Arguments For and Against Arguments For and Against the Existence of Godthe Existence of God

Analysis and DiscussionAnalysis and Discussion

byby

Dr. Michael Dr. Michael AristidouAristidouAugust 2008August 2008

Words and MeaningWords and Meaning

Knowing what one means by X or Y is crucial in order to Knowing what one means by X or Y is crucial in order to

have any meaningful dialogue.have any meaningful dialogue.

Example: Consider the following Example: Consider the following ““interestinginteresting”” dialogue dialogue (Smith, 1989, p.29)(Smith, 1989, p.29)::

Jones: An Jones: An unieunie existsexists

White: Prove itWhite: Prove it

Jones: It has rained for 3 consecutive days, thatJones: It has rained for 3 consecutive days, that’’s my proofs my proof

Who is to Who is to ““blameblame”” here? Both !!here? Both !!

Words and Meaning (cont.)Words and Meaning (cont.)

Jones must specify what an Jones must specify what an ““unieunie”” is, and White must demand a is, and White must demand a definition before a proof.definition before a proof.

Otherwise, the whole dialogue is meaningless.Otherwise, the whole dialogue is meaningless.

Similarly, theists must first specify what Similarly, theists must first specify what ““godgod”” means in means in their arguments for existence.their arguments for existence.

As Ayer said: As Ayer said:

““to say that god exists is to make a metaphysical utterance that to say that god exists is to make a metaphysical utterance that cannot be cannot be either true nor falseeither true nor false””

[A.J. Ayer, [A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and LogicLanguage, Truth, and Logic, 1935], 1935]

An An ““unieunie”” perhaps?perhaps?

God and godGod and god……

We We use(duse(d) the following convention ) the following convention (Smith, 1989, (Smith, 1989, p.xiip.xii))::

God = the JudeoGod = the Judeo--ChristeoChristeo--Islamic god Islamic god ((omnibenevolentomnibenevolent, omniscient, omnipotent, etc), omniscient, omnipotent, etc)

god = any supernatural being god = any supernatural being (not subject to the natural laws, transcends human (not subject to the natural laws, transcends human understanding, etc)understanding, etc)

The following argumentsThe following arguments deal basically with the notion of deal basically with the notion of ““GodGod”” (rather (rather

than than ““godgod””).).

godgod……

But, what about But, what about ““godgod”” then?then?

The problem is that the term The problem is that the term ““supernaturalsupernatural”” does NOT tell us anything does NOT tell us anything

positive about god. It tell us what god positive about god. It tell us what god is notis not (not part of the natural (not part of the natural universe), not what god universe), not what god isis..

This raises the following questions:This raises the following questions:

-- How could anyone recognize god?How could anyone recognize god?

-- How could How could ““unnaturalunnatural”” existence be conceived? existence be conceived?

-- Could a supernatural being be above natural law and not possessCould a supernatural being be above natural law and not possess specific specific

attributes?attributes?

Which make the notion of god Which make the notion of god incomprehensibleincomprehensible. Natural existence is a . Natural existence is a

redundancy. If god is to exist without a limited nature, is likeredundancy. If god is to exist without a limited nature, is like to exist without to exist without

any nature at all.any nature at all.

godgod……(cont.)(cont.)

A notion of god, then, that is incomprehensible to man, makes goA notion of god, then, that is incomprehensible to man, makes godd

unknowableunknowable. .

Example: Consider the following dialogue (Smith, 1989, p.43):Example: Consider the following dialogue (Smith, 1989, p.43):

Jones: I believe in godJones: I believe in god

White: What is White: What is ““godgod””??

Jones: I donJones: I don’’t knowt know

White: But what is it that you believe in?White: But what is it that you believe in?

Jones: I donJones: I don’’t know that eithert know that either

White: Then of what possible significance is your White: Then of what possible significance is your original claim tooriginal claim to

believe in god? How does your believe in god? How does your ““beliefbelief”” differ from no beliefdiffer from no belief

whatsoever?whatsoever?

As the previous dialogue shows:As the previous dialogue shows:

If god is unknowable, then the notion of If god is unknowable, then the notion of ““godgod”” is either:is either:

(a) A meaningless word, or (at best)(a) A meaningless word, or (at best)

(b) It signifies that (or all) that we don(b) It signifies that (or all) that we don’’t knowt know

Finally, as Finally, as BrandenBranden argues:argues:

The assertion that a thing is unknowable carries the necessary eThe assertion that a thing is unknowable carries the necessary epistemological pistemological

implication that the speaker is implication that the speaker is omniscientomniscient –– that he has total knowledge of that he has total knowledge of

everything in the universe and, from his unique vantage pointeverything in the universe and, from his unique vantage point, is able to proclaim, is able to proclaim

that certain things are inherently beyond the reach of manthat certain things are inherently beyond the reach of man’’s knowledge and s knowledge and

understanding.understanding.

[N. [N. BrandenBranden, , ““The Objectivist NewsletterThe Objectivist Newsletter””, Vol.2, No.1, p,3, 1963], Vol.2, No.1, p,3, 1963]

Some Arguments For the Existence Some Arguments For the Existence

of God.of God.

(with capital (with capital ““GG””. Something which, at least, has some attributes which . Something which, at least, has some attributes which ““couldcould””

be comprehensible by man)be comprehensible by man)

The Ontological ArgumentThe Ontological Argument

AnselmAnselm of Canterbury, in his of Canterbury, in his ProslogionProslogion (1077), presents the (1077), presents the following argument for the existence of god. The argument is knofollowing argument for the existence of god. The argument is known wn as the as the Ontological ArgumentOntological Argument, and it goes as follows , and it goes as follows (Sober, 1995)(Sober, 1995)::

(1) God is, by definition, the greatest (1) God is, by definition, the greatest [most perfect][most perfect] being possible. being possible. (2) A being who fails to exist in the actual world (2) A being who fails to exist in the actual world (while existing in(while existing in

other possible worlds)other possible worlds) is less perfect than a being who exists is less perfect than a being who exists in all possible worlds. in all possible worlds.

----------------------------(3) God exists (necessarily). (3) God exists (necessarily).

NoteNote: Prior to Anselm, others proposed similar types of ontological: Prior to Anselm, others proposed similar types of ontological arguments. For example, arguments. For example, AvicennaAvicenna (965(965--1037) in 1037) in The Book of Healing The Book of Healing (Section: (Section: MetaphysicsMetaphysics) he presents, perhaps,) he presents, perhaps,the first ontological type argument.the first ontological type argument.

