AREA SECURITY

OPERATIONS

Military Police FunctionsMilitary Police FunctionsManeuver and Mobility Support Operations

• Support River Crossing, Breaching Operations,

Passage of Lines

• Straggler Control and Dislocated Civilian

• Route Reconnaissance/Surveillance

• MSR Regulation Enforcement

Area Security

• Reconnaissance Operations• Area Damage Control• Base/Air Base Defense• Response Force/TCF Operations• Critical Site, Asset, High-Risk Personnel Sec.• Force Protection/Physical Security• Antiterrorism

Police Intelligence Operations

• Support Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

• Police Information Assessment Process

• Active and Passive Role

• Information Collection and Dessemination

• Joint, Interagency, Multinational Coordination

Law and Order (L&O) Operations

• Law Enforcement

• Criminal Investigations • US Customs Operations

• Related Law and Order Training

Internment and Resettlement Operations

• EPW/CI Handling

• U.S. Military Prisoner Handling

• Populace and Resource Control (PRC)

• Dislocated Civilian CATD OALB

Military Police FunctionsMilitary Police FunctionsArea Security Operations

• Reconnaissance Operations

• Area Damage Control

• Base/Air Base Defense

• Response Force/TCF Operations

• Critical Site, Asset, High-Risk Personnel

• Force Protection/Physical Security

• Antiterrorism

FM 3-19.1PAGE 3-1

OutlineOutline

• Threat / Threat PurposeThreat / Threat Purpose

• Rear AreaRear Area

• Reconnaissance OperationsReconnaissance Operations

• Area Damage ControlArea Damage Control

• Base / Air Base DefenseBase / Air Base Defense

• Response Force / TCF OperationsResponse Force / TCF Operations

• Critical Site, Asset, High-Risk Personnel SecurityCritical Site, Asset, High-Risk Personnel Security

• Force Protection / Physical SecurityForce Protection / Physical Security

• AntiterrorismAntiterrorism

THREAT PURPOSETHREAT PURPOSE

The purpose of the threat is to seize and The purpose of the threat is to seize and maintain the initiative while degrading or maintain the initiative while degrading or eliminating the enemy’s flexibility and eliminating the enemy’s flexibility and capability to sustain both close and deep capability to sustain both close and deep fights.fights.

FM 3-19.1PAGE 3-1

REAR OPERATIONS THREATREAR OPERATIONS THREAT

LEVEL ILEVEL I: Those which can be defeated by : Those which can be defeated by Base or Base-Cluster self-defense measures.Base or Base-Cluster self-defense measures.

LEVEL IILEVEL II: Those which are beyond base or : Those which are beyond base or base-cluster self-defense, and can be defeated base-cluster self-defense, and can be defeated by response forces, normally MP with by response forces, normally MP with supporting fires.supporting fires.

LEVEL IIILEVEL III: Beyond Response Force Ability, : Beyond Response Force Ability, must commit the TCF.must commit the TCF.

THREAT TARGETSTHREAT TARGETS

Nuclear Storage and Delivery SystemsNuclear Storage and Delivery Systems Command and Control FacilitiesCommand and Control Facilities ADA SitesADA Sites AirfieldsAirfields Critical Support and Logistics FacilitiesCritical Support and Logistics Facilities Main Supply RoutesMain Supply Routes ReservesReserves

xxx

XX

X X

XFLOT

FEBA

BDEDIVCORPSCOMMZ

COMBAT ZONE

MAIN BATTLE AREAMAIN BATTLE AREA

XX

X

X

X

X

X

REAR AREA LAYOUTREAR AREA LAYOUT

1 3 0 th R ear A rea O p era tion s C en te r

V eh ic le D riverS P C

O p era tion s A ss is tan ts x 2S P C

C om m u n ica tion s O p era to rs x 2S P C

C om m u n ica tion s S erg ean tS G T

In te l N C OS S G

C h em ica l N C OS S G

A ss is tan t O p era tion s N C O x 2S F C

O p era tion s S eg ean tM S G

M P O fficerC P TM P

In te llig en ce O ffice rC P TM I

A ss is tan t O p era tion s O fficer x 2C P T

C om b at A rm s

O p era tion s S ec tionO p era tion s O ffice r

M A JC om b at A rm s

A ss is tan t P lan s N C OS S G

P lan s N C OS F C

A ss is tan t P lan s O fficerC P T

C om b at A rm s

P lan s S ec tionP lan s O ffice r

M A JC om b at A rm s

L iason S erg ean t x 2S F C /S S G

O p era tion s N C OM S G

E n g in eer O ffice rC P TE N

A ss is tan t O p era tion s O fficerC P T

C om b at A rm s

A rea D am ag e C on tro l S ec tionA D C O fficer

M A JC om b at A rm s

C om m an d erL TC

C om b at A rm s

BASE/BASE CLUSTERS BASE/BASE CLUSTERS DESIGNATIONDESIGNATION

• UNITS DESIGNATED BY RAOC ASUNITS DESIGNATED BY RAOC AS: : – BaseBase

Units or multi-unit positions with Units or multi-unit positions with definite perimetersdefinite perimeters..

