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    Aristotle's Definitions of the Soul: "De Anima" ii, 1-3

    Author(s): Robert BoltonSource: Phronesis, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1978), pp. 258-278Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182048.

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    Aristotle's

    definitions

    of

    the

    soul:

    De

    A nima

    II,

    1-3

    ROBERT BOLTON

    Just

    as in public assemblies

    they are accus-

    tomed

    to newly introduce

    a law and if

    the

    law

    newly introduced

    s betterthey abandon

    the

    previous aw,

    so

    ought

    one to proceed

    in

    the

    case of

    definitions as

    well and to

    pro-

    pose, oneself, an alternatedefinition. For if

    it is

    seen

    to

    be

    better and

    makes the thing

    defined

    clearer it

    is obvious that

    the

    definition

    in

    force will have

    been aban-

    doned,

    since there are not several

    definitions

    of

    the same

    thing,

    Topics

    151 b 12-17

    1. It is

    a philosophicalcommonplace

    hatAristotle's

    definition

    of the soul

    as the

    form

    of the body contains

    an important

    anti-dualist

    olution to

    the

    mind-body

    problem.It is also

    widely understood

    that Aristotlewas

    not

    entirely unbending in his

    attachmentto an anti-dualist

    solution

    of

    the

    problem.

    He claims

    n

    variousplacesthat

    the intellect s not the

    formof

    any

    type of body and,

    hence, is capable

    of existence

    as a functioning

    entity

    separate

    from

    the body.

    And he is committed

    to the existence

    of

    an

    ensouled

    but immaterial

    living being,

    the prime mover,

    who

    not

    only

    carries

    on the psychic

    activity

    of thinkingbut derives

    hegreatestpleasure

    from

    it.

    Various

    attemptshave been

    made to either explain

    away

    the

    doctrines

    which

    seem to

    conflict with the anti-dualist

    thrust of

    the

    definition

    or

    to minimize

    their importancein

    Aristotle's

    most mature

    thought.

    But none of these

    attemptshasyet managed

    o secureandmain-

    tain

    significant

    support.'

    I

    want to offer here a new suggestion

    or dealing

    with the

    problem.

    My

    proposal

    s that the structure

    of the familiar

    definition

    of the

    soul as

    the

    form

    of

    the bodyhas not

    been properly

    understood.

    When this is

    correctly

    understood, shall

    argue,the definition

    can

    be seen to

    be

    consistent

    with

    the

    doctrine

    of

    the

    prime

    mover, with

    the

    theory

    of the

    separate

    ntellect

    and,

    most

    interestinglyperhaps,

    with

    various

    ypes

    of

    mind-body

    dualism.

    I

    begin

    with a consideration

    of a little

    noticed

    matter.

    2. Thewell-knowndefinitionof thesoul,asthe formof a certainkindof

    body,

    n DeAnimaII, 1,

    s offeredas

    an account

    whichmentions

    omething

    258

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    common

    to every soul

    (nrL

    OLVOV

    rri.

    %&1s

    4'Xis,

    412 b

    4).

    But

    at theend of

    the chapterAristotleconfesses hatthis account s merelya "roughgeneral

    account

    sketched

    in outline" (ri

    . . .

    'ooyEypa&pq&,

    13

    a

    9-10).

    This

    indicates,

    somewhatsurprisingly,

    hat

    the

    accountis in

    some

    way imper-

    fect. Butin what

    way?

    The significance

    of the language

    which Aristotleemploys

    to

    qualify

    his

    definition

    s revealed

    most

    fully

    in the

    Topics

    andin the

    History

    ofAnimals.

    An

    account "in

    outline" ('rmT)

    is,

    according

    to the

    Topics,

    a

    general

    (xa06Xov)

    ccountwhich

    does not give an

    "accurate

    definition"

    &xpLpls

    X6yos)but

    whichdoes

    permit

    us to

    know

    (yvwpieLv)

    the thing

    described n

    some way (101a 18-24).For Aristotlethere are two ways in whichsome

    thing

    may be made

    known,

    either by

    reference

    o what

    is

    prior

    and

    more

    intelligible

    to us or to

    what is prior

    and

    more

    intelligible

    absolutely 141

    a

    28-30,

    b 3-19;

    cf. PosteriorAnalytics

    1 b

    33, ff.).

    An account"inoutline"

    belongsclearly

    to the former

    type.

    An

    account

    by

    reference o

    things that

    are more intelligible

    absolutely

    conforms

    to

    "accurate

    understanding"

    (&XpLS

    BLavoLCL)nd

    this is the opposite

    of what

    is

    given

    in an account

    "in

    outline" (141 b 5-14,

    101a 21 33).2

    History

    of Animals

    491 a 7-14

    (which

    closely parallels

    De Anima

    413 a 9-20)

    further

    describes an account "in

    outline" as one which gives derivative facts ('ar

    avA1O3x6'ra)

    about some-

    thing

    in

    contrast

    o giving

    thetheoretical

    principles

    alr(aL)

    by

    reference o

    which such

    facts

    are explained.3

    Theopening ines of

    De Anima

    11,2 characterize

    n detail the

    differences

    betweenthat sort

    of account

    which

    is morefamiliar

    o

    us and which

    merely

    states some

    fact (TOr

    'rL)

    nd its more

    perfect

    counterpart.

    Since,

    as

    we have

    just

    seen,the former

    ypeof

    account s the

    account

    "in

    outline",

    hese

    lines

    giveus the

    reasons

    which

    must haveled

    Aristotle

    o think

    that the

    account

    in

    outline

    in II,

    1

    was

    imperfect.

    The reasons

    are

    these

    (1)

    The initial

    account while

    more obvious

    (qvepvrpepos)

    than

    others

    is still

    obscure

    (&aacp's)

    nd so in need

    of replacement

    by

    onewhich

    s

    more

    ntelligible

    n

    the

    order

    of explanation

    xarar

    'rv

    Xoyov

    vpW+u.'repos)

    (413

    a

    1

    1-13). (2)

    The initial accountshares

    he

    faultof most

    definitions

    which

    peoplegive of

    merely

    displayingsomething

    that is the

    case ('rO rL)

    without

    giving

    the

    essence

    (oUria)

    f the thing

    defined

    (413a 13-16).

    3)

    The initial

    definition

    is

    like a

    conclusion

    (av1LuipaaVc)

    bout

    the thing defined

    ratherthan a

    statement

    of the

    reason

    ('ob

    a'L'TLov)

    or

    such

    conclusions

    (413

    a

    16-20).

    Given thatAristotle

    s

    contrasting

    here the type

    of definition

    of which the

    famous

    accountof the

    soul

    in II,

    1

    is an

    instance

    with

    another

    superior

    type,4we need to askwhatthese contrasts mplyas to the exactcontentof

    the

    definition

    of II,

    I

    and as to what

    precisely he

    defects

    of that definition

    are.

    259

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    3.

    As commentators

    have pointed

    out, the

    contrasts

    drawn in

    brief

    betweendifferent ypesof definitionat the beginningof DeeAnima 1,2 are

    laid out at more

    length in

    the Posterior

    Analytics,

    especially

    n Book

    II,

    chapters

    8-10. But the

    significance

    of that

    discussion

    for our questions

    concerning

    he

    statusof the

    definition

    of the soulin

    De AnimaII,

    I

    has

    not

    been fullyexplored.

    Before

    turningto the

    Analytics,

    however, t will be useful

    to describe

    n

    some detail

    various

    problems

    of interpretation

    n

    De Anima

    II, 1-3 which

    are connected

    with our

    questions

    about

    the definition

    of II, 1. Light

    can, I

    think,

    be shed

    on all

    theseproblems

    by attention

    to the theory

    of types

    of

    definition n the PosteriorAnalytics.

    The first groupof

    problemsworth

    our

    attention

    here hasto do with the

    content

    of the

    definition n

    II,

    1

    or, as

    we should

    say,of the

    definitions

    n

    II,

    1, since

    there s more

    thanone.

    Are thesevarious

    definitions quivalent?

