ARISTOTLEFOREVERYBODYDIFFICULTTHOUGHTMADEEASY

MortimerJ.Adler

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Copyright©1978byMortimerJ.Adler

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FirstTouchstoneEdition1997

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

PartIManthePhilosophicalAnimal

1.PhilosophicalGames

2.TheGreatDivide

3.Man’sThreeDimensions

PartIIMantheMaker

4.Aristotle’sCrusoe

5.ChangeandPermanence

6.TheFourCauses

7.ToBeandNottoBe

8.ProductiveIdeasandKnow-How

PartIIIMantheDoer

9.ThinkingaboutEndsandMeans

10.LivingandLivingWell

11.Good,Better,Best

12.HowtoPursueHappiness

13.GoodHabitsandGoodLuck

14.WhatOthersHaveaRighttoExpectfromUs

15.WhatWeHaveaRighttoExpectfromOthersandfromtheState

PartIVMantheKnower

16.WhatGoesintotheMindandWhatComesoutofIt

17.Logic’sLittleWords

18.TellingtheTruthandThinkingIt

19.BeyondaReasonableDoubt

PartVDifficultPhilosophicalQuestions

20.Infinity

21.Eternity

22.TheImmaterialityofMind

23.God

EPILOGUEForThoseWhoHaveReadorWhoWishtoReadAristotle

PREFACE

Whentheideaforthisbookfirstoccurredtome,IthoughtofentitlingitTheChildren’s Aristotle orAristotle for Children. But those titles would not haveaccuratelyconveyedtheaudienceforwhomthissimple,easy-to-readexpositionofAristotle’s common-sense philosophy is intended.The audience, I felt,waseverybody—of any age, from twelve or fourteen years old upward.Hence thetitlechosen,and thesubtitle“DifficultThoughtMadeEasy,” togetherwith thestatementthatthisbookisanintroductiontocommonsense.

WhenIsay“everybody,”Imeaneverybodyexceptprofessionalphilosophers;inotherwords,everybodyofordinaryexperienceandintelligenceunspoiledbythesophisticationandspecializationofacademic thought.Nevertheless, IhaveaddedanEpiloguewhichstudentsofphilosophywhocomeuponthisbookmayfind useful as a guide to the reading ofAristotle’s ownworks on the subjectscoveredinthisbook.

My two sons, Douglas and Philip (thirteen and eleven, respectively), readportionsofthemanuscriptasitcamefrommytypewriterlastsummerinAspen.Iamgratefultothemfortheirenthusiasmandtheirsuggestions.

I wish also to express my gratitude to Rosemary Barnes, who read andcriticizedthewholemanuscriptat that time,aswellas tomycolleaguesat theInstitute forPhilosophicalResearchwhogaveme thebenefitof theiradvice—JohnVanDoren,OttoBird,andCharlesVanDoren.Atalaterdate,justbeforethemanuscriptwentintotype,mywife,Caroline,readthewholeofitandmadesuggestionsforitsimprovement,forwhichIamgrateful.

Asalways,Iammuchindebttomyeditorialsecretary,MarlysAllen,forhertirelesseffortsateverystageintheproductionofthisbook.MortimerJ.AdlerChicago,December28,1977

INTRODUCTION

WhyAristotle?Whyforeverybody?And why is an exposition of Aristotle for everybody an introduction to

commonsense?I can answer these three questions better after I have answered one other.

Why philosophy?Why should everyone learn how to think philosophically—how to ask the kind of searching questions that children andphilosophers askandthatphilosopherssometimesanswer?

Ihavelongbeenoftheopinionthatphilosophyiseverybody’sbusiness—butnotinordertogetmoreinformationabouttheworld,oursociety,andourselves.Forthatpurpose,itwouldbebettertoturntothenaturalandthesocialsciencesand to history. It is in another way that philosophy is useful—to help us tounderstand things we already know, understand them better than we nowunderstand them. That is why I think everyone should learn how to thinkphilosophically.

Forthatpurpose,thereisnobetterteacherthanAristotle.Idonothesitatetorecommendhimastheteachertobeginwith.TheonlyotherteacherthatImighthavechosenisPlato,butinmyjudgmentheissecondbest.Platoraisedalmostall the questions that everyone should face; Aristotle raised them too and, inaddition, gave us clearer answers to them.Plato taughtAristotle how to thinkphilosophically, but Aristotle learned the lesson so well that he is the betterteacherforallofus.

Since we are concerned with learning how to think the way Aristotle did,whatAristotlethoughtismoreimportantthanwhohewasorwhenandhowhelived.The centuries and the changes that separate him fromusmaymake theconditionsofhislifeandthesocietyinwhichhelivedappearstrangetous;but,as Iwill try toexplain, theydonotmakeeither the styleor thecontentofhisthinkingstrangetous.

Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. in theMacedonian town of Stagira on the

north coast of theAegean Sea.His fatherwas a physician in the court of theKingofMacedonia.TheKing’sgrandsonbecameAlexandertheGreat,towhomAristotlelaterbecamebothtutorandfriend.

Attheageofeighteen,AristotletookupresidenceinAthensandenrolledinPlato’sAcademyasastudentofphilosophy.ItwasnotlongbeforePlatofoundAristotle a troublesome student who questioned what he taught and openlydisagreed with him. When Plato died, and Alexander became the ruler ofGreece,Aristotleopenedhisownschool,theLyceum.Thatwasin335B.C.

TheLyceumhadafinelibrary,anextensivecollectionofmaps,andazooinwhichAristotlecollectedspecimensofanimallife.Ithasbeensaidthatsomeofthesewere sent to him byAlexander from the countries he conquered.WhenAlexanderdiedin323B.C.,AristotleexiledhimselffromAthenstooneoftheAegeanislands.Hediedthereayearlaterattheageof63.

Aristotle lived in a society inwhich the citizenshad free time to enjoy thepursuitsofleisurebecausetheyhadslavestotakecareoftheirestatesandtodomenial work. It was also a society in which women occupied an inferiorposition.Plato, inprojecting the institutionsofan ideal state,proposed thatallpolitical offices, except that of military leader, should be open to women,becauseheregardedmenandwomenasessentiallyequal;butAristotleacceptedthemoreconventionalviewofhisdayconcerningtheinferiorityofwomen.

IshallhavemoretosayinalaterchapteraboutAristotle’sviewswithregardtoslaveryandtowomen.HereIwant tosayatoncethatmyuseof thewords“man,”“men,”and“mankind”intheirgenericsensetostandforhumanbeingsofbothgenders,andnotjustforthemaleportionofthepopulation,isinnowayan indication that I shareAristotle’sviewaboutwomen.On thecontrary,withregardtothispoint,IamaPlatonist.

There may be some persons who regard Aristotle’s antiquity as adisadvantage.Theymayfeelthatitwouldbemuchbettertoselectasateachersomeone alive today—someone acquainted with the world in which we live,someonewhoknowswhatmodernsciencehasdiscoveredaboutthatworld.Idonotagreewiththem.

ThoughAristotlewas aGreekwho lived twenty-five centuries ago, hewassufficientlyacquaintedwiththemainoutlinesoftheworldinwhichwelivetotalk about it as if he were alive today. As an aid to our being able to thinkphilosophically, Aristotle would not be a better teacher even if he wereacquaintedwitheverythingthatmodernscientistsknow.

In an effort to understand nature, society, and man, Aristotle began whereeveryoneshouldbegin—withwhathealreadyknewinthelightofhisordinary,commonplaceexperience.Beginningthere,histhinkingusednotionsthatallof

uspossess,notbecauseweweretaughttheminschool,butbecausetheyarethecommonstockofhumanthoughtaboutanythingandeverything.

Wesometimesrefertothesenotionsasourcommonsenseaboutthings.Theyarenotionsthatwehaveformedasaresultofthecommonexperiencewehavein the course of our daily lives—experiences we have without any effort ofinquiryonourpart,experiencesweallhavesimplybecauseweareawakeandconscious.Inaddition,thesecommonnotionsarenotionsweareabletoexpressinthecommonwordsweemployineverydayspeech.

Forgivemeforrepeatingtheword“common”somanytimes.Icannotavoiddoingso,andIhavetolaystressonthatwordbecausewhatitmeansliesattheheartofmyargument.Noteverythingiscommon.Therearemanythingswecallourown,butthereareotherthingsthatwerecognizeasnotexclusivelyours.Weshare themwithothers, suchasabook thatour friendshave readoramotionpicturesomeofushaveenjoyed,orahousethatallthemembersofthefamilysharewhentheyliveinittogether.

Thethingswesharearecommon.Therearemanythingsthatdifferentgroupsofpeopleshare.Therearefewerthingsthatweallshareandarecommontoallofus,simplybecauseweareallhuman.Itisinthislast,all-embracingsenseoftheword“common”thatIrefertocommonexperiencesandcommonnotions,orcommonsense,ascommon.

Ourcommon-sensenotionsareexpressedbysuchwordsas“thing,”“body,”“mind,”“change,”“cause,”“part,”“whole,”“one,”“many,”andsoon.Mostofus have been using these words and notions for a long time—since we werequiteyoung.Westartedtousetheminordertotalkaboutexperiencesthatallofus have had—of things moving or remaining at rest, of plants growing, ofanimals being born and dying, of sitting down and getting up, of aches andpains,ofgoingtosleep,dreaming,andwakingup,offeedingandexercisingourbodies,andofmakingupourminds.

Icouldenlargethislistofourcommonexperiences,justasIcouldenlargethelistof thecommonwordsweuseand thecommonnotionswehave.Butevenwithout the additions that could be made, it should be clear that the words,experiences, and notions I have mentioned are all common—not exclusivelyyours,ormine,oranyoneelse’s.

In contrast, the things that scientists observe in their laboratories or thatexplorers observe on their expeditions are very special experiences. We maylearnabout them from their reports,but, as a rule,wedonot experience themourselves.

HumanbeingshavelearnedagreatdealsinceAristotle’sday,mainlythroughthe discoveries ofmodern science.Applied science has created aworld and a

wayoflifeverydifferentfromhisworldandhiswayoflife.Hedidnothaveanautomobile,couldnottalkonthetelephone,neversawwhatcanbeseenthroughamicroscope or a telescope, did not have a close view of the surface of themoon, and never heard a description of its surface bymenwalking on it.ButAristotlehadthesamecommonexperiencesinhisdaythatwehaveinours.Thekindofthinkinghedidaboutthemenabledhimtounderstandthembetterthanmostofusdo.

Thatandthataloneisthereasonhecanhelpustounderstandthesecommonexperiencesbetterandhelpustounderstandourselvesandourlives,aswellastheworld and the society inwhichwe live, even though ourway of life, ourworld,andoursocietyaredifferentfromhis.

Aristotle’s thinkingbegan with common sense, but it did not end there. Itwentmuchfurther.Itaddedtoandsurroundedcommonsensewithinsightsandunderstandings that are not common at all. His understanding of things goesdeeper than ours and sometimes soars higher. It is, in a word, uncommoncommonsense.

Thatishisgreatcontributiontoallofus.WhatIamgoingtotrytodointhisbook is to make his uncommon common sense easier to understand. If itbecomeseasiertounderstand,itmightevenbecomelessuncommon.

PARTIMANTHEPHILOSOPHICALANIMAL

1

PhilosophicalGames

Manyofushaveplayedtwogameswithoutrealizingwewereonthewaytobecomingphilosophical.Oneiscalled“Animal,Vegetable,Mineral”;theother,“TwentyQuestions.”