– Base ClusterBase ClusterGrouping of bases based on mission and Grouping of bases based on mission and

security requirementssecurity requirementsLacks clearly defined perimeterLacks clearly defined perimeter

BASE AND BASE CLUSTERSBASE AND BASE CLUSTERS

BASE CLUSTER DRAGONBASE CLUSTER DRAGON

WARFIGHTER BASEWARFIGHTER BASE

WOLF BASEWOLF BASE

LIGHTFIGHTERLIGHTFIGHTER BASEBASE

WARRIOR BASEWARRIOR BASE

• Key Concerns:– Mutually Supporting– Level I Defense– 24 Hour Operations– Fratricide Prevention– Reconnaissance and Surveillance Execution– Survivability Measures– Event Mitigation Planning, I.e. Fire Fighting,

Natural Disasters, Mass Casualty, Chemical-Biological Decontamination, Displacements

Base Development Considerations

Area of Responsibility Defense Plan Development

72 Hours

CorpsOrder

RAOC AORDefense Plan

ClustersDevelopCluster

Plan

RAOC approvesRolls into AOR

CRCPBases developBase Defense

Plan

24 Hours 48 Hours

REAR OPERATIONSREAR OPERATIONSBASE (CLUSTER) DEFENSE PLANSBASE (CLUSTER) DEFENSE PLANS

• REAR CP DESIGNATES COMMANDER FOR REAR CP DESIGNATES COMMANDER FOR EACH BASE OR BASE CLUSTEREACH BASE OR BASE CLUSTER

• SENIOR COMMANDER COMMANDS BASE SENIOR COMMANDER COMMANDS BASE CLUSTERCLUSTER

• COMMANDERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR:COMMANDERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR: • POSITIONING UNITS IN THEIR AORPOSITIONING UNITS IN THEIR AOR

• IPB OF THEIR AORIPB OF THEIR AOR

• DEVELOPMENT OF A SELF-DEFENSE PLAN DEVELOPMENT OF A SELF-DEFENSE PLAN

DEFENSE PLANS INCLUDE: DEFENSE PLANS INCLUDE: CLEAR DEFINITION OF DEFENSE C2CLEAR DEFINITION OF DEFENSE C2 DETECTION OF THREATDETECTION OF THREAT SECTORS OF RESPONSIBILITYSECTORS OF RESPONSIBILITY IDENTIFICATION OF UNIT RESPONSE FORCEIDENTIFICATION OF UNIT RESPONSE FORCE OBSTACLE PLANOBSTACLE PLAN AREA DAMAGE CONTROLAREA DAMAGE CONTROL INTERNAL ADA MEASURESINTERNAL ADA MEASURES FIRE SUPPORTFIRE SUPPORT

REAR OPERATIONSREAR OPERATIONSBASE (CLUSTER) DEFENSE PLANSBASE (CLUSTER) DEFENSE PLANS

REAR OPERATIONSREAR OPERATIONSBASE (CLUSTER) DEFENSE PLANSBASE (CLUSTER) DEFENSE PLANS

FORWARDED TO MP CONDUCTING AREA SECURITY FORWARDED TO MP CONDUCTING AREA SECURITY OR MMS IN THE BASE/BASE CLUSTER AOOR MMS IN THE BASE/BASE CLUSTER AO

FORWARDED TO QRFFORWARDED TO QRF FORWARDED TO REAR CP/RAOC/RTOCFORWARDED TO REAR CP/RAOC/RTOC COORDINATED WITH ADJACENT BASES OR COORDINATED WITH ADJACENT BASES OR

CLUSTERS TO MAXIMIZE MUTUAL SUPPORTCLUSTERS TO MAXIMIZE MUTUAL SUPPORT COMMANDERS ESTABLISH 24 HOUR OPERATION COMMANDERS ESTABLISH 24 HOUR OPERATION