    Here are

    the definitions

    which

    Aristotle

    offersus:

    (1)

    Soulis the

    substance,

    n the sense

    of the form,

    of a natural

    body

    which

    has life

    potentially

    412

    a 19-21).

    (2)

    Soul

    is the first

    actualityof

    a naturalbody

    which

    has life

    potentially

    (412

    a 27-28).

    (3) Soul is the firstactualityof a naturalbody whichhas organs(412b

    5-6).

    (4) Soul

    is the

    essenceand

    definingprinciple Xoyos)

    f that

    sortof

    natural

    body

    which

    haswithin

    itselfa source

    (&px~)

    f its

    change

    and stability

    (412b 15-17).5

    We may

    allowthat the

    first

    two definitions

    whichAristotle

    gives

    us pose

    no

    problem

    in relation

    to each other

    since

    he gives

    the

    second simply

    to

    explainwhat he

    meansby

    the first.But

    the third

    the

    account

    of soul

    as

    the

    first actuality

    of a natural

    bodywith

    organs raises

    apparent

    difficul-

    ties. Aristotletreatssoul as the principleof life; thingsareensouled f and

    only

    if

    they have

    life

    (413a 21-2).

    But must

    something

    have organs

    to

    be

    alive?

    In fact we know

    that certain

    microscopic

    living

    creatures

    are

    composed

    of

    undifferentiated

    iving tissue.

    They

    engage

    in

    life functions

    such

    as nutrition

    and

    reproduction

    withoutemploying

    any

    organs

    orthose

    functions and do not

    possessany

    organs

    at all

    in

    the

    sense

    of

    parts

    which

    perform

    distinctive unctions

    not performed

    by

    other

    parts cf.

    De

    Partibus

    Animalium

    645

    b 3

    ff., at 14). We

    might

    well

    suppose

    that Aristotledidn't

    allow

    for

    this

    because

    of his

    inadequate

    understanding

    of

    biology.

    But

    Aristotlehimself

    regards

    ertain

    material

    objects,

    namely

    the

    stars,

    as alive

    even

    though

    he

    believes

    that

    their

    matter

    s undifferentiated nd cannot

    be

    altered or moved internally n any way

    and

    that, hence, they

    do

    not have

    260

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    organs.6

    This

    apparent

    nconsistency

    holds, moreover,not only

    between

    the thirddefinitionand thingsAristotlesays elsewhere.It holds between

    the third definition

    and the second. The

    second definition requires

    only

    that to be

    ensouled7

    a

    body

    must be in a certainstateof readiness o

    engage

    in one or another

    ife function,

    whether t has

    organs

    or not.

    It will be

    said

    that

    Aristotlewants

    to

    argue

    n the De

    A

    nima

    that

    only

    a

    body

    with organs

    could

    be

    in such a state.

    But he doesn't

    argue

    for this.At best he merely

    claims t (412

    a

    28,

    f.).

    And even this he does

    not do

    unambiguously.

    For

    he

    allows that

    if a

    thing engagesregularly

    by

    naturein

    patterned

    change

    of

    place

    that is enough

    to make

    it alive

    (413

    a

    22-25).

    We know that he

    believes that the starsand thespheres n whichtheymovedo this and that

    he denies

    thatthey

    haveorgans.So

    we

    have

    good

    reason

    o want

    the second

    definition

    of soul to cover the stars.

    If it covers the

    stars,

    however,

    then

    it

    seems incompatible

    with the thirddefinition.

    Itmight

    be arguedthat the

    secondand third

    definitions

    are not

    meant to

    be equivalenton the

    groundthat the

    "bodywith organs"

    mentioned

    n the

    third definition is explicitly

    introducedin

    the text as a

    body

    of a more

    restricted

    ype

    than the "body

    which has

    life potentially"

    of

    the second

    definition (412 a 27

    -

    b 1).

    If this were

    so we could take

    the second

    definition,which coversthe stars,as the accurateone andregard he third

    as

    covering

    not all of the living

    but only a

    certain

    part of it. But the

    third

    definition is

    said to

    mention"something

    ommon

    to everysoul" (412

    b 4).

    The fourth

    definition introduces

    further

    problems.It

    apparently

    says

    that

    any

    naturalbody which

    has an internal

    source

    of patterned

    hange

    is

    ensouled. But in

    the

    Physics (192

    b 9-23) Aristotle

    claims

    that all

    the

    familiar natural bodies have

    an internalsource

    of patterned

    change.

    (Cf.

    De

    Caelo268 b 27,

    ff.). So on his

    definition

    rockswould seem

    o be alive.

    And Aristotle would deny

    that rocks are

    alive (De

    Anima

    412 a

    13-15).

    Some will

    urge

    that this fourth

    claimis not

    a definition,that

    it only gives a

    necessary

    condition for being an ensouled

    body and no

    more. Butit must

    do more to

    play

    the role Aristotlegivesto it

    in its context

    (412b 10-17).

    He

    argues

    hat the

    thing

    that

    keeps

    an

    axe from

    being

    alive is that it doesn't

    as

    an axe

    have

    the kind of natural

    body that

    engages

    in

    its proper

    motion

    -

    chopping

    -

    in

    the cgurse

    of

    nature

    from some

    internal mpulse.

    Butrocks

    do

    engage

    in their

    proper

    motion

    under

    internal

    mpulsein the course

    of

    nature (Physics

    192

    b

    12,

    ff. at b

    18). So

    the argument

    would seem to

    require

    hat

    they

    are alive. Even if we treat he fourthclaim as giving

    only a

    necessary

    condition for

    being

    alive,moreover,

    hat still creates problems.

    For,again,the starsare alive and,hence, ensouledand theydo notengage

    in

    any proper

    natural movement under internal

    impulse (De

    Caelo 290 a

    261

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    27, ff., 291b 13). On this reading, furthermore,the definition would

    require hat nothing kept alive, as we say, by externalartificialmeans can

    reallybe alive, even if it continues o engage in all its proper ife functions.

    This would not only be an unfortunate hing for Aristotle o say, it would

    put

    the

    fourth definition in conflict with the second and third. On those

    definitions, t is enough for something o be alive that it engage in organic

    life functions, whether with external or artificialassistanceor not.8 We

    might try

    to treat

    the fourth claim as giving only sufficientconditionsfor

    being ensouled.The definitioncould be readas sayingthat soul is the form

    of a natural

    body

    of the

    type

    which

    has an internalsource of change, bul

    perhapsof another ypeaswell.Butthis interpretation, esidesapparently

    making

    rocks

    alive, would seem to spoil Aristotle's rgument. f something

    with another sort of body than the one mentioned can be ensouled, how

    can the fact that an axe doesn'thave that sort show that it's

    not ensouled?

    Aside from these

    problems

    t is worth

    reviewing he old troublesmen-

    tioned

    earlierwhich bear on all the

    definitions.

    In

    the very chapterwhere

    these definitions

    occur,

    and

    in

    many

    other

    places, Aristotle claims that

    some of the

    parts,

    hat is some of the life

    functions,

    which

    makeup the soul

    are

    separable

    from the

    body

    since

    they

    are not the actualities

    of

    any body

    or bodily organ (413a 6-7).9This seems to be ruled out in advanceby all

    the

    definitions,

    since

    any non-bodilyentity

    which

    exercised

    any

    one of the

    life

    functions

    (as

    the intellect

    does,

    430 a

    17-22)

    would

    have to be alive

    (413

    a

    22-25)10

    nd hence

    ensouled

    (a 21-22).

    All

    of the definitions eem to

    rule out the

    possibility

    that

    anything

    other

    than

    a natural

    body

    can

    be

    ensouled

    or, hence,

    alive. The third

    definition,

    which

    supposedly

    mentions

    something

    common

    to

    every soul,

    is

    especiallyproblematic

    n this

    regard

    since it is later

    explicitly

    claimed that "the soul whichcan think"

    i]

    VOqTLXyL

    [iuxid)s connected

    with no

    organ(429

    a

    22-29).

