Aristotle - Ethics 1 and 2

8/7/2019 Aristotle - Ethics 1 and 2

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ETHICA NICOMACHEANicomachean Ethics)

BOOK 11 Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pur- 1094-suit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good hasrightly been declared 1 to be that at which all things aim. But a certaindifference is found among ends; some are activities, others areproducts apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are Sends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to bebetter than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, andsciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health,that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity-as 10bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment ofhorses fall under the art of riding, and t is and every military actionunder strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others-in a of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to allthe subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the 15latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities t h m ~selves are the ends of the actions, or something else apl1rt from theactivities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.2 If, then, there is some end of the things wedo, which we desirefor its own sake everything else being desired for the sake of this) ,and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something elsefor at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire 20would h empty and vain), clearly this must h the good and thecruef good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influenceon life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at be morelikely to hit upon what is right? f so, we must try, in outline at least 25to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities itis the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art

1 PerhaPll by Eudoltus; Cf. I I ~ b o.935


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93736 NI COM ACHEAN E T HICS [BK.I: CH.2and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears tobe of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences1094b should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens shoulrllearn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see eventhe most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e. g. strategy,

5 economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences,and since, again, it legislates as to what we to do and what we areto abstain from, the end of this science must include those of theothers, so that this end must be th e good for man. For even i the endis the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seemsat all events something greater and more complete whether to attainor to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely forone man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for

10 city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, sinceit is political science, in one sense of that term.3 Our discussion will be adequate i it has as much clearness as thesubject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alikein all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now

IS fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit ofmuch variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thoughtto exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also giverise to a similar fluctuation because they b ring harm to many people;for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, andothers by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speak

20 ing of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truthroughly and in outline, and in speaking ab out things which are only forthe most part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should eachtype of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man25 to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the natureof the subject admits; it is evident ly equally foolish to accept probablereasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician

scientific proofs.Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he isa good jUdge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is1095- a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an allround education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is nota proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperiencedin the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from theseand are abou t these; and, furthe r. since he tends to follow his passions,

'BK.I: CH.3] NI COM ACHEAN E T HICShis study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at isnot knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is 5young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not dependon time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, aspassion directs. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledgebrings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with 10a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of greatbenefit.These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.

Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that allknowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that wesay political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods ISachievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; forboth the genera!" run of men and people of superior refinement saythat it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with beinghappy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and 20the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the formerthink it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, orhonour; they differ, however, from One another-and often even thesame man identifies it with different things, with health when he isill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, 25they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above theircomprehension. Now some 2 thought that apart from these manygoods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodnessof all these as welL To examine all the opinions that have been heldwere perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that aremost prevalent or that seem to be arguable.

Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between 30arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too, wasright in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, 'are we onthe way from or to the first principles?'.3 There is a difference, asthere is in a race-course between the course from the judges to theturning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin with what 1 951>is known, things are objects of knowledge in two senses-,-some to us,some without qualification. Presumably, then, w must begin withthings known to us Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently tolectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects 5)f political 5cience must have been brought up in good habits. For the

2 The Platonic School; Cf. ch. 6. 3 cr Rep II B.


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938 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS [BK.I: CH.4fact is the starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he

I\ will not at the start need the reason as well; and the man who hasbeen well brought up has or can easily get starting-points. And as forhim who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the words ofHesiod::1i

iJ 10 Far best is he who knows alI things himself;, Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;But he who neither knows, nor lays to heartAnother's wisdom, is a useless wight.5 Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at whichwe digressed. To judge from th e livesthat men lead, most men, and men

1S of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identifythe good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why theylove the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominenttypes of life-that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish20 in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get someground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places

share the tastes of SardanapalIus. A consideration of the prominenttypes of life shows that people of superior refinement and of activedisposition identify happiness with honour ; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be whatwe are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow25 honour rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine tobe something proper to a man and not easily taken from him. Further,men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured of theirgoodness; at least it is by men of practica l wisdom th at they seekto be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the groundof their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue30 is better. And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather thanhonour, the end of the political life. But even this appears somewhat

incomplete; for possession of virtue seems actually compatible withbeing asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest1096& sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was livingso no one wouldcall happy, unless he Were maintaining a thesis at all costs. But enoughof this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in the currentdiscussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider later.4

4 l n a 12-II'1S 8, II7S" 22-II'9& 32.

BK. I: CIt. 5} NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 939The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and Swealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely usefuland for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take theaforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. But

it is evident that not even these are ends; yet many arguments havebeen thrown away in support of them. Let us leave this subject, then. 106 We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discussthoroughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made anuphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by friendsof our own. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better, indeed tobe our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy whattouches us closely, especially as we are philosophers or lovers of 5wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to honour truthabove our friends.

The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of classeswithin which they recognized priority and posteriority (which is thereason why they did not maintain the existence ofan Idea embracingall numbers); but the term Igood' is used both in the category ofsubstance and in that of quality and in that of relation, and that 20which is per se 1. e. substance, is prior in nature to the relative (forthe la tter is like an offshoot and accident of being) ; so that there couldnot be a common Idea set over all these goods. Furthe r, since Igood'has as many senses as 'being' (for it is predicated both in the categoryof substance, as of God and of reason, and in quality, 1. e. of the 2Svirtues, and in quantity, 1. e. of that which is moderate, and in relation, 1. e. of the useful, and in time, i. e. of the right opportunity,and in place, i. e. of the right locality and the like), clearly it cannotbe something universally present in all cases and single; for then itcould not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only. IFurther, since of the things answering to one Idea there is one science, 30there would have been one science of all the goods; but as it is thereare many sciences even of the things that fall under one category, e. g.of opportunity, for opportunity in war is studied by strategics and indisease by medicine, and the moderate in food is studiedby medicineand in exercise by the science of gymnastics. And one might ask thequestion, what in the world they mean by la thing itself', if (as isthe case) in 'ma n himself' and in a particular man the account of man 3Sis one and the same. For in so far as they are man, they will in no 1090'respect differ; and i this is so, neither will 'good itself' and particulargoods, in so far as they are good. But again it will flot be good anythe more for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter

I:


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9-+0 NI COM ACHEAN E T HICS [BK. I: CH. 65 than that which perishes in a day. The Pythagoreans seem to give aI more plausible account of the good, when they place the one in thecolumn of goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have fol11 lowed.

But let us discuss these matters elsewhere 5; an objection to what1 . we have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the Platonistsj 10 have not been speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are/ pursued and loved for themselves are called good by reference to asingle Form, while those which tend to produce or to preserve thesesomehow or to prevent their contraries are called so by reference tothese, and in a secondary sense. Clearly, then, goods must be spokenof in two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the others byreason of these. Let us separate, then, things good in themselves from

15 things useful, and consider whether the former are called good byreference to a single Idea. What sort of goods would one call good inthemselves? Is it those that are pursued even when isolated fromothers, such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours?Certainly, i we pursue these also for the sake of something else, yetone would place them among things good in themselves. Or is nothing20 other than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will be

t mpty. But if the things we have named are also things good in themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as somethingidentical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow and inwhite lead. But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of2S their goodness, the accounts a re distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is not some common element answering to one Idea.

