c ha ng e s u r f a c e s i n t h e d o c t r i n a lr o l e o f armor i n t h e b a t t a l i o n d e f e n s e . The p r im a r y p u rp os eo f t h e t a n k was t o d e s t r o y enemy t a n k s d u r i n g t h e b a t t a l i o r .d e f e n s e a s w el l a s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o nl o c a l c o u n t e r a t t a c k s . The m an ua l s t a t e s :

T he number o f t a n k s a t t a c h e d t o e a c hf r o n t - l i n e b a t t a l i o n i s d e t e r m i n e d b yt h e t e r r a i n , t h e e x t e n t o f f r o n t h e l d ,t h e enemy s i t u a t i o n , and t h ea v a i l a b i l i t y o f t a n k s u pp o r t f o r t h eregiment.33Employment of tanks i n a p i ec e me a l manner t o s a t i s f y

t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of d e f e n s i b l e t e r r a i n p os es s e v e r a ll o g i s t i c a l a nd command a nd c o n t r o l p r o b l e m s w h ic h c o u l du l t i m a t e l y ca us e a f a t a l f l a w i n t h e b a t t a l i o n d e f e n s e .

D i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e d o c t r i n a l employment of armore l em e n ts a t t a c h e d t o t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n c an c r e a t ec o n f u s i o n . T h e s w i r l i n g c o n t a c t o f b a t t l e ca n r en ?e r t h el i n e b etw ee n o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s m e a n i n g le s s .

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i mpl ement t hat doct r i ne had m nor f l aws. These same l eadersf el t t hat t hese or gani zat i onal and equi pment f l aws coul d beover come wi t h m nor changes. Pr ogr ess i n t he ar eas Gfor gani zat i on and equi pment mani f est ed i t sel f i n t he f or m cfWar Depar t ment and Theat er boar ds. These boar ds wer econvened i n 1946 t o gat her i nf or mat i on f r om combatcommander s t o r ecommend changes t o t he or gani zat i ons andequi pment of t he Wor l d War I 1 Ar my.

Or gani zat i on

The Gener al Boar d of t he Uni t ed St at es For ces i r . t heEur opean Theat er pr oduced a ser i es of st udi es whi ch resul t eci n changes t o a l l Ar my organi zat i ons.

St udy Number 17 of t he Genera l goar d, mader ecommendat i ons f or t he or gani zat i on of Ar my Post - t ardi v i s i ons based on a concensas of combat l e a d e r s ' e~pe~i~:-.':+and an exam nat i on of f ut ur e Ar my m ssi sns. Whi l econcensus of m l i t ar y opi ni on based on cnmhat exper i exe ~ a er el at i vel y easy t o achi eve, i t was onl y appl i cab?2 t a '33.3t heat er of oper at i ons. Thi s concern was not ed 9 s a st c , dy1i m t at i on: z

The st udy conc+r ns i t sel f s ol el y wi t hcombat exper i ences i n and l essonsder i ved f r om t he Eur opean Theat er of-37-


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O p e r a t i o n s . I t a t t e m p t s no a n a l y s i s o fw a r f a r e i n t h e P a c i f i c T h ea t e r , A f r i c a ,o r I t a l y , n o r of t h e m ost s u i t a b l e t y p eo f d i v i s i o n f o r employment i n t h e s ea r e a s . C o n s eq u e nt l y , w h i l e i te nu me ra te s t h e p o s s i b l e g l o b a l m i s s i o n sof t h e p o s t war Army, i t p r e m i s e s i t sr ecommended o rgan iza t ion on t h e l e s s o n sof one t h e a t e r o n l y . 3In a d d i t i o n t o r ec og n i z i n g t h i s l i m i t a t i o n , t h e s t u d y

a l s o s eemed t o s e n s e t h e t e n t a t i v e n a t u r e of A mer ic anf o r e i g n p o l i c y a s t h e w o r ld s f i r s t s u pe r po w er . The r e s u l to f t h i s l a c k of d i r e c t i o n was a s ec on d m aj or l i m i t a t i o n :

