Are HNS Spills more dangerous than oil spills

Are HNS Spillsmore Dangerous

than Oil Spills?A White Paper for the Interspill 2009

Conference and the 4th IMO R&D ForumMarseille, France, May 2009

Published in 2010by the INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION

4 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SRwww.imo.org

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Copyright © International Maritime Organization (IMO) 2010

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Contents

ARE HNS SPILLS MORE DANGEROUS THAN OIL SPILLS?

List of figures and tables 5

Preface 6

1 Introduction 7

2 Prevention 8

3 Preparedness 12

4 Response 17

5 Environmental considerations 21

6 Discussion 23

7 Research and development 26

8 Conclusions 28

Notes 29

REVIEW OF CHEMICAL SPILLS AT SEA AND LESSONS LEARNT

Foreword 33

1 Information on incidents 35

1.1 Background 351.2 Statistics 351.3 Review of shipping incidents 361.4 Causes of incidents 40

2 Characterization of incidents, risks and response 41

2.1 Short description of incidents 412.2 Identified risks 62

3 Case studies 64

3.1 Containers and packages 643.2 Packages and/or containers on fire 67

3.3 Mineral chemicals transported in bulk 683.4 Edible oil transported in bulk 693.5 Edible solid sinkers in bulk: wheat, rice, etc. 713.6 Non-edible solid ore in bulk: coal 713.7 HNS in bulk from oil distillation 72

4 Return of experience 76

4.1 Danger in air 764.2 Danger in water 774.3 Response tips 77

Main references 80

4 Contents

List of figures and tables

ARE HNS SPILLS MORE DANGEROUS THAN OIL SPILLS?

Figure 1 Trends in the number of oil spills from tankers 7Figure 2 Schematic of the main behaviour of chemicals when spilt in the marine environment 9Table 1 Behaviour of chemicals spilt on water 9

REVIEW OF CHEMICAL SPILLS AT SEA AND LESSONS LEARNT

Table 1 Accidents with more than 2,000 t of product spilled 36Table 2 Forty-nine chemical incidents at sea concerning products transported in packages or

containers 37Table 3 Thirty-five chemical incidents at sea concerning dissolvers transported in bulk 38Table 4 Twenty-one chemical incidents at sea concerning floaters and sinkers transported in

bulk 39Table 5 Thirteen chemical incidents involving gases and evaporators transported in bulk 39Table 6 Primary causes of the reviewed chemical incidents 40Table 7 Brief description of the 49 recorded packaged form transport incidents 41Table 8 Brief description of 35 incidents concerning dissolvers transported in bulk 51Table 9 Brief description of eight incidents concerning floaters transported in bulk 58Table 10 Brief description of 13 incidents involving sinkers transported in bulk 59Table 11 Brief description of 13 incidents concerning gases or evaporators transported in bulk 61

Preface

The Joint Steering Committee of the Marseille Interspill 2009 Conference and Exhibition, and the4th IMO R&D Forum, recognized that the growth in marine transportation of chemicals, together withState and industry obligations arising from the recent entry into force of the OPRC-HNS Protocol,1 havefocused professional and public attention on the potential dangers of Hazardous and Noxious Substances(HNS) spills at sea. The Committee further observed that knowledge about the fate and effects of HNS inthe marine environment is not as extensive as it is for oil spills. A potential outcome of this attention anduncertainty is concern that spills of HNS may have devastating consequences both for human health andfor the environment.

To consider whether such concern is well-founded or the result of over-rating the risks associated with aspill of HNS, the Committee agreed to prepare a White Paper that would ask the question “Are HNS spillsmore dangerous than oil spills?”. The goal of the White Paper is to present the key issues and concernsassociated with a spill of HNS into the marine environment, as compared with a spill of oil, and to providea platform to stimulate open discussion.

The White Paper has been prepared by Dr. Karen Purnell (ITOPF) with contributions from a consortiumcomprising the IMO, EMSA and CEDRE.

1Introduction

The framework for preparedness and response to oil spills from tankers has evolved over some 40 years ormore to provide a regime that has stood the test of time. Initiatives implemented by both the oil/shippingindustry and governments during this period to improve safety or preparedness have contributed to anoverall decline in oil spills from tankers to a level that is now one fifth of that observed during the 1970s,despite a steady increase in oil transported by sea.

During the same period, transport of chemicals by sea has also increased but without a comparable regimeof preparedness or response. It is therefore no surprise that the template that has served well for oil spills isbeing applied now to address spills of Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS). However, in preparingfor and responding to spills of HNS the similarities and differences between oil and HNS need to beconsidered in order to assess the suitability of existing arrangements for incidents involving HNS. Thecomparison should be carried out against a background of probability and consequences of HNS spillsfrom ships so that the conclusion reached is realistic and not based on sensationalism.

While the hazards and consequences of oil spills are well known, little information exists for chemicalspills. Words such as “carcinogenic”, “mutagenic”, and “neurotoxic”, which appear on shipping docu-ments, are readily misinterpreted and extrapolated to worst-case scenarios causing public apprehensionand mistrust. This paper attempts to answer the question “Are HNS spills more dangerous than oil spills?”by reviewing the current arrangements for prevention, preparedness and response and evaluating theseagainst the potential for serious harm from HNS and lessons learned from past incidents, includingknowledge from studies of chemical spills at sea.

Figure 1 Trends in the number of oil spills from tankers2

2Prevention

2.1 HAZARD EVALUATION

Not all chemicals transported by sea are considered hazardous but those that are have been variouslydefined in different international instruments addressing marine pollution; many definitions being similarbut largely dependent on the intent of the legal instrument. The definition provided by the OPRC-HNSProtocol is quite broad but is appropriate for consideration of the question posed in this paper. Here, HNSis defined as:

“any substance other than oil which, if introduced into the marine environment is likely to createhazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or tointerfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.”

The “hazard” associated with a particular chemical is dictated by its inherent properties. HNS may thuspresent one or any combination of the following hazards: flammability, explosivity, toxicity, infection,reactivity, corrosivity, and radioactivity. Manufacturers provide information on the chemicals they pro-duce in the form of Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS), soon to be replaced by Safety Data Sheets(SDS) under the UN Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS).These, and other internationally recognized guidance standards, provide comprehensive informationsuch as the chemical and proper shipping name, hazard identification, physical and chemical properties,emergency response information, and toxicological and ecological information.3

The behaviour of chemicals spilt or released at sea needs to be known in order to assess human health andsafety implications, the effects on the environment, and the most effective response strategy. There is,among others, a European Behaviour Classification System of chemicals spilt into the sea,4 which estab-lishes that substances behave in certain ways depending on their physical properties (physical state, density,vapour pressure, solubility) and on the environmental conditions. For example, a chemical once spiltcan evaporate more or less rapidly, dissolve wholly, partly or not at all, float or sink. Table 1 providesthe behavioural groups for chemicals spilt on water, with examples, and this is shown schematically inFigure 2.

In addition, a UN advisory body known as GESAMP 5 provides a hazard profile for chemicals based onan independent and peer-reviewed Hazard Evaluation Procedure in order to define the safe transportof these chemicals in bulk. Hazards for marine life, human health and interference effects (e.g. taint,physical effects, and interference with coastal amenities) are evaluated and the information presentedin the form of a “hazard profile” for each substance. The hazard profile is used to assign a pollutioncategory (i.e. X, Y, Z or OS), the ship type (i.e. 1, 2 or 3) and carriage conditions for each chemicalsubstance. This information may also be employed to evaluate the impact of these chemical substancesshould they enter the marine environment through abnormal operational discharges, accidental spillage,or loss overboard.

2.2 TRANSPORTATION BY SEA

It is estimated that of about 37 million different chemicals used by man some 2,000 are transportedregularly by sea, either in bulk or in packaged form. Reliable data on the actual number and volumeof chemicals transported around the world are often difficult to obtain, but a Chemical and Product

Tankers Conference held in March 20097 heard that the chemical tanker trade currently totalsapproximately 165 million tonnes, of which methanol and liquid chemicals account for some 46% andpalm/vegetable oils account for a further 29%. The UK-based independent research company, OceanShipping Consultants Ltd,8 forecast that the chemical seaborne trade will increase to 215 million tonnesby 2015.

Figure 2 Schematic of the main behaviour of chemicals when spilt in the marine environment 6

Table 1 Behaviour of chemicals spilt on water

Fate Group Properties Examples of behaviour groups

Evaporate G evaporate immediately propane, butane, vinyl chlorideImmediately(Gases)

GD evaporate immediately, dissolve ammonia

EvaporateRapidly

E float,evaporate rapidly

benzene, hexanecyclohexane

ED evaporate rapidly,dissolve

methyl-t-butyl ethervinyl acetate

Float FE float,evaporate

heptane, turpentinetoluene, xylene

FED float,evaporate,dissolve

butyl acetateisobutanolethyl acrylate

F float phthalates, vegetable oils, animal oils, dipentene,isodecanol

FD float,dissolve

butanolbutyl acrylate

Dissolve DE dissolve rapidly,evaporate

acetone, monoethylaminepropylene oxide

D dissolve rapidly some acids and bases, some alcohols, glycols, someamines, methyl ethyl ketone

Sink SD sink,dissolve

dichloromethane1,2-dichloroethane

S sink butyl benzyl phthalate, chlorobenzene creosote, coal tar,tetraethyl lead, tetramethyl lead

Prevention 9

Chemicals may be transported in bulk, i.e. in liquid gas carriers for gaseous substances, in chemicalcarriers for liquids, and in bulk carriers for solids. In these cases, there is no protective packaging as suchand a breach in the tank or hold can result in a release to the environment. However, only a few hundredchemicals are transported in bulk even though they make up most of the volume of the chemical seabornetrade. The remainder, which accounts for a very large number of chemicals but in smaller volume, istransported in packaged form primarily in container vessels.

The specific properties of chemicals as described in section 2.1 above are used to classify the chemicals andprovide guidance for their packaging and transportation in order to minimize the risk of a hazard arisingfrom their carriage by sea. The two most important international conventions governing the transporta-tion of HNS in bulk and in packaged form are SOLAS9 and MARPOL.10 Various other IMO Conventionsand Codes apply, dependent upon the physical form and quantity of the chemical transported, and theship type. For example, the IBC Code11 provides an International standard for the safe carriage by sea ofdangerous and noxious liquids in bulk; the ICG code12 applies to gaseous cargoes; the BC Code13 appliesto bulk solid cargoes, and the IMDG Code14 applies to packaged dangerous goods. Before a majorpollution emergency, the flag State has a major role to play for it is the flag State which is responsible forenacting and enforcing all the various maritime international rules and regulations.

Shippers of packaged dangerous goods are required to declare the proper shipping name, UN number,quantity and weight of any HNS to be carried by sea, and to ensure that it is correctly packaged andlabelled for carriage. Ship owners and managers use this information to produce stowage plans for thecargo, which take into account the particular hazards of the HNS and assigns a position on the ship whereit may be stowed safely. Correct declaration of the cargo is thus very important, especially for packagedgoods, and some of the HNS incidents in recent times are thought to have occurred because ofinappropriate stowage due to mis-declaration of cargo. In 2006, off the Gulf of Aden, an explosion in theaft section of the container ship Hyundai Fortune caused a fire that destroyed most of the containers in thearea and caused massive structural damage. The reason was widely thought to be an undeclared consign-ment of fireworks.15 Similarly, according to the cargo manifest for the Sea Elegance, no dangerous goodswere listed when the ship exploded off the coast of Durban, South Africa, in October 2003 killing one ofthe crew. Fire scene investigators believed that the fire was caused by the self-ignition of a container-loadof calcium hypochlorite that was mis-declared and stowed next to the engine room bulkhead where theelevated temperatures could have caused the chemical to decompose.16 Following several large fires onships carrying calcium hypochlorite, a study undertaken for the IMO17 found that consignments of thischemical are sometimes loaded on board vessels under different names and, as a result, shipments areoccasionally not declared as dangerous cargo.

The importance of declaring the correct weight of cargo and containers should also not be underestimatedas highlighted by the recent UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) report18 following theMSC Napoli incident in 2007. Investigators found that around one-fifth of all the containers were eitherbadly packed, inaccurately labelled or of the wrong weight. Others have gone on to suggest that “thiscavalier approach to the declaration of accurate weights” could have been one of the factors contributingto the loss of the MSC Napoli.19 MAIB noted that discrepancies with declared weights are widespreadwithin the container ship industry and are due to many packers and shippers “not having the facilities toweigh containers on their premises, coupled with shippers deliberately under-declaring cargo weights tominimize import taxes, to permit the overloading of containers, and to keep the declared weight withinlimits imposed by road or rail transport”.

To assist port and harbour authorities with their planning to ensure the safe handling of HNS, it isstandard practice for ships to notify the authorities in good time, but not less than 24 hours in advance ofentry into the port area, and to provide details of the HNS on board.20 This information can be used toassign the appropriate level of protection and escort to the ship as well as to specify the conditions underwhich the HNS may be discharged.

2.3 RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk assessment provides a valuable process for addressing hazards in a structured way and reducing therisk to an acceptable level. The risk process considers the potential consequences and the probability of a

10 Are HNS Spills more Dangerous than Oil Spills?

hazardous event occurring. To a large extent the consequences of an event will depend on the specificcircumstances of the incident, the preparedness of the country involved and the hazards associated withthe HNS cargo. However, the combination of these factors is important because the consequences maynot necessarily be assumed merely by people having knowledge of the hazard associated with the HNScargo. A good example is Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) where heightened public concern over a possibleterrorist attack on a LNG carrier has generated rather alarmist accounts of LNG exploding with theforce of “50 Hiroshimas”.21 The likelihood (as shown by several credible studies22) is that, if releasedunintentionally, LNG would not change from its liquid to gaseous state at a rate sufficient to cause amassive explosion, especially in view of the safety features inherent on board LNG carriers.

The probability of an event occurring requires a closer examination of the practices associated with thevoyages made, for example, the volumes transported, navigational issues, the ship-type, the stowage,packaging and labelling, the number of voyages made, etc. Information on past incidents has been particu-larly helpful when assessing the risk of oil spills occurring and similar information on HNS incidents hasbeen compiled by the IMO23 and EMSA.24 EMSA’s review of past incidents involving HNS in Europeanwaters is particularly interesting as it shows that for the majority of incidents (or potential incidents) asingle HNS cargo was involved and this was usually carried in bulk. Furthermore, most of the incidentsarose as the result of foundering or bad weather, with fire or explosion, collision and grounding making upthe secondary causes. Using the earlier example, history shows that LNG carriers have an exemplary safetyrecord and it follows that when combining consequences and probability, the risk of a serious incidentinvolving LNG is low.

Attempts to carry out a risk assessment for HNS in a meaningful way are often frustrated by the lack ofreliable information when compared with the same information for oil. In the EMSA report referred toearlier the researchers found flaws in the sources of information and studies relating to the lack of data,misidentification of chemicals, redundant chemical names or errors in translation. Whilst this is under-standable (given the wide variety of HNS and the complex naming system for chemicals) improvementsin the quality and standardization of reporting and recording information could be made to enable morereliable risk assessments to be undertaken.

Prevention 11

3Preparedness

3.1 FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND COMPENSATION

The key international convention addressing preparedness and response to HNS incidents is the OPRC-HNS Protocol, which entered into force on 14 June 2007. This Protocol provides a framework for inter-national co-operation in the event of major incidents or threats of marine pollution from HNS and isintended to ensure that ships carrying HNS are covered by preparedness and response regimes similar tothose already in existence for oil. The OPRC-HNS Protocol follows the same principles as the OPRCConvention25 and calls for contracting States to develop and maintain adequate capability to deal withpollution emergencies from HNS; more specifically, ensuring that national and regional systems for pre-paredness and response are in place, ensuring that ships carrying hazardous and noxious liquid cargoeshave shipboard emergency plans (SMPEPs)26 and enhancing international co-operation in pollutionresponse. As of the beginning of 2009, 23 countries had ratified the OPRC-HNS Protocol compared with97 countries that had ratified the OPRC Convention. The slow ratification of the Protocol is thought to bedue to the lack of available information and expertise to prepare for and respond to HNS incidents whencompared with that available for incidents involving oil, coupled with very few working national models(that demonstrate effective implementation of the Protocol) in place anywhere in the world.

To assist countries with inter alia their preparation for ratification of the OPRC-HNS Protocol, the IMOhas established a Technical Group comprising IMO Member States and Observers who report to itsMarine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) and whose responsibility it is to oversee the deliveryof the Technical Group’s work plan. Much of the work of the Group is focused on developing guidanceand resources to assist countries with ratifying and implementing the provisions of the Protocol; inparticular training and information for oil and HNS preparedness and response, with particular attentionto the needs of developing countries. A number of regional and bilateral agreements exist worldwide toprovide a mechanism for co-operation and mutual assistance in responding to marine pollution incidents.The IMO maintains and “backstops” regional centres such as REMPEC (Mediterranean), REMPEITC(Caribbean) and other centres such as the ROPME/MEMAC (Persian Gulf) and NOWPAP/MERRAC(Northwest Pacific) whose primary aim it is to service the commitments of the countries in a particularregion (that belong to such agreements) by providing assistance to the countries on preparedness andresponse to spills of oil and HNS. The IMO also works with the oil industry and others through its GlobalInitiative (GI) to encourage and facilitate the implementation of oil spill contingency plans and ratifica-tion of the relevant conventions. A flagship of this programme is the one for West and Central Africa.

These regional and bilateral agreements have been put to the test from time to time for HNS incidents. Forexample, the Ievoli Sun (2000), ECE (2006) and MSC NAPOLI (2007) incidents occurred in the EnglishChannel and necessitated close co-ordination between the French and British governments in order todecide the safest and most appropriate course of action to minimize damage due to the fuel oil and HNScargoes on board. That co-ordination was given through the bilateral “Manche Plan” which provides aframework for joint response to maritime emergencies. Similarly, parties to the Helsinki Convention wereable to assist each other when two incidents involving potash carried in bulk occurred in the Baltic Seawithin four years of each other; one of these was the Fu Shan Hai, illustrated on the cover of this paper.

The HNS Convention was established to provide compensation to victims of damage caused by HNScargoes but is not yet in force. It is a single Convention based on the two-tier system of compensation foroil spills from tankers that is provided for by the CLC27 and Fund Convention.28 Similarly, the Bunker

Convention29 (which entered into force on 21 November 2008) follows the well-established liability andinsurance provisions that apply to oil tankers under the CLC. The two-tier system of compensation for oilpollution damage from tankers has worked extremely well over the 30 years that it has been in existenceand the extension of the same principles to spills of HNS is logical. However, as a single Convention,ratification of the HNS Convention has been delayed by complications caused by the negotiations on theexclusion of packaged HNS as a contributing cargo in exchange for higher limits of liability for theship owner, the definition of “receiver”, and determining LNG contributions where the title holder is not aMember State. Furthermore, States must submit contributing cargo reports in order to assess contribu-tions to the HNS Fund. Of the 13 States that have deposited instruments of ratification, only two havesubmitted cargo reports. A draft Protocol to the HNS Convention addressing some of these difficulties hasbeen prepared and a Diplomatic Conference will be convened to consider the Protocol in 2010. In theinterim, compensation payable to victims of damage caused by HNS is dependent upon whatever regime isin force in the jurisdiction affected, usually LLMC 76,30 which is likely to provide only a fraction ofcompensation that would be available under the HNS Convention.

3.2 CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Contingency planning is essential if countries are to respond to spills of oil and HNS promptly andeffectively. A contingency plan should reflect a government’s policy towards oil or HNS incidents andclarify the roles and responsibilities of the different players involved; it should also identify the capabilitiesthat are in place to prepare for these events and the strategy to be followed. Where bilateral or regionalagreements are in place, or where arrangements are in place to pool government and industry resources,the mechanism to put these arrangements into effect should be described.

For many countries, particularly in Northern Europe, governments are responsible for responding to spillsof oil or HNS. This tried and tested approach recognizes the duty of care that governments have for theircitizens and the obligation they have for implementing the strategies identified in their national contin-gency plan. This approach also builds on the intent that is embodied in the text of the internationalpreparedness and compensations conventions described earlier. The “polluter pays” principle is realizedinsofar as the ship owner and his insurer is expected to “pick up the bill”. However, that is not to say thatthe ship owner should not contribute in a more active sense to the response and salvage/wreck removalissues. Indeed, their expertise during an incident is actively sought. Nevertheless, a government-ledresponse is more likely to be prompt and effective and will avoid the delay and confusion that can easilyresult from imposing a ship owner-led response, especially in cases where the ship was in transit andnot destined for a port in the country. This will be particularly important for incidents involving HNSwhere rapid assessment and response to a situation could be essential to avoid potentially life-threateningconsequences and where time delays are unacceptable.

The OPRC-HNS Protocol places an obligation on Member States to ensure that ships flying their flag haveon board a pollution emergency plan to deal specifically with incidents involving HNS. In general itappears that flag States are accepting the Shipboard Marine Pollution Emergency Plans (SMPEP) asrequired under MARPOL for ships of 150 gross tons or greater certified to carry oil and noxious liquidsubstances. But it should be remembered that the SMPEPs are primarily intended to enable the crew totake practical measures to control and minimize a spill from the ship under different scenarios. It would beunrealistic to expect the crew to be in a position to do anything more than is required of them to minimizethe risk of a release as their focus will be on their safety and not on responding to any release away fromthe confines of the ship. However, in a few countries, such as Canada, Japan and the USA, shipboardemergency plans are more extensive and include requirements to provide specific response capabilitiesbeyond the required shipboard equipment through local spill response contractors.

The tiered approach to responding to spills of oil has proven to be an effective and flexible mechanism forscaling the response according to the need. The concept of a local response using local resources (Tier 1)escalating to involve neighbouring government or industry-shared resources for spills beyond local cap-abilities (Tier 2), through to the mobilization of resources beyond Tier 2 capability to respond to a spill ofnational significance (Tier 3) is one that many countries have extended to address spills of HNS. Thisapproach is likely to be appropriate provided that the unique characteristics of a spill of HNS are properly

Preparedness 13

considered. A risk assessment is often the first step when considering the location and content of equip-ment stockpiles. For oil, Tier 3 regional stockpiles are mostly located in high risk areas or consumercountries, with good reason, as oil spill statistics reveal that significantly more oil spills occur close to theport of discharge rather than the port of loading.31 It is unclear whether such a trend is apparent world-wide, for HNS incidents as these have been comparatively few. However, in practice it is likely that existingstockpiles will be augmented to provide capability for HNS response rather than entirely new stockpilescreated. It is also likely that the factors that result in the trends observed for oil spills will apply similarly toHNS, such as weather patterns, congested waterways, operational malfunctions in ports and harbours etc.,in which case augmenting existing stockpiles would be sensible.

EMSA has undertaken a review of the capacity of EU Member States to respond to a spill of HNS in themarine environment.32 It was found that the level of preparedness and response capability for HNS variedbut that many countries were incorporating HNS into their established national contingency plans for oiland intending to apply the tiered response mechanism for HNS emergency response. Importantly, manycountries did not consider themselves operationally prepared to respond to HNS incidents and admittedto lacking the experience or knowledge of the behaviour of HNS in the marine environment to respond tosignificant and/or complex (multiple cargo) HNS incidents. Of the 12 EU Member States that had ratifiedthe OPRC-HNS Protocol, only 3 reported having “specialized” capability to respond to HNS incidentswhereas 6 reported “very limited” capability.

For those countries that have made preparations for responding to HNS incidents, or are in the process ofdoing so, the majority are augmenting national response arrangements already in place for oil with specificexpertise available from civil defence units, the military, specially trained fire brigades, salvage experts andother private contractors. The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) has, for example, trained 15regional fire fighting teams to deal with HNS incidents while a ship is offshore and where access by othertrained responders is impractical. Cascading the arrangements from the national level to the local andindividual port or harbour level requires a clear understanding of their obligations under the OPRC-HNSProtocol and of the roles and responsibilities of the different players involved. As with contingency plansfor oil spill response, the key to making contingency plans effective for dealing with HNS incidents is toprovide for training and regular exercises involving the various stakeholders. Particular attention will beneeded to check that emergency communication between parties is established and tested frequently astime delays in the case of HNS spills could have fatal consequences, an outcome less likely with oil spills. Aclear example is in the case of a large release of toxic gas where emergency communication and responsewill need to be automatic to ensure that inhabitants downwind of the toxic cloud are given information onhow to “shelter in place” in a timely manner.

While there is a wide array of training available for responding to land-based chemical spills, there arecomparatively fewer training courses that are focused specifically on the response to maritime incidentsinvolving HNS. However, as interest is growing, more companies and organizations are beginning to offersuch training. The Technical Group referred to in section 3.1 has recently developed two model courseson preparedness and response to HNS incidents in the marine environment: an introductory course foroperational/first responders and an introductory course for incident managers, both intended to provideawareness of the issues that a responder or incident manager may be faced with during a HNS responserather than training them to a level of competency to actually respond. This recognizes the fact thatcompetency in responding to HNS spills is a skill that will be attained only after investment in responseequipment and personnel training, including practical exercises.

3.3 INDUSTRY RESPONSIBILITIES

In considering the role and responsibilities of the industry in the context of the OPRC-HNS Protocol,“industry” is taken to include the shipping community (represented by the ship owners and operators,including many of the major oil companies) and other private and public organizations involved in themanufacture and distribution of HNS. Apart from the obligations placed on shippers as discussed insection 2.2, many countries require chemical manufacturers to provide copies of MSDS information to“centres” providing 24/7 emergency support in the event of a spillage of their product. This service isprovided by CHEMTREC33 in the USA, by CANUTEC34 in Canada and by the Marine Intervention in


Chemical Emergencies (MAR-ICE) Network35 in Europe. Beginning in January 2009, the new MAR-ICENetwork (created through a trilateral agreement between EMSA, CEFIC and CEDRE) provides, uponrequest by EU Member States, information on chemicals in cases of marine incidents involving HNS andis accessible through a single MAR-ICE Focal Point. Clearly, to enable these services to work effectively inan emergency, the cargo manifest must be made available to those needing the information as quickly aspossible, as delays in obtaining the cargo manifest have occurred in past incidents. Furthermore, onoccasion, when the manifest had been provided, it was found to be too general to be useful. These areissues that some government agencies have highlighted for particular attention.