    Aristotlealso claimsat the end of

    De Anima

    II, 1that it is

    notyet clear

    whether

    the whole

    soul11

    of a

    living thing

    is the source of the

    activity

    (6v?eXVXeLa)

    f its

    body

    as a sailor is the source of the

    activity

    of a

    ship

    (413

    a

    8-9)

    -

    apparently eaving

    the

    door

    open

    to various ormsof

    dualism.

    Since he has

    just

    said

    that, given

    the third

    definition,

    "it is

    unnecessary

    o

    inquire

    further

    whetherthe

    soul

    and the

    body

    are

    one"

    (412

    b

    6, f.),

    it is a

    long-standingpuzzle why

    Aristotle hould make this

    remark.12

    The prime

    mover

    gives

    rise

    to

    the

    final

    problem.

    It is

    alive

    and

    is, hence,

    an ensouled

    entity(Metaphysics

    072b

    13, ff.,

    cf. De Anima402 b

    5-8).

    But

    the life function

    of the

    prime

    mover does

    not

    belong

    to

    any

    natural

    body

    and

    is, afortiori,

    not the

    first

    actuality

    of

    any body.

    The standard

    ways

    out of these difficulties nvolve

    attributing

    o Aris-

    262

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    totle inconsistency,

    changeof mind, or mystery-making.13

    ut the incon-

    sistency, f such therebe, is so bald that it is hardto see howAristotlecould

    have

    failed to face it. And the hypothesizedchange

    of mind

    on Aristotle's

    partis unacknowledgedand

    has been hard

    to establish n

    any

    convincing

    way.14

    So solutions depending

    on these

    things

    have not been

    satisfying.

    And it seems too much out

    of character hatAristotleshould

    simply

    have

    regarded he whole matter

    as an

    impenetrablemystery

    or that

    proposal

    to

    be satisfying.

    4. Do the remarkswhich

    Aristotlemakes at the

    beginning

    of De A nima

    II, 2 about varioustypes of

    definition

    and about

    the defects in the account

    of the soul in II, 1help us to moresatisfactorily

    esolve

    any

    or

    all of these

    difficulties?

    As we saw earlier, he definition,or definitions,

    of the

    soul in De A

    nima

    II, 1 are implied by II, 2,

    413 a 16, to be like conclusions

    OuuR%ep&ixlrx).

    That word

    is used in PosteriorA nalytics I,

    10 to describe

    one of the three

    types

    of

    definition

    discussedthere (94 a 7-9, 13-14).

    This

    type

    of

    definition

    is contrasted

    both with the

    indemonstrableaccount of what

    something s

    and

    with the

    syllogisticallybased accountof

    what something

    s.'5The

    third

    type of definition,16

    nd hencethe sortwe

    are dealingwith

    in

    De

    Anima

    II,

    I, is the so-called

    nominal

    definition theaccountof what

    a name signifies

    (93

    b

    30).'7What implications

    of this result

    are relevant orour purposes?

    A

    nominal

    definition is the account of

    some entity or

    phenomenon

    which we have

    at the initialstages of inquiry

    before we have

    an accountof

    its essence.

    The definitionencapsulates he

    central items of information

    about an entity which we

    have at a given pre-terminal

    stage.'8 These

    central

    items

    of information'9will, in Aristotle's

    view, typically

    concern

    explicable eaturesof the entity

    under nvestigation.So he characterizes

    he

    definitions which

    display

    these features as "conclusions"

    (avRnpep&u-

    iu,rr).20

    There

    are,

    for

    Aristotle,

    two characteristic

    ypes

    of

    definition

    which functionas conclusionsof syllogisms thosewhichexhibita feature

    (but not the

    whole) of the essence

    of the entitydefined, and

    thosewhich do

    not

    exhibiteven an element

    of the essence

    but do exhibitsomeproper

    xLO'

    o0'r6)

    eature which

    is explicableby reference

    to the essence.2'

    The first

    type

    will

    exhibit

    a featurenecessarybut not

    sufficient for the presence of

    the

    thing.

    The second will, characteristically,

    xhibit a feature

    sufficient

    but

    not necessary

    or the presenceof the thing.22

    Aristotle

    takes it that nominaldefinitions

    signify a kind and delineate

    the referenceof the nameof a kind.23How

    do they do thiswhen they only

    exhibit featuresnecessaryor sufficient ormembership n theclass denoted

    by the name of the kind

    but not both? Aristotle holds

    that grasping a

    263

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    nominal

    definitioninvolves

    a knowledge

    of the existence

    of members

    of

    the class in question24 nd that the definition itself involves an implicit

    reference o the

    most familiar

    actualinstancesof the kind defined.25

    The

    definition

    identifiesthe

    kind as

    the one to which

    those actual instances

    belongand the

    membership f

    the kindas

    whateverhas the

    same

    essence

    as those instances.26

    Given this, both types

    of nominal

    definitions

    do give necessary

    and

    sufficientconditionsof

    a sort forbeing instances

    of the kindsthey

    define.

    But they

    do not

    do this by exhibiting

    generalfeatures

    of

    those instances,

    possessedby

    them as instances

    of their kinds,

    which are

    necessaryand

    sufficient for belongingto those kinds.Instead theydo so by meansof a

    reference o theessence

    of certainactual

    familiar

    objects,anessencewhose

    content is not

    spelled out in

    the definition

    but whose

    possession is

    necessary

    andsufficient

    or membership

    n the kinddefined.

    5. With this

    material

    n handwe can

    now return o the

    De A nima to see

    what

    light is shed on the

    account

    of the soul which

    we find there.

    As we

    have already

    seen, the

    famousdefinition

    of the soul in II,

    I is a

    nominal

    definition. The

    use of the term 'uuv rrpwuvx'

    (413a 16, 18)

    to describe

    it

    makes

    his clear.

    Butwhatkind

    of nominaldefinition

    s it,

    one thatexhibits

    a necessary onditionof soul or one thatexhibitsa sufficientcondition?I

    want

    to suggest hat it is

    a nominal

    definitionof the

    lattertype:It points

    to

    themost familiar

    qvepavrpTa)

    nstances

    of soul

    by meansof

    a

    description

    whichexhibits

    onlysufficient

    conditions

    for beingan instance

    of soul, and

    defines the soul as the

    genericformpossessed

    by those instances.

    The

    evidence

    for taking

    he nominaldefinition

    to

    be of this type

    is

    of two

    sorts,direct textual

    evidence and

    more

    general inductive

    evidence.

    The

    more

    general

    nductive

    evidenceis, perhaps,

    he more

    striking,

    o we

    may

    begin

    with

    it.

    Ifwe understand he

    definition(s)

    of

    soul

    in De A

    nima

    II,

    1

    in

    the

    way

    suggested,

    then

    the variousproblems

    which

    we have

    mentioned

    concerning

    he

    definition(s)

    can all be resolved,

    and

    Aristotle's

    emarks

    n

    De Anima II,

    1

    can be seen to

    be consistent

    with

    all of

    his doctrines

    mentionedelsewhere.

    The

    first

    of

    our worries

    about the definitions

    in

    II, I

    had

    to do

    with

    whether

    they are extensionally

    equivalent.It seemed

    to

    us doubtful

    that

    theyare,

    but we

    werenot reading

    he definitions

    n a

    way

    it is

    open

    to us to

    read

    nominal

    definitions.The definitions

    of

    II,

    1

    are

    equivalent

    f

    they

    are

    read as nominal

    definitions

    which exhibit

    sufficient

    conditions for

    be-

    longing

    to the kind

    defined.

    On such

    a

    reading

    the

    second

    definition

    will

    say that soul is that generic first actuality possessed by those (actual

    familiar ases

    of)

    naturalbodies primed

    or

    certain

    ife

    functions

    which

    we

    264

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    recognizeas

    ensouled).27

    t will

    not

    say

    that

    these

    (familiar)

    bodies

    are

    the

    onlyoneswhichhavethatactualitybut rather hatthatactuality s the one

    which

    they have. The

    third

    definition

    will

    say

    that soul is

    the

    generic

    actualitypossessed

    by

    (the

    actual

    familiar

    cases

    of)

    naturalbodies

    with

    organs(which

    we

    recognize

    as

    ensouled).

