1 f e‘- , ,

ARCHIVE tati,-

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NATIQHALWARC-

DIEN BIEIO PEU 1954, TFsT OFFENSIV3 1968, & CLADSEWITZ:

AN ANALYSIS

CORE COURSE TWO ESSAY

A

A

LTC JOHN R. COMBS/CLASS OF 95 COURSE 2: FOUNDATIONS IN MILITARY

THOUGET AND STRATEGY SEMINAR A COLONEL BRUCE A. HARRIS COLONEL HARRY E. ROTHMANN Jr.

Report Documentation Page Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering andmaintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, ArlingtonVA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if itdoes not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 1995 2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED 00-00-1995 to 00-00-1995

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Dien Bien Phu 1954, TET Offensive 1968, & Clausewitz: An Analysis

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319-6000

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT see report

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

18. NUMBEROF PAGES

12

19a. NAME OFRESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT unclassified

b. ABSTRACT unclassified

c. THIS PAGE unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

CA

h

e

Fc

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTfOp

TO: PRESIDENT, NATIONAL

Washington

1 March 1968

MEMORANDUM NO.

WAR COLLEGE

SUBJECT: Analysis of Dien Bien Phu and THT Offensive of 1968

xx

1. Enclosed is a tm&anscript of the president's memorandum to the NSC. Reguest you assign as you deem appropriate. Suspense back to this office is NLT 3 March 1968. - -& --&,I X3

‘<> 2. Pull Text of President Johnson's handwritten note to National Security Advisor:

--.g --; .

"I am getting more and more heat over this THT Counter- Offensive that the VC [Vietnamese Comnists] launched against our boys earlier this year, The press is referring to it as 'our Dien Bien Phu.' What I remember about Dien Bien Phu is that the French got their tail kicked and gave up North Vietnam to the communists. In THT we took some losses, but we surely didn't leave with our tail between our legs. And we are still there. What am I missing?

Also the press keeps referring to and quoting Clausewitz. Hell, I even got a copy of his book - hard as hell to read, much less understand.

BOTTOM LINE - I need an honest, close hold, assessment of any linkage between DBP [Dien Bien Phu] and THT- Also need some info on what this Clausewitz is trying to say.

Couple of points - Don't send me in some highfalutin doctoral thesis from one of the whiz kids. Likewise, don't try to distill it down to one of those half page executive summaries I hate to get. Get one of those faculty at the NWC to do it - hell, better yet get a student to do it. I'm liable to: (1) get it sooner and (2) get what 3 asked foq, not what you all think I want to read."

(signed)

LBJ

3. Point of contact - Executive Secretary, National Security Council.

h

h

P.

h

h

rc

combs 1

IHTRODUCTIOIO: In response to the President Johnson's request,

enclosed is a comparative analysis between the French defeat at

Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the recently concluded 'PET Offensive of

1968, hereafter referred to as "TET 68," in South Vietnam. On

the tactical level of war the two operations could not be more

dissimilar. The former was an outright tactical defeat of a

French strong point by Vietminh, while the latter was a

defeat of a large number bf South Vietnamese Communists by the

U.S. Forces. However, it is on the strategic level of war, in

support of strategic national policy formulation and execution,

that the lessons of Dien Bien Phu and TET 68 merge.

BACXGROUND: This section will provide a brief historical

background on the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the recent TET

68 Counter-Offensive and an overview of Clausewitz.

The French had been embroiled in Indochina since the end of

the Second World War. In March of 1945, Vietnam, the largest and

most traditionally independent territory in French Indochina,

declared its independence.l In the fall of 1953, the French

Commanding General in Indochina began a fateful operational

mission to force the Vietminh to come to a classic decisive

battle. Known as the Navarre Plan, the French established moles

d'anzarzages or "mooring points," from which they could fight the

'Melaine Billings-Yun. Decision Acrainst the War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954. (New York: Columbia Press, 1988) 2.

h

*

5 -.

e

h

h

dh brawn to support the attack. The contributions of these

F

combs 2

Vietminh in what is now North Vietnam-l One of the mooring

points was located at Dien Bien Phu. The French, hoping to lure

the Vietminh into a classic set piece, large-unit battle,

believed that Dien Bien Phu would be the linchpin.