AnalysisAnalysis

GauniloGaunilo’’ss critique: (Gcritique: (G--islands)islands)

(1) A G(1) A G--island is, by definition, the greatest [most perfect] island posisland is, by definition, the greatest [most perfect] island possible. sible.

(2) An island that fails to exist in the actual world (while (2) An island that fails to exist in the actual world (while existing inexisting in

other possible worlds) is less perfect than an island thother possible worlds) is less perfect than an island that exists at exists

in all possible worlds. in all possible worlds.

----------------------------

(3) A G(3) A G--island exists island exists (necessarily)(necessarily). .

So, since there are NO GSo, since there are NO G--island, that means that the above argument is island, that means that the above argument is invalidinvalid. That is:. That is:

(1) If the Ont. (1) If the Ont. ArgArg. is valid, then the G. is valid, then the G--island island ArgArg. is valid (same structure).. is valid (same structure).

(2) The G(2) The G--island island ArgArg. is not valid.. is not valid.

----------------------------

(3) the Ont. (3) the Ont. ArgArg. is not valid. . is not valid.

This can't be a GThis can't be a G--islandisland……

Deductive ArgumentsDeductive Arguments……

Anselm dismissed this criticism as Anselm dismissed this criticism as irrelevantirrelevant (that his argument applies to God, (that his argument applies to God,

not islands). He was not islands). He was wrongwrong, though, as the validity of deductive arguments , though, as the validity of deductive arguments

depends on their structure, not their subject matter.depends on their structure, not their subject matter.

Example: The following argument, is a perfectly VALID argument:Example: The following argument, is a perfectly VALID argument:

(1) All pigs can fly.(1) All pigs can fly.

(2) Anything that flies knows Math. (2) Anything that flies knows Math.

----------------------------

(3) All pigs know Math. (3) All pigs know Math.

Euler DiagramEuler Diagram

(where A=pigs, B=can f(where A=pigs, B=can fly, and C=know Math)ly, and C=know Math)

The problem with The problem with GauniloGaunilo’’ss criticism, though, is that it doesncriticism, though, is that it doesn’’t tell us t tell us wherewhere

Anselm has gone wrong. Anselm has gone wrong.

C

ExistenceExistence……KantKant’’s critique: (s critique: (““existenceexistence”” as property)as property)

Kant criticized the above argument by saying that existence is Kant criticized the above argument by saying that existence is notnot

really a property of a thing. As he said:really a property of a thing. As he said:

By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thBy whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing ing ---- even if we even if we

completely determine it completely determine it ---- we do not make the least addition to the thing when we we do not make the least addition to the thing when we

further declare that this thing further declare that this thing isis. .

[I. Kant, [I. Kant, Critique of Pure ReasonCritique of Pure Reason, 1878, (, 1878, (trsltrsl. by N.K. Smith, 1929, . by N.K. Smith, 1929, Ch.IIICh.III, S.4, p.505, London: , S.4, p.505, London: Macmillan)]Macmillan)]

In other words, when we say that dogs are intelligent, we are prIn other words, when we say that dogs are intelligent, we are predicating a edicating a

property of dogs (namely, intelligence). But, when we say that dproperty of dogs (namely, intelligence). But, when we say that dogs exist we ogs exist we

are NOT attributing the property of existence to dogs, but ratheare NOT attributing the property of existence to dogs, but rather we are saying r we are saying

something about the something about the conceptconcept of of doghooddoghood. To say that dogs exist is to say that. To say that dogs exist is to say that

the concept of the concept of doghooddoghood is exemplified. is exemplified.

AlsoAlso……AquinasAquinas’’s critique: (s critique: (““existenceexistence”” prior perfection, etc)prior perfection, etc)

Aquinas criticized the above argument by saying that existence sAquinas criticized the above argument by saying that existence should hould precedeprecede any notion of perfection, greatness, etc, and not vice versa. any notion of perfection, greatness, etc, and not vice versa.

But most importantly, he said:But most importantly, he said:

Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some hathan which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be ve believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this woa body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified rd "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, neverthelsomething than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not ess, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signiftherefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but ies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actonly that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be ually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothiadmitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be ng greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist. that God does not exist.

[T. Aquinas, [T. Aquinas, Summa Summa TheologicaTheologica, Part 1, Q.2, Art.1, 1265, Part 1, Q.2, Art.1, 1265--1274 (1274 (trsltrsl. by Fathers of the English . by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Dominican Province, BenzigerBenziger Bros. edition, 1947)]Bros. edition, 1947)]

Main CriticismMain CriticismThe two objections in the previous passage speak for themselves,The two objections in the previous passage speak for themselves, but but

combining his second objection, namely:combining his second objection, namely:

““Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitNor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually ted that there actually

exists something than which nothing greater can be thoughtexists something than which nothing greater can be thought””

with Kantwith Kant’’s objection that:s objection that:

““When, therefore, I think a being as the supreme reality, withoutWhen, therefore, I think a being as the supreme reality, without any defect, the any defect, the

question still remains whether it exists or notquestion still remains whether it exists or not””

one arrives to the main objection to the Ont. one arrives to the main objection to the Ont. ArgArg. which is this:. which is this:

The fact that existence is built into a concept X does NOT neThe fact that existence is built into a concept X does NOT necessarilycessarily

imply that there exists a thing Z to which the concept applieimply that there exists a thing Z to which the concept applies.s.

(i.e., Accepting that God is defined as a necessarily existing b(i.e., Accepting that God is defined as a necessarily existing being, all that we are simply eing, all that we are simply

saying is that: saying is that: If there is a God, then he necessarily existsIf there is a God, then he necessarily exists. The definition does NOT . The definition does NOT

imply the existence of anything that necessarily exists, imply the existence of anything that necessarily exists, which will make the which will make the

argument INVALID)argument INVALID)

The Cosmological ArgumentThe Cosmological Argument

AquinasAquinas, in his , in his Summa Summa TheologicaTheologica (1274), presents 5 arguments (1274), presents 5 arguments that supposedly prove the existence of God. The 2nd argument, althat supposedly prove the existence of God. The 2nd argument, also so known as the known as the Cosmological ArgumentCosmological Argument (or, first cause argument), (or, first cause argument), goes as follows goes as follows (Sober, 1995)(Sober, 1995)::

(1) Some events cause other events.(1) Some events cause other events.(2) If an event happens, then it must be caused by something (2) If an event happens, then it must be caused by something

outside of itself. outside of itself. (3) There can be no infinite cause/effect chains.(3) There can be no infinite cause/effect chains.(4) So, there is a first uncaused cause. (4) So, there is a first uncaused cause. ----------------------------(5) God exists.(5) God exists.

