ArmedConflict21stCentury

8/14/2019 ArmedConflict21stCentury

1/129

ARMED CONFL I CT I N TH E 21st CENTURY:

TH E INFORMATI ON REVOL UTI ON

AND POST-M ODERN WARFAR E

St even M et z

Apr i l 2000


2/129

*****

The views expressed in t his report are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the offi cial policy or posit ion of the Depart ment of t heArmy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This reportis cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave., Carl isle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of t hi s reportmay be obtained fr om t he Publicati ons and Product ion Office by call ingcommercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Int ernet [email protected]

*****

Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronicdissemination. SSIs Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mailnewslet ter to update the national secur ity community on t he research ofour analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcomingconferences sponsored by t he Institut e. Each newslet ter also provides astrategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you areinterested in r eceiving this newslet ter, please let us know by e-mail atout [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-018-4

ii


3/129

CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Part I :Strategic Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Part I I :Images of Future War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Part II I :The Mark of Success for Future Mil itar ies . . . . . . . 73

Part IV:Conclusion and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

iii


4/129

FOREWORD

Within the past decade, the U.S. military has implemented anumber of programs to assess the changes underway in the globalsecurity environment and in the nature of warfare. Defenseleaders and t hinkers have concluded that revolut ionary change istaking place and, if the United States develops appropriatetechnology, warfight ing concepts, and military organizations, itcan master or control this change, thus augmenting Americansecurity.

In this monograph, Dr. Steven Metz, who was one of theearliest analysts of the strategic dimension of the revolution inmilitary affairs, suggests that official thinking within the U.S.military may be too narrow. The information revolution, hecontends, will have far-reaching strategic effects. Thetransformation it brings will not only be technological, butpolit ical, social, ethical and strategic as well .

As he explores the impact that the information revolutionmay have on the conduct of armed conflict , Dr. Metz int roduces anumber of ideas which need further analysis, including thepotential for the emergence of nontraditional, networkedenemies; multidimensional asymmetry; the privatization ofsecurity; and the potential impact of technologies like robotics,nonlethality, and nanotechnology. He concludes with anasessment of the features likely to characterize successfulmili taries in the 21st century.

Because it deals with the future, this study is conceptual andspeculative. But the issues and linkages it raises are directlyrelevant to todays strategic thinkers and leaders. The StrategicStudies Insti tut e is pleased to offer i t as a cont r ibution to debateover the nature of t he challenges that the U.S. mili tary will face incoming decades.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.Interim DirectorStrategic Studies Instit ute

v


5/129

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The information revolution is increasing intercon-nectedness and escalating the pace of change in nearlyevery dimension of life. By examining the ongoing changesin the nature of armed conflict and thinking expansively,looking for wider implications and relationships, and

exploring cross-cutting connections between technology,ethics, social trends, polit ics, and strategy, the archi tects ofthe future U.S. military can increase the chances ofultimate success.

PART I : STRA TEGI C CONT EXT

I nt er conn ectedn ess and Globali zati on.

One of the most important changes associated with theinformation revolution is a dramatic increase in theinterconnectedness of people around the world. Almost nodimension of modern life has been untouched by theinformation revolution. In the realm of security, theinformation revolution brings both good news and badnews, speeding the accumulation of information and

slowing the pace of decisionmaking.The informat ion r evolut ion has also sped up the pace of

change in all aspects of life. Rapid change always haswinners and losers. Much of the violence that will exist inthe early 21st century wi ll originate from the losers of t hechange underway today.

Or gani zati onal Chan ge.

The information revolution is altering the shape ofeconomic and poli t ical organizations. Today, the successfulcommercial firm is one with a global perspective, a web of

vii


6/129

strategic partnerships, and internal flexibility based onproject teams or work groups rather than hierarchies orbureaucracies. This phenomenon is migrating to the

political world as well. Clinging to old practices andorganizations entails escalating costs and risks forgovernments as much as for corporations. At the same timethat interconnectedness undercuts the viability ofauthoritarianism by allowing repressed citizens tocommunicate, organize, and mobilize, it also placeshandcuffs on elected governments. This reflects an historicdeconcentration of political, economic, and ethical power.

The information revolution is both a force for stabilityand for instability. On the positive side, it complicates thetask of old-style repression and facilitates the developmentof grass roots civil society. But the information revolutionalso allows organizations intent on instability or violence toform alliances, thus making the world more dangerous.Some of the most complex struggles of the 21st century wi ll

pit polyglot networks against states. Hierarchies andbureaucracies face serious disadvantages when pittedagainst unscrupulous, flexible, adaptable enemies.

The Changin g Natu r e of Ar med Confl i c t .

The U.S. Department of Defense and the militaryservices hold that speed, knowledge, and precision willminimize casualties and lead to the rapid resolut ion of wars,thus minimizing the problems associated with thechallenges to the polit ical ut ility of force. States with fewerintellectual and financial resources than the United Stateswill not have the luxury of using technology to solvestrategic problems. Whether the United States can bedeterred from intervent ion by weapons of mass destruct ionor terrorism is one of the central questions for the future

global secur ity environment .

viii


7/129

Pr iva t i za t ion .

Interconnectedness, the dispersion of power and

knowledge that flows from the information revolution, andthe eroding legitimacy of armed force are leading toward amultidimensional trend toward privatization within therealms of secur ity and armed conflict . As nat ions seek waysto attain a surge capacity wi thout the expense of sustaininga large, peacetime military, and as they face difficultiesrecruiting from their own populations, contracting will bean at tractive option for fi lling the ranks. Corporate armies,

navies, air forces, and intelligence services may be majoractors in 21st century armed conflict. This will open newrealms of strategy and policy.

Asymmetry.

States which decide to commit aggression in comingdecades will know that if the United States and the world

community decide to counter the aggression, t hey can. Thequalitative gap between the U.S. mil itary and all others iswide and growing. This leaves aggressors two options: theycan pursue indirect or camouflaged aggression, or they canattempt to deter or counter American interventionasymmetrically. Asymmetry is a characteristic of periods ofrapid change, particularly r evolut ionary ones. In geologicalhistory, there have been times when many new species

emerged. Most proved unable to survive, leading to newperiods with less diversity. Military history follows thesame pattern: periods of great diversity follow periods ofrelative homogeneity. The current era is one of diversity.For the period of diversity, asymmetry will be a dominantcharacterist ic of armed conflict .

Combatants.

In the opening half of t he 21st century, the types of stateand nonstate combatants which have characterized recentarmed confl ict will cont inue to exist , but they are likely to be

ix


8/129

joined by new forms. The U.S. military probably will be thefirst post-modern state combatant, attaining greatlyamplified speed and precision by the integration of

information technology and development of a system ofsystems which links together methods for targetacquisition, strikes, maneuver, planning, communication,and supply. I ts organization will be less rigidly hierarchicalthan that of modern state combatants. The final type ofcombatants in 21st century armed conflict are likely to bepost-modern nonstate ones. These will consist of loosenetworks of a range of nonstate organizations, some

polit ical or ideological in orientation, others seeking profi t .PART I I : I MAGES OF F UTURE WAR

Th e Offi cial View .

Broadly speaking, the opening decades of the 21stcent ury are likely to see some combinat ion of thr ee modes of

warfare: formal war, informal war, and gray area war.Formal war pits state militaries against other statemilitaries. It has been the focus of most futures-orientedthinking within the U.S. military and Department ofDefense. The official vision of future war reflects the beliefthat information superiority will be the lifeblood of apost-modern military and thus the key to battlefieldsuccess.

Futures-oriented thinking deals with force developmentwhich i s a responsibility of t he services. In fact , most of t hefutures thinking within the U.S. mili tary is st il l done by theservices. So far , the Armys program is the most elaborate. I thas formulated a vision that is highly innovative in itsapproach to technology, organization, and leadership, butconservative in i ts assumpt ions about the nature of warfare

and the purposes of American military power. The U.S. AirForces vision of future war is also characterized by acombination of creativity and conservatism. The Marinesare looking at fairly radical changes in tactical and

x


9/129

operational procedures, including new organizations anddoctrine. The Navys view of future war is based on arevolution in strike warfare using existing major

platforms with better systems of target acquisition,intelligence, and guidance.The official American view of the future consistently

treats technology, particularly information t echnology, as aforce mult ipl ier rather than as a locomotive forrevolut ionary t ransformation. With t he exception of addingthree new tasks for the U.S. militaryspace operations,information warfare, and homeland protectionthe officialvision anticipates few if any strategic shift s.

