Arcadia Report on International Legal Precedents on The ......precedents on customary land tenure by...

INTERNATIONALLEGALPRECEDENTSONTHE

PROTECTIONOFTHERIGHTTOCUSTOMARYTENURE

FrancisGimaraandZacharyLomoArcadiaAdvocates

International precedents on the protection of the right to customary land tenure – Arcadia Advocates Revised Report to Trócaire – Uganda, 22 July 2017

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COVERPAGEPICTUREACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Thecoverpagepicture:SOURCE,IRINNEWS:

http://www.irinnews.org/report/95322/uganda-land-disputes-threaten-northern-peace.

19April2012


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TableofContents

COVERPAGEPICTUREACKNOWLEDGEMENT....................................................................................................iiTABLEOFACRONYMS.......................................................................................................................................................iTABLEOFCASESANDLEGISLATION.......................................................................................................................ii1 EXECUTIVESUMMARY............................................................................................................................................11.1 MajorFindings....................................................................................................................................................11.2 Recommendations............................................................................................................................................3

2 BACKGROUND.............................................................................................................................................................42.1 TermsofReference...........................................................................................................................................42.2 KeyconceptsandTerminologies................................................................................................................42.2.1 Internationallegalprecedent..............................................................................................................52.2.2 Customarylandtenure...........................................................................................................................5

2.3 METHODOLOGY.................................................................................................................................................72.4 LandtenuresystemsinUganda:anoverview......................................................................................8

3 INTERNATIONALLEGALPRECEDENTSONCUSTOMARYLANDTENURE....................................103.1 RecognitionofCustomaryLandTenure................................................................................................103.2 TheDutyofStatestoProtecttherightstoCustomaryLandTenure........................................18

4 TREATYANDDECLARATORYBASEDPROTECTIONOFCUSTOMARYLANDTENURE............204.1 TreatyBasedProtectionofCustomaryLandTenure......................................................................204.1.1 TheILOIndigenousandTribalPeoplesConvention...............................................................204.1.2 AfricanCharteronHumanandPeoples’Rights(ACHPR).....................................................214.1.3 InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR).............................................22

4.2 Declarations.......................................................................................................................................................234.2.1 TheUnitedNationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples(UNDRIP)......23

5 CHARACTERANDSTATUSOFCUSTOMARYLANDTENURE...............................................................245.1 TheStatusofCustomaryLandtenureinInternationalLaw.........................................................245.1.1 Customarylandtenure,colonialism,andthedoctrineofterranullius...........................255.1.2 InternationalLawandIndigenousCustomaryLandTenure...............................................26

5.2 CharacterandStatusofCustomaryLandTenureinDomesticLaw..........................................285.2.1 CustomaryLandTenure:RecognisedbutDistortedandrelegated..................................285.2.2 TheAuthenticNatureofAfricanCustomaryLandTenureandLaw................................36

6 CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS..................................................................................................47


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6.1 Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................................476.2 Recommendations..........................................................................................................................................48


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TABLEOFACRONYMS

ACHPR AfricanCharteronHumanandPeoplesRights

ACHPR AfricanCommissiononHumanandPeoplesRights

ACtHPR AfricanCourtonHumanandPeoplesRights

CCJ CaribbeanCourtofJustice

CRC ConventionontheRightsoftheChild

FAO FoodandAgriculturalOrganisation

IACHR Inter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights

IACtHR Inter-AmericanCourtonHumanRights

ICJ InternationalCourtofJustice

ICCPR InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights

ICERD InternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination

ILO InternationalLabourOrganisation

JASLF JointAcholiSub-regionLeaders’Forum

UNDRIP UnitedNationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples


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TABLEOFCASESANDLEGISLATION

INTERNATIONALCASES

AfricanCommissionforHumanandPeoplesRightsvRepublicofKenya,ApplicationNo.006/2012

TheMayagna(Sumo)AwasTingniCommunityvNicaragua,Inter-Am.CtH.R.(Ser.C),No.79/2001.MayaLeaders&OthersvTheAttorneyGeneralofBelize,CCJAppealNoBZCV2014/002.YakyeAxaCommunityvParaguay,(2006)Ser.C.No.142.

DOMESTICCASES

UGANDA

KampalaDistrictLandBoardvVenansioBabwayaka&Others,SupremeCourtAppealNo2

of2007.

KampalaDistrictLandBoard&AnothervNationalHousing&ConstructionCorporation,Civil

AppealNo2of2004.

TifuLukwagovSamwiriMuddeKizza&Nabitaka,CivilAppealNo.13of1996.

PaulKisekkaSsakuvSeventhDayAdventists,CivilAppealNo8of1993.

MarkoMatovu&2OthersvMohammedSseviirand2Others,CivilAppealNo7of1978.

BalamuBweitegaineKiiza&IsmaRubonavZephaniaKadoobaKiiza,CivialAppealNo59of

2009.

SOUTHAFRICA

Alexkor&theRepublicofSouthAfricavRichtersveldCommunity,(CCT19,03)[2003]ZACC

18;2004(5)SA460(CC).


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LEGISLATION

BOTSWANA

TheTribalLandsAct,Chapter32:02of1968

KENYA

LandAct,No.6of2012

TANZANIA

TheLandAct,No4(Chapter113)of1999.

TheVillageLandAct(Chapter114),1999.

UGANDA

TheConstitutionoftheRepublicofUganda,1995.

TheLandAct,Chapter227.


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1 EXECUTIVESUMMARY

1. Thisreportpresentsthefindingsofareviewofinternationallegalprecedentsonthe

protectionoftherighttocustomarylandtenure.Inaddition,itpresentsrecommendations

for both government of Uganda and other key stakeholders onwhy and how customary

land tenure as practiced by certain communities in Uganda, especially the Acholi in

NorthernUganda,maybeprotectedasacollectiveandindividualrighttoproperty.

2. Themajor findings and recommendations are summarised in subsections 1.1 and

1.2.Section2ofthereportexplainsthebackgroundtotheassignment–describestheterms

of reference and clarifies the key concepts and terms used in the report. Subsection 2.3

explains themethodology andmethods of data collection; an overviewof land tenure in

Uganda is provided in subsection 2.4. Section 3 discusses some key international legal

precedents on customary land tenure by international human rights courts and key

internationaltreatiesanddeclarationsoncustomarylandtenurearedescribedinsection4.

Section5concludesandgivessomerecommendations.

1.1 MajorFindings

3. First,therearenoexplicitinternationallegalprecedentsinthesenseofdecisionsof

an international court, as opposed to regional courts, on the protection of the right to

customarylandtenureasunderstoodinthisreport.

4. Second, international regional judicial andquasi-judicial bodieshaveunequivocally

recognised and affirmed the customary land tenure of indigenous and aboriginal peoples

butnotofpeopleandcommunitiesnotclassifiedasindigenousoraboriginalsuchasmost

thepeopleofUganda,savetheBatwawhoformerlylivedintheBwindiimpenetrableforest

inwesternUganda.

5. Third,internationalregionalhumanrightscourtsandeconomiccommunitycourtsof

justice have held that customary land tenure as practiced by certain communities in the

countries they live in is a tenure that is equal to other tenure systems and must be

protectedbytheState.Theabsenceofregistrationofcustomarylandtenuredoesnotmake

itinferiortootherformsoflandtenuresuchasleaseholdorfreehold.


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6. Fourth,incountrieswerecustomarylandtenurehasbeenexplicitlyprotectedbythe

constitution, international regional human rights courts have held that that gives rise to

collective and individual property rights for the communities that practice it within the

meaningoftheprovisionoftheconstitutionwhichguaranteestherighttoproperty.

7. Fifth, international regional human rights courts have held that where customary

land tenure is notprotectedby the constitution, the Statehas aduty toensure that it is

protectedandregistered.

8. Sixth,internationalregionalhumanrightscourtshaveheldthatStateshaveadutyto

consultwithindigenouscommunitiesthatpracticecustomarylandtenureandobtaintheir

free,prior,andinformedconsent,pertheircustomsandtraditions,beforeittakestheirland

foreconomicdevelopmentactivities.

9. Seventh,thelegalprecedentssetbyinternationalregionalhumanrightscourtsthat

recognise the right to customary land tenure and the customary law that regulate it are

narrowlyfocusedonindigenouspeoplesasdefinedininternationallegalinstruments.

10. Eighth,internationallawandcolonialismcontributedtotheerosionanddistortionof

customary land tenure in Sub-Saharan Africa. Post-colonial African States entrenched the

distorted and inferior status of customary land tenure and law in legal framework they

inheritedfromcolonialpowers.

11. Ninth, someAfrican countries have recognised customary tenure in their lawsbut

restricteditsscope,therebyperpetuatingitsinferiorstatus.

12. Courts in Uganda have not robustly engaged with customary land tenure, as for

example,theirSouthAfricancounterparts.Wherecustomarylandtenureissuesarisebefore

thecourts, thefocus isnarrowlyonprovingthatsuchacustomon landrightsexist inthe

particularcommunitywherethedisputedlandislocated.


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13. Thereare treatybasedprotectionsof the right to customary land tenure, suchas

theILOIndigenousandTribalPeoplesConventionof1989(No.169)andtheConventionon

the Protection of Biodiversity but these instruments are narrowly focused on indigenous

peoples.

1.2 Recommendations

14. AmendArticle237of theConstitutionandSections1, 3, 8 and27of the Land

Act,1998,asamended,toexplicitlyprovidethat:

14.1. land under customary land tenure in Ugandan communities is an

intergenerationalasset;

14.2. customary land ownership is on the notion of ancestral ties between the land

andthepersonwhowasbornthereandremainsattachedtheretoandmustone

dayreturnhithertobeunitedwithhisorherancestors;

14.3. customary land tenure is equal in validity and weight to other forms of land

tenure,evenwhereitisnotregistered;

14.4. customary land tenure can give rise to both individual and collective property

rightsprotectedbytheConstitutionofUganda;

14.5. anylandtenuremaybeconvertedfromonecategorytoanother;

14.6. customary law is an original and independent source of norms within the

Ugandanlegalsystem;

14.7. vests landmanagement in the three-tier communitymechanisms – the family,

clan, and community are best suited to handling all land matters in each

community;and

14.8. customarylandtobesurveyed,delimited,anddemarcated.


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15. Train judges and lawyers in Uganda on the authentic character and nature of

customarylandtenureandlaw.

2 BACKGROUND

16. This study derives from the terms of reference explained in subsection 2.1 and is

partofabroaderprojectoftheJointAcholiSub-RegionalLeadersForum(JASLF).TheJASLF

rolledoutapilotprojectontheprotectionofrightstocustomarylandtenureinAcholiLand

in 2015. The project is funded by the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), and

implemented through Trócaire, Uganda. The project aims to, among other things,

investigateexistingandpossiblelegalmechanismstosecurecustomarylandrightsinAcholi

land.

17. Thekey termsandexpressionsuponwhich thestudywas framedareexplained in

subsection 2.2 and the methodology, i.e., the underlying theoretical assumptions and

methodsofdatacollectionareexplicatedinsubsection2.3.Abriefoverviewoflandtenure

inUgandaisprovidedinsubsection2.4.

2.1 TermsofReference

18. ArcadiaAdvocateswascontractedbyTROCAIREUgandatoundertake“deskresearch

oninternationallegalprecedentsforprotectingrightstocustomarylandtenure”andbased

onitsfindings,suggest“recommendations/advocacypoints/policyoptionsforgovernment

andotherkeystakeholders.”

19. Thisreportisakeydeliverableinfulfilmentofthetermsofreference.

2.2 KeyconceptsandTerminologies

20. The key terminologies used to framework the activity of this consultancy,

internationallegalprecedent,customarylandtenure,andassociatedtermsareclarified.


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2.2.1 Internationallegalprecedent

21. Alegalprecedentisacourtcreatedlawandtracesitsorigintothecommonlawlegal

system.It issometimesreferredtobyitsLatinarticulation,staredecisiswhichmeansthat

‘priordecisionsaretobefollowed,notdisregarded’1or‘tostandwithdecidedmatters.’2A

legal precedent generally sets a new point of law that has never been considered by

previousjudicialdecisions.

22. In this report, international legal precedent means decisions of international and

regionaljudicialbodies,suchastheInternationalCourtofJustice(ICJ),theAfricanCourtof

HumanandPeoplesRights (ACtHPR), the Inter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights (IACtHR),

andtheCaribbeanCourtofJustice(CCJ)thatsetnewrulesorpointsoflawonthecharacter

andscopeofcustomarylandtenureandlaw.

23. The decisions of quasi-judicial international human rights bodies, such as

international human rights commissions, e.g., the African Commission on Human Rights

(ACHPR) that set new legal ground on the questions about customary land tenure as

practiced by various communities, including indigenous peoples, are also treated as legal

precedent.

24. International agreements or treaties that address the question of customary land

tenurearenot,technically,legalprecedentasunderstood.

2.2.2 Customarylandtenure

25. Customary land tenure, as used in this report,means a systemof land ownership

and use based on the customary law of a given community, whether rural or urban, in

Uganda.

