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Argumentative Essay
The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and in
fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept
what they have to accept (Thucydides, 1972 [c. 404 BC]).
Are the Athenians correct: does realism still provide
the best explanation for international relations?
9 April 2015
The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept (Thucydides, 1972 [c. 404 BC]).
Are the Athenians correct: does realism still provide
the best explanation for international relations?
Introduction
In 1975, in the United States Department of State (US DoS) was prepared the docu-
ment named ‘The Lessons of Viet-Nam’ which later has been declassified. In one of
the paragraphs of this document is stated,
[s]ince our ability to understand the politics of countries such as Viet-Nam is limited, it follows that our attempts to manipulate political forces may well fail. We should not assume, as we did in 1963, that we know what is best for a country and proceed, as in the overthrow of Diem, to precipitate a situation with unknown and possibly disastrous consequences. Nor should we take the opposite tack—allying ourselves too rigidly with a leadership whose diminish-ing mandate we may not be able to perceive (US DoS, 1975).
Since then some time has passed. Have the lessons identified been learned? The
question reflects the actual debate of International Relations (IR) between principal
rivals: realism and liberalism. Different realism’s theories are associated with ancient
Greek philosopher Thucydides, author of the Peloponnesian War, and this essay is
going to use primarily his pristine explanation. Therefore, realism acknowledges the
dominant role of power politics in international relations, but as well that unhindered
power is acting to defeat its own purpose (Lebow, 2013: p. 59). Realism’s main sup-
positions are that the international system is anarchic, composed of self-interested
states pursuing national interests, and the only important actors are powerful states
which shape international relations. On the other hand, different liberalism’s theories
of international relations are relatively new, with roots in the Enlightenment, and its
main assumptions are that democratic governments within states, economic interde-
pendence, and international law and institutions will make the world more peaceful
(Russet, 2013: p. 95). This essay argues that despite the existence of international
institutions and organisations, international law, and growing economic interdepend-
ence, international relations remain a place of power politics defined by realism.
Moreover, it argues that promoting democracy by force harms both realism’s and lib-
eralism’s assumptions in their pursuit for more peaceful world. The essay is divided
into three main parts. Part one seeks to examine international relations’ actors,
namely states and international institutions; it shows that important actors are the
most powerful states, and international institutions and organisations, and interna-
tional law does not much restrain them. Part two focuses on the economic interde-
pendence in international relations and includes, inter alia, how states exercise
power politics in pursuit of national interests, and the economy as a non-military
means (Walt, 2012) used by powerful states to achieve their national interest. Finally,
the last third part subsequently focuses on the defence of liberal democracy, and
how the dangerous ‘amalgam’ (Snyder, 2009) of misinterpretation of liberal and real-
ist theories damages both theories in their pursuit for more peaceful world.
Actors of international relations and international law
The state is going to survive globalization. Decolonisation, the reunification of Ger-
many, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, different separatist move-
ments, even the latest events in the Middle East with claims for an Islamic state are
examples of the desire to create own country or ‘secure political space - i.e., territory’
(Jackson and Sorensen, 2013: p. 72) despite growing interdependence. Humans are
social animals and from ancient times people have lived in groups and have attrib-
uted themselves to them. People continue to live in states, and it is rare for a human
being not belong to any state. The problem is that states inevitably will compete
between them and have conflicts. First of all, states are not in equal position. They
have different geography, existence of resources, climate conditions and so on. All
those conditions influence development and welfare of the countries. First liberals, as
John Locke, did not refuse importance of the state in preserving a favourable envir-
onment inside of the state from external threats, and liberals agree that states protect
citizens from ‘undue interference from other people’ (Sorensen, 2011, p. 149). Not to
forget that states (including neighbouring states) consist of people, it means that very
existence of states shows us not tendency of people to cooperation but rather their
tendency to separate. The European Union (EU) is an example used by liberalism’s
supporters, but it is not an exception. Every country sought to join the EU seeking the
relative gains, and the only driver was national interest. EU members preserved the
necessary degree of sovereignty. Despite the EU membership, there is growing na-
tionalism, and separatist movements in Scotland and Catalonia have not disap-
peared. When confronted with setbacks, some major contributors for the EU eco-
nomy (as, for example, the United Kingdom (UK)) questioned their membership.