Both games consist in asking questions. However, that is not what makesthem philosophical games; it is what lies behind the questions—a set ofcategories,aschemeofclassification.Classifyingthings,placingtheminthisorthat category, is a familiar process.Everyonedoes it at one timeor another—shopkeeperswhen they take stockofwhat is on their shelves, librarianswhentheycataloguebooks,secretarieswhentheyfilelettersordocuments.Butwhentheobjects tobeclassifiedare thecontentsof thephysicalworld,or theeven-larger universe that includes the physical world, then philosophy enters thepicture.

The two games—“Animal, Vegetable,Mineral” and “TwentyQuestions”—aresometimesplayedasiftheywerethesamegame.Thatoccurswhenthefirstofthetwentyquestionstobeaskedis“Animal,vegetable,ormineral?”inordertofindoutwhethertheobjectbeingthoughtoffallsintooneofthesethreelargecategories,orclasses,ofphysical things.Butonly someof theobjectswecanthink about are physical things. If, for example, the object decided on was ageometrical figure, such as a circle, or a number, such as the square root ofminusone,orifithappenedtobeoneoftheGreekgods,suchasZeus,Apollo,or Athena, asking whether the object in question was animal, vegetable, ormineralwouldnot—or,atleast,shouldnot—getananswer.

The game of twenty questions, when it is not begun by asking “Animal,vegetable, or mineral?” is concerned with discovering any object that can bethoughtaboutbyanybody.Itisnotlimitedtoobjectsthatarephysicalthings.Ofthe two games, it is the more likely to engage us in philosophical thoughtwithoutourbeingawareofit.Tobecomeawareofit,weneedAristotle’shelp.

ClassifyingwasoneoftheskillsinwhichAristotleexcelled.Anotherwashis

skill in asking questions. Philosophical thought began with the asking ofquestions—questions that can be answered on the basis of our ordinary,everydayexperienceandwithsomereflectionaboutthatexperiencethatresultsinasharpeningandrefinementofourcommonsense.

Animal, vegetable, and mineral is a rough-and-ready, threefold division ofthingswe find in the physical world. But we use theword “mineral” looselywhenweuseittostandforallthephysicalthingsthatfallononesideofthelinethatdivides livingorganisms from inanimate things—rosebushesormice fromsticksorstones.Allinanimatethingsarenotminerals,suchasgoldorsilverthatwedigfromdepositsintheearth.Somearerockformationsfoundontheearth’ssurface or in its interior; some are other forms ofmatter in liquid or gaseousstate.

Inthecategoryofnonlivingorinanimatebodiesthatislooselycoveredbytheterm “mineral,” Aristotle would have us distinguish between elementary andcomposite bodies. An elementary body, according to Aristotle, is one thatconsists in a single kind of matter—gold, for example, or copper or zinc. Incontrast, a composite body is one that is composed of two or more differentkindsofmatter, suchasbrass,which isamixtureofcopperandzinc.But, forAristotle, the more important distinction is the one that divides living fromnonlivingthings.

Whatdifferentiates all livingorganisms from inertbodies,whether theyareelementary or composite bodies? From our ordinary experience of livingorganisms,weknowthattheyallhavecertaincommoncharacteristics.Theytakenourishment;theygrow;theyreproduce.

Among living organisms, what differentiates plants from animals? Again,from our ordinary experience, we know that animals have certain commoncharacteristicsthatplantslack.Theyarenotrootedintheearthlikeplants;theyhavetheabilitytomovefromplacetoplacebytheirownmeansoflocomotion.Theydonotdrawtheirnourishmentfromtheairandfromthesoilasplantsdo.Inaddition,mostanimalshavesenseorgans.

Thelinethatdividesinertbodiesfromlivingorganismssometimesleavesuswonderingonwhichsideofthelineaparticularthingbelongs.Thisisalsotrueofthelinethatdividesplantsfromanimals.Forexample,someplantsappeartohavesensitivityeven though theydonothavesenseorgans likeeyesandears.Some animals, such as shellfish, seem to lack the power of locomotion; likeplantstheyappeartoberootedinonespot.

In classifying physical things as inanimate bodies, plants, and animals,Aristotlewasawarethathisdivisionofallphysicalthingsintothesethreelargeclassesdidnotexcludeborderlinecases—thingsthatinacertainrespectappear

tobelongononesideofthedividinglineandthat,inanotherrespect,appeartobelongontheotherside.Herecognizedthatintheworldofbodies,thetransitionfromthingslifelesstolivingthingsandfromplantlifetoanimallifeisgradualandnotaclear-cut,all-or-noneaffair.

Nevertheless, Aristotle persisted in thinking that the differences betweenlivingandnonlivingbodiesandbetweenplantsandanimalsseparatedthemintoquitedifferentkindsofthings.Hisreasonforholdingthisviewwasasfollows.

If we did not, in the first place, recognize and understand the clear-cutdistinctionbetweenastoneandamouse,wewouldneverfindourselvespuzzledby whether something difficult to classify was a living or a nonliving thing.Similarly, ifwedidnot recognize the clear-cut distinctionbetween a rosebushand a horse, we would never wonder whether a given specimen of livingorganismwasaplantorananimal.

Just as animals are a special kind of living organismbecause they performfunctionsthatplantsdonot,soforasimilarreasonarehumanbeingsaspecialkindof animal.Theyperformcertain functions thatnoother animalsperform,such as asking general questions and seeking answers to them by observationandby thought.That iswhyAristotle called humanbeings rational animals—questioningandthinkinganimals,abletoengageinphilosophicalthought.

There may be animals that appear to straddle the borderline that divideshumans from nonhumans. Porpoises and chimpanzees, it has recently beenlearned, have enough intelligence to engage in rudimentary forms ofcommunication. But they do not appear to ask themselves or one anotherquestionsaboutthenatureofthings,andtheydonotappeartotry,byonemeansor another, to discover the answers for themselves. We may speak of suchanimalsasalmosthuman,butwedonotincludethemasmembersofthehumanrace.

Eachdistinctkindofthing,Aristotlethought,hasanaturethatdistinguishesitfromalltheothers.Whatdifferentiatesoneclassofthingsfromeverythingelsedefinesthenaturepossessedbyeveryindividualthingthatbelongstothatclass.Whenwe speak of human nature, for example, we are simply saying that allhuman beings have certain characteristics and that these characteristicsdifferentiatethemfromotheranimals,fromplants,andfrominanimatethings.

Aristotle’sschemeofclassificationarrangedthefivemainclassesofphysicalthingsinanascendingorder.Heplacedelementaryandcompositebodiesatthebottomofthescale.Eachofthehigherclassesishigherbecauseitpossessesthecharacteristics of the class below and, in addition, has certain distinguishingcharacteristicsthattheclassbelowdoesnothave.

Inthescaleofnaturalthings,theanimateisahigherformofexistencethan

theinanimate;animalsareahigherformoflifethanplants;andhumanlifeisthehighestformoflifeonearth.

All living organisms, like all inanimate bodies, occupy space and haveweight, but in addition, as we have noted, they eat, grow, and reproduce.Because they are living organisms, animals, like plants, perform these vitalfunctions,buttheyalsoperformcertainfunctionsthatplantsdonot.Atthetopofthe scale are human beingswho perform all the vital functions performed byotheranimalsandwho,inaddition,havetheabilitytoseekknowledgebyaskingandansweringquestionsandtheabilitytothinkphilosophically.

Ofcourse,itcanbesaidthatmanyofthehigheranimalsthink,andeventhatcomputersthink.Norisittruethatonlyhumanshaveintelligence.Intelligenceinvaryingdegrees is tobe found throughout theanimalworld, just as it is tobefoundinvaryingdegreesinmembersofthehumanrace.Butthespecialkindofthinking that gives rise to asking and answering philosophical questionsdistinguisheshumans fromother animals.Noother animalplaysphilosophicalgames.

In theworldofphysical things thatAristotledivides into five largeclasses,theword“body”namestheone,all-embracingclass.Thereisnomoreinclusiveclassofwhichbodiesareasubclass.Everythinginthephysicalworldisabodyofonekindoranother.

Canwegototheoppositeextremeandfindasubclassofbodiesatwhichwemuststopbecauseweareunabletodivideitanyfurtherintosmallersubclasses?Isthehumanspeciessuchasubclassofanimals?

Facedwiththatquestion,mostofusprobablythinkatonceofdifferentracesor varieties ofmankind—differentiated by skin color, by facial characteristics,byheadshape,andsoon.Whydonotsuchcharacteristicsdividehumanbeingsintodifferentkindsorsubclasses?

In this connection, Aristotle made an important distinction. Not all thecharacteristics of a thing, he said, define its nature or essence. As we havealready seen, Aristotle thought man should be defined as a rational—orphilosophical—animal.Beingabletoaskquestionsaboutthewhat,thewhy,andthewhereforeofthingsiswhatmakesanyoneahumanbeing,nottheskincolor,thesnubnose,thestraighthair,ortheshapeofthehead.

Wecan,ofcourse,dividehumanbeingsintoanendlessvarietyofsubclasses—tall or short, fat or thin, white or black, strong or weak, and so on. Butalthough such differencesmay be used to distinguish one subgroup of humanbeingsfromanother,theycannotbeused,accordingtoAristotle,toexcludeanyofthesesubgroupsfromthehumanrace.Whatisevenmoreimportant,itcannotbe said that the members of one subgroup are more or less human than the

membersofanother.In otherwords, the differences between one subclass of human beings and

anotheraresuperficialorminor,ascomparedwiththebasicormajordifferencesthatseparatehumanbeingsfromotheranimals.Aristotlecalledthesuperficialorminor differences accidental; the basic or major differences he regarded asessential.

Humanbeingsandbruteanimalsareessentiallydifferent; tallhumanbeingsandshortones, fathumanbeingsandthin-ones,areaccidentallydifferent. It isonlyinthiswaythatonehumanbeingdiffersfromanother.Weareallanimalsofthesamekind,butoneindividualmayhavemoreandanotherindividuallessofthis or that human characteristic. Such individual differences are much lessimportant than the one thing that unites all men and women—their commonhumanity,whichistheonerespectinwhichallhumanbeingsareequal.

2

TheGreatDivide

Aristotle’s division of physical things into inanimate bodies and livingorganisms,andhisdivisionoflivingorganismsintoplants,animals,andhumanbeings,donotexhausthisschemeofclassificationorhissetofcategories.

Think, for example, of Wellington’s horse at the Battle of Waterloo or ofJuliusCaesar crossing theRubicon. Think of Shakespeare’sHamlet, theLochNessmonster,ortheangelGabriel.Thinkoftheodorofrosesinfullbloom,thecolorofaripetomato,Newton’stheoryofgravitation,orGod.

None of these is a physical thing that exists now as animal, vegetable, ormineral.Wellington’shorseandJuliusCaesarexistedinthepast,buttheyexistno longer. Shakespeare’s Hamlet is a fictitious person, not a real one. Theexistenceof theLochNessmonster is highlyquestionable.As for theodorofrosesinfullbloom,theangelGabriel,Newton’stheoryofgravitation,andGod,noneofthesefallunderanyoftheheadingsthatcoverbodiesthateitherexistorhaveexistedinthephysicalworld.

Theuniverseofobjectsthatcanbethoughtofismuchlargerthanthephysicalworld—the world of bodies, either those now in existence or those that haveexistedinthepast.Itincludestheworldofbodies,butitalsoincludesmuchelsebesides.Thelinethatdividesbodiesfromeverythingelseisthegreatdivide.

