ARBITRAGE DE GRIEF

EN VERTU DU CODE DU TRAVAIL DU QUÉBEC (L.R.Q., c. C-27)

ENTRE : UNIVERSITÉ McGILL

(L’ « EMPLOYEUR ») ET :

ASSOCIATION ACCRÉDITÉE DU PERSONNEL NON ENSEIGNANT DE L’UNIVERSITÉ McGILL (MUNACA)

(LE « SYNDICAT »)

ET : CHE DORAN

(LA « PLAIGNANTE»)

OBJET : DIFFÉREND ENTRE LA PLAIGNANTE ET LE SYNDICAT SUR LA

POURSUITE DE L’ARBITRAGE GRIEFS NOS : 01-135-004, 01-135-005, 01-135-198 et 02-505-197

______________________________________________________________________________

SENTENCE ARBITRALE INTERLOCUTOIRE ______________________________________________________________________________ Tribunal Me Serge Brault, arbitre

Comparutions pour l’Employeur : Me André Baril (McCarthy, Tétrault),

procureur, assisté de : Mme Diana Dutton, directrice, administration Mme Joséphine Leake, gérante

Comparutions pour l’Association : M. Dot Luk, président, ainsi que

Me Josée Lavallée (Melaçon, Marceau), procureurs, assistés de : M. Raymond MacKay, v.-président MUNACA

Comparution pour la plaignante Mme Che Doran, pour elle-même Dates d’audience : 10 octobre 2003; 13, 16 avril et 26 mai 2004 Lieu de l’audience: Montréal (Québec) Dernière correspondance : 4 novembre 2004 Date de la sentence : 2 décembre 2004

Adjudex inc. 301-1202-QP S/A 468-04

Page: 2

I

INTRODUCTION

[1] La présente sentence porte sur un incident survenu en cours d’instruction. Le Tribunal est

saisi de quatre griefs présentés par l’Association accréditée du personnel non enseignant de

l’Université McGill, ci-après le « Syndicat » ou « MUNACA », au nom de madame Che Doran,

la « plaignante ». Les griefs ont été déposés suite au retour au travail de la plaignante après une

absence maladie de longue durée. Selon la plaignante, l’Université McGill, « l’Employeur », ne

l’aurait pas vraiment réintégrée comme elle s’y devait dans le poste qu’occupait la plaignante

avant son départ en ne lui redonnant pas toutes les responsabilités qu’elle avait avant ni les

droits, privilèges et conditions matérielles de travail dont elle jouissait auparavant, notamment

son ancien bureau, son équipement informatique; ou encore, en la privant de la formation

nécessaire à la reprise ordonnée de son travail.

[2] Un différend est apparu après trois jours d’audience entre la plaignante et son syndicat

sur la conduite du dossier. Pour les raisons qui apparaissent plus loin, le Tribunal a jugé bon de

réserver une audience formelle à la résolution de cette question et d’y consacrer la présente

sentence interlocutoire.

[3] En résumé, madame Doran, qui jusque là avait été représentée par une avocate désignée

et retenue par son syndicat, nous a fait savoir qu’elle ne souhaitait plus être représentée de la

sorte et qu’elle désirait plutôt l’être d’une façon qui rencontrerait sa propre vision des choses et

par un procureur qu’elle désignerait, mais aux frais du Syndicat.

[4] Le Syndicat, qui a accepté que madame Doran puisse se représenter elle-même pour la

poursuite des audiences, tout en y demeurant lui-même présent et représenté, refuse toutefois de

défrayer les coûts de la désignation d’un avocat que choisirait cette dernière.

[5] Les dispositions pertinentes du Code du travail du Québec, L.R.Q., chapitre C-27 sont les

suivantes :

« 47.2 Une association accréditée ne doit pas agir de mauvaise foi ou de manière arbitraire ou discriminatoire, ni faire preuve de négligence grave à l’endroit de

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salariés compris dans une unité de négociation qu’elle représente, peu importe qu’ils soient ses membres ou non. 47.5 Si la Commission estime que l’association a contrevenu à l’article 47.2, elle peut autoriser le salarié à soumettre sa réclamation à un arbitre nommé par le ministre pour décision selon la convention collective comme s’il s’agissait d’un grief. Les articles 100 à 101.10 s’appliquent, compte tenu des adaptations nécessaires. L’association paie les frais encourus par le salarié. La Commission peut, en outre, rendre toute autre ordonnance qu’elle juge nécessaire dans les circonstances. 100.2. L'arbitre doit procéder en toute diligence à l'instruction du grief et, sauf disposition contraire de la convention collective, selon la procédure et le mode de preuve qu'il juge appropriés. [...]

100.5. L'arbitre doit donner à l'association accréditée, à l'employeur et au salarié intéressé l'occasion d'être entendus. Si un intéressé ci-dessus dûment convoqué par un avis écrit d'au moins cinq jours francs de la date, de l'heure et du lieu où il pourra se faire entendre ne se présente pas ou refuse de se faire entendre, l'arbitre peut procéder à l'audition de l'affaire et aucun recours judiciaire ne peut être fondé sur le fait qu'il a ainsi procédé en l'absence de cet intéressé. [...] 100.12. Dans l'exercice de ses fonctions l'arbitre peut: [...] g) rendre toute autre décision, y compris une ordonnance provisoire, propre à sauvegarder les droits des parties.

[6] Les dispositions pertinentes de la convention collective sont les suivantes :

Article 10 Procédure de règlement des griefs et des mésententes 10.01 Portée de la procédure : C'est le ferme désir des parties de régler équitablement et dans les plus brefs délais tout grief ou toute mésentente. [...]