But what then do we mean by the good? t is surely not like thethings that only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then,by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good,or are they rather one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body,30 so is reason in the soul, and so on in other cases. But perhaps thesesubjects had better be dismissed for the presen t; for perfect precisionabout them would be more appropriate to another branch of philoso

phy.6 And similarly with regard to the Idea; even if there is someone good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable ofseparate and independent existence, clearly it could not be achievedor attained by man; but we are now seeking something attainJ.ble.

35 Perhaps, however, some one might think it worth while to recognizetIis with a view to the goods that re attainable and achievable; for

II Cf. Met 986" 22-6, 1028t 21-4, 1072b 30-1073& 3,1091 29- 3, b 1 . ~ - 1 0 9 2 17.II Cf. Met iv. 2

BK.I: CH.6] NICOMACHEAN E T HICS 941having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods that 1097are good for us, and if we know them shall attain them. This argumenthas some plausibility, but seems to clash with the procedure of thesciences; for all of these, though they aim at some good and seek to 5supply the deficiency of it, leave on one side the knowledge of thegood. Yet that all the exponents of the arts should be ignorant of, andshould not even seek, so great an aid is not probable. t is hard, too,to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be benefited in regard to hisown craft by knowing this 'good itself', or how the man who has 10viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or general thereby. Fora doctor seems not even to study health in this way, but the healthof man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular man; it is individuals that he is I;tealing. But enough of these topics.7 Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it 15can be. t seems different in different actions and arts; it is differentin medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then isthe good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done.In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architec ture a house, 20in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuitthe end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else theydo. Therefore, i there is an end for all that we do, this will be thegood achievable by action, and i there are more than one, these willbe the goods achievable by action.So the argument has by a different course reached the same point;but we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e. g. wealth, 2Sflutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something else,clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidentlysomething final. Therefore, i there is only one final end, this will bewhat we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most finalof these will be what we are seeking. Now we call that which is in 30itself worthy of pursuit more final t han that which isworthy of pursuitfor the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable forthe sake of something else more final than the things that are desirableboth in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirablein itself and never for the sake of something else.Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for thiswe choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else, 1097bbut honour, pleasure, reason,and every virtue we choose indeed forthemselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should stm choose

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i 1i1,111I

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942 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS [BK.I: CR. 7each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness,

S judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on theother hand , no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, foranything other than itself.From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems tofollow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now byself-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by10 himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children,wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man isborn for citizenship, But some limit must be set to this; for i weextend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friendsfriends we are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this question,however, on another occasion;7 the self-sufficient we now define as15 that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing;and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it mostdesirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among

others-if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirableby the addition of even the least of goods; for th at which is added

lO becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always moredesirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, andisthe end of action.Presumably, however, to say t hat happiness is the chief good seems aplatitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might2S perhaps be given, i we could first ascertain the function of man. Forjust as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general,for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the wellis thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man,

i he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and t he tanner certain30 functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidentlyhas a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a functionapart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to be commoneven to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us1098& exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would

be a life of perception, but t also seems to be common even to thehorse, the ox, and. every animal. There remains, then, an active lifeof the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has sucha principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense5 of po'!Sessing one and exercising thought. And, as life of the rationalelement also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense ofactivity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense7 i 10, II h. 10.

BK.I: CR. 7] NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 943of the term. Now i the function of man is an activity of soul whichfollows or implies a rational principle, and i we say a so-and-so anda good so-and-so have a function which is the same in kind, e. g. alyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in allcases, eminence in respect of goodness being added to the name 10of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre,and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): i this is the case,[and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, andthis to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and nobleperformance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is 15perfonned in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this isthe case,] human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordancewith virtue, and i there are more than one virtue, in accordance withthe best and most complete.But we must add (in a complete life . For one swallow does notmake a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time,does not make a man blessed and happy.Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably 20first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it wouldseem that anyone is capable of carrying on an d articulating what hasonce been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or partnerin such a work; to which facts the advances of the arts a re due; foranyone can add what is lacking. And we must also remember what 5has been said before,S and not look for precision in all things alike,butin each class of things such precision as accords with the subjectmatter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter Iand a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; theformer does so in so far as the right angle is useful for his work, 30while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for heis a spectator of the truth. We must act in the same way, then, in tall other matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinatedto minor questions. Nor must we demand the cause in all matters Ialike; it is enough in some cases th at the f ct be well established, as 10981:in the case of the first principles; the fact is the primary thing or firstprinciple. Now of first principles we see some by induction, some byperception, some by a certain habituation, and others too in otherways. But each set of principles we must try to investigate in thenatural way, and we must take pains to state them definitely, since Sthey have a great influence on what follows. F or the beginning is

8 I094b I I -Zj .


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944 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS [Bx.I: Cn.1

fJIII

thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of the questionswe ask are cleared up by it.a We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our coneh.10 sian and our premisses, but also of what is commonly said about itfor with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the

;M

facts soon clash. Now goods have been di vided into three classes,\! an dsome are described as external, others as relating to soul or to body;we call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and15 psychical actions and activities we class as relating to soul. Thereforeour account must be sound, at least according to this view, which is

an old one and agreed on by philosophers. t is correct also in that weidentify the end with certain actions and activities; for thus it fallsamong goods of the soul and r.ot among external goods. Another belief20 which harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well

and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort ofgood life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for inhappiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have definedhappiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some'with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom,5 others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not

without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. Nowsome of these views have been held by many men and men of old,others by a few eminent persons; and it is not probable that eitherof these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should beright in at least some one respect or even in most respects.30 With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue

our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity.But it makes, perhaps, no smaIl difference whether we place the chiefgood in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the

1()99 state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in aman who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity,cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, andacting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautifuland the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is5 Some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightlywin, the noble and good things in life.

Their life is a)so in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of souland to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant;e. g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle

10 to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant\I PI. Euthyd. 279


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946 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS [BK.I:CH.9appropriate to anotherinquiry; happinessseems,however,eveni it

.r 15 isnot god-sentbut comes as a resultofvirtueandsome processofI learningortraining, to beamongthemostgod-likethings; for thatwhich is theprizeandendofvirtueseems tobe the bestthingin ejj world,andsomethinggodlikeand blessed.: t willalsoonthisview bevery generallyshared; for allwhoarej not maimedas regards theirpotentiality for virtuemay winit y a 20 certainkindofstudy and care.But if it is bettertobehappy thus'I : thanby chance,it is reasonablethat thefactsshouldbeso,sinceevery thingthat dependson the actionofnatureisby natureasgoodasitcanbe,and similarlyeverythingthat dependsonart orany rationalcause,and especiallyifitdependsonthebestofallcauses.To entrusttochancewhatis greatestandmostnoblewouldbea verydefectivearrangement.