The tiered response to HNS incidents that is foreseen by many governments in their contingency plansgenerally encapsulates the support of industry. Oil companies are already familiar with their role innational contingency plans for oil spill response and, as they will be among the largest shippers of bulkpetrochemicals, their role will probably be similar in the case of HNS responses. However, the level ofexpertise available generally for dealing with HNS incidents is likely to be less than for oil and greaterreliance on the oil industry for advice and support is possible. Other chemical manufacturers and distribu-tors are likely to be less familiar with their role in the event of a spill of one of their chemicals at sea andhere there is potential for expectations to be misaligned. In most cases, all that might be required of themanufacturer is confirmation of the MSDS information and other remote advice as might be neededto deal with a spillage. However, larger manufacturers such as BASF routinely respond to road andrail incidents involving their products and have specially trained personnel to deal with such spillages.Consequently, manufacturers may be able to extend their expertise relatively easily to provide technicalsupport and advice if one of their products is involved in an incident at sea. Indeed, some frustration hasbeen expressed by chemical manufacturers and responders alike when opportunities for involving theirexpertise have been missed. These situations emphasize again the importance of effective communicationbetween the shipper, ship owner, and the response agencies.

The important role that industry, and specifically the oil industry, can play in supporting governments inoil spill response has long been recognized and utilized to the benefit of both parties. As the number ofHNS incidents has been proportionally less, the support that the oil industry can, and has, played in HNSincidents, particularly where they have been the charterer or cargo owner, is perhaps less obvious. Forexample, in the Ievoli Sun the two charterers, Shell and Exxon Chemicals, were able to provide preciseinformation about the chemicals on board, including information on the polymerization inhibitor mixedwith the styrene. However, understandably perhaps, they had little knowledge of the fate of styrenereleased into seawater at a temperature of 10 degrees Celsius and at a depth generating several atmos-pheres of pressure. An added complication of marine pollution emergencies is that the owner of the cargoat the time may not necessarily be either the shipper or the consignee, for the ownership may have changedhands once or more during the voyage. Initially, therefore, it may not be easy to establish who owns thecargo. This situation is more likely to arise with oil rather than with bulk chemicals, although packagedHNS can be owned by a greater number and variety of entities.

The salvage industry is perhaps the best (and often under-utilized) source of support in many HNSincidents where expertise is lacking locally as they have specially trained personnel to deal with HNSresponse on board ships as well as specialists able to provide, for example, monitoring support, advice onspecific cargoes, re-packing and disposal expertise. Following the grounding of the LPG carrier KewBridge in India in 2006, the salvors appointed by the owners of the ship and an expert to the Indiangovernment provided advice on the behaviour of LPG in the circumstances of the incident and highlightedprecautions that could be taken to minimize any risks in order to reassure the local authorities andpopulation who were concerned about the possibility of a release and explosion.

Referring again to the example of industry’s support in response to oil spills, many of the Tier 2 or Tier 3stockpiles of oil spill response equipment (that are in existence worldwide to supplement government andlocal industry stockpiles) are entirely, or in part, funded by the oil industry in recognition of their part inthe chain of responsibility. Similarly, the ship owner or operator may be required to contribute to themaintenance and replenishment of equipment stockpiles by paying “dues” or “transit fees” when enteringcertain ports or harbours; otherwise, their responsibility is to pay for the cost of the response in accord-ance with the relevant legislation. Ideally, the same approach for supplementing and maintaining theseequipment stockpiles to prepare for HNS response would be followed.

Preparedness 15

Clearly, there exists a wealth of information among the chemical manufacturing and distribution sector,particularly in the case of land-based HNS spills, that might be tapped into more effectively to provideawareness, training and perhaps on-site support in the event of ship-source HNS incidents. Some of theinitiatives currently being undertaken by, for example, the IMO and EMSA, are intended to identify andconsolidate existing information to assist Member States and to avoid duplication of effort.


4Response

4.1 INITIAL ASSESSMENT

When dealing with an HNS incident, one of the priorities is the identification of the hazard and anassessment of the risk posed by a stricken vessel and its cargo to the public and responder safety, theenvironment and socio-economic assets that a State or coastal community depend upon. The primaryfactors which determine the severity and extent of any impact relate to the chemical and physical proper-ties of the HNS and its physical fate in the environment. Basic information can be found from the MSDSavailable from the manufacturer, the internet and/or centres established specifically to provide such assist-ance as discussed in section 3.3.

Hazards to human health are generally considered low in cases of oil spills. The more toxic, lighterfractions (BTEX) often evaporate before responders reach the scene. Therefore, the focus of an oil spillresponse differs from that of an HNS release. Following an oil spill the initial assessment is typicallyfocused on determining the trajectory of the oil for protection of sensitive resources and evaluationof the most appropriate response techniques. However, this is not always the case; the Tasman Spiritincident which occurred in Pakistan in 2003 was a case in point. When the tanker broke up spilling about27,000 tonnes of her cargo of Iranian light crude oil, the proximity of the tanker to the Karachi seafrontand the prevailing wind direction caused alarm about potentially high levels of hydrocarbon vapours.Consequently, air monitoring and medical facilities were put in place to evaluate the risk to citizens andclean-up crews. Spills of non-persistent oils can generate similar anxiety as well as concern about poten-tially flammable vapours near the source. Therefore, monitoring of explosive limits, oxygen concentration,benzene and hydrogen sulphide may be undertaken during oil spill response to ensure a safe workingenvironment. Nevertheless, for most oil spill response situations at sea and on the shoreline neither airquality nor the risk of explosion has been a concern.

Although vegetable oils are regarded as HNS they generally do not pose an immediate threat to humanhealth and safety because they are not volatile or acutely toxic. However, vegetable oils can affect sea birds,which lose thermal insulation in a similar way as with spills of petroleum oils, as documented by a spill ofcanola oil in Vancouver harbour in 1989.36 They can also be highly persistent and disruptive to amenitiesas demonstrated by the incident in which 900 tonnes of palm kernel oil was spilt from the product tankerAllegra, following a collision in the English Channel in 1997.37 This oil was originally heated but spreadand solidified when it came into contact with seawater and eventually contaminated the beaches of theChannel Islands some 100km away. The persistence of vegetable oils and therefore, their impact, is verymuch dependent upon the type of oil as demonstrated by the studies carried out after the Kimya incidentoff the coast of North Wales.38

For the majority of HNS, undertaking an initial assessment and monitoring of potential hazards is apriority before any strategy for response can be considered. The initial assessment ought to be approachedin a step-wise, logical order such that the identity of the HNS involved is first confirmed, then the primaryhazard and behaviour in the marine environment are evaluated (i.e. what will it do? and where will it go?).This will allow informed decisions to be made about whether it is safe to respond at all and, if so, how torespond (assuming a response is needed). As explained in section 2.1, the hazards associated with aparticular substance are dependent on its inherent properties and its fate in the marine environment. Themonitoring techniques employed during the initial assessment need to be designed to measure the keyproperties that could give rise to a hazard. Sometimes the “do-nothing” approach, where the situation is

kept under observation as it evolves, is the most appropriate one. Assuming that the identity of the HNScan be found from the cargo manifest (and verified through contact with the cargo owner), the MSDS willprovide information on the hazards and physical/chemical properties of the substance/s involved as well asindicate possible incompatibilities or reactivity with water or other substances if more than one isinvolved. The challenge for responders is to focus on the most important health and safety hazards(especially in complex incidents involving more than one chemical) and to ensure that they are usingappropriate monitoring techniques.

A further complication can arise when attempting to predict the fate and behaviour of individuallypackaged HNS goods that are subsequently loaded into containers. When the barge Cosel-L43 listedunder tow from Port Moresby to a gold mine in Kiunga, Papua New Guinea, in June 1984,39 containersloaded with drums of sodium cyanide and tanks of hydrogen peroxide were lost overboard. Initially, thecontainers sank but several hours later they floated to the surface due to the reaction of seawater withhydrogen peroxide, which generated oxygen and increased the buoyancy.

Usually gases and “evaporators” cause the most concern for human health and safety as they couldexplode, catch fire, or generate a toxic vapour cloud. Several monitoring devices are available to detect adangerous atmosphere and most measure the ease with which the substance ionizes to obtain a concentra-tion or percentage in air. Some marine pollution response vessels are equipped with sampling and gasdetection systems with data logging that perform the task of providing information on the air qualityaround a casualty, thus limiting potential exposure of response personnel. If “floaters” are coloured, theymay be monitored visually; otherwise techniques that rely on “interference” or “wave dampening” ofoptical properties may indicate the presence of a pollutant, and aerial/remote sensing devices, such as UV,radar, infra-red or laser techniques can be useful. The ability to monitor a “dissolver” depends to a largeextent on how the substance behaves in the water column. If it disassociates or reacts, electrochemicalmethods, such as conductivity, pH, or oxygen meters can be used. Alternatively, optical methods are usefulif the substance creates turbidity or interacts with light. “Sinkers” are usually very difficult to monitoralthough some acoustic techniques are being evaluated.

Recognizing that most concern for health and safety lies with gases and evaporators, several air dispersionmodels have been developed to aid decision-making and provide conservative estimates of safe distancesfor protection of the population and responders. After the chemical tanker Samho Brother sank off thecoast of Taiwan in 2005 with a cargo of some 2,760 tonnes of benzene and 85 tonnes of bunker oil theship owner and insurer engaged international experts to provide modelling and air/water monitoring tosupport the local authorities in determining the hazards. A conservative exclusion zone was establishedaround the sinking site and warnings issued to fishermen and other seafarers to avoid the area. Modellingshowed that the oil would move towards the coastline with the currents but the benzene vapour wouldtravel offshore driven by the wind. The modelling output was also useful to provide reassurance regardingthe effect of benzene on water column resources. To verify the model output, air monitoring was carriedout by moving from the outer edge of the exclusion zone towards the sinking site. No benzene was detectedeither in the air or water column but the exclusion zone was maintained because the stability of the shipand the possibility of further leakage were unknown.

The models that are used for emergency response tend to be fairly basic as the intention is not to attemptto mimic multiple scenarios with accuracy but to provide a rapid means of delineating potentially danger-ous zones and assessing appropriate levels of personal protective equipment (PPE). Trajectory modelshave been used for many years to monitor the movement of oil slicks and can be used in the same way tomonitor floating HNS, provided that there is sufficient information on the speed and direction of the windand currents. More sophisticated models exist for predicting the movement of substances in the watercolumn but these are very dependent upon knowledge of the sub-surface water movement, which does notexist in most areas of the world and tend not to be used in emergency situations. Reliable modelling for“sinkers” in a dynamic marine environment is still in its infancy.

The importance of an initial assessment has been demonstrated on many occasions following HNS inci-dents at sea as can be seen from the list of case studies provided in the supporting paper accompanying thisWhite Paper.37 The key difference when undertaking an initial assessment for HNS incidents, as comparedwith oil, is the timing. The initial evaluation for HNS incidents needs to be rapid because the consequencescould be very severe. However, the time elapsed between when the incident first occurred and any response


to the incident may be longer than for an oil spill because of the need to establish safe conditions and astrategy that is appropriate for the circumstances of the incident.

4.2 RESPONSE TECHNIQUES

Actions that can be taken by the crew as part of their on board emergency plans (SOPEPs/SMPEPs) arecritical for reducing the potential consequences of an incident. Closing valves, transferring cargo, chan-ging the position of the ship to take explosive/toxic vapours away, moving to less vulnerable areas awayfrom population centres or sensitive environmental resources etc., are all response options that can beconsidered by the crew provided that there is time and it is safe to do so. The actions taken by the crewon board the chemical tanker Multitank Ascania to prevent an explosion from the 1,800 tonnes of vinylacetate monomer on board following a fire in the machinery spaces were commended by the UK MAIB.The crew extinguished the fire using portable extinguishers and then flooded the machinery spaces with thefixed CO2 systems before abandoning the ship.

Apart from the initial evaluation and assessment described above, opportunities to respond to HNS oncereleased into the environment are limited when compared with spills of oil, unless the chemical can besafely contained and/or physically removed. This is because the range of behaviour for HNS is extensive,especially when more than one chemical is present or there is the potential for reaction and the formationof reaction products to consider. In contrast, oil behaves primarily as a floater and can be dealt with usinga range of response techniques specifically designed to deal with the different viscosities of oil spilt and thesea conditions. It may be possible to extend the application of these techniques to spills of floating HNSprovided that they are not reactive, potentially explosive or toxic. For example, booms have been used tocontain spills of vegetable/animal oil, floating beads and contaminated debris. Also if the HNS has beenlost as a package and, depending on the density of the HNS in the package, it may float, making it possibleto recover using booms, nets, cranes or towing devices.

Manuals have been prepared to provide advice on the different techniques that can be used to respond toHNS incidents. Examples of such are the chemical response guides prepared by CEDRE and provided ontheir website40 and the IMO Manual on Chemical Pollution.41 The response techniques are groupedaccording to the behaviour of the HNS in the environment, whether still packaged or released. In general,risks associated with gases and evaporators (e.g. ammonia, vinyl chloride and LPG) can be reduced usingcontrolled release/dilution methods or “knock-down” sprinkler systems. In their report,24 EMSA providesa synopsis of case studies grouped according to the behaviour of the HNS involved and uses the exampleof the Val Rosandra (Italy, 1990) to illustrate the controlled rupture of the cargo tanks and burning of thepropylene cargo. A similar approach was taken when 51 steel containers of chlorine were lost from theSinbad off the Dutch Coast in 1979.42 Water sprays may also be used to cool hot surfaces and reducethe risk of fire and explosion in flammable gas clouds as happened with the container ship Ever Decent,following a collision with a cruise vessel in the English Channel in 1999. However, attention needs to begiven to the consequences of using water sprays on the stability of the casualty and the potential to causeenvironmental damage by contaminated run-off.

Techniques applicable to oil spill response may be suitable for some floating substances as discussed earlier,provided that the response takes into consideration any hazards identified from the initial assessment. Thisis particularly the case for floating substances that also evaporate and create potentially explosive vapourclouds and where spark/static-free equipment should be used, for example, diesel, xylene or styrene. Foamsprays or sorbent material may also be useful for treating spills near the source.

Treating spills of HNS that dissolve or distribute in the water column (such as acids, bases and alcohols) isdifficult, more so if the water body is large and constantly moving. The HNS will form a growing plume,which if invisible could be difficult to track. In shallow water where the HNS may be confined, treatingagents such as neutralizers, activated carbon, oxidizing or reducing agents, complexing agents or ionexchangers could be considered. By way of example, ferrosulphate was added to the wreck area prior tothe salvage of the Viggo Hinrichsen, which sank off the Swedish island of Oland in September 1973.43 Theship was carrying chromium compounds among its cargo, had begun to leak and chromium was detectedin the water around the wreck. The effectiveness of these treating agents will depend on the ability of the

Response 19

product and the HNS to interact together and it is rarely the case that pouring one chemical in afteranother in flowing water could effectively neutralize or treat the spilt HNS. In many cases, particularlywhere ships have sunk, HNS that dissolve into the water column and dilute rapidly may be “bled” into thesea such that the concentration remains low and of minimal threat to the surrounding environment. Thiswas done with the cargo of methyl ethyl ketone (MEK) and isopropyl alcohol (IPA) which were on boardthe chemical tanker Ievoli Sun, when it sank in the English Channel in October 2000. It was also advisedfollowing the sinking of the chemical tanker Ece in 2006, carrying 10,000 tonnes of phosphoric acid.

Unconfined HNS that are heavier than seawater have the potential to contaminate large areas of theseabed making recovery difficult, time-consuming and expensive. Methods that have been used includevarious forms of dredges, such as mechanical, hydraulic or pneumatic. However, dredging is likelyto generate large quantities of potentially contaminated dredged material and care needs to be taken toensure proper containment and disposal of this. Capping of contaminated sediment in-situ is anotherresponse option that can be considered in some circumstances. For example, heavier clean sediment can bedumped on top of the contaminated sediment to prevent the HNS from being spread further in theenvironment. HNS contained in packages (or in a ship) may be recovered, released or pumped into othercontainers and this has been achieved primarily with the assistance of Remotely Operated Vehicles(ROVs). In the case of the Ievoli Sun mentioned earlier, the cargo of some 4,000 tonnes of styrene wasassessed as being a threat to the environment and, as such, could not be deliberately released in the sameway as the other two cargoes on board. Consequently, the diver-less Remote Offloading System (ROLS)was used to penetrate the double hull of the tanker at a depth of 90 metres and allow the styrene to bepumped into a reception vessel. ROVs have also been used in operations to pump oil out of sunken wreckssuch as the Prestige, in Spain, and the Solar 1 in the Philippines. In the case of the Prestige, oil removal wasachieved at a depth of more than 3,500 metres.

If, after a full assessment of the risks posed by an HNS incident a response is considered necessary, variousactions may be taken to reduce the risks to the surrounding population and the environment during theoperation. Local authorities may decide to evacuate some areas, prevent recreational activities, closeamenity beaches or impose fishing restrictions to protect fishermen and/or consumer health. Throughoutthe operation and until its completion, close co-ordination and co-operation with stakeholders and partiesinvolved in the response is essential to reduce the possibility of harm.


5Environmental considerations

The GESAMP hazard profiles referred to in section 2.1 are generated after evaluation of data providedby the producer or user of the chemical, including for example: LC50 values for different exposureroutes; testing for irritation, corrosion and long-term effects; and measurements of bioaccumulation,biodegradation and tainting (although the latter is not a requirement). Therefore, if a hazard profileexists for the HNS spilt into the environment following an incident it is possible to gauge the severity ofpotential environmental effects in areas where the concentrations are identified as likely to cause harm.Similarly, the MSDS information provided by the manufacturer also contains a section on ecologicaltoxicology and this can be used to indicate the risk of harm to the environment if certain concentrationsare exceeded. However, the toxicity data are, for the most part, obtained from laboratory studies inwhich test organisms are exposed to a fixed concentration of the chemical in freshwater (rather than saltor brackish water) for a period of 96 hours. The laboratory setting is not representative of the environ-ment in which HNS may be spilt following an incident at sea and neither does it account for rapiddilution of the HNS due to tidal movement in the sea. Consequently, the values provided in theGESAMP hazard profile and the MSDS are more precautionary than those which may be applicablein reality.

The effects of oil on the marine environment have been studied extensively and reported.44,45 However, thesame cannot be said of HNS where there have been relatively few studies of specific HNS on marine faunaand flora. Whilst not necessarily toxic, vegetable or animal oils are likely to pose similar problems formarine birds and mammals relying on fur and feathers for insulation. As a result, they could be just asharmful as petroleum oil spills because of their potential to physically coat the animal or bird and causeheat loss. These oils may also smother coastal fauna and flora and interfere with their biological activity,much like viscous or emulsified petroleum oils. Other cargoes may at first appear benign and of no risk tothe environment. However, as illustrated by the grounding of the bulk carrier Fenes in France in 1996, evencereals can generate a toxic environment if they ferment in-situ. In this incident some of the 2,900 tonnesof wheat cargo was dumped on the seabed causing localized smothering of the seabed fauna and flora,eventually fermenting and generating hydrogen sulphide, which created a hazardous environment forresponse personnel.

Because it is difficult to identify a direct correlation between exposure and effect for many HNS, monitor-ing programmes undertaken after an incident need to be specific and designed to produce meaningfulresults that will aid decision-makers in their strategy. For example, following an oil spill the hydrocarboncontent in the water column is often monitored and compared with control sites or background levels toenable local authorities to consider the merit and the duration of fishing restrictions that protect humanhealth and the consumer market. Similar issues are likely to arise following a spill of HNS, and monitor-ing for the presence or absence of the substance in the water column may be helpful, especially if the HNScould bio-accumulate or cause taint. This was the case following the incident described earlier involvingthe Samho Brother whereby fishermen were concerned about the effect of benzene on the fisheries. Thecombination of modelling and monitoring for benzene in the water column enabled responders to dem-onstrate that benzene would not reside in the water column in sufficient concentration to affect thefisheries.

Monitoring programmes can also provide some guidance regarding the pros and cons of leaving a wreckand its cargo in place. If studies demonstrate that the effect of the cargo is localized, transient or likely tocause minimal environmental harm, decision-makers may be reassured about the consequences of the

cargo and be able to focus solely on the consequences of the wreck. Conversely, if studies show that thecargo is hazardous, they are then able to provide the rationale for removal of the cargo. Resource, orhabitat-specific, studies may also be useful where there has been evidence of significant mortality and thereis concern about the ability of the resource or habitat to recover naturally.


6Discussion

In answering the question “Are HNS spills more dangerous than oil spills?” it is clear that consideration ofmore than just the hazardous nature of the substance/s involved is necessary. If “dangerous” means “readyto do harm or injury” the issue then becomes one of considering whether HNS spills have the potentialto cause greater harm or injury than oil spills and, if so, why.

Oil spills could be considered dangerous if the volatile vapours from the oil are of sufficient concentrationto be toxic to human health or to create a risk of fire or explosion. They may also be considered dangerousif the concentration of oil in the environment is sufficient to cause harm to sensitive environmentalresources and habitats. If a spill of HNS generates a more toxic or explosive or environmentally harmfulsituation than oil then it is logical to conclude that it will be more dangerous than an oil spill. The incidentinvolving the Cason, off the coast of Spain in December 1987, is a case in point. This ship was loaded with1,100 tonnes of packaged HNS identified as toxic, flammable and corrosive. A fire broke out on boardafter containers of sodium came into contact with seawater and killed 23 out of the 31 crew members.Subsequent explosions destroyed the ship and resulted in the evacuation of some 15,000 people within afive mile radius.

Incidents involving multiple cargoes of packaged HNS, such as the Cason, are fortunately rare. However,the circumstances that could result in an incident involving packaged goods are more likely to be associ-ated with the chain of responsibility linking the shipper to the receiver. Mis-declaration of HNS, poorpackaging, labelling, weighing, incorrect stowage etc. are all links in this chain, any one of which, ifbroken, may directly or indirectly lead to a casualty. The sheer number of potential shippers and receiversinvolved in the transport of packaged goods, together with the inevitable variation in knowledge andapplication of the IMDG code, increases the potential for HNS to be inadvertently or deliberatelymis-recorded. Although the quantities of HNS involved will probably be significantly less compared toHNS carried in bulk, the consequences of a spillage could be more severe if the HNS is considerably moredangerous. The passenger ferry Princess of the Stars, which capsized during a typhoon off the coast of thePhilippines in June 2008, illustrates this point. Tragically, fewer than 60 of the 850 passengers on boardsurvived when the ferry capsized but it was also discovered that the ferry was loaded with containersholding five highly toxic pesticides (endosulfan, carbofuran, propineb, metamidophos nicolosamide),other HNS and 100 tonnes of fuel oil. No leakage of either pesticide or fuel oil has been reported so farand recommendations made by the Joint UN/EU Mission to the Philippines include installation of acomplete system for recovery, storage and elimination or disposal of chemicals prior to the start of salvageoperations.46 Clearly, if the pesticides enter the marine environment the consequences for the near-shorefauna and flora, and subsequently the people dependent on these resources, could be severe. Because ofthe persistence of the pesticides, the extent of harm to the environment and its duration is likely to beconsiderably greater than for most other HNS or for oil.

The findings from various risk assessments and information on actual incidents or “near misses” help tohighlight the HNS most likely to be involved in an incident and, hence, the potential for a more dangeroussituation than for oil. According to these sources, it is most likely that an incident will involve HNS carriedin bulk. Given that the volumes of hydrocarbon oil transported by sea are considerably more than forother HNS, it is no surprise that oil spills make up the greatest proportion of incidents. If oil is excluded,data compiled by the International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA) in 2000 indicate that the mostcommonly transported HNS in bulk are petrochemicals (such as xylene, benzene and toluene), petro-chemical products (such as MTBE, methanol, styrene, ethyl dichloride and ethylene glycol) and acids or

bases (such as phosphoric acid, sulphuric acid and sodium hydroxide). To compare information on thevolumes of HNS moved by sea with the reported incidents or “near misses”, it is interesting to note that aUS Coast Guard statistical analysis of spills of hazardous substances for the period 1992–1996 identifiedsulphuric acid as the most commonly spilt HNS, with other dissolvers such as phosphoric acid and sodiumhydroxide being prominent. Evaporator/dissolvers such as acrylonitrile and vinyl acetate, and floater/evaporators such as benzene, toluene, xylene and styrene, were also among the HNS most commonly spiltin US waters. The same HNS featured in a number of other incidents that occurred internationally as canbe seen from the case studies in the supporting paper37 and the EMSA HNS Action Plan.24

Thus, there is reason to suggest that the most commonly transported chemicals are the ones most likelyto be involved in an incident. Also, the risk of an HNS incident occurring will almost certainly varyaccording to the location. Logically the risk will be higher along the shipping routes where most chemicalsare transported, where there is congestion, and where poor weather conditions exist, as well as at the ship–shore interface in ports where loading and discharge take place. It would seem sensible to invest in effortsto better understand the risk of HNS spills occurring in different regions of the world and to look forways of improving the quality of data gathered on the movement of HNS. Having an awareness of thesefactors will facilitate improvements in preparedness for dealing with casualties involving the “high-risk”chemicals and provide the opportunity to take measures to reduce the potential for harm or injury.

As bulk HNS are transported in chemical carriers or gas carriers, which are highly specialized ships wherecarriage of these products is heavily regulated, it would be unusual for mis-declaration of cargo or poorlystowed cargo to be a contributing factor to a dangerous situation involving HNS on board these ships. It ismore likely that other factors such as a foundering, fire/explosion, collision, or grounding would be thecause of an incident. The “human factor” as a contributory cause in a number of fires/explosions on boardchemical and product tankers was highlighted in a study carried out by an Inter-Industry Working Group(IIWG) on behalf of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee47 and illustrated the importance of followingestablished guidelines and practices. The IIWG found among their conclusions that the majority ofincidents involved MARPOL Annex II substances (rather than oil) and were caused by tank cleaning,venting or gas freeing. Recognizing the importance of the “human factor” as a contributing cause, theindustry has subsequently established a task group to address procedural compliance on board chemicaland product tankers.

A controlled release of volatile HNS from a ship (where the dangers are known and precautions are put inplace), and an uncontrolled release where precautions are not followed, highlights the progression froma non-threatening situation to a potentially dangerous situation, even when the circumstances of theincident are the same. Many of the HNS involved in past incidents could certainly be regarded as moredangerous than oil on the basis of their hazards to human health but, in several cases, their chemical andphysical properties (and subsequent fate in the marine environment), together with careful evaluation,planning and response, have combined to make the situation less dangerous than for oil. Good examplesare those where the HNS has been diluted into the surrounding sea (e.g. sulphuric acid), or released intothe atmosphere and have enabled the situation to remain in control with little or no harm to responsepersonnel, the public or the environment.