24.1. Theconceptsofownershipanduse insuchcommunitiesoftendonothave

the same meaning as in western, especially English land law, which is defined by the

1 See, e.g., Herman Oliphant, ‘A Return to Stare Decisis’ (1927) 14 American Bar Association Journal 71, at p. 72. 2 See, e.g., Paul M. Perell, ‘Stare Decisis and the Techniques of Legal Reasoning and Legal Argument’ (1987) 2 (2), Legal Research Update 11, as reproduced with permission by The Canadian Legal Research and Writing Guide, online:< http://legalresearch.org/writing-analysis/stare-decisis-techniques/>.


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customs and traditions of the English people. It is often forgotten that ‘leasehold’ and

‘freehold’ are land tenure systemsbasedon English customand law. Theonly difference

withAfrican customary land tenure and law is that the former are reduced towritingon

paperwhilethelatternot.

24.2. Insomeofthecommunities,suchastheAcholiofnorthernUgandaandthe

KakwaandLugbaraofWestNile,forexample,ownershipanduseoflandisnotafunctionof

occupation in the sense of physical presence as required by English land law. Thus, a

communitymayownvasttracksoflandonwhichtheydonotphysicallyliveorevengrow

crops but still own it because they use it for other livelihood activities such as hunting,

grazing, and collecting a variety of herbs and foods and have the right to exclude other

people,notmembersoftheircommunity,fromaccessingandharvestingresourcesonthe

land.

24.3. CustomarylandtenureinbothruralandurbanareasofUgandaisregulated

bythecustomarylawofeachcommunity,whichprovideforbothcommunalownershipand

subdivisions based on clan, family, and the individual is in perpetuity. Ownership of land

undercustomarylawofbothruralandurbancommunitiesinUgandaisnotatomised,i.e.,

individualisedinthesenseoftheEnglishorAmericansystemorcommonlawsystem.

26. Thus,customarylandtenureandthecustomarylawofmanycommunitiesinUganda

are intertwined.Boththetenuresystemandthe lawsandnormsofthecommunitiesthat

regulatethemarenotstatic;theyareorganicandevolve.

27. This report adopts the position of the South African Constitutional Court onwhat

constitutesthecustomarylawofagivencommunity,namelythatit ‘isnotafixedbodyof

formally classified and easily ascertainable rules’ because ‘[b]y its very nature’ customary

law ‘evolves as the people who live by its norms change their patterns of life.’3Thus,

customarylaw‘isasystemoflawthatwasknowntothecommunity,practisedandpassed

onfromgenerationtogeneration.Itisasystemoflawthathasitsownvaluesandnorms.’

3 Alexkor & The Republic of South Africa v Richtersveld Community (CCT19/03) [2003] ZACC 18; Others 2004 5 SA 460 (CC), at para. 52.


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28. The legitimacy of ownership of land under customary land tenure is derived, not

fromregistration,whichisaforeignidea,butfromthesovereigntyofthepeopleandtheir

laws.

29. In this report, customary land tenure is not a synonym for indigenous tenure as

suggestedbysomescholarsofcustomarylandtenure.4Indigeneityisoftennotthecriterion

withwhich thedifferent communities of people referred to as indigenouspeoplesdefine

themselves.TheAcholi,Kakwa, Lango,Baganda,Banyoroetc.ofUganda, forexample,do

notseethemselvesfirstas indigenouspeoples;rathertheyoftencall themselveswiththe

namesoftheircommunitiesornationalities.Therefore,thisreportusestheterms‘people’

and ‘community’ as the premise of discussing customary land tenure beyond indigenous

peoples.

2.3 METHODOLOGY

30. Dataforthisreportwerecollectedusingqualitativemethodsandespeciallycontent

analysis method. This involved a review and analysis of primary sources such as

constitutions, legislation on land use and tenure, and decided cases. Secondary sources

includedarticles, reports,andbooks thatexplicitlyor implicitlydealtwithcustomary land

tenure.

31. A socio-legal approachwas theunderlying theoretical approach that informed the

analyses in this report. A socio-legal approach asserts that law is a product of social,

economic,politicalrealitiesandtherefore,theanalysisof lawmustbedirectly linkedwith

the ‘analysis of the social situation inwhich law applies.’5A socio-legal approach sharply

contrastswithalegalpositivistapproachbecauselegalpositivism’sfidelitytothelawasis

and its claim that law is a social fact free from moral imperatives ignores the vast

asymmetries of power relations that define relationships between peoples; indeed, legal

positivismwascentraltofacilitatingtheespousingofconceptssuchasterranullius,which 4 See, e.g., Liz Alden Wily, ‘Customary Land Tenure in the Modern World: Rights to Resources in Crisis: Reviewing the Fate of Customary Tenure in Africa – Brief # 1 of 5’ (2012), online: https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/7713/customary%20land%20tenure%20in%20the%20modern%20world.pdf?sequence=1>. 5 See, e.g., David N. Schiff, ‘Socio-Legal Theory: Social Structure and Law’ (1976), 39 The Modern Law Review 287 – 310.


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allowed European imperial powers to proclaim conquered African lands as empty

unoccupiedlandsfreetothetakingdespitefindingcommunitiesofpeopleontheselands.

32. Aswith any qualitative study, some caveats are in order. The quality of data in a

qualitativemethodsofdatacollectiondepend largelyon the individual researchskillsand

may be prone to personal world views. This limitation notwithstanding, however, a

qualitativemethodofdatacollectionallowedusobtaindata thatsufficiently revealedthe

character and status of customary land tenure both in the international and domestic

spheres.

2.4 LandtenuresystemsinUganda:anoverview

33. AbriefoverviewoflandtenureinUgandaisnecessarytoprovideacontextforthis

reporton international legal precedentson theprotectionof the right to customary land

tenure.LandtenureinUgandais,asisthecaseinotherAfricancountries,alegacyofBritish

imperial conquest, rule, suppression, and subversion of formerly autonomous and

independentcommunities.

34. The British imperial powers negotiated with the monarchical rulers of Buganda,

Toro, and Ankole agreements that renown customary land tenure scholar, late Professor

Okoth-Ogendo, argues in effect ‘carved out Uganda into a private estate to be shared

amongst them and the British government.’6This carving out was achieved through the

1900BugandaandToroAgreements, the1901AnkoleAgreement,which introducednew

land tenure systems that ‘gave local rulers and their functionaries estates’ – mailo in

BugandaandnativefreeholdinToroandAnkole,subjectto‘certainobligationsinrespectof

customary‘tenants.’’7

34.1. ThenewlandtenuresystemsintroducedbytheBritishcolonialpowerswere

entrenchedinlaw.Thus,in1908thePossessionofLandLawwasenactedandsubsequently,

in Buganda, the Busuulu and Envujo Law was passed in 1928 to clearly define the

6 Hastings W. Opinya Okoth-Ogendo, ‘Land Policy Development in East Africa: A Survey of Recent Trends’ (1999), online < http://mokoro.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/land_policy_dev_east_africa_overview.pdf>. 7 Ibid., at p.2


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relationshipbetween thenew landownersand their tenantsand the rentpayable to the

mailo landlords.8The lands in non-monarchical areas, such as in northern Uganda, were

declaredbytheBritishcolonialpowerscrownland.

34.2. The effect of the new land ownership system the British introducedwas a

mixtureoftenures,namely,‘feudaltenuresinterlacedwithpublicandcustomaryholdings.’9

Crucially,withinthismix,customarylandtenurewastreatedasaninferiorsystemsubjectto

passingrepugnancetests.Post-IndependenceregimesinUgandasimplyentrenchedthese

tenureregimes.AttemptstoreformlandtenureinUganda,especiallythroughtheLandAct,

1969andthe1975LandReformDecreewere futile.TheDecreeabolishedthe feudaland

customarytenuresystemsandvestedalllandinUgandatotheState,whichthengaveitout

toasleaseholds.10

34.3. The1995ConstitutionofUganda,consideredalandmarkachievementinthe

constitutional historyofUganda, and the1998 LandAct, as amended, simply entrenched

this mixed bag of tenures introduced by the colonial State. And while Article 237 (1)

stipulatesthat‘[l]andinUgandabelongstothecitizensofUgandaandshallvestinthemin

accordancewiththelandtenuresystemsprovidedforinthisConstitution,’thesaidtypesof

tenure, mailo, freehold, leasehold, and customary tenure are nothing new but the old

systeminnewwineskins.

35. Theonlydifferencewiththepastisthat,intheory,theConstitutionandtheLandAct

1998, as amended, recognise and protects customary land tenure. But as shall be

demonstrated in Section5.2, theConstitution and the LandAct still treat customary land

tenure as inferior to leasehold, freehold, andmailo holdings.Moreover, our courts have

continuedtotreatcustomarylandtenureasaninferiortypeofownershipincomparisonto

leaseholdorfreehold.ThecourtsinUganda,unliketheSouthAfricancourts11forexample,

8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., at p.3. 10 See, e.g., 11 See, e.g., Tongoane & Others v Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs & Others 2010 6 SA 2014; Shilubana & Others v Nwamitwa 2009 2 SA 66 (CC); and Alexkor and the Republic of South Africa v Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 5 SA 460 (CC).


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havewoefullyfailedtodevelopandelaboratewhatconstitutescustomarylandtenureand

customarylawandinsteadadaptoldcolonialbasedtestsofprovingcustomarylaw.12

3 INTERNATIONALLEGALPRECEDENTSONCUSTOMARYLANDTENURE

36. Questions about the ownership and control of lands and resources hitherto

exclusivelyownedandusedbyvariouscommunitiesindigenoustoAfrica,theAmericas,and

the Caribbean under their customary land tenure and law have been litigated in

internationalregionalhumanrightscourts.

37. Someof the key issues concern the nature and content of customary land tenure

andthelegalconsequencesofannexationofcommunity landsbythecolonialpowersand

subsequentpost-colonialgovernments.Anotherkeyissueiswhethercustomarylandtenure

rights are protected by the constitutional guarantees for the right to private property in

domesticconstitutions.

38. International regional human rights courts, and some domestic courts, have

recognisedandaffirmedcustomarylandtenureasadistinctsystemoflandownershipand

usethatisrootedinthehistoryandcultureoftheaffectedpeopleorcommunity.Thecourts

havealsoexplicitlyrecognisedandaffirmedthedutyoftheStatetoprotectcustomaryland

tenure by among other things ensuring that there is a clear legal process of registering

customarylandtenurerights.

3.1 RecognitionofCustomaryLandTenure

39. Westartwith themost recent case,AfricanCommission forHumanandPeoples

RightsvRepublicofKenyadecidedbytheACtHPRon26May2017.13Thefocushereison

thedecisionoftheCourtonthemerits.

12 See, e.g., Kampala District Land Board Vs Venansio Babweyaka and Ors SCCA No. of 2 of 2007, where the Supreme Court, the highest Court in Uganda, limits the determination of the character and content of customary land tenure and customary law to expert opinion; Marko Matovu & 2 Others vs Mohammed Sseviiri & Another Civil Appeal No 7/788 (CA), where the Court of Appeal simply glossed over what constitutes customary tenure.13 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya, Application No. 006/2012.


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45.1. Inthiscase,theOgiekpeopleoftheMauForestinKenyaandothersettlersinthe

MauForestweregivenevictionnoticeinOctober2009bytheKenyaForestServicetoleave

within 30 days. Two NGOs filed a communication with the ACHPR about the impending

evictionoftheOgiekcommunityfromMauForest.

45.2. TheACHPRissuedanorderforinterimmeasuresrequestingKenyatosuspendthe

implementation of the eviction notice because of its ‘far-reaching implications on the

political,socialandeconomicsurvivaloftheOgiekCommunityanditspotentialirreparable

harm’.14

45.3. KenyafailedtorespondtotheorderforinterimmeasuresissuedbytheACHPRand

on12July2012,threeyearsafteritissuedtheorder,theACHPRfiledthisapplicationtothe

ACtHPRonbehalfoftheOgiekpeopleoftheMauForest.

45.4. In its application, the ACHPR claims, among other things, that the Ogiek are an

indigenousminorityethnicgroupinKenyamanyofwhominhabittheMauForestandtheir

evictionfromtheforestbytheKenyaForestryServicesfailedtoconsidertheimportanceof

theMau Forest for their survival.15And crucially, theACHPR claims that ‘theOgieks have

been subjected to several eviction measures since the colonial period, which continued

after independence’16and the eviction notice of October 2009 ‘is a perpetuation of the

historicalinjusticessufferedbytheOgieks.’17

45.5. The ACHPR claims that Kenya’s action to evict the Ogiek from the Mau Forest,

whichistheirancestralhome,violatesarticles1,2,4,8,14,17(2)and(3),21,and22ofthe

AfricanCharteronHumanandPeoplesRights,hereinaftertheCharter.

45.6. TheACHPRprayed, amongst other things, that theACtHPRorders Kenya to ‘halt

the evictions’ of the Ogiek ‘from the East of Mau Forest and refrain from harassing,

intimidating or interfering with the community’s traditional livelihoods’ and that Kenya

should ‘[r]ecognise the Ogieks’ historic land, and issue’ them ‘with legal title that is

14 Ibid., at paragraph 4. 15Ibid.,atparas.6and8.16Ibid.,atpara.8.17Ibid.


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preceded by consultative demarcation of the land by the Government and the Ogiek

Community.’Inaddition,theACHPRrequestedtheCourttoorderKenyato‘reviseitslaws

toaccommodatecommunalownershipofproperty.’18

45.7. Kenya,therespondent,inresponse,justifiedtheevictionsontheneedtopreserve

thenaturalecosystemoftheMauForestandrejectedtheACHPR’sclaimthattheOgiekare

anindigenousgroup.

