Are Russia and America ^Converging"?

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AND SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON:

Political Power: USA/USSR, New York, Viking Press, 1964.

Reviewed by Max Beloff

SPONSORED jointly by theRussian Institute and the Insti-tute of War and Peace Studiesof Columbia University, andwritten jointly by two eminentspecialists on the Soviet Unionand the United States respec-tively, this ambitious and schol-arly study should command awide audience despite the factthat—by reason, perhaps, of thedual authorship—its style tendstowards the ponderous. Theauthors have set themselves twotasks, neither of them easy.They have tried to find a con-ceptual language that would al-low meaningful comparisons be-tween political systems asdifferent from each other asthose of the United States andthe Soviet Union. They havealso tried to answer the questionthat has become so topical in

Mr. Beloff is Gladstone Professor ofGovernment and Public Adminis-tration at All Souls College, OxfordUniversity, and author of, amongothers, The Foreign Policy of SovietEussia, 1929-51, published in sev-eral volumes by Oxford UniversityPress, London and New York (19%7-1953).

recent years—namely, whethersomething in the nature of a"convergence" between the So-viet and American systems istaking place; whether, that is,the impact of increasing indus-trialization and its effect uponthe social order and habits ofdaily life may not bring aboutsimilar responses from thepeoples concerned, with a con-sequential development of near-similar institutions and politicalstyles.

Professors Brzezinski andHuntington pursue these twothemes, with the former per-haps uppermost, first through aseries of general chapters con-cerned with such matters as therole of ideas in the politics ofthe two countries, the relation-ship in each between the indi-vidual and the political system,the nature and development ofpolitical elites, and the questionof the extent to which politicalleaders are subject to pressuresfrom social groupings withinthe two societies. Later chaptersexamine the same range of prob-lems through specific examples:policy-making in the field ofagriculture; civil-military rela-

tions as exemplified in the Khru-shchev-Zhukov and Truman-MacArthur affairs; dilemmasabout intervention abroad—Hungary, 1956, and the Bay ofPigs; and finally, alliance man-agement or mismanagement asillustrated by the Soviet-Chineseand American-French imbro-glios.

THROUGHOUT the book thelevel of discussion is high, andthere are no overt concessions tothe mentality of the Cold War.That there should be some un-conscious assumption of thenormality of American develop-ment and of the abnormality ofthe Soviet experience was per-haps inevitable, and an imagi-nary observer from Mars—someone wholly outside the So-viet-American conflict—mightraise certain queries. Some ofthe questions asked about thetwo systems are such as wouldcome naturally only to studentsbasically committed to a West-ern democratic—or even apurely American—approach topolitics. Which system, the au-thors ask, "has a more effective

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method of recruiting politicalleaders and of regularly chang-ing the wielders of power?" Butwhy should regular change beregarded as a normal feature ofa healthy polity? Indeed, whenwe come to the discussion of thefirst Cuban crisis, we find theauthors pointing out how ama-teur and inexperienced, as com-pared with their Soviet oppositenumbers, were the group of menaround President Kennedy whowere responsible for the ulti-mate fiasco.

OR AGAIN they ask: "In for-mulating policy in each system,what are the roles of profes-sional politicians, civilian bu-reaucrats, military leaders, in-dustrial managers, intellectuals,public opinion?" Now thiswould certainly be a perfectlygood way of beginning a com-parative study of, say, the Amer-ican and British systems. All theclasses of persons mentioned areto be found in each of the twosystems, and in each of them"public opinion" plays a recog-nizable role through its variouschannels of expression. But, ina society so heavily politicizedas that of the Soviet Union, it isnot clear that public opinion isa meaningful concept. Howwould one define, analyze ormeasure it? How are profes-sional politicians and civilianbureaucrats to be distinguishedfrom each other in a countrywhere state and party form asingle interlocking hierarchy ?In what useful sense can indus-trial managers be distinguishedfrom either group? When wecome to the actual analysis ofthe two systems, however, theauthors' performance is muchbetter than their promise, andonly rarely do they strain to-wards an artificial comparisonof the basically incomparable.