An important difference in the dangers between oil and other HNS arises when considering the responseto a spill. Early in the paper it was explained that air quality and the risk of explosion are not usually ofconcern for response personnel following an oil spill because the oil was likely to have lost the moredangerous, volatile components by the time a response is put into effect; this is particularly the case forshoreline clean-up. Consequently, it is not unusual for fishermen or unskilled labour to be engaged to assistin the clean-up. In contrast, risk assessments and information on actual incidents have demonstrated thatclean-up of a spill of HNS is unlikely to be feasible and response will be limited, in most cases, to initialevaluation, establishing exclusions zones, modelling and monitoring, followed by planning for controlledrelease, recovery or leaving in-situ, a process which may endure for many weeks or even months. It is,therefore, more usual for specialists to be involved in these stages of the response, such as salvors, espe-cially as transfer of cargo, securing cargo holds and/or containers, and making the situation safe are nottasks that can be undertaken without the necessary expertise, equipment and PPE. This approach limitsthe potential for dangerous situations to arise and ensures that only qualified personnel are in directcontact with the HNS.


Although it is important to have an awareness of the “potential” for a particular substance to be danger-ous, the possibility of the dangers actually being realized are subject to the specific circumstances of theincident and its handling. For oil spills, experience has shown that where a country has fully implementedthe requirements of the OPRC Convention and has contingency plans in place with a complementaryprogramme of training and exercises, a pragmatic and confident approach to the handling of a casualty ismore likely. Many countries ratify Conventions without a proper understanding or application of theirinherent obligations. Consequently, when an incident occurs they are unprepared, often without theinfrastructure or equipment necessary to mount a prompt or effective response. As discussed in section3.1, the OPRC-HNS Protocol follows the same principles as the OPRC Convention and, as such, requiresmember States to dedicate resources to ensuring an adequate level of preparedness for HNS incidents.Fulfilment of the obligations of this Protocol will be especially important because of the specific dangersassociated with the HNS, which may be fundamentally different from those associated with oil.

Discussion 25

7Research and development

Very large oil spills like the Torrey Canyon (UK, 1967), the Exxon Valdez (USA, 1989), the Erika (France,1999), the Prestige (Spain, 2001) and the Heibei Spirit (Korea, 2007) have prompted investment in researchand development (R&D) with the intention of understanding the fate and effects of oil in the marineenvironment better and to identify innovative, more effective response techniques. Indeed, much of theearly development in chemical dispersants was initiated following lessons learnt from the response to theTorrey Canyon incident. The continuing demand for oil and the high volumes moved by sea have ensuredthat oil spills and associated R&D remain on the agenda. Recent spills involving heavy oils (such as theDBL 152 which occurred in Louisiana, USA in 2005), coupled with the possibility of a spill involving oneof the heavy oils coming from Russia, has prompted investment in R&D to improve monitoring andrecovery of sunken oils. Similarly, transport of oil through ice-infested waters has prompted R&D intechniques that could improve response to oil spills in ice. Dispersant effectiveness, the fate of chemicallydispersed oil, deep water oil recovery techniques, fast water booming and skimming are also topics thatattract interest and funding as different countries seek to improve their response capability.

In contrast, there has been much less investment in R&D for HNS spills, primarily because there are somany more substances potentially involved, each with widely differing properties, and the frequency ofincidents is relatively low. Nevertheless, the opportunity has been taken to study the behaviour of somechemicals following actual incidents. For example, the behaviour of styrene, MEK and IPA was studied toprovide information to decision-makers following the incident involving the Ievoli Sun40 and studies werecarried out on the behaviour of phosphoric acid after the Ece incident and on cocoa beans after thestranding of the Rokia Delmas. Similarly, Environment Canada carried out some research to investigatethe behaviour of benzene in cold seawater following the grounding of the Sichem Aneline off the coast ofMontréal, Canada in 2007.48 The information from these studies and others will be helpful for futureincidents, provided of course that a mechanism for effectively collating and disseminating the informationcan be found.

The entry into force of the OPRC-HNS Protocol and the efforts taken to bring the HNS Convention intoforce have prompted interest in understanding the fate and effects of chemicals in the marine environmentand have raised questions about the effectiveness of existing response techniques. As a consequence someflag States are supporting R&D specifically to prepare themselves for ratification of these Conventions aswell as to gain a better understanding of the advantages and limitations of evaluation and responsetechniques that are currently available. In recognition of the growing need for more information to assistmember States with ratification of the OPRC-HNS Protocol, the Technical Group referred to in section3.1 has developed a work programme that focuses on projects encompassing both oil and HNS but withparticular emphasis on HNS awareness and information. One such project is to provide a summary ofHNS incidents and lessons learnt that can be made available to all member States. Another is the organiza-tion by the IMO of the 4th R&D Forum on HNS in the Marine Environment.

From the perspective of the authors of this paper, investment in R&D specifically for HNS spills would beworthwhile in areas such as:

• Developing an electronic means of rapidly identifying the HNS and its location on board containerships. The data should be capable of being manipulated such that HNS of greatest concern can beidentified and prioritized quickly. The usefulness of such a system could extend beyond HNS.

• Identifying practical models for the extension of the tiered oil spill response concept to HNS spills.

• Extending land-based modelling capability to waterborne spills.

• Developing real-time monitoring capability for many HNS currently not measurable withoutlaboratory analysis, in particular for those chemicals that are transported most frequently, insignificant quantities.

• Developing aerial observation and/ or monitoring technologies suitable for some colourless HNS.

• Identifying the extent to which current oil spill response technologies or salvage capabilities could betransferable to HNS incidents.

• Collaboration with industry and chemical manufacturers to determine the extent to which theirexpertise can assist with the development of new response or monitoring techniques, and extendingtechniques used for land-based or inland waterway spills to the marine environment.

• Evaluation of techniques for tracking lost packages and containers on the seabed or suspendedunder water, with particular focus on the development of techniques traditionally used in thedefence industry, where possible.

• Analyses of HNS transport statistics and determination of risks.

• Studies of the fate, behaviour and toxicity of HNS most commonly transported in different marineenvironments.

• Review of waste disposal methods for HNS-contaminated liquids and solids.

• Development of a R&D database and a mechanism for maintaining it to enable dissemination ofexisting work and avoid duplication of effort.

Nevertheless, if R&D for HNS spills is to be sustainable, mechanisms need to be found to engender agreater degree of international interest, funding and co-operation. Many administrations and institutionsare experiencing financial “cut-backs” and often R&D is among the first activities to be cut. Previously ithas been noted that investment in oil spill R&D, training and exercises tends to follow after an incidentwhen interest and concern is still high and administrations are more likely to have funding available.Interest, and with it funding, tend to wane as time progresses until the next incident. Whilst this might beinevitable, there may be a greater possibility of R&D programmes being immune to such “feasts andfamines” if R&D could become more “centralized”, perhaps through supporting established R&D institu-tions worldwide with funding and collaborative projects of relevance to the greater spill community. Thismay have the added advantage of protecting funding agencies from accusations of bias, as well as generat-ing larger funding reserves to support more worthwhile R&D projects, as opposed to a proliferation ofreviews spawned because of limited resources to support larger projects. To encourage companies todevelop the products and technologies needed for HNS evaluation and response it will also be necessary toconsider how to provide commercial and confidentiality agreements within the collaborative fundingarrangements. It is interesting to note that some techniques used in oil and HNS response today have theirorigin in defence, for example, remote sensing devices. It could be that providing an opportunity for thedefence sector and related industries to appreciate the needs of the response community, and then identify-ing a mechanism to encourage “free thinking,” backed up with funding and incentives to properly recog-nize and reward collaborative effort, could encourage more manufacturers to invest in R&D. This is likelyto be more fruitful than R&D effort originating primarily from academia.

Research and development 27

8Conclusions

Even if HNS cargoes have the potential to be more dangerous than oil, incidents involving spills of HNSare statistically less likely to occur. From a risk assessment perspective there are more spills of oil thanHNS. This creates a higher frequency of oil spills but, more often than not, the risks to life are low. On theother hand, HNS spills are fortunately rarer but when they occur the risk of a life-threatening situation isgreater. Thus, in the equation:

Risk = Frequency × Consequence

oil and HNS spills may come out even. However, attempting to compare the dangers is problematicbecause of the different hazards and different circumstances associated with individual incidents. Never-theless, with projections of increased transport of chemicals on ships, some increase in the number ofHNS incidents may be expected. In addition, a single incident in which HNS is spilt or threatened issufficient to generate alarm, often accompanied by demands for more stringent restrictions and/or legisla-tion. A “fear” of chemicals tends to be instinctive, particularly among the public, and especially wheninformation is lacking and a situation appears to be out of control. Consequently, the potential to alleviateanxiety and fear exists through ensuring adequate preparedness for HNS incidents. Preparedness ought toextend throughout the chain of responsibility; from reviewing the systems in place for proper declarationof chemicals, identifying mechanisms to ensure that information on the cargoes is provided quickly in theevent of an incident, through to updating and exercising contingency plans regularly so as to generatefamiliarity and confidence with the issues that can arise.

Whilst knowledge of the hazardous nature of the cargo provides only some indication of the seriousnessof the situation, it is clear that other factors (some beyond human control) can turn a potentially danger-ous situation into a reality. There is also the dichotomy of needing to react quickly and yet respondcautiously or only monitor. These dilemmas highlight the importance and value of planning and pre-paredness, especially if competency and control are to be conveyed to politicians, the press and the publicand reduce the chances of a situation worsening.

Even today, lessons from oil spills are sometimes disappointingly slow to be learnt and the level ofpreparedness and experience throughout the world varies significantly. Given that spills of HNS arerelatively rare, the opportunities to learn lessons are less frequent. Arguably, the most effective way tofacilitate preparedness among countries is to ensure that information on HNS incidents is made accessibleand to provide opportunities to benefit from the experiences of others.

The papers being presented during the complementary oil and HNS sessions at the Interspill conferenceallow knowledge and experience to be shared. The IMO R&D Forum takes this theme further andprovides a chance for participants to express their priorities for R&D projects as well as to inform them ofprojects already planned or taking place. Joint government/industry funded projects combined with moreeffective dissemination of information from incidents and R&D projects are surely the way forward.

Notes

1 Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and NoxiousSubstances, 2000.

2 www.itopf.com3 http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/ghs/ghs_rev01/English/08e_annex4.pdf4 Bonn Agreement, 1994.5 Group of Experts on Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection (GESAMP), Working Group on the

Environmental Hazards of Substances Carried by Ships (EHS) (GESAMP Reports and Studies n°64).6 www.helcom.fi7 Geir Olafsen, Head of Research Dept., Inge Steensland, Chemical and Product Tankers, Back to Fundamentals,

London, 10–11 March 2009.8 www.osclimited.com9 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended (see SOLAS, chapter VII).

10 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the protocol of 1978relating thereto (MARPOL73/78), as amended (see MARPOL Annexes II and III).

11 International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk(IBC Code).

12 International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code).13 Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC Code).14 International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code).15 Lloyds List, 18 October 2007.16 www.hazcheck.com, 16 October 2003.17 Sub-Committee on Dangerous Goods, Solid Cargoes and Containers (DSC), 5th Session, February 2000.18 Marine Accident Investigation Branch, Report on the investigation of the structural failure of MSC Napoli, English

Channel, 18 January 2007, Report No 9/2008, April 2008.19 Lloyds List, 28 April 2008.20 IMO’s Revised Recommendations on the Safe Transport of Dangerous Cargoes and Related Activities in Port Areas,

2007 edition.21 Lloyds List, 27 November 2008.22 Hightower, M., Gritzo, L., Luketa-Hanlin, A., Covan, J. Ties Zen, S., Wellman, G., Irwin, M., Kaneshige, M., Melof,

B., Morrow, C., Ragland, D. (2004). Guidance on risk analysis and safety implication of a large liquefied naturalgas (LNG) spill over water. SAND2004–6258. Sandia National Laboratories. Albuquerque New Mexico, USA,December 2004. www.ferc.gov/industries/lng/safety/reports/sandia-rep.asp.

23 Report of the 8th meeting of the OPRC-HNS Technical Group, 29 September–3rd October 2008.24 EMSA, Action Plan for HNS Pollution Preparedness and Response, 2007.25 The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990 (OPRC).26 MARPOL, Regulation 16 of Annex II.27 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC).28 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution

Damage (Fund Convention).29 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001.30 Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC) 1976, and its Protocol, LLMC 1996.31 An Assessment of the Risk of Oil Spills and the State of Preparedness in 13 UNEP Regional Sea Areas: Technical

Report. ITOPF, London, 1996.32 EMSA, Inventory of EU Member States Policies and Operational Response Capacities for HNS Marine Pollution.

June 2008.33 Chemical Transportation Emergency Centre.34 Canadian Transport Emergency Centre, part of the Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate of Transport Canada.35 MAR-ICE Network, Implementation Plan, EMSA, December 2008.36 Spill Technology Newsletter, Oct–Dec., 1989.37 CEDRE, Review of Chemical Spills at Sea and Lessons learnt, Bonn Agreement Report 99/3/6/R, updated for

Interspill 2009.

38 Vegetable oil spills on salt marsh sediments: Comparison between sunflower and linseed oils, Marine EnvironmentalResearch 56, pp 367–385, 2003.

39 ITOPF, 1984.40 www.cedre.fr41 IMO Manual on Chemical Pollution – Section 1: Problem Assessment and Response Arrangements (1999 edition;

Section 2: Search and Recovery of Packaged Goods Lost at Sea (2007 Edition).42 Response Methods applicable to Substances Classified as Gases and Fast Evaporators when released into the Aquatic

Environment. SDU Publishers, 40 pages.43 Personal communication (IMO) with the Swedish Coastguard.44 Committee on Oil in the Sea, National Research Council, 2003. Oil in the Sea III, inputs, fates and effects, the

National Academic Press, Washington DC, USA, 265p.45 C. Bastien-Ventura, M. Girin and J. Raoul-Duval, 2005. Marées noires et environnement, Institut Océanographique

éditeur, Paris, France, 407 pages.46 Final Report of the Joint UN/EU Mission to the Philippines, August 2008.47 Study on Incidents of Explosion on Chemical and Product Tankers, Report of the Activities of the Inter-Industry

Working Group (IIWG), Maritime Safety Committee, 81st session, document MSC 81/8/1, 27 January 2006.48 Stephane Grenon, Patrick Lambert, Environmental Emergencies, Environment Canada, 2005.


REVIEW OF CHEMICAL SPILLS AT SEA ANDLESSONS LEARNT

Technical Appendix

Compiled by CEDRE1

from Bonn Agreement, HELCOM and REMPEC Databasesplus miscellaneous sources

1 Coordinator: Michel Girin (Contact: [email protected]); Contributors: Emina Mamaca, Stéphane le Floch andRawad el Zir

Foreword

This appendix to the White Paper “Are HNS spills more dangerous than oil spills?” is prepared with a viewto providing background information on existing international experience on the response to hazardousand noxious substances (HNS) spills and the related response tools and techniques.

It successively delivers:

• In Chapter 1, a summary of available global information on HNS incidents statistics, includingtables of 109 recorded incidents and an adequately documented analysis of their primary causes.

• In Chapter 2, a review of 96 incidents documented to some point, including the risks incurred andthe response measures undertaken, followed by a summary of the identified risks to human healthand the environment.

• In Chapter 3, short case studies of 24 of the best-documented incidents, identified by the type ofpollutant, with the experience gained with regard to the type of pollutant concerned.

• In Chapter 4, the general lessons learnt with regard to the dangers, consequences and response tips.

1Information on incidents

1.1 BACKGROUND

During the last 30 years, there have been considerable developments in the maritime transport of chemicalproducts, both in bulk and in packaged form. Incidents have followed. Some were well documented, whilemost remained poorly documented or basically ignored.

Past incidents are not only essential references of what happened some time ago but also, when properlyreported upon, first-hand sources of information on what may happen again and on what could bettermitigate the consequences next time. Unfortunately, quality incident reports, giving a clear view of thelessons learnt, are far from being widely available or easily accessible. This paper is built on what could beaccessed. Many gaps could not be filled and, despite the care and efforts made to verify information,errors may remain. Any corrective or additional information provided by the reader would be mostwelcome.

Chemical incidents at sea may involve products in bulk or packaged form. Products in bulk are trans-ported by general cargo vessels (solid substances at ambient temperature), by chemical tankers (liquidsubstances at ambient or controlled temperature) or by gas carriers (liquefied gas). Gas carriers transport asingle product. Their capacity can reach up to 100,000 m3. Chemical carriers may transport one or severalproducts. Their capacity can reach up to 40,000 m3, with tanks varying in capacity from 70 m3 to 2,000 m3.General cargo vessels may transport different products in different holds, with some in bulk and some inpackaged form.

Concerned with the risks involved in chemical transport by sea, various international, regional andnational authorities have published operational guides. Examples are the International Maritime Organ-ization (IMO) manuals, the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediter-ranean Sea (REMPEC) manuals for the Mediterranean Sea, the Helsinki Baltic Sea Convention manuals,the North Sea Bonn Agreement manuals and other national documents, such as the Dutch-developedEmergency Level Scale-Procedure (ELSA) software (OTSOPA, 1990) or the Centre of Documentation,Research and Experimentation on Accidental Water Pollution (CEDRE) chemical pollution responseguides, downloadable from the following website: www.cedre.fr.

1.2 STATISTICS

A statistical study conducted in the United States over 5 years (1992–1996) by the United States CoastGuard (USCG, 1999) lists 423 spills of hazardous substances from ships or port installations, giving anaverage of 85 spills each year. The total volume of these spills was 7,500 t, half of which involved sulphuricacid. The nine most frequently spilled products can be divided into three groups:

1. Products that dissolve in water (such as sulphuric acid, phosphoric acid and caustic soda)

2. Products that evaporate and dissolve in water (such as acrylonitrile and vinyl acetate)

3. Petrochemical products that float and/or evaporate (such as benzene, toluene and xylene)

Two-thirds of the spills took place at the time of loading or unloading in port or from a terminal, thespilled product coming from the facility itself or from the ship or barge.

A complementary study carried out over a period of 13 years (1981–1994) on the ten largest and most

important port zones reported 288 spills of hazardous substances, representing 22 incidents each year.There are no such statistics for other areas of the world.

REMPEC has produced (REMPEC, 2008) a statistical analysis for alerts and accidents database for theMediterranean Sea. It records 106 accidents and near misses concerning HNS during the period 1988–2007, i.e. a little over 5 per year. The major accidents were:

• The sinking of the Continental Lotus in 1991, with 51,600 t of iron ore on board, in the easternMediterranean Sea.

• The sinking of the Erato in 1991 in Italy, with a release of 25,894 t of sulphuric acid and phosphoricacid.

• The sinking of the Kira in 1996 off Greece, releasing 7,600 t of phosphoric acid.

• The sinking of the Kaptan Manolis I in 1996 in Tunisia, with 5,000 t of phosphates on board.

The contribution of the accidents with releases in excess of 2,000 t is detailed in Table 1 below.

There are no such statistics on other regions.

1.3 REVIEW OF SHIPPING INCIDENTS

In the absence of established statistics, for the purpose of the present report, available information onshipping incidents concerning chemical substances in European waters was collected and, as much aspossible, for other areas as well. The framework used, insofar as the information was available, is asfollows:

• Scene of the accident: location and causes

• Chemical product(s) involved: nature, type of transport, properties and hazards

• Response actions: mobilization, risk assessment, plan adopted and means developed

• Impact: monitoring, economic impact and impact on the environment

The results are summarized in Tables 2–5, with a total of 109 incidents classified according to the type oftransport and, for products transported in bulk, to their behaviour after being spilled at sea (dissolvers,floaters, sinkers, gases or evaporators). Most of the reported events occurred at sea during sailing, mostlyin hostile weather: only 26 (= 24%) happened in port or in nearby zones, namely:

– the port of Houston, Texas, USA (Rio Neuquen)

– the access to Mogadiscio port, Somalia (Ariadne)

Table 1 Accidents with more than 2,000 t of product spilled

Name of vessel Spilled amount (t) Year Country Accident type

Ocean Spirit 2,850 1988 Malta SinkingContinental Lotus 51,600 1991 Mediterranean Sea SinkingErato 25,894 1991 Italy SinkingScaieni 3,057 1991 Italy SinkingKira 7,600 1996 Greece SinkingKaptan Manolis 5,000 1996 Tunisia SinkingAnis Rose 2,703 1996 Italy SinkingFenes 2,500 1996 France GroundingAbdul Rahman 2,250 1997 Libya GroundingDogruyollar IV 2,020 1998 Italy SinkingRofayda 3,000 1999 Cyprus SinkingMattheos 2,500 2000 Greece SinkingCastor 29,500 2000 Morocco CrackingCamadan 2,900 2002 Malta Sinking

36 Review of Chemical Spills at Sea and Lessons Learnt

– the port of Aarhus, Denmark (Julie A)

– the port of Texas City, Texas, USA (Grandcamp)

– the port of Brest, France (Ocean Liberty)

– the entrance to the port of Zhanjiang, China (n° 1 Chung Mu)

– Kearny landing stage, New Jersey, USA (Cynthia M)

– Tokyo Bay, Japan (Yuyo Maru n° 10)

– the Rio Grande port, Brazil (Bahamas)

– Elba River, Germany (Oostzee)

– the waiting area of Gijon port, Spain (Castillo de Salas)

– the Guadalquivir estuary channel, Spain (Weisshorn)

– the port of Landskrona, Sweden (René 16)

– the port of Brindisi, Italy (Val Rosandra)

– the port of Nador, Morocco (Tiger)

– the port of Gothenburg, Sweden (Amalie Essberge)

– Chesapeake Bay, Maryland, USA (Barge AC38)

– Mombassa’s harbour, Kenya (Rafaela)

– Galveston West Bay, Texas, USA (CHEM 112)

– the Arzew terminal, Algeria (Jules Verne)

– the Bontang terminal, Indonesia (Aquarius)

– the Cove Point terminal, Maryland, USA (Mostaafa Ben Bouliad)

– the Everett terminal, Massachussets, USA (Pollenger)

– the port of Dahej, India (Disha)

– the Elba island terminal, Savannah, Georgia, USA (Golar freeze)

Table 2 Forty-nine chemical incidents at sea concerning products transported in packages or containers

Name of ship Year Chemical products Maritime zone

Erkowit 1970 Insecticide Cape Vilano, Galicia, SpainPoona 1971 Sodium chlorate Gothenburg port, SwedenViggo Hinrichsen 1973 Chromium dioxide, sodium dichromate Baltic SeaCavtat 1974 Tetra methyl lead (TML), tetraethyl lead Otranto’s Strait, ItalyBurgenstein 1977 Sodium peroxide, sodium/ potassium

cyanideBremerhaven port, Germany

Sinbad 1979 Chlorine North SeaMaria Costa 1979 Organophosphate pesticide MOCAP 10G Off the AzoresFinneagle 1980 Trimethyl phosphite North Sea, Orkney Islands, UKTestbank 1980 Pentachlorophenol, hydrogen bromide Mississippi River Gulf, Louisiana,

USAIran Shaheed 1981 Anhydrous ferric chloride Indian OceanSam Houston 1982 Dimethylenetriamine, polyamines

triethylenetetramineOff New Orleans, Louisiana, USA

Storage Tank Rupture 1983 Carbon tetrachloride, chloroform,1,2-dichloroethane, 1,1,2-trichloroethane

São Paulo State, Brazil

Dana Optima 1984 Dinitrobutylphenol pesticide North SeaRio Neuquen 1984 Aluminium phosphide Port of Houston Texas, USAMont Louis 1984 Hexafluoride North SeaAriadne 1985 Acetone, butyl acetate, toluene Indian OceanCason 1987 Sodium, aniline, creosol Atlantic OceanHerald of Free Enterprise 1987 Di-isocyanate, hydrogen bromide

chlorineZeebrugge, Belgium

Brea 1988 Organophosphate pesticides Eastern Atlantic OceanPerintis 1989 Lindane English ChannelOostzee 1989 Epichlorohydrin North SeaJulie A 1989 Hydrochloric acid Harbour of Åarhus, Denmark

Information on incidents 37

Table 2 Continued


Stora Korsnäs Link I 1991 Sodium chlorate Teesside’s coast, EnglandAriel 1992 White spirit North SeaSanta Clara 1992 Arsenic trioxide, magnesium phosphide,

phosphineCape May, New Jersey, USA

Sherbro 1993 Pesticides English ChannelFrank Michael 1993 Monoammonium phosphate fertiliser Baltic SeaMSC Carla 1997 Flammable, combustible, poisonous and

corrosive productsAtlantic Ocean

MSC Rosa M 1997 Hazardous substances English ChannelKairo 1997 Tetraethyl lead –Apus 1998 Flammable solids (lighters) North SeaBan-Ann 1998 Sulfur-phosphine North SeaEver Decent 1999 Hazardous substances North SeaDjakarta 1999 Calcium hypochlorite Mediterranean SeaRofayda 1999 Sesame seeds Mediterranean SeaMartina 2000 Hydrochloric acid Öresund, Kullen, SwedenBunga Teratai Satu 2000 Tributyltin oxide (anti-stain paint) Sudbury coral reef, AustraliaHeidelberg Express 2000 Acrylic acid Mediterranean SeaMelbridge Bilbao 2001 Chemical mix Atlantic OceanLykes Liberator 2002 Aluminium and zinc diethyl iodides Finistère, FranceHanjin Pennsylvania 2002 Calcium hypochlorite, fireworks,

phosphorusSouth Indian ocean

Jambo 2003 Zinc sulphide Ullapool, ScotlandRokia Delmas 2006 Cocoa beans Atlantic OceanNapoli 2007 Explosives, flammables, pollutants English ChannelAnabella 2007 Butylene Baltic SeaOmer N 2007 Fertilizer Baltic seaOstedijk 2007 Fertilizer La Coruña, SpainPrincess of the Stars 2008 Pesticides South China Sea

Table 3 Thirty-five chemical incidents at sea concerning dissolvers transported in bulk


Grandcamp 1947 Ammonium nitrate Texas City port, Texas, USAOcean Liberty 1947 Ammonium nitrate Bay of Brest, FranceAmalie Essberger Erkowit 1973 Molten phenol Gothenburg’s port, SwedenBarge AC38 1976 Oleum (concentrated sulphuric acid) Chesapeake Bay, Maryland,

USAStanislaw Dubois 1981 Calcium carbide, caustic soda, organic peroxide North Sea, Texel islandBrigitta Montanari 1984 Monomer vinyl chloride Adriatic SeaArges 1981 Naphtha Seine river, FranceRafaela 1981 Sodium sulphide Mombassa harbour, KenyaChem 112 1982 Acrylonitrile Galveston’s West Bay, Texas,