45.8. TherewerenolegalissuesframedbythepartieswiththehelpoftheCourtbutit

appearsfromtheCourt’sassessmentsandrulingsthatsomeofthemainissuesconcerned

whethertheOgiekpeopleconstituteanindigenouscommunitywiththeMauForestastheir

ancestral home and therefore they can claim property rights to the land and forest

resources based on their customary law; and whether failure by the respondent to

recognise the Ogiek as an indigenous community denies them the right to communal

ownershipoftheirlands.

40. TheACtHPRheldthattheOgieksconstitutean'indigenouspopulationthat ispart

of the Kenyanpeople having a particular status anddeserving special protectionderiving

fromtheirvulnerability’19becausetheycertifythecriteriaforindigeneity.

46.1. Inthefirstplace,theOgieks‘havepriorityintimewithrespecttothe

occupation of theMau Forest’20; indeed, the evidence before Court affirm that ‘theMau

Forest is the Ogieks’ ancestral home’21and the ‘Ogieks as a hunter-gatherer community,

haveforcenturiesdependedontheMauForestfortheirresidenceandasasourceoftheir

livelihood.’22

46.2. In thesecondplace, theOgieks ‘exhibitavoluntaryperpetuationof

their cultural distinctiveness, which includes aspects of language, social organisation,

religious,culturalandspiritualvalues,modesofproduction,laws..’23

18Ibid.,atpara.41.19Ibid.,atpara.112.20Ibid.,atpara.109.21Ibid.22Ibid.23Ibid.,atpara.110


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46.3. In the third place, ‘the Ogieks have suffered from continued

subjugation and marginalisation.’ Their suffering emanates from ‘evictions from their

ancestrallandsandforcedassimilationandtheverylackofrecognitionoftheirstatusasa

tribe or indigenous population attest to their persistent marginalisation that the Ogieks

haveexperiencedfordecades.’24

46.4. TheCourtfurtherheldthatbasedonArticle14oftheCharterandthe

provisionsoftheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenous

Peoples,theOgieks‘havetherighttooccupytheirancestralland,aswellasuseandenjoy

thesaidlands.’25Moreover,‘byexpellingtheOgieksfromtheirancestrallandsagainsttheir

will,without prior consultation andwithout respecting the conditions of expulsion in the

interest of public need, the Respondent violated their rights to land…as guaranteed by

Article 14 of the Charter read in light of theUnitedNationsDeclaration on the Rights of

Indigenous Peoples of 2007.’26The Court further ruled that Article 14 of the Charter

protectsbothindividualandcollectiverightstoproperty.27

41. TheACtHPR’sdecision,however,fallsshortinonefundamentalrespect:itdismally

fails to unequivocally pronounce itself on the nature or character, content, and status of

customarylandtenureandthecustomarylawthatregulatesitinthelightoftheCharter.It

reliestoomuchonprovisionsof international instrumentsanddeclarationson indigenous

communitiestogivecontentandmeaningtotheCharter.28

42. Inthiscontext,theACtHPRfailedtodevelopandclarifythecharacter,content,and

scopeofAfricancustomarylandtenureandlawasanautonomousbodyofnormsandrules

thatregulatetheownership,use,andtransferforlandinthelightoftheprovisionsofthe

Charter,especiallyArticle14.TheCourtsimplyglossedoverthisfundamental issueswhen

interpretingArticle14 in the lightofArticle26 (2)of theUNDeclarationon theRightsof

24Ibid.,atpara.111.25Ibid.,atpara.128.26Ibid.,atpara.131.27Ibid.,atpara.123.28 Similar criticism has been made with respect to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Right; see e.g., Wilmien Wicomb & Henk Smith, ‘Customary Communities as ‘Peoples’ and their Customary Tenure as ‘Culture’: What we can do with the Endorois Decision’ (2011), 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 422 – 446, at pp 432 – 435; 437 – 439.


14

IndigenousPeoplesnotingthattherighttopropertyinthetraditionalsense,shouldnotbe

excludedfromtheinterpretation.29

43. Forthesereasons,theprecedentsetbytheACtHPRmaybeoflimitedvaluetothe

questionofcustomarylandtenureinAfrica.

44. In the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua30, the applicant

community sought, through the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR),

recognitionandprotectionoftheirrighttocustomaryland.

50.1. One of the main contentions of the IACHR is that ‘the Mayagna Awas Tingni

Community has communal property rights to land and natural resources based on

traditional patterns of us and occupation of ancestral territory. Their rights “exist even

withoutStateactionswhichspecifythem”.

50.2. The IACHR further submitted that traditional land tenure is linked to historical

continuity…’31andthe‘overallterritoryofthecommunityispossessedcollectively,andthe

individualsandfamiliesenjoysubsidiaryrightsofuseandoccupation.’32Thus,Nicaraguais

in breach of Article 21 of the American Convention which guarantees the protection of

propertyrights.

50.3. Nicaragua, inresponse,arguedthat theMayagnaAwasTingniCommunitycannot

claimcustomary land tenure rightsbecause,amongothers, ‘theypossess landswhichare

not ancestral and on part of which title has already been obtained by other indigenous

communities,orotherclaimthattheyhaveancestralpossessionrightspredatingthealleged

rightsoftheAwasTingni…’33

51. TheCourtheld,amongothers,that‘article21oftheConventionprotectstherights

toproperty ina sensewhich includes,amongothers, the rightofmembersof indigenous

29Ibid.,atpara.127.30 The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 31 August 2001, Inter- Am. Ct H.R. (Ser. C), No. 79/2001. 31 Ibid., at para. 140 (a). 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., at para. 141 (a).


15

communitieswithintheframeworkofcommunalpropertywhich isalsorecognizedbythe

constitutionofNicaragua.’34TheCourtobservedthat‘[a]mongindigenouspeoplesthereisa

communitariantraditionregardingcommunalformofcollectivepropertyoftheland,inthe

sensethatownershipoflandisnotcentredonanindividualbutratheronthegroupandits

community…’35

51.1. TheCourtfurthernotedthat

[i]ndigenous groups, by the fact of their very existence have the right to livefreely intheirownproperty;theclosetiesof indigenouspeopleswiththelandmustberecognizedandunderstoodasthefundamentalbasisoftheircultures,their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenouscommunities, relations to the land are notmerely amatter of possession andproduction but a material and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy,eventopreservetheirculturallegacyandtransmitittofuturegenerations.36

51.2. Andcrucially,theCourtaddressedthequestionofownershipoflandbyindigenous

communitiesintheabsenceoftitle:

‘[i]ndigenous peoples’ customary law must be especially taken intoaccountforpurposesofthisanalysis.Asaresultofcustomarypractices,possessionofthelandshouldsufficeforindigenouscommunitieslackingrealtitletothepropertyofthelandtoobtainofficialrecognitionofthatproperty,andforconsequentregistration.’37

51.3. The Court held that members of the Awas Tingni Community have communal

property rights to the lands they currently inhabit under Article 5 of the Constitution of

Nicaraguaandthat‘inlightofArticle21oftheConvention’,Nicaragua‘violatedtherightsof

members of the Mayagna Awas Tingni Community to the use and enjoyment of their

property, and that it has granted concessions to third parties to utilize the property and

resourceslocatedanareawhichcouldcorrespond,fullyorinpart,tothelandswhichmust

bedelimited,demarcatedandtitled.’38

34 Ibid., at para. 148. 35 Ibid., at para. 149. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., at para. 151. 38 Ibid., at para. 153.


16

52. In the Case of the Yakye Axa Community v Paraguay39 , the IACHR filed an

applicationagainstParaguayonbehalfoftheYakyeAxaCommunityintheIACtHR,claiming,

among others, that Paraguay violated the Community’s right to property protected by

Article21oftheAmericanConventiononHumanRights.

52.1. TheIACHRallegedthatParaguayfailedtoprotecttheancestralpropertyrightsof

theYakyeAxaCommunityandthishasmadeitimpossibleforthethemtoownandpossess

theirterritory.40

52.2. ParaguayinresponsesubmittedthatitrecognisedYakyeAxaCommunity’srightto

theirancestrallandsbutarguesthatthecommunityhasnoownershiporpossessionofthe

landtheyclaim.41

53. The IACtHR held that Paraguay violated the Yakye Axa Community right to their

ancestral lands and territory, which are protected under Article 21 of the American

ConventiononHumanRights,becauseitfailedtotake‘thenecessarydomestic legalsteps

toensureeffectiveuseandenjoymentbymembersof theYakyeAxaCommunityof their

traditional lands, and thishas threatened the freedevelopmentand transmissionof their

traditionalpracticesandculture’42tofuturegenerations.

53.1. TheIACtHR‘underlinedthecloserelationshipofindigenouspeopleswiththeland

mustbeacknowledgedandunderstoodasthefundamentalbasisfortheirculture,spiritual

life, wholeness, economic survival, and preservation and transmission to future

generations.’43

53.2. TheCourtconcludedthat‘theclosetiesofindigenouspeopleswiththeirtraditional

territoriesandthenatural resources thereinassociatedwith theirculture,aswellas the

39(2006)Ser.C.No.142.40Ibid.,atpara.2.41Ibid.,atpara.122.42Ibid.,atpara.155and156.43Ibid.,atpara.131.


17

components derived from them, must be safeguarded by Article 21 of the American

Convention.’44

54. In theMayaLeaders&OthersvTheAttorneyGeneralofBelize45,decidedby the

CaribbeanCourtof Justice (CCJ)on30October2015, theAppellants in thiscaseappealed

againstajudgmentoftheCourtofAppealofBelizetotheCaribbeanCourtofJustice(CCJ).46

54.1. The Appellants ‘claim that Belize…by its actions or omissions violated their

customary land tenure rights protected by Section 3 (a), 3(d), 16 and 17 of the

Constitution.’47The actions andomissions that constituted the alleged violations ofMaya

customary land tenure rights by the Government of Belize included, for example, two

decadesofissuing‘leases,licenses,permits,andconcessionspermittingoildrilling,logging,

surveying,andcattlegrazingbythirdpartiesoverlandsituateinMayavillages…’48

54.2. Inaddition,theAppellantsclaimthattheGovernmentofBelizefailed‘toprovidea

mechanism to recognize and protectMaya customary land tenure despite the Ten-Point

Agreementof2008,the2004recommendationsoftheIACHR,andthe2007decisioninthe

MayaLandRightsCase’49inwhichtheHighCourtofBelizeheldthat‘theredoesexistinthe

ToledoDistrict,Mayacustomarylandtenure.’50

55. The CCJ, having reviewed the history of litigation of this case, the formal

agreements between the Government and the leadership of the Maya community, the

decision of the courts in Belize, and the findings and recommendations of the IACHR,

concludedthat 44Ibid.,atpara.137.45 The Maya Leaders Alliance, the Toledo Alcaldes Association & 23 Others v the Attorney General of Belize, CCJ Appeal No BZCV 2014/002 46 The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is a regional international court of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) akin to the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) of the East African Community (EAC). CARICOM is a 15 member organisation comprising: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Source:< http://caricom.org/about-caricom/who-we-are/our-governance/members-and-associate-members/>. 47 Ibid., at para. 2.< 48 Ibid, at para. 14. 49 Ibid., at para. 18. The Maya Land Rights case comprise two constitutional petitions, Aurelio Cal v Attorney General of Belize, No 171 of 3 April 2007 and Manuel Coy v Attorney General of Belize, No.172 of 3 April 2007. 50 Ibid., at para. 18


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the Government of Belize was under a duty to take positive steps torecognizeMayacustomarylandtenureandthelandrightsflowingtherefromand, without detriment to other indigenous communities, to delimit,demarcateandtitleorotherwiseestablishthelegalmechanismnecessarytoclarifyandprotecttheserightsinthegenerallawofthecountry.51

55.1. TheCCJfoundthat‘Belizeanlandlawdoesnotextentprotectiontoindividualand

collective land rightswhichariseunder theMayasystemofcustomary land tenure.’52And

whileBelizewas‘alertedtothisdeficiencyasfarbackas1998’whentheMayaCommunity

filedapetitionwiththeIACHR,Belizelandlawremainsunchanged.53TheCourtstatedthat

theinordinatedelaybytheGovernmentofBelizein‘resolvingtheissuesofindigenoustitle

cannotgounchecked’evenifreconciling‘twocompetingsystemsoflandtenure’isfraught

with‘complexitiesandintricacies.’54

3.2 TheDutyofStatestoProtecttherightstoCustomaryLandTenure

56. In addition to the duty of States to recognise customary land tenure, the cases

reviewed explicitly hold that the State has a duty to protect customary land tenure by

puttinginplacealegalmechanismandmeasuresthatwillguaranteetherightsofcustomary

landtenureholdersandprovideremediesincaseofinfringementofthoserights.