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(b) À toutes les étapes de la procédure, le Syndicat peut formuler le grief ou la mésentente en français ou en anglais. La réponse du représentant de l'Université est donnée en français ou en anglais, selon la langue utilisée par le Syndicat. 10.02 Étapes de la procédure : (a) Le salarié qui a un problème relatif à l'application de ses conditions de travail pouvant donner naissance à un grief ou à une mésentente est encouragé à discuter avec son supérieur immédiat pour tenter de le résoudre. Le salarié peut être accompagné de deux (2) représentants syndicaux s'il le désire. Si cette discussion informelle entre le salarié et son supérieur immédiat ne permet pas de régler le problème ou que le salarié préfère ne pas discuter de la question avec son supérieur immédiat, le Syndicat peut alors recourir à la procédure de

règlement des griefs et des mésententes. (b) Étape 1 : Le Syndicat doit soumettre le grief ou la mésentente par écrit au chef de service ou au directeur du salarié dans un délai de cinquante-cinq (55) jours ouvrables de la date à laquelle il a pris connaissance de l'événement qui y a donné lieu, mais au plus tard six (6) mois après l'occurrence de cet événement Le chef de service ou directeur doit rendre une décision par écrit dans les dix (10) jours ouvrables de la réception du grief ou de la mésentente. (c) Étape 2 : Si le grief ou la mésentente n'est pas réglé par la décision du chef de service ou du directeur ou que le chef de service ou le directeur ne répond pas dans le délai prescrit de dix (10) jours ouvrables, le Syndicat doit alors référer le

grief ou la mésentente au doyen ou au cadre administratif dirigeant dans les dix (10) jours ouvrables de la décision rendue en vertu de l'étape 1 ou, selon le cas, à l'expiration du délai prescrit Le doyen ou cadre administratif dirigeant doit rendre une décision dans les dix (10) jours ouvrables de la réception du grief ou de la mésentente. (d) Étape 3 : Si le grief ou la mésentente n'est pas réglé par la décision du doyen ou cadre administratif dirigeant ou que le doyen ou le cadre administratif dirigeant ne rend pas de décision dans ce délai de dix (10) jours ouvrables, le

Syndicat doit saisir le Service des relations avec le personnel du grief ou de la mésentente dans tes dix (10) jours ouvrables de la décision prise en vertu de l'étape 2 ou, selon le cas, à l'expiration du délai prescrit. Le Service des relations avec le personnel doit rendre une décision par écrit dans les dix (10) jours ouvrables de la réception du grief ou de la mésentente. (e) Étape 4 (arbitrage) : Si le grief ou la mésentente n'est pas réglé par la décision du Service des relations avec le personnel ou que ce dernier ne rend pas de décision dans ces dix (10) jours ouvrables, le Syndicat doit, dans les vingt (20)

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jours ouvrables de la décision ou, selon le cas, à l'expiration du délai prescrit, soumettre au Service des relations avec le personnel une demande d'arbitrage signée. Ladite demande doit comprendre une copie du grief ou de la mésentente. 10.03 Procédure de règlement des griefs et des mésententes: [...] (c) Tout règlement intervenu entre les parties durant la procédure de règlement des griefs et des mésententes doit faire l'objet d'un écrit signé par les deux

parties. 10.04 Procédures d'arbitrage : Les parties conviennent d'être entendues par un arbitre unique choisi par l'Université et le Syndicat. À défaut d'entente quant au choix d'un arbitre, l'une ou l'autre des parties peut exiger que l'arbitre soit désigné par le ministre du Travail conformément aux dispositions du Code du travail du Québec. 10.05 Compétence de l'arbitre : (a) En rendant une décision sur tout grief ou toute mésentente, l'arbitre doit prendre en considération la lettre et l'esprit de la convention collective. Pour les mésententes sur des conditions de travail non prévues à la présente convention, l'arbitre doit tenir compte des principes de justice et d'équité ainsi que les politiques générales de relations de travail qui se dégagent de la présente convention. (b) En rendant une décision au sujet d'un grief, l'arbitre ne doit pas soustraire, amender ou modifier quoi que ce soit dans la présente convention. [...] 10.08 Les honoraires et les frais de l'arbitre sont répartis également entre les parties.» [Les caractères gras sont du soussigné]

II

PREUVE

[7] Un bref rappel des procédures à ce jour éclairera la suite.

[8] Le 10 octobre 2003, lors de la première journée d’audience, le Tribunal a jugé qu’en

vertu de l’article 100.5 du Code du travail, une tierce personne, collègue de la plaignante, visée

Page: 6 par certaines allégations ou conclusions des griefs, était une personne intéressée par ces

procédures. Elle se devait donc d’en être formellement notifiée, ce qui n’avait pas été fait.

L’audience fut ajournée afin que l’avis approprié soit donné, ce qui fut fait. Une fois informée

des procédures, la personne en question a fait savoir qu’elle n’avait pas l’intention d’être

présente aux audiences ni d’intervenir au dossier.

[9] L’instruction s’est poursuivie le 13 avril 2004 avec le début de la présentation de la

preuve syndicale. Madame Doran a été citée comme premier témoin par le Syndicat. Son

interrogatoire en chef s’est poursuivi et terminé le 16 avril alors qu’elle a aussi été contre-

interrogée par l’Employeur. À la fin du contre-interrogatoire, le Syndicat a fait savoir qu’il

n’allait pas ré-interroger la plaignante et la cause fut ajournée.

[10] L’audience devait alors se poursuivre le 26 mai suivant.

[11] Toutefois, suivant la preuve présentée dans le cadre du présent incident, madame Doran

a, à compter du 17 avril 2004, transmis à la procureure du Syndicat une série de courriels et de

documents concernant le déroulement des audiences et la preuve présentée jusque là.