Whatisleftwhenweputthewholephysicalworldtooneside?Whatbelongsto the other half of the all-embracing universe of objects that we can thinkabout?Iamnotgoingtotrytogiveanexhaustiveenumerationofthekindsofobjectsthatarenotbodies,buthereatleastaresomeofthepossiblekinds:

mathematicalobjects,suchastrianglesandsquarerootsimaginary or fictitious characters, such as Shakespeare’sHamlet orMarkTwain’sHuckleberryFinndisembodiedorunembodiedspiritsofallsorts,includingghostsandangelsgodsorGodwhendivinebeingsarethoughtofasnothavingbodies

mythologicalbeings,suchascentaursandmermaidsmindsthatareabletothinkupthekindofquestionswehavebeenaskingideasortheoriesthatmindsthinkwith

I am fully aware that this enumerationofpossibleobjectsof thought raisesmany questions.Do such objects exist, in any sense of thatword? If they do,howdoestheirexistencedifferfromtheexistenceofbodies?Whatdoesitmeanto call them possibilities? Are there any objects of thought that areimpossibilities?Ifmindsarenotbodies,whatistheirrelationshiptobodies?

Iwill trytoanswersomeofthesequestions—withAristotle’shelp—inlaterchapters of this book. Some are difficult philosophical questions that I willpostponeuntiltheveryend.Forthemoment,askingthemservesthepurposeofcallingattentiontothelargeruniverseofwhichthephysicalworldisbutapart,eventhoughtheworldofbodiesmaybetheonlyonethatreallyexists.

Staying with that world, we must consider another distinction made byAristotle.Weneedittohandlethequestionabouttheodorofrosesinfullbloomorthecolorofaripetomato.Rosesandtomatoesarebodies,theyareplants,buttheirodorandtheircolorarenot.Consideringthephysicalworld,Aristotledrewalinethatdividesitsconstituents intotwomajorkinds.Ontheonesideof theline,heplacedbodies;ontheotherside,theircharacteristicsorattributes, suchastheirodorsorcolors.

Inoureverydayspeech,weordinarilymakethesamedistinction.Wedonotspeakofthesizeandweightofastoneasifitwereabody.Iwouldnotaskyouto handme the stone’s size orweight, for I know that youmust handme thestoneinorderformetofeelitssizeorweight.

Wecanthinkofthestone’ssizeorweightwithoutthinkingofthestone,butwecannotchange thestone’ssizeorweightwithoutchanging thestone. If thestoneislyinginapileofstones,wecantakeitfromthepileandleavetheotherstonesbehind,butwecannot take the stone’s sizeorweight away from it andleavethestonebehind.

What belongs to a body in the way in which the stone’s size or weightbelongstoitis,accordingtoAristotle,somethingthathasitsexistenceinathing(asthestone’sweightexistsinthestone),butdoesnotexistinandofitself(asthestoneexists).

Aphysicalthing,abody,maybelongtoacollectionofthingsfromwhichitcanberemoved—asonestonecanbe takenfromapileofstones.Buteachofthestonesinthepileexistsinandofitself,evenwhenitexistsinacollectionofstones.That isnot trueof thestone’ssizeorweight.Sizesandweightsdonotexist in andof themselves.They are always the sizes andweights of physical

things,andtheyceasetoexistwhenthebodiesinwhichtheyexistceasetoexist.Anotherwayof grasping this basic distinction between physical things and

theirattributes is toconsiderhow thingschange.Astonewitha roughsurfacecanbepolishedandmadesmooth.Astonethatisalmostroundinshapecanbemadeperfectlyround.Whilewearechangingastone’sattributes,wearedealingwithoneandthesamestone.Itisnotanotherstone,butthesamestonealtered.

If it didnot remain the same stonewhilebecomingdifferent in this or thatrespect,itcouldnotbesaidtohavechangedfrombeingroughtobeingsmoothorfrombeinglargertobeingsmaller.Whenweunderstandthis,weunderstandAristotle’sreasonforsayingthataphysicalthingisthatwhichremainswhatitis(this individual stone) while at the same time being subject to change in onerespectoranother(insizeorweight,shape,color,ortexture).

The attributes of bodies, unlike bodies themselves, are never subject tochange.Roughnessneverbecomessmoothness;greenneverbecomes red. It istheroughstonethatbecomessmooth;thegreentomatothatbecomesredwhenitripens. Physical things, in short, are changeable. Physical attributes are notchangeable;theyaretherespectsinwhichphysicalthingschange.

Aristotle attempted to make a complete enumeration of the attributes thatphysical thingshave.Itscompletenessmaybequestioned,but theattributeshenames are ones we are all acquainted with in common experience, especiallythosethataretheprincipalrespectsinwhichthingschange:

inquantity,whentheyincreaseordecreaseinweightorsizeinquality,whentheyalterinshape,color,ortextureinplaceorposition,whentheymovefromheretothere

A thing has other attributes, such as the relationships inwhich it stands tootherthings,theactionsitperforms,theresultsofitsbeingactedon,thetimeofitscomingintoexistence,thedurationofitsexistence,andthetimeofitsceasingtoexist.

Ofalltheattributesthataphysicalthinghas,themostimportantarethosethatithas throughout itsexistenceandwith respect towhich itdoesnotchangeaslongasitexists.Thesepermanentattributesmakeitthekindofthingit is.Forexample,itisapermanentattributeofsaltthatitdissolvesinwater;apermanentattribute of certainmetals that they are conductors of electricity; a permanentattribute of mammals that they give birth to living offspring and suckle theiryoung.

Suchattributesnotonlymakeathingthespecialkindofthingitis,theyalsodifferentiateonekindofthingfromanother.Beingabletoaskquestionsofthe

sort we have been asking is a permanent attribute of rational animals thatdifferentiatesus fromothermammals.Rational animals are, of course, bodies.Theyarephysicalthings,butnotonlyphysicalthings.

Werecognizethisfactinouruseoftheword“person.”Wecallhumanbeingspersons.Wedonotcallspiders,snakes,sharksorbirdspersons.Whenwetreatour pet cat or dog as if itwere a person,we treat it as if itwere human—oralmosthuman.Objectsthatweregardasmerethings,wedonottreatinthesamemanner.

Uptothispoint,theword“thing”hasbeenusedtorefertophysicalthings—tobodies.Nowtheword“thing”hasbeenusedincontrasttotheword“person.”Itisatroublesomeword.Itsmeaningissometimessobroadthatitreferstoanypossibleobjectofthought—notonlytoexistentphysicalthings,butalsototheirattributesaswell,and toobjects thatdonotexist,objects thatmayneverhaveexisted,andevenobjectsthatcannotpossiblyexist.Sometimestheword“thing”narrowlyappliesonlytobodiesthatnowexistinthephysicalworld,bodiesthathaveexistedthereinthepast,orbodiesthatcanexistthereinthefuture.

Usingthesamewordinavarietyofsensesisoftenunavoidable.Inthecaseof the most important words we use, especially words we use in ordinaryeverydayspeech,itisalmostimpossiblenottodoso.Aristotlefrequentlycalledattentiontothedifferentsensesinwhichhefounditnecessarytousethesameword.Whenwethinkaboutourexperienceashedid,wemustalsopayattentiontothedifferentsensesofthewordsweuse.

Human beings are physical things in one sense of that word and not inanotherwhenwe call thempersons, not things.As physical things, as bodies,theyhave the threedimensionswithwhichwe are all acquainted.Aspersons,theyalsohavethreedimensions,whicharequitedifferent.

3

MansThreeDimensions

Regarding ourselves simply as bodies—or merely as physical things—Iwould say that our three dimensions, like the three dimensions of any otherbody, are length, breadth, and height. That is the way in which any bodyoccupiesspace.

While,asbodies,wearephysicalthingslikeallotherbodies,weare,aswehavejustseen,thespecialkindofthing—theonlykindofthing—thatiscalledaperson.Whatareourthreedimensionsaspersons,notjustasbodies?

Inspace,adimensionisadirectioninwhichIcanmove.Icanmovemyhandfromlefttoright,fromfronttoback,fromuptodown.Likespatialdimensions,personaldimensionsarealsodirections—directionsinwhichI,asaperson,canactasahumanbeing.Iamsurethatwehaveonlythreedimensionsasphysicalbodies, but I cannot be as sure that we have only three dimensions as activehumanbeings—onlythreedirectionsinwhichouractivitiescantakeus.

However,IthinkthatthethreedimensionsIshallnamerepresentthreeveryimportant directions that human activity can take. Theremay be others, but Idoubt if thereareanyas important as these.The threearemaking,doing, andknowing.

In the first of these three dimensions, making, we have man the artist orartisan—the producer of all sorts of things: shoes, ships, and houses, books,music, and paintings. It is not just when human beings produce statues orpaintingsthatweshouldcallthemartists.Thatismuchtoorestrictedauseofthewordart.Anythingintheworldthatisartificialratherthannaturalisaworkofart—somethingman-made.

Inthesecondofthesedimensions,doing,wehavemanthemoralandsocialbeing—someonewhocandorightorwrong,someonewho,bywhatheorshedoes or does not do, either achieves happiness or fails to achieve it, someonewhofindsitnecessarytoassociatewithotherhumanbeingsinordertodowhat,asahumanbeing,heorshefeelsimpelledtodo.

In the third dimension, knowing, we have man as learner, acquiringknowledge of all sorts—not only about nature, not only about the society ofwhich human beings are a part, not only about human nature, but also aboutknowledgeitself.

Inallthreeofthesedimensions,manisathinker,butthekindofthinkinghedoesinordertomakethingsdiffersfromthekindofthinkinghedoesinordertoactmorallyandsocially.Bothkindsofthinkingdifferfromthekindofthinkingahumanbeingdoesinorderjusttoknow—toknowjustforthesakeofknowing.

Aristotlewasverymuchconcernedwiththedifferencesthatdistinguishthesethreekindsofthinking.Heusedtheterm“productivethinking”todescribethekindofthinkingthatmanengagesinasamaker;“practicalthinking”todescribethekindthatheengagesinasadoer;and“speculative”or“theoreticalthinking”todescribethekindheengagesinasaknower.

This threefold division of the kinds of thinking can be found inAristotle’sbooks.Someofthem,suchashisbooksonmoralandpoliticalphilosophy,areconcerned with practical thinking and with man as a doer—as an individualliving his own life and trying to make it as good as possible, and also as amember of society, associated with other human beings and cooperating withthem. Some of these books, such as the ones on natural philosophy, areconcernedwith theoretical thinking about thewhole physicalworld, includingmanasapartofthatworld,andman’smindandknowledgeaswell.

Hewroteatreatiseaboutmanasamaker,butthatbookdealsonlywithmanas amaker of poetry,music, and paintings.He entitled itPoetics because theGreek word from which we get the word “poetry” means making—makinganything,notjustthekindofobjectsthatentertainusandthatgiveuspleasurewhen we enjoy them. Men and women produce an extraordinary variety ofusefulthings,thingsweuseinourdailylives,suchastheclotheswewear,thehouseswe live in, thefurniture in thosehouses,and the implementsneeded tomakesuchthings.

Themoregeneraltreatmentofmanasamaker,particularlymanasamakerofusefulphysicalthings,wefindinthebooksthatAristotlewroteaboutnature—his books of natural philosophy. In his effort to understand the phenomena ofnature, Aristotle frequently resorted to comparisons between the way menproducethingsandthewaynatureworks.Hisunderstandingofwhatisinvolvedinhumanmakinghelpedhim—anditwillhelpus—tounderstandtheworkingsofnature.