25 Theanswer tothe questionwe areaskingisplainalso fromthedefinitionofhappiness; forit hasbeensaid1.2 tobeavirtuousactivityofsoul, ofa certainkind.Of the remaininggoods, somemustnecessarily pre-existas conditions of happiness,and othersarenaturallyco-operativeandusefulasinstruments.Andthiswillbefoundtoagreewithwhatwesaid at the outset;13forwe statedthe endofpolitical30 sciencetobethebestend,and politicalsciencespendsmostof itspainson making the citizensto beof a certain character,viz. good andcapableofnobleacts.

t isnatural,then, that we callneitheroxnorhorsenorany otheroftheanimalshappy; fornoneof themiscapableofsharinginsuchllooa activity. Forthis reason alsoa boyis nothappy; forhe isnotyetcapableofsuchacts,owingtohisage; and boyswhoarecalledhappyarebeingcongratulatedby reasonofthehopeswehaveforthem.Forthereisrequired,aswe said,14 not onlycompletevirtuebut also a5completelife, sincemany changes occurin life, andall mannerofchances,and the mostprosperousmay fall intogr eatmisfortunes inold age, asistoldofPriam inthe Trojan Cycle; and onewhohasexperiencedsuchchancesandhasendedwretchedlynoonecallshappy.10 10 Must nooneat all,then, be calledhappywhilehe lives; mustwe,asSolonsays,seethe end?Eveni wearetolay downthisdoctrine,isit alsothecase that amans happywhenheis dead Orisnotthbquiteabsurd,especiallyforuswhosaythat happinessisanactivity?15 Butif we do not callthedeadmanhappy,and if Solondoesnotmeenthis,but that onecanthensafelycall amanblessedas beingat lastbeyondevilsand misfortunes,thisalsoaffordsmatt erfordiscussion;

12 10 98 ' 16. 13 10 94"' 27. 14 1098 16-18.

941Bx.I: ClIo 10] NICOMACHEAN ETHICSforbotheviland goodarethoughttoexistforadeadman,as muchasforonewho is alivebut notawareofthem; e. g. honoursanddishon- 20ours and the good or bad fortunes of children and in general ofdescendants.Andthisalsopresents aproblem; for thoughamanhaslivedhappilyup toold ageand hashad a deathworthyofhislife,manyreverses may befall his descendants-someof them may begoodand attain thelifethey deserve, whilewithothers theopposite25may be the case; andclearlytoo thedegreesofrelationshipbetweenthemandtheirancestorsmayvaryindefinitely. It wouldbeodd,then,if1hedeadmanweretoshareinthesechangesandbecomeat onetimeh8.ppy, at anotherwretched;whileit wouldalsobeoddi thefortunesof the descendants did not for some time havesome effect on the 30happinessoftheirancestors.Butwe mustreturntoourfirstdifficulty;forperhapsby aconsiderationofit ourpresentproblemmightbesolved.Nowi we mustseetheendandonlythencalIamanhappy,notasbeinghappybut ashavingbeen so before, surelythis isa paradox,that whenhe is happythe3::attribute that belongs tohim isnot tobe truly predicated of himbecausewe do notwishto callliving menhappy,onaccountof the1100'changesthat maybefall them,and becausewe haveassumed happiness to be something permanentandby no means easily changed,whilea single manmay suffer manyturns of fortune's wheel. Forclearlyi we weretokeeppacewithhisfortunes, we shouldoftencall 5thesamemanhappyandagainwretched,makingthehappymanouttobea'chameleonandinsecurelybased'.Oristhiskeepingpacewithhis fortunes quitewrong? Successor failurein lifedoes not dependonthese,but humanlife,aswe said,15 needstheseasmereadditions,whilevirtuousactivitiesortheiroppositesarewhatconstitutehappinessorthe reverse. 10Thequestion we havenow discussed confirmsour definition. Forno functionof manhas so much permanenceas virtuousactivities(theseare thought to bemore durableevent han knowledge of thesciences),andofthesethemselvesthemostvaluable are moredurable15becausethosewhoare happyspendtheir lifemostreadilyand Ihostcontinuouslyinthese; for thisseemsto bethereasonwhywe do notforgetthem.The attributeinquestion,16then,willbelongtothehappyman,and hewillbehappythroughouthislife;foralways,orby preference to everythingelse, hewill be engaged in virtuousaction andcontemplation, and hewill bear the chancesof life mostnoblyand 20altogether decorously, if he is truly good' and 'foursquare beyondreproach' .11

111099. 3t_b 7. 18Durability. 11 SimoDides.


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,NICOMACHEAN ETHICS48

Nowmanyeventshappenby chance,andeventsdifferinginimportance; smallpieces ofgood fortuneor ofits oppositeclearlydo notweighdownthescalesoflifeonewayortheother, but amultitudeof25 greateventsif theyturn outwellwillmakelifehappier (fornot only'aretheythemselvessuchastoaddbeautytolife,but thewaya man'dealswiththemmaybe nobleandgood),whileiftheyturn outill theycrushandmaimhappiness; forthey bothbringpainwiththemand30 hinder many activities. Yeteven in these nobility shines through,when a man bears with resignation many great misfortunes, not,throughinsensibilitytopainbut throughnobilityandgreatnessof soul. '

f activitiesare,aswesaid,18whatgiveslifeitscharacter,nohappymancan become miserable; for hewill neverdo the actsthat are35 hatefulandmean.Forthemanwhoistrulygoodandwise,we think,'1101- bearsallthechancesoflifebecominglyandalwaysmakesthe bestofcircumstances,as agoodgeneralmakes thebest military useof the'armyat hiscommandandagoodshoemakermakesthebestshoesout5 ofthehidesthataregivenhim;andsowithallothercraftsmen.Andifthisis thecase,thehappymancanneverbecomemiserable-thougllhewill not reachblessedness ifhemeetwith fortuneslike those ofPriam.Nor, again,is he many-colouredand changeable; for neitherwill

10 hebemovedfromhishappystateeasilyorby anyordinarymisadventures,but only by manygreatones, nor, if hehashad manygreatmisadventures,will herecoverhishappinessinashorttime,but ifatall,onlyin a longand completeone inwhichhehas attained manysplendidsuccesses.Why then should we notsaythat heis happywhois active in15 accordancewithcompletevirtueandissufficientlyequippedwithex-'ternalgoods,not for somechanceperiodbut throughout a completelife?Ormustweadd'andwhoisdestinedtolivethusanddieasbefits

his life'?Certainlythefutureis obscure tous, while happiness,weclaim,isanendandsomethingin everywayfinal. f so,we shallcallhappythoseamonglivingmeninwhom theseconditionsare,and are20 tobe,fulfilled-but happymen o much for thesequestions.11 llYfhat the fortunes ofdescendantsant! ofall a man'sfriendsshouldnotaffecthis happinessat allseemsaveryunfriendlydoctrine,and oneopposedtoth eopinionsmenhold; butsincethe eventsthat

25 happenare numerousand admit ofall sorts ofdifference,and some111.,9. Aristotlenowreturnstothequestionstatedin IIOO 18-30.