    Since the familiar

    bodies

    which

    are

    primed

    for the

    familiar ife functions

    are,

    at

    least

    in

    part,

    the same

    as

    the familiar

    bodies with

    organs,

    the two definitions

    will

    be

    extensionally

    equivalent.

    The fourth

    definition

    will

    say

    that soul is the

    generic

    form

    possessed

    by

    those

    (actual

    familiarcases

    of)

    bodies with an internal

    ource

    of their

    activity which

    we

    recognizeas

    ensouled).28

    Here

    the familiar

    ases

    are again,at least in part,the same as for the other definitions.Since the

    generic

    form of each

    of

    these

    groups

    of

    entities is the

    same, these

    definitionswill all be

    extensionally

    equivalent.Given this we cannot

    say

    that the

    starsor the

    microorganisms

    withoutorgansconformto

    the

    second

    definitionbut

    not

    to the

    third.For

    the third

    does not

    say

    thatonly entities

    with

    organsare

    ensouled.

    It

    says,

    merely,that

    only things

    with

    the

    same

    generic

    actuality

    as certain

    familiar

    bodies

    with

    organsare

    ensouled.Nor

    can we

    say that

    the

    fourth

    definition

    requiresthat

    rocks are

    ensouled. It

    does

    not say

    thatevery

    naturalbody

    withan internal

    ource

    of its

    activity

    s

    ensouled.

    It says

    only

    that

    thingswhich

    have the

    samegenericessence as

    the

    most

    familiar

    casesof

    self-moving

    bodiesare

    ensouled.

    And

    thisneed

    not, and in

    fact does

    not,

    includerocks.29

    For similar

    reasons

    the

    starsdo

    not

    have

    to be

    self-moved

    to be

    alive;

    andentities

    whose

    life is

    maintained

    artificiallycan

    still live

    -

    providing

    their

    essence is of

    the rightgeneric

    type.

    The

    definitions

    of II,

    I

    do

    not

    tell us

    directlywhat

    thattype

    is,

    so

    they

    do

    notsettle

    these

    matters.

    Earlier

    we

    noted

    difficulties

    in the

    way of

    treating the

    definitions as

    exhibitingonly

    suffitcient

    onditionsfor

    the

    presence

    of soul. As the suf-

    ficient

    conditions are

    treated n

    Aristotle'snominal definitionsof the

    type

    we areconsidering,however,thosedifficultiesno longerface us.The third

    definition of

    the

    soul, as

    the

    first

    actualityof

    the most

    familiarcases

    of

    natural

    bodies

    with

    organs, is

    said to

    mention

    "something

    common

    to

    every

    soul." It

    is

    clearthat

    it cannot

    do this if

    it

    onlygives

    straightforward

    sufficient

    conditions

    for the

    presence

    of

    soul. But

    on

    Aristotle'sway

    of

    construing

    nominal

    definitions

    which

    exhibit

    sufficient

    conditions t

    does

    give

    something

    common. It

    identifies

    the

    generic

    form

    common to all

    ensouled

    things.

    For

    Aristotle,any

    nominal

    definition

    identifies

    the kind

    that its

    corresponding eal

    definition

    displays

    (Posterior A

    nalytics 93 b

    38

    - 94 a 2).

    Treating

    he fourth

    definition

    in

    theway

    suggested,

    moreover,

    does not

    265

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    spoil

    Aristotle's ontention

    hat axesare not alive.

    Sincethe definition

    does

    identifythegenerickindto whichall ensouledthingsbelongit canbe used

    to

    rule

    axes outof that

    kind.

    Since

    it

    onlyexhibits

    sufficient

    conditions

    for

    belonging

    to the

    kind,an

    argument

    hat

    axesare

    notalive which

    was

    based

    on

    it would

    likely

    not

    be very

    convincing

    even

    if sound.

    But

    Aristotle

    does

    not in

    factuse

    it to argue

    that

    axesare

    notalive.

    When

    he discusses

    he

    axe

    (412

    b

    10, ff.)

    he is

    only illustrating

    his contention

    that

    soul

    is the

    generic

    form

    of (among

    other

    things)

    a special

    type

    of body

    -

    one otherthan

    the

    type

    the axe

    has

    -

    and

    not arguing.

    The reading

    of

    the definitions

    n II,

    1 proposed

    here

    also

    provides

    us

    with

    a simple way to resolve the worries over the conflict between those

    definitions

    and

    the

    various

    claims

    which

    Aristotle

    makes

    concerning

    the

    separability

    of the intellect

    from

    the

    body.

    The definition

    n

    II,

    1

    - in

    any

    of its forms

    -

    does

    nothing

    to

    rule those

    claims

    out.

    If a functioning

    intellect

    has the

    same

    generic

    type

    of

    actuality

    as

    familiar

    functioning

    organic

    entities,

    ndependent

    of anyattachment

    o

    any

    body,

    then

    it is

    alive

    and ensouled

    -

    and

    it is so

    according

    o the

    definition.

    The

    prime

    mover

    too will

    count

    as

    a case

    of a living

    and,hence,

    ensouled

    entity,according

    o

    the definition,

    since

    the

    actuality

    of the

    prime

    mover

    s of the same

    generic

    typeas thatof the mostfamiliarensouledentities.

    Given this

    understanding

    f

    thedefinition

    of

    II, 1,

    moreover,

    we

    cannot

    claim

    that

    on

    that definition

    the mind-body

    problem

    does

    not

    arise.

    The

    claim made

    at the end of I1,

    1

    that nothing

    up

    to

    that

    point

    has ruledout

    the

    possibility

    hat

    the

    soul is the

    actualityof

    the

    bodyas

    the sailor

    s

    of the

    ship

    is compatible

    with

    what

    has

    gone

    before,

    understood

    n its

    natural

    dualistic

    sense.

    The definition does

    require

    that

    as a

    whole

    the

    soul of

    the

    most

    familiar

    ensouled things,

    including

    sailors,

    is incapable

    of its full

    func-

    tioningapart

    rom ts body -just

    as the sailor

    s

    incapable

    of functioning

    as

    a sailorapartfrom a ship.Butsincethedefinitiondoes

    not of itself

    require

    thatevery

    functioning oul

    be embodied,

    t

    by

    itselfleaves

    itopenthat

    most

    of the life functions

    of even

    the

    familiar

    ensouled

    things

    can

    go

    on disem-

    bodied

    -

    just

    as

    most of the

    psychic

    functions

    which a

    sailor

    employs

    in

    sailing

    can go on

    apart

    from

    any

    ship.

    This constitutes

    the general

    inductive

    evidence

    for

    the readingof

    the

    definition

    of the soul

    in De

    Anima

    II,

    1

    proposed

    here. If it is

    a

    nominal

    definition

    of the

    sort

    proposed,

    hen

    we areno

    longer

    faced

    with

    inconsis-

    tencies

    between

    different

    works

    (Metaphysics

    XII,

    and De

    Anima II)

    or

    between

    different

    books

    of

    the

    De

    Anima

    (II

    and

    III)

    or within

    a

    single

    chapter

    II,

    1)

    of the

    De Anima.

    266

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    6. We need now to look more closely

    at

    the

    text

    to

    see what

    direct

    support t offers for our readingof the definition.

    What we should be

    given

    in De Anima

    II, 2,

    ff.

    according

    o the

    opening

    sentence of that chapter,

    is a new account of soul which stands to

    the

    account of II,

    1

    as explanation to fact

    (IT'ra

    to

    O"Tl)

    nd as reason

    to

    conclusion (a'L'Tov

    to

    oavIepacvia).

    So we should

    expect

    to find a

    new

    account from

    which

    the old account s somehow

    derivable.

    If we can find

    such a new account that should help

    us to understandwhat form the

    old

    accounthas in Aristotle'sview.