Asymm et r y Agai n.

Asymmetry has become a central concept in officialAmerican thinking about future warfare. The question thenbecomes: what forms of asymmetry will be most commonand, more importantly, most problematic for the UnitedStates? Enemies using precision munitions or weapons ofmass destruction to complicate deployment into a theater ofoperations could pose a serious challenge to some of themost basic tenets of American strategy. A counter-deployment strategy is only one of several asymmetricapproaches that future enemies may attempt. They mightalso resort to terrorism, either in conjunction with acounterdeployment strategy or in lieu of it. Of all forms ofasymmetry, urban warfare may be the most problematicand the most likely. Two types of technology, though, mighthelp alleviate some of the challenges posed by urbanoperations: nonlethal weapons and robotics.

Broadly speaking, the opening decades of the 21stcentury will see both symmetric formal war pitting twomodern states, and asymmetric formal war pitting apost-modern mi litary against a modern one. It remains to beseen whether another post-modern mi litary will emerge tochallenge the United States or whether, as Americanstrategic thinking posits, the post-modern U.S. mil itary wi ll

xi


10/129

always be able to overcome the asymmetric methods used bymodern militaries.

I n fo rm al War .Informal war is armed conflict where at least one of the

antagonists is a nonstate ent ity such as an insurgent armyor ethnic milit ia. Twenty-first century informal war will bebased on some combination of ethnicity, race, regionalism,economics, personality, and ideology. Informal war will bothbe more common and more strategically significant . Combat

in future informal war is likely to remain hands on, pit t ingthe combatants in close combat. Warriors will be inter-spersed among noncombatants, using them as shields andbargaining chips. At times, refugee disasters will bedeliberately stoked and sustained to attract outsideattention and intervention. Unlike formal war, informalwar wi ll remain dir ty and bloody.

Some types of informal war will be comparativelysimple. Counterinsurgency, which uses military forces toatt ain not only the short-term restoration of order but alsoult imate resolut ion of the confl ict that led to disorder in thefirst place, is a different and more difficult matter. There isno doctrine or strategy for dealing with networkedopponents, be they existing criminal cartels or futureinsurgent s. To be successful against future insurgent s, theU.S. military will need better intelligence, better forceprotection, and greater precision at the tactical andstrategic levels. In part, these things require neworganizational methods. Emerging technology also holdspromise. Again, nonlethal weapons and robotics may provethe most vit al.

Gr ay Ar ea War .

Gray area phenomena combine elements of traditionalwarfight ing with those of organized crime. Today, gray areathreats are increasing in strategic significance. Since grayarea war overlaps and falls in between traditional national

xii


11/129

security threats and law enforcement issues, states mustoft en scramble to find the appropriate secur ity structure tocounter it . As the debate within t he United States over the

use of the military to counter gray area enemies intensifiesin coming years, creation of an American nationalgendarmerie should be considered. It could form its ownall iances with similar secur ity forces around the world andoperate more effectively against gray area enemies in aninterconnected security environment and globalizedeconomy.

Str at egic I nfor mat i on War far e.Future war may see attacks via computer viruses,

worms, logic bombs, and t rojan horses rather than bullets,bombs, and missiles. Information technology might providea politically usable way to damage an enemys national orcommercial infrastructure badly enough to attain victorywithout having to first defeat fielded military forces.

Today strategic information warfare remains simply aconcept or theory. The technology to wage it does not exist .But until it is proven ineffect ive, states and nonstate actorswhich have the capacity to attempt it probably will, doing sobecause it appears potent ially effective and less risky thanother forms of armed conflict .

Cyberattacks might erode the traditional advantagelarge and rich states hold in armed confl ict . Private ent it iesmight be able to match state armed forces. As one of theworlds most wired nations, strategic information warfarecould be particularly problematic for the United States,forcing policymakers and military strategists to examinesome of their most basic beliefs about warfighting andnational secur ity.

Technologi cal Tr ansfor mati on.

New technologies or new combinations of technologyhave the potent ial to alt er not only tactics and operational

xiii


12/129

methods, but military strategy itself. Soon t echnology mayallow military planners to select which individual orphysical object in a building is to be destroyed.

Coming decades are likely to see the proliferation ofrobots around the world and in many walks of l ife. As one ofthe most avid customers of new technology, this willcertainly affect the American milit ary. Init ially, the primefunction of military robots will be to replace humans inparticularly dangerous or tedious functions. The realbreakthrough and decision point will come when robotsadvance to the point that they have the potent ial for combatuse.

While initial thinking about robotics concentrates onminiaturization and the integration of networks of smallrobots with relatively limited functions, partially organicrobots may prove nearly as useful. Beyond technologicalobstacles, the potent ial for effect ive bat tlefield robots raisesa whole series of strategic, operations, and ethical issues,particularly when or if r obots change from being li fters tokillers.

Other emerging technologies could prove equallyrevolutionary. One example is what can be calledpsychotechnology. Future military commanders mighthave the technology to alter the beliefs, perceptions, andfeelings of enemies. Any developments in this realm

warrant very close scrutiny. Barring some sort of trulyfundamental change in the global security environment,they should be eschewed.

PART I I I : TH E MA RK OF SUCCESS FOR FUTUREM I L I TA R I E S

Foundat ion .

Even in revolutionary times, continuity outweighschange. This holds true for the current revolution inmilitary affairs. War will always involve a dangerous anddynamic relationship among passion, hatred, reason,

xiv


13/129

chance and probability. The specialness of warfightingand warriors will survive any real or apparent changes inthe nature of armed confl ict . War is and wil l be distinct from

other types of human activity. Largely because of this,future warriors, at least in democracies like the UnitedStates, will cont inue to be bound by an ethos stressing duty,honor, sacrifice, and the highest ethical standards.

Speed.

One of the most important determinants of success for

21st century militaries will be the extent to which they arefaster than their opponent s. Tactical and operational speedcomes from information technologythe digitizedforceand appropriate doctrine and training.Strategic speed will be equally important as a determinant of successin future armed conflict. For nations that undertakelong-range power projection, strategic speed includesmobility into and within a theater of military operations.

Strategic speed also entails faster decisionmaking. One ofthe core dilemmas the United States is likely to face ishaving a mil itary t hat can deploy and operate at l ighteningspeed, whi le strategic and polit ical decisionmaking remainsa t ime-consuming process of consensus building.

Speed also has an even broader, meta-strategicmeaning. The militaries which meet with the greatestsuccess in future armed conflict will be those which canundertake rapid organizational and conceptual adaptation.Successful state militaries must institut ionalize proceduresfor what might be called strategic entrepreneurshiptheability to rapidly identify and understand significantchanges in the strategic environment and form appropriateorganizat ions and concepts.

Precision.So far thinking on the revolut ion in military affairs has

focused on what might be calledphysical precisiontheability to hit targets with great accuracy from great

xv


14/129

distances with precisely the desired physical effect. Militarystrategists and commanders must come to think in t erms ofpsychological precision as well: shaping a military

operation so as to attain the desired attitudes, beliefs, andperceptions on the part of both the enemy and otherobservers, whether noncombatants in the area of operationsor global audiences.

Precision has a strategic component which is sometimesoverlooked. Strategic precision entails shaping a military sothat it best reflects its nations strategic situation, includingstrategic culture, level of technological development, andmost significant threats. For the U.S. military, this entailsfinding the appropriate balance among capabilities to dealwith formal war, informal war, and gray area war. It alsoentails reaching a degree of privatization which maximizesefficiency wi thout creating unacceptable risks. In att ainingstrategic precision, past success can be a hindrance. Victorylimits the urge to adapt and innovate. For the United

States, avoiding a victory-induced slumber wi ll be a key steptoward a post-modern military.

Fin d in g and Hi d in g.

One of the most crucial dynamics of future armed conflictwi ll be the struggle between finding and hiding. Successfulmilitaries will be those bet ter at finding their enemies thantheir enemies are at finding them. Within the UnitedStates, the emphasis has been on the offensive part of thisequationthe finding. Hiding, though, warrants moreattention. Future military strategists must rebuild theirunderstanding of deception and hiding, working with newinformation technology that allows things like morphingand sophisticated spoofing (including things likeholographic soldiers, tanks, planes, and so forth). In

particular, the notions of operational and strategicdeception must be revisited.

xvi


15/129

Reorganizing.