56.1. IntheMayaLeadersAssociation&23OthersvTheAttorneyGeneralofBelize

case,theCCJconcludedthat

Thenatureoftraditionalorcustomaryrightsinland,thehistoryoflitigation,the informal aswell as the formal acknowledgments by the State, and thefact thatsuchrightsnonetheless remain invisible in thegeneral lawsof thecountry, suggest the obligation to put in place special measures to giverecognitionandeffecttotheserightssothattheprotectionofthe lawmaybeenjoyed.55

56.2. TheCourtemphasizedthatthedutyofBelizetoprotectthecustomaryland

tenurerightsoftheMaya‘flowsfromtherecognitionthatMayacustomarylandtenure,a

51 Ibid., at para. 59. 52Ibid.,atpara.57.53Ibid.54Ibid.55Ibid.


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speciesofpropertyrightsnotprovidedforinthecurrentlegalsystemofBelize,isprotected

undersections3(d)and17oftheConstitution.’56

56.3. IntheMayagna(Sumo)AwasTingniCommunityvNicaragua,theIACtHR

unanimouslyheldthatNicaragua

…must adopt in its domestic law, pursuant to Article 2 of the AmericanConvention on Human Rights, legislative, administrative, and any othermeasures necessary to create an effective mechanism for delimitation,demarcation, and titling of the property of indigenous communities, inaccordancewiththeircustomarylaw,values,customs,andmores…57

56.3. The Court emphasized that while Nicaragua undertakes to delimit,

demarcate,andtitlethelandsoftheMayagnaAwasTingniCommunity,

‘itmustabstainfromanyactsthatmightleadtheagentsofStateitself,orthirdpartiesactingwith itsacquiescenceor itstolerance,toaffecttheexistence,value,useorenjoymentoftheproperty located inthegeographic area where the members of the Mayagna (Sumo) AwasTingniCommunityliveandcarryouttheiractivities…’58

56.4. The decision of the ACtHPR in ACHPR v Kenya, as noted already, does not

directly deal with the questions of customary land tenure but the Court did emphasize

Kenya’s duty to provide effective remedies for the Ogiek community as an indigenous

Kenyanpopulation.

56.5. TheCourtnotedthatitisnotenoughthatKenyahasenactedlaws,including

a new constitution that outlaw discrimination. It observed that given the ‘persisting

eviction of the Ogieks, the failure of the authorities of the Respondent to stop such

evictionsandtocomplywiththedecisionsofthenationalcourtsdemonstratethatthenew

Constitutionandthe institutionswhichtheRespondenthassetuptoremedypastoron-

goinginjusticesarenotfullyeffective.’59

56Ibid.,atpara.60.57Ibid,atparas.173(3),164,and138.58Ibid.,atpara.173(4)and155.59Ibid.,atpara.144.


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4 TREATYANDDECLARATORYBASEDPROTECTIONOFCUSTOMARYLANDTENURE

57. Inadditiontolegalprecedentssetbyregionalinternationalhumanrightscourtson

theprotectionoftherighttocustomarylandtenureofindigenouscommunities,thereare

specifictreatiesanddeclarationsoftheUnitedNationsthatexplicitlyandimplicitlyprotect

thecustomarylandtenuresystemsoftheindigenouscommunities.

4.1 TreatyBasedProtectionofCustomaryLandTenure

58. The International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples

Convention,theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR),andtheAfrican

Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) are considered in the subsections and

paragraphsthatfollow.

4.1.1 TheILOIndigenousandTribalPeoplesConvention

59. The ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169)makes explicit

provisionsfortheprotectionofthecustomarylandtenureofindigenouspeoples.PartIIof

theConventionisdevotedtolandandArticles13and14arethemostrelevant.

59.1. Indigenouspeoples’specialattachmenttotheirlandsandterritoriesasboth

sourcesandmeansofpractisingtheirculturesandspiritualvaluesisguaranteedbyArticle

13andArticle14(1)enjoinsStatespartiestoConventiontorecogniseindigenousandtribal

peoples right to ownership and possession of the lands that they have traditionally

occupied.

59.2. Inaddition,underArticle14(2)and14(3)governmentshaveadutyto‘take

stepstoidentifythelands’whicharetraditionallyoccupiedbyindigenousandtribalpeoples

andguarantee the rightofownershipandpossessionof the land so identifiedandput in

place adequate procedures within their national legal systems to resolve land claims by

indigenousandtribalpeoples.


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4.1.2 AfricanCharteronHumanandPeoples’Rights(ACHPR)

60. TheAfrican Charter onHuman and Peoples’ Rights have no explicit provision that

addressescustomarylandtenure,albeitthepreamblereferstotheuniquecircumstancesof

theAfricanpeoples.

60.1. Article14oftheCharterontherighttopropertyhasbeeninterpretedbythe

African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) to include both individual and

collectiverighttoproperty.

60.2. Unfortunately,theCourt,initsrecentdecisionofTheAfricanCommissionfor

HumanandPeoplesRightvRepublicofKenya,failstoelaborateonthisaspectinthelightof

theuniquecircumstancesoftheAfricanpeople,especiallysincealmost80percentofland

ownershipinSub-SaharanAfricaisinformofcommunalorcustomarytenure.

60.3. TheCourt,sadly,paysdeferencetoUnitedNationsDeclarationsontheRights

of Indigenous Peoples. That is not to say that the Court should not address itself to

international lawand jurisprudence.Far from it.Rather theCourtshouldgiveprecedence

andprioritytoAfrica’suniquecircumstancestodevelopits jurisprudencethatwill liberate

itspeoplefromcontinueddominationbyforeigninterests.

60.4. The I.C.J.hasnothandledanycasethatexplicitlyaddressesthequestionof

therightofcommunitiestotheircustomarylandtenuresystems.Ithas,however,handled

casesonquestionsoftherightofcommunitiestoself-determination,suchastheWestern

SaharaCase.60In this case, the I.C.J.wasasked toaddress,amongotherquestions, ‘[w]as

Western Sahara (Rio deOro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a

territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?’ The Court answered that question in the

negative:

Whateverdifferencesofopiniontheremaybeamongjurists,theStatepractice of the relevant period indicates that territory inhabited bytribes or peoples having a social and political organizationwere notregarded terrae nullius. … the information furnished to the Court

60 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p.12, at para. 1.


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showsthatatthetimeofcolonizationWesternSaharawas inhabitedbypeopleswhich,ifnomadic,weresociallyandpoliticallyorganizedintribes and under chiefs competent to represent them. It also showsthat,incolonizingWesternSaharaSpaindidnotproceedonthebasisthatitwasestablishingitssovereigntyoverterraenullius.’61

60.5. Whilenotexplicitlydealingwithcustomarylandtenure,theconceptofterra

nullius is relevant to the discussion of customary land tenure because of how it

contributed and facilitated colonialism andprovided justifications for eroding the laws,

customs, and land tenure systems of the communities who territories or land were

expropriatedbyEuropeancolonialpowers.WeshallreturntoinSection5ofthisreport.

4.1.3 InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)

61. TheICCPR62hasnoexplicitprovisionontherighttocustomarylandtenure.61.1. But customary land tenure rights may read from certain articles of the

Convention,suchasArticles1(1),1(2),2(1),and27.

61.2. Article 1 (1) guarantees to all peoples the right to self-determination. This

rights includes the freedomof all peoples todetermine their political destiny andpursue

theirsocio-economicdevelopment.Since landisan importantfactorofproduction, itmay

thearguedthatArticle1(1)alsocontainstherightofallpeoples,includingAfricanpeoples,

todeterminetheir landtenuresystem.Inthiscontext,customarylandtenureandlaware

criticalelementsofself-determinationforthosecommunitiesthatpracticethisformofland

tenure.

61.3. Article1(2) guarantees to all peoples the right toownanddisposeof their

naturalwealthandresourcesaspartoftheirrighttoself-determination.Whilethisarticle

doesnotexplicitlystateunderwhattypeoftenurethismayberealised,wesubmitthatthe

ownershipanduseoflandshouldbedefinedandregulatedthrougheachpeople’scustoms,

61 Ibid., at paras 80 – 81. 62 United Nations, 999 United Nations Treaty Series 171.


23

traditions, and laws. In this light, a right to customary land tenuremay be read into this

article.63

61.4. Article 27 guarantees the rights of minorities to ‘enjoy their own culture,

professandpracticetheirownreligion,or tousetheirown language.’64Andwhile itdoes

not explicitlymake reference to customary land tenure rights or state inwhatways and

forms the minority groups will exercises their right to culture, a case of their right to

customarylandtenuremaybemadeasanexpressionandexerciseoftheirculture.

61.5. TheCommitteethatsupervisestheICCPR,theHumanRightsCommittee,has

in its General Comment on Article 27 stated that the article includes indigenous peoples

righttoland.65

4.2 Declarations

62. OnlytheUnitedNationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples(UNDRIP)is

considered.

4.2.1 TheUnitedNationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples(UNDRIP)

63. The UNDRIP was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13

September200766andwhilenotatreaty,thereforenotbindingonStates,providessome

valuableprinciplesontheprotectionofthecustomarylandrightsofindigenouspeople.

63.1. Article26(1)oftheUNDRIPguaranteesforindigenouspeoplestheirrightto

their ‘lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or

otherwiseusedoracquired.’

63 See, e.g. Jeremie Gilbert, ‘The Right to Freely Dispose of Natural Resources: Utopia or Forgotten Right’ (2013), 31 (2) Netherland Quarterly of Human Rights 314 – 341. 64 United Nations, supra, note 62, at p.179. 65 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities ( Art. 27):-08/04/94, Online http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f21%2fRev.1%2fAdd.5&Lang=en>. 66Availableat:<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf>.


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63.2. Article 26 (1) enjoins States to ‘give legal recognition and protection’ to

indigenouspeoples‘lands,territoriesandresources.Andcrucially,suchrecognition‘shallbe

conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the

indigenouspeoplesconcerned’(emphasissupplied).

63.3. In addition,Article 27enjoins States to give ‘due recognition to indigenous

peoples’laws,traditions,customsandlandtenuresystems…’(emphasissupplied).

5 CHARACTERANDSTATUSOFCUSTOMARYLANDTENURE64. What, then, is the character and status of customary land tenure both in

internationalanddomesticlaw?

64.1. FromtherecentdecisionsoftheIACtHRandtheCCJcustomarylandtenureis

recognisedasadistinct formof landownershipanduse thatgives rise toboth individual

andcollectiverightstopropertydeservingofprotectionbytheStateinthesamewaythat

otherpropertyrightsareprotectedbylaw.

64.2. Butdespite the landmarkdecisionsof internationalhuman rights courtson

customarylandtenure,thecharacterandstatusofcustomarylawinbothinternationallaw

anddomesticlawremainsdistortedandmisunderstood.

5.1 TheStatusofCustomaryLandtenureinInternationalLaw

65. The status of customary land tenure in international law today is ambiguous.

InternationallawfacilitatedtheexpropriationoflandsownedbyAfricansandvestedthem

inEuropeancolonialpowersanddistortedcustomarylandtenureandlaw.AfterWorldWar

II,however,internationallawwasreformedinwaysthatattemptedtoredeemandrestore


25

toAfricanpeoplesexpropriatedlandsbyEuropeanpowersandthecustomarylandtenure

systemandlawunderwhichitoperated.

66. Towhat extent has post-WorldWar II international law accorded customary land

tenureastatusthatisequaltootherformsoflandtenure?Abriefreviewoftherelationship

betweeninternationallaw,colonialism,customarylandtenureisnecessary.

5.1.1 Customarylandtenure,colonialism,andthedoctrineofterranullius

67. Internationallaw,especiallypositivistinternationallaw,i.e.,lawasisasopposedto

lawasoughttobe,doesnotrecognisecustomarylawandthelandtenuresystembasedon

it. Indeed, international law developed the doctrine of terra nullius in the 18th Century

which posited that any land outside Europe, which was unoccupied or unsettled in the

European sense, i.e.., without houses, cultivated pastures, developed towns, roads, and

farms, was land that belonged to no one and could be acquired as new territory by a

sovereign European State.67In its original formulation, terra nullius was said to be only

limitedtoterritories thatwereuninhabited. Indeed, in theWesternSaharacase, the I.C.J.

heldamongothers,thatregardlessofthedifferencesofopinionbetweenjurists,‘theState

practiceoftherelevantperiodindicatethatterritoryinhabitedbytribesorpeopleshavinga

socialandpoliticalorganisationwerenotregardedterraenullius.’68

67.1. Internationallawthereforecannotbeseparatedfromthecolonialencounter,

which encounter is at the core of the denigration of African value systems, including

customary land tenure and law. Indeed, Antony Anghie argues that ‘the colonial

confrontation was central to the formation of international law.’69In other words, the

Europeanconquestofnon-Europeanpeoplesgavebirthtointernationallaw,whichinturn

allowedthemtolegitimatetheirconquestofnon-Europeanpeoples.

67 See, e.g., Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature Natural Law and on Luxury (Liberty Fund Inc. 2008), Book I, pp.100 ff. 68 Western Sahara Case, supra, note 60, at para. 80. 69 Antony Anghie, ‘Colonialism and the Birth of International Law: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the Lead of Nations’ (2004), 34 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 513, at p.516.