Notamment, la plaignante soulignait à Me Lavallée l’importance qu’aurait eu à ses yeux le fait

d’être réinterrogée à la suite de son contre-interrogatoire du 16 avril et son opinion sur le fait

qu’elle désapprouvait fortement de ne pas l’avoir été. Elle écrit dans un courriel daté du 17 avril :

“I had a chance to reflect on the abrupt termination of the hearing yesterday at McGill University. I have two disturbing concerns about Day #2 - the damages phase and the lack of redirect examination to rehabilitate me. When I asked you what would be on the schedule for the morning session in terms of your contribution to the hearing, you did not mention that the damages phase would be upcoming. That's why I was confused when you asked the question. I held back thinking that it was a cursory summation of the damages I suffered. There is much much more I did not testify to. I anticipated that the damages phase was going to be at the end - as in May 26th. I was not prepared for it at all and thus was unable to satisfactorily shift from McGill's actions to its effect on me without preparation. Have I been put at a disadvantage in that regard ? The second issue is regarding no redirect examination. On our way back from lunch, I asked you what your role would be after the cross examination was completed by Maitre Baril. In that vein, I let answers stand in cross-examination

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anticipating that you would clarify and amplify the whole truth in redirect examination. I've had an opportunity to think about the cross-examination testimony that I strongly feel cannot and should not stand alone. As I understand legal procedure, you cannot in your closing arguments refer to anything new information or facts unless I already testified to it. Maitre Baril has the right to object in overruling you. Also, there is more evidence I can produce to supplement the work environment issue such as the desk order Yvonne Ng completed form. I have made many notes that I will organize and send to you on Monday evening at the latest after I review McGill's evidence. One particular issue that the arbitrator cannot consider alone is that the CSST made an unfair decision regarding my two work injuries. When the CSST called me, the agent was contemplating if I had an industrial accident or an occupational disease. When she called Yvonne Ng shortly after who prejudiced her in terms of not signing the accident report (and who knows what else), the CSST immediately refused my claim. (The neck injury is a mirror image of the 1997 accident that was accepted by the CSST yet 2001 was the opposite.) I also did not have the opportunity to state that the CSST withheld subpoenaed documents from the CLP and that 3 McGill managers (including Yvonne Ng) prompted a revision of my CLP case. One document was a laundry list of modifications to my work environment that Yvonne Ng suggested in the early Spring. Yvonne Ng knew I needed these changes even before Joe Vincelli (Environmental Safety Office) came to evaluate my office. Did Mr. Brault pick up that everyone who comes in contact with the Dean's Office suddenly becomes hostile and unaccommodating towards me? I am requesting that the May 26th arbitration session commence with your redirect examination of me. This would require a prepatory session within the next 5 weeks. Thank you. »

[12] Madame Doran a réécrit à Me Lavallée notamment les 18, 19 et 20 avril. Le 29, elle lui

demande dans les termes suivants de bien vouloir répondre aux courriels précédents :

« I would appreciate your response to 3 emails I wrote regarding arbitration 0 subpoenas, redirect testimony, review of defense evidence, etc. I have to coordinate with a lawyer I’m bringing on board. I would appreciate a date for the arbitration prep session. […]”

[13] Madame Doran réécrit à Me Lavallée, notamment à ce sujet, les 3, 5 et 10 mai suivant.

[14] Le 12 mai 2004, le président du Syndicat, monsieur Dot Luk écrit à la plaignante au sujet

de ses communications avec Me Lavallée:

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“I am writing this letter in response to several e-mails that you sent to MLTNACA and MUNACA's lawyer Me Josée Lavallée concerning the arbitration before arbitrator Brault. MUNACA filed four (4) grievances on your behalf, related to various modifications to your working conditions that occurred upon your return to work after an absence due to disability. Me Lavallée has been mandated to act on your behalf in this case. In the course of the hearing of these grievances before the arbitrator, MUNACA's attorney prepared your testimony and discussed the litigation strategy with you and MUNACA representatives. At the time you agreed with this strategy. I have since been informed that you now question this strategy as well as the unfolding of the hearing. MUNACA has full confidence in Me Lavallée's legal opinion regarding the direction of the case. We have also been informed that the comments made in your e-mails have not modified the way in which our lawyer intends to proceed in this file. We consider her legal opinion to be in your interest. I ask for your co-operation in order that we may continue with the hearing of the grievances as suggested by Me Lavallée, MUNACA takes your interests very seriously and we believe the best route is to follow our lawyer's advice in the circumstances. Finally, I ask that in the future you refrain from sending e-mails directly to Me Lavallée and from communicating with her secretary. Like any other member, your communication with our attorneys should be done through MUNACA. In this case, you should communicate with me. »

[15] Le 19 mai, madame Doran répond au président du Syndicat :

1) You state that Maitre Lavallée "prepared" my testimony. Short shrift was given to the grievance regarding my work station in both the September and March preparatory sessions. This became an obvious flaw that was highlighted once Maitre Baril representing McGill University focused on this during cross-examination. 2) You state that Maitre Lavallée "discussed the litigation strategy" with me. On the Sherbrooke Street sidewalk?? Or was this MUNACA's intention for the last six months anyway and I was led to believe otherwise? 3) You state that I agreed with this strategy - under duress. I had just been cross-examined for several hours under hostile conditions before I was ambushed by Maitre Lavallée on the street about this development. As I stated in an email you received the following day, I had a chance to reflect on what has just transpired in cross-examination once away from the fray. 4) If as you state MUNACA "takes (my) interests very seriously", then why have I not received any responses before your May 12th letter - a full three weeks after I first started writing you?