The most successful future militaries will be those that

undertake a blank slate reevaluation of their most basicconcepts and organizational precepts. Developing hybridblends of hierarchical structures with networks, publiccomponents with private, and humans with machines willbe particularly important. Reevaluating career paths in themilitary also might be necessary. The trend in thecommercial world has been toward a blurring betweenmanagement and staff. If this is extrapolated to the

military, it might be necessary to consider whether thedivision of a service into enlisted personnel andcommissioned officers makes sense in the 21st century. Inaddition, the organization of militaries into land, sea, andair services needs assessed. Perhaps it would make moresense to organize them into components focused on aspecific type of armed conflictone for formal war, one forinformal, and one for gray area war. Alternatively,

post-modern militaries must consider whether a newservice is needed for new operating environments. Thosemilitaries able to let go of old organizational patterns andembrace, even master new ones will be the most likely tosucceed in future armed conflict .

Adjust in g Civi l -Mi l i ta r y Rela t i ons.

The current health of American civil -military relationsis based on the perception that: (1) the military has a vit al job to do in defending the nat ion against external enemies, itdoes so very competently, and should receive adequateresources to do so; (2) the effectiveness of the U.S. militarydoes not threaten domestic civil rights or politicalinsti tut ions; and, (3) the U.S. military represents the best oftradit ional American values. Changes in any of t hese threecomponent s could degrade civil-military r elations.

The U.S. military must do its part to help forestallproblems with civil-military relations. Foremost, it mustassure that any capabilities or methods it develops reflect

xvii


16/129

national values and strategic culture. For instance, itshould eschew operational concepts that call for thepreempt ive use of force on t he part of t he United States or

fo r ac t ions tha t would ind i sc r imina te ly ha rmnoncombatant s. And, unless circumstances change in somefundamental way, the military should eschew developmentof dangerous new technologies like psychotechnology whichrun counter to American values like personal privacy andcivi l r ights.

Cont r ol l i ng for Asymmetr y.

Since asymmetric conflict will be common in the openingdecades of the 21st century, finding ways to resist ortranscend it will be one of the determinants of success formilitaries and other organizations that participate inarmed conflict . For the United States, what might be calledan asymmetry of time is likely to be particularlyproblematic. Today, long wars are simply considered

inconceivable in American planning While everythingsuggests that the future United States (just like the currentone) would prefer short wars, fail ing to plan for protractedconflict increases the chances it will occur. Given this,greater attention should be given to protracted war in thevarious wargames, seminars, and simulations that the U.S.military uses to think about future armed confl ict .

Adapt i ng to Technol ogi cal Shi ft s.

The ability to accept and capitalize on emergingtechnology will be a determinant of success in future armedconflict . No military is bet ter at t his than the American, inlarge part because no culture is better at it than theAmerican. That said, there will be new, radical technologieswith great promise which will challenge the ability of themilitary to master and integrate. In particular, robotics,miniaturizat ion, and nonlethality are likely to provide thekeys to future success.

xviii


17/129

Ant i cipat i ng Second and Th i r d Or der Effects.

Because strategy and armed conflict are so complex, any

action has a multitude of second order effects (and third,fourth, and so on). Strategic decisions made today,particularly by the United States, will have second andthird order effects on 21st century armed conflict . Some ofthese second order effects wi ll be strategic and poli t ical. Totake one example, by vigorously pursuing a revolution inmilitary affairs designed to augment power projection and,perhaps, to lessen t he need for allies, the United States may

very well encourage the strengthening of regional securitystructures designed to minimize the need for Americaninvolvement or intervent ion. Many future innovations willbring equally unexpected second and third order effects.The development of military robotics, biotechnology, andpsychotechnology, in particular, may unleash a hur ricane ofpolit ical, legal, and ethical problems.

Conclusion.No nation has ever undertaken a full revolution in

military affairs unless it is responding to perceived risk orrecent disaster. The paralysis of victory is great and vestedinterests always powerful. If historical patterns hold, theU.S. military may not be able to make the leap into thefuture on i ts own. I t often seems that the Pentagons plans

for the future, including systems acquisit ions, are based onbygone battles. Ultimately, firm prodding may benecessary. This could come from Congress, the Presidentand Secretary of Defense, or from battlefield defeat. If thenation is lucky, visionary leadership rather than Americanblood will inspire the necessary changes.

Recommendations.

The key strategic challenges for the Army in the short- tomid-term (5 to 20 years) will be att aining greater strategicmobil ity, completing digit ization, and becoming as effective

xix


18/129

at shaping the strategic environment as it is at r espondingto threats. The key strategic challenges for the mid- tolong-term (15-30 years) will be:

developing and int egrating robotics and miniaturizedsystems;

stressing the ful l modulari ty of equipment , systemsand organization;

developing methods for the rapid transformation ofdoctrine, concepts, and organizations; and,

developing greater psychological precision, includingthe ful l integration of nonlethal capabilit ies.To prepare for this second wave of transformation, the

Army should use its futures-oriented programs andintellectual resources, particularly the Army After NextProject and the War College, to explore the strategicimplications.

xx


19/129

INTRODUCTION

The German phi losopher Hegel held that revolut ions arethe locomotive of history. According to his theory, everysocial, polit ical, and economic system builds up tensions andcontradictions over time. Eventually these explode inrevolution. Taking the argument one step further, Leninheld that a revolutionary did not have to wait for theexplosion, but could speed it up, manipulate it , and cont rolit . But Lenin was wrong. One cannot create a revolut ion inthe way that an architect designs a building. Nor is itpossible to control revolutions like a conductor leads anorchestra. Revolutions are much too big and complex forthat. Those who live in revolut ionary t imes can only make athousand small decisions and hope that they move historyforward in the desired direction. This holds as much formilitary revolut ions as for any other kind.

A revolut ion-cent ric perspective on t he development ofwar emerged among American strategic thinkers in the1990s. Now secur ity analysts, military leaders, and defensepolicymakers, not only in the United States, but around theworld, accept the idea that some sort of revolution inmilitary affairs is underway.1 Its nature and eventualoutcome, though, are less clear. One thing is certain: the

United States has a greater stake in the revolution inmilitary affairs than any other nation. By definition,revolutions upset existing relationships and hierarchies.Since the cur rent configuration of global polit ical, economic,and military power is favorable to the United States, thechances are that fundamental strategic change will provedeleterious to the American position. Washington is thusfaced with the difficult task of modulating, directing, or

controlling the revolut ion in mili tary affair s.History has seen two types of military revolutions.

Operational and tactical revolutions occurred when newtechnology, operational concepts, or military organizations

1


20/129

combined to generate a substantial increase in theeffectiveness of military organizations. The revolution ofthe 1920s and 1930s that led to mechanized land warfare,

strategic air war, and carrier war at sea is one example.Strategic revolutions have been much rarer. Alvin andHeidi Toffler suggest that strategic revolut ions occur whena much broader shift in the method of production changesthe ent ire panoply of human r elationships, thus altering notonly how militaries fight, butwho fights and why theyfight.2 Today American strategic thinkers assume that theworld is in the midst of an operational or technological

military revolut ion and plan accordingly. In fact, a strategicrevolut ion may be under way, spawned by and reflect ing theinformation revolut ion.

Underestimating the extent of the ongoing revolut ion inmilitary affairs and fail ing to understand its int ricacies andsecond order effects can endanger American security. Theneed to think broadly and holistically is pressing. In simple

terms, the information revolution is increasing intercon-nectedness and escalating the pace of change in nearlyevery dimension of life. This, in turn, shapes the evolut ion ofarmed conflict. Whether in economics, politics, orwarfighting, those who are able to grasp the magnitude ofthis will be the best prepared to deal wi th i t .

The architects of the 21st century American militarymust understand the broad polit ical, economic, social, andethical changes brought by the information revolut ion andby its manifestationsinterconnectedness and anescalated pace of change. They must understand the effectthese changes are having or might have on t he evolut ion ofarmed conflict . Then, most importantly, they must developsome notion of what characteristics the future Americanmilitary must have to prosper in the new strategicenvironment . The better an individual, an organization, or astate understands the nature of a r evolut ion, the better itschances of emerging a winner. By examining the ongoingchanges in the nature of armed conflict and thinkingexpansively, looking for wider implications and relation-

2


21/129

ships, and exploring cross-cutting connections betweentechnology, ethics, social trends, polit ics, and strategy, thearchitects of the future U.S. military can increase the

chances of ultimate success. This study provides somesuggestions on how this might be done.