USAPuerto Rican 1984 Caustic soda Pacific Ocean,

San Francisco Bay,California, USA

Anna Broere 1988 Acrylonitrile, dodecylbenzene North SeaBarge ACO-501 1988 Sulphuric acid Mississippi River, USAAlessandro Primo 1991 Acrylonitrile, dichloroethane Mediterranean SeaScaieni 1991 Ammonium nitrate Western Mediterranean SeaCape Charles 1993 Trimethylchlorosilane North of Panama’s Canal,

PanamaCynthia M 1994 Caustic soda Atlantic OceanKira 1996 Phosphoric acid Aegean SeaAlbion II 1997 Calcium carbide, phenol, caustic soda . . . Bay of BiscayAbdul Rahman 1997 Ammonium nitrate, ferrosilicon, caustic soda . . . Eastern Mediterranean SeaBahamas 1998 Sulphuric acid Atlantic OceanPanam Perla 1998 Sulphuric acid Atlantic Ocean


Junior M 1999 Ammonium nitrate Bay of Brest, FranceMultitank Ascania 1999 Vinyl acetate monomer North SeaCastor 2000 Gasoline Mediterranean SeaMartina 2000 Chlorhydric acid Oresund, SwedenBalu 2001 Sulphuric acid Bay of BiscayBow Eagle 2002 Methyl ethyl ketone, ethyl acetate . . . English ChannelCamadan 2002 Phosphate fertilizer Mediterranean SeaFu Shan Hai 2003 Potash Baltic SeaBow Mariner 2004 Ethanol Atlantic OceanEna 2 2004 Sulphuric acid Hamburg’s port, GermanyBarge 2005 Sulphuric acid Chocolate Bay, Texas, USSamho Brother 2005 Benzene Western Pacific OceanEce 2006 Phosphoric acid English ChannelGolden Sky 2007 Potassium chloride Ventspils, LatviaVolgonorsk, Nahichevan andKovel

2007 Sulphur Kerch Strait, RussianFederation, Ukraine

Table 4 Twenty-one chemical incidents at sea concerning floaters and sinkers transported in bulk


FloatersLindenbank 1975 Coconut oil Pacific OceanKimya 1991 Sunflower oil Irish SeaGrape One 1993 Xylene English ChannelN°1 Chung Mu 1995 Styrene China SeaAllegra 1997 Palm nut oil English ChannelChampion Trader 1998 Palm oil MississippiIevoli Sun 2000 Styrene, methyl ethyl ketone,

isopropyl alcoholEnglish Channel

Ice Prince 2007 Untreated sawn timber Scilly Isles, UK

SinkersGino 1979 Carbon black Off Brittany, FranceCastillo De Salas 1986 Coal Bay of BiscayNorafrakt 1992 Lead sulphur North SeaContinental Lotus 1991 Iron ore Mediterranean SeaWeisshorn 1994 Rice Atlantic OceanInfiniti 1995 Rice Atlantic OceanFenes 1996 Wheat Mediterranean SeaAnis Rose 1996 Chromium ore Western Mediterranean SeaDogruyollar IV 1999 Zinc and lead concentrates Western Mediterranean SeaEurobulker IV 2000 Coal Mediterranean SeaCo-Op Venture 2002 Corn Pacific OceanAdamandas 2003 Deoxidized iron balls Indian OceanTiger 2007 Direct reduced iron Outside Nador port, Morocco

Table 5 Thirteen chemical incidents involving gases and evaporators transported in bulk


Methane Princess 1965 Methane UnknownJules Verne 1965 Liquified natural gas (LNG) Arzew port, AlgeriaYuyo Maru 10 1974 Butane, propane Tokyo Bay, JapanRené 16 1976 Anhydrous ammonia Landskrona’s port, SwedenAquarius 1977 LNG Bontang port, IndonesiaMostafa Ben Bouliad 1979 LNG Cove Point, Maryland, USAPollenger 1979 LNG Everett, Massachusetts, USAVal Rosandra 1990 Propylene Port of Brindisi, ItalyBachir Chihani 1990 LNG UnknownIgloo Moon 1996 Butadiene Key Biscayne, Florida, USANorman Lady 2002 LNG Off Gibraltar, UKDisha 2005 LNG Dahej terminal, IndiaGolar Freeze 2006 LNG Georgia, USA

Information on incidents 39

1.4 CAUSES OF INCIDENTS

When the incidents were documented (71 out of the 118 reported incidents, i.e. 52%), the primary causesof the incidents identified in Table 5 were broadly classed into two groups (Table 6):

• One linked to navigation risks, usually following poor weather conditions, causing the loss of part ofthe cargo, a shipwreck or a collision.

• The second linked to an initial internal event on board, such as a fire, a mechanical failure, animproper manoeuvre (in ship ballasting, cargo stowage, etc.), or deliberate dumping of cargo orsinking of the ship.

Incidents involving chemicals transported in bulk (52%) slightly exceeded those involving chemicals inpackaged form (48%). Considering both categories together, the primary group of causes was “incidenton board ship” (55%), whereas “bad weather conditions” (45%) constituted the secondary group of causes.Among specific causes, “human error” came first (13 incidents, i.e. 18%), before “deliberate dumping orsinking” (11 incidents, i.e. 15%) and grounding (9 incidents, i.e. 13% of the total).

However, these results must be considered with caution as, in general, first-hand information from theincident investigation could not be accessed. As a result, there is a high probability that the actual primarycause was missed in a number of cases.

Table 6 Primary causes of the reviewed chemical incidents

Packaged products Bulk transport Total

Bad weather conditions 17 15 32Leakage, shifting or loss of cargo 7 1 8Grounding 3 7 10Shipwreck 5 4 9Collision 2 3 5

Incident on board ship 17 22 39Fire 3 6 9Mechanical failure 3 3 6Human error 7 6 13Deliberate dumping/sinking 4 7 11

Total 34 37 71


2Characterization of incidents, risksand response

2.1 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENTS

In this chapter, the 118 incidents listed in Chapter 1 are briefly described, with the identification of therelated risks and response actions undertaken. The 26 best-documented incidents are further detailed anddiscussed as case studies in Chapter 3.

2.1.1 Packaged form transport

The 49 incidents identified under this category are briefly described in Table 7.

Table 7 Brief description of the 49 recorded packaged form transport incidents

Incident Risks Response

ERKOWIT, 1970 – Cape Vilano, Galicia.On its way from Liverpool (UK) to PortSudan, the container ship Erkowit wasseverely damaged following a collision inthick fog with the Durtmond, a Germansteamboat.

The Erkowit carried 2,000 barrelsof insecticide. The incident is likelyto have resulted in some pollutionof the region’s coastal waters, butno study could be found.

The German vessel saved all the crew ofthe Erkowit. The ship was towed awayand beached in the Bay of La Coruña.Attempts to repair it failed and strongwaves rapidly deteriorated it. The wreckand part of its cargo were abandoned onthe beach.

POONA, 1971 – Sweden. The Danishdry cargo vessel Poona was carrying 36 tof sodium chlorate and 600 t of rapeseedoil stowed on pallets in the same holds.The sodium chlorate spilled out whilehoisting and mixed with the rapeseed oil.The pallets slid on the floor, creatingsparks that ignited the mixture. Flamesflared up out of the hold and threesevere and rapid explosions occurred.Three sailors were killed and sixinjured.

It is highly inappropriate to stowoxidizers and combustibles in thesame hold. Sodium chlorate is apowerful oxidizer. Whendecomposed by heat, it freesoxygen and may cause fire andexplosion in contact withcombustibles.

Fire fighting went on for 4 days and hadto be performed both from the quay andfrom the sea side. Full extinction wasonly achieved after 10 days.

VIGGO HINRICHSEN, 1973 – BalticSea, Sweden. The West German drycargo ship Viggo Hinrichsen sank at adepth of 17 m, with a cargo of 234 t ofchromium trioxide in 1,100 drums and180 t of sodium dichromate in 700drums, on her way from Rotterdam toRönnskär, in northern Sweden. Thechromium compound started to dissolvein water.

Chromium trioxide and sodiumdichromate form corrosivechromic acid in water.

The place was treated with 11 tons offerrous sulphate, a reducing agent, notdoing any good but no harm either. Theaccident showed the need for betterpreparedness regarding response tochemical accidents at sea. A year after,the Swedish Coast Guard wascommissioned this responsibility.

CAVTAT, 1974 – The Strait of Otranto,Italy. After collision with the bulk carrierLady Rita, the Cavtat sank at a depth of94 m, with 150 t of tetra-methyl lead in

Tetraethyl lead and tetra methyllead are poisonous if inhaled or ifthe skin is exposed to them.

The decision to salvage the cargo wastaken 2.5 years after the accident, underpressure from scientists, politicians andthe mass media. Ninety-three per cent



500 drums on deck and 120 t oftetraethyl lead in 400 drums in the holds.The hull opened, making salvage of thewhole vessel impossible.

(250 t) of the cargo was salvaged over aone-year period.

BURGENSTEIN, 1977 – Port ofBremerhaven, Germany. Sodium peroxidedrums were damaged by a fork-lift truckduring the loading of the Burgenstein.The spill of the peroxide reacted with wetplastic sheets under a spinning truckwheel. A fire broke out and spreadrapidly to more spilled peroxide on deckand then to the cargo, followed by aviolent blaze. The port and a large areaaround it were declared a safety zone.People in parts of the city were told tokeep doors and windows closed.

Sodium peroxide is a powerfuloxidizer that reacts violently withwater and organic material. It isdecomposed by heat, to freeoxygen, and may cause fire andexplosion in contact withcombustibles. Sodium cyanideand potassium cyanide are highlytoxic solids. In contact with water,moisture, oxidants, or acids, theyemit an extremely poisonouscompound, hydrogen cyanide.

Fire fighting had to be carried out undergreat precaution. In the beginning, thefire brigade used water. This was aserious mistake. Consequently, the firespread and explosions forced the firefighters to withdraw temporarily. The firewas extinguished after 9 hours of fiercefighting.

SINBAD, 1979 – The Netherlands. Lossof part of the cargo at sea under badweather conditions: 51 cylinders ofchlorine (1 t each).

Related to the possible recovery ofthe cylinders in fishermen’s trawlernets: chlorine is toxic, harmful tohuman health (inhalation) andreactive, producing a corrosiveacid when mixed with water.

The rapid recovery of seven cylinders.Recovery of five other cylinders byfishermen (lack of safety measures).Search was initiated 5 years later forother cylinders: 27 found and destroyed;13 cylinders still missing.

MARIA COSTA, 1979 – Portugal. Theship carrying the organophosphatepesticide MOCAP 10G (activeingredient: Ethoprop) sustained hulldamage in rough seas. Cracks in the hullcaused water to seep in, which becamecontaminated with the pesticide.

Approximately 2,000 t ofcontaminated water was estimatedto be in the hold. If released, itcould damage local marine life.The hold was temporarily sealedwhile the contaminated water waspumped into a tanker for disposalin an assigned dumping area.

FINNEAGLE, 1980 – North Sea, UnitedKingdom. Under very bad weatherconditions, Finneagle’s cargo shifted on avoyage from New Orleans to Valhamn(Sweden). A tank container withtrimethyl phosphite was damaged andstarted to leak. A fire broke out, followedby an explosion. The fire increased.

Trimethyl phosphate is aflammable liquid with high flashpoint. It reacts violently with acids,producing heat and dangerousphosphorus pentoxide in thesmoke gases.

The sprinkler system failed after sprayingabout 300 t of water due to a pressurefailure (foam or powder is recommendedfor extinguishing trimethyl phosphitefire). The crew, wearing breathingapparatus, fought the fire in the smoked-filled engine room. Finally, they wererescued by a British search-and-rescuehelicopter and the ship was abandoned.

TESTBANK, 1980 – Mississippi RiverGulf Outlet, Louisiana, USA. When theoutbound West German container shipTestbank collided with the inboundPanamanian bulk carrier Sea Daniel,four containers were knocked overboardinto the 11-m deep Mississippi river.Sixteen tonnes of pentachlorophenol in23-kg paper bags and three steel barrelsof hydrogen bromide (reported as hydro-bromic acid) were lost. Shortly after thecollision, a white haze of hydrogenbromide enveloped the Testbank. Thecrew secured the ship’s ventilation systemand took shelter below decks. The whitehaze was carried by the winds into avillage, where the sheriff evacuated 75residents from their homes.

Pentachlorophenol is a very toxicsolid biocide. Hydrogen bromide isa corrosive and very toxic gas.

A safety zone was established, closing thechannel to all non-emergency traffic. Itcaused enormous financial losses for themaritime community but was ideal forcontrolling access to the area. After 5days, the search of the sunken chemicalsby a colour video fish finder wassuccessful. The pentachlorophenolcontainers were damaged, with theircontent scattered on the seabed. Ninetyper cent of the pentachlorophenol wasrecovered over 10 days by an air liftdredge, guided by a pile grid. Thedredged mud–water mixture was treatedby flocculation and an active carbonfiltration system in a barge.




IRAN SHAHEED, 1981 – India. TheIranian cargo ship Iran Shaheed wascarrying anhydrous ferric chloridedrums to Iran from Bombay, India, inmid-October 1981 when extensivecorrosion of the bottoms of holds 1 and2 was noticed. Apparently, some drumshad been damaged in transit and theferric chloride had reacted with thewater present in the holds to formhydrochloride which, in turn, ate throughmore metal drums as well as the tanktop plating and leaked into the doublebottom tanks, one of which containeddiesel oil.

The ferric chloride had reactedwith the water present in the holdsto form hydrochloride, which is atoxic and corrosive product.

Some 700 t of acid-contaminated waterwas pumped out of the holds and thedouble bottom tanks. Besides steelplating, ballast, bilge, sounding and airpipes were extensively damaged.

SAM HOUSTON, 1982 – USA. Whileat sea, the crew of the barge noticeda strong, unidentifiable odour.Knowing that the vessel carrieddimethylenetriamine, triethylene-tetramine, trimethylenediamine, alkylamines, polyamines, butyl acrylate,hexachlorocyclopentadiene (C56) andpetroleum distillates in drums, the crewmembers were concerned of a potentiallyserious problem due to the pungentodour emanating from the barge.Permission was requested to enter portand investigate the odour.

Toxic vapours. The source of the odour was notidentified until the barge hatch wasremoved. An inspection traced the odourto butyl acrylate. Visual surveys showedno leakage. At that time, the siteinvestigators could not give a conclusiveexplanation for the odour despitecontinuous ventilation of the barge whileat sea.

SHIP COLLISION WITH STORAGETANK, 1983 – Brazil. On 5 May 1983, atanker collided with a chemical storagereservoir. Five hundred cubic metres ofcarbon tetrachloride, chloroform,1,2-dichloroethane and 1,1,2-trichloro-ethane were released into the Pinheirinhoand Avecuia rivers (Brazil).

1,2-dichloroethane is toxic, highlyinflammable, harmful if swallowedand a potential carcinogen.

Pumping operations began in the deepwaters near the spillage area. In 5 days,20 m3 of substances was recovered.Dredging operations removed a layer of0.5–1 m of mud from the bottom of thespillage area. The mud wasdecontaminated in a system using two50-m3 drains, with walls at a 45° angle.

DANA OPTIMA, 1984 – North Sea,Denmark. An engine failure in a heavystorm, on her way to Esbierg (Denmark),caused the Dana Optima to list, with theoverboard fall of 80 drums ofdinitrobutylphenol (200 l each), whichsank to the bottom at a depth of 40 m.

Dinitrobutylphenol (Dinoseb) isan extremely toxic solid pesticide,with low solubility.

An extensive search was implemented byDanish and Dutch vessels, with side-scansonar and a remotely operated vehicle(ROV). Four months later, 72 of the 80drums lost had been found and salvaged.They had been damaged by fishing andsalvage gear as well as by water pressure.No environmental effects were observed.

RIO NEUQUEN, 1984 – Port ofHouston, Texas, USA. Duringunloading of the Argentino containership Rio Neuquen, a 20-foot container,filled with aluminium phosphideexploded, resulting in a further spillof the aluminium phosphide. Alongshoreman was killed by a flyingcontainer door and the other men wereexposed to phosphine gas.

Aluminium phosphide is a toxicbiocide used as a fumigant tocontrol insects. It is acutely toxicwhen ingested and reacts withwater or atmospheric moisture toemit phosphine. Phosphine is ahighly toxic and reactive gas and isextremely flammable. It is oftencontaminated by small amounts ofdiphosphine, which is likely toautoignite in air and causeexplosion, even at ambienttemperature.

The early information about the identityof the cargo was incorrect and had to bechecked carefully. The master and thecrew refused to leave the ship and had tobe removed by the response authorities.After thorough evaluation, oceandumping of the aluminium phosphidewas accepted as a safe and satisfactoryoption.

Characterization of incidents, risks and response 43



MONT LOUIS, 1984 – North Sea,Belgium. The French ship Mont Louis,bound for Riga, was carrying 30cylinders (15 t each) of solid nuclear fuel,uranium hexafluoride (UF6), when itcollided with the car ferry Olau Britanniaoff the Belgian coast and sank ininternational waters at a depth of 15 m,partly exposed at low tide.

Uranium hexafluoride is a lowradioactivity solid that reacts withwater to form hydrogen fluoride, ahighly corrosive and toxic gas orliquid. It was difficult to achieve afull understanding of the hazardsof the cargo and to identify therisks.

The French charter company that wasresponsible for the ship contracted theDutch salvor Smit Tak International tosalvage the cargo. The Belgiangovernment kept the operation underclose continuous observation. Thework had to be interrupted severaltimes because of rough weather. The30 cylinders were successively salvaged40 days after the accident.

ARIADNE, 1985 – Somalia. Whilesailing out of the Port of Mogadishu(Somalia), the container ship Ariadnegrounded on rocks about 100 m fromthe shore.

The ship was transporting a cargoof 118 containers of hazardouschemicals, including acetone, butylacetate, tetraethyl lead, toluene,trichloroethylene and xylene.

Salvage attempts failed. As time passed,the ship listed more and more, part of thedeck collapsed and a fire started aboveone of the decks. Toxic fumes andchemical emissions drifted towards thecity. The authorities ordered theevacuation of a number of inhabitantsand companies in port area. The vesselbroke in two and large quantities of oiland the cargo, including drums ofchemicals, began to come ashore. A fewdays later, the rear part of the ship brokeoff further and began to list at a 90° angle.Despite the lack of protective clothing, avast operation was set up to recover thecargo washed up on the shore.

CASON, 1987 – Spain. The ship caughton fire, sought shelter and grounded onthe Galician “Death Coast”.

A number of hazardoussubstances were present in thecargo, including diphenyl methanedi-isocyanate, orthocresol, anilineand sodium, all toxic to theenvironment and harmful tohuman health and someexplosively reactive with water.

European assistance (emergency taskforce) and IMO expertise were mobilizedfor the identification of the cargo,initially unknown. Plans to unloadhazardous substances from the ship werehampered by bad weather conditions andfire on board. The operation necessitated3 months of work, along with water andair monitoring. Following an explosion,15,000 people were evacuated from thesurrounding area overnight with buses.Great difficulties were encountered inevaluating the risks involved withoutproper information on the cargo. A delayoccurred in transporting interventionequipment to the site. Information to thepublic was poor.

HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE,1987– Belgium. The car ferry heeled overjust after leaving port, came to lie on itsside and sank, causing the loss of about200 lives. A full inventory of the cargo infive rolled-on lorries, obtained 73 hoursafter the disaster, showed a cocktail ofchemicals: toluene di-isocyanate,hydrogen bromide, chlorine, ethylene,carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide,hydrochloric acid, fluoromethane, diethylether, chlorotrifluoromethane,methylamine, tetrafluoroborate, antimonypentafluoride, aniline, acrylonitrile,hydroquinone, lead sulphate, cyanides,paints and other chemicals.

The risks for response personneland for the marine environmentwere evaluated using simplifiedscenarios and computersimulations.

After the initial rescue operation, effortswere focused on the salvage of the vesseland cargo. Environmental contaminationwas monitored and protective counter-pollution measures were implemented.Although more than half of thedangerous cargo was not recovered,environmental damage was kept to aminimum. Response activities met withtechnical, scientific, legal andorganizational difficulties.




BREA, 1988 – France. On 22 January1988, the vessel Brea was lost in astorm, north of Ushant Island(Finistère, Brittany), with 700 drumsplaced on deck. About 50 of thesecontained organophosphatepesticides. Despite searches, none couldbe located.

Organophosphate pesticides aremarine pollutants.

After the storm, the drums were foundand recovered on the shoreline, but noneof them could be formally identified ascoming from the Brea.

PERINTIS, 1989 – France. The ship waswrecked during a storm, with a cargoincluding containers of pesticides:lindane (5.8 t), permethrine (1 t) andcypermethrine (0.6 t). The containers oflindane were lost during towing.

Contamination of theenvironment.

Search for the lindane container wasunsuccessful, but the drums ofpermethrine and cypermethrine near thewreck were immediately recovered by theBritish Marine Pollution Control Unit(MPCU). Surveillance of thecontamination of the marineenvironment in the zone where thelindane container was presumed lost wasconducted through efficient French–British co-operation.

OOSTZEE, 1989 – Germany. The vesselwas carrying 975 t of epichlorohydrinin3,900 drums. The badly stowed drumsdeteriorated and, under bad weatherconditions on the Elba river, theepichlorohydrin leaked out. All 14 crewmembers were hospitalized for 10 days.

A flammable, toxic substance(fumes) of carcinogenic nature.

Inspection of the ship was done and thecrew was taken to the hospital formedical checks. Towing and unloadingof the ship should be done in safeconditions. Cleaning operation on board.Long-term (several years) effects (toxicfumes) on the crew.

JULIE A, 1989 – Åarhus Harbour,Denmark. The dry cargo ship Julie Areported a leaking tank of hydrochloricacid on board when moored in theharbour of Åarhus. The leaking tankcontained 300 t of 33% hydrochloricacid. The acid had eaten its way throughthe tank (the coating of which was notstrong enough), spread into a ballasttank and threatened to reach through thebottom of the ship.

Hydrochloric acid is a watery,corrosive liquid that reacts withsheet iron to form flammablehydrogen gas.

After some trouble finding theappropriate equipment to pump the acidinto tanks on shore, the offloading ofthe acid was initiated. However, verysoon, the stability of the ship decreased.It was moved to a dry dock the next dayand dried off the acid through a holedrilled in the bottom.

STORA KORSNÄS LINK I, 1991 –Teeside, England. The Swedish ferryStora Korsnäs Link I was on a voyagefrom Sweden to Hartlepool (UK) when afire started in the machine room. On thelower deck, 40 t of sodium chlorate wasstowed within two containers. When thiswas found out, the ship was quicklyabandoned. An explosion occurred closeto the containers. It blew out the side ofthe ship, causing it to roll over, capsizeand, after a few hours, sink at a depth of40 m. The explosion also blew out twowindows on the fire fighting vessel.

Sodium chlorate is a solidpowerful oxidizer that isdecomposed by heat to freeoxygen. It may cause fire andexplosion in contact withcombustibles.

Attempts were made to extinguish thefire by filling the machine room withcarbon dioxide. But the attempts failedand the crew was forced to shut down theengines. The cargo manifest did not havethe proper information and this led to avery dangerous situation as the rescuepersonnel boarded the vessel and tried tofight the fire, unaware of the risk ofexplosion. A one-mile exclusion zone wasestablished after knowing about theoxidizer and the salvage tugs left thescene. After sometime, it was decided topump water onto the exterior of the shipin order to achieve control over the fire.This proved unsuccessful and the firespread to the other cargo decks duringthe following days.

ARIEL, 1992 – The Netherlands. Loss of45 drums of white spirit at sea, washedup on the coastline.

Contamination of theenvironment due to leakage fromthe drums.

Recovery of drums grounded on thecoastline.




SANTA CLARA, 1992 – Cape May, NewJersey, USA. In adverse weather, thePanamanian container ship Santa Claralost 21 intermodal containers, some30 nautical miles off the coast of CapeMay, New Jersey. In total, 414 drums ofarsenic trioxide (374 pounds each) felloverboard in 125 feet of water. The vesselleft Baltimore in an extremely hazardouscondition, placing its crew and ultimatelythe port of Charleston and its citizens atgreat risk.

Arsenic trioxide is a biocide, verypoisonous when ingested andpossibly when absorbed by theskin, and a known carcinogen; itis lethal to human beings in asingle dose no larger than the sizeof an aspirin tablet. Magnesiumphosphide is a toxic biocide usedas a fumigant to control insects.It is acutely toxic when ingestedand reacts with water oratmospheric moisture to emitphosphine. Phosphine is ahighly toxic and reactive gas, isextremely flammable and is oftencontaminated by small amountsof diphosphane, which is likelyto autoignite in air and causeexplosion, even at ambienttemperature.

The search for the drums took place withthe participation of vessels and anaircraft from the US Coast Guard,assisted by Navy helicopters. Some of thevessels were equipped with side-scansonar and sophisticated navigationalequipment. A specially constructedsalvage barge with two large ROVs wasused by the salvage team, who managedto salvage 320 of the 414 drums ofarsenic trioxide from the ocean floor. Themain deck and several cargo hatches ofthe vessel were literally awashed with thesubstance on arrival at Baltimoreharbour. Below deck, in the n°1 cargohold, toxic magnesium phosphide hadspilled. The ship was taken to an isolatedanchorage, where she wasdecontaminated by the personnel of theNational Strike Force.

SHERBRO, 1993 – France. Lossof 88 containers in bad weather,including 10 with hazardoussubstances, mainly pesticides,among which was thiocarbamate(Apron Plus, 188,000 sachets).

Apron Plus is dangerous for theenvironment. It reacts with waterto form phosphine, a toxic gas.Grounding of the sachets wasreported along the French, Dutchand German coasts.

The badly stowed containers wereoffloaded in Port of Brest. Thecontainers of hazardous substances(classified 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) were storedunder a tarpaulin, respecting thecompatibility of the products. Driftpredictions were made for 15 containerslost at sea. The pesticide sachets wererecovered by hand on beaches in France,Germany and the Netherlands (91% ofthe lost sachets recovered). There wasgood co-operation between the countriesconcerned and the chemical industry.

FRANK MICHAEL, 1993 – North ofGotland Island, Baltic Sea, Sweden. TheGerman dry bulk carrier Frank Michaelgrounded and suffered severe bottomdamage. Its cargo of 1,100 t of fertilizerstarted to escape and dissolve in thesurrounding water. The weather gotworse and the cargo content ofphosphate escaped into the sea overthe weeks following the accident.