    The conclusion of II, 2 is that a certain account of soul has been

    demonstrated.The conclusion reads: "It is thereforeevident,from these

    considerations,that the soul is a certain type of actuality and defining

    principle (Xoyos)

    of

    that

    which

    has the capacity

    for life"

    (414

    a

    27-28,

    reading

    TOLOVTOv

    at a 28 as at 412 a 21). This definitionof soul which is said

    to have been establishedomits explicitreferenceto

    the

    body altogether,

    unlike the earlier

    definitions

    n

    II,

    1.

    But according

    o this definitionsoul is

    the form of that which has a certain capacityor potentialityand Aristotle

    has just said (414 a 16-17, 25-27) that what has a given potentiality is

    always matterof a certainsort.30So this definitionsays, implicitlyat least,

    that

    the soul is a certaintype of actualityor form of a certain ype of living

    body. So understood, he definition s, in its general mport,equivalentto

    the definitions of II, 1.

    Is there, then, any other generaldefinition from which this definition is

    derived

    over the course of II, 2? The most prominentgeneral proposition

    about soul

    offered in the chapter is the one introduced

    at 413 b 11-12:

    "Soul is the

    source

    (&pXA)

    f

    and is delimitedby

    the life

    functions,

    such as

    nutrition, sensation, thought and motion." This proposition is the first

    account of

    soul

    at which Aristotle arrivesafter having begun,

    at 413

    a

    20,

    his searchfor a

    new definition.And the patternof

    the discussion

    ollowing

    this new accountis what we would expect giventhe interpretation f the

    opening

    lines of

    11,

    2

    defendedearlier.The new

    account

    of soul is

    higherup

    in the

    order of explanation than the account of II,

    1

    since

    from it that

    earlieraccount

    is derived,as follows:

    (1)

    Soul is the

    source

    (&pyA)

    f and is delimitedby any

    one or more of the

    life

    functions nutrition, ensation, houghtand motion (413

    a

    22-25,

    withb 11-12).

    (2) The defining life function of plants (413 a 25-31) and that of animals

    (b 1-4)

    -

    though probably not all life functions (b 24-29)

    -

    are the

    functionsof an appropriate ortof body (b 27-29).

    267

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    but it exhibits

    a

    sufficient

    and

    not a

    necessary

    condition

    fora

    squaring.It

    focusesonly on the squaringof planefiguresand, as Aristotlewasaware,

    not

    only plane

    areas

    can

    be

    expressed

    as

    the

    squares

    of some

    magnitude

    but also

    numbers.37Aristotle

    offers

    as

    the correctdefinition

    of

    squaring,

    "findinga

    mean proportional"

    413

    a

    19).

    This

    definition

    s

    repeated

    n

    the

    Metaphysics (996

    b

    20-21)

    as

    a definition

    of

    squaring

    generally ('rb

    TE'rpaycvLCtLv)

    without

    any restriction as

    to

    type

    of

    magnitude.

    And

    it

    covers

    numbers

    as

    well as

    plane areas.38

    n the

    Metaphysics

    his

    definition

    of

    squaring,

    "finding

    a

    mean

    proportional,"

    s

    given

    as a

    paradigm

    of

    a

    statementof the

    essence

    (ovaia

    and

    #

    oTn)

    of

    something

    996

    b

    10-12).

    So

    if this is an accurate llustrationof the characterof the new definitionof

    soul

    in

    II,

    2,

    as Aristotle intends

    it to

    be,

    that definition

    must

    give

    the

    whole of the essence

    of soul

    and thedefinition of

    II,

    1

    cannot give

    even

    a

    part

    of

    the

    essence.

    Given

    this

    there

    s, again,

    only

    one

    type

    countenanced

    in

    Aristotle's heory

    of definition to

    which the

    familiardefinition

    of

    II,

    1

    can

    belong,

    and thatis the

    type to which

    we haveassigned t.

    8.

    Further ighton the

    characterof

    the definitionsof II,

    1

    can be gotten

    from closerattention

    o the

    argumentwhich

    leads to the first

    definition of

    soul

    there.That

    argument s

    similar n structure

    o

    the one

    we

    have

    just

    been considering.It

    concludes

    that soul is

    substance n the senseof

    form,

    being the

    form of a

    naturalbody which

    has life

    potentially(412 a 19-21).

    The

    curious hing

    about thisconclusion,

    which is the first

    definitionof

    II, 1,

    is that it

    focuses, ike414 a

    12-13,on a special

    rangeof life

    functions.In it,

    and

    in

    its

    successor, life' has

    the special

    signification

    ntroduced

    at

    412 a

    14-15:

    "nourishment,growth

    and decay

    through itself."

    So

    the

    first

    definition at 412 a

    19-21says

    that soul is the

    form of those natural

    bodies

    which have

    thecapacityfor

    just theseelementary

    ife

    functions.But it has

    to

    identify

    the

    genericform

    of, at least, all

    organic

    bodies (412

    a

    27, ff.)

    and,

    hence,

    to

    at least

    identify the

    generic formwhich

    some such bodies

    possessby havingother life functionsas well as these (cf. 413 b 11,ff.). To

    do

    this

    the

    initial

    definitionhas to say

    that soul is the

    generic form

    which

    belongs

    to

    those

    familiarbodies which

    have the

    basic functions of

    nour-

    ishment,growthand

    ageing,

    eaving t open that

    the possessionof

    soul can

    involve

    the capacity

    for other

    functions han

    those.

    Once

    we

    understand this we can

    see what the

    progression

    from

    definition to

    definition n II,

    1-2 is. The first two

    definitionsof soul, as the

    form

    or

    first

    actuality of a

    natural

    body which has

    the capacity for

    nutrition,growth

    and ageing, focus on

    entitieswhich

    possess one

    special

    typeof soul.This is the type"mostcommon" o livingthings(415 a 23-25),

    a

    fact

    which

    makes the first

    two definitions

    appropriate tarting

    points.

    269

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    They characterize

    oul generallyas

    the genericform possessed

    by entities

    of the special type in question. The third definitionof soul, as the first

    actualityof

    a

    natural

    body with organs, ocuses

    on a widerrange

    of entities.

    Entities

    characterizedby any of the special types of sould defined by

    reference o collections

    of organicfunctionsare

    in focus in thisdefinition.

    The fourthdefinition

    speaks of soul more generally

    as the type of form

    possessed

    by a certainsort of natural

    body with

    an internalsource of its

    activity.

    This definition

    focusesoncertainnatural

    bodieswhichengage n

    a

    certain

    range

    of activitiesbut does

    not tie thoseactivitiesdown

    to organs.

    The newdefinition of

    II, 2 marksanotherstage

    in the processof generali-

    zation.Itdefines soulas the generic orm of thetype possessedby whatever

    engages

    in any life function.Here

    the functionsare neither

    tied down to

    organs

    nor tied down

    to body.

    9.

    Having attended

    to those features

    of

    the text which support the

    readingof the definition

    of II,

    1

    offered here,

    we shouldconsider those

    features

    which mightbe thoughtto

    go against

    t. One of these

    has

    already

    been alluded

    to. At 412

    b 4-6 and b 10Aristotle

    peaksof onevariant

    of the

    account

    of soul in II,

    1

    as an accountwhich "mentions

    omething ommon

    (TL

    XOLV6V)

    to

    every

    soul"

    and which

    "says whatsoul is in

    general

    (xa0o-

    Xov)".As we have seen, however,these remarksare not inconsistentwith

    the

    interpretation

    ffered here.39

    The genericform of the

    familiar

    natural

    bodies

    with organs belongseven to

    the separate

    ntellect andto the prime

    mover.