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5) Why should I "communicate" with you when you have steadfastly ignored me to date? 6) What I find particularly disturbing is MUNACA took over 5 months to respond to me about dubious advice not to approach my supervisor about Sue Lovasik doing my job behind my back because it would "prejudice" me, but you take less than 3 weeks a motion to dismiss my lawsuit for misrepresentation and invasion of my privacy. Then on top of everything the explanation was a bold-faced lie. Melançon Grenier et al represents a conflict of interest I broached with MUNACA's Senior Counsel, Maitre George Marceau. The fact that Maitre Nicolas Cleroux of Melançon has been removed from the motion to dismiss file is too little, too late. 7) Please explain why the letter was not undersigned by Raynald Lepage, VP-Communications? As things stand at this time, arbitration will not proceed. Your intentions all along? Currently, I am underrepresented, misinformed and uniformed. This is

unacceptable and a breach of Article 100.5 of the Quebec Labour Code. I have contacted the Commission des relations du travail, my lawyer and will be

contacting the arbitrator Maitre Serge Brault to correct this situation

immediately to ensure that Article 100.5 is invoked. [sic] Lastly, good riddance to Erik Mackay.” [Les caractères gras sont du soussigné]

[16] Le même jour, le président du Syndicat répond à madame Doran :

« [...] As I have stated to you before, MUNACA has full confidence in Me Lavallée’s legal opinion regarding the direction of the case. We regret that you do not agree with our lawyer’s strategy, but since this is the case, we have no choice but to

advise you that MUNACA will no longer be able to represent you in this case,

nor will it be responsible for any expenses incurred should you consult or retain other legal counsel. We have instructed Me Lavallée to inform the arbitrator of this situation” [Les caractères gras sont du soussigné]

[17] Une audience était déjà convoquée pour le 26 mai. Préalablement, le différend entre la

plaignante et le Syndicat était porté à la connaissance du Tribunal le 20 mai par Me Josée

Lavallée qui nous écrivait :

« Nous venons d’être informés par notre cliente MUNACA que nous n’avons plus le mandat de représenter madame Doran relativement au dossier mentionné en titre. En effet, madame Doran a avisé la soussignée qu’elle s’est constituée un nouveau procureur, Me Dareen Henriet. [...] »

Page: 10 [18] Peu après, madame Doran nous fait savoir que Me Henriet ne la représente pas dans la

présente affaire mais qu’il avait tout au plus été consulté par elle.

[19] Le 22 mai, madame Doran adresse le courriel suivant à Me Lavallée :

« To clarify our conversation on the afternoon of Thursday, May 20, 2004, I did not tell you that Maitre Darren Henriet would be representing me at arbitration. I simply told you to telephone him because you were refusing to allow me to be heard at the arbitration hearing on May 26th or debrief me on McGill University evidence as well as several other issues you have refused to entertain without valid reason. You were requested to contact my lawyer and you did not as you stated you would after speaking to Dot Luk at MUNACA. Instead you wrote the arbitrator, Maitre Serge Brault, and my lawyer with misleading information. This is inappropriate behavior once again on your behalf and MUNACA’s. I would like you to return my lawyer’s telephone message on Tuesday morning. […]”.

[20] La plaignante a produit à l’audience du 26 une lettre d’abord adressée au soussigné et qui

à notre demande devait aussi être transmise aux deux procureurs au dossier (document S-30) :

“ Since the second day of arbitration which consisted primarily of cross-examination of me on April 16, 2004 by Maitre Andre Baril representing McGill University, I have been attempting without any success to be properly prepared, updated and informed for the next day of arbitration on May 26, 2004. The last five weeks have been squandered. I have contacted both MUNACA and Maitre Josée Lavallée since April 17th by email and telephone several times to respond about a date for a preparatory session. It wasn't until May 12th - three weeks later that I received a response, but it was to inform me that no such session would materialize and arbitration would proceed with witnesses called by McGill University to testify against me. This is unacceptable. 1. I informed both MUNACA and Maitre Lavallée that I recalled the existence of

evidence (that MUNACA ignored three years ago) to submit at arbitration which shows that my temporary replacement Miss Sue Lovasik was given my job in violation of the collective agreement. This document would deflate McGill University's position that a new job was created for her. This piece of evidence that has been ignored is an email that shows that Miss Lovasik had anxiety about her job security after I returned to work. If a new position had in fact been created for Miss Lovasik then there shouldn't been anxiety on her part.

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2. During cross examination, Maitre Baril submitted 15 documents into evidence. Many of these documents require clarification so that I am aware of their significance and impact, and I can comprehensively make notes during the proceedings, and ask relevant questions of my legal counsel as arbitration unfolds particularly in the witness phase where these notes and queries need to be applicable. This requirement has been denied by MUNACA and Maitre Lavallée outright.

3. A document submitted into evidence on April 13h by Maitre Lavallée was withheld from me. It was only by accident that I discovered that a March 3, 2004 letter written by Miss Sue Lovasik had become evidentiary, was told by Maitre Lavallée that it was submitted into evidence upon your insistence. MUNACA and Maitre Lavallée have refused to respond about this development. This document was entered into evidence without my knowledge. This letter written to you by Miss Lovasik contained false implications and false statements. One statement I have deemed libelous. Miss Lovasik has refused to respond about her statements also. Maitre Lavallée claims 1 was aware that this document was submitted with my knowledge. It was not. I found out about it when I realized after April 16th that I did not have a copy of all evidence including S-9 which included Miss Lovasik's controversial letter to you.

4. As you are aware, the damages phase of arbitration was a complete surprise to me on the morning of April 16, 2004. This, as I stated in my email to Maitre Lavallée the following day, put me at a disadvantage. I was informed that this phase would be at the end of arbitration - that is, May 26th. I was also surprised that the hearing adjourned abruptly on April 16, 2004 without redirect examination. That same day Maitre Lavallée indicated that redirect examination was a natural follow-up to cross-examination. This is also a severe disadvantage.

