EPSILON I

We are now almost ready to pass to the consideration if substance itself, but in book Epsilon Aristotle still wishes to add afew more distinctions to the picture that he has built up if the activity if philosophy. In this chapter he stresses again that philosophy is concerned with the whole if being and not just some part of it, as is each if the departmental saences. He also makes the important new point that another difference between philosophy and the departmental saences is that the former, but not the latter, is interested in the intrinsic properties if the subject if the saence itself and not just in demonstrating its accidental features. Furthermore, the departmental saences take for granted the existence if their domains, whereas it is part if the task if philosophy to prove the existence if its.

Aristotle also takes up the distinction between the practical, productive and theoretical saences and further subdivides the last if these into physics, which is concerned with separately existing entities which naturally have both matter and movement, mathematics, which is concerned with non-separable entities which do not have movement, and the third and highest theoretical saence which is concerned with things that are separable but immune to movement and process. This saence is called theology, but it is also to be identified with First Philosophy. The apparent contradiction between claiming that philosophy is the universal saence ifbeing and that it is the saence if the highest kind of being and substance is removed when it is understood that the highest substance is the cause and principle if being as a whole and thus the proper object of philosophy even on the earlier account.

It is the principles and causes of the things. that are [I02Sb 1 that we are seeking, and clearly it is their principles and causes just as things that are. Now there is, to be sure, something that is the cause of health and offitness, and there are principles, elements and causes of mathematical entities. And quite generally any science which, in whole or in part,

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involves reasoning or inference, is concerned with causes and principles, be they more precise or more primordial. On the other hand, all these other sciences, being devoted to a certain sort of thing that is and a certain genus, set to work on that delimited domain. They do not at all consider that which is simpliciter or just as that which is. Nor does any such science offer an account of what it is to be a thing in their domain. Rather, they start this, displaying it, in some cases, to the senses and, in others, taking it as a hypothesis, and go on to offer more or less rigorous demonstrations of the per se attributes of their proprietary genera. This sort of procedure is inductive and it is as plain as a pikestaff that it does not amount to a demonstration of essence or of what it is to be a thing. The style of disclosing the entity is some other, at any rate not this. It is in keeping with this that the sciences do not occupy themselves with the question whether or not their proprietary genus exists. The question whether something exists requires the same mode of thinking as the demonstration of an essence.

Now, it so happens, as a matter offact, that the proprietary domain of the science of nature too is a certain genus of that which is. (This science takes as its dOm.aJ.n that kind of substance which has within it the principle of its own undergoing some process or not.) And this is as much as to say that this science is neither practical nor productive. For the principle of anything that is produced lies in that which produces it, mind, as it may be, or skill or some potentiality, and the principle of anything that is done lies in that which does it, the faculty of choice (that which is done and that which is chosen are the same thing). If, then, all rational activity can be divided into the practical, the productive and the theoretical, the science of nature would be a kind of theoretical activity, but theoretical of the kind of entity that can undergo change and with substance according, indeed, to its basic definition, only not separable from matter.

It is, however, vital not to overlook the question of what it is to be a thing and the definitional account of how it is what it is. If we leave these out, scientific inquiry is mere shadow boxing. We can, then, distinguish things which, being susceptible of definition, there is some­thing which it is to be into two types, snub-type entities and concave­type entities. The difference is as follows. Snub-type entities are

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immersed in matter (the snub is [by definition] a concave nose), whereas concave-types, like concavity itself, do not as such involve perceptible matter. Now all natural entities are, quite unifonnly, given snub-type definitions. [1026a] Consider a few examples: nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, animal in general, and leaf, root, bark, plant in general. In each case the definition must refer to change, so that in each case they must have matter. It is, then, clear how we are to investigate and define essences for the purposes of the science of nature. It is also clear why some types of soul fall within the domain of natural science, those types, that is, that essentially involve matter.

OK, natural science is theoretical, case concluded. What about mathematics? Theoretical too. Ah, but does its domain consist of entities removed from all change and standing apart? Too early to say. (A distinct question, to which a positive answer can indeed be given, is whether some mathematical arguments treat these entities as unchanged and separate.) Suppose, however, that there is something that is eternal, unchanging and apart. Does this putative Entity form the domain of a theoretical science? Yes, of course, but not that either of natural science or of mathematics, but of a science more fundamental than them both. The domain of natural science is things that are in a way separate but which are eminently subject to change, and at least part of the domain of mathematics is things that are not subject to change but also not separable, in the sense of being separable from matter. But First Science deals with things that are separable and are remote from change.

All the causes must be eternal, of course, but eternity must pertain more specially still to the causes of First Science, operating, as they do, to produce those effects of Divinity that are manifest even to us. Let us, then, say that there are three forms of contemplative philosophy -mathematics, natural science and theology. For who can doubt that, if there is Divinity anywhere in the universe, then it is in the nature studied by First Science that It is to be found. And it is also for the Supreme Science to study the Supreme Genus. And contemplative study is to be chosen above all other sciences, but it is this First Science ofTheology that we must prefer to all other kinds even of contemplation.