26

67.2. International law ‘sanctioned conquest and exploitation’70of non-European

peoplesandexpropriationoftheirlandsandthatincludedthesuppressionandsubversion

ofcustomarylandtenureandlawofthepeoplesconquered.71

67.3. Positive international law effectively ‘eroded’ the ‘moral fibre of many

indigenous communities by ignoring the social origins of indigenous law and concerning

itself mainly with the inner workings of westernised legal code.’ 72 In other words,

internationallaw,especiallylegalpositivistinternationallaw,condemned‘indigenouslawto

theobscurityofasub-legalorder.’73

5.1.2 InternationalLawandIndigenousCustomaryLandTenure

67.4. AfterWorldWar I andWorldWar II, attemptsweremade to displace ‘the

positivistinternationallawofconquest’withaninternationallawthat,whilecontinuingthe

mission of civilizing non-European peoples, prepared the conquered peoples for

independence.74

67.5. These attempts, especially under the auspices of theUnitedNations never

fully redeemed customary land tenure and law of the non-European peoples from its

‘invisible’ status. And even where attempts have been made to protect customary land

tenure using international treaties, especially human rights treaties, the focus is on

indigenousoraboriginalcommunitieslandtenure.TheInternationalLabourOrganisation’s

IndigenousandTribalPeoples’Convention,1989(No.169)isaclassicexample.

70 Ibid., at p. 563. 71 See, e.g., Hastings W. Opinya Okoth-Ogendo, ‘The Tragic of African Commons: A Century of Exploitation, Suppression and Subversion’ (2003), 1 University of Nairobi Law Journal, 107 – 117. 72 Gerrit Pienaar, ‘The Methodology Used to Interpret Customary Land Tenure’ (2012), 15 (3) PER/PELJ 153 – 183, at p. 159. 73 Ibid. 74 Anghie, supra, note 69, at pp. 565 – 6.


27

67.6. Indeed, the regional international human rights courts have followed this

narrowfocusontheprotectionofthecustomarylandtenurerightsofindigenouspeoples.

The IACtHR’s, forexample,hasconcludedthat ‘[i]t isbeyonddoubt that international law

recognises and protects the rights of indigenous peoples’, presumably to their lands and

territories,anddrawsthisconclusionfromareadingoftheUniversalDeclarationofHuman

Rights (UDHR) and general human rights treaties such as the Genocide Convention, the

ICCPR, the InternationalCovenantof theEliminationofAll FormsofRacialDiscrimination

(ICERD),andtheConventionontheRightsoftheChild(CRC).75

67.7. InternationalorganisationssuchastheInternationalBankforReconstruction

and Development (IBRD), often referred to as the World Bank (WB) and the Food and

Agricultural Organisation (FAO) have recently developed interest in customary land

tenure.76

67.7.1. This interest, however, focuses mainly on technical difficulties with

registrationofcustomarylandrightsandhowtoconvertthemintomarketablecommodities

inaneo-liberaleconomicandmarketsystem.77

67.7.2. The nature and content of customary tenure is often glossed over and

conclusionaboutculturalnormsdenyingwomenlandrightshastilydrawnbetrayingbotha

marked lack of understanding of customs of the various African peoples and an inherent

bias and disproportionate focus on the negative aspects of the customary laws of the

variousAfricancommunities.78

67.8. Thus,thefundamentalissueconcerningthenatureandcontentofcustomary

landtenureareignoredandsometimesconflatedwiththeissueofthesourceofthevalidity

ofcustomarylandtenureandlaw.

75 See, e.g., The Maya Leaders & Others Case, supra, note 45 at para. 53.76 A host of World Bank sponsored studies on customary land tenure have been published, see, e.g., Shem Migot-Adholla et al, ‘Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?’ (1991), 5 (1), World Bank Economic Review , 155 - 175; 77 See, e.g., Frank F.K. Byamugisha, Securing Africa’s Land for Shared Prosperity: A Program to Scale Up Reforms and Investment (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington D.C., 2013); Rachel S. Knight, Statutory Recognition of Customary Land Rights in Africa (Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), Rome, 2010). 78 See, e.g., Frank Byamugisha, supra, note 74 at p.2.


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67.9. Onemainconclusion:internationallawandprecedentscannotbethemeans

to redeemand restore customary land tenureand lawas anautonomous systemof land

ownershipanduseofothercommunitiesnotclassifiedas ‘indigenousand tribalpeoples’.

Thisisbecauseinternationalprecedentsandtreatiesoncustomarylandtenurearenarrowly

focusedonindigenouspeoples.

5.2 CharacterandStatusofCustomaryLandTenureinDomesticLaw

68. Thecharacterandstatusofcustomary landtenureremainsdistorted inmanySub-

Saharan African countries. The distortion, as already noted, is traced to colonialism and

perpetuatedbypost-colonialStatesandsomewestern-educationintellectualsandelite.

69. Theauthenticnatureandcharacterofcustomary landtenureand lawneedstobe

restored.ThiswillrequirededicatednewAfricanscholarstoemergeandfillthegapleftby

scholars,suchasthelateHastingsW.OpinyaOkoth-OgendoofKenya,whoablydeveloped

conceptualandanalyticaltoolstointerrogateissuesoflanduse,especiallycustomaryland

tenureontheAfricancontinent.

5.2.1 CustomaryLandTenure:RecognisedbutDistortedandrelegated

70. ThecolonialpowersdistortedthenatureandstatusofcustomarylandtenureinSub-

SaharanAfricaandtreateditasinferior,forexample,totheEnglishleaseholdandfreehold

tenuresystems.79

71. Twomain reasons account for this distorted conceptionof customary land tenure

and law in Africa. The first, as already point, is the influence of legal positivism, and

especially international legal positivism produced by the colonial encounter. The second

reason, implicitly related to legal positivism, is the fallacious assumptions underlying

westerntheoriesofpropertysuperimposedonAfricanrealities.80

79 Okoth-Ogendo, supra, note 71. 80 On this aspect, see, e.g., Garret Harding, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968), 162 (3859) Science 1243 – 1248.


29

71.1. In the firstplace,western theoriesofpropertyassume thatproperty rights

must only and always derive from a sovereign. Since African communities were not

consideredsovereigninthesenseofEuropeansovereignty,theycannotandcouldnothave

theauthoritytodefineandassignpropertyrights.81

71.2. In the secondplace, African communities do not have legal persona in the

sense of a sovereign European State having legal personality. Therefore, they lacked the

legalcapacitytodefinepropertyrightsandrulesformanagingtheserights.

71.3. In the third place, decision-making rules applied in various African

communitiesdemandedcollectiveparticipationbyallmembers.Thiswasimpracticableand

inefficient.

71.4. Finally, customary lawand land tenure arebasedon an inclusivenotionof

property and cannot be used at the time to define boundaries of exclusive rights as

understoodinthewesternatomisedindividual.

71.5. Okoth-Ogendo82and Bromley and Cernea83have demonstrated that these

assumptions are based on a marked lack of or ‘inadequate understanding of the nature

customarylandtenureandlaw,theregimewhichgivesitsstructureandcontent.’84

72. Okoth-Ogendo,renownKenyanscholarofcustomarylandtenuresystem,has

argued that the colonial powers ‘contemptuously denied the juridical content’ of

customarylandtenureor‘AfricanCommons’through‘systematicadministrative,judicial

and legislative subversion designed to foreclose any possibility of their renaissance.’85

WicombandSmithhavesimilarlyobservedthat

Indigenouslawandcustomarylegalsystemswereregardedasinferior,were never extended to areas covered by colonial laws and, when

81 See, e.g., Okoth-Ogendo, supra, note 71, at p. 109. 82 Ibid. 83 David W. Bromley & Michael M. Cernea, The Management of Common Property Natural Resources: Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies (1989), World Bank Discussion Paper No. 57.84 Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 71, at p.109. 85 Ibid., at p. 107; also, see, e.g., Jeanmarie Fenrich, Paolo Galizzi, and Tracey E. Higgins, The Future of African Customary Law (Cambridge, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.323.


30

applied, itwasdoneonlytotheextentthattheywerenotrepugnanttoWesternjusticeandmoralityorinconsistentwithanywrittenlaw.86

72.1. Unfortunately,post-colonialAfricanStates,especiallySub-Saharancountries

includingUganda,entrenchedthisdistortedviewandpositionofcustomarylandtenureand

law in subsequent legislation and practice, without questioning the underlying

assumptions.87

72.2. InthecaseofUganda,forexample,thenowrepealedPublicLandsAct,1969

and regulations thereunder, namely the Public Land (Restriction of Customary Tenure)

Order,1969,SINo.139/1969andtheLandReformDecree,1975andregulations,purported

to recognise customary land tenure inUgandabut at the same time imposed restrictions

whichnegatedtheveryconceptandnatureofcustomarylandtenure.Theideaofcreating

customary land tenure on public land is nothing new but a continuation of the colonial

practice.Whatarenowconsideredpublic landswere landownedandusedby indigenous

communities.When these landswere expropriated by the colonial powers, they became

publiclands.

72.3. Thekeyquestionthen,is,ifcolonialexpropriationextinguishedtherightsof

communitiestothe landtheyonceowned,howcanonecreatecustomary landtenureon

thatsamelandwhichisnolongersubjecttocustomarylaw?Whosecustomarylawisbeing

appliedtosuchland?

72.4. The 1995 Constitution and the 1998 Land Act, as amended, purports to

answer these questions and restore customary land tenure and protect it as one of the

formsoflandownershipinUganda.Onacriticalreview,however,theConstitutionandthe

LandAct,1998, treat customary land tenureand lawas inferior towestern formsof land

tenure systembecause they allow the conversionof customary land tenure into freehold

tenure.Article237 (4) (b)of theConstitutionprovides that ‘landunder customary tenure

maybeconvertedtofreeholdlandownershipbyregistration.’Section9(1)oftheLandAct 86Wilmien Wicomb and Henk Smith, ‘Customary communities and ‘peoples’ and their customary tenure as ‘culture: What we can do with the Endorois decision’ (2011), 11 African Human Rights Law Journal, 422, at pp. 425 – 426.87 Okoth-Ogendo, supra, note 71, at p. 10; Lorenzo Cotula (ed.) Changes in “Customary” Land Tenure Systems Across Africa (Stevenage, Hertfordshire, SMI (Distribution Services) Ltd, 2007), at p.10.


31

1998,asamended,stipulatesthat ‘[a]nyperson, family,communityorassociationholding

landundercustomarytenureonformerpubliclandmayconvertthecustomarytenureinto

freeholdtenure…’88Theseprovisionsreinforcetheinferiorstatusofcustomarylandtenure

inUganda.

72.5. If both freehold and customary tenure are forms of land ownership in

perpetuity,89why convert customary tenure into freehold? The simply answer is that the

draftersof theConstitutionand the LandActwere influencedby inherited colonial views

thatfreeholdtenureisasuperiortenuretocustomarytenure.Foramorecogentreason,it

willbenecessarytoreviewtherecordofthedeliberationsoftheConstituentAssemblythat

draftedtheConstitutionandontheBill thatwaspassedtobecometheLandAct,1998to

establish why the drafted deemed it necessary to include a provision that allowed

conversionofcustomarylandtenureintofreehold.

72.6. The courts and advocates in Uganda, while recognising customary land

tenure, have not, unlike South African courts, elaborated on its character and content.

Instead, they focusproving that a customexists that creates customary land tenure.And

onceitisestablishedthatthepartyrelyingoncustomarylawtolayclaimonapieceofland

failedtobringexpertsincustomarylandtenureandlaw,thatisendofstory.

72.7. Indeed,boththecourtsandadvocatespayverylittleattention,ifatall,tothe

natureofcustomarylawonwhichcustomarytenureisbasedandoftenconflatecustomary

lawandthelandtenurewiththeEnglishcommonlawtenure,whichinterestinlandmaybe

acquiredbylonguseandcarryingoutcertainactivitiesontheland.

72.8. And crucially, the courts in Uganda still follow old tests for establishing

customary law developed by colonial courts and experts, namely through the work of

writers on customary law and other authoritative sources. While this approach is not

invidious per se, it ignores the inherent flaws and biases of text book authors, especially

western authors, or African experts wholly socialised into western worldviews and

contemptuous of their own African heritage, who often view customary law and tenure

88 The Land Act, Chapter 227. 89 Ibid., at sections 3(1)(h) and 3(2)(a).


32

through the lens of their own legal conceptions of property ownership and relationships

thatarecompletelyalientoAfricanconceptionsofownershipandrelationsaroundlandand

otherresources.

72.8.1. Thus,inastringofcasesdecidedbyboththeSupremeCourtandtheCourt

ofAppeal,inwhichissuesofcustomarylandtenurewereraised,thefocusisonprovingthe

existence of a custom by the party claiming a customary land tenure on disputed land:

KampalaDistrictLandBoardvVenansioBabwayaka&Others,SupremeCourtAppealNo2

of 2007; Kampala District Land Board & Another v National Housing & Construction

Corporation,CivilAppealNo2of2004,Tifu Lukwagov SamwiriMuddeKizza&Nabitaka,

CivilAppealNo.13of1996,PaulKisekkaSsakuvSeventhDayAdventists,CivilAppealNo8

of1993,MarkoMatovu&2OthersvMohammedSseviirand2Others,CivilAppealNo7of

1978,andBalamuBweitegaineKiiza&IsmaRubonavZephaniaKadoobaKiiza,CivialAppeal

No59of2009.