Blt.l: CR.11) NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 949come more nearto us and othersless so, it seemsa long-nay aninfinite-task todiscusseachindetail; a generaloutlinewillperhapssuffice. If then,assomeofaman'sownmisadventureshavea certainweight and influence onlifewhileothers are,asit were, lighter, sotootherearedifferencesamongthemisadventuresofourfriendstaken 30asa whole, and itmakesa differencewhether the various sufferingsbefall thelivingorthe dead (muchmoreevent hanwhetherlawless Iandterribledeedsarepresupposedinatragedyordoneonthestage),thisdifferencealsomustbetakenintoaccount; or rather,perhaps,thefact that doubtisfeltwhetherthe dead share inany good orevil.35 IIForit seems,fromtheseconsiderations,thateven if anythingwhether1101 good or evil penetrates to them,it must be something weak andnegligible, eitherin itself orfor them,orif not,at least it mustbe ,1\suchindegreeandkindasnottomakehappythosewhoarenothappy itnorto take awaytheir blessednessfromthosewhoare.The goodor 11badfortunesof friends,then, seemtohavesomeeffectson thedead,5 [Ibut effectsofsucha kindand degreeasneither tomakethe happy Iunhappynortoproduceanyotherchangeof thekind.12 Thesequestionshavingbeendefinitelyanswered,let usconsider10whetherhappinessisamongthethingsthat arepraisedorratheramong r;thethings that areprized; for clearlyitis not tobe placed amongpotentiaUties.20Everythingthat ispraisedseemstobepraisedbecauseitis ofacertain kindand isrelated somehowto somethingelse; forwepraisethejust orbravemanandingeneralboththe goodmanandvirtueitselfbecauseof the actions and functions involved, andwe 15praisethestrongman,thegoodrunner,andso on,becauseheisofa 'Icertainkindandis relatedina certainway tosomethinggood andimportant.Thisisclearalsofromthepraisesofthe gods; forit seemsabsurdthat thegodsshouldbereferredtoourstandard,but thisis donebecausepraiseinvolvesareference,aswe said,tosomethingelse.But20if praiseis forthingssuchaswehavedescribed,clearlywhatappliestothebestthingsisnotpraise,but somethinggreaterandbetter,asisindeedobvious;forwhatwedotothegodsandthe mostgodlikeofmenisto callthemblessedandhappy.Andsotoowithgoodthings; noone 25praiseshappinessashedoesjustice,but rathercallsit blessed,asbeingsomethingmoredivineandbetter.Eudoxusalsoseemstohavebeenrightinhismethodofadvocatingthesupremacyofpleasure; hethoughtthat the factthat, thoughagood,it isnot praisedindicatedit tobebetterthanthethingsthat arepraised,andthat thisiswhatGodand thegoodare ; forbyreference30,

20 Cf.Top n6 b4; M M n83 b
http:///reader/full/potentiaUties.20http:///reader/full/potentiaUties.20http:///reader/full/potentiaUties.20


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950 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS [BK.I:Cn.12

Ii totheseallotherthingsarejudged. raiseisappropriatetovirtue,forasa result of virtuementend todo noble deeds; but encomia arebestowed on acts,whether ofthe bodyor ofthe soul.But perhaps

3S nicetyinthesemattersismorepropertothosewhohavemadeastudyofencomia;to usit isclearfromwhathas beensaidthat happinessis 1102 amongthethings that areprizedandperfect.It seemstobe soalsofromthe factthat it is a firstprinciple; for it is for thesakeofthisr that we alldoallthat wedo,and thefirstprincipleand causeofgoodsis,weclaim,somethingprizedanddivine.

5 13 Sincehappinessis an activityofsoulinaccordancewithperfectvirtue,wemustconsiderthe na.tureofvirtue;forperhapswe shallthusseebetterthenatureofhappiness. The truestudentofpolitics,too,isthought tohavestudiedvirtueaboveallthings; forhewishestomake10 his fellow citizensgoodand obedient to thelaws. As an exampleofthiswehavethelawgiversoftheCretansandtheSpartans,andanyothersof thekindthat theremayhavebeen.Andif thisinquirybelongstopoliticalscience,clearlythe pursuitofit willbeinaccordancewithour original plan. But clearly thevirtuewe must studyis humanvirtue;forthe goodwe wereseekingwashumangoodand thehappinessIS humanhappiness. By humanvirtuewemeannot that ofthebodybut

that ofthe soul;andhappinessalsowe callan activityofsoul.But ifthisisso,clearlythestudentofpoliticsmustknowsomehowthefactsaboutsoul,as themanwhoistohealtheeyes or thebodyasawholemustknowabouttheeyes or thebody;and allthemoresincepolitics20 ismoreprizedand betterthanmedicine;but evenamongdoctorsthebesteducatedspendmuchlabouronacquiringknowledgeofthebody.

The studentofpolitics,then,muststudy thesoul,and muststudyitwiththeseobjectsinview,and dosojusttotheextentwhichis s u i ~dent for the questionswe are discussing; for further precision iszs perhapssomethingmorelaborious thanourpurposesreqUire.Somethingsare saidaboutit,adequatelyenough,eveninthediscussionsoutsideourschool,andwe mustusethese; e.g. that oneelementinthesoulisirrationalandonehasarationalprinciple.Whetherthese30 areseparated asthe partsof thebody or ofanything divisibleare,or are distinctbydefinitionbut by natureinseparable,likeconvexandconcavein the circumferenceof a circle, doesnot affect the preserotquestion.

ftheirrationalelementonedivisionseems to be widelydistributed,andvegetativein itsnature,Imean that whichcausesnutritionandgrowth;forit isthiskindofpowerofthesoulthat onemUst assignto1102\' allnurslingsand toembryos,and thissl\mepowertofuD-growncrea.