The authors rightly stresswhat is too often forgotten bythe preachers of "convergence"—namely, the basic ideological

dissimilarities between the twosystems. On the one hand, acountry in which the social haspriority, and in which politicalinstitutions are merely the in-struments of social pressures;a country whose ideology islimited to the constitutionalsphere, to the world of meansrather than of ends; a" countrywith a rather high degree ofideological homogeneity, but ofa spontaneous rather than aforced variety. On the otherhand, a country dominated byan ideology looking to the com-plete transformation of societyby the use of political power,where the political has completepriority over the social, a coun-try prepared to use every kindof coercion necessary to preserveideological homogeneity, what-ever the internal pressures.

In the light of this perfectlyvalid analysis, the authors arecertainly right to repudiateeither of the two crude versionsof the "convergence" theory:the straightforward Marxismof Khrushchev's "We shall buryyou!"—that is to say, conver-gence through the eventual uni-versal triumph of communism—or the equally Marxist over-simplification which proclaimsthat the single fact of indus-trialization will bring every-thing else in its train. The au-thors have no difficulty inshowing, first,, that the politicalsystem in the Soviet Union ismuch more than a "superstruc-ture" ; and, second, that even ifgreater affluence resulted fromincreased industrialization, itwould be "collective" affluence,not the private affluence of West-ern consumer-oriented econo-mies. But it is possible that bytheir choice of topics for in-vestigation they may haveomitted another aspect of "con-vergence"—i.e., the special pres-sures that might bring Ameri-can society closer to the Sovietsystem without necessarilytransforming it entirely in thatdirection.

The United States, for in-stance, may be becoming moreideological; the South has pro-duced its share of ideologists al-ready. The authors relate thatmany schools in the UnitedStates teach courses "devotedprimarily to exposing the evilsof communism" and that "attimes this is done with a crude-ness fully matching that of So-viet descriptions of the UnitedStates." It is true that the So-viet educational system is stillfar more directly political in itsaims than that of the UnitedStates; but cnce political indoc-trination begins, it is difficult tolimit its ravages. In otherwords, the Cold War tends toimpose on the adversaries ofcommunism some of commu-nism's own features.

FURTHERMORE, although itis no doubt of some importancethat the United States has abasically privately-owned econ-omy while in the USSR thestate is the sole owner of prop-erty, some importance shouldbe attached to the fact thatunder Cold War conditions theUS Government remains theprincipal customer of an im-portant section of industry, andthat the security of employmentin important areas dependsupon the maintenance of de-mand for weapons of war unlessadequate substitutes can befound. In such circumstances,the "military-industrial com-plex" which worried PresidentEisenhower cannot simply bedismissed as a figment of left-wing imagination, however far-fetched the conclusions thatleft-wing writers may drawfrom it.

It is harder today than it wasa quarter of a century ago to seethe state as something externalto the economy and to society atlarge. The authors take the con-ventional view of American lib-eral thinkers that the adminis-tration and the American

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"Establishment" represent lib-eral and internationalist forces,while Congress h more likely tobe responsive to mass move-ments of a less enlightened andmore fundamentalist kind. Theypoint out, for instance, that thelatter dissents from the "Estab-lishment" on "key issues of ColdWar strategy, foreign aid, nu-clear testing and disarmament,civil rights, and civil liberties";and they are at the moment ob-viously right to hold theseviews. But not all members ofthe "Establishment," and noteven all those connected with thepresent administration, respondto the external and internalpressures of the day with equalliberality or an equal degree ofinternationalism. The contem-porary challenge to traditionalAmerican values in politics andto traditional American politicalmethods would seem to a non-American observer to be rathergreater than the authors allow.

IN THE concluding chapter,Brzezinski and Huntingtonpoint out that the appeal of the"convergence" theory in theWest largely springs from theview that it is the only hope forpeace, that a greater similaritybetween the two systems wouldmake armed conflict betweenthem less likely. The authorsare right to point out the hollow-ness of this argument; greatwars in the past have most oftenbeen waged between countrieswith very similar social andpolitical patterns. On the otherhand, the inhibitions againstlarge-scale war that have beeneffective in the post-World WarII period have owed nothing toany similarity of structure orbasic aims between Russia andAmerica. Each has been guidedby enlightened self-interest, andif this continues to operate, nomore is needed.