3


22/129

PART I :STRA TEGI C CONTEXT

I nt er conn ectedn ess and Globali zati on.

What is driving the current revolution in militaryaffairs? Throughout history, many factors have alt ered thehuman condition: new ideas, religions, ecological shifts,disease, migrations, conquest, and so forth. Todaytechnology, particularly information technology, is thelocomotive, defining what is possible and pushing old ideas,values, methods, and organizations into obsolescence. Aspart of this, the information revolution is shaping thestrategic environment in which armed conflict takes place.The revolut ion in military affairs is the dependent variable,driven and buffeted by wider changes. To understand futurearmed conflict, then, one must at least attempt tounderstand the political, economic, social, and ethicaldimensions of the information revolution.

One of the most important changes associated with theinformation revolution is a dramatic increase in theinterconnectedness of people around the world. This isevident at many levels and in many ways. For individuals,the number of people with whom they can cultivate some

sort of relationship has increased exponent ially. For most ofhuman history, people only connected with the relativelyfew people who lived in their locale or whom they met ontravels. Printing and literacy increased this somewhat byallowing people to develop at least a rudimentaryunderstanding of others far away. Radio, the telegraph, thetelephone, and television increased interconnectednessfurther by escalating the speed with which ideas could be

transmitted and augment ing their psychological impact bymaking them more human. Today, informationtechnology allows the transmission of massive amounts ofdata to large audiences over great distances very quickly.

5


23/129

These relationships are much more dynamic, interactive,and powerful than the static one between author andreader.

On a personal level, individuals can cultivate arelationship with hundreds or thousands of people, whetherthrough email, onl ine chat , or other means. The explosion ofwireless communications means that anyone who wants tocan stay connected twenty-four hours a day. One canstand in the middle of an African game reserve manykilometers from the nearest paved road and read officeemail from a hand phone. By 2025, according to the Uni tedStates Commission on National Secur ity/21st Century, theentire world will be linked, so that from any stationary ormobile station it will be physically possible to send andreceive near-instantaneous voice, video and other serialelectronic signals to any other station.3 As Bill Gatesphrases it :

Universal connect ivi ty wil l bring together all t he informationand services you need and make them available to youregardless of where you are, what you are doing, or the kind ofdevice you are using. Call it virtual convergenceeverything you want is in one place, but that place is whereveryou want it to be, not just at home or in the offi ce.4

Even more importantly, information technology allowseveryone with access to it to become attuned to issues and

problems in far-flung parts of the globe. There are tens ofthousands of newspapers, newsletters, magazines, radiostations, and government documents available onl ine. Chatrooms, email distribution l ists, and online newsgroups existfor every conceivable topic. One can cultivate a fairlysophisticated understanding of any part of the worldwithout leaving home. Information previously availableonly to those with the ability and the t ime to visit a library

can now be delivered to anyone with a simple PC and aphone.The information revolution opens new vistas for those

who do leave home. For most of history, to migrate

6


24/129

demanded extraordinary boldness or desperation. Today,information technology allows potential migrants to bothreconnoiter the area they would like to move to, and to

retain reasonable ties with the family and friends leftbehind. International travel and migrationwhetherpermanent or temporaryis thus easier and more commonthan it has ever been. The world is crisscrossed by networks,some based on ties like ethnicity or nationality, others onshared ideas, concerns, or ideology. These provide not only asource of informat ion, but also a means to mobilize economicand polit ical support for an organization or an idea.

Some dimensions of the information revolution andtechnological advancements are destabilizing or evendangerous. They have, for instance, blur red the distinctionbetween fantasy and reali ty. Users of I nternet Relay Chat(IRC) jokingly compare RL (real l ife) to the virtual worldthat entertains, informs, and, sometimes, confuses them.5The psychologically mature users understand the

distinction between RL and IRC. For others, particularlyadolescent s and less mentally stable adults, the boundary isunclear, causing misunderstanding, confusion and anxiety.The fact that one can create an online personaunencumbered by reality can be liberating, but alsodangerous for the immature or irresponsible. Freedom isalways potentially dangerous. In this IRC is simply amicrocosm of the wider problems brought by the

information revolution. Advances in communicationtechnology, especially the ability to meld reali ty and fantasythrough things like morphing, when combined with themarketability of violent entertainment , confuse the youngand the unstable who then feed each others delusions viavirtual communications. In the worst cases, fantasy andreality become hopelessly entangled and the resul t can beevents like the murders at Columbine High School.

The information revolution has brought informationoverload. Everyone with a PC and an Internet connectionruns the risk of being bombarded with ideas and images.While this can broaden an individuals perspective by

7


25/129

providing access to different points of view and sources ofinformation, it can also reinforce delusions by showing thatothers believe the same thing. Bizarre ideas and outright

lies can be propagated much more easily than in the past.One has only to look at the plethora of conspir acy or racistweb sites to see this at work.6 And, information technology isalso broadening the gap between the haves and havenots, both within advanced societies like the United Statesand in t he world as a whole.

Almost no dimension of modern life has been untouchedby the information revolution. One of its most importanteffects has been the cascading globalization of economies.The tactical outcome is that businesses must have a globalapproach to markets, financing, trends, risk amelioration,partners, and suppliers. The strategic outcome is alinkage of economies around the world. Economicdownturns, notes the U.S. Commission on NationalSecurity, that have usually been episodic and local may

become, thanks to the integration of global financialmarkets, more systemic in their origins and hence moreglobal in their effects.7 In a sense, this is not an entirelynew phenomenon. Thomas Friedman points out that theperiod from the late 19th century to the middle of the 20thalso saw substantial globalization driven by a decline intransportation costs arising from the invention of therailroad, steamship, and automobile.8 But the process of

globalization underway today i s immensely more powerfulin terms of its impact on politics, economics, culture, andvalues.

Every state must choose between participation in theglobalized economy or persistent poverty. Participationmeans that the statenot just businesses within a state,but the government itselfmust follow certain rules ofbehavior, including things like limiting corruption andmaking budget ing and f inances t ransparent .Transparency, write Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, isbecoming a key asset for countries seeking investments.The ability to hoard information, which once seemed so

8


26/129


27/129

using globalization to cause his nations 1997 economiccrisis, is simply one of the first of what will be many leaderslooking for a scapegoat to explain their shortcomings or

frustrations.13

As globalization erodes the abil ity of polit icalleaders to fully control their own countrys destiny, itsimultaneously erodes their propensity to acceptresponsibility for events. This leads to a search forscapegoats. Often the symbols of globalizationthe Uni tedStates, the International Monetary Fund, and similariconswill serve this function.

The information revolution, by eroding the control thatauthoritarian regimes can exercise over their citizens, isboth liberating and destabilizing. The informationrevolution helped destroy Marxism-Leninism by stokingdiscontent and allowing opposition movements to formcoalit ions both within t heir states and outside. I t may notnecessarily represent the global ascendance of t ruth, but itcertainly shortens the li fespan of lies. With the exception of

dinosaurs like North Korea, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraqwhich will tolerate opprobrium rather than surrendercontrol of their citizens, world public opinion matters.Increasingly, states which practice repression do so throughquick, spasmodic campaigns as in Rwanda. Sinceinternational intervention will continue to require a slowprocess of consensus building, the world will see a longseries of humanitarian disasters in the face of rapid

genocide or ethnic cleansing. In so many ways, theinformation revolution brings both good news and badnews, speeding the accumulation of information and, byincreasing the data that must be considered and the rangeof available options, slowing the pace of decisionmaking.