72.8.2. In KampalaDistrict Land Board v Venansio Babwayaka&Others, Supreme

CourtAppealNo2of2007,forexample,theappellantsappealedtotheSupremeCourton

thegrounds,amongothers,thatthelearnedjusticesoftheCourtofAppealerredinlawand

factwhentheyheldthattherespondentsarecustomaryownersofthesuitland.

72.8.3. TheCourtheld,amongothers,thattherespondentshadnotdischargedthe

burden of proving that they held customary land interests on the suit land because they

failedtoprovideevidenceofexpertopinionto‘showunderwhatkindofcustomorpractice

theyoccupiedthe landandwhetherthatcustomhadbeenrecognizedandregulatedbya

grouporclassofpersonslivinginthatarea.’

72.8.4. The Court, citingwith approval the decision of Duffus, J.A., in the case of

KinyanjuiKimanivMuiraGikanga,held:

It iswell established thatwhereAfrica customary law is neitherwellknownordocumented,itmustbeestablishedfortheCourt’sguidancebythepartyintendingtorelyonit.Itisalsotritelawthatasamatterof practice and convenience in civil cases customary law, if it isincapableofbeingjudiciallynoticed,shouldbeprovedbyevidenceofexpertopinion.


33

72.8.5. TherelianceonexpertopinionasthemainmeansofestablishinganAfrican

custom that facilitates the conveyance of land is problematic because it perpetuates the

colonialnotionofcustomarylaw,oftenseenthroughtheprismofEnglishcommonlaw.In

most communities in Uganda, there are people, whether elders or other, who have

knowledgeofthecustomsandlawsofthecommunityoneveryaspectoflife,includingland

ownershipanduse.Thesearepeoplewhohavetheexpertiseoncustomarylandtenureand

law. Indeed, thewesterneducatedexpert,usuallygleanshisorherknowledgeonAfrican

customarylawbyamongotherthingsinterviewinglocalcommunityexperts.

73. In other African countries, such as Botswana, Tanzania, and Kenya, for example,

customary land tenure is recognised but as with the case of Uganda, it is restricted and

distorted.

73.1. Botswanapurportstorecogniseandprotectcustomarylandtenurethrough

the enactment of the Tribal Lands Act, Chapter 32:02 of 1968 but section 10 of the Act

stipulates that ‘[a]ll the rights and title to land in each tribal area…shall vest in the land

boards…’andthelandboardshallholdthese‘intrustforthebenefitandadvantageofthe

citizens of Botswana and for the purpose of promoting the economic and social

developmentofallthepeoplesofBotswana.’

73.1.1. Technically, theTribal LandsActexpropriated indigenouspeoples’ landand

vested it in a landboardalien to the tribal communities and the ideaof holding lands in

trustnotonly forthetribalcommunitiesbutalsoall thecitizensofBotswana isacolonial

creation.90

73.1.2. Thus,while customary land tenure is recognised under Botswana law, it is

treatedasaninferiorcategoryoflandownershipandnotunderstooditisownright.

73.2. In the caseof Tanzania, the situation is evenmore complicatedbecauseof

severallawsthatregulatelandmatters.ThefocushereisontheLandAct,No4of1999and

theVillage LandAct (Chapter114),1999. Section3 (1)of the LandAct stipulates that ‘all

90 See, e.g., Okoth-Ogendo, supra, note 71, at p. 110.


34

land inTanzania ispublic landvested in thepresidentas trusteeonbehalfofall citizens.’

Thus,inTanzania,peopleonlyhave‘occupancyrights’,whethercustomaryorotherwise.91

73.2.1. InadditiontotheLandAct,cap113,Tanzaniahasanotherlegislationonland,

the Village Land Act, Chapter 114, which regulates, among others, ‘customary right of

occupancy’.TheActdefines‘customaryrightofoccupancy’asa‘rightofoccupancycreated

bymeansof the issuingacertificateof customary rightofoccupancyunder section27of

thisAct.’Itfurtherprovidesthatacustomaryrightofoccupancyincludesa‘deemedrightof

occupancy’ and a ‘deemed right of occupancy’means ‘the title of a Tanzanian citizen of

AfricandescentoracommunityofTanzaniancitizensofAfricandescentusingoroccupying

landunderandinaccordancewithcustomarylaw.’

73.2.2. Customary law is defined by section 4 of the Interpretation of Laws Act,

Chapter1,as

anyruleorbodyofruleswherebyrightsanddutiesareacquiredorimposed,establishedbyusageinanyAfricancommunityinTanzaniaandacceptedassuch community in general as having the force of law, including anydeclarations or modifications of customary lawmade or deemed to havebeenmadeundersection12oftheJudicatureandApplicationofLawsAct,and reference to “native law” or to “native law and custom” shall besimilarlyconstrued.’73.2.3. Section18definesthe‘incidents’ofcustomaryrightofoccupancy.Themost

relevantprovisionforthisreportissubsection1,whichstipulatesthat‘[a]customaryright

ofoccupancyisineveryrespectofequalstatusandeffecttoagrantedrightofoccupancy’.

73.2.4. Section 20 (2) of the Village Act provides in effect that the customs,

traditions,andpracticesofagivencommunityshallinformanydecisionstakeninrespectof

landheldundercustomarytenure,providedthattheyaccordwiththenationallandpolicy

andanywrittenlaw.

91 For a discussion of statutory recognition of customary tenure in Tanzania, see, e.g., Knight, supra, note 77, at p. 150 – 214.


35

73.2.5. While the law recognises customary tenure, itnotonly limits its scopebut

alsodistortsisauthenticcharacterbyintroducingthecolonialteststhatcustomarylawmust

pass tobeacceptable. Inotherwords, justas is thecasewithBotswanaandUganda, the

misconceptionsofcustomarylawandcustomarytenureareentrenchedinlegislation.

73.3. Kenya’sLandAct,No.6of2012,recognisesfourtypesoflandtenure,oneof

whichiscustomarylandrights.92Section2definescustomarylandtomean‘privatelandon

whichoneormoremembersofthefamilyhavecustomaryrightsofownership.’Thesame

section defines customary land rights as ‘rights conferred by or derived from Kenyan

customarylawwhetherformallyrecognisedbylegislationornot’.

73.3.1. CustomarytenureinKenyaenjoysequalstatuswithotherformsoftenure.

Section5(2)providesthat‘[t]hereshallbeequalrecognitionandenforcementoflandrights

arisingunderalltenuresystemsandnon-discriminationinownershipof,andaccesstoland

underalltenuresystems.’

73.3.2. Unlike Uganda, where customary land tenure is the only one that can be

converted intofreeholdtenure,section9(1)ofKenya’sLandActprovidesthat ‘[a]ny land

maybeconvertedfromonecategorytoanother’butthismustbedoneinaccordancewith

theprovisionoftheActor‘anyotherwrittenlaw.’

73.3.3. Despite the apparent equality accorded customary land tenure in Kenya’s

LandAct, it is theonly tenure subjected topassing theoldcolonial testof repugnancy to

western civilisation. Customary tenure in Kenya is only valid if it is ‘consistent with the

constitution.’

74. Indeed, the recognitionof customary land tenure inmost of theAfrican countries

southoftheSaharaDesertissubjecttoitbeing‘consistentwiththeconstitution’orwritten

law. In other words, customary land tenuremust still pass the repugnancy test that the

colonialpowersimposedonAfricanvaluessystemstheyconsiderinferiortotheirown.But

92 Section 5 (1).


36

the repugnancy test has been reformulated in constitutional language. The post-

independence constitutionsofmostof these countrieshavedraftedbeenwith theactive

participation of western countries who ensured that these documents entrenched their

dominant world views, with their inherent biases towards other world views, especially

thosethatchallengetheirhegemonyoverpeoples.

5.2.2 TheAuthenticNatureofAfricanCustomaryLandTenureandLaw

75. ArestorationofcustomarylandtenureinUgandamuststartwithanauthenticgrasp

ofitsnatureandlaw,i.e.,wemustobjectivelyunderstanditasthecommunitiesunderstand

withoutsuperimposingforeignconceptionsofpropertylaw.

76. The late Professor Okoth-Ogendo is possibly the one scholar who cogently

understoodorgraspedthecharacterandcontentofAfricancustomarylandtenureandlaw.

He starts from thebasics, how the variousAfrican communitiesunderstood landand the

resources associatedwith it: land ‘is held as a transgenerational asset’which is ‘available

exclusivelytospecificcommunities,lineagesorfamiliesoperatingascorporateentities.’93

76.1. Okoth-Ogendo explains that the ‘internal mechanism for the management

andaccessto’landor‘bodyofCommons’,ashepreferstocallit,‘wasandremaincomplex’

but provides a structural and normative analysis which reveal its authentic scope and

meaning.

76.2. Structurally,landinAfricancommunities

‘was managed and protected by a social hierarchy organized in theformofan invertedpyramidwith the tip representing the family, themiddle the clan and lineage, and thebase the community. These aredecision-making levels designed to respond to the issues regardingallocation, use and management of resources comprised within thecommonsonthebasisofascaleofneed,function,andprocess.’

76.3. ‘Atthenormativelevel’,inAfricancommunities

93 Ibid., at p. 108.


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‘access to the resources of the Commonswas open to individualsandgroupswhoqualifyonthebasisofsociallydefinedmembershipcriteriareinforced,internally,byobligationswhichareassumedonthe basis of reciprocity and to each member of the socialhierarchy.’94

76.4. Thecommunitiesunderstood thesemechanismswelland landwasused in

function, i.e., in ‘specific ways, including cultivation, grazing, hunting transit, recreation,

fishing,andbiodiversityconservation.’

77. Tounderstandcustomarylandtenureandlawinitsauthenticnatureandprotectit

bylegislationrequiresanapproachthatdoesnotconflateitwithotherformsoflandtenure,

especiallythetypeofcustomarylandtenuredevelopedthroughtheEnglishcommonlawin

countriesthatwereonceestatesofBritishcolonialpower.

78. The jurisprudenceofSouthAfricancourtsprovidesusefulguidance in this respect.

SouthAfricancourtshaverobustlyengagedwithissuesaroundcustomarylandtenureand

delivered landmark decisions that clarify the character and content of customary land

tenureinSouthAfrica.WeshallfocushereontheAlexkor&theRepublicofSouthAfricav

RichtersveldCommunity.95

78.1. InAlexkor&theRepublicofSouthAfricavRichtersveldCommunity&Others,

theSouthAfricanConstitutionalCourtelaboratedat lengthon thenatureand contentof

customary tenure and associated rights to ownership of land by certain South African

communities. In thiscase, therespondents,Richtersveldcommunity,claimeda restitution

oftheirlandundertheLandRestitutionAct,No.22of1994.Theclaimedlandwasnotthe

whole of the Richtersveld, which is ‘a large area of land in north-western corner of the

NorthernCape’96butastrip‘alongthewestcoastfromtheGariep(Orange)Riverinnorthto

justbelowPortNollothinthesouth.’97

94 Ibid. 95(CCT 19,03) [2003] ZACC 18; 2004(5)SA460(CC).96 Supra, note 95, at para. 4. 97 Ibid., at para. 5.


38

78.1.1. ThemainissuesbeforetheLandClaimsCourt(LCC)were,first,whetherthe

Richtersveldcommunitymet therequirementofsection2 (1)of theLandRestitutionAct;

and second,whether the ‘Richtersveld community constituteda communityorpartyof a

community dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially

discriminatorylawsorpractices.’98Thecommunityhadclaimedthatit‘wasdispossessedof

ownership (undercommon lawor indigenous law)or the right toexclusiveandbeneficial

occupationanduseofthesubjectlandincludingtheexploitationofitsnaturalresources.’99

78.1.2. The LCC held that the Richtersveld community met the requirement of

Section2(1)oftheLandRestitutionActandweredispossessedoftheir landafter19June

1913butthey‘failedtoprovethatthisdispossessionwastheresultofdiscriminatorylaws

orpractices.’100

78.1.3. OnappealtotheSupremeCourtofAppeal(SCA),theCourt‘foundthatthe

RichtersveldcommunityhadbeeninexclusivepossessionofthewholeoftheRichtersveld,

includingthesubjectlandpriortoandafteritsannexationbytheCrownin1847’andheld

that‘therightsofthecommunitytotheland(includingmineralsandpreciousstones)were

akin to those held under common law ownership and that they constitute “customary

interest” as defined in the Act.’101The SCA further held that ‘the manner in which the

Richtersveld community was dispossessed of the subject land amounted to racially

discriminatorypracticesasdefinedbytheAct.’102

78.1.4. Theappellants,AlexkorandthegovernmentofSouthAfrica,onappealtothe

ConstitutionalCourtcontendedthat ‘any rights in thesubject landwhich theRichtersveld

communitymighthaveheldpriortotheannexationofthatlandbytheBritishCrownwere

terminatedbyreasonofsuchannexation.’103Moreover,‘inanyevent,thedispossessionof

thesubjectlandafter19June1913wasnottheconsequenceofraciallydiscriminatorylaws

andpractices.’104

98Ibid.,atpara.7.99 Ibid. 100 Ibid., at para. 8. 101 Ibid., at para. 9. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid., at para. 10. 104 Ibid.