That iswhy I amgoing tobegin, inPart II of this book,withmaking as adimensionofhumanactivity.Afterthat,inPartIII,Iamgoingtodealwiththedimension of human activity in whichman is a moral and social being. And

finally, inPart IV, Iwill come toman as a knower, postponing to the last themost difficult questions thatwe have to consider—questions about the humanmindandknowledgeitself.

The most challenging words in anyone’s vocabulary are three words thatnametheuniversalvalues thatelicit respectandevokewonder.Theyare truth,goodness, and beauty—or the true, the good, and the beautiful. These threevaluespertaintothethreedimensionsofhumanactivity.

In the sphereofmaking,weare concernedwithbeautyor, to say the least,with trying to produce things that are well made. In the sphere of doing, asindividuals and asmembers of society,we are concernedwith good and evil,rightandwrong.Inthesphereofknowing,weareconcernedwithtruth.

PARTIIMANTHEMAKER

4

Aristotle’sCrusoe

IfAristotlehadwritten the storyofRobinsonCrusoe, themoralof the talewouldhavebeendifferent.

Thestorymostofushave readcelebratesCrusoe’s ingenuity insolving theproblemofhowtolivesecurelyandcomfortablyontheislandwherehefoundhimselfacastawayafterashipwreck.Italsocelebrateshisvirtues—hiscourageand his foresight. It is a story of man’s conquest of nature, his mastery andcontroloverit.

ForAristotle,theislandwouldhaverepresentedNature,naturewithacapitalN,natureuntouchedbyhumans.Theworksofnature—theseedingoftreesandbushes,thegrowthofplants,thebirthanddeathofanimals,theshiftingofsands,the wearing away of rocks, the formation of caves—had been going on longbeforeCrusoe’s arrival. Aristotlewould have viewed the changes that Crusoebrought about as a way of understanding the changes that had taken placewithout him. For him, the storywould not have been a story ofman againstnature,butanaccountofmanworkingwithnature.

Whenwetrytounderstandsomethingthat isdifficult tounderstand,agoodcommon-senseruleistostartoutwithsomethingeasiertounderstandinordertoseeifthathelpsusovercomethedifficulties.Whatismoreunderstandablemaythrowsomelightonwhatislessunderstandable.Humanbeingsshouldbeableto understandwhat goes onwhen theymake something or change something.That is less difficult to understand than what goes on in nature when humanbeingsarenotinthepicture.Understandingworksofartmay,therefore,helpustounderstandtheworkingsofnature.

Isuggested,intheprecedingchapter,thatinitsbroadestmeaningthephrase“work of art” covers everything that is manmade. Let’s reconsider that. Iseverything produced by human beings artificial, not natural? When parentsproducechildren,are thechildrenartificial?Are theyworksofart? Ifyousayno,asIthinkyoushould,thenwehavenotyetsucceededincorrectlydrawing

thelinethatdividestheartificialfromthenatural.Supposethatlightningstrikesatreeinadenseforest.Thetreeissplitinhalf;

branches are cut off. The burning of some of them sets off a forest fire. Theforestfireandalltheotherchangesthatresultfromthelightning’sstrokeareallnatural,aretheynot?

But aperson,walking through thewoods, carelessly throwsawaya lightedcigarette. It sets the dry leaves of the underbrush on fire, and the woods areconsumedinflames.Thatforestfirewascausedbyahumanbeing,asthefirstonewascausedbylightning.Thefirstonewasaworkofnature.Wasthesecondaworkofman—somethingartificial,notnatural?

Suppose,however,thattheindividualinthewoodshadnotdroppedalightedcigarette.Supposehehadgathereddry twigsand leavesandheaped them inamoundthathesurroundedwithsmallstones.Then,lightingamatch,hesetfiretotheminordertocookhislunch.Wewouldordinarilysay,wouldwenot,thathehadbuiltafire.Wouldthefirehebuiltbeaworkofart,unlikethefiresetoffbythecarelessdroppingofalightedcigarette?

Before you answer that question too quickly, remember that fire itself issomethingnatural. Itdoesnotneedahumanbeing tomake ithappen. In fact,whenmandoesmakeithappen,whatdoeshemake—thefire itselfordoeshemerely cause it to happen at a certain time and place, as the man walkingthrough the woods caused it to happen at the spot where he decided to cooklunch?

Onemoreexampletoconsider:lightningsplitthetreeandcutoffsomeofitsbranches.Mencando that, too,withaxesandsaws;and theydo itwhen theyengageinlumberinginordertoobtainthewoodtheyneedtobuildhouses,ortomakechairsandtables.Youunderstandthatthehousesmenbuildareproductsofart,notofnature—artificial,notnatural.Buildingahouse,then,isnotquitethesameasbuildingafire, foryoucannotbequitesosure that thefireamanbuildsisartificial,notnatural.

Whatisthedifferencebetweentheman-madehouse—ortheman-madechairortable—andtheman-madefire?Orbetweenthetree’sbranchesthatarecutoffby lightning and the tree’s branches that are cut down by lumberjacks? Orbetween the fire built by the picnicker in order to cookhis lunch and the firecausedbythemantrampingthroughthewoodswhocarelesslydroppedalightedcigarette?

Let’s start with the easiest question first. The fire caused by the lightedcigarette was accidental rather than intentional. It was not for a purpose thatsome human being had in mind. It resulted from human carelessness—evenmindlessness—rather thanfromcarefulplanningandforesight.Theabsenceof

anyhumanpurpose,planning,orforesightputsitonthenaturalsideofthelinethatdividesthenaturalfromtheartificial.

It was man-caused but not man-made. It resulted from something that ahumanbeingdid,butman isapartofnature justasmuchas lightning is.Noteverythingthatresultsfromhumanbehaviorisahumanproductionoraworkofart.

Now,whatoftheman-madefire,deliberatelybuiltforthepurposeofcookinglunch,andtheman-madehouse,deliberatelybuiltforthepurposeofprovidingshelter? Here neither humanly-brought-about result is accidental. Purpose andplanning are certainly involved in both. So for, at least, both belong on theartificialsideofthelinethatdividesthenaturalfromtheartificial.What,then,isthedifferencebetweenthem?

Onedifferenceisclearimmediately.Fireshappeninnaturewhenmenarenotpresent, but houses do not. Men can help nature produce fires by lightingmatchesandsettingdryleavesandtwigsaflame.Butwhenhumanbeingsbuildhouses rather than fires, they are not helping nature produce them. In the onecase,wesaidbefore,mendonotmakefireitself,buttheymakefireshappenatacertaintimeandplace.Intheothercase,mendomakehouses.

Thehouse thatRobinsonCrusoebuiltafterhehadrescuedsometoolsfromtheshipwreckwassomethingthatheandhealoneproduced,notsomethinghejustmadehappenatacertaintimeandplace.Exceptforhisbeingontheisland,nohouseswouldhaveeverhappened,asfiresmighthavehappenedasaresultofboltsoflightning.

One more question remains. We have so far decided that Crusoe’s house,plannedandproducedforapurpose, isaworkofart,notofnature,somethingartificial,notnatural.Butisitentirelyartificial—whollyahumancreation?TheBible tells us that before God created the world there was nothing, and thatGod’screationoftheworldbroughtsomethingoutofnothing.DidCrusoebringsomethingoutofnothingwhenhebuilthishouse?

Hardly.Hebuiltitoutofthewoodhehadobtainedfromchoppingdowntreeswith his ax, cutting off branches with his saw, and smoothing them with hisplane.Thewood thatwent into thebuildingof thehousecamefromnature. Itwas there to begin with. So, too, was the iron out of which nails had beenformed,nailsthatCrusoerecoveredalongwithtoolsinthecarpenter’schestthatfloatedashoreaftertheshipwreck.Thehouse,madeoutofwoodandnails,wasindeedmadebyCrusoe,notbynature,butitwasmadeoutofnaturalmaterials.ThatisalsotrueofallthetoolsthatCrusoehadthegoodlucktobeabletouse.

Let’snot forget the children thatparentsproduce.Wehavealreadydecidedthatchildrenarenaturalproducts,notartificial—notworksofart.Isthatbecause

theyaresometimesaccidentalproductsratherthanintentionalones?Sometimes, we know, children are the result of carelessness or

thoughtlessness,andareasunexpectedastheyareunplannedfor.Butevenwhenchildren are wanted and planned for, even when some thought is involved inbegetting them, and even when, with some luck, parents help nature producechildrenatacertaintimeandplace,theyarenotlikethefirethatthepicnickerhelpednaturetoproduceorthehousethatCrusoebuiltoutofmaterialsprovidedbynature.

Whynot?For the timebeing, let usbe satisfiedwith the answer suggestedabove. Children, like the offspring of other animals, can certainly happenwithoutanythought,planning,orpurpose.Thatisnottrueofanythingwewouldcallaworkofartorartificial.Butjustashumanbeingscanmakefireshappenby knowing something about how fires happen in nature, so, too, can humanbeingsmakechildrenhappenbyknowingsomethingabouthowtheprocreationofoffspringhappensinnature.

When they are totally ignorant of that, then their offspring are entirelyaccidental. But when they have such knowledge, the having of offspring is,partlyatleast,theresultofplanningandpurpose.

We have surveyed a lot of happenings and productions, and we havecomparedthedifferencesbetweentheminordertoseeifwecanplaceeachononeortheothersideofthelinethatdividesthenaturalandtheartificial.Beforewegoon,itmightbeagoodideatosummarizewhatwehavelearned.

First,wedecidedthatfire itself issomethingentirelynatural.Theparticularfireamanpurposelybuildsatacertaintimeandplaceisanartificialhappening—somethingthatwouldnothavehappenedhadnotsomehumanbeingcausedittohappenthenandthere.

Second,theartificialityofthefirethepicnickerbuiltinordertomakelunchdiffers from the artificiality of the house thatCrusoe built in order to providehimselfwithshelter.Thoughbothspringfromhumanpurposes,houses,unlikefires,neveroccurinnaturewhenhumanbeingsarenotatwork.Letusrefertothe picnicker’s fire as an artificial happening and to Crusoe’s house as anartificialproduct.

Third,Crusoe’shouse, thoughanartificialproduct, isnotsomethingwhollyartificial.Itwasmadeoutofnaturalmaterials,notoutofnothing.Itis,therefore,unliketheworlditselfthat,accordingtotheBible,Godcreatedoutofnothing.Let us always call things that men make out of natural materials theirproductionsratherthantheircreations.

Fourth,weconsideredhumanchildrenandtheoffspringofotheranimals.Doweordinarilycallthemeitherproductionsorcreations?No,thelanguageweuse

for describing their coming to be involves such words as “reproduction” and“procreation.”

Letus take that factassignificant.Theresultsofbiological reproductionorprocreationarenot like the firecausedby lightning—anaturalevent; nor likethe fire built byman—anartificialhappening; nor like the house thatCrusoeerected—an artificial product; nor like the world that God created out ofnothing.

However, understanding howmen build houses will help us to understandhow animals reproduce or procreate offspring. Understanding howmenmakefires happen will help us to understand how fires happen as natural events.Understandingthedifferencebetweenmakingfireshappenandbuildinghouseswillhelpustounderstandthedifferencebetweenfireshappeninginnatureandanimalsreproducingtheirkind.