NoteNote: Prior to Aquinas, others proposed similar types of cosmologic: Prior to Aquinas, others proposed similar types of cosmological arguments. For example, al arguments. For example, AristotleAristotle argued argued in his in his MetaphysicsMetaphysics (Book XII, Chapter 7, 1072) for the notion of a (Book XII, Chapter 7, 1072) for the notion of a ““prime mover unmovedprime mover unmoved”” ((πρώτονπρώτον κινούνκινούνακίνητονακίνητον))

AnalysisAnalysis

God or something else?God or something else?

What this argument What this argument at most at most establishes is the existence of a first establishes is the existence of a first

cause and NOT God. This first cause could be a big explosion (cause and NOT God. This first cause could be a big explosion (““big big

bangbang””) and not necessarily a God as Aquinas understood him (i.e.) and not necessarily a God as Aquinas understood him (i.e.

omnipotent, omniscient, etc). omnipotent, omniscient, etc).

Hence, the move from premise (4) to premise (5) is MISTAKEN!Hence, the move from premise (4) to premise (5) is MISTAKEN!(and hence, the (and hence, the CosmCosm. . ArgArg. is . is invalidinvalid))

What about the premises?What about the premises?

Contradictory premises?Contradictory premises?

Previously, we said Previously, we said ““at mostat most””, etc, but actually the argument does NOT , etc, but actually the argument does NOT

even prove the existence of a first cause. Indeed, premises (2) even prove the existence of a first cause. Indeed, premises (2) and (4)and (4)

are are contradictorycontradictory. One cannot reach the conclusion in (4), as (2) . One cannot reach the conclusion in (4), as (2)

precludes such possibility.precludes such possibility.

Hence, once again, the argument is Hence, once again, the argument is invalidinvalid..

Logical Fallacies?Logical Fallacies?

Birthday Fallacy?Birthday Fallacy?

Suppose we grant premise (2), and that is true, indeed, that eacSuppose we grant premise (2), and that is true, indeed, that each h causal chain has a beginning (an uncaused cause). Does it necesscausal chain has a beginning (an uncaused cause). Does it necessarily arily follow that there is an uncaused cause that is the origin of allfollow that there is an uncaused cause that is the origin of all causal causal chains? chains? NoNo it does NOT. it does NOT.

The above error in the argument is called the The above error in the argument is called the Birthday FallacyBirthday Fallacy..

That is: Every person has a birthday (a day which he/she wasThat is: Every person has a birthday (a day which he/she was born).born).------------------------There is a single day that is everybodyThere is a single day that is everybody’’s birthday.s birthday.

At most, the At most, the CosmCosm. . ArgArg. shows the existence of . shows the existence of at least oneat least one first cause, and first cause, and not exactly onenot exactly one,, otherwise it commits the Birthday Fallacy (hence otherwise it commits the Birthday Fallacy (hence invalidinvalid).).

Note:Note:

Although Aquinas intended to account for chains that extend fromAlthough Aquinas intended to account for chains that extend from thethe

present to the past, that is:present to the past, that is:

premise (3), in virtue of what it says, has the following implicpremise (3), in virtue of what it says, has the following implication:ation:

That is, cause and effect chains must be finite in either time dThat is, cause and effect chains must be finite in either time direction.irection.

1E

PRESENT

→230 EEE

PAST

→→→L L→

FUTURE

1E

PRESENT

→230 EEE

PAST

→→→L nn EE

FUTURE

→→−1L

KalamKalam Cosmological ArgumentCosmological Argument

A more A more ““refinedrefined”” version of the cosmological argument (usually called version of the cosmological argument (usually called

the the KalamKalam Cosmological ArgumentCosmological Argument (from Arabic: (from Arabic: kalamkalam = speech, = speech,

dialectical theology) is given by dialectical theology) is given by CraigCraig (in his (in his ThThe e KalamKalam Cosmological Cosmological

ArgumentArgument,, 19791979) ) below:below:

(1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence. (1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

(2) The universe began to exist. (2) The universe began to exist.

----------------------------

(3) The universe has a cause of its existence. (3) The universe has a cause of its existence.

AnalysisAnalysis

Would you agree that the Bing Bang Theory could be employed hereWould you agree that the Bing Bang Theory could be employed here in in

support of (2) of the argument? support of (2) of the argument?

The problem, though, is this: The problem, though, is this: ““The argument above either commits one to a The argument above either commits one to a

dualism or commits one to the view that there are physical thingdualism or commits one to the view that there are physical things that came to s that came to

exist without a causeexist without a cause.. If dualism is the choice, then premise (2) has no longer If dualism is the choice, then premise (2) has no longer

the support of the Bing Bang Theory (as the latter rejects superthe support of the Bing Bang Theory (as the latter rejects supernatural natural

causes), and if physical things that came to exist uncaused is tcauses), and if physical things that came to exist uncaused is the choice, then he choice, then

premise (1) is being contradicted (and hence the whole argument premise (1) is being contradicted (and hence the whole argument is is

contradictory) contradictory) ””..

Many theists (including Craig) intend the above argument as an aMany theists (including Craig) intend the above argument as an argument for rgument for

the existence of God (with capital the existence of God (with capital ““GG””). Would you say that the argument ). Would you say that the argument

establishes the existence of such a type of god? establishes the existence of such a type of god?

Design ArgumentDesign Argument

AquinasAquinas’’ 5th argument in 5th argument in Summa Summa TheologicaTheologica is an argument also is an argument also known as the known as the Design ArgumentDesign Argument, and it, and it goes as follows goes as follows (Sober, 1995):(Sober, 1995):

(1) Among objects that act for an end, some have minds whereas(1) Among objects that act for an end, some have minds whereasothers do not.others do not.

(2) An object that acts for an end, but does not itself have a(2) An object that acts for an end, but does not itself have a mind,mind,must have been designed by a being that has a mind.must have been designed by a being that has a mind.

(3) So, there exists a being with a mind who designed all mind(3) So, there exists a being with a mind who designed all mindlesslessobjects that act for an end. objects that act for an end.

----------------------------(4) God exists. (4) God exists.