5. Since preparation began in earnest for arbitration that was subsequently aborted on October 10, 2003, Miss Sue Lovasik was going to be subpoenaed by Maitre Lavallée. This was still the case at the point of the second preparation session on March 31, 2004. At the end of the second day of arbitration on April 16, 2004, Maitre Lavallée informed me that Miss Lovasik would not be subpoenaed. Maitre Lavallée stated that she feared Miss Lovasik would make statements Maitre Lavallée would not already have knowledge of. Maitre Lavallée did not know what Miss Lovasik might say six months ago either. The day after agreeing with her position (minutes after I had been subjected to hours of hostile cross-examination); I informed MUNACA and Maitre Lavallée that I had a chance to reflect and changed my mind about Miss Lovasik's testimony. This request has been denied outright.

6. I informed Maitre Lavallée that short shrift had been given to preparation for the grievance related to the 10-month delay for a proper work station. This lack of preparation became evident after cross-examination where Maitre Baril forced me to respond with yes or no answers. My request to testify on redirect examination (which Maitre Lavallée led me to believe would

Page: 12

transpire) has been denied outright. Maitre Lavallée claims that she can address these omissions outlined in three emails from me during her closing arguments. This is against legal procedure as I understand it. Maitre Lavallée cannot discuss testimony I did not testify to. Testimony such as that McGill University contested my work injury claims to CSST just because "it's costly to McGill" according to the CSST Administrator at McGill's Department of Human Resources.

7. One particular statement I made in an email should be addressed in redirect examination. Last week in a telephone conversation, I asked Maitre Lavallée to state what 1 meant by my statement "I need you (my supervisor, Yvonne Ng) to get out of my way." Maitre Lavallée stated that she did not know. Maitre André Baril certainly thinks he knows. Redirect examination would correct this misconception.

8. On April 16th, Maitre Lavallée said that she would invite any new evidence. The following Monday I did so by fax. Maitre Lavallée characterized these documents as "return to work" evidence when in fact they referred to the reclassification of my job that ultimately went to my replacement, Miss Lovasik.

9. I believe it is vital that redirect examination occur before the witness phase (MUNACA and Maitre Lavallée are refusing to participate in). Responding to Maitre Baril's questions with either yes or no does not reflect the whole truth which you asked me to swear to do at the outset of the hearing on April 13th. I only relented in responding to some of Maitre Baril's questions considering that Maitre Lavallée would clarify and amplify my responses on redirect examination as she indicated in the lunch break before cross examination continued that afternoon on April 16th. Maitre Lavallée has refused to maintain her original position to conduct redirect examination

10. Earlier in the year I sued my labour union, MUNACA, for misrepresentation as well as other serious breaches. The law firm Maitre Lavallée works for filed a motion to dismiss my lawsuit. They took less than three weeks to file this motion, but when I requested a response from my union on another matter, they took over 5 months to respond then offered to say the very least a dubious response. This represents a conflict of interest that is unacceptable.

In consideration of the foregoing, I cannot let arbitration proceed as it stands at

this point. According to Article 100.5 of the Quebec Labour Code, the "arbitrator must give the ... employee an opportunity to be heard". Until this Article has been invoked to your satisfaction, I am requesting that arbitration be

delayed until I have been fully represented legally by MUNACA. Thank you. » [Les caractères gras sont du soussigné]

[21] Le 26 mai, une demande a été présentée par le procureur de l’Employeur afin que la

partie syndicale fasse formellement savoir si sa preuve était ou non close. La plaignante a pour sa

Page: 13 part réitéré qu’elle entendait pouvoir poursuivre l’audience de la façon qu’elle jugerait bon,

assistée si elle le souhaitait du procureur qu’elle désignerait, les frais de celui-ci devant être à la

charge de son syndicat. La plaignante n’a pas indiqué quelle serait sa position à l’égard de la

question soulevée par le procureur patronal. Le Syndicat non plus.

[22] Après avoir délibéré sur le tout séance tenante, le Tribunal a décidé d’ajourner l’affaire,

en demandant au Syndicat de préciser par écrit ses arguments sur la façon dont l’arbitrage devrait

se poursuivre ainsi que sa réponse motivée à la demande de la plaignante relative aux frais

juridiques afférents à la constitution éventuelle par celle-ci d’un avocat de son choix. Le Tribunal

a en outre accordé un délai suffisant à la plaignante ainsi qu’à l’Employeur pour répondre ou

réagir aux positions que lui présenterait le Syndicat; ce qu’ils ont fait.

III

PLAIDOIRIES

Le Syndicat

[23] Dans son argumentation datée du 4 juin 2004, le Syndicat écrit sous la plume de son

président Dot Luk :

« As per your request, I am writing to explain the union's position regarding the grievances filed on behalf of Ms. Doran. Since the hearing date of April 16th 2004, the Union and Ms. Doran are in profound disagreement regarding the approach in the present file. Despite the discussions between Ms. Doran and our attorney, Me Josée Lavallée, it has become impossible to agree on a common strategy to continue the file. Since the union agrees with Me Lavallée’s suggested strategy and Ms. Doran indicated her profound disagreement, it became evident that Me Lavallée was unable to continue acting in the file. Following which, MUNACA withdrew Me Lavallée's mandate and informed Ms. Doran that she may continue to pursue her grievances by representing herself or by choosing new counsel at her expense. MUNACA mandated Me Lavallée to advise you of this situation as soon as possible. MUNACA recognizes that it is the sole proprietor of the grievances before you and will continue to have a representative present at all of the future hearings, who will intervene if necessary. As indicated above, MUNACA

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authorizes Ms. Doran to continue said grievances and to adopt the strategy she deems appropriate. Regarding any question of Ms. Doran's legal fees to complete the hearings, MUNACA considers this question to be beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. Therefore MUNACA will be present at the time and date that you will set to continue the hearing. Please note that a copy of this letter has been sent to Ms. Doran and to Me Andre Baril. Having not obtained Ms. Doran's authorization to give out her coordinates in order for you to correspond with her, we have asked Ms. Doran to indicate in her reply how she chooses for you to communicate with her.”

