Arbitration Independent Clause

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    Can an employer compel arbitration in accordance with an arbitration clause in a contract that

    has terminated? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently answered this question

    in the affirmative.

    InHuffman v. The Hilltop Cos., LLC,a group of plaintiffs filed a class and collective action

    under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Ohios wage and hour law for allegedly unpaidovertime due to their misclassification as independent contractors. Each plaintiff had signed a

    professional services contract agreement that contained an arbitration clause. The agreement

    ended upon termination of the independent contractor relationship, which preceded their lawsuit.

    The agreement contained a survival clause that specifically identified a number of provisions

    that survived its expiration. Although the arbitration clause was not included in the list of

    provisions in the survival clause, the defendant moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the

    arbitration clause survived the termination of the agreement. The district court disagreed and

    denied the motion, holding that the survival clause was limited to those provisions specifically

    listed.

    On appeal, the Sixth Circuit overruled the district court, determining that the arbitration clause

    survived the termination of the agreement. The court held that, despite the specific list of

    provisions in the survival clause, the language did not constitute a sufficiently clear intention

    that the list was exclusive. The court noted that other non-enumerated clauses, such as the non-

    competition, severability, and integration clauses, survived contract termination. Without a cl ear

    intention to the contrary, the strong federal presumption favoring arbitration embodied in the

    Federal Arbitration Act resulted in resolving the doubt as to the parties intentions in favor of

    arbitration.

    As the Sixth Circuit noted, its decision was consistent with the Supreme Courts decisioninLitton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB.The 1991 opinion held, in the context of a collective

    bargaining agreement, that the duty to arbitrate does not automatically expire upon the

    termination of the agreement and that broadly worded arbitration clauses contain a presumption

    of arbitrability if the dispute arose under the agreement. Other circuit and district courts have

    reached similar results, finding that arbitration clauses survive contract termination.

    Although theHuffman case is a welcome result for employers and consumer financial services

    companies that seek broad application of their arbitration agreements, it is not certain that other

    courts would reach the same outcome in considering the parties intentions in light of a specific

    survival clause that fails to mention the arbitration agreement. We recommend that employers

    and other companies review their contracts to confirm that any survivor provisions specificallyreference mandatory arbitration.

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    Court Finds Restrictive Arbitration Clause

    Unenforceable

    ByJessica B. Summers,Associate

    For the many companies that utilize arbitration clauses in their independent contractor

    agreements or employment agreements, a recent decision from the U.S. District Court for

    the Eastern District of Virginia serves as an important reminder of the care that must be

    taken in crafting these provisions. Otherwise, what was meant to provide a cost-savings

    mechanism for dispute resolution may end up actually increasing litigation expenses

    significantly. As this case demonstrates, the litigants spent substantial time (and no doubt

    expense) litigating the enforceability of the arbitration provision even before getting to the

    merits of the case.

    In the case of Winston v. Academi Training Center, Inc. (2013 WL 989999)(memorandum opinion availablehere), the District Court refused to enforce an arbitration

    clause contained in the independent contractor agreements between the defendant and the

    two plaintiffs. The District Court concluded that, because the arbitration clauses barred any

    discovery and required the plaintiffs to pay the costs regardless of the outcome, the clauses

    were both counter to federal statute and unconscionable.

    This appears to be the first case in which a court within the Fourth Circuit has considered

    the enforceability of an arbitration clause containing such a discovery prohibition and a fee

    shifting provision. However, it is not the first time that a court within the circuit has declined

    to enforce an arbitration clause on the basis that it overly favors the employer and impedes

    the legal rights of an employee or independent contractor. The Fourth Circuit itself has

    declined to enforce arbitration clauses which require that the arbitrator be selected from a

    list produced by the employer or that the arbitration proceed under broad rules set by the

    employer.

    The ongoing Winston case centers on Fair Claims Act (the FCA) and state law retaliation

    claims brought by two independent contractors against Academi Training Center, Inc

    (Academi), a government contractor. Both plaintiffs entered into independent contractor

    agreements with Academi to provide firearm instruction in relation to a security contract

    between Academi and the U.S. Department of State. The plaintiffs and other firearm

    instructors were responsible for observing shooters performances and preparing reports

    which Academi submitted to the State Department.

    Plaintiffs claim to have witnessed other Academi contractors submitting false records and

    one of the plaintiffs claims to have been asked to complete a report using made-up

    numbers. The plaintiffs reported these incidents to their supervisor and were terminated the

    next day with the explanation that they had failed to report the fraud sooner and had

    http://www.paleyrothman.com/attorneys/jessica-summers/http://www.paleyrothman.com/attorneys/jessica-summers/http://www.paleyrothman.com/attorneys/jessica-summers/http://www.paleyrothman.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Winston-v.-Academi.pdfhttp://www.paleyrothman.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Winston-v.-Academi.pdfhttp://www.paleyrothman.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Winston-v.-Academi.pdfhttp://www.paleyrothman.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Winston-v.-Academi.pdfhttp://www.paleyrothman.com/attorneys/jessica-summers/
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    allegedly participated in the fraud. The plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court claiming

    retaliation in violation of the FCA and state law.

    In determining whether to enforce the arbitration clauses of the plaintiffs independent

    contractor agreements, the Court distinguished between the plaintiffs FCA claims and their

    state law claims. The Court recognized that, because FCA claims are subject to the Federal

    Arbitration Act, doubts about the enforceability of an arbitration clause as to FCA claims are

    generally resolved in favor of arbitration. The Court emphasized however, that an

    arbitration clause should not be enforced if such arbitration would deny the plaintiff his or

    her rights under the FCA.

    The Court identified just such a situation in the Winston case. The Court was particularly

    troubled that the arbitration clause did not allow discovery, particularly in light of the fact

    that the plaintiffs would need the allegedly falsified documents to prove their claims and

    that these documents would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in the absence of

    discovery. Further, the Court also found that, as applied, the arbitration clause wouldfrustrate Congressional intent by placing the financial burden of the arbitration on the

    plaintiff. Counter to the arbitration clauses provision, the FCA, like many of the federal

    employment law statutes including Title VII and the ADA, contains a fee shifting provision

    which awards attorney fees to successful plaintiffs.

    In considering the application of the arbitration provisions to the plaintiffs state law

    claims, the Court began by refusing to enforce the forum selection clauses also contained in

    the independent contractor agreements. The Court made this decision on the basis that the

    clauses called for the application of New York law despite the facts that Academi was a

    Delaware corporation headquartered in Virginia, that neither plaintiff was from New Yorkand that the agreements were signed in North Carolina. Applying North Carolina law, the

    Court concluded that the same aspects of the arbitration clause that rendered it

    unenforceable as to FCA claims would also make the state law claims unfairly difficult to

    pursue and thus make the enforcement of the arbitration clause unconscionable.

    The Court refused to sever the problematic discovery and fee shifting provisions and

    enforce the remainder of the arbitration clauses because both the Fourth Circuit and North

    Carolina courts have taken the position that courts should not engage in rewriting

    unconscionable contracts.

    Winston presents yet another example of what Fourth Circuit courts consider to be

    unenforceable arbitration provisions. Employers would be well advised to take this

    opportunity to review and revise any of their own arbitration provisions that contain broad

    restrictions or limits that could render the provision unenforceable.

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