Apart from this, the last elections to the European Parliament also displayed the rise
of Eurosceptic parties. The commitment to preserve the state system in the ongoing
globalization strengthens realism’s assumptions.
However, liberalism argues that there are other actors of IR—international institutions
and organisations, and international law—which can shake state sovereignty. In
practice, international institutions and organisations, and international law do not
much restrain powerful states. Starting with international non-governmental institu-
tions and organisations (INGOs), primarily of democratic states, (role of intergovern-
mental institutions (IGIs) will be discussed later) they do not have as a scope to sub-
stitute states. As for example, ‘hybrid’ and ‘a class of its own’ (Rona, 2004) the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross ‘has a limited mandate’ and ‘tied as it is to
states and the state system of international relations’ (Forsythe, 2005). Also in this
case, it is interesting the assessment of international relations of another important
INGO, Amnesty International. Their 2003 report emphasises a ‘slightly’ different trend
than those expected by liberalism. They notice that against a backdrop of increasing
globalisation, there is growing concern of powerful states to defend national interests
by using their military, political and economic means. Also, it is underlined that IN-
GOs may be easily targeted as propagandists of interests of an opponent state (Am-
nesty International, 2003). Regarding international law, it theoretically has potential to
stabilize forces of international relations, and it can end impunity and promote justice.
But in practice powerful states have maintained their sovereignty in that domain, pro-
tecting their citizens and engaging in support of international law when it is consistent
with advance of their interests and values. For instance, the US is not a party to the
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Statute and is supporting only ad hoc interna-
tional tribunals and hybrid courts (US DoS, no date). Other major powers such as
China, Russia and India are also reluctant towards the ICC. International law faces
political challenges mainly by constraints imposed by the major powers, caused by
rivalry between them. Moreover, the application of international law has potential
negative impact on the peace process between opponents (Royal African Society,
2008).
The most important actors in international relations are great powers. As a result of
the anarchic competition there are alternately emerging powerful states, ‘largely re-
sponsible for shaping the most important international events’ (Jackson and
Sorensen, 2013: p. 94). The most significant part of their power is military might, but
the use of military means is not only a single way how states exercise power. The ex-
ample of the work of power politics is the UN Security Council (UNSC), which ‘has
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ (UN,
1945), and particularly its five permanent members (P5). Liberals argue that the UN
is an example of IGIs as potential peace promoter. However, the UNSC has not once
failed to stop outbreak of violence in international relations when particular P5 mem-
ber’s interests were at stake. Secondly, the UNSC membership has not preserved P5
to express their power in third countries (including sustainment of proxy conflicts) as
it was in Afghanistan in 1979, Grenada, Panama, Iraq in 2003 and Ukraine. Thirdly,
since the end of the Second World War, the real pacifier has been nuclear capability,
thus present great powers are concerned about proliferation of nuclear capabilities.
Fourthly, there is struggle to maintain power by P5, opposed to reforms of the UNSC,
which is not exactly representing real division of power among states (UN, 2013). Be-
sides, despite reducing military spending in the West, there are also different trends,
especially in rising powers such as China and India (Jeppesen, 2014; IISS, 2015).
Lastly, the potential inability of the UNSC to prevent the outbreak of violence is em-
bodied in the UN Charter, which has preserved the right of countries to self-defence
and was used by the UK, the P5 member, during the Argentinian invasion of the
Falklands. The role of intergovernmental institutions in promotion of peace is exag-
gerated; in reality, the world remains a place of power politics, and intergovernmental
institutions do not much restrain great powers.