L’Employeur

[24] Le procureur de l’Employeur écrit le 9 juin :

« La présente fait suite à la lettre de Munaca du 4 juin dernier relativement au dossier cité en rubrique. Nous n’avons aucun commentaire à émettre, puisque nous considérons qu’il s’agit d’une question de régie interne qui concerne le syndicat et son membre. [...] »

La plaignante

[25] Madame Doran écrit dans l’envoi qu’elle nous fait le 10 juin 2004 :

« I am writing in response to your request of May 26, 2004 to respond to the improper revocation of legal services by MUNACA at arbitration. This unfortunate and needless situation boils down to a simple scenario created by my labour union - a secretary vs. a McGill labour lawyer. Fundamentally, MUNACA's "legal strategy" is to give McGill University the advantage. MUNACA is advocating no rehabilitation in redirect examination; no clarification or insight into 15 documents submitted by McGill University; no submission of new evidence to support the four grievances or refute McGill's desperate defense; no witnesses to subpoena for their testimony; no communication with me; reliance on a single email from legal counsel that curiously ignores a new vital pièce of evidence that is pivotal, and discounting the submission of other new evidence in the wake of cross-examination. None of the foregoing offers me the advantage — only McGill University. This does not sound like a lawyer or a labour union who "takes my interests very seriously" in any

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way. MUNACA is attempting to deceive you in their letter of June 4, 2004. They did not have any "discussions" with me. Maitre Lavallée didn't call me until May 18th and only to reiterate her position that "we rest our case". It is also my case. This single discussion with Maitre Lavallée basically consisted of her argument that I was already informed of evidence submitted by both parties. Her position is preposterous yet she refused to yield. This is unreasonable and unethical. Contrary to McGill University's representative, Maitre André Baril's opinion, the arbitration hearing before you is not "a game". This is my livelihood. The last time we met on May 26th, Maitre Baril had the gall to laugh at me openly while I recounted the barrage of harassment by managers. This insensitivity and arrogance makes him and McGill a perfect fit for each other. It is not funny that I wasted two and half years of my life on disability which McGill is directly responsible for. It is not funny that after a year and a half on leave and anticipating an imminent return to work that it was thwarted by scurrilous telephone calls made by managers (including Miss Josephine Leake) to the Montreal Police. To this day, McGill University on every level has refused to explain those telephone calls despite many prompts from me to do so. Then I return to work after another year of disability to find that my office, my equipment and my job has been given away. All I was left with was a crippled reputation. My job security is MUNACA's mandate. In Article 1.01 of the Collective Agreement, it states that MUNACA must seek "an equitable settlement of problems that may arise" for its membership. MUNACA withdrawing legal counsel in the middle of arbitration is a gross breach of that article. MUNACA's Labour Relations Représentative: I’m sure you have noted the absence of MUNACA's Miss Maria Ruocco, VP-Labour Relations at all four sessions of arbitration since it commenced on October 10, 2003. MUNACA claimed Miss Ruocco was a "resource" that was "allocated" elsewhere when the truth is I banned her from any proceedings including arbitration as of January 2003 when I gained full access to the "dirty tricks" file I mentioned to you on May 26th kept by McGill known internally as the "file". Miss Ruocco had been as early as April 2000 leaking personal, confidential and medical information directly to the Department of Human Resources - without my knowledge or permission when I had a reasonable expectation of privacy. This has compromised my standing in the workplace and perpetuated the harassment. It is absurd for MUNACA to maintain the position that the labour relations representative's replacement, Mr. Raynald Lepage who only recently vacated the position of VP-Communications be my solitary representative at arbitration. On May 26th, Mr. Lepage demonstrated his lack of the mastery of the English language which makes him imminently incompetent to represent me. I have no confidence for dependence on him as my union representative. His duties have

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primarily been to record meeting minutes, keep records of the Association and be an ex-officio member of the newsletter. He isn't qualified to represent me in a legal capacity. Since I met him on October 10, 2003, I have had difficulty following his train of thought as he struggles to speak in English. As Mr. Lepage eloquently stated to me on May 26th before the session commenced, "I must remind you that I am only a witness" which means he has only been documenting the proceedings and not analyzing or drafting useful strategy that my lawyer would otherwise have done. Did MUNACA expect that he would cross-examine McGill's witnesses or conduct redirect examination of me under those circumstances? I recently received a letter undersigned by Mr. Lepage that MUNACA took five months to write regarding controversial advice given to me in October 2001. This letter which obviously was not composed by Mr. Lepage should have been undersigned by Miss Dot Luk, the President of MUNACA was, simply put, a lie. I am still wondering what could be the explanation for the sudden departure of MUNACA's Maitre Erik Mackay. Access to Information Requests: On September 17, 2001, I discovered documents that showed a supervisor was breaching my privacy to my assignments. One of these documents generated 6 months after I went on leave was making inflammatory remarks about me to my assignments. This supervisor whom I had never even met was basically kicking me when I was down. What kind of an environment were they creating for my return to work? I immediately contacted MUNACA to help me secure access to my departmental file at the Faculty of Management. MUNACA said they would help, but ultimately they dragged their feet to the point where I had to do act alone. They had no interest in my finding out the truth about management - or the truth about MUNACA which became the case when I got accidental access to the "file" on July 4, 2002. It took 6 months, but on January 23, 2003, I gained full access to the "file". My lawsuits are based on the "dirty tricks" file at the Department of Human Resources. To date, those initial documents have been withheld from McGill. To date, MUNACA has refused to respond to documents about their complicity. I was compelled to file lawsuits because no one even attempted to explain its contents and MUNACA never lifted a hand to intervene. Union Intervention: My labour problems were becoming so difficult to deal with on a daily basis that I had to schedule a meeting at MUNACA for some sort of intervention. I discussed my issues. I left with reassurances that an immediate resolution would be reached by MUNACA. Nothing happened for weeks which turned into months. Again, I