CENTERS (BCOC/BDOC)CENTERS (BCOC/BDOC) IN THE TA BASE DEFENSE COORDINATION TEAMS IN THE TA BASE DEFENSE COORDINATION TEAMS

(BDCT’S) ASSIST IN REAR AREA DEFENSE PLANNING(BDCT’S) ASSIST IN REAR AREA DEFENSE PLANNING

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS/INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS/INFORMATION

REQUIREMENTSREQUIREMENTS

• Examples of PIR’s: Any Enemy Size Examples of PIR’s: Any Enemy Size Force, NBC Contaminated Area, Force, NBC Contaminated Area, Assassinations, Breach of Base Security Assassinations, Breach of Base Security measures, and Criminal Activity.measures, and Criminal Activity.

• Examples of IR’s: Damage to roads, Examples of IR’s: Damage to roads, Locations of DZ’s/LZ’s, Possible Ambush Locations of DZ’s/LZ’s, Possible Ambush Sites, Hospitals, External Fuel Sites, Water Sites, Hospitals, External Fuel Sites, Water Sites, etc.Sites, etc.

RECONNAISSANCE RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONSMISSIONS

ZONE RECONNAISSANCEZONE RECONNAISSANCE

AREA RECONNAISSANCEAREA RECONNAISSANCE

“As part of their area security mission, MP serve as the eyes

and ears of the battlefield commander by seeking out enemy

and reporting information obtained by recon patrols.”

FM 3-19.1 PAGE 4-7

FUNDAMENTALS OF FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCERECONNAISSANCE

REMAIN FOCUSED ON THE REMAIN FOCUSED ON THE OBJECTIVEOBJECTIVE

REPORT QUICKLY AND REPORT QUICKLY AND ACCURATELYACCURATELY

RETAIN FREEDOM TO MANEUVERRETAIN FREEDOM TO MANEUVER GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACTGAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACT DEVELOP THE SITUATION RAPIDLYDEVELOP THE SITUATION RAPIDLY

ZONE RECONNAISSANCEZONE RECONNAISSANCE

Zone Reconnaissance is a directed Zone Reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information effort to obtain detailed information concerning all route, obstacles, terrain, concerning all route, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries.defined by boundaries.

ZONE RECONNAISSANCEZONE RECONNAISSANCEBEST USED WHEN INITIALLY DEPLOYING BEST USED WHEN INITIALLY DEPLOYING

INTO AN AREAINTO AN AREA

MOST TIME CONSUMING TYPE OF MOST TIME CONSUMING TYPE OF RECONNAISSANCERECONNAISSANCE

COMMANDERS CRITICAL INFORMATION COMMANDERS CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTSREQUIREMENTS

3 METHODS OF ZONE 3 METHODS OF ZONE RECONRECON

• FANFAN

• CONVERGING ROUTESCONVERGING ROUTES

• SUCCESSIVE SECTORSUCCESSIVE SECTOR

ORPORP

ORPORP

PLANNED ROUTESPLANNED ROUTESRESERVERESERVE

FAN METHODFAN METHOD

ORPORP

CONVERGING ROUTESCONVERGING ROUTES

ORP

TO FRIENDLYLINES

SUCCESSIVESUCCESSIVE SECTORSECTOR

ORPORP

RENDEZVOUSRENDEZVOUSPOINT/ORPsPOINT/ORPs

RECONNAISSANCERECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTSELEMENTS

ZONE RECON ZONE RECON PATROLPATROL

HQHQ RECONRECON ELEMENTELEMENT

RECON RECON ELEMENTELEMENT

RECON RECON ELEMENTELEMENT

AREAAREA RECONNAISSANCERECONNAISSANCE

Area Reconnaissance is a directed Area Reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information effort to obtain detailed information concerning the terrain or enemy concerning the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area such activity within a prescribed area such as a town, ridge line, woods, or other as a town, ridge line, woods, or other feature critical to operationsfeature critical to operations

AREA RECONAREA RECON

GAIN SPECIFIC INFORMATIONGAIN SPECIFIC INFORMATION

MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCEMAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE

COMMANDER’S CRITICAL COMMANDER’S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTINFORMATION REQUIREMENT

SIZE OF THE ELEMENT TO UTILIZESIZE OF THE ELEMENT TO UTILIZE

SS

SS

SS

SS

SS

SECURITYSECURITY

SECURITYSECURITY

RECONRECONELEMENTELEMENT

RECONRECONELEMENTELEMENTOBJOBJ

AREA RECONNAISSANCEAREA RECONNAISSANCE

RECONNAISSANCE RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTSELEMENTS

AREA RECON AREA RECON PATROLPATROL

HQHQ RECONRECON ELEMENTELEMENT

SECURITYSECURITY ELEMENTELEMENT

FM 3-19.1PAGE 4-8

ADCMeasures taken before, during and afterhostile action,man-made or natural disasters to: • Reduce probability of damage • Regulate MSRs • Aid in continuation or reestablishment of normal operations • Control refugees and provide local security

ADC Operations• Panama• LA Riots• Hurricane Andrew• West Coast Fires• Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo

FM 3-19.1PAGE 4-8

BASE AND BASE CLUSTERSBASE AND BASE CLUSTERS

BASE CLUSTER DRAGONBASE CLUSTER DRAGON

WARFIGHTER BASEWARFIGHTER BASE

WOLF BASEWOLF BASE

LIGHTFIGHTERLIGHTFIGHTER BASEBASE

WARRIOR BASEWARRIOR BASE

“The MP is the base and base cluster commander’s link for detection, early

warning, and employment against enemy attacks. Base defense is the

cornerstone of rear security”.

FM 3-19.1 PAGE 4-8

AIR BASE GROUND AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSEDEFENSE(ABGD)(ABGD)

Local security measures, both Local security measures, both normal and emergency, required to normal and emergency, required to nullify and reduce the effectiveness of nullify and reduce the effectiveness of the enemy ground attack directed the enemy ground attack directed against USAF bases and installations.against USAF bases and installations.

ABGD OBJECTIVEABGD OBJECTIVE

The objective of ABGD is to prevent the degradation of sortie The objective of ABGD is to prevent the degradation of sortie generation by detecting and disrupting the enemy ground forces far generation by detecting and disrupting the enemy ground forces far enough from the base to prevent the use of stand off or direct fire enough from the base to prevent the use of stand off or direct fire weapons.weapons.

ABGD Requires:ABGD Requires: • MP to have special coordination with the USAFMP to have special coordination with the USAF• MP to treat ABGD like any other base or base clusterMP to treat ABGD like any other base or base cluster

AIR FORCE AORAIR FORCE AOR

• Air Base Perimeter and insideAir Base Perimeter and inside

• 3-5 KM out to include perimeter 3-5 KM out to include perimeter

• METT-TC Driven METT-TC Driven

ARMY AORARMY AOR

• 3-5 KM forward of Air Force AOR3-5 KM forward of Air Force AOR

• Deliberate Defense MeasuresDeliberate Defense Measures

• METT-TC Driven METT-TC Driven

• Command RelationshipCommand Relationship

AVAILABLE FORCESAVAILABLE FORCES

•ABGD FORCES (security forces)ABGD FORCES (security forces)

•RESPONSE FORCES (MP)RESPONSE FORCES (MP)

•TACTICAL COMBAT FORCESTACTICAL COMBAT FORCES

•TRANSIENT FORCESTRANSIENT FORCES

USAF SECURITY FORCEUSAF SECURITY FORCE

WING CDRWING CDR

MSN SPT CDRMSN SPT CDR

GRP CDR CSPGRP CDR CSP

SQNSQN X3X3

FLTFLT X3X3

X3X3 K9K9 MORTARMORTAR X3X3

O-7O-7

O-6O-6

O-4/O-6O-4/O-6

FM 3-19.1PAGE 4-8

REAR OPERATIONS THREATREAR OPERATIONS THREAT

LEVEL ILEVEL I: Those which can be defeated by : Those which can be defeated by Base or Base-Cluster self-defense measures.Base or Base-Cluster self-defense measures.

LEVEL IILEVEL II: Those which are beyond base or : Those which are beyond base or base-cluster self-defense, and can be defeated base-cluster self-defense, and can be defeated by response forces, normally MP with by response forces, normally MP with supporting fires.supporting fires.

LEVEL IIILEVEL III: Beyond Response Force Ability, : Beyond Response Force Ability, must commit the TCF.must commit the TCF.

RESPONSE FORCESRESPONSE FORCES

USUALLY MILITARY POLICE !!USUALLY MILITARY POLICE !!