    Aristotlealso says

    at 412 b 6-9 that it follows

    from his account of soul

    that we do

    not

    need

    to

    inquire

    whether"the

    soul and the body

    are one,"

    since

    an

    actualityand

    that of whichit is the actuality

    orm

    a

    unity

    in

    the

    strictest

    ense.This does

    require hat

    any typeof soul

    which s the actuality

    of a

    particular

    body is not separable

    n toto from that body

    and

    thatthat

    body

    is not

    separable n toto from

    that soul. But

    it does

    not

    require

    hat no

    facultyor faculties of

    such a soul

    are inseparable

    rom

    the

    composite

    to

    which

    they

    are attached

    413 a 3-7),nor that such

    a faculty

    could

    not

    when

    separateengage

    in

    some life function and be,

    hence,

    alive

    and

    ensouled

    (413 a 20-25).40That

    "thesoul and

    the bodyare

    one"

    no more

    requires

    hat

    every

    ensouled

    thing

    s

    embodied

    han t

    requires

    hat

    every

    material

    bject

    is ensouled.The phrase"the soul"

    s no more general

    than

    its

    companion,

    "the body."And the

    phrase"the body"refers

    not to

    bodies

    in

    general

    but

    to the

    special

    bodies of certain

    particular

    hings

    (412

    b

    6-8, 11-17).

    In

    the

    Metaphysics,

    n

    language

    which

    echoes

    that

    in

    the

    De

    Anima,

    Aristotle

    claimsthatin general"theproximatematterandthe form are one and the

    same

    thing" (1045

    b

    18-19).

    The

    unity

    in view there isjust the sort which

    270

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    the adequacy

    of the new definitionof soul in

    I,

    2. Does the claim

    at the end

    of II, 3 that the most appropriateaccountof soul

    (Xoyos

    oLxEL6TxTos . . .

    'nep'p

    vXiAs,

    15 a

    13) s a serialaccount

    of each of the distinct ifefunctions,

    spoil in any way the results

    of

    II,

    2? In

    particular

    oes it show that the new

    account

    of

    soul

    in

    II,

    2

    does not genuinely

    give

    the

    explanation

    (t'iTLov)of

    the account of II,

    1 or the essence (OL'Ta)

    of

    the actuality

    which is

    soul

    according

    o

    the definition

    of

    11,

    1. A problemarisesbecausethe

    account,

    in

    sequence,

    of the special facultiesis

    said

    to

    be most

    proper

    not as an

    accountof the special

    facultiesbut as an accountof soul simply

    (415a 13).

    This stronglysuggests

    that the generalaccountof II, 2,

    though t explains

    the accountof II, 1 in a way, is still not a full real definitionor accountof

    the essence of

    anything.

    And this

    is in

    fact requiredby

    other

    evidence.

    According o thePosterior A nalytics, the

    trueexplanationof

    some

    fact (oTL)

    is supposed to give

    the essence of thatof which the fact holds

    (90 a 5-15,

    93 a 3-9). And according o the De Anima

    no generalaccountwhichcovers

    several species of some genus can give

    the essence of anything

    (414 b

    25-27). The doctrine

    of

    the Metaphysics

    1030

    a

    6, ff.) that only

    ultimate

    species have definitions

    which, strictlyspeaking,give the essence

    of any-

    thing

    is

    clearly

    in play in the De Anima. And given the doctrine

    of

    the

    Metaphysics,we must conclude that thedefinitionof II,2 doesnot, strictly

    speaking, tand to

    the definitionof II,

    1

    as accountof essence

    o accountof

    fact.

    But

    the definition

    of II, 2 is in fact

    only put forwardasone which

    will

    suffice for

    the time being (413 b 11-12).

    Did Aristotlebelievethen that this

    definition only leads

    us in the directionof the mostproper

    xplanationof

    the definition of II,

    1,

    and that the full accountof the particular

    aculties

    would provide one

    with such an explanation?

    That seems thenaturalway

    to

    maketheconclusionof II, 3 consistent

    with II, 1-2.It is easyto see how a

    new serial account

    of soul as the source

    (ap)i')

    of each

    of the various

    special faculties n sequencewould serveto establish he claimof II, 1that

    soul

    is

    the

    generic

    actualitycertaincasesof

    which

    belong

    to a

    special

    sort

    of

    naturalbody. For many of those faculties

    will be explicitly hown by this

    account to constitute, ndividuallyor collectively, ypes

    of

    soul

    which

    are

    capable

    of

    existing only in such a body.

    We can, however,

    still speak of the definition

    of II, 2 as giving,so far as is

    possible,

    the

    full

    essence or the real definition

    of

    the

    genus

    of

    each

    type

    of

    soul

    -

    remembering hat no such genus

    can, strictly speaking,

    have

    an

    essence

    or, hence,

    a

    real

    definition.

    The

    definition

    of

    II,

    2

    does

    give

    a

    full

    explanation (ai'TLov),

    n

    the

    sense

    of

    that

    term

    employed

    in

    the

    Posterior

    Analytics,

    of the fact (orL) tated in the definition

    of

    II,

    1.

    (The

    doctrine

    that

    no

    genus

    can have an essence is not

    found

    in

    the

    Analytics.)

    But

    the

    new

    272

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    Anima

    II, 1-2

    to the

    initial

    definition of

    the soul.45

    This

    highlightsthe

    importanceof the discussionof nominaldefinition n the PosteriorAna-

    lytics,

    since

    that is

    the one

    place

    where

    Aristotle

    explains n a full

    way what

    at

    least one sort of

    account

    of this

    type is like. It also

    indicates hat

    special

    care

    may

    need

    often to

    be taken not

    to

    attribute o

    Aristotleviews

    stronger

    than

    thoseto

    which he is

    actually

    committed

    when, as

    in

    the case

    of the

    famous

    definitionof

    the soul,

    whathe

    says

    only

    describes he

    objectunder

    discussion

    "in

    outline."46

    Rutgers

    College,

    Rutgers

    University

    1

    The standard

    contemporary

    attempts to deal with the

    problem are those of W.

    Jaeger,

    who

    argued that the dualistic

    doctrines are inconsistent

    with the anti-dualist

    definition

    and

    constitutean inheritance

    rom Plato

    which Aristotlenever

    abandoned

    Aristotle,

    2nd

    edn.,

    Oxford, 1948, 217-219,

    332-34); F. Nuyens, who

    supposed that the

    problematic

    doctrines

    while not

    inconsistent with the definition

    constituted with

    it for Aristotle

    a

    mystery whose

    threads he could not

    unravel

    (L'tvolution

    de la

    Psychologie

    d'Aristote,

    Louvain, 1948,

    Ch. VII, especially

    317-318); and W.

    D. Ross, who argued

    that

    the

    dualistic doctrines

    belonged to an earlier

    phase of Aristotle's

    thought and were aban-

    doned by the time

    of writingof De A nimaII

    ("The

    Development of Aristotle's

    Thought,"

    Proceedings f the British

    Academy,43

    (1957) 65-67). For the standard

    older views, see the

    discussion in R. D. Hicks,Aristotle,De Anima(Cambridge, 1907),pp. lxiv-lxix.

    2

    r4vrcand

    &xpl0s

    are

    standardly contrasted with

    each other. See

    H. Bonitz,

    Index

    Aristotelicus

    Berlin, 1870),p.

    779. Physics 184 a 23-26

    shows that

    xao6Xou

    s

    sometimes

    used

    like

    rimy

    and contrasted

    with

    W'

    &xpOEiaS.

    See

    also Prior

    Analytics 46 a 10,

    ff.,

    a

    28-30.

    3

    Cf.

    De A nima402 b 16, ff

    The account which gives the

    akrla

    s the

    one which gives the

    genuine

    ri

    bL.

    This

    is

    presumed n the illustrationat 413

    a 17-20 and is required

    by

    the

    language, as we

    shall see below.

    4

    Two other ways

    of reading the opening

    remarks of

    II,

    2

    deserve consideration.

    (1)

    Aristotle s announcing the

    method which he is about to

    follow

    -

    beginningwith

    matters

    which are "clearer to us"

    than the

    definition of II, I (namely,

    the accounts of the

    particularfaculties of soul) and workingup inductivelyto a new account which is an

    improvement on

    that definition. (See R. D.

    Hicks, op. cit., p. 322.

    Hicks was following

    Simplicius,

    n

    De

    A nima, 96-97 Hayduck).