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scheduled a meeting at MUNACA. It was the same scenario again. These meetings turned out to be only bitch sessions - nothing else. I was then compelled to request a meeting with Maitre Georges Marceau, Senior Counsel on the Executive Board of MUNACA and a partner of MUNACA's legal firm, Melançon, Grenier, Marceau & Sciortino after the frustration climaxed because my complaints had not even reached the first step of the grievance procedure after one and a half years of my complaint. It wasn't until I made this demand to meet Maitre Marceau (and not before) that my grievances were finally filed. MUNACA had 55 days to file a complaint; therefore, the first step of arbitration should have been reached in July 2001 - not December 2002 instead. MUNACA said they would "fast track" my grievances. They did not. I begged MUNACA to urge management to supply me with a proper work environment because my injuries were being compounded. There were telephone calls, messages and emails to this effect. I got no response from MUNACA. This is unacceptable and egregious behaviour on their part. How does the Faculty deal with my issues? They ignore them hoping I will give up, but they have miscalculated me and MUNACA will not stand in my way either to find McGill University accountable. On June 3rd, I suffered a demoralizing defeat when a vote brought before the membership regarding affiliation (which MUNACA had no interests in pursuing) was voted down. Now there is no hope that I will be protected from my employer without the current executive of MUNACA being held accountable. Just prior to the vote at this meeting, I asked the Executive to explain why a May 25, 2004 bulletin they sent to the membership espoused "legal representation by legal counsel(s)" at arbitration when in fact it was not true in my case. I was ruled out of order claiming my question was confidential and personal. It was obvious I waived my right to confidentiality, yet there was no response from the Executive. The CSST & the CLP: I submitted about 50 documents to MUNACA for them to forward to the CSST's Administrative Review - none were sent. They then had the nerve to blame me for this incompetence. After in-house legal counsel Erik Mackay was mysteriously unavailable for my first Commission des lesions professionnelles (CLP) hearing, MUNACA replaced him with Maitre Denis Lavoie from Melançon, Grenier, Marceau & Sciortino who promptly postponed the hearing without my consent or consultation. I was amenable to conciliation. That opportunity was wasted. I was told by the CLP that the hearing was postponed because Maitre Jacques Rousse representing McGill University was vacationing at the time of proposed hearing. CLP hearings are only supposed to be postponed for "serious reasons". To date, I have still not received documentation to support Maitre Rousse was on vacation

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even though he stated as recently as April 14, 2004 that there is a letter to that effect he would give me. The CLP file maintained by MUNACA was initially and unnecessarily withheld from me when I requested it. The file from MUNACA was devoid of communications between MUNACA's Maitre Erik Mackay, Melançon's Maitre Denis Lavoie as well as Maitre Jacques Rousse I learned when I requested a second copy of the file directly from the CLP. I discovered in the second file that the CLP hearing had also been postponed because Gaetan Olivier, CSST Administrator, Department of Human Resources, McGill University was on parental leave when that particular day did not lend itself to such. I still have not received documentation from Mr. Olivier to show proof of his parental leave which he has promised he would provide. This is the same person who contested my work injuries claims because they're "costly to McGill". When the hearing was finally rescheduled, Maitre Rousse asked the managers I was compelled to dismiss from testifying because they withheld their documents to appear anyway. Maitre Rousse claimed he was confused about these managerial witnesses. His feigned confusion lay with the subpoenas which were straightforward and unambiguous. He also requested another manager appear that I did not subpoena and claimed I made the request for his attendance. It is noteworthy that Maitre Rousse did not request that the carpenter who had to fix my desk three times was not approached by him to testify. At the second CLP hearing, Maitre Rousse took advantage of my being unrepresented by telling the Commissioner and his panel that I spent the entire day testifying to personal activity contributing to my work injuries. I did no such thing. I would never have filed an injury claim had that been the case. McGill's refusal to furnish me with a proper desk is abusive. MUNACA's lack of intervention in the matter is despicable. To say the least, I have lost confidence in MUNACA's ability to respond to the inequities I have endured since April 2001. Redirect Examination: The record must show that the facts and testimony are much more than an inconvenient truth for McGill University. It is of note that Maitre Baril did not argue on May 26th for redirect examination of me upon resumption of arbitration. Yes or no answers he insisted on in cross-examination are to McGill's advantage not mine. It's obvious to any lay person that redirect examination is vital for my case to unfold in a fair manner. It is inconceivable that MUNACA is refusing redirect examination. For example: - Maitre Baril was correct. I did have a sick day for the second pièce of

evidence generated by a professor. In redirect, it would have been revealed

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emphatically that my records posed the question - was this the first time the professor made a request of this nature?

- Yes, the CSST refused my work injury claims - after my supervisor, Yvonne Ng told the indemnities agent that she had "followed up very closely" with me upon my return to work which was patently untrue. If I had been reintegrated, wouldn't I have been aware of it?

- Yes, the CSST Administrative Board denied my claims - after MUNACA failed to submit 50 documents I gave them to forward to the Board. The Board also issued their decision after refusing to wait one day for Maitre Mackay to return to work from a sick day. The investigator later claimed she was not calling MUNACA for his comments when I challenged her. This is unreasonable.

- The email I wrote to my supervisor, Yvonne Ng was over two pages long and Maitre Baril focused on one sentence - "I need you to get out of my way". It is a matter of course that my legal counsel should want to put that statement in its proper context. My legal counsel should also want to correct several errors and misconceptions proffered by Miss Ng in that same email.