While amplifying and magnifying connections, theinformation revolut ion has drast ically increased the pace ofchange in human life. By almost any measure," writesHans Moravec, the developed world is growing morecapable and complex faster than ever before.14 Social,personal, economic, political, ethical, and technologicalfactors all shift with breathtaking speed. Transformation

10


28/129

and revolut ion are daily events. Successful individuals andorganizations adapt to the pace of change and, at times,even cont rol it . Those that cannot will face anxiety, stress,

confl ict , and failure.Rapid change always has winners and losers,

revolutionary change even more so. Much of the violencethat wi ll exist in the early 21st century wil l originate fromthe losers of the change underway today. The losers wi ll be apolyglot group. They will include some societies or statesunable or unwilling to adapt to globalization, particularlyones that cannot continence the lack of control andtransparency that successful integration into the globalizedeconomy demands.15 The more benign ones may attemptisolation from the world (even given the human costs thiswill entail.) Others, like I ran or Afghanistan, will wrap theircause in cul tural ident ity and use the tools of state power toresist or punish the United States, the InternationalMonetary Fund, and other nations or organizations

associated with globalization and int erconnectedness. Butthere will also be losers within globalizing states. Theprotests against the World Trade Organizations 1999Seattle meeting may give birth (or, at least , coherence) to anew ideology defined by opposition to globalization andinterconnectedness. It is likely to bring togetherenvironmental activists, industrial workers, religious andcultural leaders opposed to the globalization, and political

conservatives concerned about the erosion of nationalsovereignty and the intrusiveness of globalization.16 Thismovement , with i ts dizzying, almost bizarre complexity andreliance on modern technology for mobilization andcommunication at the same t ime that it rejects the economicand social consequences of modernization, will typify manyof the political movements of the coming era. Most of itscomponent s wi ll not use violence and armed force, but some

will. The information revolution will empower thoseopposed to it as well as those who accept it .

11


29/129

Or gani zati onal Chan ge.

The onward rush of information revolution is altering

the shape of economic and political organizations. Duringthe industrial age big, hierarchical organizations heldadvantage over smaller, less formally organized ones. Firmslike Standard Petroleum and General Motors could crush orabsorb smaller competitors through brute power. Smallstates, unless protected by some quirk of politics orgeography, could seldom compete militarily wi th large ones.Today, the trend in the business world is toward macro-level

integration and strategic partnerships but internaldecentralization and the loosening of hierarchies.Technology is forcing a major shift in paradigms of scalewith adaptability and speed as important as aggregateresources.17 By allowing mul tiple, cross-cut t ing connectionsbetween individuals and organizations, technology isdispersing power, creativity, and productive capability.Today, the successful commercial fi rm is one with a global

perspective, a web of strategic partnerships, and internalflexibility based on project teams or work groups ratherthan hierarchies or bureaucracies. This phenomenon ismigrating to the polit ical world as well.

In the business world, the pressure to adopt modernorganizational structure is a matter of institutional life ordeath. Corporations that resist risk failure. Governments,with their polit ical and military r esources, can hang on toout moded structures longer than businesses. A governmentusing outmoded organizational methods is in less danger offailure than a corporation that refuses to adapt. Butclinging to old practices and organizations entailsescalating costs and risks for governments as much as forcorporations. As the same time that interconnectednessundercuts the viability of authoritarianism by allowing

repressed citizens to communicate, organize, and mobilize,it also places handcuffs on elected governments. More andmore, governments are blamed for economic and socialcondit ions that they cannot ameliorate or cont rol.

12


30/129

This reflects an historic deconcentration of political,economic, and ethical power. Carl Builder and BrianNichiporuk wrote, Since so many of the inst itut ions of the

nation-state are hierarchical and so many of thetransnational organizations are networked, the net flow ofpower today tends to be out of the nation-state and intononstate actors.18 Global public policy networks, which areloose alliances of government agencies, internationalorganizat ions, corporat ions, nongovernmentalorganizations, professional societies, and other socialgroups, are becoming major political actors.19 Information

technology allows issue, goal, or project oriented networksto grow as dispersed actors communicate and coordinateacross great distances, thus mobilizing pressure ongovernments.20 Interest networks, if they have skilledleadership and an att ractive product , can wield influencedisproportionate to their size. More and more, flexibility,creativity, astute marketing and responsiveness tosupporters or constituents trump pure size or anaggregation of resources. States are like dinosaurs towardthe end of the Cretaceous Period: powerful but cumbersome,not yet superseded but no longer the unchallenged mastersof their environment .

The information revolution is both a force for stabilityand for instability. On the positive side, it complicates thetask of old-style repression and facilitates the development

of grass roots civil society. I t is not coincidence that there ismore democracy today than at any time in history. But theinformation revolution also allows organizations intent oninstability or violence to form alliances, thus making theworld more dangerous. Some of t he most complex strugglesof the 21st century will pit polyglot networks against states.Colombia today offers a glimpse of this. There the alliance ofpolitical insurgents, drug cartels, international mafias,

hired legal and economic advisers, and other affiliates isflush with resources and unbound by ethical or legalconsiderat ions. Characterized by nimble neworganizations and high tech gear, the Colombian drug

13


31/129

t raffickers contract out many functions, thus limiting theexposure of their core organization, and use the latesttechnology for encrypt ion and cellular phone cloning.21 The

Revolut ionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a left ist guerrillamovement which protects the heroin and cocaine industries,has amassed a small air force.22 Such dangerous andpolyglot enemies will probably propagate, posing greatdangers for state security services. Hierarchies andbureaucracies face serious disadvantages when pittedagainst unscrupulous, flexible, adaptable enemies. If statesare like dinosaurs, networks are like early mammals, st ill

weak but waiting for the time that they will inherit theearth.The strategic context in which future armed confl ict will

unfold will be a tempestuous blend of the old and the new.The information revolution is challenging the traditionalframeworks which provided personal identity andmoderated behavior, whether the family, village, church,

place of employment, region, state, or nation. Thereplacements for these things are nascent, but not yet inplace. As a resul t , the old bedrocks still matteras ThomasFr iedman points out , even the most forward-looking humanstill needs an olive tree, which is his metaphor foreverything that roots us, anchors us, identifies us andlocates us in this world.23 Individuals, organizations andstates are redefining themselves, altering who they are,

what they do, and how they relate to others. The world willnever be the same.

Th e Changin g Natu r e of Ar med Conf l i c t .

The essence of warfare will always remain the same asantagonists attempt to impose their wills on each otherwhi le struggling with fog and friction. The information age,

though, is generating important changes in the conduct ofarmed conflict . As these mature in the second decade of the21st century and beyond, some will be case specific,affecting a limited number of states or particular regions.

14


32/129

Others will be cross-cutting trends affecting nearly everyparticipant in armed conflict and every mode of it. Allorganizations which part icipate in armed confl ict , from the

smallest terrorist cell to the most complex state military,are being changed by new technology, particularlyinformation t echnology. For relatively simple war-makingorganizations, technology is helping to overcomeshortcomings in communications, intelligence, andplanning. For the complex militaries of advanced states, thechange is even deeper, leadingat least according toAmerican military thinkerstoward a fully digitized

force where information technology eradicates fog andfriction.Other forces are also shaping armed conflict. The

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is particularlyimportant. In fact, Martin van Creveld contends thatproliferation will obviate traditional state-on-state war.24Even if one does not go that far, there is no question that

proliferat ion wi ll dramatically alter the strategic calculusfor most nations. Nearly every moderately advanced statewill have weapons of mass destruction, ballistic or cruisemissiles, or the capacity to make them by the second or thirddecade of the 21st century.25 This may not make armedconflict itself obsolete but, as van Creveld argues, willcertainly make old-style major war unbearably dangerous.

Proliferation, in combination with interconnectednessand globalization, has created challenges to the politicalutility of armed force. This is likely to escalate in comingdecades. This is not entirely new. History is replete withattempts to constrain, regulate, ban, or delegitimize armedforce. The United Nations Charter, which constitutesbinding international law for its signatory states, placesstrict limits on the conditions under which armed force isacceptable. Article 38 states:

The part ies to any dispute, the cont inuance of which is likely toendanger the maintenance of international peace and security,shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,

15


33/129

mediation, concili ation, arbit ration, judicial set t lement , resortto regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful meansof their own choice.26

Since the end of the Cold War, challenges to theacceptability of armed force have continued and evenaccelerated, particularly in open political systems like theUnited States. To a large extent, this is a result of theinformation revolution. The casualties of war and theirfami lies are no longer faceless, but real, grieving humans. Itis harder for policymakers to use force when theirconstituents understand the likely results. Americanleaders have responded by searching for modes of warfarethat minimize friendly military and civilian casualties,particularly the use of precision aerial bombing. Theproblem is that such modes of warfare are inherent ly lessdecisive. It is possible that the concept of decisive victorywill fade from the lexicon of strategy in coming decades. AsEdward Lut twak contends, early 21st century war may looklike early 18th century war where campaigns were wagedfor relatively limited objectives and the antagonists werenot willing to pay a high blood cost for success.27