39

78.1.5. Seven questionswere argued in appeal in the Constitutional Court butwe

shallrestrictourselvestothemostrelevantforthisreport:‘thenaturesofrightsintheland

of the Richtersveld community prior to annexation’. 105 The Richtersveld community

contendedthat‘itsindigenouslawownershipconstitutedarealrightinlandinindigenous

laworattheveryleasta“customarylawinterest”withinthedefinitionofarightinland.’106

78.1.6. TheCourtstartedbynotingthat:

ThenatureandcontentoftherightsthattheRichtersveldcommunityheldinthesubjectlandpriortoannexationmustbedeterminedbyreferencetoindigenouslaw.Thatisthelawwhichgoverneditslandrights.Thoserightscannotbedeterminedbyreferencetocommonlaw.ThePrivyCouncilhasheld,andweagree,thatadisputebetweenindigenouspeopleastotherighttooccupyapieceoflandhastobedeterminedaccordingtoindigenouslaw“withoutimportingEnglishConceptionsofpropertylaw.”107

78.1.7. TheCourtfurthernotedthatWhile in the past indigenous law was seen through thecommon law lens, itmust be seen as an integral part of ourlaw.Likealllaw,itdependsonitsultimateforceandvalidityonthe constitution. Its validity must now be determined byreferencenottocommonlaw,buttotheconstitution.

78.1.8. TheCourtemphasizedthattounderstandindigenousrightstolandproperly,

‘these rights must be considered in their own terms and not through the prism of the

commonlaw.’108TheCourtaddressedthedangersofdoingso.Itnotedthat‘[t]hedangersof

lookingatindigenouslawthroughacommonlawprismareobvious.Thetwosystemsoflaw

developed in different situations, under different cultures and in response to different

conditions.’TheCourtbuttressthisassertionwiththePrivyCouncil’sobservationinAmodu

TijanivTheSecretary,SouthernNigeria:

“TheirLordshipsmakethepreliminaryobservationthatininterpretingthenativetitletoland,notonlyinSouthernNigeria,butotherpartsof

105Ibid.,atpara.18(c).106Ibid.,atpara.49.107 Ibid., at para. 50. 108 Ibid., at para. 55.


40

the British Empire, much caution is essential. There is a tendency,operating at timesunconsciously, to render that title conceptually interms which are appropriate only to systems which have grown upunderEnglish law.Butthistendencyhastobeheld incheckclosely…The title, such as it is, may not be that of the individual, as in thiscountry it nearly always is in some form, but may be that of acommunity….Toascertainhowfarthislatterdevelopmentofrighthasprogressed involves the study of the history of the particularcommunityanditsusagesineachcase.”109

78.1.9. TheCourtconcludedthatthat, ‘[t]hedeterminationoftherealcharacterof

indigenous title to land therefore “involves the study of the history of a particular

communityanditsusages.”Sodoesthedeterminationofitscontent.’

78.1.10. TheCourtheld,interalia,that

‘therealcharacterofthetitlethattheRichtersveldcommunitypossessed in the subject land was a right of communalownership under indigenous law. The content of that rightincludedtherighttoexclusiveoccupationanduseofthesubjectlandbythemembersofthecommunity.Thecommunityhadtherighttouseitswater,touseitslandforgrazingandhuntingandtoexploititsnaturalresources,aboveandbeneaththesurface.Itfollows therefore that prior to annexation the RichtersveldCommunity had a right of ownership in the subject land underindigenouslaw.’

79. Thus, the South African Constitutional Court explicitly recognises and affirms the

customary landtenuresystemofthe indigenouscommunitiesofSouthAfrica. Itdoesnot,

however, address the doctrine of terra nullius and how it continues to dictate land

ownershipinSouthAfrica.

80. A restoration of customary land tenure necessitates overturning the doctrine of

terra nullius,which, as discussed earlier, claims that lands thatwere not occupied in the

European sense of erecting houses on it, cultivating it, etc., were free for the taking by

Europeanpowers.Theoneprecedentthathasaddressedthedoctrineofterranulliusand 109 Ibid., at para. 56.


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most relevant to this report is the case of Mabo v The State of Queensland (No.2),110

hereinafter,theMabocase.Itisnecessarytoreviewbothcases,i.e.,MaboNo.1andMabo

No.2.

80.1. InMabo No. 1, i.e.,Mabo& Another v State of Queensland (No.1)111, the

plaintiffs, members of the Mer indigenous community inhabiting the Mer Islands, also

knownasMurrayIslandsbythecolonialauthorities,soughtlegalrecognitionandprotection

oftheirtraditionallandrightswhichtheyclaimtopossessinandovertheMerIslands.They

claim that ‘since time immemorial, the Meriam people have continuously inhabited and

exclusivelypossessedtheTorresStraitIslandsofMer(knownasMurray),DawarandWaier

and their surrounding seas, seabeds, fringing reefs.’112In addition, they claimed that that

‘since time immemorial, they havemaintained a system of laws, customs, traditions and

practicesoftheirownfordeterminingquestionsconcerningownershipof,anddealingwith,

land,seas,seabedsandreefs.’113

80.1.1. In response, the State of Queensland, while acknowledging that the Mer

IslandshavebeeninhabitedfromtimeimmemorialbypeoplecommonlyknownastheMer

orMurray Islanders,denied that thesepeoplehad lands rights to the lands they claim. It

then amended its defence, following the enactment of the Queensland Coast Islands

Declaratory Act, 1985, three years after the suit was instituted, which in effect,

retrospectively,triedtoabolishnativetitlerights,includingtheplaintiffs’Mercommunity.

80.1.2. Theplaintiffsobjected to theState’s amendeddefencebasedon the1985

ActandtwomainquestionsbeforetheAustralianHighCourtfordeterminationwere,first,

what effect, if any, did theQueensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act, 1985, have on the

plaintiffs’ interests in the land areas of the Mer or Murray Islands, and second, what

materialinconsistency,ifany,betweenthe1985Actandprovisionsofsections9and10of

theRacialDiscriminationAct,1975.

110 [1992] 175 CLR 1, HCA 23. 111 [1988] 166 CLR 168, [1988] HCA 69. 112 Ibid, at para. 2, judgment of Brennan, Toohey, and Gaudron JJ. 113 Ibid., at para. 2., judgement of Mason, C.J.


42

80.1.3. Counsel for the State of Queensland submitted that the 1985 Act ‘has the

effect that those rights which might have otherwise survived annexation in 1879 are

deemednottohavesurvivedand,forpurposesof1985,nevertohavesurvived.’114

80.1.4. TheCourtheldthatonitstrueconstruction,the1985Actextinguishedallthe

traditional legal rights inorover theMerorMurray Islands,whichwouldotherwisehave

survivedannexationandconfirmsallrightsinorovertheMerorMurrayIslandwhichwere

purportedlydisposedofunderCrownlands legislationafterannexation.115Inotherwords,

the1985Act‘extinguishesalllegalrightswhichtaketheiroriginfromnativelawandcustom

while confirmingall legal rightswhich take theirorigin fromthe relevant statutory lawof

Queensland,namely,Crownlandslegislation.’116

80.1.5. Onwhethertherewasanymaterialinconsistencebetweenthe1985Actand

sections 9 and 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, the Court found material

inconsistency between the 1985 Act and the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 because the

1985 Act extinguished the rights ofMeriam people in and over theMurray Island while

preservingtherightsofotherpeoples.Itheld,amongothers,that

Byextinguishingthetraditional legalrightsvested intheMeriampeople,the1985ActabrogatedtheimmunityoftheMeriampeoplefromarbitrarydeprivation of their legal rights in and over theMurray Islands. The Actthus impaired their human rights while leaving unimpaired thecorrespondinghumanrightsofthosewhoserightsinandovertheMurrayIslandsdidnottaketheiroriginfromthelawsandcustomsoftheMeriampeople. If we accord to the traditional rights of theMeriam people thestatusof recognised legal rightsunderQueensland law, the1985ActhastheeffectofprecludingtheMeriampeoplefromenjoyingsome,ifnotall,of their legalrights inandovertheMurray Islandswhile leavingallotherpersonsunaffected in theenjoymentof their legal rights inandover theMurrayIslands.117

80.1.6. TheCourtheldthatattemptstoextinguishthetraditionallegalrightsofthe

MeriampeopleinandovertheMurrayIslandsbythe1985Actis‘undone’bysection10(1) 114 Ibid., at para. 3 of the judgment of Brennan, Toohey, and Gaudron JJ. 115 Ibid., at para. 11. 116 Ibid., at para. 12. 117 Ibid., at para. 20, judgment of Brennan J.


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of the Racial Discrimination Act, 1975. In other words, the 1985 Act’s attempts to

extinguishtherightsoftheMeriampeopleinthelandoftheMurrayIslandsisvoidunder

section10(1)oftheRacialDiscriminationAct,1975.

80.2. InMaboNo.2, i.e.,MabovTheStateofQueensland (No.2),Australia’sHighCourt

hadtoaddressoneof thekey legal issuesthat thepartiesagreednottobeaddressedby

court,inMaboNo.1,namely,whethertheannexationoftheMurrayIslandin1August1879

vested in the Crown absolute ownership of, legal possession of, and exclusive power to

confertitletoallthelandintheMurrayIslands.118

80.2.1. TheStateofQueenslandarguedineffectthattheannexationoftheMurray

IslandhadvestedintheCrownabsoluteownership,legalpossessionof,andexclusivepower

toconfertitleto,alllandintheMurrayIsland.’Inotherwords,theQueenofEngland‘took

the landoccupiedby theMeriampeopleon1August1879without themknowingof the

expropriation’and‘theywerenolongerentitledwiththeconsentoftheCrowntocontinue

occupyingthelandtheyhadoccupiedforcenturies.’119

80.2.2. Thedefendant’sargumentswerebasedon thedoctrineofexclusive

crown ownership which posits that ‘when the crown assumed sovereignty over an

Australian colony, it became the universal and absolute beneficial owner of all the land

therein.’TheCourtcalledintoquestionthisproposition:

If the conclusion atwhich StephenC.J. arrived inAttorney-General vBrownbe right, the interestof indigenous inhabitants in the colonialland were extinguished so soon as the British subjects settled in acolony, though the indigenous inhabitants had neither ceded theirlands to the Crown nor suffered them to be taken as the spoils ofconquest. According to the cases, the common law itself took fromindigenous inhabitants any rights to occupy their traditional land,exposed them to deprivation of the religious, cultural and economicsustenancewhichthelandprovides,vestedthelandeffectivelyinthecontrolofthe imperialauthoritieswithoutanyrighttocompensationandmadetheindigenousinhabitantsintrudersintheirownhomesandmendicantsforaplacetolive.Judgedbyanycivilizedstandard,sucha

118 Ibid., at para. 23, judgment of Brennan J. 119Ibid.


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lawisunjustanditsclaimtobepartofthecommonlawtobeappliedincontemporaryAustraliamustbequestion.120

80.2.3. TheCourt,havingrejectedthedoctrineofexclusiveCrownownershipofland

incoloniesforbeingunjust,turnedtoconsider‘whetherbythecommonlaw’ofAustralia,

‘therightsand interestsoftheMeriampeopletodayaretobedeterminedonthefooting

thattheirancestorslostthetraditionalrightsandinterestsinthelandofMurrayIslandson

1August1879.’121

80.2.4. In answering this question the Court, reviewed at length, the various

theoriesanddoctrinesusedtojustifytheexpropriationofforeignlandbyEuropeanpowers,

includingthedoctrineofterranulliusandthejustificationfortheapplicationofthetheory

of terra nullius to inhabited territory122and the common law doctrine that sovereign

acquiredabsolutebeneficialownershipofalllandinthecolonies.123

80.2.4.1. The Court, noted that ‘[i]nternational law recognized conquest,

cession,andoccupationofterritorythatwasterranulliusasthreeoftheeffectivewaysof

acquiring sovereignty.’124The Court further observed that the Europeannations parcelled

out territories newly ‘discovered’ amongst themselves and ‘[t]o these territories the

Europeancolonialnationsapplied thedoctrine relating to theacquisitionof territory that

wasterranullius’and‘recognizedthesovereigntyoftherespectiveEuropeannationsover

the territory of “backward peoples” and by State practice, permitted the acquisition of

sovereigntyofsuchterritorybyoccupationratherthanbyconquest.’125

80.2.4.2. TheCourtexaminedsomeofthe justificationsfortheapplicationof

thetheoryofterranulliustoinhabitedlandsorterritorybutfocusedonthejustificationthat

the ‘new territories could be claimed by occupation if the land were uncultivated, for

Europeanshadarighttobringslandsintoproductioniftheywereleftuncultivatedbythe

120 Ibid., at para. 28, judgment of Brennan J. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid., at para. 33 – 46. 123 Ibid., at para. 31ff. 124 Ibid., at para. 33.125 Ibid.