DonotasknowwhetherunderstandingallthiswillalsohelpustounderstandhowGodcreated theworld.ThatquestionmustwaituntilweseewhetherourunderstandingoftheworksofnatureandofartleadsusbacktotheBible’sstoryofcreation—astorythatAristotleneverread.

5

ChangeandPermanence

Aristotle tookasensibleattitude toward the thinkerswhoprecededhim.Hesaidhethoughtitwaswisetopayattentiontowhattheyhadtosayinordertodiscover which of their opinions were correct and which were incorrect. Bysiftingthetruefromthefalse,someadvancemightbemade.

Twoearlier thinkers—HeraclitusandParmenides—heldveryextremeviewsabouttheworld.Heraclitusdeclaredthateverything,absolutelyeverything,wasconstantlychanging.Nothing,absolutelynothing,everremainedthesame.Oneofhisfollowers,Cratylus,evenwentsofarastosaythatthismadeitimpossibleto use language to communicate, for words are constantly changing theirmeanings.Theonlywaytocommunicateisbywigglingyourfinger.

At theotherextreme,Parmenidesdeclared thatpermanencereignssupreme.Whatever is, is; whatever is not, is not; nothing ever comes into existence orperishes;nothingatallchanges,nothingmoves.Theappearanceofchangeandmotion,whichParmenidesacknowledgedaspartofourdailyexperience, isanillusion. We are being deceived by our senses. In reality, everything alwaysremainsthesame.

You may wonder how Parmenides could persuade anyone to accept soextreme a view, and one so contrary to our everyday experience. One of hisfollowers,amannamedZeno,triedtoinventargumentsthatwouldpersuadeusthatwhenweperceivedthingsmovingabout,wewerebeingdeceived.Weweresufferinganillusion.

Oneoftheseargumentsransomewhatlikethis:Youwanttohitaballfromoneendofthetenniscourttoanother.Inordertogetthere,theballfirsthastogothroughhalfthedistance.Ithastoreachthenet.Inordertogetthere,itfirsthastogothroughhalfthedistance—atleasttotheservicebox.Inordertogetthere,itfirsthastogothroughhalfthedistance;andsoonindefinitely,byacontinualhalvingof thedistances thatremain.Fromthis, ifwefollowedthedirectionofZeno’sreasoning,wewouldbeledtotheconclusionthattheballcouldneverget

started—couldneverleaveyourracket.Aristotle was acquainted with these opinions and arguments. His common

senseaswellashiscommonexperiencetoldhimtheywerewrong.Ifwordsarealways changing their meanings, how could Heraclitus and his followersrepeatedlysay thateverything ischangingandsuppose,as theyobviouslydid,thattheyweresayingthesamethingeachtime,nottheopposite?Ifthemotionoftheheavenlybodiesisanillusion,thensoisthechangefromdaytonight.Ifnothingcomesintoexistenceorperishes,noonedies,butwhereareParmenidesandhisfriendZenonow?

HeraclitusandParmenideswerewrong,butnotallwrong.Infact,eachwaspartlyright,andthewholetruth,Aristotlethought,consistedincombiningtwopartialtruths.

Ontheonehand,motionandchange,comingtobeandpassingaway,occurthroughout theworld of nature andwere occurring long before human beingscameonthescene.Farfrombeingfullofillusions,ourcommonexperienceofnature grasps the reality of change. Things are the way they seem to be—changing.

On the other hand, not everything is always changing in every respect. Inevery change, theremust be somethingpermanent—something that persists orremainsthesamewhilebecomingdifferentinonerespectoranother.Thattennisball, for example,which you tried to hit across the court, didmove fromoneplacetoanother,butwhenitreachedyouropponent’sbaseline,itwasthesametennisball thatyoupropelled in thatdirection. If ithadbeenadifferent tennisball, conjured up by amagician standing on the sidelines, itwould have beencalledafoul.

Motionfromheretothere(whichAristotlecalledlocalmotionorchangeofplace)isthemostobviousofthechangesinwhichsomethingremainsthesame.Themovingthingistheunchangingsubjectofthechangethatislocalmotion.Ifitwas “your tennis ball”when it left your racket, it is still “your tennis ball”whenyouropponenthitsitback—theselfsame,identicalball,notanotherball.

Whilewe are talking about localmotion, letmemention a distinction thatAristotlemakesbetweentwokindsoflocalmotion.Whenyouaccidentallydropatennisball,itfallstothegroundbecauseitisheavy(youandIsaybecauseofgravity, which is another word for heavy). You did not throw it down. It fellnaturally.Thatwasanatural,notanartificial,motion.

Butwhenyouhitthetennisballwithyourracket,thatisaman-mademotion,notanaturalone.Theforceofyourstrokeovercomesthenaturaltendencyoftheball tofallbecauseofitsweight,andthisforcesendsitonapathitwouldnothavefollowed ifyouhadnotpropelled it in thatdirectionbyyourstroke.The

same thing is truewhenwepropela rocket to themoon.That isnotanaturalmotionforaheavybodylikearocket.Withoutthepropellingforcewegiveit,itwouldnotnaturallyleavetheearth’sfieldofgravity.

From tennis balls to rockets, fromelevators to cannonballs, there is awidevarietyofbodiesinlocalmotionthatwouldnotbemovingastheydowereitnotforman’s interferencewith nature. Since they are not natural, shouldwe callthesemotionsartificial?Thatwordmightbeused,fortheyaremotionsbroughtaboutbymen.Aristotlecalled themviolentmotions—violent in the sense thattheyviolatethenaturaltendencyofthebodiesinquestion.

What other changes that occur naturally also occur artificially, or throughman’shavingahandinthem?Theheatof thesunripensa tomatoandturnsitfromgreentored.Thatisnotachangeinplace,butachangeincolor.Itisnotalocalmotion,butthealterationofanattributeofthetomato.

Frombeinggreenatonetime,thetomatohasbecomeredatanother,justasthetennisball,frombeinghereatonetime,isthereatanother.Whatiscommonto these two changes is time, not space. No change of place occurred in theripeningofthetomato,onlyachangeinquality;butneitherchange—thechangeinplaceandthechangeinquality—tookplacewithoutachangeintime.

Peoplepaintgreenthingsred,orredthingsgreen—houses,tables,chairs,andsoon.Theripeningofthetomatoisanaturalalteration;thepaintingofthingsisanartificialalterationofthem.Thehouse,table,orchair,whichwasatonetimegreen,didnotbecomeredatanothertimewithouthumanintervention.

Inadditiontolocalmotion(orchangeinplace)andalteration(orchangeinquality), there is still a third kind of change that is both natural and artificial.Thistimeletusbeginwiththeartificialformofit.

Takearubberballoonandblowitup.Asyoudoso,itchangesinsizeaswellasinshape.Itgetslarger,andwillcontinuetodosoasyoublowairintoit.Andwhenyouletairoutofit,itdecreasesinsizeandreturnstoitsoriginalshape.

Left on the table by itself, the balloon would not have increased in size.Blownup,withitsendtwistedandbound,theballoonwillnotdecreaseinsize.Thechangeinsize,accompaniedbyachangeinshape,isyourdoing.Youhavecausedtwoartificialchangestooccuratthesametime—achangeinquality(thealteration of the balloon’s shape) and a change in quantity (the increase ordecreaseintheballoon’ssize).

Changesinquantityoccurnaturallyaswellasartificially.Forexample,rockson a seacoastwear away as they are continually battered bywaves. They getsmaller.Theactionofwavesmayalsomakeseacoastcaveslarger.Morefamiliarexperiences of natural increase—in size and weight—occur in the world oflivingthings.Plantsandanimalsgrow.Theirgrowthinvolvesmanychanges,of

course,butamongthemarechangesinquantity—increasesinsizeandweight.Althoughoneaspectofthegrowthofalivingbodyiscertainlyanincreaseor

a change inquantity, it has apeculiar characteristic thatwedonot find in theincrease of inanimate bodies. You build a fire and you canmake it larger byaddingmorelogs.Ifmoreandmorelogsareavailabletopileonit,therewouldappeartobenolimittothesizeofthefireyoucanbuild.Ifyoufeedcarrotstoarabbit, the rabbit grows in size, but nomatter howmany carrots you feed therabbit,thereisalimittotherabbit’sincreaseinsize.

You can build smaller or larger pyramids and, given enough stones andhumanlabor,youcanmakeonelargerthananypyramidthathaseverbeenbuilt.But nomatterwhat you do in the feeding of animals, you cannotmake themgrowtobelargerthanacertainsize.Youcannotmakeahousecatthesizeofalionoratiger.

Thereverseisalsotrue.Theballoonyoublewupdecreasesinsizeasyouletthe air out of it, and the decrease cangoon to the pointwhere the balloon iscompletely collapsed. But when animals cease to grow, they may cease toincreaseinsize,buttheydonotdecreaseinsizetothevanishingpointsolongastheyremainalive.

Butanimalsandplantsdie.So,too,doballoonsburstandceasetobeballoonswhenyoublowtoomuchairintothem.Thisbringsustoafourthkindofchange—both natural and artificial—that is so different from the other three thatAristotleseparatesitsharplyfromtherest.

Alltheothers,aswehaveseen,taketimetohappen.Timeelapsesasbodiesmovefromheretothere,alterincolororshape,getlargerorsmaller.Butwhentheballoonbursts,itceasestobeaballooninstantaneously.Thatchangewouldappeartotakenotime,certainlynoappreciableamountoftime.Itoccursinaninstant; or perhapswe should say: at one instant theballoonexists, and at theverynextinstantitnolongerexists.Allwehaveleftareshredsorfragmentsofrubber,notaballoonwecanblowup.

Thesameistrueoftherabbitthatdies.Inoneinstantitisalive;atthenext,itisnomore.Allwehaveleftisthecarcass,which,inthecourseoffurthertime,willprogressivelydecayanddisintegrate.

This special kind of change (whichAristotle refers to as coming to be andpassingaway)isspecialinotherwaysthanbeinginstantaneous.Itissospecialthatitraisesseriousproblemsforus.

Ineverychange,wehavebeensayingsofar,somethingremainspermanentand unchanging. The body or thing that changes in place, in color, or in sizeremainsthesamebodywhenitmovesfromoneplaceoranother,whenitaltersincolor,whenitincreasesinsize.Butwhatremainsthesamewhentheballoon

bursts? What remains the same when the rabbit dies? The decaying,disintegratingcarcassisnottherabbitwefedcarrotsto.Theshredsofrubberarenottheballoonweblewup.

Nevertheless,thereissomethingpermanentinthisspecialkindofchange.Itiseasiertoseewhatitisintheproductionordestructionofthingsbymenthanitisinthebirthanddeathofplantsandanimals.

Pieces of wood, nails, and glue do not come together naturally to make achair.Menmakechairsbyputtingthesematerialstogetherinacertainway.Theyarethesamematerialsbeforetheywereputtogetherandshapedintoachairastheyareafterthathappens,attheinstantwhenthechaircomesintoexistenceassomethingyoucansiton.

Youfind thechairuncomfortableoryouhaveotherchairsandwanta tableinsteadofthisone.Youprobablycannotreuseallthenailsortheglue,butyoucantakethechairapartand,usingthepiecesofwoodandsomeofthenails,youcanbuildasmalltablewithmostofthesamematerials.Ifyouhadnotusedglueinthefirstplace,andifyouhadbeenabletoextractallthenailsinusableform,thematerialsinthechairthathasceasedtobeandinthetablethathascomeintobeingwouldbeidentical.Theywoulddifferonlyinrespecttohowtheyareputtogether.