BK I: Cn.13] NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 951tures;thisismorereasonablethanto assignsomedifferentpowertothem. Nowth eexcellenceof this seemsto becommon toa ll speciesandnotspecificallyhuman; forthispart or facultyseemsto functionSmostin sleep,whilegoodnessand badnessarele astmanifestin sleep(whence comesthe saying that thehappyare nobetteroff than thewretchedforhalftheirlives;and thishappensnaturallyenough,sincesleepisan inactivityof thesoul in that respectinwhich it iscalledgoodorbad), unlessperhapsto asmallextentsomeofthemovements10actuallypenetratetothesoul,and inthisrespectthedreamsofgood 11timenarebetterthanthoseof ordinarypeople.Enoughofthissubject, however; let usleave thenutritivefacultyalone,sinceit hasby itsnaturenoshareinhumanexcellence.Ther eseemst obe also another irrationalelementin thesoul-one iwhichinasense,however,sharesin arationalprinciple.For we praisetherationalprincipleofthecontinentmanandoftheincontinent, and 15 1Ithepart oftheir soul that hassucha principle,sinceit urgesthem tarightandtowardsthebestobjects;but thereis found in themalso [another element naturally opposed to the rational principle, whichfights against and resists that principle. For exactly as paralysedlimbswhen we intendtomovethemtotherighttum onthecontrary20totheleft,so isit withthesoul; theimpulSf'.s ofincontinentpeoplemoveincontrarydirections.But whileinthebody we seethat whichmovesastray,in the soulwe donot.Nodoubt,however,wemustnonethelesssupposethat inthesoultoothereissomethingcontrarytothe 2Srationalprinciple,resistingand opposingit.In whatsenseit isdistinctfromthe otherelementsdoesnotconcernus.Noweventhis seemstohaveashareina rationalprinciple,aswesaid;21 at any rateinthecontinentman it obeystherational principle-and presumablyin thetemperateandbravemanit isstillmoreobedient;forinhimit speaks,on allmatters,withthesamevoiceastherationalprinciple.Thereforetheirrationalelementalsoappearsto betwofold.Forthevegetative elementinnoway shares in a rational principle, but the 30appetitive,and ingeneralthedesiringelementinasensesharesin it,inso farasit listens to and obeysit; thisis thesenseinwhichwespeakof'taltingaccount'ofone'sfatheror one'sfriends,not that inwhichwespeakof'accounting'foramathematicalproperty. That theirrationalelementisin somesensepersuadedby arationalprinCipleisindicatedalsoby thegivingofadvicemd by allreproof ' lIlO exnorta- 1103tion.Andif thiselementalsomustbe saidtohavearatioruU ~ r i n c i p l ethat whichhas a rationalprinciple (aswell as that which hasnot)will be twofold, onesubdivisionhaving it in the strict sense lnd in

l l t 13.


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952 N IC O MA C H E A N E T HI C S BIC. 11: CH. 1] N IC O MA C H E A N E T HI C S 953itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one's fatherJ

\ Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this d i f ~ference; for we say that some of the virtues are intelIectual and others5 moral, philosophic wisdom and understanding and practical wisdOIl'lbeing intellectual, liberality and temperance moral. For in speaking1 about a man'f character we do not say that he is wise or has under,.standing but that he is good-tempered or temperate; yet we Praise.lrt; the wise man also with respect to his state of mind; and of states of; 10 mind we call those which merit praise virtues.I OOK

1 Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual} 15 virtue in the main owes both its bi rth and it s growth to teaching (forwhich reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtuecomes about as a result of habit, whence also its name ethike is onethat is formed by a slight r i t ~ o n from the word ethos (habit). Frontthis it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by

20 for nothing tha t existsby nature can form a habi t contrary to its natl' ...:;For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannothabituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train i tby h r o w i n ~it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to movewards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way btrained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrariJ:to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adaptedby nature to

2S receive them, and are made perfect byhabit.Again) of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquirethe potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case30 of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing thatgot these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we usethem, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtudwe get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of theas weII. For the things we have to learn before we can do them,learn by doing them, e. g. men become builders by building and lyre:11031) players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts"temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing braveacts,This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators mabthe citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish ofS every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, andit is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that everyvirtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for itis from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are pro

Iduced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of allthe rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of buildingwell 10 ior badly. For if this were not s o ~ there would have been no need of ateacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. ,IThis, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts thatwe do in ou. transactions with other men we become just or unjust, 15 I.iand by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger,and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave orcowardly, The same is true of appetities and feelings of anger;some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgentand irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate 20circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of likeactivities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certainkind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differencesbetween these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we formhabits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes III very 25great difference, or rather all the difference.2 Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know whatvirtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquirywould have been of no use), we must examine the nature of actions,namely how we ought to do them; for these determine also the nature 30of the states of characte rthat are produced, as we have said." Now, thatwe must act according to the right rule is a common principle and mustbe assumed it will be discussed later,2 i e. both what the right ruleis, and how it is related to the other virtues. But this must be agreed lI04rupon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct must begiven in outline and not precisely, as we said at the very beginning 3that the accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subjectmatter; matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is goodfor us have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general 5account being of this nature, the account of particular cases is yet morelacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any art or precept butthe agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropmateto the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation.But though our present account is of this natur e we must give what 10help we can. First, then, let us consider this,that it is the nature of suchthings to be destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the case ofstrength and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible , emust use the evidence of sensible thin gs); both excessive and defective 15

s 3IJ 25. 2 vi 13. 3 l094b II 27.


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954 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS [BK. II: CR.2exercise de!!troys the strength, and similarly drink or food which isabove or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that whichis proportionate both produces and increases and preserves it. So too

20 is it, then, in the case of temperance and courage and the other virtues.For the man who flies from md fears everything and does not stand hisground against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fearsnothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from nonebecomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns every pleasure, as

Z5 boors do, becomes in a way insensible; temperance and courage, then,are destroyed by excess and defect, and preservedby the mean.But not only are the sources and causes of their origination andgrowth the same as those of their destruction, but also the sphere oftheir actualization will be the same; for this is also true of the things30 which are more evident to sense, e. g. of strength; it is produced bytaking much food and undergoing much exertion, and it is the strongman that will be most able to do these things. So too is it with thevirtues; by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and it is35 when we have become so that we are most able to abstain from them;1104b and similarly too in the case of courage; for by being habituated todespise things that are terrible and to stand our ground against themwe become brave, and it is when we have become so that we shall bemost able to stand our ground against them.