    But Aristotle

    does not produce a new

    account

    of

    soul

    at

    the

    end

    of his discussion of the

    special faculties. At the end of

    II,

    2 we

    have

    the

    old

    definition

    reaffirmed 414 a 27-28; see

    below Sec. 6);

    and

    there

    is no new

    definition

    after

    that. And

    the accounts of

    the special

    faculties are

    not

    and cannot

    be

    derived from

    any new

    fully adequate general

    account of soul as they would

    be

    if

    they

    were accounts

    of

    soul

    which

    are

    "clearer o us."

    (Such accounts stand to the

    fully adequate

    account

    in

    the

    relation of fact to

    explanation

    and conclusion to

    reason,

    413

    a

    11-16).

    The

    relation

    is

    rather

    he other

    way around(see Sec. II). (2)

    Aristotle

    s

    beginning

    again

    from

    an

    account

    of

    soul

    which is

    more obvious to us

    than

    the definition

    of

    II,

    I

    and

    working

    from

    that

    to

    establish inductively the old definition which is itself "moreintelligiblein the orderof

    explanation." (So, apparently,

    Aquinas,

    in

    De Anima,

    Sections

    245,

    ff.

    Pirotta;

    but

    see

    Section

    244.)

    But

    the definition

    of

    II,

    I

    is

    itself

    an account

    "in outline"

    ('rimy),

    and

    274

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    AnalyticsII, 10.This is contrary o Aristotle'sassertionat 94 a I1 ff. (cf. 75 b 31-32) and

    to

    other evidence, but it is enough for our purposes in this paper that the definitions of De

    Anima II,

    I

    belong to the type called "conclusions." Here, and in what follows,

    the

    discussion draws on the results of "Essentialism and Semantic Theory in

    Aristotle:

    PosteriorA nalytics

    1I,

    7-10,"

    PhilosophicalReview, 85 (1976); referred o below as

    ESTA.

    On the point in question here see

    ESTA, n.

    14.

    17

    This conclusion is confirmed by

    the other language used to describe the definition

    in

    De Anima II, 2. The definition is said

    there to merely state a fact ('r

    bT&)

    bout the

    soul

    and

    not to specify the essence (j

    alrCat)

    hich explains such facts. This language s used

    in

    the PosteriorAnalyticsto contrast

    nominal with real definitions (93 a 16,

    ff.,

    93 b 29,

    ff.).

    The

    definition is also said to give

    an account of soul which is clearer to us but

    less

    knowable in the order of

    explanation. This language is used to characterizenominal

    definitions as opposed to other typesat Physics 184 a 18, ff.

    18

    PosteriorAnalytics,93 a 16-29 with 93 b 29-32 and 94 a 7-9.

    19

    The items can change from stage to stage; 93 b 7-14 at 12-14.

    20 93 b38-94a9.

    21

    Some of these definitions give

    "somethingof the thing itself' (T

    axaroi,roe

    fp&yRaros),

    i.e. an element of the essence of the thing, 93 a 22-24, 27-29 with 94 a 7-9; others give

    not

    an

    element of the essence but only a feature by means of which we grasp the existence of

    the thing and are pointed to (a

    knowledge of) the essence

    (vpbs

    [-T

    C8?vai]

    To Tv

    kaTL)

    due

    to

    the fact that the feature is exhibitable in a conclusion derivable from the essence

    (93

    a

    27-29, a 35-37; cf. De Anima

    402 b 21-22). There is a third type of nominal

    definition, one which mentions

    merely accidental features of the entity defined (93 b

    29-37, cf. 93 a 24-26). But this typecan only function as a conclusion of a syllogismor a

    statementthat

    something is (Tb

    bTL)

    in

    a

    secondary

    way (75 b 30-32). So this type

    is

    not

    in

    play

    in De A

    nima II, 1.

    22

    See

    84

    a, 11, ff. for the two permissible types of conclusions of demonstrations.

    The

    second

    type could,

    in

    principle, exhibit the inherence of a proprium

    n a

    thing but

    Aristotle thinks that such conclusions

    are very rare (73 a 6-7, 16-20).

    23

    Nominal definitions are accounts

    of what some word or phrase signifies

    (0aiiwve),

    93 b

    29-32.

    And significationhas two components, referenceand a fixing on a

    kind.

    (See

    the

    uses

    of

    ajo.clveLv

    t

    92 b 26-34, 93

    b 39-94 a 2 and ESTA, Sec. 7.)

    24

    93

    a 16-29

    with 93 b 29-32 and

    94

    a 7-9, and ESTA, Sec. 6.

    Cf. n. 26

    below.

    25

    An exampleof the type of nominal

    definition which specifies a feature

    of the

    essence is

    'Thunder(OpovTi)s a certain type of noise in the clouds (4&posrs vrqGCv)'93 a 22-23).

    This definition does not say that any noise in the clouds would be thunder.It says that

    thunder is that certain type of noise in

    the clouds, familiar actual instances of

    which we

    recognize

    as thunder.

    It says, hence,

    that something

    is an

    instance

    of thunder

    f

    and

    only

    if it

    belongs

    to

    the same kind as those familiaractual nstances.

    An

    example

    of

    the

    type

    of

    nominal

    definition which specifies a properfeature

    not a

    part

    of

    the essence

    is

    'Eclipse

    s

    the

    failure of the full

    moon to cast shadowswhen nothing

    visible

    is

    in the

    way'(93

    a 36 -

    b

    7).

    This definition

    refers us to familiar actual cases

    of

    eclipse by

    means of

    a

    description

    which provides us with a sufficient

    condition for the occurrence

    of an

    eclipse.

    It tells

    us

    that something

    is an

    eclipse if and only if it

    has the same

    essence or

    cause

    adxiTa

    or

    &6rt1)

    as

    those

    actual cases of inability of the

    full

    moon to

    cast shadows

    under

    a

    visibly

    clear

    sky

    which we recognizeas cases of eclipse. See ESTA,Sec. 9. For anotherdefinition of this

    type

    see the definition of

    a citizen at Politics

    1275

    a

    29-33

    (with

    a 33

    ff.

    at

    b

    5-7).

    26

    The indefinite 'TLS'plays

    a crucial

    role

    in definitions

    of

    this

    type (see

    93

    a

    21-24).

    It

    276

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    means "that

    certainfamiliar."

    This is

    made clear

    by

    an

    important

    passage

    in the

    Physics

    (1, 1, 184 a 16- b 14, at a 26, ff.) which revealsthat initial(nominal)definitions in science

    are accounts

    by

    reference to actual cases of the

    entity

    defined which are familiar

    to

    us.

    These definitions focus

    by

    means of such a

    referenceonto a certain

    familiarwhole

    (QXov

    n). See

    ESTA,

    Sec. 7.

    27

    Here and

    in

    what follows

    I

    make

    explicit

    in

    parentheses

    various features of

    nominal

    definitions which

    Aristotle himself

    normally

    only brings

    out in theoretical

    discussions

    of

    definition. See nn.

    25-26,

    Sec.

    7

    below,

    and

    ESTA,

    Secs.

    6-9.

    28

    In

    the fourth definition '"oLoa&'

    412

    b

    16)

    functions

    as

    'fIs'

    does in

    the

    nominal

    definitions at

    PosteriorAnalytics

    3

    a 22-24

    to indicate that it is a

    special

    sort of

    body

    that

    is

    in

    question

    here (cf.

    'roip,&

    a6paxn,

    b

    I

    1)

    and

    not

    just

    any body

    with an internal

    source

    of

    change.

    That

    sort is

    "the most familiarsort"with an internalsource of

    change

    and it

    is

    the function of the

    'roLoo00'

    o signify this. (Cf. Metaphysics,1035 b 16 and 1043 a 36,

    where 'To&6a8E'

    nd 'Tus'play,

    interchangeably,

    his

    role.) So understood the

    definition

    does

    provide

    a

    sufficient

    condition.

    29

    It is

    not

    here

    assumed that

    Aristotle ever succeeds in

    adequately

    differentiating

    the

    innate

    capacity for

    motion of

    living

    things,

    especially

    plants,

    from the innate

    impulse

    to

    motion

    (Physics

    192

    b

    18)

    possessed

    by

    al

    inanimate

    natural

    objects.