AnalysisAnalysis

-- Can you give an example of a mindless object that acts for an eCan you give an example of a mindless object that acts for an end? nd?

-- Does the argument say that humans, for example, were designed bDoes the argument say that humans, for example, were designed by y

God? God?

-- Does the transition from some premises to others (which ones?) Does the transition from some premises to others (which ones?)

commits the commits the Birthday FallacyBirthday Fallacy??

If the argument commits, indeed, the Birthday Fallacy, then the If the argument commits, indeed, the Birthday Fallacy, then the

argument is argument is invalidinvalid. .

HumeHume

A more A more ““romanticromantic”” version of the Design Argument is given by version of the Design Argument is given by HumeHume, , who was also one of its most fierce critics:who was also one of its most fierce critics:

““Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of itLook round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it : You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinto be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser ite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyonmachines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses d what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machinand faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most es, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy whiminute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into ch ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curioadmiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means us adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore, the effects resemble each othintelligence. Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by er, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Naturethat the Author of Natureis somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of mis somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, uch larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executeproportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a d. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once tposteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, he existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligenceand his similarity to human mind and intelligence””. .

[D. Hume, [D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural ReligionDialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 1854, Part II, p.13, 1854, Part II, p.13--14, 14, KessingerKessinger Publishing, 2004]Publishing, 2004]

The watch argumentThe watch argument……

PaleyPaley’’ss Argument(sArgument(s):):

(1) A watch is intricate and well suited to the task of measur(1) A watch is intricate and well suited to the task of measuring time. ing time.

----------------------------

(2) A watch is the product of intelligent design. (2) A watch is the product of intelligent design.

As As PaleyPaley says, granting the argument above, one should grant the followisays, granting the argument above, one should grant the following twong two

arguments as well:arguments as well:

AA BB

(1) An organism is intricate and well suited to (1)(1) An organism is intricate and well suited to (1) The universe is intricate and well suited toThe universe is intricate and well suited to

the task of survival and reproduction. the task of survival and reproduction. the task of providing and sustaining life.the task of providing and sustaining life.

---------------------------- ----------------------------

(2) An organism is the product of intelligent design. (2) T(2) An organism is the product of intelligent design. (2) The universe is the product of intelligent design. he universe is the product of intelligent design.

Would you agree that, indeed, the world is a Would you agree that, indeed, the world is a ““fine tunedfine tuned””machine in which things work with perfect accuracy?machine in which things work with perfect accuracy?

Hume certainly wouldnHume certainly wouldn’’t:t:

““If we see a house, CLEANTHES, we conclude, with the greatest cerIf we see a house, CLEANTHES, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had tainty, that it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely that speciean architect or builder; because this is precisely that species of effect which we have s of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house, that we can the universe bears such a resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a gis so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a uess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause[presumption concerning a similar cause[……]. For ought we can know a priori, matter may ]. For ought we can know a priori, matter may may contain the source or spring of order originally within itmay contain the source or spring of order originally within itself as well as mind does; self as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the severaand there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements, from an internal l elements, from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, tunknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that han to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like internaltheir ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. The equal possibility of both these suppositthat arrangement. The equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowedions is allowed””..

[D. Hume, [D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural ReligionDialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 1854, Part II, p.15, 1854, Part II, p.15--16, 16, KessingerKessinger Publishing, 2004]Publishing, 2004]

The two objectionsThe two objections……

Hume, basically, poses two objections to the Design Hume, basically, poses two objections to the Design

Argument. Namely: (a) weak analogy Argument. Namely: (a) weak analogy

(b) alternative hypothesis. (b) alternative hypothesis.

Is objection (a) a strong enough objection to challenge the Is objection (a) a strong enough objection to challenge the ““design hypothesisdesign hypothesis””

(over the (over the ““random hypothesisrandom hypothesis””), as perhaps the best explanation for something ), as perhaps the best explanation for something

like the human eye coming into existence?like the human eye coming into existence?

Objection (a) formalized.Objection (a) formalized.

Hume argument could be described as follows:Hume argument could be described as follows:

(1) Object (1) Object AA has property has property PP. .

(2) Object (2) Object A A and object and object BB are similar to a degree are similar to a degree n.n.

[[nn] ] ----------------------------

(3) Object (3) Object BB has property has property PP. .

where (1=where (1=AA,,BB are identical, 0=are identical, 0=A,BA,B are different) and [are different) and [nn]=probability that the conclusion follows.]=probability that the conclusion follows.

In particularly:In particularly:AA BB

(1) A watch is the product of intelligent design. (1) A watch is the product of intelligent design. (1) A watch is the product of intelligent design.(1) A watch is the product of intelligent design.

(2) A watch and an organism are (2) A watch and an organism are nn--similar. (2) A watch and the universe are similar. (2) A watch and the universe are nn--similar . similar .

[[nn] ] ---------------------------- [[nn] ] ----------------------------(3) An organisms is the product of intelligent design. (3) An organisms is the product of intelligent design. (3) The universe is the product of intelligent (3) The universe is the product of intelligent

design.design.

]1,0[∈n

Cont.Cont.

But as Hume argues:But as Hume argues:

In A, an organism is NOT really similar to a watch in very In A, an organism is NOT really similar to a watch in very

many aspects, so many aspects, so nn is very small. Hence, [is very small. Hence, [nn] is very small.] is very small.

In B, the universe is NOT really similar to a watch in very In B, the universe is NOT really similar to a watch in very

many aspects, so many aspects, so nn is very small. Hence, [is very small. Hence, [nn] is very small.] is very small.

In both cases, the analogy is weak and hence the argument is weaIn both cases, the analogy is weak and hence the argument is weak. k.

Objection (b).Objection (b).Taking as an example the human eye again, would you say that Taking as an example the human eye again, would you say that HumeHume’’s objection (b) is valid, considering the fact that Evolution s objection (b) is valid, considering the fact that Evolution Theory is the best explanation so far (or, at least, a better alTheory is the best explanation so far (or, at least, a better alternative ternative hypothesis than the design hypothesis (and simplerhypothesis than the design hypothesis (and simpler----OccamOccam’’ss RazorRazor)) )) on how the human eye came into existence? on how the human eye came into existence?

-- CouldnCouldn’’t evolution have also been designed by a designer? Could that t evolution have also been designed by a designer? Could that designer be the Judeodesigner be the Judeo--ChristeoChristeo--Islamic god? Islamic god?