The Ge n e r a l Boa rd h a s no a u t h o r i t a t i v es t a t emen t of t h e p a t t e r n of t h e f o r e i g nand m i l i t a r y p o l i c y of t h e Un it ed S t a t e sa n d , c o n se q u e n t l y , t h e m i s s i o n s of t h eArmy o f t h e f u t u r e h av e b ee n b a s e d o ni n t e l l i g e n t e s t i m a t e s . I t i s e n t i r e l yc o nc i ev a bl e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h eu l t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s of t h e U ni te d S t a t e smay r e q u i r e t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n an dm a i n t e n a n c e of t a c t i c a l u n i t s p o s s e s s i z gc h a r a c t e r i s i t c s n o t c on te mp la te d i n t h i sr e p o r t . 4

W i t h t h e m a jo r s t u d y l i i n i t a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d , :hes t u d y on Post-War Army D i v i s i o n s t h e n e x am in ed t h e f u t u r em i s s i o n s o f t h e U ni te d S t a t e s A r m y . The major n iss io~ ; ; : ort h e Army a t t h i s time h av e b e en d i s c u s s e d i n t h - c:hapt.er :nd o c t r i n e . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h o s e a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d , 9 A r z ym i ss io n t o p r o v id e a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e S e c u r i t y C ou n ci l .:ft h e U ni t ed Na t i o n s O r g a n i z a t i o n s u r f a c e s . T he z t c d y s

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d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e f o r c e d e s i g n e d t oa c c o m p l i s h t h i s m i s s i o n i s p r o p h e t i c :

A s s i s t a n c e t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n sO r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l p r o b a b l y b e p r o v i d e db y e lement s of t h e s t r a t e g i c r e s e r v e .I f , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , p o l i c y d i c t a t e st h e c r e a t i o n o f a s e p a r a t e " p o l i c ef o r c e , " i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i l lr e q u i r e t h a t i t b e a sma l le r p r o t o t y p eo f t h e s t r a t e g i c r e s e r v e . 5I t is i r o n i c t h a t i n t h e f a c e o f t h e l i m i t a t i o n s and

m i s s i o n s t h a t m a d e up t h e Army's m o s t " i n t e l l i g e n t g u e s s , "t h a t t h e s t u d y d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e i n f a n t r y and a r m o r . % Id i v i s i o n o f W o r l d War 11, w i t h s om e m i n o r o r g a n i z a t i o n e lc h a n g e s , w o u l d a d e q u a t e l y s e r v e t h e P o s t -W a r Army.

I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e l e s s o n s l e a r n e d d u r i n g t h ee m p l o y m e n t o f t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n i n E u r o p e , t h e s t u d ye m p h a s i z e d t h a t t h e " u n i f o r m l y b e t t e r p e r f o r m a n c e ,ofi n f a n t r y w hen c l o s e l y s u p p o r t e d b y tan


46/148

Based o n t h i s com bat e x p e r i e n c e and f u t u r e A r m ym i s s i o n s , t h e s t u d y recommended t h a t t h e Army a d o pt t h es p e c i f i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e c om me nd at io ns of G e n e r a l Boa rdStudy Number 1 5 .

Ge ne ra l Board S tu dy Number i 5 producedrecommendat ions f o r c h a n g e s t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n , e q u i p m e n t ,and t a c t i c a l employment o f t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n .

Two re co m me nd at i on s of t h i s s t u d y had s i g n i f i c a n te f f e c t s on t h e ar m o r - i n f a nt r y t ea ms w i t h i n t h e i n f a n t r yd i v i s i o n s .