3 We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain5 tha t ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasuresand delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who isannoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground againstthings that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained isbrave, while the man who is pained is a coward. For moral excellenceis concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure

10 that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstainfrom noble ones. Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says,4 so as both to delight in andto be pained by t he things that we ought; for this is the right education.Again, if the virtues are concerned with actions and passions, andevery passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain,

15 for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains.This is indicated also by the fact that punishment is inflicted by thesemeans; for it is a kind of cure, and it is the nature ofCUres to be effectedby contraries.< lAws 653 A If., Rep. 401 E-40:l It

BK. II: CR. 3] NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 955Again, as we said but lately,1i every state of soul has a natur e relativeto and concerned with the kind of things by which it tends to be made 20worse or better; but it is by reason of pleasures and pains that menbecome bad, by pursuing and avoiding these-either the pleasures andpains they ought not or when they ought not or as they ought not, or bygoing wrong in one of the other similar ways that may be distinguished.Hence men 6 even define the virtues as certain states of impassivity and 25

rest; not well, however, because they speak absolutely, and do not say'as one ought' and 'as one ought not' and 'when one ought or ought not',and the other things that may be added. We assume, then, that thiskind of excellence tends to do what is best with regard to pleasures andpains, and vice does the contrary.The following facts also may show us that virtue and vice are concerned with these same things. There being three objects of choice and 30three of avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and theircontraries, the base, the injurious, the painful, about all of these thegood man tends to go right and the bad man togo wrong, and especiallyabout pleasure ; for this is common to the animals, and also it accompanies all objects of choice; for even the noble and the advantageous 35appear pleasant.Again, it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it 1105ais difficult to rub off this passion, engrained as it is in our life. And wemeasure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by the rule 5of pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole inquiry mustbe about these; for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has nosmall effect on our actions.Again, it is harder to fight with pleasure than with anger, to useHeraclitus' phrase, but both art and virtue are always concerned withwhat is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. Therefore 10for this reason also the whole concern both of virtue and of politicalscience is with pleasures and pains; for the man who uses these wellwill be good, he who uses them badly bad.That virtue, then, is concerned with pleasures and pains, and that

by the acts from which it arises it is both increased and, if they are donedifferently, destroyed, and that the acts from which it arose are those 15in which it actualizes itself-let this be taken as said.4 The question might be asked, what we mean by saying 7 that wemust become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperateacts; for if men do just and temperate acts, they are already jus t and

I} 27 -b 3.6 Probably Speusippus s referred to. ~ ' n o J 3I-b 25, II04" 27 -b 3.


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95156 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS [Bx. II: Cx.420 temperate, exactly as, if they do what is in accordance with the lawsof grammar and of music, they are grammarians and musicians.Or is this not true even of the arts? It is possible to do somethingthat is in accordance with the laws of grammar, either by chance or atthe suggestion of another. A man will be a grammarian, then, only when25 he has both done something grammatical and done it grammatically;and th is means doing it in accordance with the grammatical knowledgein himself.

Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar;for the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so thatit is enough that they should have a certain character, but if the actsthat are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain

30 character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately.The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; inthe first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose theacts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action mustproceed from a firm and unchangeable character. These are notreckoned in as conditions of the possession of the arts, except the

1l05b bare knowledge; but as a condition of the possession of the virtuesKnowledge has little or no weight, while the other conditions countnot for a little but for everything, i. e. the very conditions whichresult from often doing just and temperate acts.5 Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such asthe just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who doesthese that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them asjust and temperate men do them. t is well said, then, that it is by

10 doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperateacts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have evena prospect of becoming good.But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory andthink they are being philosophers and will become good in this way,

15 behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered to do. s the latterwill not be made well in body by such a course of treatment, theformer will not be made well in soul by such a course of philosophy.5 Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found

20 in the soul are of three kinds-passions, faculties, states of character,virtue must be one of these. By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear,confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity,and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain;by faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable

Bx. II: Cx. 5] NICOMACHEAN ETHIC Sof feeling these, e. g. of becoming angry or being pained or feelingpity; by states of character the things in virtue of which we stand 25well or badly with reference to the passions, e. g. with reference toanger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and wellif we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the otherpassions.Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions because we arenot called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called soon the ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neitherpraised nor blamed for our passions ( for the man who feels fear oranger is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed,but the man who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and 1106'our vices we are praised or blamed.Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues aremodes of choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passionswe are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices Swe are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular way.

For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neithercalled good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacityof feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, butwe are not made good or bad by nature; we have spoken of thisbefore.sIf then, the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, all that re- 10mains is that they should be st tes of character.Thus we have stated what viltue is in respect of its genus.

6 We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of character ,but also say what sort of sta te it is. We may remark, then,that every 15virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of whichit is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well;e. g. the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work good:for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly theexcellence of the horse makes a horse both good in itself and good at 20running and at carrying its rider and at awaiting the attack of theenemy. Therefore, if this is true in every case, the virtue of man alsowill be the state of character which makes a man good and whichmakes him do his own work well.How this is to happen we have stated already,9 but it will be madeplain also by the following consideration of the specific nature of 25

v i t ~ u e In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible torake more, less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the8 l IOS" r8 -b 2. 9 1I04" I I 27


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958 NICOMACHEAN ETHICSI thing itself or relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate betweenexcess and defect. By the intermediate in the object I mean that which30 is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the samefor all men; by the intermediate relatively to us that which is neithertoo much nor too littIe and this is not one, nor the same for all.For instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is the intermediate;J taken in terms of the object; for it exceeds and is exceededby an equalJ 35 amount; this is intermediate according to arithmetical proportion. Butthe intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken so; if ten pounds11061> are too much for a particular person to eat and two too little, t dDe

not follow that the trainer will order six pounds; for this also is perhapstoo much for the person who is to take it, or too little too little ot5 Milo,10 too much for the beginner in athletic exercises.The same is trueof running and wrestling. Thu s a master of any art avoids excess anddefect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this the intermediatenot in the object but relatively to us.H it is thus, then, that every art does its work well by looking tothe intermediate and judging its works by this standard so that we

10 often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to take awayor to add anything, implyingthat excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the mean preserves it; and good artists,as we say, look to this in their work), and if, further, virtue is moreexact and better than any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have15 the quality of aimingat the intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for itis this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these thereis excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure andpain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not20 well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the rightobjects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in theright way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess,defect, and the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with passions25 and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while

the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praisedand being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtueis a kind of mean, since, aswe have seen, t aims at what is i n t e r m e d i t e ~Again, it is possible to fail in many ways for evil belongs to theclass of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans con}ectured, and good to30 that of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way forwhich reason also one is easy and the otherdifficult to miss the mark

10 A famous wrestler.

I

Bx. II: ClIo 6] NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 959easy, to hit it difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and defectare characteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue;

For men are good in but one way, but bad in many. 35Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying ina mean, i. e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rat ional 1 1 7 ~principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom

would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that whichdepends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is amean because the vices respectively faIl short of or exceed what is rightin both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that Swhich is intermediate. Hence in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to whatis best and right an extreme.But no t every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for somehave names that already imply badness, e. g. spite, shamelessness, 10envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of theseand suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad.and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. t is not possible, then,ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong. Nordoes goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on com- 15mitting adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in theright way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong. t would beequally absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuousaction there should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; forat that 20rate there would be a mean of excess and of deficiency, an excess ofexcess, and a deficiency of deficiency. But as there is no excess anddeficiency of temperance and courage because what is intermediateis in a sense an extreme, so too of the actions we have mentioned thereis no mean nor any excess and deficiency, but however they are donethey are wrong; for in general there is neither a mean of excess and 25deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean.7 We must, hQwever, not only make this general statement, bu t ahoapply it to the individual facts. For among statements about conductthose which are general apply more widely, but those which are particular are more genuine, since conduct has to do with individual 30cases, and our statements must harmonize with the facts in these cases.We may take these cases from our table. With regard to feelings offear and confidence courage is the mean; of the people who exceed, 1107he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name many of the states haveno name), while the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who


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96196 NICOMACHEAN ETHICSexceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward. With regardto pleasures and pains-not all of them, and not so much with regard5 to the pains-the mean is temperance, the excess self-indulgence. Persons deficient with regard to the pleasures are not often found; hencesuch persons also have received no name. But let us call them 'insensible'.