Other elements of interconnectedness appear to beconstraining at least s tate on state aggression.Globalization of the economy has created such tightlinkages that armed violence in one part of t he world has aripple effect, often causing price increases or inflationelsewhere. This increases the pressure on hostilepartiesparticularly those integrated into the globaleconomyto refrain from war or seek a speedy end to onealready underway. Undoubtedly there will be times whenstates consider the interests at stake in a conflict soimportant that they are willing to accept the costs of going towar. But the frequency of conflicts where a state sees itsvital interests at stake and where war is seen as anacceptable means of promoting or protecting these int erestsis declining. This is particularly true for the United States.Preserving democracy and freedom against communismwas a cause for which most Americans were willing to shed

16


34/129

blood. Many of t odays persistent conflicts, with their rootsin ethnic and religious enmity, are difficult to understandand do not seem worth dying for, so minimizing casualties

has become a central consideration for military planners,sometimes the preeminent one.28 When the interests atstake are less than vital, the economic and polit ical costs ofarmed conflict may serve as a brake. Ironically, though,these same constr aints may prevent states from mobil izingand deploying overwhelming force in all but the mostext reme cases, and thus cause those armed conflicts that dooccur to be protracted. Again like wars in the early 18th

century, early 21st century wars may drag on for extendedperiods of t ime.In some ways, interconnectedness and globalization are

creating new vulnerabilities for the United States. Futureenemies are likely to have a better understanding of theAmerican mentali ty than past ones and thus be able to craftmore effective polit ical and psychological campaigns. Their

leaders may be attending college in the Uni ted States today.Those who are not can use the Internet as a window into theAmerican psyche. And, as Martin Libicki suggests, smallstates may be able to use the globalization of perception tocast themselves as victims and mobilize world publicopinion if they engage in conflict with the United States.29

Interconnectedness also means that future enemies wi llhave a potential constituency within the United States.This is not to imply that migr communit ies are automaticbreeding grounds for third columnists. But immigrants oreven native-born children or grandchildren of immigrantscan, in some cases, retain a tie to their ethnic homelandwhich can lead them to lobby for or against Americanmilitary involvement , as did Serbian Americans during thefirst stages of the 1999 air campaign. This increases thepressure on American policymakers and military leaders tominimize casualties if the use of force becomes necessary.migr communities can also provide logistics andintelligence support for terrorists. Interconnectedness willmake protection against terrorism more difficult .

17


35/129

The U.S. Department of Defense and the militaryservices hold that speed, knowledge, and precision willminimize casualties and lead to the rapid resolut ion of wars,

thus minimizing the problems associated with thechallenges to the polit ical ut ility of force. States with fewerintellectual and financial resources than the United Stateswill not have the luxury of using technology as a palliativefor the strategic problems associated with intercon-nectedness and thus must seek other solutions. One suchresponse has been renewed interest in multinationalpeacekeeping. The idea is that containing or deterring

armed conflict limits the chances of full blown war. Somestates may turn instead to strategies of passive defense.One of the dilemmas of interconnectedness is that whathappens in one place affects many others, but explainingthis to mass publics remains difficult. Aggressive states ornon-state actors will also have to find ways to transcend theconstraints brought on by interconnectedness. Some willrely on proxy confl ict , providing surreptit ious or, at least ,quiet support to insurgents, militias, or terrorists whoseactivities further the aims of the sponsoring state. Somemay attempt hidden or camouflaged aggression,particularly cyberwarfare aimed at the informationsystems of their enemies. Someparticularly those whichfind their ambitions blunted by the United Stateswillturn to political methods, ceding battlefield superiority tothe American mili tary while seeking to constrictWashington through legal and political means. Americasmilitary advantages, after all , are not always matched by anequal polit ical and diplomatic superiority.

Because globalization and int erconnectedness erode thecontrol which regimes can exercise within their states,those with a shaky hold on power will oft en seek scapegoatsbut will sometimes turn to the time-tested method of

solidifying internal unity by external aggression as well.Since globalization and interconnectedness raise thepolit ical and economic cost of protracted war , regimes whichseek to deflect internal discontent through external

18


36/129

aggression will probably seek lightening campaigns, seizingsomething before the international community can reachconsensus on intervention. Future actions like the Iraqi

seizure of Kuwait are not out of the question, at least forstates which believe that the United States cannot or willnot stop them. Whether the United States can be deterredfrom intervention by weapons of mass destruction orterrorism is one of t he cent ral questions for the future globalsecurity environment.

Pr iva t i za t ion .

Interconnectedness, the dispersion of power andknowledge that flows from the information revolution, andthe eroding legitimacy of armed force are leading towardprivatization in t he realms of secur ity and armed confl ict .This has a long history, particularly functions involvingtechnical skills beyond those of t he average warrior. Dur ingthe early modern period, for instance, artillery and siege

engineering were often handled by cont ractors rather thanregular soldiers. Today, as warfight ing becomes ever morecomplex and the costs of training and retaining technicalspecialists escalate, the same process is occurring. Withinthe Uni ted States, many jobs done by uniformed personnel afew years ago are now handled by cont ractors. This includesnot only administrative tasks but, increasingly, planning,analysis, wargaming, tr aining, and education. To take oneexample, the Uni ted States recent ly established the AfricanCenter for Strategic Studies (ACSS) to help African statesimprove their civil military relations and their ability tounderstand national security planning and defensebudgeting.30 This is similar to Department of Defenseschools established for Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, andthe Americas. But unlike these others, which are operatedby the U.S. mil itary, the corporation Military ProfessionalResources International, which is composed mostly ofretired U.S. military officers, is responsible for thedevelopment and implementation of the curriculum forACSS (with oversight from the Office of the Secretary of

19


37/129

Defense).31 Similarly, contractors play a vital role in mostDepartment of Defense and service wargames. As in thebusiness world, outsourcing allows the U.S. military to

acquire expertise whi le retaining organizat ional flexibil ity.Today the contracting out of military functions is most

pervasive in the United States. In coming decades, otherstates will probably t urn t o it both as a means of acquir ingcut ting edge expertise and providing surge capacity duringmajor operations. They might, for instance, hire medicalsupport when they go to war rather than building anextraordinari ly expensive mil i tary infrastructure.Privat ization wi ll give many state militaries and non-stateactors the ability to acquire advanced skills much moreeffectively and quickly than if they had to develop theminternally. Drug cartels and rogue states, for instance,might simply hire the best available information warfareexperts. This could decrease the qualitative advantage heldby the United States and other advanced militaries, at least

in key areas where the expense of cont racting is warranted.The same could happen in the realm of combat itself. Theworld is witnessing the re-emergence of powerful andeffective mercenary firms, particularly in places likeSub-Saharan Africa where state militaries are rife withproblems and weaknesses. The best known was a companycalled Executive Outcomes which was composed of combatveterans from the ex-South African Defence Force. This

company not only offered military advice and consulting,but also combat forces which saw action in Angola andSierra Leone.32 While Execut ive Outcomes officially closedshop at the end of 1998 (largely in response to South Africaspassage of the Military and Foreign Assistance Act), asuccessor or successors may emerge.33 In fact, there werereports in early 1999 that South African mercenariessimply r elocated to Eastern Europe and cont inued to supply

the Angolan rebels (who could pay with the proceeds ofdiamond sales).34 This is simply the starkest example of awider trend toward the privatization of secur ity.35

20


38/129

As nations seek ways to attain a surge capacity wi thoutthe expense of sustaining a large, peacetime military, andas they face difficulties recruiting from their own

populations, contracting will be an attractive option forfilling the ranks. Eventually, advanced nations like theUnited States may replicate the development of the Romanarmy. During the early days of the Roman Republic, thearmy was composed largely of citizen soldiers who servedduring times of threat. Eventually this gave way to an armyof long-service professionals attracted by the financialbenefi ts service could provide. By the late imperial period, it

was increasingly difficult to recruit Romans because ofother economic opportunities and because the prestige ofmilitary service declined. At that point, the army wascomposed mostly of foreigners attracted by the chance togain citizenship and other material inducements. There isthe possibility that the future U.S. military may have toturn to foreign recruits in order to fill its ranks. This issimply one addit ional form of the privatization of secur ity.

History suggests another twist that privatization mighttake as well. Whenever rich, powerful companies believedthat no state was willing to shed blood to defend their peopleand assets, the temptation was to form pr ivate armies andnavies. The Brit ish East India Company, for instance, oncehad one of the largest military establishments on earth. Ifcoming decades see the development of truly transnational

or non-nat ional corporations, thi s process may be repeated.Corporate armies, navies, air forces, and intelligenceservices may be major actors in 21st century armed conflict .This will open new realms of strategy and policy. Would it ,for instance, it be legal and acceptable for the Uni ted Statesto declare war on a corporation that was guilty of armedaggression against a fr iend? To sign an alliance with one?