Monoammonium phosphate(ammonium dihydrogenphosphate) is a non-toxic solidfertilizer: a nutrient for algae andthus a severe oxygen consumer.The time of the year and thefavourable water turnover in thearea reduced the risk for theenvironment. But all possibleactions should always be taken toreduce the release of oxygen-consuming chemicals into thevulnerable Baltic Sea.

The ship’s bunker oil was lightered, butno response actions were taken to stopthe release of the phosphate.

MSC CARLA, 1997 – off the Azores,Portugal. The container carrier MSCCarla broke in two in a violent stormwhile sailing off the coast of the Azores.The 34 crew members were safelyevacuated. Seventy-four containerswere lost.

The lost containers were loadedwith wine, alcohol, flammable andcombustive products andpoisonous and corrosivesubstances. Fourteen carriedproducts classified as “marinepollutant”. Also, one containercarried three laboratory irradiatorswith their radioactive sources(Cesium 137).

The aft part of the ship was taken in tow,while the fore part sank in waters 3,000 mdeep, with the containers still on board.The documentation reviewed showedthat the container transporting thelaboratory irradiators was positioned inthe fore part of the ship. The cesium-protective cells, designed to resist apressure of 20 atmospheres, would haveimploded while the section of the shipwas sinking. The French Institute ofProtection and Nuclear Security (IPSN)carried out assessments of the possible




impact on human beings and the faunain the area. Because of the great depth(3,000 m), a high dilution capacitylimited the exposure. The risk toconsumers was minimal, as trawling inthe zone was carried out at depths of lessthan 2,000 m.

MSC ROSA M, 1997 – France. The shiplisted more than 20° after a ballastingerror, with 70 t of hazardous substanceson board (liquid gases, flammable solidsand corrosive and oxidizing substances).

The wrecking of the ship couldhave generated a multi-chemicalhazard, similar to the Casonincident.

After collection of information on thecargo on board, the ship was rapidlytowed and beached in a sandy bay.Chemical risk assessments wereperformed by specialized HNSemergency teams. The water was pumpedfrom the ballasts to rebalance the shipand it was returned to Le Havre port forunloading and repairs.

KAIRO, 1997 – France. On 21 January1998, a tank container drifting at sea off

the coast of Royan was signalled bySpanish fishermen.

The markings on the tanks indicatedthat it contained a chemical calledNovoktan (tetraethyl lead),classified as toxic and flammableand made by a German firm,Novoktan Gmbh. Three tankscontaining this substance had beendeclared as lost at sea on 31December 1997 by the Kairo, a shipheading for the English Channel,off the Spanish coast.

At first, no information was found toidentify the product from only its brandname, Novoktan, but it was lateridentified. Contacts between theNovoktan manufacturing company andthe French authorities ensured a saferesponse for recovery operations at seaand on-shore storage.

APUS, 1998 – The Netherlands. Lossof the cargo from a ferry of a trailer’scontainer with 2,100 boxes of firelighters. Grounded on the coastline.

Product harmful to human health(urea-formaldehyde), anenvironmental contaminant(kerosene).

Recovery of the fire lighters buried insand on beaches. Costs reimbursed by theship owner.

BAN-ANN, 1998 – The Netherlands.Deliberate dumping at sea of sachetsof anti-vermin product containingsulphur-phosphine (Detia-Ex-B).

The chemical reacts with humidity,generating a toxic gas.

Recovery and destruction of sachetswashed up on the coastline.

EVER DECENT, 1999 – UnitedKingdom. The container ship collidedwith an ocean liner. A fire broke out onboard, involving containers of hazardousmaterials, notably cyanide, organic leadand pesticides.

Chemical risk from fire on boardthe container ship.

Towing of ship. Fire fighting. Control ofair contamination (fear of cyanide).

DJAKARTA, 1999 – off Cyprus. In July1999, the CMA Djakarta, off Cyprus,suffered an explosion on deck, followedby a fire. The crew could not control thefire, further explosions occurred and thevessel was abandoned and subsequentlygrounded off the Egyptian coast, wheresalvors took over.

It appeared that the explosionsand the fire had been caused by acargo of calcium hypochlorite thatself-combusted, possibly as a resultof impurities added during themanufacturing process orcontamination during transport.

The fire was eventually put out and thevessel was towed to Malta as a refuge andthen to Croatia for repairs.

ROFAYDA, 1999 – off Cyprus. On28 July 1999, en route from Limassol(Cyprus) to Latakia (Syria), the generalcargo ship Rofayda, loaded with 3,000 tof sesame seeds, suffered an explosion,followed by a fire, in the engine room.She sank off cape Greco (Cyprus). Somebunker fuel was spilled. Six out of theeight crew members were rescued.

Not stated. Not stated.




MARTINA, 2000 – Öresund, Sweden.The chemical tanker Martina collidedwith the cargo ship Werder Bremen inNorthern Öresund. The Martina broke intwo and the stern part sank immediately.The rest, with a cargo of 600 t of 30%hydrochloric acid, sank within a fewhours.

Hydrochloric acid is a watery,corrosive liquid that generatesirritating vapours. It is not amarine pollutant and is notharmful in low concentrations.Therefore, it was decided that amonitored release of the cargowould be preferred. However, theship’s bunker oil was considered asa threat to the marine environmentand needed to be pumped up.There was no immediate risk of oilleakage from the bunker oil.

Two out of the seven crew members weresaved from the water. Due to the weather,it was impossible to reach the ship duringthe first 2 days. Both parts of the shipwere localized later with the help ofROVs. A salvage company was hired toremove the cargo and the bunker oil. Thesalvage of the bunker oil was successfuland no harm was done by the releasedhydrochloric acid.

BUNGA TERATAI SATU, 2000 –Sudbury coral reef, Australia. On2 November 2000, the container shipBunga Teratai Satu, transporting a fullcargo of containers and with 1,200 t offuel in its bunkers, ran aground onSudbury coral reef (Great Barrier Reef )when approaching Cairns harbour. Theship damaged 1,500 m2 of its hull when itscraped against the coral reef and spreadmany small fragments of tributyltinoxide anti-stain paint over the reef.

Tributyltin oxide anti-foulingpaint is a pesticide used to controlbiofouling. It would have anegative impact on the reef.

On 13 November, after 13 days of effortand three rescue attempts, the vessel wasrefloated without losing any cargo orfuel. An agreement was made betweenthe Australian authorities and the shipowner regarding the cleaning andstabilization of the reef and a specializedservice provider was recruited to carryout the work. An environmental follow-up programme was set up for a 10-yearperiod, in collaboration with theco-operative research centre for the GreatBarrier Reef’s world heritage zone.

HEIDELBERG EXPRESS, 2000 –Malta. A tank container loaded withacrylic acid (inhibited) was found leakingon a voyage to Saudi Arabia. Thecontainer was offloaded in Malta.

Acrylic acid is a colourless, wateryliquid with an irritating, acridsmell. It is toxic when ingested,flammable, corrosive, carcinogenicand can burn the skin on contact.

Arrangements were made for areplacement container to be obtainedand a tank-to-tank transfer by gravitywas done by the personnel of the BASFFire Department. The emptied tankcontainer was allowed to drip dry for anadditional 24 hours. Co-operationbetween the chemical industry and thegovernment ensured a smooth andtrouble-free operation. The empty,damaged tank container was sent to afacility belonging to its leasing companyin port of Rotterdam, while thereplacement container was safelydispatched to Saudi Arabia.

MELBRIDGE BILBAO, 2001 – MolèneIsland, France. The container shipMelbridge Bilbao missed the Ushanttraffic separation scheme by 17 miles andran aground at full speed on a sandybeach of the island of Molène.

The ship carried 218 containersand 330 cases, including onecontainer with 17 t ofInternational MaritimeDangerous Goods Code (IMDGCode) class 9 substances. It alsohad on board 180 t of fuel oil and60 t of diesel oil.

The ship was refloated at high tide andtowed to a waiting area for inspection bydivers. Seeps of fuel were reported andthe ship was towed to a dry dock in Brestharbour, after verification of the actualhazards related to the catalyst. There, itwas decontaminated and repaired.

LYKES LIBERATOR, 2002 – Finistère,France. On Saturday, 2 February 2002,the container ship Lykes Liberator,sailing from Bremerhaven (Germany) toCharleston (USA) with 3,000 containerson board, reported the loss of 60containers in rough sea, 120 nauticalmiles west of Sein Island.

A 40-foot open container, carryingthree empty (residue) tanks thathad been used for the transport ofdangerous products, i.e. catalystsused in the manufacture ofsynthetic rubber, cosmetics andpharmaceuticals, identified asaluminium diethyl iodide (2 tanks)and toluene diethyl zinc (1 tank).Both products react when in

The Préfecture Maritime for the AtlanticOcean immediately addressed the riskswith regard to maritime traffic, as well asthe risks for the environment and thepotential risk to human lives. CEDREwas requested to assess the fate of thetanks at sea, and called on the services ofMétéo France. The information sent bythe ship with regard to the content of thedrifting tanks was vague. Therefore, the




contact with water, producingheat, may ignite spontaneously incontact with air, and are known tocause serious burns. Since thetanks were empty, although stillcontaining chemical residues andvapours, they were able to float.

supplier was contacted. He reactedquickly and responsibly, providingdetailed information on the tanks andthe risks and precautions to be taken.The risk to human health was assessed(risk of explosion) but not the risk for theenvironment. The supplier’s emergencyresponse centre was made available to theFrench authorities. There were neithervictims nor pollution, but a heavyemergency response workload in harshconditions.

HANJIN PENNSYLVANIA, 2002 –south of Sri Lanka. The brand newcontainer ship Hanjin Pennsylvania wassailing 80 miles south of Sri Lanka, on11 November 2002, when containers withphosphorus and fireworks caught fireand exploded. A huge fire killed two crewmembers and forced the others toabandon the ship.

The fire was understood to havestarted below deck, whereas thefireworks were supposed to becarried on deck. The similarity ofthe explosions and the fire onboard the Hanjin Pennsylvaniaand the Djarkarta points tocalcium hypochlorite, alsopresent in the cargo, as theprobable cause.

The ship was towed to a port to dischargeits cargo containers and was sold tobreakers. The hull was used to build asecond, new Hanjin Pennsylvania.

JAMBO, 2003 – Ullapool, Scotland. On29 June 2003, the Cypriot bulk carrierthe Jambo was sailing from Dublin toOdda (Norway) with a cargo of 3,300 tof zinc sulphide when she ran agroundon the north coast of Scotland at theentrance to Loch Broom. The zincconcentrate was leaking from the wreckand the bulbous bow was seriouslydamaged. On 3 July, a sheen was visiblearound the Jambo.

Experts assessed the risksassociated with the wreck, hercargo and her diesel, especially forthe five fish farms existing in theimmediate vicinity.

The response crew was rapidly takenon board. Surveillance flights monitoredthe pollution. The main concern was theearly recovery of marine diesel and of thecargo. The Maritime and CoastguardAgency (MCA) took measures tocontain and recover the oil and deployed600 m of booms to protect the fish farms.A temporary exclusion zone was set uparound the wreck and was lifted on 8July. The possibility of the removal of theJambo was discussed. The responseteams eventually managed to pump out1,900 t of the cargo, which was sent toImmingham (England). The remaining400 t of zinc sulphide was considered anegligible environmental threat and itwas decided to leave the wreck in place.Samples of fish and shellfish were takenfor analysis and environmental impactassessment.

ROKIA DELMAS, 2006 – Isle de Ré,France. On 24 October 2006, at around4 a.m., the container ship Rokia Delmas,suffering from total engine failure,was driven ashore by a storm on thesouth coast of the Ile de Ré, on theFrench Atlantic coast, and hit a rockyoutcrop 1 nautical mile south of thecoast.

The vessel was mainlytransporting cocoa beans, woodand more than 500 t of IFO 380and 50 t of marine diesel. Thecocoa beans could rot if spilledand generate organic pollution in amajor oyster farming area.

As a precautionary measure, the PolmarLand Plan for Charente-Maritime wasactivated. An oil spill response vessel wassent to the site. The oyster beds wereprotected by booms. During a 15-monthoperation, the ship’s cargo was removed,the wreck was cut into five pieces and thepieces were removed.

ANABELLA, 2007 – near GotlandIsland, Sweden. During the evening of 25February 2007, on passage in the BalticSea, the container ship Annabellaencountered heavy weather, rolled andpitched heavily. The next morning, thecrew discovered that a stack of seven

Butylene polymerization. The vessel was redirected to the port ofKotka (Finland), where the damagedhazardous containers were safelyunloaded.




containers had collapsed against theforward part of the hold. This resulted indamage to the containers, three of whichcontained a hazardous cargo: butylenegas.

NAPOLI, 2007 – Channel, France andUnited Kingdom. At the entry to theEnglish Channel during a storm, thecontainer ship Napoli suffered a leakand a failure of her steering system.

The ship was transporting 2,394containers, carrying nearly 42,000t of merchandise, of which some1,700 t was classed as hazardoussubstances. In her bunkers, sheheld over 3,000 t of heavy fuel oil.

The crew members were evacuated byrescue helicopters. The risks forresponders (explosive or flammablesubstances and toxic gases) and the risksfor the marine environment (aquaticpollutants and toxic substances for theflora and fauna) were analysed. Afterinspection, the Napoli was towed to theDorset port of Portland. En route, due tothe growing risk of the vessel breaking,the convoy was diverted to Lyme Bay,where the Napoli was beached. In total,103 containers were lost overboard, with57 of them being washed ashore, many inLyme Bay. In France, packets ofchocolate biscuits covered in fuel oillanded on the coasts of northernFinistère and Côtes d’Armor. In LymeBay, the ship was unloaded and cut intotwo pieces, which were towed away.

OMER N, 2007 – Baltic Sea. The OmerN, a freighter carrying 1,980 t ofammonium nitrate fertilizer from Polandto France, capsized on 28 October 2007on the southern tip of the island ofFalster.

Ammonium nitrate fertilizerdecomposes into gases, includingoxygen, when heated and could beinduced to decompose explosively.

Three of the eleven crew members wererescued by a Russian ship, while a Navyhelicopter found the fourth crew memberdrowned. Danish and German diverspulled two drowned crew members out ofthe wreck. Little concern was expressedon the fate of the ammonium nitrate.

OSTEDJIK, 2007 – La Coruña, Spain.On 17 February 2007, while the Ostedijkwas transporting 6,012 t of NPKfertilizer from Porsgruun (Norway) toValencia (Spain), its cargo underwent achemical, heat generating reaction, off

the Galician “Death Coast”. A largeplume of irritant gases topped the ship,which was refused refuge in port. It took7 days to terminate the reaction off

shore, destroying part of the cargo andcompromising the ship.

Ammonium nitrate, an element ofNPK, can, when ignited, causehighly damaging explosions.

The Spanish authorities consulted withtechnical experts. The gases affected thecrew and four members were evacuated.A tugboat cooled the ship’s cover withwater. Specialized personnel were sentaboard the ship to open the cargocontainers. On 22 February, special waterpipes or spears were inserted inside thecargo and the fire was controlled.

PRINCESS OF THE STARS, 2008 –Philippines. On 21 June 2008, thePrincess of the Stars ferry hit typhoon“Fengshen” and sank with 850 people onboard, off the coast of Sibuyan Island.Many passengers and the crew died.

On 28 June, operations to recoverthe bodies were suspended due tothe presence of containers ofpesticides on board. It wasconsidered necessary to removethese substances before continuingthe recovery of the corpses orattempting to refloat the wreck.

A 5-km exclusion zone was set up aroundthe wreck, where fishing and aquacultureactivities were prohibited. On 9 July, ateam of European experts arrived on siteto assess human and environmental risks.Five highly toxic pesticides were beingtransported in two containers on boardthe ferry: a 40-foot container held 10 t ofendosulfan and a 10-foot containerstored four other pesticides in smallerquantities. Samples around the wreckshowed no water pollution. Thecontainers were ultimately removed,undamaged, from the hold.


2.1.2 Transport in bulk

The 69 incidents identified under this category are distributed as follows:

– 35 for dissolvers (Table 8)

– 8 floaters (Table 9)

– 13 sinkers (Table 10)

– 13 gases or evaporators (Table 11).

Table 8 Brief description of 35 incidents concerning dissolvers transported in bulk


GRANDCAMP, 1947 – Texas City,USA. On 16 April 1947, the liberty shipGrandcamp was loading fertilizers,including ammonium nitrate, whenfire broke out. It exploded while beingtaken in tow away from the loadingpier. The fire and the explosionscontinued for 6 days, destroying mostport equipment and facilities, as wellas many houses and buildings. In total,600 people died and 3,000 werewounded.

Ammonium nitrate is anagricultural fertilizer compound,soluble in water, highly explosivewhen heated.

Fire fighting and rescuing the wounded.

OCEAN LIBERTY, 1947 – Bay of Brest,France. The liberty ship Ocean Liberty,loaded with 3,158 t of ammoniumnitrate, safely entered Brest harbour.However, after mooring, smoke was seenpouring from one of the closed holds anda fire rapidly spread.

Ammonium nitrate is anagricultural fertilizer compound,soluble in water, highly explosivewhen heated.

After a series of small explosions, theship was towed away with the availablemeans and the salvors flooded the holds.Despite these measures, a huge explosionoccurred, which was felt within a 60-kmradius, killing 26 people and causinghundreds of casualties, as well asdestroying 4,000–5,000 houses andbuildings downtown. The harbourcranes were lying on the ground. The gasworks and the oil depot were in flames.There was no report of any waterpollution.

AMALIE ESSBERGER, 1973 – Sweden.This German tank vessel was unloadingmolten phenol in port of Gothenburgwhen a cistern carrying the phenolsuddenly ruptured.

A total of 400 t of phenol leakeddown on the quay and into thewater. The fire department wasalerted, and by the time theyarrived, a large gas cloud wasvisible above the quay.

The actions taken included personalprotection for the emergency responders,establishment of a safety zone andredirection of incoming vessels; recoveryof solidified phenol from the bottom ofthe port area was achieved using simpledredging equipment.

Barge AC38, 1976 – USA. The bargereleased over 1,000 t of 20% oleum intothe water almost immediately aftercapsizing but the crew of the towingvessel neglected telling the Coast Guardinvestigators about the release.

Oleum is concentrated sulphuricacid. Both oleum and sulphuricacid are produced by bubblingsulphur trioxide, a fuming liquid,through water. When all thewater present has reacted withsulphur trioxide, the solution issaturated, i.e. pure 100% acid isformed.

The authorities, the chemical companyand the salvage personnel proceeded inthe emergency under the illusion that thebarge still contained the product,implementing a costly and uselessresponse effort involving many peopleand disrupting the lives of the localpopulation.

STANISLAW DUBOIS, 1981 – Texel,North Sea, Denmark. The Polish generalcargo ship Stanislaw Dubois loaded with857 t of calcium carbide, 955 t of causticsoda (solid sodium hydroxide), 5.4 t of aflammable organic peroxide and 5.6 t ofexplosives collided on her way in theNorth Sea with the Sudanese ship

Calcium carbide is a solid thatproduces the highly flammable gasacetylene on contact with water ormoisture. There was an imminentrisk of explosion.

After 7 days of negotiations, the Dutchauthorities ordered the Stanislaw Duboisto be sunk. Salvage vessels kept her afloatthrough continuous pumping andlightered all her fuel oil. Finally, theDutch Navy frigate Callenburgh escortedher to north-west of the island of Texel,where she was sunk at a depth of 72 m.




Omdurman off the Dutch island of Texel.Water flooded the holds through a holein port side, which caused a draught thatmade it impossible for the ship to enterany port for repair.

BRIGITTA MONTANARI, 1984 –Adriatic Sea, Yugoslavia. The BrigittaMontanari was transporting 1,300 t ofvinyl chloride monomer when she sankin the Adriatic Sea, to a depth of 82 m.

Vinyl chloride monomer iscarcinogenic and, when spilled,evaporates into an extremelyflammable gas, forming anexplosive mixture with air.

It was decided almost 3 years later torefloat the ship and to pump out thechemical. A leak was detected and a holewas bored in the bridge, through whichthe chemical was first released (on anestimated basis of 3 t per day). Then,divers connected polyvinyl chloride(PVC) tubes to the hole, through whichthe chemical was released at the watersurface, where it dispersed and wasburnt. Finally, the ship was returned to adepth of 30 m and the 700 t of chemicalstill on board was pumped andtransferred to another tanker.

ARGES, 1981 – France. While off-loading at a terminal, this tanker spillednaphtha. First unnoticed, the spillednaphtha caught fire on the water surface.The fire was eventually put out but notbefore causing damage to the othervessels in the vicinity.

The river was set ablaze over anarea 3,000 m long and 100–200 mwide, with flames 30–40 m high.The fire was moving upstream inthe direction of the Arges (the riverflow had changed its direction dueto the tide change). The ship wasfound not to be gas-free, makingher a considerable risk to thepopulation in the vicinity.

As soon as the fire alarm was raised, theharbour master notified the Fire RescueServices. A fire boat and port tugs weresent to the scene. The gas-inert operationwas considered to be dangerous if carriedout in port. Contrary to the regularprocedure, which does not allow a shiphaving pending claims against it toproceed outside a harbour, theauthorities allowed the ship to anchor atthe entrance of the river until hercreditors had been satisfied.

RAFAELA, 1981 – Kenya. The cargoship was declared a total loss after a firebroke out during discharge operations inthe harbour. Among other cargoes, shecarried sodium sulphide.

Sodium sulphide is a flammableand toxic chemical.

The drums of chemicals exploded whilethe fire was raging, spreading flames tothe adjacent hold. The port and local firebrigades tried unsuccessfully to put outthe blaze. Eventually, the ship was movedfrom the quayside out into the fairway,where fire fighting tugs continued topump water into her holds.

CHEM 112, 1982 – USA. Coupled toanother barge, the chemical barge Chem112, fully laden with acrylonitrile, strucka railway bridge, rupturing her cargotanks and igniting her cargo. The blastblew out the windows in the bridgecontrol and the bridge operator, sufferingfrom smoke inhalation, was taken to thehospital.

Acrylonitrile is a chemicalintermediate used in themanufacture of acrylic fibres,plastics and elastomers. It is highlyflammable, toxic and polymerizesviolently. It has a flash point of 0°C,which means that its vapoursbecome flammable at anytemperature above the freezingpoint of water. The vapours alsoburn so rapidly that they appear toexplode, especially in a confinedarea. Acrylonitrile is toxic in bothliquid and vapour forms and can belethal in high concentrations. It hasalso been found to be carcinogenicover long exposure periods.However, no permanent damage isconsidered to be caused by short-term exposures once a personrecovers from the acute exposure.

Immediately following the explosion, thecrew of the other barge uncoupled fromthe Chem 112. Response authoritiesfought the fire on the other barge and letthe cargo of the Chem 112 burn. Twelvefamilies around the area were evacuated.The personnel from the chemicalcompany monitored the atmosphere andthe water. No traces of toxic fumes wererecorded and the evacuees were allowedto return to their homes.




PUERTO RICAN, 1984 – San Francisco,California, USA. The US-registeredchemical tank ship Puerto Rican waspreparing to disembark a pilot about8 miles west of the Golden Gate bridgewhen an explosion occurred in thevicinity of the vessel’s central void spacenumber 6. The main deck over the voidand adjacent wing tanks was lifted up,blown forward and landed inverted overthe central cargo tank. An intense fireerupted and burned out of control forseveral hours. It was discovered later that400–500 m3 of caustic soda solution andsome 200 m3 of alkyl benzene had leaked,creating a flammable mixture, whichignited shortly before the explosion. Thevessel was towed off shore in an effort toavoid polluting the coastline if it sank.Several days later, it broke in two while inheavy seas, and the stern section sank.

Caustic soda in 50% solution iscorrosive and reacts with manymetals (e.g. zinc). generatinghydrogen gas, which is flammableand explosive.

The pilot, a mate and a seaman werethrown overboard by the explosion. Thefirst two were recovered alive, severelyinjured. The seaman was not found. Nopollution was claimed.

ANNA BROERE, 1988 – TheNetherlands. In a collision with anothership, the chemical tanker Anna Broerespilled 547 t of acrylonitrile and 500 tof dodecylbenzene.

Acrylonitrile is toxic, flammableand explosive. When on fire, itgives off toxic fumes.

A 10-mile safety perimeter wasestablished around the ship fornavigation. Unsuccessful attempts weremade to lift the ship whole. It had to becut into two after lightering of its cargo.Environmental monitoring continuedduring the whole operation, which wasundertaken in safe conditions (protectiveclothing and chemical monitoring) over 2months of effective co-operationbetween various teams of theintervention personnel.

Barge ACO-501, 1988 – USA. The tankbarge sank in a river with a cargo of over1,400 t of sulphuric acid. It was intact,with most of the cargo remainingon board.

See Barge AC38 – USA 1976mentioned previously.

Response efforts included the underwatertransfer of the cargo, the salvage of thebarge with some cargo on board and thecontrolled discharge of the cargo into theriver.

SCAIENI, 1991 – WesternMediterranean Sea. On 7 December1991, on its way from Constanza(Romania) to France, the general cargoship Scaieni got caught in a storm east ofSicilia (Italy), with its cargo of 3,057 t ofammonium nitrate. One crew memberwas found dead, ten were missing.

Local and temporary planktonbloom.

No response known.

ALESSANDRO PRIMO, 1991 – Italy.The ship was wrecked in a storm, with594 barrels of acrylonitrile and 3,013 tof dichloroethane.

Acrylonitrile is toxic, flammableand explosive, giving off toxicfumes (HCN) in the event of a fire.Dichloroethane is harmful tohuman health.

The wreck was found 108 m deep by aremote-controlled underwater vehicle.Cargo recovery began 2 months afterthe accident, with priority given toacrylonitrile. In total, 900 t ofacrylonitrile and 2,750 t ofdichloroethane were recovered over3 months, with the advantage of theexperience of the Anna Broere shipwreck.Maximum safety precautions were takenfor recovery workers (fire alarms,emergency training, protective clothingand medical services on site).




CAPE CHARLES, 1993 – PanamaCanal. While cruising the Panama Canal,the crew of the container ship noticed aleakage from tank containers, causingcorrosion to the material of the containerand to the ship’s deck.

The product involved wastrimethylchlorosilane, aflammable, corrosive liquid thatproduces phosgene gas whenignited. The chemical and itsvapours are extremely reactivewith water, producing hydrochloricacid and hydrogen gas.