It would, therefore, appear to be the case that in artificial productions anddestructions,whatpersistsorremainsthesamethroughoutthechangeisnotthethingthatwasproducedanddestroyed,butonlythematerialsthatapersonusedinputtingittogetherandthematerialsthatareleftwhenitistakenapart.

Somethinglikethatisalsothecaseinthedeathoftherabbit.Beingalivingbody, the rabbit is, after all, a material thing, just as the chair or table is amaterialthing.Thereismatterinitsmakeup.Andthatmatterremains,notinthesameform,ofcourse,butneverthelessitremains,whentherabbitbreaksup—dies, decays, disintegrates.And just as the inorganicmaterials of a chairmayenter into the compositionof a table, so theorganicmaterials of a rabbitmayenterintothecompositionofanotherlivingthing.

Therabbitmayhavebeenkilledbya jackalanddevouredfornourishment.To the extent that the jackal is able to assimilate what it eats, the organicmaterialsoftherabbitenterintothebone,flesh,andmuscleofthejackal.

Modernsciencehasanameforwhatisgoingonhere—anamethatAristotledidnotuse.Wecallittheconservationofmatter.Howeveritisreferredto,thepointisthatsomethingpersistsinthespecialkindofchangethatiscomingtobeandpassingaway.Thatsomething,inthecaseofartificialthingssuchastablesandchairs,consistsofthematerialsoutofwhichtheyaremade.

Inman-madeproductions,wecanusuallyidentifywhatthesematerialsare—

theseparticularpiecesofwood,theseparticularnails.Itisnotalwaysaseasytoidentify theparticularunitorunitsofmatter thatpersistwhenoneanimaleatsanotherorwhenlivingthingsdie.Buttherecanbenodoubtthatinallinstancesofcomingtobeandpassingaway,bothnaturalandartificial,eithermatteritselformaterialsofacertainkindundergotransformation.

What ismeant by “matter itself” as contrastedwith “materials of a certainkind”?Humanbeings,inmakingordestroyingartificialthings,neverworkwithmatteritself,butonlywithmaterialsofacertainkind.Doesnature,unlikeman,workwithmatteritself?Ifso,thenthatwhichpersistsorremainsthesubjectofchange in artificial production and destruction is not the same as that whichpersists or remains the subject of change in natural coming to be and passingaway.Similar, but not the same. The transformation of identifiable materials in

human production and destruction is only like but not identical with thetransformationofmatterinnaturalcomingtobeandpassingaway.Nevertheless,the similarity or likeness may help us to understand what happens when, innature,thingscometobeandpassaway.Wewilllookintothismorecloselyinthefollowingchapters.

6

TheFourCauses

The“fourcauses”aretheanswersthatAristotlegivestofourquestionsthatcanandshouldbeaskedaboutthechangeswithwhichweareacquaintedinourcommonexperience.Theyarecommon-sensequestions,andsoaretheanswers.Let us begin by considering them as they apply to changes brought about byhumanbeings,especiallythethingstheyproduceormake.Thatwillhelpustoconsiderthefourcausesastheyoperateintheworkingsofnature.

Thefirstquestionaboutanyhumanproductionis:Whatisitgoingtobemadeof? If you asked this question of a shoemaker at work, the answer would be“leather.” If you asked it of a jeweler, fashioning bracelets or rings out ofpreciousmetals, the answer might be “gold” or “silver.” If you asked it of agunsmithproducingarifle,theanswerwouldprobablybe“woodandsteel.”Thekindofmaterialnamedineachcase,onwhichthecraftsmanworksandoutofwhich he is producing a particular product, is the material cause of theproduction. It is one of four indispensable factors—factors without which theproductionwouldnotandcouldnotoccur.

The secondquestion is:Whomade it?Thatwould appear to be the easiestquestionofall,atleastwhenwearedealingwithhumanproductions.Itmaynotbe so easywhenwe come to the changes that take place in nature and to thethingsproducedbynatureratherthanbymen.Sofarashumanproductionsareconcerned,thequestionhasalreadybeenansweredinwhatwassaidinanswertothe first question: the shoemaker is themaker of the shoe, the jeweler of thebracelets or rings, the gunsmith of the gun. The maker in each case is theefficientcauseoftheproduction.

The thirdquestion is:What is it that isbeingmade?On the faceof it, thatquestion issoeasy that itmaymakeyou impatient tohave toconsider it. It isobvious,youmaysay, thatwhat isbeingmadebytheshoemakerisashoe,bythejeweleraring,andsoon.ButwhenItellyouthatAristotlecalledtheanswerto this question the formal cause of the change or production, you may be

puzzledbytheintroductionofthatword“formal,”thoughitis,asyouwillsoonsee,theprecisewordtopairwith“material,”thefirstofthefourcauses.Iwillreturntotheexplanationof“formal”afterwehaveconsideredthelastofthefourcauses.

Thefourthquestionis:Whatisitbeingmadefor?Whatpurposeisitintendedtofulfill?Whatobjectiveorusedidthemakerhaveinmindastheendtoserve?Initssimplestform,thequestionis:Whyisitbeingmade?Andtheanswer,withregard to the productions we have been talking about, comes quickly.We allknowwhat shoes and rings and guns are for—what function they perform orwhatpurposetheyserve.

This fourth factor in human productions Aristotle called the final cause,callingitthatbecausethefactorbeingreferredtoisanendinview.WhenyouorImakeanything,theendwehaveinmindissomethingthatweachievelastorfinally.Wemustfinishmakingitbeforewecanputittouseforthepurposewehadinmind.

I said earlier that the four causes are indispensable factors that must bepresent and operative whenever men produce anything. To call themindispensable is to say that, taken together, they are that without which theproductioncouldnothavetakenplace.Eachofthefourfactors,takenbyitself,isnecessary,butnonebyitselfissufficient.

Allfourmustbepresenttogetherandoperateinrelationtooneanotherinacertain way. The workman must have material to work on and must actuallyworkonit.Bydoingso,hemusttransformitintosomethingthatthematerialsinhandcanbemadetobecome.Andwhathasbeenmademustbeofsomeusetothepersonmakingit.Inotherwords,hemusthavehadareasonformakingit,forwithoutthat,hewouldprobablynothaveexpendedtheefforttomakeit.

Youmayquestionthelastofthesestatements.Youmaywonderwhetherthefinal cause—the reason for making something—must always be present andoperating.Isn’t itpossibleforsomeonetoproducesomethingwithouthavingareasonfordoingso—withouthaving inmind, inadvance,adeliberatepurposethathewishestoserve?

That question is not easy to answerwith certainty, though youmust admitthat, for the most part, human beings do make the effort to produce thingsbecause theyneedorwant the things they are engaged inproducing.Yet theymay also, on occasion, fiddle aroundwithmaterials and, as a result, producesomethingunexpected—aimlesslyor,shallwesay,playfully.

When this happens, therewould appear to be no final cause, no end resultbeingaimedat.Apurposefortheobjectproduced,afunctionforittoperform,maybethoughtupaftertheproductioniscompleted,buttheproducerofitdid

not have it in mind in advance. It could, therefore, hardly have been anindispensablefactor,oracause,ofwhatoccurred.

When we turn from human productions to the workings of nature, thequestion about the presence and operation of final causes becomes moreinsistent.Wecannotavoidfacingitsquarely,forweshouldcertainlybeuneasyaboutsayingthatnaturehasthisorthatinmindastheendresultthatitaimsat.Perhaps, when I am able to explain why Aristotle calls the third of the fourcauses the formal cause, I will also be able to answer the question about theoperationoffinalcausesintheworkingsofnature.

BeforeIdoso, letmesummarize thefourcausesbydescribingtheminthesimplest termspossible.Because these statementsabout the fourcausesare sovery simple, they may also be difficult to understand. We must pay closeattentiontothekeywordsthatareitalicizedineachstatement.

1. Materialcause:thatoutofwhichsomethingismade.2. Efficientcause:thatbywhichsomethingismade.3. Formalcause:thatintowhichsomethingismade.4. Finalcause:thatforthesakeofwhichsomethingismade.

Whatdowemeanwhenwe say“that intowhich something ismade”?Theleatheroutofwhichtheshoewasmadebytheshoemakerwasnotashoebeforetheshoemakerwenttoworkonit.Itbecameashoeorgotturnedintoashoebytheworkhedid,whichtransformeditfrombeingmerelyapieceofleatherintobeingashoemadeoutofleather.That,whichatanearliertimewasleathernothavingtheformofashoe,isnowatalatertimeleatherformedintoashoe.ThatiswhyAristotle says that “shoeness” is the formal cause in the production ofshoes.

Theintroductionofthatword“shoeness”willhelpustoavoidtheworsterrorwe can make in dealing with formal causes. We might be tempted, verynaturally,tothinkoftheformofathingasitsshape—somethingweareabletosketchonapieceofpaper.Butshoescomeinawidevarietyofshapes,aswellascolorsandsizes.Ifyoustoodinfrontofashoestorewindowwithsketchpadinhand,youwouldfinditverydifficultorimpossibletodrawwhatiscommontothevariousshapesoftheshoesinthewindow.

Youcanthinkofwhatiscommontothem,butyoucannotdrawit.Whenyoudohaveanideaofwhatiscommontoallshoes,ofeveryshape,size,andcolor,thenyouhavegraspedtheformthatAristotlecallsshoeness.Withouttherebeingsuchaform,shoescouldneverbemade; therawmaterialsoutofwhichshoesare made could never be transformed into shoes. Please notice that word

“transform.” It contains the word “form.”When you transform rawmaterialsintosomethingthattheyarenot—leatherintoshoes,goldintobracelets,andsoon—youaregivingthemaformthattheydidnotpreviouslyhave.Ashoemaker,byworkingonrawmaterials,transformsthemintosomethingtheycanbecomebutwhich,beforeheworkedonthem,theywerenot.

Wecangetfurtherawayfromthemistakeofthinkingthattheformalcauseistheshapeathingtakesbyconsideringotherkindsofchangethatwediscussedbefore—changes other than the production of things such as shoes, rings, andguns.

Thetennisballyousetinmotionmovesfromyourracketacrossthecourttoyouropponent’sbaseline.Youaretheefficientcauseofthatmotion,propellingtheballbytheforceofyourstroke.Theballisthematerialcause—thatwhichisbeingactedon.Butwhatistheformalcause?Itmustbesomeplaceotherthantheplacefromwhichtheballstartedoutwhenyouhitit.Letussupposethattheballlandsontheothersideofthenet,ismissedbyyouropponent,andcomestorestagainstthebackfence.Theplacewhereitcomestorestistheformalcauseoftheparticularmotionthatendedthere.Fromhavingbeenhere,onyoursideofthenet,itspositionorplacehasbeentransformedintobeingoverthere,againstthebackfence.

Thegreenchairthatyoupaintredissimilarlytransformedincolor.So,too,theballoonyoublewup;itistransformedinsize.Rednessistheformalcauseofthechangeyoubroughtaboutbypaintingthechair,justasovertherenessistheformalcauseofthechangeyoubroughtaboutbyhittingthetennisball.Ineachofthesechanges,youaretheefficientcause.Inoneofthem,thegreenchairisthematerialcause, thatwhichyouactedon inpainting it red. In theother, thecollapsedballoonisthematerialcause,thatwhichyouactedonwhenyoublewitup.