Dien Bien Phu, located in a broad valley, offered the

French both strat position and proximity to two -.=

airfields that would support armor and airforce reinforcements in 1-z

its defense. The location of Dien Bien Phu was approximately

ten to twelve kilometers from the crests of surrounding

mountains. The key French assessment was that for the enemy to

employ artillery, it would have to be on the front slopes and,

therefore, quickly silenced by the superior French artillery

counterfires and/or airstrikes. In addition, the French

believed that the Vietminh could not move a sufficient enough

force, much less keep it logistically supplied,

threaten Dien Bien Phu.

into the area to

The Vietminh, under the command of General Vo Nguyen Giap,

moved more than thirty-three battalions (49,500 combatants) and

55,000 support troops into the area surrounding Dien Bien Phu.

Also, over 100,000 transport workers provided the logistical

'Stanley K. Karnow. Vietnam - A Historv (New York: Penguin Books, 1984) 205.

'William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981) 158.

c

A

c

c

h

combs 3

transport workers cannot be overemphasized; they transported

hundreds of artillery pieces, over two hundred miles on the Ho

Chi Minh trail, literally piece by piece. On 13 March 1954, Giap zTj

attacked.

The devastating effects of the Giap's artillery destroyed

both the airfields at Di& Bien Phu and the French artillery.

Giap's soldiers dug miles of extensive trenches to cover their

approach and to protect them from the superior French firepower

during the attacks on the French defenses. The French attempted

to reinforce Dien Bien Phu by air with both soldiers and

supplies. However, the combined effects of the weather and

Vietminh anti-aircraft fire made the effort futile. In spite of

56 days of incredibly heroic actions by her defenders, on 7 May

the French outpost at Dien Bien Phu fell. The French loss

included 1,500 killed, 4,000 wounded and over 10,000 captured.

The Vietminh lost an estimated 10,000 killed and 15,000 wounded.*

At the tactical level, the recently concluded TET 68

offensive bears little resemblance to the French defeat at Dien

Bien Phu. The South Vietnamese Communists suffered overwhelming

losses in their attacks without achieving any significant

tactical advantage or victory. Our abilities to mass and to

reinforce, where necessary, turned the initial surprise and local

gains secured by the South Vietnamese Communists into defeat.

'Duiker 161-162.

CL .

combs 4

A

P

h

The repeated references to "Clausewitz" by the press refers

to Carl van Clausewitz, 1780-1832, a Prussian-born, BLilitary

theorist. Clausewitz wrote the frequently quoted, and less

fully understood, On War, between 1836-1832. One of the key

aspects of Clausewitz's work lies in his attempt to outline the

fundamental nature of war. He, moreover, is one of the first

military theorists to late that "War, therefore, is an act

of policy.... The political object is the goal, war is the

means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in

isolation for their purpose.as

AWAIJYSIS: The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, while tactically

*

n

h

F

*

disastrous, transcended to a strategic failure of the French

national strategy policy in Indo-China. The French government,

or more accurately governments, never clearly articulated to the

military or to the French people the end-state of their political

or military efforts in Vietnam. Clausewitz reminds us time and

again that war is:

a remarkable trinity - composed of primordial violence hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.6

Although the trinity can be focused through military

operations as the French and the United States did, the critical

'Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 87.

'Clausewitz 89.

b

combs5

aspect is the will of the people and/or the government within the

trinity to contiuue with a military strategy in the execution of -7 national policy. That will failed in both the French Government

and in the French people. - -3

‘4% - JT

The French Government's failure was due to its inability to

h

articulate a clear naTi&&al policy with an attainable end for the

military to execute. mTg'French military, in part due to the -

-3 _ 42s

vacillating, inconsistent or simply non-existent political z :y -;

policy, carried on a military strategy of attrition with little

substance in the form of strategic goals.

Failing to articulate the French national interest at

stake in Indo-China, the French government could not sustain the

will of the French people. The French did attempt to garner

popular support through the institution of a national &aft to

support the war. However, as the war losses mounted, compounded

by the extended duration of the war, the French populous grew

weary of supporting a colonial military entanglement that

consistently took a toll on its most precious treasure - its male

youth. Interestingly, the French losses at Dien Bien Phu

amounted to less than four per cent of their total force in all

of Vietnam, yet it was a stunning strategic defeat.

The United States appears to be on the same road of

ambiguity with respect to national policy goals. Articulating

n

0 -- c

-n

n

h,

h

Combs6

the rationale for fighting in Vietnam is becoming increasingly

difficult. The press continue to report our losses and our

apparent inability to bring stability to the South Vietnamese

government and/or to control the counter-insurgency operations

going on in South Vietnam. While we have likewise been

supporting the war with the &aft, we have failed to stiffen our _ &d

resolve by mobilizing 1 Guard or Reserve Forces to support

our operations in So&h Vietnam. We, as the French before us,

are resolved to suffer the slow bleeding of a nation. But,

unlike the French, our bleeding will be portrayed in the media

each day in seemingly more graphic detail.