T h e f i r s t m a j o r recommended c h an g e was t h e d e i e t i xo f t h e r e g i m e n t a l a n t i - t a n k com pan y. Th e l o g i c b e h i nd t h i zd e c i s i o n was b e s t summar ized by Ma jo r G ene ra l K ibL a r a t ac o n f e r e n c e o n t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n g iv en 3t the Gra-d H ~ 7 t s 1a t Bad Neuheim o n 20 November, 1945, when he s a i d :

I t seems t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y do n c t want 9t a nk u n i t o rg a ni c i n t h e i n f a n t r yr eg im en t t o r e p l a c e t h e a n t i - t a n kcompany. A l l seem t o a gr ee t h a t t h eb e s t a n t i - t a n k weapon t o d a y i s t h emedium tank. I t t h e r e f o r e seems t o bet h e c o n c e n s u s of t h i s m ee ti ng t h a t t h ea n t i - t a n k company s h o u l d b e e l i n i n a t e df r o m e a c h i n f a n t r y regiment a n d t h r e et a n k c o m p an i es s h o u l d b e ad de d t o t b et a n k r e g i m e n t a t d i v i s i o n l e v e l . The s e n t i m e n t d i s p l a y e d i n t h i s c o nf 5 re E ce wzc

r e f l e c t e d i n t h e f i n a l s t u d y r e p o r t w h i c h recommended 5k.e

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e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e a n t i - t a n k c omp an y. T he e l i m i n a t i c n o ft h e a n t i - t a n k c omp any was p r e d i c a t e d on t h e e s t a b l i s h m e c t o fa t a n k r e g i me nt o r g a n i c t o t h e d i v i s i 3 n . a

Th e se co nd s i g n i f i c a n t i m p a c t on a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t r a n swas a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n t o make a t a n k r e g i n e n t o f t h - e e t an n a t a o r 8c:;~li . L- C .p e n e t r a t e t h e t a n k s a r m o r, T h e i r e f f e c t was : . c g l : g i t s .The 105 m m how i tze r w h ich was a c t i n g a s an a n t i -t a r, . : ,c e a s e d to b e e f f e c t i v e w h e n i t had c om pl +, te d f i r i z g 3 ? ? ? ? ?

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o f s i x HEAT ro un ds . Th a t a m m u n i t i o n r e p r e s e n t e d t h e t o t a ls t o c k o f a n t i - t a n k a mm un it io n a v a i l a b l e i n J a p a n . T h i sp e r f o r m a n c e , a l t h o u g h s h o c k in g t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c ,s h o u l d h a v e b e e n n o s u r p r i s e t o t h e l e a d e r s who s e n t T a s kForce S m i t h t o a c c o m p l i s h i t s m i s s i o n . 3 6

M a c A r th u r h a d c o m p la i n e d o f t h e s t a t e of e q u i p m e n t ir.h i s command, b u t r e c e i v e d n o r e l i e f f r o m m i l i t a r y l e a d e r rme sm er iz ed b y b u dg e t b a t t l e s a nd i n t e r n a t i o n a l c c m n u n i s i -i d e o l o g y . I n an e f f o r t t o im p r o v e t h e s t a t u s o f h i se q u ip m en t , M ac Ar th ur i n i t i a t e d "O p e r a t io n R G l : - U p . " I n t k i eo p e r a t i o n M a cA rt hu r d i s p a t c h e d teams t o t h e i s l a n d s i n t h ?P a c i f i c t o r ec l a im r u s t y , a ba nd on ed eq u ip me n t l s f t 2 v P r f ' r - . ~World War 1 1 . 4 0

T h i s e f f o r t s e r v e d two p u r p os e s . F i r s t , i t p r o v i d c dH a c A r t h u r w i t h a source o f e q ui p me n t f o r his c o m b a t ur.S.te.a n d s e c o n d i t p r o v i d e d a means t o s t i m u l a t e t h e J s p a z e s eeconomy b y p r o v i d i n g t h e J a p a n e s e w i t h work r s f u r 5 i s h i n g t ? eo l d e q u i p m e n t . " O p e r a t i o n R o ll - Up " was o n l y :I s to p - g s ; .m ea su re t h a t was i n s u f f u c i e n t t o p r e v e n t t h e i n i t i a l p,2;rp e r f o r m a n c e o f American e q u i p m e n t ir. K o r e a . T h e sigcs mct , h e s e e q u i p m e n t p r o b l e m s were e v i d e n t t o Wa l ke r ' s E i g h t hA r m y i n s p e c t i o n teams h e a d e d S y h i s C-3, # i l ? i a m H. ?srk:?i n t h e s p r i n g o f 1350. I n o n e i n s p e c t e d c n i t , t wo t -: ir,iz