To rely on "convergence" tobring peace is to be more pessi-mistic than one need be. Inter-

national tensions and internalpolitical developments are in-deed connected, as the authorsshow in studying Khrushchev'schequered course in the peren-nial competition between heavyindustry and consumer interestsfor scarce resources. But in thecase of the Soviet Union, whereexternal goals are codeterminedby ideology, foreign policy willnot be shifted simply becauseSoviet citizens demand a morerelaxed existence at home.

THE CHAPTERS devoted toforeign affairs are worth study-ing for the light they throw onthe two countries, rather thanas signposts to a problematicalfuture. The authors are struckby the extent to which solidityof doctrine as well as the con-centration of highly-placed andexperienced decision-makersupon important issues of prin-ciple may give the Soviet Unionan advantage in some aspectsof foreign affairs, particularlyin view of its freedom from anymoral inhibitions about the useof force.

The relations between the So-viet Union and Eastern Europedo have a good deal in commonwith the relations between theUnited States and Latin Amer-ica. In both cases the prepond-erant power is feared, disliked,and regarded as culturally in-ferior by the lesser ones. Butthe Soviet Union can decide ex-actly what degree of dissidenceit will tolerate, and can moverapidly, as in Hungary, if themark is overstepped. In rela-tion to Cuba, the United Stateshas never been able to establisha satisfactory criterion for in-tervention-—except in relationto nuclear missiles—and its pol-icy of limited harassment, itselfconditioned by the impact ofequal uncertainties about rela-tions with other Latin Americancountries, has proved much lesseffective, if more humane.

On the other hand, in the

matter of relations with allies,the lack of a rigid ideologicalframework can help to keep dis-sension within bounds. Francehas some grievances against theUnited States which are similarto those that China nourishesagainst the Soviet Union—though there is not of coursethe element of direct territorialrivalry. But the United Stateshas been able to put up withFrench obstruction to its policiesand with French criticism with-out attempting to have Franceexcluded from the Westerncamp because no basic challengeto America's self-confidence orways of thought is involved.De Gaulle is not trying to rein-terpret the Founding Fathers,and there is no Gaullist party inWashington. The Soviet Unionand China have allowed tacticaldifferences of approach to spillover into an ideological disputewith immense ramifications inthe entire Communist world.

HOW FAR this striving for ide-ological conformity is inherentin the Communist system itself,and how far it is reinforced bythe social background of theSoviet ruling elite, is difficult tosay. The authors are influencedby American sociological theorywhich tends to equate doctrinalabsolutism with a low positionon the social and educationalscale, and they find a parallel inSoviet experience:

The peasant-worker origin ofthe Soviet elite has left an im-print on its behavior and mores.. . . It also stimulates a markedtendency, common among theless educated masses, to simplifyissues and reduce them to blackand ivhite categories. To theextent that this facilitates massindoctrination, it may be doneconsciously, but there is alsoample evidence that Stalin,Khrushchev and others reasonin fairly simple dichotomic cate-gories.

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To some extent this factmay be relevant to another ofthe book's main conclusions.Whereas in the United Statesthe struggle for power is insti-tutionalized in a form whichdivides it from the policy-mak-ing process—party platformshave little binding force andmake little difference as to whowins—in the Soviet Union "pol-icy-making . . . is not nearlyas distinct and identifiable as itis in the United States. Instead,it is one aspect of the strugglefor power and is absorbed in it."Because of this fact and becauseof the importance of ideology,"competition for power in theSoviet Union tends to magnifypolicy differences between thecontestants; in the US it tendsto moderate them."

BUT ONE should not overlookthe fact that in both countriesthe grip of dogma may inhibitrationality—or if one prefers it,economic rationality may besubordinated to social prefer-ences. In the Soviet Union, in-dustry has been consistentlyfavored as against agriculture;

the country's lack of food andits basic cause, the law pro-ductivity of agriculture, couldonly be remedied by abandoningcertain "socialist" principles oforganization and by providingpeasants with incentives at in-dustry's expense. But this wouldrun against the regime's dearestconvictions. The Americans,on the other hand, face a con-stant threat of glut encouragedby the subsidies given to agri-culture; and these in turn arejustified by the Jeffersonianagrarian myth which makesspecial treatment of the farmera paradoxical exception to thecountry's general commitmentto laissez-faire. By a final twist,each country is helping by itsown policies to maintain thestatus quo in the other: "TheMidwestern politician or grainexporter who wishes to sell tothe Soviet Union is helping tomaintain the collective systemin Soviet agriculture. The Sovietapparatchik urging grain pur-chases from the United States ishelping to alleviate the dilemmaof American overabundance andto perpetuate its basic causes."