Asymmetry.States which decide to commit aggression in coming

decades will know that if the United States and the world

21


39/129

community decide to counter the aggression, t hey can. Thequalitative gap between the U.S. mil itary and all others iswide and growing. This leaves aggressors two options: they

can pursue indirect or camouflaged aggression, or they canattempt to deter or counter American interventionasymmetrically. While the word asymmetry only recent lyent ered the American strategic lexicon, the idea is not new.From Sun Tzus contention that all warfare is based ondeception through B.H. Liddell Harts advocacy of theindirect approach to Edward Lut twaks paradoxical logicof strategy, strategic thinkers have long trumpeted the

wisdom of avoiding the enemys strength and probing for hisweakness.36 Asymmetry simply means making maximumuse of ones advantages. I t is the core logic of al l competit iveendeavors, whether sports, business, or war. Consistentwinners master this logic.

Through what might be called low asymmetry,militaries facing a superior opponent avoid open,

force-on-force battles and rely on hit-and-run tactics,deception, camouflage, dispersion, the use of complexterrain l ike cit ies, mountains, and jungles, guerilla warfare,or terrorism. They often drag out the conflict , playing on anasymmetry of will or patience, and make use of their owntolerance for pain and cost. Throughout history, lowasymmetry has allowed the weak to overcome the mighty,from the defeat of Darius by Scythian guerrillas through the

American Revolut ion and Spains expulsion of Napoleon t othe 20th century wars of liberation in Algeria, Zimbabwe,Namibia, Vietnam, and other colonies. By cont rast , highasymmetry is favored by militaries facing an enemy whichoutnumbers them or in situations where casualties must beminimized. High asymmetry uses superior technology,information, training, leadership, and the ability to planand coordinate complex operations to overcome

quantitative disadvantages or limit the blood cost ofwarfare. Many colonial wars, from those of Caesar throughthe campaigns of the Spanish conquistadors to theEuropean conquest of Africa in the 20th century evinced

22


40/129

this type of asymmetry. Battles like Marathon, Agincourt ,Blood River, and Omdurman were won by asymmetry. Inthe modern context ,blitzkrieg , whether used by it s German

architects or by the coalition forces expelling Iraq fromKuwait, is an example of high asymmetry.Asymmetry is a characteristic of periods of r apid change,

part icularly revolut ionary ones. In geological history, therehave been times when many new species emerged. Mostproved unable to survive, leading to new periods with lessdiversity. Military history follows the same pattern: periodsof great diversity follow periods of relative homogeneity.The cur rent era is one of diversity. In coming decades, somemethods of warfare or of military organizations will provedysfunctional, thus leading to greater homogeneity. But forthe period of diversity, asymmetry will be a dominantcharacterist ic of armed conflict .

Combatants.

Throughout the 20th century both states and nonstateactors have undertaken armed conflict. While somenonstate actors, particularly insurgent movements, haveshaped history, state combatants have been the mostsignificant. Great wars tend to work against diversity inmethods and organizations for armed conflict, serving toweed out the dysfunctional from the successful. The greatwars of the 20th century did precisely that for statecombatants. While there certainly was great variationamong states in terms of the size, effectiveness, andtechnological advancement of their militaries, there weresignificant similarities in terms of military organizationsand methods. These included: (1) hierarchical organizat ionin to serv ices def ined by the pr imary opera t ingenvironment, and into discrete groups of officers and

enlisted personnel; (2) formal, hierarchical procedures forplanning and decision making; (3) a professional core ofsome type reinforced, in many cases, by a reserve; (4)emphasis on linear operations (supported, in some cases, by

23


41/129

nonlinear special operations) organized into battles,campaigns, and wars; and, (5) reliance on the equipmentproduced by advanced industry and science, and on formal

supply systems. Nonstate combatants varied from this.Their organization tended to be less formal, with somecombination of guerrilla combatants, political cadres,terrorist cells, and militias. Their operational techniquesstressed hit and run tactics, harassment, psychologicalactions, and guerrilla activities, often using complexterrain. Their supply systems tended to be a blend of theformal and informal, often relying on captured arms,

ammunit ion, and equipment , in large part because they didnot have the geographic, financial, or organizationalresources to do otherwise. Often the ultimate objective ofnonstate combatants was to take on the characteristics ofstate ones.

In the opening half of t he 21st century, the types of stateand nonstate combatants which have characterized recent

armed confl ict will cont inue to exist , but they are likely to be joined by new forms. The U.S. military probably will be thefirst postmodern state combatant, attaining greatlyamplified speed and precision by the integration ofinformation technology and development of a system ofsystems which links together methods for targetacquisition, strikes, maneuver, planning, communication,and supply. I ts organization will be less rigidly hierarchical

than that of modern state combatants. This will both reflectthe fact that a digit ized force needs less rigidly cent ralizedcontrol, and that the sort of high tempo, pulsed, holistic,nonlinear operations it will undertake simply will not workwith rigid, centralized control.37 The final type ofcombatants in 21st century armed conflict are likely to bepostmodern nonstate ones. This will consist of loosenetworks of a range of nonstate organizations, some

polit ical or ideological in orientation, others seeking profi t .They will work toward an overarching common purpose, butwill not be centrally controlled or have a single center ofgravity.

24


42/129


43/129

PART I I :I M AGES OF FUT URE WAR

Th e Ser vi ce and D OD View .

The specific shape of future armed conflict will bedetermined by policy decisions, technologicaldevelopments, economic, polit ical, and social trends, and bythe geostrategic configuration that emerges. This dizzyingcomplexity makes it impossible to predict the path of futurewarfare with certainty. At best, images can be sketched.Broadly speaking, the opening decades of the 21st centuryare likely to see some combination of three modes ofwarfare: formal war, informal war, and gray area war.

Formal war pits state militaries against other statemilitaries. Since the 17th century, it has been the most

strategically significant form of armed conflict and willprobably remain so for at least a few more decades, perhapslonger. For this reason, it has been the focus of mostfutures-oriented thinking within the U.S. military andDepartment of Defense. American policymakers andmilitary leaders are attempting to define and create the firstpostmodern state military, primarily for use against roguestates or a near peer competitor that might appear early

in the 21st century.38

The official vision of future war reflects the belief thatinformation superiority will be the lifeblood of apostmodern military and thus the key to bat t lefield success.According to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Theongoing transformation of our military capabilitiestheso-called Revolut ion in Military Affairs (RMA)centers ondeveloping the improved information and command andcontrol capabilities needed to significantly enhance jointoperations.39 Deriving from a system of systems thatconnects space-based, ground-based, and air-based sensorsand decision-assistance technology, information

27


44/129

superiorityshould it be realizedwould allow Americancommanders to use precision weaponsmany fired fromsafe locations far from the battlefieldto strike the enemys

decisive points at exactly the right time.40

The idea is thatAmerican forces will be nearly omniscient while enemyforces are confused and blind.41

The most important expression of the official Americanvision of future war is a document known asJoint Vision 2010 .42 Known within the Department of Defense as JV2010, this is the conceptual template for the future U.S.military able to attain full spectrum dominancequalitative superiority over any anticipated enemy in anyanticipated operating environment . JV 2010 holds that thekey to success in an increasingly lethal battlespace will bedominant batt lespace awareness growing from the systemof systems. This will allow the postmodern U.S. military tosurvive on a battlefield replete with weapons of massdestruction and precision guided munitions. JV 2010 states:

To cope with more lethal systems and improved targeting, ourforces will require stealth and other means of passiveprotect ion, along with mobil it y superior to the enemys abili ty toretarget or react or our forces. Increased stealth will reduce anenemys ability to target our forces. Increased dispersion andmobility are possible offensively because each platform orindividual warfighter carries higher lethality and has greaterreach. Defensively, dispersion and higher tempo complicateenemy targeting and r educe the effect iveness of area attack andarea denial weaponry such as weapons of mass destruction(WMD). The capabil ity to cont rol the tempo of operations and, ifnecessary, sustain a tempo faster than the enemys will alsohelp enable our forces to seize and maintain the initiativeduring milit ary operations.43