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t h e r i f l e s were b r o k e n . I n a n o t h e r t h e y d i d n o t f i n d 3s i n g l e v e h i c l e c a p a b l e o f s u s t a i n e d p e r f o r m a n c e . 4 1

Upon t h e c om m i t m z n t o f t h e 3 r d B a t t a l i o n 3 5 t hI n f a n t r y t o K o r e a , o n l y t h e SCR-300 r a d i o i n t h e b a t t a l i o r .command n e t was o p e r a b l e . T h e 2 4 t h I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n tr e p o r t e d o n l y 60% o f t h e i r a u t h o r i z e d r a d i o s o n h a n d . 3ft h o s e on h a n d , f o u r - f i f t h s were i n o p e r a b l e . B a t t e r i e s f o rr a d i o s were o l d a n d u n r e l i a b l e c a u s i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o c sf a i l u r e s a t c r i t i c a l t imes i n c o m b a t . T h e 1s t E a t t a l i o r .3 5 t h I n f a n t r y h a d o n l y o n e r e c o i l l e s s r i f l e a n d n o ::Fareb a r r e l s f o r t h e i r m a c h i n e g u n s . Many o f t h e 6 0 m m m o r t n r swere i n o p e r a b l e b e c a u s e t h e b i p o d s a n d t u b e s were w o r n i-5.F i f t y t o 60% o f t h e a m m u n i t i o n f o z t h e s e m o r t a r s t u r n e d c u tt o b e d u d s . T h e a r m o r u n i t s a l s o e x p e r i e n c e d n u m e r o u se q u i p m e n t p r o b l e m s . T y p i c a l i s t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f zd i v i s i o n a l G - 3 w hen h e s a i d : 4 2

T h e d i v i s i c n h a d b a c k o r d e r s t w o y e a r so l d f o r r e c o i l o i l , s o t h e 75 m m gansh a d n e v e r b e e n f i r e d . When t h a g u n swere f i r e d i n K o r e a , i t was d o n e b yl a n y a r d and p r o m p t l y b l e w o f f t h et u r r e t s . * 3T h e Army met i t s c r i t i c s ? n 5 e d f o r e q u i p m e n t i:: t h e

e c r l y days c f t h e X ~ 3 r e s r . War by d r s w i n g XI Worlmi Vz: I Is t o c k s . T h i s e q u i p m e n t , o f t e n r e f u r b i s h e d i n . Ja~.a .n, ,:>;:

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R e a l i s t i c a nd de ma nd in g t r a i n i n g was n o t conduc ted i nt h e E i g h t h Army i n s u f f i c i e n t t im e t o p r e v e n t p o u r combatpe r fo rmance i n K or ea . The i n a b i l i t y o f i n f a n t r y e le me nt s t ot r a i n w i t h armor u n i t s r e s u l t e d i n m i s t r u s t and decrealcedc o m b a t e f f i c i e n c y .