-- Would the phenomenon of Would the phenomenon of imperfect adaptationimperfect adaptation cause a problem to cause a problem to the idea of evolution being designed by a designer? the idea of evolution being designed by a designer? (e.g.(e.g. PandaPanda’’s s ““thumbthumb””, fetal growth and birth (malnutrition, premature birth, etc)), fetal growth and birth (malnutrition, premature birth, etc))

(What about other natural mistakes? Extra limbs, conjoined twins(What about other natural mistakes? Extra limbs, conjoined twins, etc?), etc?)

(There are philosophical arguments, not just scientific, against(There are philosophical arguments, not just scientific, against the notion of a the notion of a ““designerdesigner””,,as we will see later)as we will see later)

M. Denton said in his M. Denton said in his ““The Puzzle of PerfectionThe Puzzle of Perfection”” (in (in Readings in the Readings in the Philosophy of ReligionPhilosophy of Religion, by K.J. Clark, 2000, p.44):, by K.J. Clark, 2000, p.44):

……a few imperfect adaptations which give every impression of havina few imperfect adaptations which give every impression of having beeng beenachieved [nature] by chance are certainly, amid the general achieved [nature] by chance are certainly, amid the general perfection ofperfection ofdesign in nature, an insufficient basis on which to argue fodesign in nature, an insufficient basis on which to argue for the allr the allsufficiency of chance. sufficiency of chance.

The problem, though, is that the above comment misses the point.The problem, though, is that the above comment misses the point. The point The point is for one to account for the imperfect adaptations, mistakes, eis for one to account for the imperfect adaptations, mistakes, etc, assuming tc, assuming that nature was designed by a perfect god and didnthat nature was designed by a perfect god and didn’’t occur randomly. Saying, t occur randomly. Saying, for example, that imperfect adaptations are deliberately designefor example, that imperfect adaptations are deliberately designed as such by d as such by god as well, because that way they (will) serve a higher purposegod as well, because that way they (will) serve a higher purpose, or plan, or , or plan, or a higher design, not only is an unsatisfactory answer (it resorta higher design, not only is an unsatisfactory answer (it resorts to dubious s to dubious explanations) but perhaps require, also, omniscient on behalf ofexplanations) but perhaps require, also, omniscient on behalf of the speaker. the speaker.

EXERCISEEXERCISE

AquinasAquinas’’ 44thth Argument (Argument (““In Degrees PropertiesIn Degrees Properties””) in ) in Summa Summa TheologicaTheologica runs as follows runs as follows [Sober, 1995][Sober, 1995]: :

(1) Objects have properties to greater or lesser extends.(1) Objects have properties to greater or lesser extends.(2) If an object has a property to a lesser extent, then there e(2) If an object has a property to a lesser extent, then there exists somexists some

other object that has that property to the maximum possibleother object that has that property to the maximum possible degree degree (call this a maximum exemplar of the property)(call this a maximum exemplar of the property)..

(3) So, there is an entity that has all properties to the maximu(3) So, there is an entity that has all properties to the maximum possible m possible degree.degree.

----------------------------(4) God exists. (4) God exists.

Find Find at least one at least one objection to the above argument. If you donobjection to the above argument. If you don’’tt……

……you ARE a believer. But, hey...at least you go to HEAVEN !!you ARE a believer. But, hey...at least you go to HEAVEN !!

SOLUTIONSOLUTION

-- One could object premise (2)One could object premise (2): The fact that G. W. Bush is : The fact that G. W. Bush is

less than maximally smart, doesnless than maximally smart, doesn’’t mean that there must t mean that there must

exist a maximally smart president. exist a maximally smart president.

-- Birthday FallacyBirthday Fallacy: Even if each property has a maximum: Even if each property has a maximum

exemplar, it doesnexemplar, it doesn’’t follow that there is an entity that ist follow that there is an entity that is

is the a maximum exemplar of all properties.is the a maximum exemplar of all properties.

-- ContradictionContradiction: If intelligence has its maximum exemplar, : If intelligence has its maximum exemplar,

then stupidity would have its maximum exemplar as too.then stupidity would have its maximum exemplar as too.

But then, this would imply that God is both maximallyBut then, this would imply that God is both maximally

intelligent and maximally stupid. intelligent and maximally stupid.

Some Arguments Against the Some Arguments Against the

Existence of God.Existence of God.

What about arguments against?What about arguments against?

A problem that many regard as a key issue in providing an A problem that many regard as a key issue in providing an

argument against the existence of God is the argument against the existence of God is the problem of problem of

evilevil. . EpicurusEpicurus stated it as follows:stated it as follows:

““Is [god] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotIs [god] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. ent.

Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.

Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?””

[D. Hume, [D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural ReligionDialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 1854, Part X, p.56, , 1854, Part X, p.56, KessingerKessinger Publishing, 2004]Publishing, 2004]

EvilEvil……

-- In your view, is there evil in the world or not? In your view, is there evil in the world or not?

-- If yes, does it then render the following three If yes, does it then render the following three

statements, namely: statements, namely:

““god is god is omnibenevolentomnibenevolent””, , ““god is omnipotentgod is omnipotent””, and , and ““evil existsevil exists””,,

contradictory? contradictory?

Argument from EvilArgument from Evil

The notion of evil gives rise to the following argument against The notion of evil gives rise to the following argument against the the existence of god (usually called the existence of god (usually called the Argument from EvilArgument from Evil), which), whichgoes as follows goes as follows [Sober, 1995][Sober, 1995]::

(1) If God were to exists, then God would be (1) If God were to exists, then God would be omnibenevolentomnibenevolent, , omnipotent, and omniscient omnipotent, and omniscient (call those properties omni(call those properties omni--BPS, for BPS, for short).short).

(2) If an omni(2) If an omni--BPS god existed, then there would be no evil. BPS god existed, then there would be no evil. (3) There is evil.(3) There is evil.------------------------------(4) God does not exist. (4) God does not exist.

(First formally formulated by (First formally formulated by LactantiusLactantius (240(240--320) in his 320) in his Treatise on the Anger of God. Treatise on the Anger of God. Also inAlso inLucretiusLucretius’’s De Rerum Naturas De Rerum Natura))

AnalysisAnalysis

-- One could attack premise (3), and basically claim that One could attack premise (3), and basically claim that there is no there is no

difference, really, between right and wrong. difference, really, between right and wrong. (The latter are human notions, etc.)(The latter are human notions, etc.)