As the U.S. military evolves along the lines described inJV 2010, it will gradually abandon old operational conceptslike massed force and sequential operations in favor ofmassed effects and simultaneous operations. These will bepossible because information technology will allowcommanders to identify targets and coordinate complex

28


45/129

actions much better than in the past. In addition,technological advances, according to JV 2010, will cont inuethe trend toward improved precision. Global positioning

systems, high-energy research, electromagnetic technology,and enhanced stand-off capabilities will provide increasedaccuracy and a wider range of delivery options.44

To make maximum use of emerging technology, JV 2010outlines four new operational concepts to guide thedevelopment of U.S. armed forces and military strategy:dominan t maneuve r which is def ined as themultidimensional application of information, engagement,and mobility capabilities to position and employ widelydispersed joint air , land, sea, and space forces to accompl ishthe assigned operational tasks; precision engagement which will allow accurate aerial delivery of weapons,discriminate weapon strikes, and precise, all-weatherstand-off capability from extended range;full-dimensional protection of American forces based on active measures such

as battlespace control operations to guarantee air, sea,space, and information superiority, and integrated,in-depth theater air and missile defense, and passivemeasures such as operational dispersion, stealth, andimproved sensors to allow greater warning against attack,including chemical or biological attack; andfocused logistics which is the fusion of information, logistics, andtransportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response,

to track and shi ft assets even whi le enroute, and to delivertailored logist ics packages and sustainment directly at thestrategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations.45

Joint Vision 2010 was intended to synchronize thefutures-orient ed programs which the services had begun todevelop. Where JV 2010s time frame was mid-term, theJoint Experimentation Program created in 1998 at theUnited States Atlantic Command (USACOM, sincerenamed U.S. Joint Forces Command or JFCOM) sought toexpand the U.S. militarys thinking about future warfare byweaving together the services futures programs.46 This is avery ambitious undertaking. Futures-oriented thinking

29


46/129


47/129

while a shortage of food and arable land might do likewise inthe Asian arc. Should either of these happen, the U.S.Army might be called on the defend or liberate territory,

contain the conflict , or perform other missions.49

To transform the concepts outlined in documents likeArmy Vi sion 2010 into reali ty, the Army developed a seriesof battlelab simulations and exercises called LouisianaManeuvers.50 Begun in 1992, this quickly grew into theelaborate Force XXI process that uses bat t le laboratories,warfighting experiments, and advanced technologydemonstrations to generate and test ideas.51 In themid-1990s, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimerdecided that hi s service needed to look even deeper into thefuture. The pace of change in the modern world had becomeso intense, General Reimer concluded, that complexorganizations like the Army must extend their strategicplanning horizons. And the main weapon platforms of theArmy, including the Abrams main batt le tank, the Bradley

fighting vehicle, and the Apache attack helicopter wereexpected to approach obsolescence around 2015. GeneralReimer thought it necessary to craft a rigorous method todecide whether the Army should seek a new generation oftanks, fight ing vehicles, and helicopters or instead pursueleap ahead technology.

The framework for this analysis is the Army Aft er NextProjectan ongoing series of wargames, workshops,studies, and conferences which explore the feasiblestrategic environments of the 2020-2025 period andspeculate on the sort of technology, force structure, andoperational concepts that the U.S. Army might need.52 Oneof t he most crucial parts of t he Army After Next process hasbeen ident ifying the most likely or dangerous type of enemy.Speed and Knowledge , which was the first annual report ofthe Army After Next Project , singled out a major militarycompetitor.53 This would be a nation-state that threatensthe United States or U.S. interests but cannot or does notemulate the digitized American military. Such an enemywould attempt to offset technological inferiority with

31


48/129

relatively cheap counters such as land and sea mines,distributed air defense, coastal seacraft, submarines,inexpensive cruise and bal l is t ic miss i les , and

unsophisticated weapons of mass destruction which havebecome, as Richard Betts points out, weapons of the weakrather than the most advanced.54 Quanti ty would substitutefor quali ty. The Army After Next Project seeks to design aforce with superior operational and decisional speed,strategic mobility, and batt lefield awareness to defeat sucha major military competit or.

The Army After Next Project assumes that precisionweapons wil l make the bat tlefield of 2025 so deadly t hat thedefensive will be strengthened, making extended maneuverpossible only when the enemys advanced systems havebeen degraded and when ones own forces have very highdegrees of mobility and speed. Mobility and speed will allowdistributed, decentralized, high tempo operations withwhat are described as cascading effects. Tactical

success, according to the second annual report of t he ArmyAfter Next Project, piled up nearly simul taneously acrossthe entire battlespace, could then lead under the rightcircumstances to rapid operational-level disintegration asthe enemys plans are fi rst foiled and then shatteredevenas his ability to cont rol his own forces evaporates before hecan respond.55

The Army After Next will be buil t on knowledge accruingfrom advanced information technology, specifically anintegrated, multilayered system of systems that fusesinformation from a variety of sources and provides acoherent, near real time, common picture of thebattlespace. The Annual Report states that knowledge isparamount. . . . the unprecedented level of battlespaceawareness that is expected to be available will significantlyreduce both fog and friction. I t cont inues:

Knowledge wi ll shape the batt lespace and create condi t ions forsuccess . I t wi l l permi t . . .d is t r ibuted , decent ra l ized ,noncont iguous operati ons...I t will provide secur ity and r educe

32


49/129

risk. Through the identification of enemy strengths,weaknesses, and centers of gravity, coupled with nearcomplete visibility of friendly force status and capabilities,knowledge will underwrite the most efficient application of allelements of military powerenabling higher tempos ofoperations. Knowledge will also focus and streamline thelogist ics support required to maint ain high tempos.56

Organizationally, the Army After Next Projectanticipates a hybrid U.S. Army combining very advancedcomponents with legacy forces. This will include:contingency forces including Battle Forces, Strike Forces,Campaign Forces, Homeland Defense Forces, and SpecialForces.57 Through this combination, the future U.S. Armywould retain flexibility and be able to operate in coalitionwith all ies who had not buil t digit ized forces. Throughoutthe Army After Next Projects studies, programs, wargamesand seminars, though, emphasis remains on counteringcross-border aggression against a state where the UnitedStates had economic interests (usually petroleum) byanother state using combined arms warfare with a fewadditional technological twists and capabilit ies. Invariably,the blue forces emerge victorious leaving the Armyunprepared to think about the consequences of or responsesto defeat.

The U.S. Air Forces vision of future war is alsocharacterized by a combination of creativity and

conservatism. The Air Force 2025 study, commissioned bythe Chief of Staff of the Air Force, was an cauldron of new,creative thinking. It solidified the position of the AirUniversity as the U.S. militarys cutting edge source ofideas. Often using teams with a senior researcher of colonelor lieutenant colonel rank and a number of majors, Air Force2025 explored topics such as information warfare,unmanned aerial combat platforms, organizations to deal

with the gray area between peace and war, and ways to mostefficient ly erode an enemys unity and will.58 To some extent , the Air Force is more open to innovative

strategic concepts than the other services, particularly the

33


50/129

Army and the Navy. TheAir Force Str ategic Plan notes thatexotic technologies such as micro-technology,biotechnology, and nanotechnology could alter the shape of

future batt lefields. But generally, Air Forces senior leaderssee future warfare as an extrapolation of the 1990s. TheAi r Force Str ategic Plan indicates that non-state enemies andasymmetric strategies will pose challenges and the U.S.military must become more proficient in environments likethe infosphere, space, and urban areas, but assumescont inui ty in American strategy and in the overall nature ofarmed conflict . Ironically, the Air Force planning document

notes the ongoing diffusion of information technology andthe commercialization of space, but does not suggest thatthese might challenge the notion of informationsuperiority on whichJoint Vision 2010 is buil t .

The sea services also subscribe to the notion t hat futurewarfare will be a high-tech version of late 20th centurycombat. But the Marines, at least , are looking seriously at

fairly radical changes in tactical and operationalprocedures, including new organizations and doctrine. Infact, the Marines are in many ways the service mostamenable to true transformation. For instance, the MarineCorps After Next (MCAN) Branch of the Marine CorpsWarfighting Laboratory is exploring what it calls abiological systems inspiration for future warfighting.According to its web site:

. . . for the last three centuries, we have approached war as aNewtonian system. That is, mechanical and ordered [sic]. Infact, it is probably not. The more likely model is

ArmedConflict21stCentury

Documents

Transcript of ArmedConflict21stCentury