OTHER POSSIBILITIESOTHER POSSIBILITIES

CHEMICALCHEMICALENGINEERSENGINEERS

ELEMENT OF TCFELEMENT OF TCFHN FORCESHN FORCES

RECONSTITUTING UNITRECONSTITUTING UNITTRANSITIONING TRANSITIONING

COMBATCOMBATFORCESFORCES

RESPONSE FORCESRESPONSE FORCESMISSIONSMISSIONS

• Movement to Contact

• Hasty Ambush

• Hasty Attack

• Delays

• Call for Fire

• Repel attacks against and defend Critical Sites

RESPONSE FORCE RESPONSE FORCE CONSIDERATIONSCONSIDERATIONS

• Defense Capability at Each BaseDefense Capability at Each Base• Location of Obstacles and MinesLocation of Obstacles and Mines• Communication ProceduresCommunication Procedures• Deceptions Plan and Capability for Deceptions Plan and Capability for Each Base Each Base

RESPONSE FORCERESPONSE FORCE COORDINATION COORDINATION

• Location and Type of Fire SupportLocation and Type of Fire Support• Signals for FPFSignals for FPF• Locations of Planned Fire Missions(TRPs)Locations of Planned Fire Missions(TRPs)• Procedures for Contacting the BDOCProcedures for Contacting the BDOC• Locations of LPs/ OPs, Patrols and Locations of LPs/ OPs, Patrols and

Contact PointsContact Points• Location and Type of Aviation SupportLocation and Type of Aviation Support

TACTICAL COMBAT TACTICAL COMBAT FORCEFORCE

Designated by the G-3Designated by the G-3

Normally a Combined Arms organizationNormally a Combined Arms organization

Normally the TCF receives fire support, aviation Normally the TCF receives fire support, aviation

support and any other support neededsupport and any other support needed

Once TCF is designated it establishes liaison Once TCF is designated it establishes liaison

with rear CP and response force (MP)with rear CP and response force (MP)

The TCF will develop its own IPBThe TCF will develop its own IPBFM 3-19.1PAGE 3-9

• Direct Coordination with MPs forDirect Coordination with MPs for Intelligence and Contingency Plans Intelligence and Contingency Plans

• TCF Commitment is a Command DecisionTCF Commitment is a Command Decision

• Command Relationship is OPCON to TCFCommand Relationship is OPCON to TCF CDR CDR

• Battle Hand Over, Blocking Positions, and Battle Hand Over, Blocking Positions, and Passage of Lines are ImpliedTasks Passage of Lines are ImpliedTasks • The Military Police Brigade is capableThe Military Police Brigade is capable of conducting TCF missions only when properlyof conducting TCF missions only when properly augmented augmented

TACTICAL COMBAT TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE and THE MPFORCE and THE MP

FM 3-19.1PAGE 4-9

SECURITY OF CRITICAL SECURITY OF CRITICAL SITES AND ASSETSSITES AND ASSETS

“MP performs their area security function across the entire designated AO. When

MP provides security around a critical site or asset they usually provide a mobile

security screen, taking advantage of its weapons/communications platforms.”

FM 3-19.1 PAGE 4-9

TASKS• PATROLS, RECONNAISSANCE

• CHECKPOINTS

• LISTENING/OBSERVATION POST

• ACCESS-CONTROL POINTS

• RESPONSE FORCE OPERATIONS

• IN-TRANSIT SECURITY FOR CP RELOCATION

• CONVOY SECURITY

HIGH-RISK-PERSONNELSECURITY

PSD Organization

Principal and the Protective Service Principal and the Protective Service Detail Detail

PSD TeamPSD Team * Detail Leader * Detail Leader * Personal Security Officer (PSO) * Personal Security Officer (PSO) * Advance and Protective Team * Advance and Protective Team (Residence and Baggage Watch) (Residence and Baggage Watch)

--Individuals may be in several teams

PSD Fundamentals

Planning -- Two StagesPlanning -- Two Stages * Written Personal Security Plan (Detail LDR) * Written Personal Security Plan (Detail LDR) * On-site Survey (ADV TM) * On-site Survey (ADV TM)

Army Concept -- Based on “defense in depth”Army Concept -- Based on “defense in depth” Principal Principal Inner Cordon Inner Cordon Middle Cordon Middle Cordon Outer Cordon Outer Cordon

Planning Considerations Threat Collection and AnalysisThreat Collection and Analysis Principal’s ItineraryPrincipal’s Itinerary Route ReconnaissanceRoute Reconnaissance Evacuation PlanEvacuation Plan HN/Local OfficialsHN/Local Officials

Three Areas of ProtectionThree Areas of Protection* On-foot, On-site, and during travel.* On-foot, On-site, and during travel.(On-foot most critical!!!)(On-foot most critical!!!)

QUESTIONS ?QUESTIONS ?