The ship’s crew was immediately orderedto steer clear of the area of exposure. Thevessel was directed to an anchorage, whilea tug held it in position to keep the crewupwind of the source of release.Responders boarded the vessel to find outthe cause of the release and the conditionof the seeping tank. The tank was found tobe in good condition and could be movedto an isolation area ashore. Flammableand organic vapour readings gave negativeresults. To keep the internal pressure fromincreasing, the tank was protected fromthe sun and continually monitored fortemperature and flammable vapours.

CYNTHIA M, 1994 – Kearny, New Jersey,USA. When the barge Cynthia M, loadedwith 1,200 m3 of caustic soda, was mooredat a landing stage in the south of Kearny,New Jersey, USA, with a list of 70°, shespilled 490 t of her cargo into theHackensack River and the Bay of Newark.

The pH alongside the bargereached 12 very quickly andlowered to 9 three hours later.Only the area in the immediatevicinity of the barge was affectedby the pollution.

No recovery was possible. The dischargeof caustic soda caused a fish kill and thedestruction of the neighbouring marshes.

ALBION II, 1997 – North Atlantic Sea,Bay of Biscay, Brittany, France. Thecargo vessel Albion II broke in two andsank silently off the Bay of Biscay inwaters 120 m deep. Its 25 crew memberssank with it.

The vessel was carrying tendangerous substances, accordingto the IMO code, plus 1,100 t ofpropulsion fuel (IFO 180). Withregard to the chemicals, the mainrisk was related to the 12-bar(120 m of water) resistance of thebarrels containing calciumcarbide. Acetylene could form inthe case of water infiltration,inducing a possibility of ignition.

No response known.

ABDUL RAHMAN, 1997 – off Benghazi,Lybia. On 20 November 1997, theEgyptian cargo vessel Abdul Rahman ranaground off Benghazi (Libya) and wasbadly damaged, spilling 1,500 t ofammonium nitrate, 500 t of ferrosilicon,100 t of caustic soda and 100 t of blackhoney.

The major risk, an explosioncaused by the ammonium nitrate,was averted in the absence of fire.

The pollution was monitored but nospecific action was carried out.

BAHAMAS, 1998 – Brazil. Error in thehandling of the pumping system duringunloading, generating an internal crisis,culminating in a spill of 1,700 t ofsulphuric acid and the ship beingabandoned.

See Panam Perla as follows. Initial errors resulted from the ship’sdilapidated condition, incompetence ofthe crew, lack of means to stock verycorrosive diluted acid, impossibility ofneutralization due to lack of basicneutralizing agent, which led to the acidbeing pumped from the hold anddumped in port as the tide was going out.The court ordered the cargo to bedumped at sea. A 12,000 t lighteringoperation was implemented usinganother chemical carrier. The ship wasthen towed and scuttled in internationalwaters. These various operations took10 months. Chemical monitoring of thepH was carried out. The monitoringshowed some impact on the environment,with direct and indirect reactivation oftoxic metals absorbed in port sediment.




PANAM PERLA, 1998 – Atlantic Ocean.Seep in the double hull of a cargo tankof sulphuric acid (100 t), which was nolonger watertight.

Sulphuric acid is a corrosiveproduct that reacts with water,with a risk of ignition andexplosion (formation ofhydrogen). Harmful to humanhealth. Marine pollutant.

Pumping of the acid was completed oneweek after the leak was reported.Neutralization of the lost acid (3.4 t) wascarried out using bicarbonate.

JUNIOR M, 1999 – Brest, France. On4 October 1999, the Egyptian cargoboat Junior M, transporting 6,900 t ofammonium nitrate in bulk, indicated tothe Maritime Rescue Co-ordinationCentre (MRCC) off Corsen point,Brittany, that there was a water leakagein one of its three holds.

The ship’s pumps were unable todrain the water from the floodedhold. The ship was at a risk ofsinking.

On the orders of the PréfectureMaritime, the ship was towed to Brestharbour master. The risks involved werewell known to the harbour master, fromthe dramatic experience of the OceanLiberty in 1947. The reception operationof the Junior M was built around a safetyarea, where its holds could be flooded if afire started. The ship owner was unable tocarry out the demands of the authoritiesand the ship at the quay was put underthe control of the fire brigade. The waterinflow in one of the holds could not besealed. After an ecological assessment, adecision was made to dump the nitratesolution in the open sea, in batches of400 m3 of solution (120 t ammoniumnitrate each). The dry cargo was sold andthe abandoned ship stayed alongside thequay for 6 years before it could be sold.

MULTITANK ASCANIA, 1999 – NorthSea. On 19 March 1999, while thechemical tanker Multitank Ascania wassailing around the north tip of Scotland,with a cargo of 1,800 t of vinyl acetatemonomer, a fire started in the engineroom. The engine stopped, a fireextinguishing system using carbon dioxidewas activated and assistance was calledfor. The crew was airlifted. The captainfollowed, after having anchored the ship.

Vinyl acetate monomer is highlyflammable, moderately solubleand toxic.

A 5-km diameter temporary exclusionzone was set, requiring the evacuation of600 coastal inhabitants. An assessmentteam went on board the ship thefollowing day and reported that the firewas out. The ship was towed to Lynespier and lightered from its cargo andbunkers. It was then towed on 30 Marchto Rotterdam for repairs.

CASTOR, 2000 – Morocco. MT Castor,under the Cyprus flag, sustained atransversal crack on the main deckduring extreme weather on 30 and31 December 2000. The ship, ladenwith 29,500 t of unleaded gasoline, wasrefused refuge in several harbours andtowed through the Mediterranean Seafor 40 days before cargo transfer waseffected off the Tunisian coast, on 8February 2001.

Many non-aliphatics naturallypresent in gasoline as well as manyanti-knocking additives arecarcinogenic. Gasoline is volatileand could be the source ofpollutant gases: carbon dioxide,nitrogen oxides and carbonmonoxide.

The vessel was ordered to steer well awayfrom several Mediterranean countries’territorial waters. The crew wasevacuated by a Spanish rescue companyand a salvage contractor, hired by theship owner, took control of the ship,under a tug escort. The REMPECMediterranean Assistance Unit (MAU)provided information on responsemeasures to be taken in case of spillageand participated in a meeting onmeasures to be taken in case ofdeterioration of the situation.

MARTINA, 2000 – Öresund. On28 March 2000, in a dense fog, in thenorth zone of the Öresund, the chemicaltanker Martina broke in two in acollision. The aft part sank immediately.The fore part, with 600 t of chlorhydricacid at 30%, followed a few hours later.Only 2 of the 7 crew members weresaved.

Local temporary acidification ofseawater.

After wreck investigation by ROVs on30 March, the bunkers were pumped andthe acid was released in a controlled way.




BALU, 2001 – Bay of Biscay, limit of theFrench and Spanish response waters. Thechemical tanker Balu, transporting 8,000t of sulphuric acid (D, MARPOLcategory Y), sank without sending out aMayday in the Bay of Biscay at a depthof 4,600 m.

When mixed with water, theconcentrated acid releases greatquantities of heat. In shallowwaters, the water can heat up tothe point of boiling. In verydeep waters, the pressure wouldlikely prevent boiling. Whenspilled in large quantities, the acidwould normally sink and then bediluted.

No response known.

BOW EAGLE, 2002 – English Channel.The Bow Eagle collided with a trawler inthe middle of the night, in the EnglishChannel.

The ship was transporting 510 t ofsoya lecithin, 1,652 t of sunfloweroil, 1,050 t of methyl ethyl ketone(MEK), 4,750 t of cyclohexane,3,108 t of toluene, 500 t ofvegetable oil, 2,100 t of ethylacetate, 4,725 t of benzene and5,250 t of ethanol. In total, 200 tof ethyl acetate had leaked fromthe tanker before the chemicalcould be transferred to anothertank. Luckily, there was nosignificant pollution.

The breach was sealed.

CAMADAN, 2002 – south-west of Malta.On 11 March 2002, in a storm, theTurkish cargo vessel Camadan began totake water in off the coast of Malta. Thefollowing day, towing attempts werecarried out without success. The crewwas rescued by a helicopter and the vesselsank with its cargo of phosphatefertilizer.

Local phytoplankton bloom. No pollution response.

FU SHAN HAI, 2003 – Baltic Sea,Sweden. On 31 May 2003, the Chinesebulk carrier Fu Shan Hai collidedwith the Polish freighter Gdynia about40 km south-west of Sweden in thewestern Baltic Sea. It sank in waters68-m deep, from where it began to leakoil.

The ship was carrying 66,000 t ofpotassium carbonate (potash). Ithad bunkers of 1,680 t of heavyfuel oil, 110 t of diesel oil and 35 tof lubricating oil. The responsefocused on oil seeping from thewreck.

Coastal cleaning of the spilled oil. Noaction with regard to the potash.

BOW MARINER, 2004 – off Virginia,USA. The Bow Mariner sank quickly50 miles off the coast of Virginia (USA)to a depth of 80 m following a fire on thebridge and several very severe explosions.Eighteen of the 27 crew members wentmissing during the shipwreck.

The ship was transporting 11,000 tof ethanol.

Given that ethanol is completely solublein water, no containment or recovery wasattempted. No impact study wasimplemented. The only recognizedpollution was that produced by thebunker fuel, 720 t of IFO 380 and 166 tof MDO transported by the vessel for itsuse.

ENA II, 2004 – Germany. On 28 June2004, the German chemical tanker EnaII, loaded with 960 t of sulphuric acid,collided with the container ship PusanSenator when she was carrying outher stowage operation. The collisiondamaged the outer hull of the vessel. Aleak of the pollutant affected 11 sailors(toxic fumes) and killed thousands offish.

See Panam Perla mentionedpreviously.

The pollution was quickly controlledand, after careful investigation, thetanker was refloated without anysignificant leak.




BARGE IN CHOCOLATE BAY, 2005 –Texas, USA. On 15 August 2005, thebarge containing 1,572 m3 of sulphuricacid grounded in the marshy ChocolateBay, Texas, spilling around 1,300 m3.Measurements of the pH around thebarge indicated the presence of sulphuricacid in the water.

See Panam Perla mentionedpreviously.

On 19 August, the acid–water mixtureremaining within the barge was pumpedout of the tanks. The impact wasinvestigated, as the bay constituted animportant natural reserve.

SAMHO BROTHER, 2005 – off

Taiwan, China. On 10 October 2005, thechemical tanker Samho Brother capsizedafter colliding with the Nigerian cargoship TS Hong Kong off the north-western coast of Taiwan, China, andsank 70 m deep, with a cargo of 3,100 tof benzene and bunkers of 85 t of fueland 16 t of diesel.

Benzene is highly toxic for themarine fauna and flora.

There was no evidence of a benzene and/or hydrocarbon leak at the surface. Theauthorities demanded that the shipowner remove the benzene, fuel andother hydrocarbons. The ship owner didnot comply. Two years later, Air Forcebombers made two attempts to explodethe shipwreck, with containment andrecovery vessels standing by. No benzenewas detected later, neither in the air or inthe water nor at the shore.

ECE, 2006 – United Kingdom. On thenight of 30 January 2006, the bulk carrierthe General Grot Rowecki, collided withthe Marshall Islands chemical tanker theEce, on her way from Casablanca(Morocco) to Ghent (Belgium). The Ece,transporting 10,000 t of phosphoric acid,developed a leak and a significant list.She had bunkers with 70 t of propulsionfuel (IFO 180), 20 t of marine diesel and20 t of lubricating oil.

Phosphoric acid is a corrosiveliquid. The main risk for humanbeings is essentially irritation orburns in case of contact with aconcentrated solution. The sameapplies to marine animals. Theenvironmental impact would bemuch localized: phosphoric acidleaking from the wreck wouldacidify the immediatesurroundings and be quicklyneutralized around.

The French regional marine rescue centreco-ordinated the crew rescue operation,which was implemented by the BritishMCA. On 1 February, while on towtowards the port of Le Havre, the vesselsank 70 m deep, 50 nautical miles west ofthe point of The Hague, in internationalwaters. After negotiations, an agreementwas made with the ship owner to removethe hydrocarbons remaining on board thewreck and to release the phosphoric acidunder controlled conditions. This wasachieved with an ROV by 15 September.

GOLDEN SKY, 2007 – Near Ventspilsport, Latvia. On 11 January 2007, theGolden Sky, carrying 24,983 t of“muriate of potash” (potassiumchloride) in bulk, ran aground near theport of Ventspils.

Potassium chloride may beharmful if swallowed, may causeirritation to the skin, eyes andrespiratory tract.

The crew were rescued in a joint Latvian–Swedish operation. The vessel wasrefloated on 16 March.

VOLGONORSK, NAHICHEVAN,KOVEL, 2007 – Black Sea. On 10 and11 November 2007, a severe storm hit theKerch Strait, causing serious damage toaround ten vessels, most of which wereanchored. At least 4 sailors died and 19others went missing. Three Russianvessels carrying sulphur sank in thestrait: the Volgonorsk was shipwreckedand sank to a depth of 10.6 m, with 2,500t of sulphur; the Nahichevan sank to adepth of 9.5 m, with 2,400 t of sulphur;and the Kovel sank almost in the middleof the channel to a depth of 9.3 m, with2,100 t of sulphur.

See SS MARINE SULPHURQUEEN mentioned previously.

No response known.

Letter prefixing MARPOL categories throughout the text indicate the following: D, dissolvers; DE, dissolver-evaporator;E, Evaporator; f, floater; FE, floater-evaporator; FED, floater-evaporator-dissolver; Fp, persistent floaters; G, gas; GD,Gas-dissolver; S, sinker-dissolver; unknown, unknown.


Table 9 Brief description of eight incidents concerning floaters transported in bulk


LINDENBANK, 1975 – South of Hawaii.Grounding on Fanning Atoll, south ofHawaii, with 18,000 t of cane sugar andother foodstuffs on board, including9,500 t of copra, seeds of cocoa beans,palm oil and coconut oil.

Oil impact on the coral reef. Unsuccessful attempts to raise theship from the coral reef. Unloadingof 18,000 t of cargo in the water.Monitoring of the possible impactof coconut oil on the reef.

KIMYA, 1991 – United Kingdom. Facedwith a storm in the Irish Sea on 6 January1991, with a cargo of 1,500 t of sunfloweroil, the Kimya ended up stranded upsidedown close to the island of Anglesey(Wales). Only 2 out of the 10 crewmembers were rescued. Sunflower oilseeps were observed and the whole cargowas spilled over 6–9 months. InFebruary, the wreck was relocated andanchored. In the autumn of 1991, thelocal population observed chewing-gum-like landings on the beaches and highmussel mortality. Scientific studiesestablished that sunflower oil moleculespolymerized under wave action. Once onthe beaches, oil and sand formed awaterproof aggregate, damaging localpopulations. Biodiversity was stronglyaltered. Mussels suffocated after 2 weeksof contact with sunflower oil.Laboratory tests indicated that theinside of the mussel shell lost its pearlycoating and that the outside becamechalky.

Oil impact on the environment. The ship was refloated. Environmentalmonitoring confirmed some impact oninter-tidal populations.

GRAPE ONE, 1993 – United Kingdom.Error while ballasting the ship causedshipwreck, with 3,041 t of xylene onboard.

Moderate pollutant, but veryflammable.

The crew was evacuated and winched tosafety. The ship was stranded andshipwrecked with the cargo in theEnglish Channel.

N° 1 CHUNG MU, 1995 – China.Collision with another ship at theentrance of the port of Zhanjiang.Spill of 230 t of styrene.

Styrene: reactive product(exothermic polymerization),flammable and irritant, with animpact on the environment(tainting fishing and maricultureproducts).

Attempt to limit the leakage and to stopthe spill by intervention of scuba divers.A construction site had to be temporarilyevacuated. Risks concerning the seaenvironment were assessed, as styrenechanges the organoleptic characteristicsof the flesh of fish and shellfish(tainting).

ALLEGRA, 1997 – France. Collisionwith another ship in the English Channelin foggy weather, loss of 900 t of palmnut oil.

Oil impact on the environment. Slick drift monitoring and prediction(observation by air and by sea, positiveuse of remote sensing, French–Britishco-operation). Recovery of oil residueson the coast (12 t).

CHAMPION TRADER, 1998 –Mississippi River, USA. An explosioncaused the release of 460 t of palmoil in the Mississippi river (OSIR,1998).

Oil impact on the environment. The oil drifted 3 km downriver. Only 20 twas recovered.

IEVOLI SUN, 2000 – Channel, France.Faced with a water intake, the chemicaltanker Ievoli Sun was evacuated by itscrew and, while on tow to a port ofrefuge with 6,000 t of chemicals on

The ship had a cargo of 4,000 t ofstyrene, 1,000 t of methyl ethylketone and 1,000 t of isopropylalcohol plus bunkers of 160 t offuel (IFO 180) and 40 t of diesel

It was agreed that the ship owner wouldpump the styrene and fuel and release theMEK and IPA, under the control of theauthorities. The work was completed on31 May, after 51 days of intervention


Table 9 Brief description of eight incidents concerning floaters transported in bulk


board, sank in waters 70 m deep to thenorth of Casquets.

oil. The behaviour of thesechemicals in the prevailingconditions around the wreck wastotally unknown. Experimentswere quickly implemented.

entirely carried out by ROVs, underchallenging conditions.

ICE PRINCE, 2007 – Scilly Isles, UnitedKingdom. The Greek vessel Ice Princesank on 15 January 2007 after gettinginto trouble in severe weather in theEnglish Channel, en route from Swedento Egypt. She was carrying a cargoof 5,260 t of Swedish red and whitewood, 2,000 t of which was on deck.It is believed that the deck cargoshifted in heavy seas, causing the vesselto list dramatically and eventuallysink.

Eleven hours after the incident,a 5-mile trail of wood caused ahazard to shipping in the area.

The wreck was surveyed by the Britishauthorities to assess whether there was ahazard to shipping.

Table 10 Brief description of 13 incidents involving sinkers transported in bulk


GINO, 1979 – off Brittany, France. TheLiberian oil tanker Gino, transporting40,000 t of carbon black from PortArthur (Texas) to Le Havre (France),sank with her cargo at a depth of 120 moff Ushant Island after colliding with theNorwegian oil tanker Team Castor underfoggy conditions. About 1,000 t of oilwas spilled from a damaged tank in theTeam Castor. The highly viscous carbonblack spread along the bottom aroundthe wrecked Gino.

There was a major coastalpollution risk by the oil of theTeam Castor.

Seventeen vessels poured dispersants onthe oil slicks. Observations of thespreading carbon black oil were made bythe French Navy. No recovery wasattempted.

CASTILLO DE SALAS, 1986 – Bay ofGijon, Spain. While at anchor in thewaiting area of the port of Gijon, with100,000 t of coal on board, the ship waswashed by a storm on to a submergedreef and broke in two.

An impact study by the SpanishOceanographic Instituteconcluded that this particulartype of coal was not dangerous forhuman beings or the environment.

The fore part of the ship was towed awayand sunk in high seas. The aft partremained stranded on the submergedrock. Gijon city beaches were repeatedlysoiled by coal dust and pellets mixed withfuel. Landings of coal dust and fuel wererecognized as a nuisance and theauthorities contracted the removal of theship remains. Years later, new oil slickssoiled Gijon beaches and harbour. Theywere traced to the double bottom of theship, left in place as an artificial reef. Thedouble bottom was cleaned by divers, cutinto pieces and taken ashore.

CONTINENTAL LOTUS, 1991 – eastof Malta. On 21 January 1991, en routein the Mediterranean Sea fromMormugao (India) to Genova (Italy),the hull of the Indian bulk carrierContinental Lotus cracked. The ship sank300 km east of Malta Island with itscargo, which was 51,600 tons of iron ore.Four crew members were rescued but12 went missing and 26 died.

No major pollution hazards. No pollution-related responseundertaken.




NORDFRAKT, 1992 – Germany.Shipwreck due to the displacement ofthe cargo, with 1,600 t of lead sulphur.

Potential impact on theenvironment.

Refloating of the wreck and its cargo.

WEISSHORN, 1994 – Spain. On27 February 1994, the cargo vesselWeisshorn, travelling from Thailand andbound for Sevilla with a full cargo of rice,became stranded on a sandbank in theGuadalquivir estuary channel.

Possibility of organic pollution byrotting rice.

No response known.

INFINITI, 1995 – Curaçao. Stranded ina marine park, 400 t of rice spilled.

See Weisshorn mentionedpreviously.

No response known.

FENES, 1996 – France. The bulk carrier,loaded with 26,000 t of edible wheat,grounded in the Lavezzi Island MarineReserve, where it was dismantled bywinter storms, releasing its cargo.

The wheat fermented, producinggaseous products (hydrogensulphide) capable of intoxicatingintervention personnel andgenerating local acidity, which isdamaging to the sessile benthos.

The ship’s fuel and oil were removed. Therotting cargo spilled on the sea bed at adepth of 15–20 m, where it formed a coatup to 2 m deep. It was recognized as apollutant, to be removed and waspumped onto a barge and dumped inthe high sea at a low density. The shipremains were collected and removedduring an 8-month operation.

ANIS ROSE, 1996 – north-east ofSardinia, Italy. On 30 January 1996,during its journey from Durres (Albania)to Sète (France), the cargo of 2,703 t ofchromium ore on board the Syrian vesselAnis Rose shifted transversally. Themovement made the ship capsize andsink. Eight crew members were saved buttwo died and one went missing.

No risk of pollution taken intoaccount.

No response undertaken.

DOGRUYOLLAR IV, 1998 – south ofSardinia, Italy. On 2 February 1998, theTurkish cargo ship Dogruyollar IV wassailing from Canakkale (Turkey) toPorto Vesme (Italy) when the hullcracked south of cape Carbonara. The11 crew members were rescued. The shipsank with a cargo of 2,020 t of zinc andlead concentrates.

No information. No information.

EUROBULKER IV, 2000 – San PietroChannel, Sardinia, Italy. Ship sank in theSan Pietro Channel, with 14,000 t of coalon board.

The San Pietro Channel is anecologically rich area, with bedsof Posidonia oceanica, whichwere affected by mechanicalphenomena (smothering of thevegetation and covering of thesediment).

An environmental impact study wasimplemented by the ItalianGovernment’s Istituto Centrale per laRicerca Scientifica e TecnologicaApplicata al Mare (ICRAM).

CO-OP VENTURE, 2002 – Japan. Theship was stranded; unknown tonnage ofcorn spilled.

See Fenes mentioned previously.Two firemen sent on board diedfrom exposure to hydrogensulphide vapours.

No response known.

ADAMANDAS, 2003 – La Reunion,France. The Adamandas bulk carrier,transporting 21,000 t of deoxidized ironballs, noted an increase in thetemperature of its cargo. It sailed to LaRéunion, as it was the only place in theMozambique Strait where it could seekassistance.

Uncontrollable heating, fire andexplosion.

There was no adequate structure in portand, due to the risks for the population,the authorities moved the ship 10nautical miles away and scuttled it inwaters 1,700 m deep.




TIGER, 2007 – Nador, Morocco. Theship was anchored outside Nadorharbour, with 3,000 t of direct reducediron, when she caught fire and exploded.The REMPEC provided technical adviceon hazards and response.

Explosion. No response known.

Table 11 Brief description of 13 incidents concerning gases or evaporators transported in bulk

Incident Risks/Consequences Response

METHANE PRINCESS, 1965 – locationunknown. Liquified natural gas (LNG)discharging arms were disconnectedprematurely before the lines had beencompletely drained, causing LNG liquidto pass through a partially opened valveand onto a stainless steel drip pan placedunderneath the arms.

A star-shaped fracture appeared inthe deck plating despite theapplication of seawater.

Unknown.

JULES VERNE, 1965 – Arzew, Algeria.Overflowing of an LNG cargo tank.

Fracture of the cover plating ofthe tank and adjacent deckplating.

Unknown.

YUYO MARU N°10, 1974 – Japan. On9 November 1974, the gas tanker YuyoMaru N°10, loaded with 47,000 t ofpropane, butane and naphtha, suffered acollision in Tokyo Bay. The wall of anaphtha tank was breached and naphthaescaped causing a raging fire.

Fire and explosion. The ship was towed out of the bay in asea of flames, with occasional explosions.On 27 November, it was sunk withbombs and torpedoes, south of NojimaSaki. Five crew members of the YuyoMaru N°10 were killed and seven werewounded. All crew members of thecolliding ship were killed except one.

RENÉ 16, 1976 – Port of Landskrona,Sweden. The Belgian tanker René 16was unloading ammonia in port ofLandskrona (Sweden) when an incorrectchoice of hose produced a leak of about180 l into the quay. A large cloud coveredthe vessel and was blown by windtowards a nearby shipyard.

Ammonia vapours are corrosiveand toxic. When the clouddispersed, two members of thecrew were found dead on the quay.

This accident shows the danger of usingincorrect equipment and stresses theimportance of being aware of theproperties of a chemical when handlingit.

AQUARIUS, 1977 – Bontang terminal,Indonesia. During the filling of a cargotank, LNG overflowed through the ventmast serving that tank. The incidentmay have been caused by difficulties inthe liquid level gauge system. Thehigh-level alarm had been placed in theoverride mode to eliminate nuisancealarms.

Unknown. Unknown.

MOSTAFA BEN BOULIAD, 1979 –Cove Point terminal, Maryland. Whiledischarging, a check valve in the pipingsystem of the vessel failed and released asmall quantity of LNG.

Minor fractures of the deckplating.

Unknown.

POLLENGER, 1979 – Everett terminal,Massachusetts. While the vessel wasdischarging LNG at the terminal, theproduct leaked from a valve.

Tank’s cover plating fractured. Unknown.


2.2 IDENTIFIED RISKS

2.2.1 Human health

Risks that affect human health come mainly from reactive substances (reactivity with air, water or betweenthe products themselves). The most significant hazard is clearly visible in the grounding of the Cason(Spain, 1987), with a fire on board a ship carrying a number of toxic and highly reactive flammablesubstances (reactivity of sodium with water), aggravated by the fact that the products’ identity andclassification (IMDG code) were unknown during the first few hours following the accident. The evalu-ation of the chemical risks of ships in difficulty, when they are carrying diverse hazardous substances, is apriority of the response authority (see the MSC Rosa M, France, 1997; the Ever Decent, UK, 1999; theNapoli, the English Channel, 2007).

Table 11 Brief description of 13 incidents concerning gases or evaporators transported in bulk

Incident Risks/Consequences Response

VAL ROSANDRA, 1990 – Port ofBrindisi, Italy. On the night of 28 April1990, the gas carrier Val Rosandra wasdischarging a cargo of propylene in portof Brindisi (Italy) when a fire startedbetween the compressor room and acargo tank.