I suppose someone will raise the quibble, is the domain of First Philosophy, then, universal or concerned with some single genus and

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nature? Actually, you can answer this question both ways even for mathematics; geometry and astrology have single-nature domains, whereas general mathematics is universal. Anyway, our answer is this. Either (a) there is no other substance beyond those furnished by nature, in which case the science of nature is the First Science, or (b) there is some Substance that is without change, and, if (b) is trl!-e, then that Substance is prior to all others and the science of it is First Philosophy - and such a science is universal just because it is first. And here we will have the science to study that which is just as that which is, both in its essence and in the properties which, just as a thing that is, it has.

EPSILON 2

We are now, at last, in a position to commence the study ofbeing, but Aristotle again reminds lis that there are at least four basic accounts of being, accidental being, being as truth, the category of being or substance and being in actuality and potentiality. Aristotle's interest is going to be above all in substance, as has already been made clear, and also in questions of actuality and potentiality. He now wishes to eliminate the first two kinds of account of beingfrom the inquiry. In fact, being as truth has already been dealt with in book Gamma. Here in Epsilon he concentrates on accidental being, although he will have more to say on being as truth in the last chapter.

He begins by defining accidental being. Entities can be divided into those that have being always and of necessity, those that have beingfor the most part and those that only have being sometimes. It is the last sort of entities that we call accidental and their causation is crucially material. This is one reason for their inferiority, and another is that they fall outside the scope of science, which studies only such things as have being either always and of necessity or for the most part.

Now the locution 'the thing that is', unencumbered with qualifications, is used in an important variety of ways. We have seen that one such way is with regard to that which is accidentally, while another is the use as the true (that which is not is, on this usage, the false). And then there is the whole table of categories (substance, quality, quantity, place, time, etc.), [I026b] and finally there is that which is potentially and that which is actually.

Given all these ways of using the locution, we can begin by saying that there can be no theoretical treatment of that which is accidentally. This is clearly borne out by the fact that no science, be it practical, productive or theoretical, takes cognizance of the accidental. Take production. If one produces a building, one does not produce all the

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accidental properties that come into being with the building. (In fact, there is an infinity of the latter. It happens very often that a building produced provides pleasure for some, harm for others and convenience for still others, so that the building can be described as different from every other thing that is. But the architect has not produced any of these accidental properties.) It is exacdy the same with geometry, whose devotees do not contemplate the accidental properties of figures, nor bother with whatever difference there might be between, say, a triangle and a triangle with angles equal to two right angles.

There is no real surprise about all this. For an accidental expression is, in effect, an expression without a definition. We can, in this light, sympathize with Plato's classification of sophistry as dealing with that which is not. For more or less all sophistic arguments concern accidental properties, such as whether the musical and the literate are the same or different, or whether Coriscus is the same or different from the musical Coriscus, or whether everything that is, but is not eternal, has come to be, from which it can be concluded that if someone is musical and become literate then he must also have been literate and become musical! This is but a sample of a veritable galingale of such sophisms. All this goes to show that the accidental is very close to that which is not. But this can, in any case, be shown by the fact that there is generation and destruction for things that are in one of the other ways, but not for things that are accidentally. The discussion of the accidental, however, to the limited extent that such is possible, is not to be dismissed out of hand. We must go on to state its nature and the cause of its being. In doing so, perhaps, we will at the same time be explaining why it is no subject of a science.

Well, the things that are include things that are always (and of necessity) in the same condition (we are not referring to enforced necessity but to the necessity ascribed on the basis that it cannot be otherwise) and things that are not of necessity or indeed for ever, but rather for the most part ... Now it is the latter that is the principle and cause of being for the accidental. For whatever would be neither always nor for the most part would be classified as accidental. Suppose, for instance, that in the season of the Cynosure arctic cold were to prevail, this we would regard as an accident, whereas, if there were a sweltering

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heatwave, we would not. And this is because the latter, unlike the former, is always or for the most part the case. It is also an accident that a man is white (for men are not always or for the most part white), but it is not an accident that he is an animal. And it is an accident that the builder heals, [1027a] since it is not the nature of the builder but of the doctor to produce health, whereas it is an accident if the builder is also a doctor. Similarly, the delicatessen, bent only on titillation of the palate, might achieve a miracle cure, but not just in its capacity as a delicatessen. We would call it an accident - it sort of produces the health, but not really.