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indigenous inhabitants.’126This, the Court noted, was an expanded version of Vattel’s

originalconceptualisationofterranulliustoconstituteonlyuninhabitedterritoryorlands.127

80.2.4.3. TheCourtfurtherobservedthattheexpandedtheoryofterranullius

wasfurtherbuttressedwithanothertheory,namelythattheindigenousinhabitantsofthe

territories expropriated were backwards or barbarians or ‘so low on the scale of social

organization’ to deny them their proprietary rights in the lands they have inhabited for

millennia:

Astheindigenousinhabitantsofasettledcolonywereregarded“lowinthe scale of social organization”, they and their occupancy of coloniallandwere ignored in considering the title to land in a settled colony.Ignoring those rights and interests, the Crown’s sovereignty over aterritorywhich had been acquired under the enlarged notion of terranulliuswas equatedwith the Crown’s ownership of the lands therein,because, as Stephen C.J. said, therewas “no other proprietor of suchlands.128

80.2.4.4. TheCourtrejectedthistheorybecauseitwasbasedondiscrimination

anddenigrationoftheindigenousinhabitants:

Thetheorythattheindigenousinhabitantsofa“settled”colonyhadnoproprietary interest in the land thus depended on discriminatorydenigrationofthe indigenous inhabitants, theirsocialorganizationandcustoms.Asthebasisofthetheory is false infactandunacceptable inoursociety,there isachoiceof legalprincipletobemadeinthiscase.This Court can either apply the existing authorities and proceed toinquire whether theMeriam people are higher “in the scale of socialorganization”thantheAustralianAborigineswhoseclaimswere“utterlydisregarded” by existing authorities or the Court can overrule existingauthorities, discarding the distinction between inhabited colonies thatwereterranulliusandthosewhichwerenot.12980.2.4.5. TheCourt, approvingly adopting thedictumof JudgeAmmoun,Vice

Presidentof the InternationalCourtof Justice (ICJ) intheWesternSaharaCase, ‘that“the

conceptofterranullius,employedatallperiods, tothebrinkofthetwentiethcentury, to

126 Ibid. 127 Ibid. 128Ibid., at para. 39, judgment of Brenna J.129 Ibid.


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justify conquest and colonization, stands condemned’, concludes that the theory of terra

nulliusno‘longercommandsgeneralsupport’.130

80.2.5. The Court also rejected the common law doctrine that the sovereign or

Crown acquired absolute beneficial ownership of all land in the inhabited territories by

indigenouspeopleseitherbecausethereisallegedly“nootherproprietor”or‘alllandinthe

colonyisthepatrimonyofthenation’:

ItwasbyfasteningonthenotionthatasettledcolonywasterranulliusthatitwaspossibletopredicateoftheCrowntheacquisitionoflandina colony alreadyoccupiedby indigenous inhabitants. Itwas only thehypothesis that therewasnobody inoccupationthat itcouldbesaidthat the Crown was the owner because there was no other. If thathypothesis is rejected, thenotion that sovereignty carriedownershipinitswakemustberejectedtoo.131

80.3. Afterathoroughreviewofthevarioustheoreticalanddoctrinaljustifications

forexpropriatingthelandsinhabitedbynon-Europeansintheterritoriestheyoccupied,and

especiallytheMeriampeople,theCourtheld,amongothers,that:

the Meriam people are entitled as against the whole world topossession,occupation,useandenjoymentoftheislandofMerexceptfortheparceloflandleasedtotheTrusteesotheAustralianBoardofMissions and those parcels of land (if any) which have validlyappropriated for use for administrative purposes the use ofwhich isinconsistentwiththecontinuedenjoymentoftherightsandprivilegesoftheMeriampeopleundernativetitle.

80.4. The implicationof thisholding is that theCourtoverturns thecenturiesold

theoryofterranulliusandrecognisesthetitleoftheMeriampeopletothelandstheyhave

inhabitedforcenturies.

130 Ibid., at para. 40. 131 Ibid.


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6 CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Conclusion

81. First, customary land tenure as practiced by indigenous peoples is recognised by

international legalprecedentscreatedbyregionalhumanrightsandeconomiccommunity

courtsasanautonomousformof landownershipandusewhosevalidityderivesfromthe

lawandcustomsoftherespectiveindigenouscommunities.Thesecourtsalsorecognisethat

customarylandtenurecangiverisetobothindividualandcollectivepropertyrightswhich

areprotectedbytherespectiveregionalhumanrightsinstrumentsand,insomecases,the

constitutionsofrespectivecountries.Furthermore,theseprecedentsaffirmtheobligations

of States to recognise and protect the customary land tenure rights of the indigenous

communitiesintheirterritories,includingtheobligationtodelimit,demarcate,andregister

the lands of the indigenous peoples and provide effective remedies in law so that

indigenouspeoplescanvindicatetheirrightstotheirlandswhenviolated.

81.1. There are also specific international treaties that guarantee the right to

customary landtenureof indigenouspeoples. Inadditiontospecific internationaltreaties,

certainprovisionsofinternationalhumanrightsinstruments,suchastheAfricanCharteron

HumanandPeoplesRightsandtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,can

be interpreted to extend protection to customary land tenure rights for any given

communityinSub-SaharanAfrican,includingtheAcholicommunityinnorthernUganda.

81.2. The character and status of customary land tenure in international law,

however,remainsinferioranddistorted.International law,especiallythroughthedoctrine

of terra nullius, facilitated colonialism and created the fiction that indigenous inhabitants

did not possess proprietary interests in the lands they lived in for centuries. This in turn

allowedtheimpositionofcoloniallawsandlegalsystemontheterritoryofthecommunities

and systematically eroded and, in some contexts, explicitly outlawed or denied the

existenceofthecustomsandlawsoftheinhabitants.


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81.3. Themajor shortcoming of the international legal precedents on customary

land tenure rights and specific treaties on indigenous and tribal peoples is that they

exclusively focus on indigenous and tribal peoples. Other communities, not technically

indigenous and tribal peoples, such asmany of the communities in Uganda, such as the

Acholi,maynotbedirectlycoveredbytheseprecedents,savethoseofgeneralhumanrights

instruments.

81.4. Despite thismajor flaw,however, the ideasgeneratedby theseprecedents

provides useful roadmaps that may be innovatively deployed to make the case for

advancing theprotectionof thecustomary land tenure rightsof communities suchas the

AcholiofnorthernUganda.

82. Second,someAfricancountries,includingUganda,recognisecustomarylandtenure

and have taken steps to protect it in both their constitutions and land legislation. These

laws, however, entrench the colonial distortions of customary land tenure and law and

perpetuate the doctrine of terra nullius and certain common law doctrines that denied

indigenous inhabitants proprietary interests in the land they inhabited based on

‘discriminatory denigration of the indigenous inhabitants, their social organization, and

custom.’

82.1. Insomeofthecourtcases,especiallyinUganda,bothcourtsandlawyersfail

tograsp that customary land tenureand titlearenota creatureof statuteor theEnglish

common law. Thus, they confuseor conflate ownership andoccupation as understood in

Englishcommonlawandpropertylawwiththeauthenticunderstandingoftheseconcepts

bythespecificindigenouscommunities.

6.2 Recommendations83. Inthelightofthereviewofinternationallegalprecedentsoncustomarylandtenure

rights, thenatureand statusof customary land tenure in international anddomestic law,

anddoctrinalworkofscholars,fourmainrecommendationsaresuggested:


49

84. First,amendArticle237oftheConstitutionofUganda1995andsections1,3,and27

oftheLandAct,1998,asamended,to:

84.1. provide that customary land tenure in is an intergenerational asset amongst

certain communities of Uganda that is managed at different levels of social

organisationwithineachcommunity;

84.2. provide that customary land tenure is based on a notion of ancestral ties

betweenthe landandpersonwhowasborn thereandremainsattachedthere

andmustonedayreturntothelandtobeunitedwithhisorherancestors;this

linkisthebasisoftitleandownershipoftheland;thus,thereshouldbeexplicit

provision in the law that customary land tenureof thevarious communitiesof

Ugandaisnotcreatedbygrantnorisitacommonlawtenure;

84.3. provide that customary land tenure is equal in status, validity, and weight to

other formsof land tenure,even if it isnot registered; forcenturies,European

colonial powers and their intellectuals crafted the fiction that indigenous

inhabitants in the territories theyexpropriatedhadneitherproprietary interest

inthelandtheyinhabitednoranylawregulatingaccesstoandownershipofland

akintotheirown;

84.4. provide that customary land tenure can give raise to individual and collective

property rights capable of protection by Article 26 of the Constitution on the

righttoproperty;

84.5. vest management of land in the traditional three-tier community mechanism

comprising the family, the clan, and the community; this tested and resilient

mechanism should be protected and not denigrated; imposition of new

administrativestructuresoutsidethesethreelevelsofsocialorganisationineach

communitywillonlyunderminetheinstitutionofcustomarylandtenureandlaw;

84.6. provide that the customary law of the various communities is an original and

independent source of norms within the Ugandan legal system because the


50

customary law of the various communities in Uganda rare not static; they are

‘living’andorganicandobservedbythepeoplewhocreatedit;

84.6.1. the colonial powers denigrated African custom on the basis that it was

repugnant to their civilisation. Western scholarship is replete with

accusationsagainstcommunitycustoms,manyofwhichtheymisunderstood

orcriticisedfromtheperspectiveoftheirowncultureandworldview;

84.6.2. Sadly, African elite have bought into the denigration of their own cultures

andenactedconstitutionsthatplaceunduerestrictionsonAfrican lawsand

custom. Whatever justifications and doctrines were used by the colonial

powers to refuse to recogniseour laws, customs, and rights in land,unjust

anddiscriminatorydoctrinesdenigratingourvaluesystemsshouldnolonger

beaccepted.

84.7. provide for thesurvey,delimitation,anddemarcationofcustomary landof the

various communitiesofUganda. Thiswill enhance the recognitionof the landof

eachcommunityandprotectagainstlandgrabbing.Registrationandcertificates

ofownershipshouldnotbemademandatory;norshouldtherebefixeddatesor

deadlinesforcommunitiestosurveyanddemarcatetheirlands;

84.8. provideforprotectionagainstarbitrarycompulsoryacquisitionoflandownedby

communitiesundertheircustomsandlaws.Whereagivencommunity’s landis

neededforlegitimatepublicinterestprojects,provisionshouldbemadeforprior

consultation and informed consent without intimidation of any kind by the

authorities.

85. Second, trainUgandan judgesand lawyerson theauthenticnatureandcontentof

customary land tenure to eliminate the continued treatment of customary tenure as an

inferiorformofownershipandendconfusingitwithcommonlawnotionsofownershipand

occupation.


51

86. Third, enact specific legislation, e.g., a Land Restitution Act, to overturn and

eradicatethedoctrineofterranulliuswhichcontinuestoinfluencetheapproachtodealing

with customary land tenure in Uganda. This legislation should explicitly recognise the

proprietary character of customary land ownership on its own right. This will rectify the

injustice that customary communities have suffered for over a centurywhen the colonial

powers deliberately refused to recognise the proprietary character of African communal

landownership.

87. Fourth, there is urgent need for Ugandan scholars to undertake research on

customarylawandtenureinUgandaandclosethecurrentgapandpaucityofauthoritative

worksonthiscriticalarea.


52

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Perell,PaulM.,‘StareDecisisandtheTechniquesofLegalReasoningandLegalArgument’(1987)2(2),LegalResearchUpdate11,asreproducedwithpermissionbyTheCanadianLegalResearchandWritingGuide,online:<http://legalresearch.org/writing-analysis/stare-decisis-techniques/>.Pienaar,Gerrit,‘TheMethodologyUsedtoInterpretCustomaryLandTenure’(2012),15(3)PER/PELJ153–183.Schiff,DavidN.,‘Socio-LegalTheory:SocialStructureandLaw’(1976),39TheModernLawReview287–310.UnitedNationsHumanRightsCommittee,GeneralCommentNo.23:TheRightsofMinorities(Art.27):-08/04/94,Onlinehttp://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f21%2fRev.1%2fAdd.5&Lang=en>.UnitedNations,UnitedNationsTreatySeries,999UnitedNationsTreatySeries171.Vattel,Emerde,TheLawofNations,Or,PrinciplesoftheLawofNature,AppliedtotheConductandAffairsofNationsandSovereigns,withThreeEarlyEssaysontheOriginandNatureNaturalLawandonLuxury(LibertyFundInc.2008),BookI.Wicomb,Wilmien&Smith,Henk,‘CustomaryCommunitiesas‘Peoples’andtheirCustomaryTenureas‘Culture’:WhatwecandowiththeEndoroisDecision’(2011),11AfricanHumanRightsLawJournal422–446.Wily,LizAlden,‘CustomaryLandTenureintheModernWorld:RightstoResourcesinCrisis:ReviewingtheFateofCustomaryTenureinAfrica–Brief#1of5’(2012),online:https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/7713/customary%20land%20tenure%20in%20the%20modern%20world.pdf?sequence=1>.

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