With reg.ard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality, t he10 excess and the defect prodigality and meanness. In these actions people

exceed and faU short in contraryways; the prodigal exceeds in spendingand falls short in taking, while the mean man exceeds in ta king and fallsshort in spending. At present weare giving a mere outI ineor summary,

is and are satisfied with this; later these states will be more exactlydetermined.n) With regard to money there are also other dispositionsa mean, magnificence (for the magnificent man differs from theliberal man; the former deals with large sums, the latter with smallones), an excess, tastelessness and rolgarity, and a deficiency, nig

20 gardliness; these differ from the states opposed to liberality, and themode of their difference will be stated later.12With regard to honour and dishonour the meJ.n is proper pride, theexcess is known as a sort of empty vanity', and the deficiency is unduehumility; and as we said 13 liberality was related to magnificence,

25 differing from it by dealing with small sums, so there is a state similarly related to proper pride, being concerned with small honours whilethat is concerned with great. For it is possible to desire honour as oneought, and more than one ought, and less, and the man who exceedsin his desires is called ambitious, the man who falls short unambitious,

30 while the intermediate person has no name. The dispositions also arenameless, except that that of the ambitious man is called ambition.Hence the people who are at the extremes lay claim to the middle place;and we ourselves sometimes call the intermediate person ambitiousand sometimes unambitious, and sometimes praise the ambitious manllQSa and sometimes the unambitious. The reason of our doing this will bestated in what followS;14 but now let us speak of the remaining statesaccording to the method which has been indicated.

With regard to anger also there is an excess, a deficiency, and a5 mean. Although they can scarcely be said to have names, yet since wecall the intermediate person good-tempered let us call the mean goodtemper; of the persons at the extremes let the one who exceeds becalled irascible, and his vice irascibility, and the man who falls sbortan inirascible sort of person, and the deficiency inir ascibility.

11 iv. t 12 1122&20-9,1> rO-IS., Il1.11. f 7 ~ I 9 :1:4 b II-26, II25br4-,I8.

Ex:. II: Cx.7] NICOMACHEAN ETHIC SThere are also three other means, which have a certain likeness toone another, but differ from one another: for they are all concerned 10with intercourse in words and actions, but differ in that one is concerned with truth in this sphere, the other two with pleasantness; andof this one kinJ is exhibited in giving amusement, the other in all thecircumstances of life. We must therefore speak of these too, that we

may the better see that in all things t he mean is praiseworthy, and 15the extremes neither praiseworthy nor right, but worthy of blame.Now most of these states also have no names, but we must try, as inthe other cases, to inve nt names ourselves so that we may be clear andeasy to follow. With regard to truth, then, the intermediate is a truthf ul 20sort of person and the mean may be called truthfulness, while thepretence which exaggerates is boastfulness and the person characterized by it a boaster, and that which understates is mock modesty andthe person characterized by it mock-modest. With regard to pleasantness in the giving of amusement the intermediate person is readywitted and the disposition ready wit, the excess is buffoonery and theperson characterized by it a buffoon, while the man who falls short 25is a sort of boor and his state is boorishness. With regard to the remaining kind of pleasantness, that which is exhibited in life in general,the man who is pleasant in the right way is friendly and the mean isfriendliness, while the man who exceeds is an obsequious person if hehas no end in view, a flatterer if he is aiming at his own advantage,and the man who falls short and is unpleasant in all circumstancesis a quarrelsome and surly sort of person.

There are also means in the passions and concerned with the pas- 30sions; since shame is not a virtue, and yet praise is extended to themodest man. For even in these matters one man is said to be intermediate, and another to exceed, as for instance the bashful man whois ashamed of everything; while he who falls short or is not ashamedof anything at all is shameless, and the intermediate person is modest.Righteous indignation is a mean between envy and spite, and these 35states are concerned with the pain and pleasures that are felt at the 1108'fortunes of our neighbours; the man who is characterized by righteousindignation is pained at undeserved good fortune, the envious man,

g o i n ~ beyond him, is pained at all good fortune, and the spiteful man 5falls so far short of being pained that he even rejoices. But these statesthere will be an opportunity of describing elsewhere;15 with regardlIS The reference may be to the whole treatment of the moral virtues in iii. 6-iv.9, or to the discussion of shame in iv. 9 and an intended corresponding discussionof righteous indignation, o r to the discussion of these two states in Rhd ii 6,

9,10.
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962 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS [Bx:. II; CR. 7to justice, since it has not one simple meaning, we shall, after describingthe other states, distinguish its two kinds and say how each of them

10 is a mean; 10 and similarly we shall treat also of the rational virtues.1T8 There are three kinds of disposition, then, two of them vices,involving excess and deficiency respectively, and one a virtue, viz.the mean, and all are in a sense opposed to all; for the extreme statesare contrary both to the intermediate state and to each other, and the

15 intermediate to the extremes; as the equal is greater relatively to theless, less relatively to the greater, so the middle states are excessiverelatively to the deficiencies, deficient relatively to the excesses, bothin passions and in actions. For the brave man appears rash relatively20 to the coward, and cowardly relatively to the rash man; and similarlythe temperate man appears self-indulgent relatively to the insensibleman, insensible relatively to the self-indulgent, and the liberal manprodigal relatively to the mean man, mean relatively to the prodigal.Hence also the people at the extremes push the intermediate maneach over to the other, and the brave man is called rash by the coward,25 cowardly by the rash man, and correspondingly in the other cases.These states being thus opposed to one another, the greatest contrariety is that of the extremes to each other, rather than to the

intermediate; for these are further from each other than from theintermediate, as the great is further from the small and the small30 from the great than both are from the equal. Again, to the intermediate some extremes show a certain likeness, as that of rashnessto courage and that of prodigality to liberality; but the extremes showthe greatest unlikeness to each other; now contraries are defined asthe things that are furthest from each other, so that things that are35 further apart are more contrary.