ThatThat’’s a weak objection, though, since there are some acts which are s a weak objection, though, since there are some acts which are clearly clearly

wrong (e.g. torturing a baby for no reason, for fun, etc), and awrong (e.g. torturing a baby for no reason, for fun, etc), and also premise (3) lso premise (3)

is accepted by almost all religious traditions.is accepted by almost all religious traditions.

-- One could also attack premise (1), and claim that One could also attack premise (1), and claim that GodGod simply is not simply is not omniomni--BPS, etc. BPS, etc.

That might interpret evil, perhaps, as whatever God cannot preveThat might interpret evil, perhaps, as whatever God cannot prevent, fight, etc, nt, fight, etc,

but still it doesnbut still it doesn’’t explain where evil came from. Also, God not being omnit explain where evil came from. Also, God not being omni--BPS, BPS,

etc, it is not what at least the Judeoetc, it is not what at least the Judeo--ChristeoChristeo--Islamic tradition considers God to Islamic tradition considers God to

be.be.

(But, since others (ancient Greek religion, Zoroastrianism, etc)(But, since others (ancient Greek religion, Zoroastrianism, etc) denied that denied that God(sGod(s) are ) are

omniomni--BPS, rejecting premise (1) is a good option to go in explaining BPS, rejecting premise (1) is a good option to go in explaining why evil exists)why evil exists)

Analysis (cont.)Analysis (cont.)A stronger objection to the A stronger objection to the ArgArg. From Evil is rejecting premise (2). . From Evil is rejecting premise (2).

Then, one needs to show how evil and an omniThen, one needs to show how evil and an omni--BPS God could be BPS God could be

reconciled reconciled (Theodicy)(Theodicy). .

Theodicy is the claim that Theodicy is the claim that some evils are allowed by God because they some evils are allowed by God because they are are ““soulsoul--buildingbuilding”” evilsevils. . (i.e. they make humans better people)(i.e. they make humans better people)

The The ““parentparent--child analogychild analogy”” is usually introduced: Just as a parent will allow is usually introduced: Just as a parent will allow

some bad things in order for the child to grow stronger, similarsome bad things in order for the child to grow stronger, similarly God allows ly God allows

some bad things for our benefit.some bad things for our benefit.

Questions, of course, could be raised: Questions, of course, could be raised:

-- Why God couldnWhy God couldn’’t simply make us with strong souls in the first place?t simply make us with strong souls in the first place?

(So (So wewe can take credit for our strong souls (characters, achievements,can take credit for our strong souls (characters, achievements, etc) and etc) and notnot

just simply be grateful to a benevolent God (perhaps?)) just simply be grateful to a benevolent God (perhaps?))

-- Why is it so important that we be able to take credit for our sWhy is it so important that we be able to take credit for our strong souls?trong souls?

(So we(So we……))…….It doesn.It doesn’’t matter!!t matter!!

From Evil #2From Evil #2It doesnIt doesn’’t matter because even if one suppose for a second that premise t matter because even if one suppose for a second that premise (2) is false, and some amount of evil is allowed to exist along (2) is false, and some amount of evil is allowed to exist along with an with an omniomni--BPS God, then one could suggest the following argument BPS God, then one could suggest the following argument [Sober,1995]:[Sober,1995]:

(1) If an omni(1) If an omni--BPS God existed, then the amount of evil wouldBPS God existed, then the amount of evil wouldnot exceed a soulnot exceed a soul--building minimum building minimum (the minimum amount that(the minimum amount thatsuffices to have strong soul)suffices to have strong soul). .

(2) The amount of evil does exceed a soul(2) The amount of evil does exceed a soul--building minimum. building minimum. ------------------------------

(3) An omni(3) An omni--BPS God does not exist.BPS God does not exist.

One, of course, could challenge premise (2) above, and claim thaOne, of course, could challenge premise (2) above, and claim that we are not in the position t we are not in the position to know/say how much evil is required for oneto know/say how much evil is required for one’’s souls soul--building. building.

But, this charge could perhaps be neutralized by pointing to theBut, this charge could perhaps be neutralized by pointing to the facts which show that not facts which show that not only some evils that hit one are immensely only some evils that hit one are immensely disanalogousdisanalogous to any soul improvement, some to any soul improvement, some are are unnecessaryunnecessary, and some are even , and some are even destructivedestructive. .

(e.g. (e.g. X X breaks his leg in soccer, and thenbreaks his leg in soccer, and then X X gets cancer and dies suffering)gets cancer and dies suffering)

Free WillFree WillTo refute the previous argument, one must present reasons good To refute the previous argument, one must present reasons good

enough that explain enough that explain why would an omniwhy would an omni--BPS God permit more evilBPS God permit more evil

than the necessary soulthan the necessary soul--building minimum.building minimum.

A usual response is because of A usual response is because of Free WillFree Will. Since we are free to do good or evil, . Since we are free to do good or evil,

then evil from free will is then evil from free will is ““addedadded”” to what God allows as necessary. to what God allows as necessary.

(Notice that the suggestion above, would challenge premise (1) o(Notice that the suggestion above, would challenge premise (1) of the f the ArgArg. From Evil #2). From Evil #2)

But, consider the following two examples: But, consider the following two examples:

(a) (a) HitlerHitler (great suffering and death (great suffering and death ---- CouldnCouldn’’t God intervene and make a difference?) t God intervene and make a difference?)

(b) (b) Bubonic PlagueBubonic Plague (great suffering and death (great suffering and death –– CouldnCouldn’’t God do something about it?)t God do something about it?)

One might consider example (a) as weak, since as free agents we One might consider example (a) as weak, since as free agents we could have acted, could have acted,

perhaps, in such ways to prevent Hitler from coming to power, etperhaps, in such ways to prevent Hitler from coming to power, etc. Unless if God c. Unless if God

intervened at the sperm/egg level and prevented Hitler from comiintervened at the sperm/egg level and prevented Hitler from coming to be, which also ng to be, which also

could be perhaps thought of as God undermining our free choices.could be perhaps thought of as God undermining our free choices. Example (b) is strongerExample (b) is stronger

as we couldnas we couldn’’t have done much (didnt have done much (didn’’t know cure, etc) and it came out of no onet know cure, etc) and it came out of no one’’s will.s will.