Propylene is a flammable gas. The ship was towed 10 km away and firecrews doused it with water from a safetydistance of 300 m. After 3 weeks ofsalvage attempts, the vessel was towed50 km off the coast, where a safety zonewas set up. Explosives were used to burnthe remaining propylene and bunker fuelbefore the ship was sunk. Measurementstaken after the incident showed noevidence of pollution in the area.

BACHIR CHIHANI, 1990 – high seas.Inner fracture occurred in the part of theinner hull structure of the 130,000 m3

vessel prone to high stressesaccompanying the complex deflectionsthat the hull encounters on the high seas.

Unstated. Unknown.

IGLOO MOON, 1996 – Key Biscayne,Florida, USA. The gas tanker Igloo Moonran aground, due to an unknown reason,outside Key Biscayne in Florida, with acargo of 6,589 t of compressed, liquefiedbutadiene.

Butadiene is flammable, reactiveand a potential carcinogen. Alsothe ballast water might be a threatto the environment, the area beingpart of a national park.

A hydrographic survey of the area wasdone in order to find the best way tobring another gas tanker alongside theIgloo Moon. The ballast tanks weretreated with calcium hypochlorite inorder not to kill any exotic species.Approximately 1,000 t of butadiene wastransferred by a lightering vessel. TheIgloo Moon then released its ballast waterand was refloated with the flood tide.

NORMAN LADY, 2002 – MediterraneanSea, off Gibraltar. The LNG carrier wasstruck off Gibraltar by a Navy nuclearsubmarine. Minor damage to bothvessels was caused by the submarine’speriscope.

Luckily, the company hadunloaded its LNG cargo inBarcelona.

No response known.

DISHA, 2005 – Dahej terminal,India. While casting off after unloading,in winds over 40 knots, an LNG carriertugboat hit the dolphin piles of the jetty.

Damage to the jetty. Unknown.

GOLAR FREEZE, 2006 – Savannah,Georgia, USA. While discharging its loadat the southern LNG terminal on ElbaIsland, the LNG carrier broke from itsmoorings and pulled away from the pier.

Dock shut down for about36 hours.

The Coast Guard and an LNG engineerfrom the Federal Energy RegulatoryCommission investigated the incident.


Certain substances that are transported in large quantities can pose very serious risks to human health.One-tonne cylinders of chlorine, a highly reactive and corrosive gas, lost by the Sinbad (the Netherlands,1979) is an example of the problems involved in the transportation of chemicals in packaged form. Fumesof epichlorohydrin, leaking from the damaged drums on the Oostzee (Germany, 1989), seriously affectedthe ship’s crew. Years later, cancer, likely linked to the incident, was diagnosed in several crew members andsome of them died soon after.

As far as the transport of chemicals in bulk is concerned, five types of products must be noted as beingparticularly hazardous and reactive:

1. Ammonium nitrate (Grandcamp and Ocean Liberty, 1947) is a highly explosive compound, holdingthe world record for human casualties in a single chemical shipping incident.

2. Acrylonitrile (Alessandro Primo, Italy, 1991; Anna Broere, the Netherlands, 1988) is a toxic product,both flammable and explosive and, in the event of a fire, produces phosgene, a highly toxic gas.

3. Styrene (N° 1 Chung Mu, China, 1995; Ievoli Sun, the English Channel, 2000) can possibly polymer-ize in the form of a violent exothermic reaction.

4. Sulphuric acid leak on board ships (Panam Perla, Atlantic Ocean, 1998; Bahamas, Brazil, 1998)causes risks to the ships themselves, diluted acid being much more corrosive than pure acid. Amixture of acid with water also gives off explosive hydrogen.

5. Vinyl acetate is a flammable and polymerizable plasticizing product. In the case of the MultitankAscania incident (United Kingdom, 1999), the explosion zone was evaluated as 2 km long and 1 kmwide.

2.2.2 Environment

Hazards to the environment are varied and highly dependent on packaging, quantity and time of the year.Examples of particular interest are:

• The almost 200,000 sachets of pesticide (thiocarbamate) lost by the Sherbro (France, 1993) whichdrifted to the coasts of France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, were totally innocuous aslong as the sachets remained sealed. However, they could become a dangerous pollutant should thesachets break open.

• The loss of a 5 t container of lindane (Perintis, France, 1989), similarly innocuous if it remainedtightly sealed, could have been a dramatic source of pollution if it leaked.

• The spill of 1,600 t of lead sulphur (Nordfrakt, Germany, 1992) resulted in an input of lead equal tothe overall amount of the metal over the whole of the North Sea in a full year.

Substances considered as non-pollutants such as vegetable oils (Lindenbank, Hawaii, 1975; Kimya, UK,1991; Allegra, France, 1997) can also lead to the mortality of certain species or to disturbances affectingthe use of local amenities.

Even a substance as inoffensive as wheat, a food product (Fenes, France, 1997), can cause risks. Wheatfermentation in the marine environment, in an anoxic reaction, results in the release of hydrogen sulphur, ahighly toxic gas which makes it necessary for the intervening personnel to wear respiratory protection onsite.


3Case studies

3.1 CONTAINERS AND PACKAGES

Five incidents involving container ships are analysed here:

1. MSC Carla, 1997, wrecked in high seas off the Azores, Portugal, with the loss of 74 containers, onecontaining radioactive cells.

2. MSC Rosa M, 1997, 20° list in the English Channel, with 70 t of HNS on board.

3. Melbridge Bilbao, 2001, Brittany, Molène Island, France, stranded with 218 containers and330 cases.

4. Rokia Delmas, 2006, stranded south of Ré Island with, among other cargoes, containers of cocoabeans.

5. Napoli, 2007, the English Channel, structural failure with 600 containers on board.

3.1.1 MSC Carla

In 1997, the container carrier MSC Carla, sailing off the coast of the Azores in a violent storm, broke intwo. The 34 crew members were safely evacuated. Seventy-four containers of wine, alcohol, flammable andcombustive products, marine pollutants and corrosive substances were lost. The aft part of the ship wastaken in tow, while the fore part sank at a depth of 3,000 m. During towing, it appeared that the ship hadone container on board containing three biological irradiators with their radioactive sources (Cesium137).

Literature research carried out by CEDRE indicated that the container transporting the biologicalirradiators was positioned in the sunken part of the ship. The protective cells of the radioactive sourceswere designed to resist a pressure of 20 atmospheres. Thus, they imploded, while at a depth of some 200 m,when sinking. The French Institute of Protection and Nuclear Security (IPSN) carried out assessments ofthe possible impacts on the fauna in the vicinity of the wreck and on bottom-fish consumers. The greatdepth (3,000 m), the high dilution and the absence of fisheries in the area limited the exposure risk.

3.1.2 MSC Rosa M

In 1997, inadequate tank ballasting in the container ship MSC Rosa M in the bay of Seine led the ship to a30° list off Cherbourg. The ship was beached by the salvors in a shallow bay. The loading plan indicatedthe presence of containers of approximately 70 t of dangerous substances, in particular flammable gasesand liquids, as well as corrosive and oxidizing substances. The ship also contained 2,900 t of fuel oil. The32 crew members were evacuated and taken to the hospital. The risk of pollution of the marine environ-ment required not only full cargo information but also direct observation of the state of the ship and itscargo and a dialogue with the experts and the ship owner. Finally, the contents of the holds were pumpedout and the ship recovered its normal waterlines and was towed at high tide to Cherbourg harbour.

3.1.3 Melbridge Bilbao

In 2001, the container ship Melbridge Bilbao missed the Ushant traffic separation scheme by 17 miles andran aground at full speed on a sandy beach of the island of Molène. It carried 218 containers and 330 caseson board, loaded with 1,078 t of various goods (tobacco, alcohol, telephones, honey, glycerine, metals,

furniture, cigars, a catalyst and empty packages). The catalyst, 17 t in one container, was classified IMDGclass 9. The ship also had 180 t of fuel oil and 60 t of diesel oil on board.

The ship was refloated at high tide and towed to a waiting area in the Bay of Berthaume for inspection byFrench Navy divers before being towed to a dry dock, following verification of the actual hazards associ-ated with the catalyst. Enlargements of a poor-quality photocopy helped in the identification of theshipper of the product, a Mexican company in Ciudad Del Carmen. The photocopy indicated the com-pany’s phone number and qualified the product as “mezcla quimica” (chemical mixture). When thecompany’s office in Mexico opened the next day, CEDRE was able to speak to a competent person andlearnt that the shipment was the return of a rejected French product, with nothing more dangerous in itscomposition than diesel oil as a solvent. Shortly thereafter, the convoy was allowed to enter the Bay ofBrest and the dry dock.

The following day, fuel began to leak from a breach in the ship’s ballast tanks, indicating that the internalpartitions of the double bottom were damaged and that the fuel had circulated between the fuel andballast tanks. The pumping operations to completely clean the ship before repair and the cleaning of thedry dock extended over several days. The duration of these operations, carried out under optimal condi-tions, in a confined space, showed the damage that Molène Island had escaped. Had the ship not beenrefloated immediately, it would have been gradually dismantled by the winter storm, requiring cleaningoperations extending over several months.

3.1.4 Rokia Delmas

On 24 October 2006, at 4 a.m., the container ship Rokia Delmas, faced with an engine failure in a storm,was stranded by winds, currents and waves on a submerged rocky bank, one nautical mile south of Ile deRé. The ship had on board, among other cargoes, containers of cocoa beans, wood and bunkers of 500 tof fuel oil (IFO 380) and 50 t of marine diesel. The crew was airlifted to safety, except the Master and fivecrew members, who remained to assist the salvors with the response measures.

The ship had a breach in the hull and listed at a 20° angle. No pollution was observed, but the marinepollution response plan of Charente-Maritime was activated nevertheless. CEDRE was mobilized and senttwo technical advisers on site. The high-seas oil spill response vessel Alcyon sailed from Brest with con-tainment and recovery equipment. The first investigations showed that it was impossible to refloat thevessel at high tide that evening. The following day, divers detected a 20-m-long breach, confirming that itwould be impossible to tow the vessel in her current state. The Préfecture de département decided to protectthe oyster beds in the area using booms. Two barges equipped with skimmers and with storage capacitywere deployed. On 30 October, 430 m3 of fuel was pumped out of the tanks and stored on the Alcyon. Themain concern then turned to the 300 containers of cocoa beans on board the vessel. Upon request fromthe Préfecture Maritime, CEDRE set up a series of experiments to determine the behaviour of cocoabeans in the event of a loss of the containers into the water. By the third day of immersion, a greatabundance of suspended matter and turbidity were observed in the water. Over time, an increasing propor-tion of beans sank and a white oily film on the surface indicated the release of lipids. Monitoring of thegaseous release showed the generation of hydrogen sulphide by the fermentation of cocoa beans inseawater.

The préfet maritime of the Atlantic Ocean issued an order to the ship owner to remove the wreck and itscargo. Removal of the containers and the cargo of timber began on 10 November 2006. The speed of theoperations was dictated by the sea state. Several openings were made in the vessel to access the variousdecks and to remove the cargo trapped within. Together with the salvage plan, a pollution contingencyplan was established, which consisted of deploying a boom around the entire site and pre-positioning oilrecovery equipment (skimmers, sorbents, booms, etc.). On 9 March 2007, the salvage company began toremove the wreck’s superstructures.

The cutting up and removal of the superstructures continued until September 2007. The hull could not berefloated. It was cut into five vertical sections, which were removed by a crane barge, prior to the finaldisposal at a demolition site. The last section of the hull was hoisted out of the port of La Pallice on 28November 2007. Residual debris was removed and the works were finalized on 19 December.

Case studies 65

3.1.5 MSC Napoli

On 18 January 2007, the British container ship Napoli, en route from Antwerp to Lisbon, was caught in astorm at the entry to the English Channel. She suffered a leak and a failure of her steering system. She wastransporting 2,394 containers, carrying nearly 42,000 t of merchandise, of which some 1,700 t was classedas hazardous substances (explosives, flammable gases, liquids and solids, oxidants, toxic substances, corro-sive materials, etc.). In her bunkers, she held over 3,000 t of heavy fuel oil. The 26 crew members wereevacuated from the vessel by rescue helicopters. The French Préfecture Maritime of the Atlantic Oceanconducted a risk assessment before carrying out a towing attempt on the abandoned ship. CEDREparticipated by carrying out drift predictions in the case of a spill and by analysing the pollution risksposed by the products in the cargo classed as hazardous, selected from a 106-page list, containing up toseven entries per page.

Two types of dangers were examined and discussed: the risks for responders (explosive or flammablesubstances and toxic gases) and the risks for the marine environment (aquatic pollutants and toxic sub-stances for the flora and fauna). The difficulty in examining this type of situation was not so much becauseof the dangers caused by a single product in isolation, for which information could be found in specializedtechnical literature, but rather because of the possibility of interference and reactivity between the prod-ucts. Despite these uncertainties, the risk analysis was carried out in 6 hours and, by midnight, a commit-tee of experts had finalized the hazard assessment, having provided a detailed opinion to the operationalservices of the préfet maritime.

The risk of the vessel breaking during towing could not be excluded. Following inspection, the assessmentteam gave clearance for the Napoli to be towed and a decision was made to head for Portland, on theDorset coast. Over the following hours, the convoy moved out of the French zone of responsibility andrescue management was taken over by the UK MCA. While en route, due to the growing risk of the vesselbreaking up, the convoy was diverted to Lyme Bay, where the Napoli was beached.

In total, 103 containers were lost overboard, with 57 of them being washed ashore, many on the Brans-combe beach. The cargo of motorcycles, wine casks, nappies, perfume, car parts, etc. attracted hundredsof scavengers, despite police warnings that any wreck material recovered must be reported.

In France, packets of chocolate biscuits, made in Turkey and covered in fuel oil, landed on the northernFinistère and Côtes d’Armor coasts over the weekend of 27–28 January 2008. Questions were raised as towhether the packets of biscuits and the fuel oil came from the Napoli. Backtrack drift modelling showedthat this was possible. Samples of the Napoli fuel oil were compared with samples collected on theshoreline. While the analysis was underway, the Turkish manufacturer of the chocolate biscuits was identi-fied on the internet and contacted. The company provided the references of two containers loaded with14 t of the biscuits (200,000 packets). These were the two containers lost overboard at the beginning of theincident. There was no doubt left. Over the following week, local communities from Finistère and Côtesd’Armor, helped by a Civil Protection Response Unit, cleaned up sandy beaches and rocky areas pollutedby accumulations of oiled biscuit packets and patches of fuel oil.

In Lyme Bay, the ship owner unloaded the containers and the fuel from the ship. By the end of March, allthe containers on deck and the fuel oil had been removed. An assessment made at this stage indicatedthat it would not be possible to refloat the vessel with its cargo on board and a decision was made toremove all the remaining containers. The first phase of the removal of the MSC Napoli could then begin.When empty, the ship was cut into two pieces and, in August 2008, the bow section was towed to a yard inNorthern Ireland. The stern section was expected to follow by mid-2009.

Biomonitoring, carried out by the University of Plymouth, was implemented in the bay to assess thegeneral impact of the incident and the particular impact of the ship’s bunker oil.

3.1.6 Experience gained

Considered together, these incidents show that:

(i) We are here faced with a world of extreme diversity in which the initial concern of responders is tolearn the exact location of the containers in/on the ship, the content of each container and the waythat content is packed. This type of information is sought in order to determine whether thecontainer or package would either float or sink if it were to fall overboard and to what extent didthe packaging include a waterproof layer.


(ii) As a consequence of the high diversity of the chemicals present on a vessel, responders have toidentify and quantify both the individual fate of each chemical and the possible reactions resultingfrom the mixing of two or more substances.

(iii) The great majority of chemicals involved in the incidents have only a temporary and localizedimpact on marine life. No follow-up impact studies were implemented in the recorded examplesafter the recovery operations were completed.

3.2 PACKAGES AND/OR CONTAINERS ON FIRE

Two incidents involving packages and/or containers of diverse HNS catching fire are analysed here:

1. Ariadne, 1985, Somalia, stranded and on fire, with 118 containers of hazardous chemicals (includingacetone, butyl-acetate, tetraethyl lead, toluene, trichlorethylene and xylene).

2. Cason, 1987, cape Finistère, Spain, with 22 chemical products and fuel oil, representing 1,000 t ofchemicals, almost 5,000 barrels, cans, containers or bags of flammable products (xylene, butanol,butyl acrylate, cyclohexanone and sodium), toxic products (including aniline, diphenyl methane,orthocresol and dibutyl phthalate) and corrosive products (including phosphoric acid and phthalicanhydride).

3.2.1 Ariadne

While sailing out of the Port of Mogadishu (Somalia), the container ship Ariadne grounded on rocksapproximately 100 m from the shore. She was transporting a cargo of 118 containers of hazardouschemicals, including acetone, butyl acetate, tetraethyl lead, toluene, trichloroethylene and xylene. Attemptsto salvage her failed. As time passed, she continued to list. Part of the deck collapsed and a fire startedabove one of the decks. Toxic fumes and chemical emissions drifted towards the city. The authoritiesordered the evacuation of a number of inhabitants and companies in port area.

The vessel broke in two and large quantities of oil and cargo, including the drums of chemicals, began tocome ashore. A few days later, the rear part of the ship broke off and the vessel began to list at a 90° angle.Despite the lack of protective clothing, an operation was initiated to recover the cargo washed up on theshore.

3.2.2 Cason

While sailing off the coast of Spanish Finistère in December 1987, the general cargo vessel Casonannounced a fire on board and requested assistance. The fire spread and the ship lost control. Despite thefast deployment of the rescuers, 23 of the 31 crew members died. Towing attempts failed, the fire propa-gated and the ship drifted and ran aground on rocks 100 m from the coast, near the town of Corcubion.

The hull was damaged and water penetrated the holds. It was only after grounding that the full diversity ofthe cargo became known. Part of the cargo on deck was being unloaded (orthocresol and formaldehyde)when a series of explosions occurred. Operations were suspended. The complete declaration of the loadinglist disclosed the presence of close to 1,000 t of chemicals on board, including 1,400 barrels of sodium and10 containers of flammable, toxic and/or corrosive chemicals loaded on deck. There were 300 barrels ofbutanol (D, MARPOL category Z), orthocresol (MARPOL category Y), cyclohexane (MARPOL cat-egory Y), aniline, butacrylate (MARPOL category Y) and phthalic anhydride (MARPOL category Y)bags in five cargo holds.

Fifteen thousand people within a 5-km radius were evacuated overnight. This required the mobilization of300 buses. Once the danger of explosion was ruled out, quality control of air, water and marine organismswas carried out in order to evaluate the possible threat to the public and the environment in the affectedarea. The results showed moderate levels of air and water contamination. Continuing bad weather condi-tions facilitated the dispersion and neutralization of the chemicals spilled. Analyses of marine organisms(mussels, barnacles and octopuses) showed no bioaccumulation of aniline nor of orthocresol.

Case studies 67


These incidents show:

(i) The difficulty of responding to a fire on a vessel that is transporting a variety of toxic products andthe importance of having preset access to specific means and personnel for responding in a toxicenvironment.

(ii) The problem of rapidly obtaining a fully detailed list of the products transported and the loadingplan in order to properly assess the dangers for response personnel and the public, expecting littlehelp from crew members, who are unaware of the full nature of the products being transported, arenot trained in first response in the event of an incident and can easily become the first victims.

(iii) The challenge of evaluating the environmental damage and assessing the related impact on eco-nomic activities (especially fishing and aquaculture) following a major chemical spill.

3.3 MINERAL CHEMICALS TRANSPORTED IN BULK

Five incidents involving chemicals obtained from non-oil mineral sources are described:

1. Ocean Liberty, 1947, Brest, France: 3,158 t of ammonium nitrate

2. Cynthia M, 1994, Kearny, New Jersey, USA: 490 t of caustic soda

3. Albion II, 1997, off Brest, France: 114 t of calcium carbide

4. Balu, 2001, Bay of Biscay, Spain: 8,000 t of sulphuric acid

5. Adamandas, 2003, La Reunion, France: 23,000 t of deoxidized iron balls

3.3.1 Ocean Liberty

When the Ocean Liberty’s cargo of 3,158 t of ammonium nitrate started burning after mooring in Brestharbour, and after a series of small explosions, the Master of the bulk carrier wanted it towed out of theharbour immediately. The operation was undertaken. But a huge explosion occurred half-way out, killing26 people, causing hundreds of casualties and blasting 4,000–5,000 houses and downtown buildings. Inthese circumstances, water pollution was not a concern and the impact on marine life was not studied.

3.3.2 Cynthia M

When the barge Cynthia M, loaded with 1,200 m3 of caustic soda, was moored at a landing stage in thesouth of Kearny, New Jersey, USA, with a list of 70°, she spilled 490 t of her cargo in the HackensackRiver and the Bay of Newark. The pH alongside the barge reached 12 very quickly and came down to 9three hours later. The pollution only affected the area in the immediate vicinity of the barge. No recoverywas possible. The discharge of caustic soda caused a fish kill and the destruction of neighbouring marshes.

3.3.3 Albion II

When the cargo vessel Albion II broke in two and sank silently off the Bay of Biscay at a depth of 120 m,its 25 crew members sank with it. The vessel was carrying ten dangerous substances, according to theIMDG Code, plus 1,100 t of propulsion fuel (IFO 180). With regard to the chemicals, the main risk wasrelated to the resistance to the pressure of the barrels containing calcium carbide: they must have implodedat a depth of 120 m, with the formation of acetylene and possible ignition. For the phenol, lead oxides,naphthalene, caustic soda, camphor, iodine, resins, solids and paints on board, the potential risk was likelyquite limited in terms of space and time.

3.3.4 Balu

When the chemical tanker Balu, transporting 8,000 t of sulphuric acid, sank in the Bay of Biscay, at adepth of 4,600 m, the concentrated acid diluted in water, releasing significant quantities of heat. In shallowwaters, this could have brought the water on site to boiling. However, as the ship sank in very deep


waters, the pressure likely prevented this from occurring. Spilled in large quantities, the acid would sinkand become diluted in the water. The product is miscible in water in any proportion and would becomecompletely diluted in the long term. No response was possible.

3.3.5 Adamandas

In 2003, the Adamandas bulk carrier, transporting 21,000 t of deoxidized iron balls, noted an increase inthe temperature of its cargo. It sailed to La Reunion, France, as this was the only place in the area where itcould seek assistance. It did not have the authorization to berth and remained in Possession Bay to air itsholds and to evacuate hydrogen by natural ventilation. This proved insufficient in cooling the cargo.Deoxidized iron balls tend to reoxidize, releasing heat and hydrogen in contact with air or humidity. This iswhy loading of this type must be carried out with significant caution, i.e. dry loading into clean, water-tight, nitrogen-saturated holds. The principal risks are explosion, if hydrogen is produced and not properlyventilated, and weakening of the ship’s structures if exposed to heat.

In this case, the authority in charge moved the ship 10 nautical miles away from Pointe des Galets and,after having evacuated the crew, scuttled the ship, sinking it at a depth of 1,700 m.



(i) Responders may be faced with families of chemicals presenting very different characteristics anddangers.

(ii) The most aggressive acid or soda may cause dramatic damage at high concentrations and generate atoxic cloud. These chemicals, however, are fully soluble in seawater and present a hazard notbeyond some tens of metres to some hundred of metres from the spill source.

(iii) Some chemicals, such as ammonium nitrate, generate very different hazards in air and water. In air,ammonium nitrate is a potent explosive and, as a result, a major risk for populations around. Inwater, it is a fertilizer, hypothetically capable of generating, depending on the area and season,either a small, localized phytoplankton bloom or a major bloom, the consequences of which maybe of considerable importance.

(iv) Metals, such as deoxidized iron balls, can produce an exothermic chemical reaction in air that couldbe immediately stopped in water.

3.4 EDIBLE OIL TRANSPORTED IN BULK

Vegetable oils are classified as Fp (floating persistent). According to the SB Code, they are included in thecategory Y of appendix II of MARPOL. They were not considered as dangerous in the marine environ-ment until January 2007, the date of entry into force of the new IBC Code. Since that date, vegetable oilshave been recognized as being in category Y, i.e. “liquid substances which are deemed to present a hazardto either marine resources or human health or cause harm to amenities or other legitimate uses of the seaand therefore justify a limitation on the quality and quantity of the discharge into the marineenvironment”.

Some information of interest was collected on two incidents involving food products, namely:

1. Kimya, 1991, Irish Sea: 1,500 t of sunflower oil

2. Allegra, 1997, the English Channel, France: 900 t of palm kernel oil

3.4.1 Kimya

The Kimya incident is an interesting example of a chemical polymerizing in seawater: the sunflower oilmolecules polymerized under wave action and, once on the beaches, the polymerized oil and sand formed awaterproof aggregate, imprisoning wildlife.

Case studies 69

Near the wreck, mussels died by suffocation. Also, Mudge et al. (1993) showed that certain moleculesof the sunflower oil’s fatty acids (linoleic, oleic and palmitic) accumulated in the flesh of the mussels in a3-km radius around the wreck.

3.4.2 Allegra

On 1 October 1997, off the coast of Guernsey in the English Channel, the Liberian tanker Allegra wasinvolved in a collision and subsequently spilled 900 t of palm kernel oil. The oil solidified quickly, formingan 800 m × 400 m slick. The slick continued to spread and broke up into a series of slicks extending over anarea 20 km long and 4 km wide. Part of the solidified oil came ashore on the Channel Islands and on theCoast of the French Cotentin, where it beached at the high water mark. It was made up of margarine-likerubbery balls (5–50 cm), with a spongy yellow core and a whitish crust.

The slicks were tracked over the next 2 days by French Customs and British Coastguard remote sensingaircraft using airborne sideways-looking radars, housed in pods under the fuselage. Recovery tests wereundertaken with surface trawl nets. This spill would have been of paramount importance had it occurredin summer, as one can easily imagine the social impact of wide-scale landings of “margarine” balls on thebeaches at the height of the summer season.

The main difference between this spill and a crude oil spill was that palm oil is solid at room temperature.Three factors were investigated: slick drift, physical and chemical changes to the oil and oil dispersionpatterns in the marine environment. The locations of the slicks, as indicated by the remote sensing aircraft,were compared with computer-generated predictions designed for oil spills. However, the computermodelling did not appear to be suited to dealing with this kind of oil, due to its solid state.