National interest and non-military means to exercise power
Concerning economic interdependence, the answer of the realism is that this is not
something new; thus, it cannot be seen as an argument in favour of liberalism, which
tends to overestimate the positive side of economic globalisation. History often re-
peats itself and remains the best prophet of the future. International trade has been a
necessary attribute of states to enhance the wealth and welfare of countries for cen-
turies. In the second half of nineteenth century the developed world knew of the high
growth of trade, which did not prevent the outbreak of the Great War. Again, after
this, despite optimistic discourses of liberals the world was going to the next world-
wide war, and great powers were using their economy to build war machines. The
globalisation of economy is believed by liberals as a challenge to the existence of the
state system. They sincerely hope that people will forget longstanding conflicts and
be concerned about profit through honest commerce, as the US president Thomas
Jefferson stated, ‘peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, en-
tangling alliances with none’ (1801). The trouble with this view is the issue of insur-
ance of fair trade. There is misunderstanding of differences between the intrastate
environment and the realm beyond state's borders, in the world where there is no
sovereign higher authority, and relations are governed by principles of power. One of
the realism’s assumptions is that self-interested states pursue national interest, and
commercial interest (sometimes subnational) can become part of national interest in
pursuit of balance of power (Morgenthau, 1950: p. 835). Economic rivalry in the
global economy is high, and free market brings not only benefits. Economy has tied
states together, making them interdependent, but the increased interdependence
gave more levers of power for leaders of international relations. Moreover, growing
number of population in the world related with the scarcity of resources and food
shortages hardly will make economy a pacifier of international relations.
States pursue national interest, and economy remains a place of power politics. Let
us take a look on an example how commercial (or economic) interest is becoming a
national interest of a state. Since the end of nineteenth century, the US has had per-
manently growing interest and involvement in the East Asia (mainly China) and
named at that time ‘Open Door’ policy. The initial meaning of this policy was simply
commercial. However, after other powers, especially Japan, threatened the US com-
mercial interest militarily, the principle was interpreted not for commercial, but for
political reasons (US DoS, no date; Morgenthau, 1950: p. 835). Since then, interna-
tional relations have modernized, and talk about economic interest of a state is un-
popular. However, power politics did not leave economic relations. Alan Greenspan,
ex-Chairman of the US Federal Reserve stated, ‘I am saddened that it is politically in-
convenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war [2003] is largely
about oil’ (2009). For sure the US remains the world’s strongest military power, but
the US economic status is going to be challenged by rising mainland China. China
continues to grow and already started to secure resources for its economy in the
South China Sea (EIA, 2013; Chilcoat, 2014; The Economist, 2015). Smaller coun-
tries also do not remain behind. France is concerned about its business-related is-
sues in West Africa (Baig, 2013; The Economist, 2014), and there is continued con-
frontation among the UK and Argentina concerning the Falkland Islands, where were
found considerable reserves of crude oil (Stanley, 2014). The reciprocal influences of
economy and geopolitics remain central concern for governments of states, which
are continuously adjusting their security strategies. For instance, Norway observing
melting ice already developed a strategy ‘to take advantage of the opportunities in
the High North’ (Norwegian Government, 2006). Similar with Greenspan’s opinion
has former UK Government’s Chief Scientific Advisor Sir David King, who added,
‘[u]nless we get to grips with this problem globally, we potentially are going to lead
ourselves into a situation where large, powerful nations will secure the resources for
their own people at the expense of others’ (Randerson, 2009).
Next, the economic interdependence made from the economy a powerful tool in the
hands of great powers. However, the non-military exercise of power remains backed
by the military might of the countries. The example of the Russian Federation can be
the most illustrative. Recent political developments in post-Soviet countries are
strongly related to economy, or more precise, to Russian politico-economic pressure
(Birnbaum, 2014). One of the useful tools of Russian policy is natural gas price. An
analysis of gas prices for the abroad consumers revealed an interesting ‘anomaly’.