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f o g , No r th Korean t r o o p s i n f i l t r a t e d t h e 1st B a t t a l i o n sp o s i t i o n s . By 0 80 0. t h e f o g had c l e a r e d r e v e a l i n g t h ea p pr o ac h of enemy t r o o p s t o t h e f r o n t o f t h e r e g i n e n t sp o s i t i o n . A t t h e same t i m e , t a n k an d s m a l l arms f i r e C G U ~ ?b e h e a r d t o t h e rear and f l a n k = o f t h e 1st B a t t a l i o n . TheH eavy Mor ta r P la toon was o v e r r u n b y t h e i n f i l t r a t i n g e nen y ,l e a v i n g t h e b a t t a l i o n w i th ou t o r g a n ic f i r e s u p p o r t . W i r ecommunicat ion w i t h t h e s u p p o r t in g a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n wasc u t . By 1205 , t h e r e g i me n t a l commander c o a l d not . :rep thea d hoc b a t t a l i o n un d er C a p t a i n A l k i r e i n p o si t io ? .. ? s tB a t t a l i o n f l e d t h r ou gh t h e r i c e p a t t i e s , s t r a f e d by f r i e n d l ya i r c r a f t and s h e l l e d by s u p p o r t i n g a r t i l l e r y . R e t r s a t e:-.d&when t h e y a r r i v e d a t t h e 3 r d B a t t a l i o n p o s i t i o n s 500 met.erst o t h a s o u t h e a s t . 5

T s nk s s u p p o r t i n g t h e r e g i m e n t p e r fo r me d p o o r ly . 1 It h e c on fu si ng b a t t l e t h e y f a i l e d t o s t o p t h e n t t a c k i r . g e n e z yt a n k s . Lack o f c o n t r o l p r e cl u d a d t h e z f rc n cav?r:zz tF ,er e t r e a t o f t h e i n f a n t r y . T a nk s , immune t o small 3 r m ~ n dm or ta r f i r e , c o u l d h av e c o v e r ed t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e 1stB a t t a l i o n . The a b i l i t y o f t h e T 3 4 / 8 5 s t o p e c e t r s t a t h ea n t i - t a n k p o s i t i o n s of t ie 1st B a t t a l i o n r e v e a l s d ti:ei n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e 3 2 4 C h a f f e e , l i g i t t x i k as a na n t i - t a n k weapon.

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C o l o n e l S t e p h e n s o r d e r e d t h e 3 r d B a t t a l i o n t o r e g a i nt h e p o s i t i o n s l o s t b y t h e 1st B a t t a l i o n . The commande: t ~ f3 r d B a t t a l i o n , L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l P r y o r , w a s u n a b l e t o carryo u t t h e a t t a c k a nd was r e l i e v e d as a n o n - b a t t l e c a s u a l t y .H i s e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r , M aj o r J e n s e n , a s s u me d command. M aj orJ e n s e n w ei gh t ed h i s c o u n t e r a t t a c k w i t h f o u r K24 C h a f fe el i g h t t a n k s . The c o u n t e r a t t a c k was s u c c e s s f u la nd t h e 3 r d S a t t a l i o n r e g a i n ed t h e r i d g e s c u t h of C ho nu ia r o un d d u s k . Th e t a n k p l a t o o n s u p p o r t i n g t h e c o c n t e rs t t a , : kp e r fo r me d b e t t e r t h a n t h e compa ny ha d e a r l i e r i r ; t h e 3 s y . e

A lt h ou gh t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k was s u c c e s s f s l . T o l o n e 1S t e p h e n ' s a r m o r - i n f a n t r y . t e a m p e r fo r me d p o o r l y . T h ei n a b i l i t y o f t h e H24 C ha f f e e t o a c t as a v i a b l e . ar .t l- ta r . kweapon gave t h e e nemy T 3 4 / 8 5' s t h e e d g e i n c o m ba t .O ut gu nn ed , t h e t a n k s s u p p o r t i n g t h e i n f n z t r y wsrei n e f f e c t i v e a nd c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e g r c w i n g f a s r '.bat t h : ?N o r t t K o r e a n a s s a u l t s -auld n o t b e s t o p p e d . ... Y 3FF a r s h i n g and t h e H 4 A 3 S h e r m a n t a n k s , superior i r , Pirep2:rs:t o t h e M24 C h a f f e e , w e r e i m m e d i a t e l y r e q u i r e 3 t o t u i l i i ?v i a b l e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team. U n f u r t u n a t e l y , t + ? 1 e a d s r s , j Pt h e Fsr E a s t ' Tommand hsd d e c i d e d i n t h e y - a r s fc : lowing?lorld War 11, t h a k s u c h weapons were n o t n e e d e d i n t h e

E i g h t h Army.