From Evil #3From Evil #3

But, as before, the examples could suggest the following modifieBut, as before, the examples could suggest the following modified d

(and more powerful) version of the previous argument, which (and more powerful) version of the previous argument, which

additionally takes free will into consideration additionally takes free will into consideration [Sober,1995][Sober,1995]::

(1) If an omni(1) If an omni--BPS God existed, then there would be no moreBPS God existed, then there would be no more

evil than the minimum required for soulevil than the minimum required for soul--building and as abuilding and as a

consequence of free will.consequence of free will.

(2) The amount of evil does exceed the minimum required f(2) The amount of evil does exceed the minimum required foror

soulsoul--building and as a consequence of free will.building and as a consequence of free will.

------------------------------

(3) An omni(3) An omni--BPS God does not exist.BPS God does not exist.

Now, to refute the above, one must provide reasons good enough fNow, to refute the above, one must provide reasons good enough for one to reject or one to reject

premises (1) and (2). As we said before (in the Design case), inpremises (1) and (2). As we said before (in the Design case), insisting that the sisting that the ““mysterymystery””

is somehow too great is NO reply at all (if not worse than no reis somehow too great is NO reply at all (if not worse than no reply at all).ply at all).

Note:Note:

-- Do you think that premised (2) could be challenged by Do you think that premised (2) could be challenged by

using Platousing Plato’’s s EuthyphroEuthyphro’’ss DilemmaDilemma in a way that showsin a way that shows

that evil is irrelevant to God? that evil is irrelevant to God?

-- Would that undermine the Argument from Evil? Would that undermine the Argument from Evil?

-- Do you think that the argument is a convincing argument Do you think that the argument is a convincing argument

against the existence of god? against the existence of god? (with lower case (with lower case ““gg””))

EuthyproEuthypro’’ss Dilemma (recall)Dilemma (recall)

“Is the pious loved (or commanded) by the gods because it

is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”[Plato, Euthyphro, 380 BC]

((pious = what is moral, right, good, etc)

(loved or commanded (or wanted), etc))

The problem is that in the above, one canThe problem is that in the above, one can’’t have both. If you have t have both. If you have

both, then the above claim is equivalent to:both, then the above claim is equivalent to:

““God loves (wants, etc) God loves (wants, etc) XX because God loves (wants, etc) because God loves (wants, etc) XX””

which this, according to Cogburn, “makes God sound a lot more like a willful

pre-adolescent than the sort of being that mature adults ought to worship,

love, and emulate”. [J. Cogburn, Philosophy Through Video Games, 2008]

CarneadesCarneades’’ Argument(sArgument(s))

EmpiricusEmpiricus (160(160--210), in his 210), in his Against the PhysicistsAgainst the Physicists presents the following presents the following argument by argument by CarneadesCarneades (213(213--128 BC) against the existence of God: 128 BC) against the existence of God:

(1) If God is all(1) If God is all--virtuous and possesses wisdom, it possesses virtuous and possesses wisdom, it possesses sound deliberation.sound deliberation.

(2) And if God deliberates, there is something which is (2) And if God deliberates, there is something which is nonnon--evident to God.evident to God.

(3) It is impossible that anything would be non(3) It is impossible that anything would be non--evident to God. evident to God. ----------------------------(4) God does not exist. (4) God does not exist.

Refined versions of some of Refined versions of some of CarneadesCarneades’’ arguments have been proposed. For example, D. Walton, in arguments have been proposed. For example, D. Walton, in his his ““Can an Ancient Argument of Can an Ancient Argument of CarneadesCarneades [[……] Disprove the Existence of God?] Disprove the Existence of God?”” [[PhiloPhilo, No.2, 1999 , No.2, 1999 (in (in The Impossibility of GodThe Impossibility of God, M. Martin and R. , M. Martin and R. MonnierMonnier, 2003, p.38)], presents an , 2003, p.38)], presents an ontological typeontological typeCarneadeanCarneadean--based argument. based argument.

AnalysisAnalysis

-- Do you think that the argument above could undermine Do you think that the argument above could undermine

the case for a wise God? the case for a wise God?

-- Do you think that the argument above could undermine Do you think that the argument above could undermine

the case for a God who was/is the designer of the the case for a God who was/is the designer of the

universe?universe?

-- Do you think that the argument is a convincing argument Do you think that the argument is a convincing argument

against the existence of God (or god)? against the existence of God (or god)?

Some ObjectionsSome Objections

J. Turner (a student of mine) objected to J. Turner (a student of mine) objected to CarneadesCarneades’’ ArgArg. as follows:. as follows:

Premise (1) merely states that that God has the ability to Premise (1) merely states that that God has the ability to deliberate; itdeliberate; itdoes not say that he does not say that he needs needs to deliberate or whether he to deliberate or whether he does does deliberate deliberate or not. Possessing all the faculties required to do somethior not. Possessing all the faculties required to do something does neitherng does neithermean that you will do it, not that you have done it (nor thmean that you will do it, not that you have done it (nor that you willat you willeventually do it). So, by analogy, consider the following aeventually do it). So, by analogy, consider the following argument:rgument:

(1) I have the ability to hit someone in the face.(1) I have the ability to hit someone in the face.(2) A person who hits someone in the face is a bad p(2) A person who hits someone in the face is a bad person.erson.----------------------------(3) I am a bad person. (3) I am a bad person.

which is valid, but which is valid, but unsoundunsound, argument., argument.

It is true, for the analogy to It is true, for the analogy to ““runrun”” Turner has to produce a valid unsoundTurner has to produce a valid unsoundargument. But, is his argument really valid?argument. But, is his argument really valid?

Is it valid?Is it valid?

The answer is The answer is NONO. Because, for his . Because, for his argarg. to be valid, it has to have the . to be valid, it has to have the

following structure:following structure:

But, because But, because Ability To HitAbility To Hit HitHit ., his argument has the following form ., his argument has the following form

instead:instead:

(a)(a) or or (b)(b)

(where A=You, B=Ability to Hit, C=Hit, D=Bad)(where A=You, B=Ability to Hit, C=Hit, D=Bad)

≠

C

C

D

C

D

Can it be fixed?Can it be fixed?

YesYes, Turner, Turner’’s premise (2) could be changed into:s premise (2) could be changed into:

(2)(2)’’ ““A person who has the ability to hit someone in the face is a badA person who has the ability to hit someone in the face is a bad personperson””

which will turn his argument into the which will turn his argument into the validvalid argument: argument:

(1) I have the ability to hit someone in the face.(1) I have the ability to hit someone in the face.