The other things that are have corresponding productive capacities (sometimes), but for accidents there is no skill or dedicated capacity. For when things are, or are generated, accidentally, their cause is also accidental. If, then, not everything either is or is generated always or of necessity, but most things are for the most part, then there must be

that which is accidentally. For instance, the white man·is neither always nor for the most part musical, so that when he becomes musical this will be an accident (if not, everything would be of necessity). It is, then, matter, capable of being other than it is for the most part, that is

the cause of the accidental. As for the principle, it must be the following question: is there

nothing which is neither always nor for the most part, or is this impossible? Ifwe take it that there must be some such thing(s}, then these will be the subjects of chance and accidental. Is it, then, the case that there is that which is for the most part but that that which is always is not a property of anything? Or, conversely, are there some things

that are eternal? Well, let's put that question off for now. What we have seen is that there is no science of the accidental. For all science is either of that which is always or of that which is for the most part. Indeed, how otherwise would understanding, let alone teaching, be possible? A scientific subject has to be defined as arising either always or for the most part (e.g. it is true for the most part that suspension of honey is beneficial for fever patients). But anything that falls outside this will be unpredictable - as also will its non-occurrence be. We

cannot, for instance, describe it as not happening on the day of the new

moon, since even what happens on the day of the new moon is either

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something that always happens or something that happens for the most part, whereas the accidental must be different from these.

This concludes the discussion of the accidental. We have seen:

what it is,

from what cause it comes, and that there is no science of it.

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EPSILON 3

The notion of accidental being entails that of accidental causation, and Aristotle explores this in the present chapter. He shows that with accidental causal chains there is some link which is in a way fortuitous, in that its occurrence is not required of necessity. It is an important question, dealt with extensively in the Physics though not here, whether suchfortuitous causation is or is not ultimately reducible to the kinds of causation that Aristotle officially admits.

Clearly there are principles and causes that are such as to be generated and destroyed without their generation or destruction in fact occurring. If this were not the case, everything would be of necessity, assuming that for each thing that is generated and destroyed there must be a non-accidental cause. We can put the question whether such a thing will exist or not; to which the answer will be yes, if a certain other thing is generated, and, if not, no. And the generation of this other thing will in tum be dependent on that of a third. From this it is clear that if time is of limited duration and a fIxed amount is constantly being deducted from it, [I027b] the procedure will always lead to the present moment. Thus, a given person will, ifhe goes out, meet a violent end; and he will do this, viz. go out, ifhe is thirsty; and he will be thirsty, if xyz. Such a series will always lead either to what is occurring at the moment or to some one of the past events. For instance, he will go out if he is thirsty and he will be thirsty if he eats something hot. And, of course, ~e is either doing so or not, so that it is a necessary matter either that he will or that he will not die.

And even if you leap back to past events, the same still holds. For this very past event is present in something at the start of the reasoning. So everything that is to be will be of necessity, e.g. that a living animal will eventually die. And this is because of something that has already happened, such as, perhaps, that opposites are combined in the same

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individual. It is, however, not yet determined whether the animal is to die by disease or violence, but whichever is the outcome will occur conditionally on some other event. The process is therefore clearly to an initial principle, from which there is no further progression to something else. This principle will be that of an outcome of chance, and there will be no further thing which is the cause of its coming to

be. But of what quality are the principle and cause at the start of such an induction, whether material, final or efficient, is a question of

importance and difficulty.

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EPSILON 4

Aristotle now deals summarily with being as truth. Being as truth or falsity is a matter of assOciations made in the mind. if the mind associates things that are associated in the world, then it has a truth, if not, a falsity. This means that this kind of being is merely an affection of the mind and not something in the world.

Thus both accidental being and being as truth fall outside the direct remit of philosophy, the one as being indeterminate and random, the other as being mental not real. This leaves philosophy free to examine being that is both determinate and real, i.e. substance, which is to be the topic of the next two,

central books.

We may now leave the subject of that which is accidentally, now that a satisfactory account has been given of it.

Now that which is as being true (and that which is not as being false) have to do with composition and division, and the conjunction of them has to do with the two poles of a contradiction. (For truth involves assertion in the case of a combination and denial in the case of a separation, while falsity is the contradiction of this arrangement.) And as to how thinking of things conjoindy or separately occurs, this requires another discussion, and by this I am meaning the togetherness and apartness that is not connected with a sequence but with a single presentation.

For it is not in states of affairs that truth and falsity arise - certainly, the good is not the true and the bad the false straight off - but in thinking. And for things that are simple and for essences, truth and falsity do not arise even in thinking.

In the light of all this, it is for a later discussion to consider what account should be given of that which is and is not in this way. But since it is in thoughts and not in states of affairs that composition and

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division occurs, and since that which is in this way is a different thing that is from those things that are in the standard-setting way (for the thought process either compounds or divides off the essence of a thing, or its possession of a quality or a quantity or some one of the other categories), we can pass on from that which is as being true just as much as we can from that which is accidentally. The cause of that which is accidentally lacks a definition, while the cause of that which is as being true is something that happens to a thought process. They are thus both connected with the remaining genus of that which is [lo28a] and do not reveal some nature of that which is as obtaining independently.

Let us, then, leave these two and turn to the consideration of the causes and principles of that which is proper, just as that which is. [It became clear in the discussion of the many ways in which each thing is said that that which is is said in many ways.]