The prices for gas for faraway countries can be significantly lower than for more prox-
imate countries to Russia, or countries situated at the same distance of transporta-
tion have significantly different prices (Kates and Luo, 2014). The similar tool of Rus-
sia’s economic power is Rospotrebnadzor (the service responsible for supervision of
Russian consumers rights), which allows Russia to ban some particular imported
items using different alleged pretexts (Cenusa et al, 2014). However, similar eco-
nomic tools were used by the West against Russia as an answer to its actions in
Ukraine. The result of the imposed sanction is Russia’s ongoing economic downturn
(The Economist, 2014). However, liberals are right that actual economic interdepend-
ence is high because sanctions against Russia affected its small neighbours (Reck-
nagel, 2014). Likewise, China, which is well-known for its opposition to the use of
sanctions, does not shun using unilateral sanctions to advance its interests over
Taiwan or Tibet (Reilly, 2012). Those examples show that economy also can be tar-
geted or used as tool of economic warfare. Chinese militaries envision economic
means of warfare as part of new generation of wider ’unrestricted warfare’ (Liang and
Xiangsui, 2002). Going back to the role of international organisations, the World
Trade Organization (WTO) cannot do much to prevent sanctions imposed by states
for security reasons (WTO, no date). As it is seen, economy, envisioned by liberalism
to pacify international relations, plays the role of a new powerful tool in the hands of
great powers searching for their national interests.
Defending liberal democracy in realism’s world
Liberal democracy should be protected, and it should be protected by realism’s
means. No matter how paradoxical it may sound it is true. Thucydides, the ‘father’ of
realism, in his writing about the Peloponnesian War by the Pericles’ funeral oration
praises democracy, despite the fact that he was less enthusiastic about it. After cen-
turies, Winston Churchill once said that democracy is ‘the worst form of Government,
except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time’ (Langworth,
2008). Since the time of ancient Greeks, democracy has undergone long trip, and it
will be very sad if a setback occurs again. However, the realm beyond state's borders
is different. The attempt to strangle the young Ukrainian democracy is the most egre-
gious breach of security in international relations. The Russian-Ukrainian armed con-
flict (unfortunately, denied) should be a wake-up call for those who do not observe
reality in international relations. However, previous Russian actions in other former
Soviet republics have not awakened liberals (UK Parliament Website, 2014). The
world remains a dangerous place, and rogue autocratic states (sometimes with
pseudo democratic governments) present a danger for liberal democracy. Si vis
pacem, para bellum. In this way, liberal democracy should be seen as a child of real-
ism that should be protected. The Ukrainian case has resurrected such terms
claimed by realism as ‘anarchy’, ‘state’, ‘national interest’, ‘power politics’, ‘balance of
power’ and so on. At the same time, things envisioned by liberalism to pacify, such
as international law and international institutions, played little role, and economy was
used by power politics as non-military tool to curb Putin’s desires. At one fell swoop
NATO relevance was confirmed, together with its reliance on American hegemony.
Theories are good in checking on each other. Realism is first of all a theory of sur-
vival. If protected by realism’s means liberal democracy becomes the unique form
government, liberalism will have opportunity to check realism theory in practice, an-
swering the question if democracies will fight democracies in completely Kantian
world.
However, if liberal democracy is the best known form of political organisation of the
state, it does not mean that democracy should be promoted by force. This is a dan-
gerous amalgam of misinterpretation of liberal and realist theories. Realism is re-
served about the imposing of will on other nations, whatever they are—religious, so-
cio-economic and so on. Realists see it as a dangerous endeavour which threatens
peace and security in international relations. First of all, it can cause an honour-
based resistance to invaders (Lebow, 2007: p. 396) of indigenous inhabitants as it
was, for instance, during colonisation (and decolonisation). And it is still harder to
convince people that the real enemy is their own government, when they are being
bombed by foreign aircraft. Secondly, such interventions cause a balancing of antag-
onistic states against the invader and open or covert ‘intervention on behalf of tar-
gets’ (Wang and Ray, 1994: p. 139). The results can be prolonged conflicts, as it
was, for instance, in Afghanistan starting with the late 1970s, where the interest of
the US, the Soviet Union and others collided (US DoS, 2013; Wilson Centre, no
date). As a consequence, promotion of democracy by force can become a Sisyphean
task. By the words of Richard Ned Lebow, ‘[realism] stresses […] the need to base
influence, whenever possible, on shared interests and persuasion’ (2013: p. 59). The
concept Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is considered as the achievement of liberal
policies, but it will be hardly applied on great powers. Moreover, the study on the
R2P, conducted by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty (ICISS), concluded that the military intervention should be proportional and the
last resort for protection of population. It should be authorised by the UNSC, with no
intention to defeat a state. The intervention should be ‘clearly supported by regional
opinion and the victims concerned’, ‘with the consequences of action not likely to be
worse than the consequences of inaction’ and ‘maximum possible coordination with
humanitarian organizations’ (ICISS, 2001).