1109" To the mean in some cases the deficiency, in some the excess ismore opposed; e. g. it is not rashness, which is an excess, butcowardice, which is a deficiency, that is more opposed to courage,and not insensibility, which is a deficiency, but self-indulgence, which5 is an excess, that is more opposed to temperance. This happens fromtwo reasons, one being drawn from the thing itself; for because oneextreme is nearer and liker to the intermediate, we Oppose not thisbut rather its contrary to the intermediate. E. g., since rashness isthought liker and nearer to courage, and cowardice more unlike, we

1: oppose rather the latter to courage; for things that are further fromthe intermediate are thought more contrary to it. This, then, is one16 II29" :a6 1> I, 1I30 14 1> $, II3Ib 9-15, IIJ2& 24-30 , 1I33b 30-1134" I.J7 Bk vj . .

jl

Bx:. II: CR. 8] NICOMACHEAN ETHIC S 963cause, drawn from the thing itself; another is drawn from ourselves;for the things to which we ourselves more naturally tend seem morecontrary to the intermediate. For instance, we ourselves tend more 15naturally to pleasures, and hence are more easily carried away towardsself-indulgence than towards propriety. We describe as contrary to themean, then, rather the directions in which we more often go to greatlengths; and therefore self-indulgence, which is an excess, is the morecontrary to temperance.9 That moral virtue is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and 20that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the otherdeficiency, and that it is such because its character is to aim at whatis intermediate in passions and in actions, has been sufficiently stated.Hence also it is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is no

:easy task to find the middle, e. g. to find the middle of a circle is not 2Sfor everyone but for him who knows; so, too, anyone can get angrythat is easy-or give or spend money; but to do this to the rightperson, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, I,and in the right way, th t is not for everyone, nor is it easy; where Ifore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble. I,

Hence he who aims at the intermediate must first depart from what 30i

Iiis the more contrary to it, a s Calypso advises- - IiHold the ship out beyond that surf and spray.18 IiFor of the extremes one is more erroneous, one less so; therefore,since to hit the mean is hard in the extreme, we must as a second Iibest, as people say, take the least of the evils; and this will be done 35best in the way we describe.But we must consider the things towards which we ourselves also 1109 iare easily carried away; for some of us tend to one thing, some to

Ianother; and this will be recognizable from the pleasure and the painwe feel. We must drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for 5 Iiiwe shall get into the intermediate state by drawing well away from iiierror, as people do in straightening sticks that are bent. i INow in everything the pleasant or pleasure is most to be guarded Iagainst; for we do not judge it impartially. We ought, then, to feel Itowards pleasure as the elders of the people felt towards Helen, andin all circumstances repeat their saying;19 for i we dismiss pleasure 10180d xii. :219 f. (Mackail's trans.). But it was Circe who gave the advice (xii.

I08), and the actual quotation is from Odysseus' orden to his steersman.19 11 iii. 156-60.
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964 NICOMACHEAN ETHICSthus we are less likely to go astray. It is by doing this, then, (to sumthe matter up) that we shall best be able to hit the mean.

But this is no doubt difficult, and especially in individual cases;15 for it is not easy to determine both how and with whom and on whatprovocation and how long one should be angry; for we too sometimespraise those who fall short and call them good-tempered, but sometimes we praise those who get angry and call them'manly. The man"however, who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether

he do so in the direction of the more or of the less, but only the manwho deviates more widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. But up20 to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before hebecomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, anymore than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such thingsdepend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception.So much, then, is plain, that the intermediate state is in all things

25 to be praised, but that we must incline sometimes towards the excess,sometimes towards the deficiency; for so shall we most easily hit themean and what is right.OOK

.30 1 Since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on voluntary passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on thosethat are involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguishthe voluntary and the involuntary is presumably necessary for thosewho are studying the nature of virtue, and useful also for legislatorswith a view to the assigning both of honours and of punishments.35 Those things, then, are thought involuntary, which take placeUlQa under compulsion or owing to ignorance; and that is compulsory ofwhich the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or is feeling the passion,e. g. i he were to he carried somewhere by a wind, or by men whohad him in their power.

But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater5 evils or for some noble object (e. g. i a tyrant were to order one todo something base, having one's parents and children in his power,and i one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise wouldbe put to death), it may t debated whether such actions are involun

tary or voluntary. Something of the sort happens also with regard tothe throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract nowone throws goods away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing

BK III:CH l] NICOMACHEAN E THICS 965the safety of himself and his crew any sensible man does so. Suchactions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary actions; for theyare worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end ofan action is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, 'voluntary'and 'involuntary', must be used with reference to the moment ofaction. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the principle that moves 15the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him, and thethings of which the moving principle is in a man himself are in hispower to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voh.ntary,but in the ahstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would chooseany such act in itself.For such actions men are sometimes even praised, when they 20endure something base or painful in return for great and noble objectsgained; in the opposite case they are blamed, since to endure thegreatest indignities for no noble end or for a trifling end is the markof an inferior person. On some actions praise indeed is not bestowed,but pardon is, when one does what he ought not under pressure which 25overstrains human nature and which no one could withstand. Butsome acts, perhaps, we cannot be forced to do, but ought rather toface death after the most fearful sufferings; for the things that forced'Euripides' AIcmaeon to slay his mother seem absurd. It is d i f f i u l ~sometimes to determine what shouldbe chosen at what cost, and whatshould be endured in return for what gain, and yet more difficult to 30abide by our decisions; for as a rule what is expected is painful, andwhat we are forced to do is base, whence praise and blame are bestowed on those who have been compelled or have not.What sort of acts, then, should be called compulsory? We answer Ul()bthat without qualification actions are so when the cause is in theexternal circumstances and the agent contributes nothing. But thethings that in themselves are involuntary, but now and in returnfor these gains are worthy of choice, and whose moving principleis in the agent, are in themselves involuntary, but now and in return 5for these gains voluntary. They are more like voluntary acts; foractions are in the class of particulars, and the particular acts hereare voluntary. What sort of things are to be chosen, and in returnfor what, it is not easy to stat e; for there are many differences inthe part icular cases.But if some one were to say that pleasant and noble objects havea compelling power, forcing us from without, all acts would be forhim compulsory; for it is for these objects that all men do every- 1thing they do. And those who act under compulsion and unwillingly


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The Basic Works ofARISTOTLE

EDITED JND WITH .AN INTRODUCTION Y

RICHARD McK ONDean of the Division of the Humanities, Utdve1 sit) of Chicagt

Kunsthistorisches Museum Vienna R N D O M H O U S E NEW YORKRISTOTLE


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' "wentY-Third Printing, ovember :97 :

COPYRTGHT, J94J Y RANDOM HOUB mc.Y ARRANGEMENT WITH THE OXl 'ORD UNlVEJISITY PBUS

MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMEIUCA

Aristotle - Ethics 1 and 2

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Transcript of Aristotle - Ethics 1 and 2