Thethreekindsofchange justconsideredalsooccurnaturally,withoutmanentering the picture as efficient cause. When we examine their naturaloccurrence, identifying the four causes becomesmoredifficult, and somenewproblems arise. However, what has already been said about humanly causedchangeswillbeofsomehelptous.

Sunshineripensthetomatoandturnsitfromgreentored.Theraysofthesunare the efficient cause of this alteration, and the tomato itself, the subjectundergoingthechange,isthematerialcauseofit.Here,asinaperson’spaintingagreenchairred,rednessistheformalcause.Fromhavingbeengreenincolor,that iswhat the tomatobecomes.Buthere there isnofinalcausedistinct fromtheformalcausejustnamed.

Thepersonwhopaintedthegreenchairredmayhavedonesoforthesakeof

having it match a set of chairs in a certain room. The purpose or end theindividualhadinmindwasdistinctfromtherednessthatwastheformalcauseinthetransformationofthechair’scolor.Butwewouldhardlysaythatthesun,inshiningonthetomato,wishedtomakeitredasasignthatithadatlastbecomeedible. The end result of the tomato’s ripening, so far as its surface color isconcerned,consistsinitsbeingred.Itsbeingredisboththeformalandthefinalcauseofthechange.

Muchthesamecanbesaidabouttherockthatwearsawayunderthebatteringofthewaves,becomingsmallerinsizeasaresultofthatprocess.Thisprocessmaygoonforalongtime,butatanygivenmoment,thesizeoftherockatthattimeisboth theformalandthefinalcauseof thechange—thedecrease insizethathasoccurredsofar.

Theaccountjustgivenofanaturalalterationincolorandanaturaldecreasein size applies as well to a natural change of place. The tennis ball that isaccidentallydroppedfallstothegroundandeventuallycomestorestthere.Thatlocalmotioncomestoanendattheplacewheretheballcomestorest,andthatplaceistheformalaswellasthefinalcauseofthemotion.

If,inthiscase,oneweretoaskabouttheefficientcause,theforceofgravitywouldprobablybenamed—ananswerthatmostofuslearnedinschool,butthatwouldhavepuzzledAristotle.Ihatfactdoesnotaffectourunderstandingofthedifferencebetweenanefficientcause,on theonehand,andmaterial, finalandformalcauses,ontheother.Howeveritisnamedordesignated,itisalwaysthatwhich, in any process of change, acts upon a changeable subject or exerts aninfluenceuponitthatresultsinthatchangeablesubject’sbecomingdifferentinacertainrespect—red,fromhavingbeengreen;smaller,fromhavingbeenlarger;there,fromhavingbeenhere.

Letusconsideroneotherkindofchange—thegrowthofalivingthingthat,thoughitinvolvesincreaseinsize,involvesmuchmorethanthis.Aristotleusesthefamiliarexampleoftheacornthatfallstothegroundfromanoak,takesrootthere, is nurtured by sunshine, rain, and nutrients in the soil, and eventuallydevelopsintoanotherfull-grownoaktree.

Theacorn,hetellsus,isanoakintheprocessofbecoming.Whatitistobeoakisboththefinalandtheformalcauseoftheacorn’sturningintoanoak.Theform that the acorn assumes when, through growth, it reaches its fulldevelopmentistheendthattheacornwasdestinedtoreachsimplybyvirtueofitsbeinganacorn.

If,insteadofbeinganacorn,theseedlinghadbeenakerneltakenfromanearofcorn,ourplanting it andnurturing itwouldhave resulted inadifferent endproduct—astalkofcornwithearsonit.AccordingtoAristotle,theendthatisto

beachievedand the form that is tobedeveloped in theprocessofgrowtharesomehowpresentattheverybeginning—intheseedthat,withpropernurturing,growsintothefullydevelopedplant.

They are not present actually, he would acknowledge, for then the acornwould already be an oak, and the kernel a stalk of corn.But they are presentpotentially,whichissimplytheoppositeoftheirbeingpresentactually.Itisthedifferencebetweenthepotentialitythatispresentintheacorn,ontheonehand,andthepotentialitythatispresentinthecornkernel,ontheother,whichcausestheoneseedtodevelopinonewayandtheotherseedtodevelopinanother.

Todaywehaveadifferentwayofsaying thesame thing.Aristotlesaid thatthe “entelechy” of one seed differed from the “entelechy” of the other.All hemeantbythatGreekwordwasthateachseedhadinitapotentialitythatdestinedittoreach,throughgrowthanddevelopment,adifferentfinalformorendresult.Wesay,whenweuse the languageofmodernscience, that thegeneticcodeinoneseedgivesitasetofdirectionsforgrowthanddevelopmentthatisdifferentfromthesetofdirectionsgivenbythegeneticcodeintheotherseed.

We think of the genetic code as programming a living thing’s growth anddevelopment fromtheverymomentwhen thatprocessstarts.Aristotle thoughtof a living thing’s inherent potentialities as guiding and controlling what itbecomesinitsprocessofgrowthanddevelopment.Uptoacertainpoint,thetwodescriptionsofwhathappensarealmostinterchangeable.Theobservablefactstobeaccountedforremainthesame.Acornsneverturnintocornstalks.

That this is somust be because there is something initially different in thematter that constitutes the acorn, on the one hand, and in the matter thatconstitutesthekerneloftablecorn,ontheother.Callingwhatistheregenesthatprogramgrowth anddevelopment or calling thempotentialities that guide andcontrol growth and development does not make much difference to ourunderstanding of what is going on. But, as most of us know, it doesmake adifferencetowhathumanbeingscandotointerferewithnaturalprocesses.

Our scientific knowledge of DNA (an abbreviation for a term inbiochemistry) enables us to experiment with the genetic code of an organismand,perhaps, tomake significant changes in thedirections itgives.Aristotle’sphilosophical understanding of the role that potentialities play did not enablehim,nordoesitenableus,tointerfereintheslightestwaywiththeworkingsofnature.

I shall have more to say in the next chapter about potentialities andactualities,andalsoaboutmatterandform,asfundamentalfactorsinchangesofall sorts, both natural and artificial. These four factors, although not identicalwiththefourcauses,arecloselyrelatedtothem.

Towhet your appetite forwhat is coming next, letme ask you to consideragain onemore change that has already beenmentioned—the special kind ofchange thatAristotlecalledcoming tobeandpassingaway.Asanexampleofthat special kind of change, I am going to take an occurrence that is mostfamiliartousinoureverydaylife.

We sit down todinner and, in the courseof it,we eat apieceof fruit.Theappleonourplate,whentakenfromthetree,hadfinishedgrowing.Butitisstillalivingthing,withseedsinitthatcanbeplantedtosproutmoreappletrees.Itshowsnosignsofdecayorrotting.Weeatit,allbutthecore.Whathasbecomeoftheapple?

Wehavenotonlyeatenit,cheweditup,digestedit,butwealsohavedrawnsomenourishmentfromit,whichmeansthatithassomehowbecomepartofus.Beforewestartedeatingit,theorganicmatterofthatpieceoffruithadtheformofanapple.Afterwefinishedeating,digesting,anddrawingnourishmentfromit,thematter,whichoncehadtheformofanapple,hassomehowbecomefusedormergedwithourownmatter,whichhastheformofahumanbeing.

The apple has not become a human being. Rather, it would appear,matteritselfhasbeentransformed,fromhavingtheformofanappletohavingtheformofahumanbeing.Itceasedtobeapplematterandbecamehumanmatter.

What ismeantby“matter itself” asopposed to “applematter” and“humanmatter”? Can we say that matter itself is that which remains the permanentunderlying subject of change in this remarkable kind of change that happenseverydaywhenweeatthefoodthatnourishesus?

IhopeIcanthrowsomelightonthese“matters”inthenextchapter.

7

ToBeandNottoBe

Weordinarilythinkofthebirthofalivingorganismasthecomingintobeingof something that did not exist before. And we often refer to the death of apersonashisorherpassingaway.

InAristotle’sthoughtaboutthechangesthatoccurintheworldofnatureandthe changes that human beings bring about by their effort, the special kind ofchange that he calls coming to be and passing away is distinguished from allotherkindsofchange,suchaschangeofplace,alterationinquality,andincreaseordecreaseinquantity.

This special kind of change in nature is more difficult to understand thanother kinds of change.Why? To find out, let us beginwith what is easier tounderstand—theproductionordestructionofthingsbyhumanbeings.

When people move things from one place to another, when they alter orenlarge them, the individual thing that theymove,alter,orenlargeremains theselfsamething.Itchangesonlywithrespecttoitsattributes—itsplace,itscolor,itssize.Itnotonlyremainsthesamekindofthingthatitwasbeforeitchanged;afterithasbeenchanged,italsopersistsasthisone,unique,individualthing.

Theenduringsamenessorpermanenceoftheindividualthingthatundergoesthesechanges is clear tous from the fact that its identitycanbenamed in thesame way before and after the change occurs: this ball, that chair. It is notanotherballoranotherchair,butthisoneorthatone.

Whensomeonetakesrawmaterials,suchaspiecesofwood,andtransformsthoserawmaterialsintoachair,anartificialthing—somethingthatdidnotexistbefore—comes into existence.What beforewere several pieces ofwood havenowbecomethisparticularchair.Piecesofwoodbecomingachair iscertainlynotthesameasthisgreenchairbecomingred.Thereasonisthatwhenthechairhascome intobeing, the several separatepiecesofwoodno longer remain, atleastnotasseveralseparatepiecesofwood,thoughthischairremainspreciselythischairwhenitchangesincolor.

Beforewego fromartificial production tonatural generation (which is justanothernamefortheprocessofcomingtobe),itwillbehelpfultousifwelookalittlemorecloselyatwhatishappeningintheeasier-to-understandprocessofartificialproduction.Thehelpwillcomefromgettingsomegraspofthemeaningof four words that were used in the preceding chapter. They are “matter,”“form,” “potentiality,” and “actuality.” Though what they mean can beunderstoodinthelightofcommonexperienceandincommon-senseterms,thewordsthemselvesarenotwordsweusefrequentlyineverydayspeech.

Piecesofwoodthatarenotachairbecomepiecesofwoodthatareachair.When the pieces ofwood are not a chair, their not being a chair is a lack ofchairness on their part.They lack—they are deprivedof—the formof a chair.Let’susetheword“privation”forthislackofacertainform.

Thereismoreinthesepiecesofwoodthantheprivationofchairness.Ifthatwasalltherewastoit,thesepiecesofwoodcouldneverbemadeintoachair.Inadditiontolackingchairness,thesepiecesofwoodmustalsohavethecapacitytoacquirechairness.Theircapacityisinseparablyconnectedwiththeirprivation,forifthesepiecesofwooddidnotlacktheformofachair,theywouldnothavethe capacity for acquiring that form, since not lacking it, they would alreadyhaveit.Onlywhencertainmaterials,suchaspiecesofwood,lackacertainformcantheyhavethecapacityforacquiringit.

Letus call that capacity apotentialityof thematerials inquestion.Anotherwordforpotentialityis“canbe.”Itmakesagreatdealofdifferencewhetheryousaythatsomethingisachairorcanbeachair.Thesepiecesofwoodarenotachair,buttheycanbeachair.AsIsaidamomentago,iftheywereachair,theycouldnotbecomeachair.