Finally, promoting democracy by force undermines liberalism’s agenda by harming
democracy itself. Democracy cannot be hurried up. It took time for countries to be-
come liberal democracies. Historical events made liberal democracy to win in the US
(however, there is room for improvement). The leading states are also a role model
for other states, and the US is a leader. However, unrestrained by the membership of
the UNSC and without the resolution of the latter, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003
drastically damaged the US’s soft power (CSIS, 2007). Additionally, the dichotomy
between speech and deed of the US officials, on the one hand, stressing on demo-
cracy promotion, and, on the other hand, having good relationship with authoritarian
regimes also played its role. Moreover, the issue of the breaching of human rights
and civil liberties in occupied countries, at homeland and elsewhere was raised up in
the context of the world-wide counter-terrorism (UN, 2006). The importance of soft
power or, in other words, winning of hearts and minds of the people in other countries
should not be underestimated. The 2003 watershed year damaged position of liberal
democracy in the entire world, working to the advantage of the political adversaries of
the US in other countries, associating liberal democracy with America’s self-interest.
Some countries previously quite benevolent towards the US gradually shifted to-
wards potential opponents (Samuels, 2007). It is remarkable that Francis Fukuyama
clarified his position towards promoting democracy after received criticism on his
earlier writing. He already argues that ‘coercive regime change was never the key to
democratic transition’ (Fukuyama, 2007). The US is not the first great power and
most likely not the last one which by its actions demonstrated realism’s claim that
‘great powers to be their own worst enemies’ (Lebow, 2013, p. 60). The Iraqi cam-
paign backfired against the US, and, as it was pointed out by many, the proverb ‘if
you break it, you own it’ is the best description of the situation. However, realism is
not a theory of despair, and it is necessary to learn lessons taught by it.
Conclusion
International relations are complex, and no single theory is perfect in explaining
them. Nevertheless, the Athenians, represented by Thucydides, are right, and real-
ism still provides the best explanation for international relations. Realism describes
how the world actually is in comparison with its counterpart liberalism, which de-
scribes how the world is ought to be. And the world remains a place of power politics.
International relations are still bound to the state system, and powerful states are
strengthening their positions. Intergovernmental institutions are dominated by power-
ful states, and international non-governmental institutions and organisations do not
much restrain them. International law, designed to bring justice, is still having discrim-
inating applicability between winners and losers in international relations. Despite the
growing economic interdependence, powerful states are driven by national interest
and enabling their economy to become a non-military means to exercise a state’s for-
eign policy.
However, power politics has also the negative side, and great powers remain their
own enemies. A great deal of the misunderstanding and misperception of realities
further exacerbates international relations, and liberal democracy itself is caught in a
trap of the realities of international relations. Power politics has multiple facets. It is,
of cause, hard military and economic powers, which are backing one another. But it
is also underestimated soft power—or ability to lead and influence, which, accompa-
nying its fellow hard part, can do much more than all of them alone. The promotion of
democracy by force with the coercive replacement of a government in order to insure
peaceful relations represents a dangerous enterprise which harms peace and secur-
ity, and undermines the basics of democratic rights and freedoms. Practitioners of
foreign policies should understand that whenever possible hard power politics should
come after and accompanied by negotiations, searching common ground and con-
sensus with all interested actors, and with a discourse supplemented by correlated
conduct. As the leader, the US is responsible for the defence of liberal democracy
outside but also inside of the country, and not letting democracy regress. But it does
not mean to impose it. Liberal democracy should itself become attractive for others
and not to be associated with bombing and torture. America should learn the lessons
identified in Vietnam and confirmed in Iraq. And eventually democratic peace will be
achieved through the realistic means of realism. Finally, it is necessary not to forget
that theoretical debates have real-world consequences.
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