(2)(2)’’ A person who has the ability to hit someone in the face is a baA person who has the ability to hit someone in the face is a bad d

person.person.

----------------------------

(3) I am a bad person. (3) I am a bad person.

which has the appropriate form:which has the appropriate form:

C

ProblemProblem……But now, the problem is that his But now, the problem is that his argarg. becomes too . becomes too weakweak..

That is because: That is because:

-- Premise (2)Premise (2)’’ becomes highly becomes highly implausibleimplausible (unlike (unlike CarneadesCarneades’’ premise (2)).premise (2)).

-- CounterintuitiveCounterintuitive: We rarely think that a person who has the : We rarely think that a person who has the ability to hitability to hit (not(nothithit) someone in the face is necessarily a bad person. There ) someone in the face is necessarily a bad person. There are also countless examples of gare also countless examples of good persons with such ability.ood persons with such ability.

-- DefinitionalDefinitional: Premise (2) is a definition. It defines as a : Premise (2) is a definition. It defines as a bad person bad person a person with thea person with theability to hit one in the face. Hence, ability to hit one in the face. Hence, is a BAD definition. is a BAD definition.

(More accurately, (2)(More accurately, (2)’’ should had been: (2)should had been: (2)’’’’ ““If a personIf a person……, then is bad, then is bad””. But then, compare (2). But then, compare (2)’’’’ and (2).)and (2).)

-- It would imply that, basically, almost It would imply that, basically, almost everybodyeverybody is a bad person. is a bad person.

Indeed, change Indeed, change ““II”” for any for any X X to get: (1) to get: (1) XX has the ability to hit someone in the face.has the ability to hit someone in the face.(2)(2)’’ A person who has the ability to hit someone A person who has the ability to hit someone

in the face is a bad person. in the face is a bad person. ----------------------------(3) (3) XX is a bad person. is a bad person.

A A Design TypeDesign Type CarneadeanCarneadean--Based ArgumentBased Argument

Finally, perhaps one could also challenge premise (1) of Finally, perhaps one could also challenge premise (1) of CarneadesCarneades’’ ArgArg., .,

on the basis that on the basis that it suggests that one accumulates wisdom by sound it suggests that one accumulates wisdom by sound

deliberationdeliberation,, like humans do, which is unlikely that theists would accept like humans do, which is unlikely that theists would accept

that. that.

Nevertheless, one could still perhaps make a case against an Nevertheless, one could still perhaps make a case against an ““infinitely wiseinfinitely wise”” God God

with the following with the following design typedesign type CarneadeanCarneadean--based argument:based argument:

(1) If God exists, then God has infinite wisdom.(1) If God exists, then God has infinite wisdom.

(2) God(2) God’’s infinite wisdom produced the world and its content.s infinite wisdom produced the world and its content.

(3) Infinite wisdom produces (if not perfect) at least hi(3) Infinite wisdom produces (if not perfect) at least highly successful things in the world. ghly successful things in the world.

(4) There are highly unsuccessful things in the world. (4) There are highly unsuccessful things in the world.

----------------------------

(5) God does not exist. (5) God does not exist.

The argument is The argument is validvalid. So to refute its conclusion, one has to reject one of its . So to refute its conclusion, one has to reject one of its

premises.premises.

Note:Note:

Feel free to try to refute itFeel free to try to refute it……

Observe this, though:Observe this, though:

Most likely, one would attack premises (1) and (2). But, what Most likely, one would attack premises (1) and (2). But, what would rejecting (1) and (2) imply for a theist? It would imply would rejecting (1) and (2) imply for a theist? It would imply that:that:

-- God does NOT have infinite wisdom.God does NOT have infinite wisdom.-- The world was NOT produced out of GodThe world was NOT produced out of God’’s infinite wisdom.s infinite wisdom.

But, these are premises that, usually, a theist takes for But, these are premises that, usually, a theist takes for granted !! granted !!

ConclusionsConclusions

““ΜηδενίΜηδενί άλλωάλλω πείθεσθαιπείθεσθαι ηη τωτω λόγωλόγω””

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

((ΠλάτωνΠλάτων, , ““ΚρίτωνΚρίτων””, 46, 46ββ) )

OK, donOK, don’’t panict panic……Let me help:Let me help:

““Nothing can convince me but reasonNothing can convince me but reason””

SOCRATESSOCRATES

(Plato, (Plato, ““CritoCrito””, 46b), 46b)

Thank You Very MuchThank You Very Much……!!!!

You Have Been a Great Audience.You Have Been a Great Audience.

ReferencesReferences1.1. Aristotle, Aristotle, MetaphysicsMetaphysics (Book XII, Chapter 7, 1072, 350 BC ((Book XII, Chapter 7, 1072, 350 BC (trsltrsl. by W.D. Ross, 1924)). . by W.D. Ross, 1924)). 2.2. T. Aquinas, T. Aquinas, Summa Summa TheologicaTheologica, (Part 1, Q.2, Art.1, 1265, (Part 1, Q.2, Art.1, 1265--1274 (1274 (trsltrsl. by Fathers of the . by Fathers of the

English Dominican Province, English Dominican Province, BenzigerBenziger Bros. edition, 1947)).Bros. edition, 1947)).3.3. Avicenna, Avicenna, The Book of Healing The Book of Healing ((““MetaphysicsMetaphysics””, 965, 965--1037).1037).4.4. A.J. Ayer, A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and LogicLanguage, Truth, and Logic, 1935., 1935.5.5. N. N. BrandenBranden, , ““The Objectivist NewsletterThe Objectivist Newsletter””, Vol.2, No.1, p,3, 1963., Vol.2, No.1, p,3, 1963.6.6. W.L. W.L. Craig, Craig, The The KalamKalam Cosmological ArgumentCosmological Argument, Harper & Row, 1979., Harper & Row, 1979.7.7. J. J. CogburnCogburn, , Philosophy Through Video Games, Philosophy Through Video Games, Elsevier, 2008.Elsevier, 2008.8.8. M. Denton said in his M. Denton said in his ““The Puzzle of PerfectionThe Puzzle of Perfection”” (in (in Readings in the Philosophy of Readings in the Philosophy of

ReligionReligion, by K.J. Clark, 2000, p.44)., by K.J. Clark, 2000, p.44).9.9. S. S. EmpiricusEmpiricus, , SextusSextus EmpiricusEmpiricus, III, Against the Physicists. Against the Ethicists, III, Against the Physicists. Against the Ethicists,, p. 139p. 139--

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