    See

    F.

    Solmsen,

    Aristotle's

    System

    of

    the

    Physical World

    Ithaca,

    1960),

    95-102. But

    the

    fourth definition

    of soul

    leaves

    open the

    possibilityof a

    solution.

    30

    This

    rules out

    the

    reading of 414

    a 27-28 in J.

    Owens,

    "Aristotle's

    Definition of

    Soul,"

    in R. B.

    Palmer

    and R.

    Hamerton-KeUy eds.)

    Philomathes

    The

    Hague,

    1971), at n. 29.

    31

    Assuming the

    primacyof

    the actuality

    of a

    function to

    the function,

    as at 415 a

    18-20.

    This step in the argument s not explicitbut it is easily supplied.

    32

    In

    fact

    Aristotle's

    claim at 413 b

    24-27 is the

    stronger

    claim

    that "it is likely

    (Iotxe)that

    the intellect

    is a different

    type

    of soul, and

    it alone is

    separable."

    That

    IOLXE'

    has this

    force

    is clear from

    the parallel

    passage

    408 b

    18-29 (cf. 430

    a 17-25).

    33

    It might

    be suggested

    that the

    definition of II, I is a

    nominal

    definition of

    the

    sort that

    exhibits

    necessary

    conditions

    for the

    presence

    of soul. If so,

    then

    according o

    the pattern

    at Posterior

    Analytics94 a

    3-9

    the new

    definition of II, 2

    would

    be a

    combination of

    the

    old definition of

    II,

    I

    and

    what we have

    been calling

    the new definition. In that case

    the

    correct new

    definition

    would be: Soul

    is the

    source (&p

    ii)

    of

    any

    group

    of

    the life

    functions,

    which

    source

    is

    always

    possessed (as first

    actuality)

    by

    a natural

    body

    which

    has life

    potentially.

    In

    this case each

    type

    of soul would have to be a

    function

    of some

    natural

    body.

    But

    Aristotle denies having claimed this in the very place where he is

    developing

    his

    new

    definition

    (413

    b

    13-16,24-29). So

    his

    new definition

    can

    hardly have

    this form.

    34

    "Source of life"

    (&PX.

    Tow

    v, 413 b

    11-13 with a

    22-25) may

    seem rather

    thin and

    commonplace

    for a real

    definition.

    But Politics

    1275 a 38

    -

    b

    I

    shows

    that

    genera of the

    type

    to which soul

    belongs

    are

    very

    thin in

    content (cf. De A

    nima

    414

    b 28-32) and

    the real

    definitions

    of

    entities of

    this

    type

    may

    be

    quite

    commonplace (see

    Politics

    1279

    a 25-27

    with 1278b

    8-10,

    ff.,

    and for

    the sort of

    definition of figure

    probably

    n

    view

    at DeAnima

    414 b

    20, ff.,

    see

    Euclid,

    ElementsI, Def.

    14).

    The account

    of II,

    I

    may also seem

    rather

    technical for a nominal

    definition. But

    even a

    relatively

    advanced account

    may

    still

    be

    what is "familiar o

    us"

    and

    only nominal.

    (See

    the

    nominal definition of

    squaringat 413

    a

    16-19;

    cf.

    Politics

    1275 a

    29-34 and n. 25

    above.)

    35

    Note that the new

    definition of

    II,

    2

    is

    not

    defective in

    this way

    -

    another

    reason for

    not

    taking

    it to be

    the inferior

    definition in view

    at 413 a

    1

    1,

    ff. Cf. n. 4

    above.

    277

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  • 8/10/2019 Aristotle Anima

    22/22

    36

    The squaring

    of a plane rectilinear

    igure which

    has been reduced to a rectangle

    with

    unequal sides. For the theorems which Aristotlehas in mind in this connection see Sir

    Thomas Heath, Mathematics

    n Aristotle

    Oxford, 1949), 191-193.

    37

    See, e.g.

    Posterior

    A

    nalytics76 b 8,

    and Heath, op. cit., 43-44.

    38

    To

    square,

    i.e. to find

    the square root of, a number

    is to find the mean proportional

    between

    two factorswhich, multiplied

    together,yield the number.

    "

    See above, Sec.

    5. Physics 184 a 16, ff. at a 23,

    25 makes clear that all

    nominal

    definitions

    and all accounts from the point of view

    of what is more familiarare

    accounts

    of something

    "in

    general"

    (x066ou).

    The

    infant's

    notion of woman

    as what

    mother

    is

    contains an understanding

    of what a woman is xa(6Xov.

    It does mention a

    characteristic

    common

    to all women

    -

    being not a

    mother but what mother s

    - but it only does

    this in

    an

    indirect

    way.

    And

    this mention

    is indirect in the same way

    as that in the

    nominal

    definitionof II, I on the reading givenhere.

    40

    In

    view

    of this Aristotle cannot

    mean to say at 415 a 23-25 that

    nutrition s a faculty

    belonging

    to

    all living

    things.He says that "the nutritive

    soul is the firstand most

    common

    faculty by

    which

    life

    belongs to all the things that

    have life, taken

    collectively,and

    is the

    faculty most

    widely distributed over

    that collection; but not

    that it belongs to

    each

    member

    of that collection. 434 a 22-26

    coversonly those

    thingswhich "live, and

    have soul

    from

    birth to death,"

    i.e. with mortal things, as Aristotle's

    more careful

    statement

    of the

    same

    point at 413 a 31-32

    confirms.

    41

    Taking

    an essence ('ri

    iv

    elvaL,

    045 b 3, to be a

    form; 1032 b 1-2, with De Gen.

    et

    Cor.

    335 b

    35. Cf. 1037 a

    1-2). The entitieswhich consist

    of form without

    matterhere

    are the

    categories,

    but that does not affect the

    point at issue. Aristotle,

    moreover,describes

    the

    essence of the prime mover (1071 b 19-21) and that of the separate ntellect(De Anima

    430 a

    22-23)

    in

    the same

    way. The substance

    ov'ai)

    of the intellect 408

    b

    19,430

    a

    18) s,

    doubtless, substance n

    the sense of form (412 a 6-9).

    42

    Cf.

    Sec.

    6

    above. The

    view of 414 a 19-20 is attributedby

    Aristotle

    to certain

    of

    his

    predecessors.When they

    spoke of the soul, as he points

    out, they

    were almost exclusively

    discussing

    the human soul (402 b 3-5).

    Commentatorsagree that

    the view is closest

    to the

    position

    discussed

    by

    Aristotle in the

    Eudemus and at De

    Anima 407

    b

    27, ff.,

    and

    defended by

    Simmias

    at

    Phaedo,85 e ff. (414 a 22-25

    seems to recall

    the

    deficiency

    n the

    view discussed at 408

    a 10, f.) Simmias was talking

    about the human soul and

    so was

    Aristotle in the Eudemus see

    W. D. Ross, Aristotle: Parva Naturalia,

    Oxford, 1955, pp.

    3-5).

    Cf. Politics 1340 b

    14-19.At De Anima

    402 a

    6-10 "soul"covers

    only

    animal

    souls.

    43

    See E. Zeller,Aristotleand the EarlierPeripatetics,Eng. tr.(London, 1897),4.

    44

    See above, Sec.

    2.

    45

    See

    Bonitz, op. cit.,

    under

    'T&wos',

    i'nro'runo0v',

    nd

    yv6pitos

    and,

    in

    particular,

    Metaphysics

    1028 b 27-32

    at

    31-32,

    1029 b

    3-12;

    Ethics

    1094 a

    25,

    b

    19-22,

    1176a

    30-32,

    1179

    a 33-35.

    "

    An earlierversion

    of

    this

    paper

    was read

    to the Ancient

    Greek

    PhilosophyColloquium

    (NYC).

    Many points

    in

    the

    paper

    have

    been

    improved

    as a

    resultof the discussionon

    that

    occasion

    and as a result

    of later discussion

    with John

    M.

    Cooper.

    278