However,itisnottruetosaythatwhencertainmaterialslackacertainform,they always have the potentiality for acquiring it. For example, water and airlacktheformofachair,butunlikewood,waterandairarematerialsthatdonothavethepotentialityforacquiringtheformofachair.Althoughthepotentialityforacquiringacertainformisneverpresentinthematerialsunlessthatformisabsent, the mere absence of the form—the lack or privation of it—does notnecessarilymean that thematerials have the potentiality for acquiring it.Mencanmakechairsoutofwood,butnotoutofairorwater.

When the pieces of wood that lack the form of a chair and also have thepotentialityforacquiringthatformtakeonthatformasaresultofacarpenter’sskillandeffort,wesaythatthepiecesofwoodthatwerepotentiallyachairhavenowactuallybecomeachair.Throughoutthewholeprocessofbecoming,untilthe very moment when the chair is finally finished, the pieces of wood,undergoing transformation, were still only potentially a chair. Not until their

transformationhasbeencompleteddotheyactuallyhavetheformofachair.Whenthepiecesofwoodareactuallyachair,theirpotentialityforbecoming

a chair has been actualized; and so, of course, it no longer remains as apotentiality. The form the pieces of wood have acquired is the actuality thatremovesthepotentialitythataccompaniedthelackofthatforminthewoodbutdidnotaccompanythelackofitinwaterorair.

Wecannowseehowthesefourimportantwords—matter,form,potentiality,andactuality—arerelated.Mattermayhaveor lackacertain form.Lacking it,mattermayalsohave thecapacity foracquiring it,which is itspotentiality forhavingthatform.Butitdoesnotalwayshavesuchapotentialitywhenitlacksacertain form, aswe saw in the case ofwater and air as comparedwithwood.When it acquires the form forwhich it has a potentiality, that potentiality hasbeen actualized. Having the acquired form has transformed the matter frombeingapotentialchairintobeinganactualchair.

I have been using thewords “matter” and “materials” interchangeably.Butwhenwearereferringtowood,ontheonehand,andwater,ontheother,wearespeakingofdifferentkindsofmatter.Woodisnotjustmatter;itisacertainkindof matter—matter having the form of wood, which is different from matterhavingtheformofwater.

Onekindofmatter,wood,provideshumanbeingswithmaterialsoutofwhichthey canmake chairs; anotherkind,water, doesnot.The form thematter has,which makes it a certain kind of matter (wood), also gives it a certainpotentiality (forbecominga chair).Matter in the formofwaterdoesnothavethatpotentiality.

Whenweunderstandthissimplepoint,asimplestepofreasoningenablesustograspanotherimportantpoint.

Woodcanbecomeachair,butitcannotbecomeanelectriclightbulb;watercanbecomeafountain,butitcannotbecomeachair.

Matter having a certain form has a limited potentiality for acquiring otherforms.This is trueof everykindofmatter, all thedifferentkindsofmaterialsthat people can work on to produce things—chairs, electric light bulbs, andfountains.

Now suppose there was matter totally deprived of form—utterly formlessmatter. It would not actually be any kind of matter. But it would also bepotentially every kind of matter; since, lacking all forms, it would have thecapacitytoacquireanyform.Itwouldhaveanunlimitedpotentialityforforms.

Youwouldbequiterightif, thinkingaboutthis,youweretosay:“Holdon,matter without any form might have an unlimited potentiality, an unlimitedcapacity,foracquiringforms,butlackingallforms,itwouldbeactuallynothing.

Whatisactuallynothingdoesnotexist.Hencetotalkaboutformlessmatteristotalkaboutsomethingthatcannotexist.”Why,then,youmayask,didIbothertomentionitinthefirstplace?What’sthepointinthinkingaboutit?

Aristotlewouldsaythat,lookedatinoneway,youarerightinthinkingthatpure matter, formless matter, is not actually anything or, in other words, isnothing.Youare,therefore,alsorightinthinkingthatformlessmatterdoesnotexist.ButAristotlewouldaddthat,althoughformlessmatterisactuallynothing,itisalsopotentiallyeverything.Itispotentiallyeverypossiblekindofthingthatcanbe.

Still,youpersistinasking,ifformlessmatterdoesnotexistandcannotexist,whatisthepointinmentioningitorthinkingaboutit?Aristotle’sansweristhattherewouldbenoneedtomentionitorthinkaboutitifweconfinedourselvestotrying to understand artificial productions and destructions—the making andunmakingofsuchthingsaschairs.Butthebirthanddeathofanimalsarenotsoeasytounderstand.

Let’stakeananimal’sdeathfirst.Ourpetrabbitdies—decays,disintegrates,andeventuallydisappears.Thematterthathadtheformofarabbitnolongerhasthatform.Itnowhasacquiredanotherform,aswouldhappeniftherabbitwerekilledanddevouredbyawolf.Whenthishappens,matterthatwasthematterofonekindof thing (rabbit)hasnowbecome thematterofanotherkindof thing(wolf).

Ifyouthinkaboutthisforamoment,youwillseethatwhathasoccurredhereisdifferent fromwhatoccurredwhenwood,which isacertainkindofmatter,becomes a chair.Becoming a chair, it does not cease to bewood. It does notcease to be matter of a certain kind. A certain kind of matter has persistedthroughoutthischange.Itcanbeidentifiedasthesubjectof thechange.Thesepieces of wood that at one time were not actually a chair have now becomeactuallyachair.

Butinthetransformationthatoccurredwhenthewolfkilledanddevouredtherabbit,acertainkindofmatterdidnotpersistthroughoutthechange.Thematterofacertainkindofthing(matterhavingtheformofarabbit)becamethematterofanotherkindofthing(matterhavingtheformofawolf).Theonlyidentifiablesubjectofthischangeismatter—notmatterofacertainkind,sincematterofaparticularkinddoesnotpersistthroughoutthechange.

Letusnowturnfromdeathtobirth.Thatpetrabbitofyourscameintobeingasaresultofsexualreproduction.Aristotlewasaswellacquaintedwiththefactsof life asyouand I are.Theprocess that results in thebirthof a living rabbitbeganwhenanovumofa female rabbitwas fertilizedby thespermofamalerabbit.

From the moment of fertilization, a new organism has begun to develop,though while it is still being carried in the female rabbit’s uterus, it is not aseparatelivingthing.Thebirthoftherabbitisjustaphaseintherabbit’sprocessof development. It has been developingwithin themother rabbit before beingborn,anditgoesondevelopingafteritisbornuntilitreachesfullgrowth.

Birthisnothingbuttheseparationofonelivingbodyfromanother—thebabyrabbitfromthemotherrabbit.Andthatseparationisalocalmotion,amovementof the baby rabbit from being in one place to being in another—from beinginsidethemotherrabbittobeingoutsidethemotherrabbit.

Letusnowgobacktothebeginningofthebabyrabbit—themomentwhenitfirstcametobe.Beforethatmoment,therewasthefemalerabbit’sovumandthemale rabbit’s sperm. Neither the ovum nor the sperm was actually a rabbit,though both together had the potentiality for becoming a rabbit. Theactualizationofthatpotentialitytookplaceatthemomentoffertilization,whenthematterofthespermwasmergedorfusedwiththematterofovum.

Do thematter of the ovum and thematter of the sperm in separation fromeach other stand in the same relation to the matter of the baby rabbit afterfertilizationoccurs, as thematterof the rabbit stands to thematterof thewolfaftertherabbithasbeenkilledanddevouredbythewolf?Ifso,thensomethinglikewhatAristotlehadinmindwhenheaskedustothinkaboutformlessmatteris the subject of change in the coming to be and passing away of livingorganisms. It is thatwhichwe identifyaspersistingorenduring in thisspecialkindofchange.

ThisisasnearasIcancometoexplainingwhyAristotlethoughtitnecessarytomention formlessmatter. Youmay think that hewent too far—that naturalgenerationcanbeaccountedforinthesamewayasartificialproduction.Ifyoudothinkso,letmeaskyoutoconsideronemoreexample.

The example is one that Aristotle himself considered. He said that “natureproceedslittlebylittlefromthingslifelesstolivingthingsinsuchawaythatitisimpossibletodeterminetheexactlineofdemarcation.”Hewasquitecapableofimaginingthelinebetweenthenonlivingandthelivingbeingcrossedwhenthefirstlivingorganismsonearthemergedfromnonlivingmatter.Inthatcomingtobeofthefirstlivingorganisms,canweidentifythematterthatisthesubjectofthis remarkable change as beingmatter of a certain kind?Does it remain thesamekindofmatterbothbeforeandafter the first livingorganismscame intobeing?

Youmaynotwanttogosofarastocallitformlessmatter.But,ontheotherhand,youmay find itdifficult to identify it asmatterofacertainkind,whichwouldmeanthatithadandretainedacertainform.Ifthisisyourstateofmind,

thenyouunderstandwhyAristotle thoughtnaturalgenerationmoredifficult toexplain than artificial production; and you also understand why he thought itnecessarytomentionandaskyoutothinkaboutpureorformlessmatter,which,ofcourse,doesnotexist.

8

ProductiveIdeasandKnow-How

Theindividualwhofirst tookwoodandmade it intoachair—orabedorahouse—musthavehadsomeideaofwhathewasgoingtomakeorbuildbeforesettingtowork.Suchanindividualhadtounderstandtheformthatthepiecesofwoodwouldhave toacquire inorder tobecomeachair.Hecouldnotget thatidea fromanexperiencewithchairsbecausenochairs existedbeforehemadethisone.Perhaps,wemayguess,hegotitfromexperienceswithrockformationsthatprovidedhisbodywithsupportforsittingdown.Thefirstchairwasthusanimitationofsomething its inventorhadfoundinnature,as thefirsthousewas,perhaps,animitationofnaturalcaveformationsthatprovidedshelter.

Wherever or however the first chairmaker got the idea of a chair, the ideaitselfwasnotenough.Asweobservedinanearlierchapter,theformofachair—chairness—is common to chairs of every size, shape, and configuration ofparts. If all that the first carpenter had in his mind was an idea of chairs ingeneral, he could not have produced an individual chair, particular in everyrespect in which one individual chair can differ from others. In order totransformthewoodmaterialsheworkedon,bygivingthosematerialstheformofachair,healsohadtohavesomeideaoftheparticularchairhewasabouttoproduce.

Productivethinkinginvolveshavingwhatwemaybetemptedtocallcreativeideas. Since no Greek equivalent of the word “creative” was in Aristotle’svocabulary, we should resist that temptation, and speak instead of productiveideas.Productiveideasarebasedonsomeunderstandingoftheformsthatmattercan take, supplemented by imaginative thinking about such details as sizes,shapes, and configurations. Without a productive idea in this full sense, thecraftsman cannot transform raw materials into this individual thing—be it achair,abed,ahouse,oranythingelsethatcanbemadeoutofmaterialsprovidedbynature.

There are twoways inwhich a productive idea canbe expressed.The first

chairmakerorhousebuilderprobablydidnotdrawupaplanorblueprintofthethinghewasabouttoproduce.Withaproductiveideainmind,hejustproducedit. Thematerialization of that idea—its embodiment inmatter—expressed theproductiveideahehad.Ifyouhadaskedhimwhatideahehadinmindbeforehemadethechairorbuiltthehouse,hemightnothavebeenabletotellyouinsomanywords.Butoncehehadbroughtthechairorhouseintoexistence,hecouldhavepointedtoitandsaid,“There,thatiswhatIhadinmind.”

Much later in thehistoryofmankind,craftsmenofall sortsbecameable todraw up plans for the making of things. They became abl