Oil samples were collected both from the sea and from the beaches in order to investigate the effect ofwater on the product. Upon investigation, no change in the physical properties of the oil was observed.Small-scale testing was conducted at CEDRE in a bid to simulate the spill. The oil solidified almostinstantaneously into very small particles, only a few millimetres in diameter, which later aggregated into“margarine” balls, 5–10 cm in diameter. The testing showed that the oil dispersed naturally in the watercolumn, which may well explain why a large quantity of the spilled oil seemed to have disappeared. A post-spill research programme subsequently elucidated the fact that the physical state of the oil is of crucialimportance when a spill occurs. The drift of the slick, surface behaviour patterns and response equipmentand methods are radically different for solid and liquid pollutants.

The example of the Allegra incident is a good illustration of the fate of vegetable oil at sea. There was nosignificant impact on wildlife. Twenty-six tonnes of solid pellets was collected from the beaches by hand, afast and low-cost option. On the whole, some 870 t of oil disappeared, constituting, to some extent, both asource of consumable lipids for the marine flora and fauna and a potential threat, as the degradation ofpalm kernel oil is likely to produce compounds such as alkanes, esters, aldehydes or alcohols (Hui, 1992),some of which are harmful for the marine fauna, such as pentane and hexanal (CDCP, 2002).

The very large quantity of oil not recovered remains unexplained. Degradation by bacteria is a possibleassumption. Studies carried out in the laboratory on soybean oil and samples of palm kernel oil from theAllegra highlighted this bacteriological degradation. Marine bacteria preferentially break down poly-unsaturated fatty acids (C18:2, linoleic acid, in both cases). The kinetics of degradation of the oleic acid(C18:1) is slower. The bacteria first break down palmitic acid (C16:0), with a shorter chain, and then thestearic acid (C18:0), whose degradation starts later (Le Goff, 2002). The same results were obtained inseawater by Hui (1992) in experiments on the degradation of vegetable oils in the atmosphere.



(i) Accidental release of edible oil in the open sea generates highly visible drifting slicks that arequickly dispersed in high-energy water bodies and have no measurable effect on the ecosystem. As aresult, no incident studied involving edible oil was the source of a major environmental, humanhealth or economic problem.


(ii) However, the same release in a shallow bay may result in the destruction of coastal habitats andhamper beach usage by mankind.

3.5 EDIBLE SOLID SINKERS IN BULK: WHEAT, RICE, ETC.

Within the framework of the international marine pollution conventions, food products, such as wheat,corn and rice, are not regarded as marine pollutants. When an incident occurs involving a ship carryingsuch products, the pollution concern is initially centred on the fuel and oils of the vessel. Preventing fueland oil from being released or, if released, from drifting on the sea surface and impacting fishing, fishfarming and the coastline is the priority of the first response measures. There is a general belief that a foodproduct spilled at sea will be good food for marine life. It is only in the second phase, when it remainsuneaten and starts rotting, that concern extends to its degradation products.

Some information of interest was collected on two incidents involving solid food products, namely:

1. Weisshorn, 1992, stranded with a cargo of rice near the mouth of the Guadalquivir estuary

2. Cargo vessel Fenes, 1996, stranded on Lavezzi islands, Corsica, France, with 2,700 t of wheat onboard

3.5.1 Weisshorn

On 27 February 1994, the cargo vessel Weisshorn, coming from Thailand, with a full cargo of rice andbound for Sevilla, became stranded on a sandbank in the access channel to the Guadalquivir estuary. Theship could not be moved from its position. It was left spilling its cargo and was dismantled over time bywinter storms. No monitoring of the possibility of organic pollution by the rotting rice was undertaken.

3.5.2 Fenes

The majority opinion is that cereals, such as rice, wheat and corn, are not sources of pollution for thepopulation or the environment. But a massive discharge of cereals in a marine area, remaining mostly inplace, smothering the sessile fauna and marine flora of the zone and rotting on site, presents particularchallenges to responders.

The release of 2,600 t of edible wheat from the Fenes, stranded in a late 1996 storm on one of the Lavezziislands (Bonifacio Strait, Corsica), is an example where pollution was generated not by the product spilledbut by its transformation through the rotting process. It showed that a massive discharge of cereals in amarine area can be far less complex and offensive than it first appears, and can force response authoritiesto face complex challenges they had not originally imagined. Two months after the incident, decom-position of the organic matter occurred, resulting in an exothermic reaction, creating exceptionallyfavourable conditions for the development of sulphate-reducing microflora. This microflora contributedto the degradation of the organic matter on site, with significant production of hydrogen sulphide, a toxicgas, which forced the response personnel to don respiratory protection equipment.


These incidents show that:

(i) While an accidental release of edible grain in the open sea and/or in high-energy areas has nomeasurable effect, the same release in a shallow bay may result in the destruction of the bottomflora and the sessile fauna, which are buried under a thick coat of the organic product.

(ii) With time, an organic product in the form of a thick layer on the sea bottom may rot and releasehydrogen sulphide, creating the need for an exclusion or protection area around the wreckage.

3.6 NON-EDIBLE SOLID ORE IN BULK: COAL

Some information of interest was collected on two incidents involving coal transported in bulk:

Case studies 71

1. Castillo de Salas, 1986, Bay of Gijon, Spain: 100,000 t of coal

2. Eurobulker IV, 2000, San Pietro Channel, Italy: 14,000 t of coal

3.6.1 Castillo de Salas

When the Castillo de Salas sank in a storm in 1986, while in the waiting area of Gijón Harbour, the forepart was towed away to be sunk in high seas, but the aft part remained stranded on a submerged rock halfa mile off the San Lorenzo beach, the largest Gijon city beach. During the following months, the SanLorenzo beach was regularly soiled by coal dust and pellets mixed with fuel. Although an impact studyconducted by the Spanish Oceanographic Institute concluded that this particular type of coal was neitherdangerous to human beings nor to the environment, this repeated nuisance led the authorities in charge tocontract the removal of the ship remains, except for the compartmented double bottom, which was left inplace to become an artificial reef after all accessible fuel was pumped out. This solved the problem of coalpollution, but not that of fuel pollution.

Sixteen years later, the double bottom began, once again, to release fuel. In the end, it had to be thor-oughly cleaned, cut into pieces and removed. In this incident, the pollution due to coal was mostly visual,affecting an amenity beach, with no assessed consequences on local flora and fauna.

3.6.2 Eurobulker IV

The coal carrier Eurobulker IV sank in the San Pietro Channel (southern Sardinia) in 2000. The channel isrecognized as an ecologically rich area, with beds of Posidonia oceanica. These were not affected bychemical contamination of the water column, but mainly by mechanical phenomena (smothering of thevegetation, abrasion of the leaves and covering of the sediment) related to the coal. Chemical analyses ofthe heavy metal content of the coal were carried out. However, the wreck lay in a zone of chronic heavymetal contamination by industrial wastes and it proved impossible to determine the exact origin of thedetected chemical compounds.


Considered together, these two incidents show that:

(i) Spilled coal has no demonstrated toxic or coating effect on waterfowl and marine life, except whenin a thick layer.

(ii) Coal dust stranded on an amenity beach is unacceptable to the public, but pollution risks andresponse after a coal spill remain far less important than the risks and response related to the ship’sbunkers.

3.7 HNS IN BULK FROM OIL DISTILLATION

Eight incidents involving HNS obtained through the cracking (distillation) of crude oil and transportedin bulk have, to some extent, been documented:

1. Brigitta Montanari, 1984, Adriatic Sea, Yugoslavia: 1,300 t of vinyl chloride monomer

2. Anna Broere, 1988, North Sea, the Netherlands: acrylonitrile

3. Alessandro Primo, 1991, Adriatic Sea, Italy: 3,013 t of 1,2-dichloroethane and 549 t of acrylonitrile

4. N°1 Chung Mu, 1995, access to the port of Zhanjiang, South of China: styrene monomer

5. Ievoli Sun, 2000, north of Batz Island, France: styrene, methyl ethyl ketone, isopropyl alcohol

6. Bow Eagle, 2002, off Sein Island, France: ethyl acetate and cyclohexane

7. Bow Mariner, 2004, Virginia, USA: ethanol

8. Samho Brother, 2005, Western Pacific Ocean, Taiwan: benzene


3.7.1 Brigitta Montanari

The Brigitta Montanari, a chemical tanker was transporting vinyl chloride monomer, or VCM (FE,MARPOL category Y), when she sank in the Adriatic Sea in 1984, in 82 m of water. VCM is an extremelyflammable gas, forming an explosive mixture with air. It is a carcinogenic substance. The assumption thatthe cargo tanks were not damaged made it possible, some 3 years later (in August 1987), to refloat the shipand to pump out the VCM. A leak of the VCM was, however, detected at the beginning of the operations.Were there to have been a massive release of the VCM, the refloating would have become very dangerous.

In order to prevent that risk, a hole was bored in the bridge, through which the VCM was released on anestimated basis of 3 t per day. A concentration of more than 5 µg/l was measured in the water column upto 300 m from the wreck. Most of the chemicals solubilized quickly in the sea water. Following severaldays of release, the divers connected PVC tubes to the previously made holes and released the VCM at thewater surface, where it either dispersed in the atmosphere or burned. The ship was re-sunk to a depth of 30m and the 700 t of the product still on board was pumped out and transferred to another chemical tanker.

The biological monitoring of the benthic communities of the contaminated area started later (1987),including examination of histopathologies and biochemical tests. The results showed no acute toxicity ofthe organisms sampled near the wreck.

3.7.2 Anna Broere

The Anna Broere, carrying acrylonitrile, sank in the North Sea at a depth of 30 m, 50 miles east ofYjmuiden (near Amsterdam) following a collision with a container ship. When released in the environ-ment, acrylonitrile evaporates, producing a flammable and explosive cloud. In the event of a fire, itproduces phosgene, a highly toxic gas. The ship could not be left on site. It was refloated over the next73 days, of which only 25 days were suitable to carry out the work, due to poor weather conditions.

The response operation was done properly and correctly. The costs were much greater than expected, butthis was mostly due to the bad weather conditions. The 200 t of acrylonitrile that leaked out did causedamage to the marine biota, but with significantly less impact than anticipated. As the concentrations ofthe pollutant were continuously measured, no unnecessary risks were taken by the rescue personnel.

3.7.3 Alessandro Primo

The Alessandro Primo sank to a depth of 108 m in the Adriatic Sea, 30 km of Molfetta (Italy) with 3,013 tof 1,2-dichloroethane (SD, MARPOL category Y) and 549 t of acrylonitrile (MARPOL category Y)on board. The position of the wreck made it non-refloatable. Five days after the sinking, acrylonitrileconcentration rose to 2.7 ppm, in the water directly above the wreck. A rapid intervention was needed tostop, or at least reduce, the diffusion of the substance.

This operation was carried out by an underwater team of divers and the residual product remaining in thetank was recovered. The acrylonitrile leak was stopped by fitting special joints on the valves of the affectedtank and by coating the supports with a special epoxy resin. Once the urgent matter had been dealt with,a cargo recovery project was set up and implemented by expert salvors. Some 900 m3 of acrylonitrile andseawater was recovered, along with 2,750 t of dichloroethane.

At that time, the operation was the first of its kind in the world.

3.7.4 N°1 Chung Mu

On 9 March 1995, the N°1 Chung Mu, a chemical tanker built in 1994 and loaded with styrene monomer,suffered a collision with the cargo boat Chon Stone N°1 in the access channel to Zhanjiang’s Harbour(Southern China). When the two ships collided, 230 t of styrene monomer was spilled at sea. The breachwas immediately sealed by divers using wooden plugs; however it is likely that some styrene continued togradually leak out.

When immediate human health risks had been eliminated (styrene vapours are neurotoxic), the risks to thesea environment were assessed by the change in the organoleptic characteristics of the flesh of fish and

Case studies 73

shellfish. Styrene monomer is moderately toxic for aquatic life and bio-accumulates only to a small extentin the environment.

The Chung Mu was immobilized by the authorities and was ordered to provide a significant bank guaran-tee because of the potential damage to aquatic species. The P&I Club insurers contracted CEDRE to carryout two missions in China, in order to assess the damages caused. This estimation allowed the P&I Club tocome to an agreement with the authorities on the release of the ship against a deposit of a reasonable bankguarantee.

3.7.5 Ievoli Sun

In 2000, while in tow to a port of refuge, the chemical tanker Ievoli Sun sank to a depth of 70 m in thenorth of Casquets, France, with 6,000 t of chemicals on board. The crew was evacuated in time. The cargoconsisted of styrene (4,000 t, FE, MARPOL category Y), methyl ethyl ketone (1,000 t, DE, MARPOLcategory Z) and isopropanol (1,000 t, D, MARPOL category Z). There was also 160 t of fuel (IFO 180)and 40 t of diesel oil on board. The behaviour of these chemicals in the prevailing conditions aroundthe wreck was unknown. Experiments were quickly implemented at CEDRE to determine the behaviourof the products and their effect on marine species. These studies made it possible to identify the risk ofstyrene polymerization, to evaluate the feasibility of controlled release of methyl ethyl ketone andisopropanol, and to study the exposure of marine organisms to styrene.

This illustrated the need for a good knowledge of the characteristics and behaviour of the chemicals inseawater in order to intervene effectively and safely in the event of an accident. In this case, it was agreedbetween the French and British authorities and the ship owner that the ship owner would pump the styreneand fuel and release the methyl ethyl ketone and isopropanol under the control of the authorities. Theoperations began on 12 April 2001 and allowed the recovery of 3,012 m3 of styrene and heavy fuelremaining in the ship. The work was completed on 31 May, after a 51-day response carried out entirely byROVs, under challenging sea conditions and in strong currents.

3.7.6 Bow Eagle

In 2002, the Norwegian chemical tanker Bow Eagle, transporting 510 t of soya lecithin (Fp, MARPOLcategory Y), 1,652 t of sunflower oil (Fp, MARPOL category Y), 1,050 t of MEK (DE, MARPOLcategory Z), 4,750 t of cyclohexane (E, MARPOL category Y), 3,108 t of toluene (MARPOL category Y),500 t of vegetable oil FA201 (Fp, MARPOL category Y), 2,100 t of ethyl acetate (DE, MARPOL categoryZ), 4,725 t of benzene (E, MARPOL category Y) and 5,250 t of ethanol (D, MARPOL category Z), enroute to Rotterdam, reported a breach on its port side to the MRCC of Jobourg, France, following acollision with a trawler in the middle of the night. The trawler sank quickly and 4 of the 9 crew membersdied. Two hundred tonnes of ethyl acetate had leaked from the tanker before the chemical could betransferred to another tank and the breach could be sealed.

One can imagine the effect on the coast or in a harbour entry from a wrecked vessel carrying a cocktail ofnine different food products and chemicals such as that in the Bow Eagle, two of which are considered tobe severe pollutants (benzene and toluene). Luckily, no notable pollution was observed.

3.7.7 Bow Mariner

The Bow Mariner sank quickly 50 miles off Virginia (USA) to a depth of 80 m after a fire on the bridgeand several severe explosions. It was transporting 11,000 t of ethanol (D, MARPOL category Z). Eighteenof the 27 crew members went missing during the shipwreck and only three bodies were recovered. Giventhat ethanol is completely soluble in water, no containment or recovery was attempted nor was any impactstudy implemented. The only recognized pollution was that produced by the 720 t of IFO 380 and 166 t ofMDO transported by the vessel for its use.

3.7.8 Samho Brother

On 10 October 2005, the chemical tanker Samho Brother, registered in South Korea, capsized aftercolliding with the Nigerian cargo ship TS Hong Kong off the northwestern coast of Taiwan, China,


sinking in 70 m of water, with a cargo of 3,100 t of benzene and bunkers of 85 t of fuel and 16 t of diesel.The 14 crew members were successfully rescued by the Taiwanese Coast Guard. There was no evidence ofa benzene and/or hydrocarbon leak at the surface of the sea.

Water and air samples were collected and analysed daily. The authorities demanded that the ship ownerremove the benzene, fuel and hydrocarbons. The ship owner did not comply and, 2 years later, it wasdecided that the ship should be detonated. After looking at various options, the idea of using explosiveseither placed by divers or delivered via torpedo shot from a short distance was rejected and bombing wasidentified as the preferred method.

On 27 October 2007, an Air Force F16 carrying four bombs made two attempts to explode the shipwreck.Twelve boats and ten oil recovery vessels were standing by in the surrounding 10 nautical mile area to dealwith emergencies. Two more explosion attempts were made by army helicopters. Despite these efforts, theSamho Brother suffered only some damage in the hull. No benzene was detected in the air or water or atthe shore.



(i) A number of spilled oil distillate chemicals are not recognized as carcinogens or as marine pollu-tants but can evaporate to form a moderately toxic gas, often capable of producing a flammableand/or explosive mix in air. As a result, the major risks to be accounted for are fire and explosion onboard or a toxic cloud downwind of the ship.

(ii) Most of these chemicals have no demonstrated toxic or coating effect on waterfowl and marinelife, except when in a thick layer. In fact, little is known about the actual marine pollution effect ofmost of these substances. As a consequence, the general rule is, to the extent possible, to recoverthem and to voluntarily release the smallest possible quantity.

(iii) For ships carrying different products in different tanks, products that are soluble in seawater arecustomarily released at sea in controlled conditions, accepting that some minor and temporarypollution is acceptable, while responders focus on the more dangerous chemicals and products.

(iv) Fuel and lubrication oils on board always receive full attention as the most dangerous chemicals inthe cargo. Whenever possible, they are recovered.

Case studies 75

4Return of experience

4.1 DANGER IN AIR

4.1.1 Explosion

The Grandcamp and Ocean Liberty incidents, with respective tolls of 600 and 26 human lives plus 3,000and several hundred injured, are the two most obvious demonstrations that a fire in a chemical cargo cangenerate a massive explosion with dramatic consequences, at a distance of 1 km or more from the source.

The Adamandas is an example of a drastic response to the risk of explosion in a harbour, i.e. the towing ofthe ship and the voluntary sinking, together with its cargo, in high seas. However, such extreme situationsrepresent less than 7% of the incidents.

Human casualties and evacuations have also taken place in a few oil spill incidents. The human casualties’record is held by the collision, on 10 April 1991, of the Moby Prince ferry with the Agip Abruzzo oil tanker,at anchor outside Livorno harbour. Hitting the tanker by the bow, the ferry caused a breach in the wall ofa cargo tank, which became engulfed in a ball of fire. All except one of the 141 passengers and the crew onboard the ferry died. Not all the deaths were caused by the fire. A large number of the victims died as resultof inhalation of toxic fumes and smoke while they were gathering in the main internal room of the ship.There were no casualties on board the tanker.

Second, in terms of casualties, comes the explosion of the oil tanker Bételgeuse at Bantry Bay terminal(Ireland) on 8 January 1979, resulting in the loss of 50 lives, mostly crew members and family and 8terminal workers.

The largest evacuation operation involving a tanker on fire, with a risk of explosion, took place inLa Coruna, Spain, in December 1992, when several hundred inhabitants of the neighbouring homes wereaffected by the fire and smoke from the oil tanker Aegean Sea’s burning cargo. The vessel had missed theport entrance and broke up on the rocks of the Roman tower point.

On the whole, ammonium nitrate involved in a fire has demonstrated a higher killing and injury capacitythan oil. It can therefore be said that there are HNS that are more dangerous than oil, in terms of fire andexplosion hazards.

4.1.2 Toxic cloud

The Multitank Ascania, the Ariadne and the Cason incidents are demonstrations of evacuations of coastalpopulations implemented in the face of the threat of a toxic cloud, ranging from 200 people for theMultitank Ascania incident to 15,000 evacuated overnight in the case of the Cason. The Ievoli Sun is anexample of air pollution monitoring undertaken to protect the public and with a view to being preparedfor an emergency evacuation.

There are many mentions of local citizens complaining of dizziness and headache after smelling crude oilvapours in spill response reports, at significant distances from the spill site (up to 30 km in the case of theAmoco Cadiz). There are also frequent interrogations, in reports of spill response investigation commis-sions, on the potential long-term effects of human exposure to oil vapours. But, for the time being, oilspills are not considered as sources of dangerous vapour clouds and oil pollution contingency plans do notinclude evacuation plans.

However, the 14 August 2003 spill of the Tasman Spirit oil tanker, stranded at the entrance channel toKarachi harbour (Pakistan), has generated many claims of throat, respiratory and digestive problems,including vomiting and diarrhoea, related to inhalation of oil vapours. Children were reportedly particu-larly affected. This may be the first oil pollution incident ever to generate investigation into the actualdanger of inhaling oil vapours.

However, for the time being, the danger of a toxic cloud is the only concern for chemical spill responders.

4.2 DANGER IN WATER

4.2.1 Coastal waters

The Lindenbank, the Kimya, the Allegra, the Champion Trader, the Castillo de Salas and the Eurobulker IVspills are examples of coastline pollution from a floating chemical or from coal dust.

The Sherbro and the Napoli incidents are examples of the coastline being affected by the strandingof thousands of sealed plastic bags containing a pollutant (pesticides) or manufactured food products(chocolate biscuits).

None of these incidents generated damages nor response needs comparable with those of a major oil spill.As a consequence, it can be said that the danger of coastline pollution is a far greater concern for oil spillsthan for HNS spills.

4.2.2 Open seas

The Brigitta Montanari, the Alessandro Primo, the Anna Broere, the Cynthia M, the Bow Eagle and theFenes all generated some marine pollution. However, the pollution remained localized and was not con-sidered of such importance as to justify an impact study comparable with those implemented following anoil spill.

As a consequence, it can be concluded that the danger of marine pollution is a far greater concern for oilspills than for HNS spills.

4.3 RESPONSE TIPS

Response measures undertaken obviously differ according to the conditions of the incident, the spilledchemical and the risks involved. It is, however, possible to show a certain number of significant and/orspecific elements in chemical incidents at sea.

4.3.1 Information on the ship’s cargo

Information on the cargo used for the evaluation of chemical risks is of primary importance before anyoperational decision is taken, especially when the ship is carrying a wide variety of chemical products inpackaged form. Information concerning the cargo is not always immediately available, as shown in the caseof the Cason and, to a lesser extent, in the Ever Decent and Napoli incidents. The method of loadingcontainers is also to be taken into account, although the rules are not always respected (MSC Rosa M).

The evaluation of the chemical risk involved is an essential element that relies on national chemicalemergency centres (British for the Multitank Ascania; French and British for the Ievoli Sun and Napoli)and on co-operation with the chemical industry (Sherbro and Sindbad) as well as on international co-operation (Princess of the Stars). The value of a specialized intervention team to deal with chemical riskswas underlined in the UK by the Multitank Ascania incident and was recommended by the French inquirycommission after the MSC Rosa M incident.

Return of experience 77

4.3.2 Ship crew response

Initial response actions can be carried out by the ship’s crew, whose effectiveness depends on the profes-sional competence of the sailors and officers. It may be excellent, as seen during the Multitank Ascaniaincident before the ship was abandoned. It may be non-existent, as seen in the Ievoli Sun incident, in whichno crew member attempted to help the response team of the préfecture maritime, either by taking withhim, when evacuated, the computer record of the cargo, or by returning on the vessel to guide the team. Itcan be disastrous, as seen in the unloading of sulphuric acid from the Bahamas.

External response assistance is, nevertheless, needed. Several incidents (e.g. Multitank Ascania and RosaM) show the importance of the actions undertaken during emergency towing. Delays in the transportationof response resources and bad weather conditions can have extremely serious effects on the efficiency ofthe planned operations (Cason). In a port, the facilities available to lighter a chemical tanker in difficulty,whether on shore or on board, are not always anticipated, as shown in the transfer of a cargo of sulphuricacid from the Bahamas.

4.3.3 Response tools

In this appendix, specific or non-specific tools used in chemical incidents are also mentioned. Differentways of dispersing a chemical pollutant in water and in air are used to evaluate the risks to human healthand the impacts on the marine environment (Anna Broere and Alessandro Primo), as well as the differentways in which floating objects or products drift (Sherbro and Allegra).

Remote sensors, normally used for the detection of oil slicks, are also effective when monitoring drifts ofvegetable oil (Allegra). An evaluation of the state of the shipwreck (Alessandro Primo) or a search forspilled products, such as cylinders of chlorine (Sinbad ), can be conducted by underwater remote-controlled vehicles or by sonar.

Fires on board chemical tankers require specific safety measures, taking into account the risk of explosion.A remote evaluation of hot points by an infra-red camera was used during the incident of the MultitankAscania.

4.3.4 Response personnel

The toxic effects of a chemical can be extremely harmful to response personnel during the response phase(wheat fermentation and the production of hydrogen sulphide during the recovery operation of the cargoof the Fenes) or in the long term and may involve medical monitoring over several years (exposure of thecrew of the Ootzee to toxic fumes of epichlorohydrin).

The response on board a ship in difficulty often involves a large quantity of very specialized equipment.The environment is highly unsafe, necessitating protective clothing, monitoring of any contamination,emergency procedures and means of evacuation (Anna Broere, Alessandro Primo and Ievoli Sun).

The efficiency of the response action depends on the competence of each member of the personnelinvolved and on the co-ordination of operators. Experience gained from the response on the wrecked AnnaBroere to recover acrylonitrile proved useful some 3 years later for a similar operation on the wreckedAlessandro Primo. The response to the Multitank Ascania incident was made much easier by a pollutionresponse exercise on chemical risks that had been conducted two weeks earlier.

4.3.5 Communication

Communication is extremely important during chemical incidents. This applies first, on an operationallevel, between responders (the lack of dialogue between the captain of the Bahamas and the Rio GrandeBrazilian port authorities had a disastrous effect).

It also applies to communication with the public, always very anxious about chemical risks, as shown bythe incidents of the Cason and, to a lesser extent, of the Fenes and the Rosa M. This particularly applies toenvironmental impact, necessitating the monitoring of the quality of the environment and a study on theeffects of the pollutant on the flora and fauna. Such monitoring is equally necessary for substances


considered as non-pollutants such as vegetable oils (Kimya). Indirect effects on the environment must alsobe considered, as in the remobilization of toxic metals absorbed in sediments, due to a decrease in the pHcaused by an acid spill (Bahamas), or the production of hydrogen sulphide as a consequence of wheatfermentation by sulphate-reducing bacteria (Fenes).

Return of experience 79

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denmark_sea_03/index.html.Hadden, R., F. Jervis and G. Rein, 2009. Investigation of the Fertilizer Fire aboard the Ostedijk. Fire Safety Science

9: pp. 1091–1101. doi:10.3801/IAFSS.FSS.9-1091. http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/2518.HELCOM, 1991. Manual on Co-operation in Combating Marine Pollution within the framework of the Convention on

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Are HNS Spills more dangerous than oil spills

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