.l., -

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l e d m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s t o b e l i e v e t h a t Korea was n o t s u i t e df o r a rm or o p e r a t i o n s . The r a p i d a d va n c e of t h e NKPAs,s p e a r h e a d , t h e 1 0 7 t h Armored B r i g a d e , d i s p e l l e d t h e s eb e l i e f s . A s p e c i a l r e p o r t on t h e prob lems o f t h e Korean Wars u c c i n c t l y sum mari zed t h i s n e w e n l i g h t e n e d v iew:s

The m ou n ta in o us t e r r a i n , l a c k o f goodroad n e t , p oo r c c n d i t i o n s o f t h e r o a d s ,d e m o l i s h e d b r i d g e s a n d l a ck o f b r i d g e sc a p a b l e o f s u p p o r t i n g t a n k s , s t e e p h i g hpaddy d i k e s , and r i c e p a t t i e s had l i t t l ee f f e c t on t a n k w a r f a r e . The o c l y c h an g et h e t e r r a i n i mp os ed o n t h e e mp lo ym en t o farmor WBS t o l o w er t h e num be r o f t a n k st h a t c o u l d b e de p lo y ed i n a ny g i v e n a r e aa t o n e t i m e . 1 0

T e r r a i n h a d a pro found impac t on t h e R a tu r e c f t h ewar. I t r e duced b a t t l e s t o a s e r i e s of v i c i o u s i nd ep en de ntengagement s . A b a t t a l i o n i n t h e d e f e n s e c o u ld l s s e 32e n t i r e company t o an enemy a s s a u l t w i t ho u t s u s t s i n i n g 3s i n g l e loss i n t h e r e m a i n i n g c o m p a n i e s o f t h e b s t t s l l s n .Y o u n t ai n s m u ff l e d t h e s o cn d s o f b a t t l e R a k i n g t h e s t r . i g z l + zo f f l a n k e l e m en t s i n d i s t i n c t a n d f a r away. T h e ~ h y s i c s l r.2p s y ch o l o g ic a l i s o l a t i o n c f t h e s o l d i e r s f ad t h e i r f a s r s ar.2b r o k e down u n i t c o h e s i o n .

E s t t l e i n Korea was a s a r i e s of s mal l un i t ac t i : l n ;r a r e l y l a r g e r t ha n 2 r e g i m e n t . F o r t h i s r e a s o n t h e s t i ; d : . c m fs e v e r a l sma l l u n i t a c t i o n s , o c c u r r i n g du r l n g t h e f i r s t :C

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o f t h e r e g i m e n t , t h e r e g im e n t was a ug me nt ed b y 2 3 t a n k s f r s mt w o s e p a r a t e t a n k c s m p an i es .

L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l J o h n G ro wd en 's 6 t h Ta nk E a t t a l i o r :s e n t t h i r t e e n t a n k s f ro m Cumpany 9. T h e s e t a n k s were M48P a t t o n s a n d were n o t o r g a n i c t o t h e 1st C a v a l r y D i v i s i o n .G i v e n an o r d e r t o b e g i n t h e i r move t o j o i n t h e 5 t h C a v a l r yw i t h i n 30 minu tes , Company D was on t h e r o ad i n 25 m i n u t e st o e f f e c t t h e l i n k u p .

T h e remaining t e n t a n k s were X4A3s, w h i c h b e l c n g ~ d :L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l H en ry Z e i e n ' s , A Company o f t h e 70t : T3r.i;B a t t a l i o n .