Whether or not the North Vietnamese Communists are aware of

it, the press will wittingly (or unwittingly) be the gateway to

our Nation's will. Like the French, our will, or the lack

thereof, has become our center of gravity. Clausewitz defines

the center of gravity as "the hub of all power and movement, on

which everything depends."' The support of the American people

is critical to our mission in South Vietnam. Should we lose that

support, and it appears that we are doing so, our fate in Vietnam

will be compared to that of the French in 1954. Our center of

gravity is weakened by our inability to extricate ourselves,

militarily or politically, from this quagmire. Whatever the

moral impetus, it may be that, as General George C. Marshall

reflected at the end of World War 11, "a democracy cannot fight a

'Clausewitz 595-596.

combs 7

h

P

h

n

h

Seven Years War."'

We, like the French, are enamored with the sophistication of

technology over the moral aspects of war. While not discounting

the technological advantage we possess over our adversary, we are

embroiled in an counter-insurgency war and are hoping that high ai.

technology will overt moral aspects of the battle.

Clausewitz states th& "will is a moral guautity . . . audcanuot

be classified or couuted."' He further believes that %ritics

usually exclude all moral qualities from strategic theory, and

only examine material factors."1° Without the will to use our

technological advantage in Vietnam, specifically in North

Vietnam, that advantage alone will not prevail. Quantitatively,

there is no doubt that we should be winning the war in South

Vietnam - so why aren't we?

coWCIDWsIOW: The comparison between Dien Bien fhu and TET 68 is

at the strategic level. The French experience in Vietnam and,

specifically, in the battle of Dien Bien Phu underlines the

basics of Clausewitz's military theory. The French military

attempted a military solution without a coherent national policy

*Maurice Matloff, "Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945," Makers of Modern Strateuv: From Machiavelli to Nuclear Aue ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) 681.

'Clausewitz 184.

laClausewitz 178.

.

A

. . e

n

h

n

.

h

Combs8

as a foundation. In doing so, they failed to grasp that the will

of the French people and government was vital to their mission. --

- The Vietminh took advantage of the opportunity created by the

tactical defeat of Dien Bien Phu and turned it into a French

strategic defeat. The Vietminh struck the Rench center of

gravity - the French national will. Like the French, the United

States finds itself ng-term cummitment to which waning

national interest will3npact on our national will. - -2, *I&

The United States has embarked on the same course set by the

French over 20 years ago. Clausewitz said that "war is an act of

force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that

force".%l The act of force must be toward a goal, otherwise it

is merely action for action's sake. 3owever, Clausewitz warus us

that in some instances "the political objective will not provide

a suitable military objective. In that event, another military

objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose

and symbolize it in the peace negotiations"." Without strategic

goals or a clear idea of the political end-state, militaries

throughout the ages have always defaulted to the destruction of 2:. 1 the enemy forces as the military end-state. While often

successful, history is replete with the military's ability to win

the war tactically, coupled with the nation's ability to lose the

peace strategically. For if the United States continues on its

A

%lausewitz 77.

l*Clausewitz 81.

.

combs 9

n

current course of a war of attrition, we run the risk of failing

to link the means (railitary) effectively with our goal

(national policy) to create au end in Vietnam. Clausewitz's

writings, while over 130 years old, still ring txue today.

A

-e

c

h

F

D the less iuteuse the motives, the less the military eiGe&s natural teudency to violence coincide with political directi\lles. As a result, war will be driven further from its%kural course, the political object will be more and morecat variauce with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict wil1 seem increasingly political in character.--

REC~EfDATIoIo: We must articulate an attainable political

policy objective in South Vietnam. We must translate that

political policy objective into a strateuic military policy in

Vietnam.

F

f3Clausewitz 88.

h

cc

6

P

Billings-Yun, Melanie. Decision Auainst War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954. New York: Columbia Press, 1988.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On Wal;, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Duiker, William J. T e onmtunist Road to Power in Vietnam. Boulder CO: We&i: Press, 1981.

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A Historv. New York: Viking Press, 1983.

Hhong, Yuen Foong. &&cries at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and The Vietnam Decisions of 1965. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Palmer, Bruce, Jr. The 2%Year War: America's Militarr Role in Vietnam. Lexington, HY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984.

Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Stratecrv: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Aae, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Roy, Jules. The Battle of Dienbiennhu, trans. Robert Baldick. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.

Summers, Harry, G. Jr. On Strateuv: A Critical Analvsis of the Vietnam War. Navato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982.

United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The Battle pf Dien Bien Phu. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1968.

h