The fundamental question re-

mains the position of the indi-vidual. The Soviet system hasmany strong points—this bookwill give no comfort to thosewho still look for signs of itsspeedy downfall; but thestrengths of the system are in-compatible with any real respectfor individual rights. Even innon-political matters the degreeof deviant misbehavior that canbe tolerated is very limited; eachdeparture from the norm isviewed as a symptom of politi-cal alienation and treated ac-cordingly. "For this reason at-tempts to discuss with the So-viets the common problems ofindustrialized society, such asjuvenile delinquency, are un-fruitful." The insulation of somuch of the Soviet publicagainst knowledge of the ex-ternal world and its prevailingcurrents of thought keeps themental gap from diminishing.It is because of this mental gapthat in the end all attempts atmaking comparisons exceptwithin the narrowest limita-tions come up against insuper-able obstacles. In these circum-stances "convergence" seems asfar off as ever.

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Bringing up the Communist Man

EMMANUEL JOHN HEVI : An African Student in China, New York,F. A. Praeger, 1963.

EDMUND A. KING (ED.) : Communist Education, New York,Bobbs-Merrill, 1963.

Reviewed by Allen Kassof

AS THE Russians have dis-covered to their sorrow, wooingstudents from the new nationswith a free ride at Soviet uni-versities isn't nearly as easy asit sounds. The angry westwardexodus of individuals andgroups charging mistreatmentat Soviet hands, and such propa-ganda disasters as the demon-strations by young Africans inRed Square some months ago al-leging foul play in the death ofone of their fellows, are onlythe most dramatic signs of fric-tion between the Communisthosts and their student guests.

It is only fair to say thatforeign students anywhere arelikely to be set on edge by lan-guage problems and homesick-ness. If one also considers theunaccustomed rigors of the con-

Mr. Kassof is Assistant Professorof Sociology at Princeton Univer-sity (Princeton, N.J.) and authorof The Soviet Youth Program, to bepublished shortly by Harvard Uni-versity Press. His last contributionto these pages was "Moscow Dis-covers Public Opinion Polls" (May-June 1961).

tinental winter and the super-sensitivity understandably har-bored by many non-Europeansabout color, it is no wonder thatthere are frequent eruptions ofdiscontent. One Soviet attemptat a solution is Moscow's Lu-mumba (formerly Friendship)University, established as aseparate institution for foreignstudents. But the educationalbenefits of attending a third-rate institution are question-able, and the enforced sepa-ration from regular Sovietstudents has led to charges bysome that Lumumba U. is really"Apartheid U." Moreover, themost serious sources of discon-tent—unwelcome ideological in-doctrination, suppression of vol-untary student organizations,restrictions on freedom ofspeech, travel, and association—cannot be eradicated until theSoviets are ready to drop thepolitical price-tag from whatthey advertise as free education.

Now we have a very similarstory from Communist China,where the Soviet errors havebeen repeated on a granderscale. Emmanuel John Hevi, a

young Ghanaian, went to Pek-ing in 1960 to study medicine.Less than two years later, afteran unsuccessful struggle to rec-oncile his vision of socialismwith the miseries and humilia-tions that he and his fellowssuffered in Communist China,he left (along with almost allthe other Africans) in despairand disillusionment. An ardentnationalist with no specialsympathy towards the West,Hevi came away filled with pro-found fears about the conse-quences of importing the Chi-nese variety of socialism to hisnative continent.

WHILE appreciating the needfor austere living in a develop-ing economy, the African stu-dents found it almost impossibleto make ends meet on theirmeager allowances and weredismayed at discovering thatChinese students were forced tolive on far less, even to the pointwhere many suffered from mal-nutrition. Chinese cant in deny-ing the existence of the problemwas even more disturbing.

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