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e t a n k s , t h e r e g i m e n t was suf&dl: ' te .rb y t h e 6 1 s t F i e l d A r t i l l e r y , and .a b a t t a l i o n o f 155 m ms e l f - p r o p e l l e d g u n s . 1 5

A t 1 7 0 0 , w h i l e t h e f o r c e was b e i n g a sse m b l r d a t Y,>.j: i ,C o l o n e l Crombez r e c i e v e d t h e o r d e r t o e x e c u t e h i sb r e a k t h r o u g h t o t h e 23 rd I n f a n t r y . 1;: t h e d n ~ l c n e s s , Z L Lu n i t s b u t t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s c r o s s e d '3veri m p r o v i s e d b r i d g e s t o b e g i n t h e i r a t t a c k t o wa rd sC h i p y o n g - n i . T h e u n i t s d r o v e un d e r b?ackcJut c o n i i t i a n s 3 ' ~ e . i 'n a r r a w , r u t t e d , i c e pa c k e d r o a d s u n t i l n i t n i g h t w ? e : - . tF .5;r e a c h e d a d e s t r c y e d b r i d g e i n t h e v i c i n i t y z f - up:'-ri.W h i l e t h e e n g i n e e r s r e p a i r e d t h e b r i d g e , :he u n i t : fv:;?ie,Il .?

..

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d e f e n s i v e p e r i m e t e r . By t h i s t i m e t h e y had cove red ha l f o ft h e f i f t e e n m i l e s t o C h ip yo ng -n i . le

A t dawn on th e 1 5 t h . t h e 1st B a t t a l i o n , 5 t h C s va l ryu n d e r L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l Morgan H e a s l e y , a t t a c k e d t o s e i c t .t h e k e y t e r r a i n f e a t u r e on t h e r i g h t s i d e of t h e r o ad . T h ish i l l do min ated t h e r oa d t o t h e n o r t h f o r s e v e r a l m i l e s . Theb a t t a l i o n was s t op p ed i n t h e f a c e o f w i t h e r i n g enemy f i r ea f t e r a d v an c i n g o n l y o ne h u nd r ed y a r d s . C o l o n e l Crombezt h e n s e n t t h e 2nd B a t t a l i o n , 5 t h Cavalry, commanded b yL i e u te n a n t C o lo n el P a ul C l i f f o r d , t o s e i z e t h e h i g h groundan t h e l e f t s i d e o f t h e r o a d . Soon t h e e n t i r e r eg im en t w a sc om mi tt ed t o a g e n e r a l a t t a c k s up p o r te d by two a r t i l l e r yb a t t a l i o n s a nd nu me ro us a i r s t r i k e s . Ey 1 1 0 0 i t becamea p p a r e n t t h a t t h e 2 3r d I n f a n t r y would n o t be r e l i e v e d b e f c - cd a r k n e s s a r r i v e d u n l e s s s p e c i a l m e a su r e s we re i nF l? zc r. 5e ?. 1- '

C o l o n e l Crombez f a c e d s e v e r a l i m p o r ta n t t a c t i c a lc o n s i d e r a t i o n s . F i r s t , t h e m is s i on of t h e r eg i3 e r. t 5 i x ?:op en t h e r oa d f o r s u p p l y a n d m ed i ca l v e h i z l e s t o i a l ~ I?b e l e a u g e r e d 23rd I n f a n t r y . H e had a l r e a d y f a i l e d i t h a tm i s s i o n . C o l o n e ? Crombez r a d i o e d t o C u lc ; ne l J a c k C i i ? 2 s .who had r e p l ac e d t h e wounded Col on el Freeman as UdmnxcIs : : Pt h e 2 3 r d . and t o l d h i m t h a t he t h 0 u g P . t o n l y t z n l i s t + : > i > l . i ?:+a b l e t o g e t t h ro u gh a nd t h a t t h e t r a i n s would h a ve tcs f c : l ~ r rL a t e r . C h i l e s r e s po n d ed s a y i n g , "C;me on t r a i n s .&

Armor Infantry Team in Korea

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