- Maitre Baril criticized me for not signing up for computer software courses prior to returning to work. I attempted to get information from both Diana Dutton, the Area Personnel Officer at the Faculty of Management and my immediate supervisor, Yvonne Ng. Miss Ng's response was talk to Diana Dutton. Miss Dutton's response to me when I called her was only "What information?" How could I sign up for a course when I was being refused any "information" on my return to work? Besides, Maitre Baril expected me to afford courses when I was barely surviving on 60% of my salary for the last two years.

- I recalled an instance where computer technicians were not responsive to my constant computer problems. When I approached computer support, I was told to go to the manager of the department, Marc Belisle which is inappropriate because "that's your job", I told him.

The Damages Phase: Insofar as the damages phase, it was difficult for me to shift from the testimonial stage to the damages stage which you noticed immediately. I have several preparation notes on this arbitration stage that I had been delaying to review fully until May 26th when the hearing would conclude and this phase would naturally be presented. Ideally, this phase should have been conducted after all the evidence and testimony from both parties had been put on record. I still maintain this is a severe disadvantage that must be reversed. The Faculty of Management: I received a reprimand in 1997 for refusing communication from the university after my supervisor, Yvonne Ng, came to my home falsely claiming she'd been

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waiting for my doctor's note when on every occasion prior to that day, I brought the note in with me when I returned to work. She left with the note leading me to believe it was acceptable otherwise why would she relieve me of it? Miss Ng conferred with other managers and then within hours the couriers from the Faculty of Management started coming to my home. I believed rightly they were firing me. They could wait until I returned on Monday to do it person. I refused this invasion. If there was a problem with the note then why did Miss Ng accept it? That harassment wasn't enough for them, so Miss Ng personally seized a week's salary before the deadline to revise the doctor's note - not one revision, not two revisions, but three times it was revised and my salary was still seized before the deadline. The telephone calls made to the Montréal Police in 2000 was called an "intervention" in the "dirty tricks" file yet in the four years I have been attempting a response for why these managers made these calls; they have yet to put a single word of explanation in writing. Miss Leake did telephone me - 5 months later, but she invented a bad memory about the events. It is not curious that my Access to Information requests for her documents have been withheld from me. Perhaps if managers had come to me and said Sue Lovasik is working out well, she's gelled with the professors old and new, would I consider a lateral transfer to another area, I’m sure some accommodation could have been managed. Instead, management created an environment of isolation, alienation and intimidation that was ostracizing for me upon my return. This setting they devised for my return would precipitate my quitting in frustration or even worse relapsing into depression. McGill University was successful on one count. To the chagrin of McGill University, I am not an incompetent employee, so the Faculty has had to resort to underhanded means to find another way to get rid of me without being held accountable. I work at a business school that doesn't practice what is preaches. Maitre Baril's criticism of me on May 26th for my filing lawsuits is disingenuous. I waited for over a year before I filed the lawsuits after attempts for an explanation and responsibility were ignored by all parties concerned. Miss Sue Lovasik: This puppet of management is party to the Faculty's mandate to undermine me at McGill University. Why has Miss Lovasik consistently been doing my job when I am in the vicinity? What were my assignments told for the past three years about their doubled secretarial privileges? Although I find Miss Lovasik's behaviour devious and dishonest, I don't blame her for wanting my job. I have the distinction at the Faculty of Management of being the only secretary at the Faculty who

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never applied for a transfer to another area or elsewhere on campus. She doesn't deserve my job. The only email from Maitre Lavallée: In this only email dated April 30, 2004 from Maitre Lavallée since Day 2 of arbitration ended, she stated that there was "no reason to ask you more questions" then she goes on to state that "I cannot make you testify again". She claims that I "already mentioned" that I was at the revision stage of the CLP which I believe is not testimonial. She ignored a pivotal piece of new evidence that would quash McGill University's preposterous position in one grievance. She claimed I can not change my mind about the legal strategy despite she ambushed within minutes of a full day of cross-examination ending on a city street. She ignored my questions about S-6 and S-7. She didn't explain the submission of S-9 which included Miss Lovasik's letter I was told at the preparation session on March 31st (a session I was compelled to order when it was forthcoming from MUNACA themselves) would not be entered into evidence. (When I learned of this letter undersigned by Miss Lovasik on March 31st, I was quite shocked by this cheap shot.) The Only Discussion with Maitre Lavallée: Since April 16th, the only discussion I have had with Maitre Lavallée was for a mere 14 minutes on May 18, 2004. In this lone conversation with Maitre Lavallée, she vehemently claimed "you do know" that I was aware that the S-9 document which included Miss Lovasik's suspicious letter was entered into evidence when I did not. She claimed "it was done in front of you." I told her I did not know the letter was evidentiary. She then declared "I don't know why you didn't get a copy of it". Finally, Maitre Lavallée conceded "maybe you missed it". I definitely missed it. (When I received this letter by fax at the MUNACA office on May 23rd (10 days after it had been entered into evidence), I thought the inclusion of Miss Lovasik's letter had to be a clerical mistake.) Maitre Lavallée claimed that the evidence that McGill submitted had been copied to me when the documents originated. This is untrue and I outlined this fact in an email to her dated April 18th which she ignored. She finally relented and stated that I was copied on "most of it". This is entirely unacceptable. I have to know and understand what all of the evidence is — not most of it. Maitre Lavallée claimed we discussed the witness list I submitted to her when we did not. She claimed "we already discussed everything" in terms of new evidence when we did not. This was our first discussion since I left her after Day 2 of arbitration on April 16th. In my email of April 19th, I requested that she explain the "significance" of the evidence submitted by McGill University in cross-examination. This is Maitre Lavallée's responsibility, but she ignored me. To this date, I do not know the

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significance of evidence U-l, U-4, U-9, U-10, U-12, U-13 and U-15. Evidence U-3 was not copied to me and I do not know its significance. Insofar as evidence U-7 and U-8, I did not even have this evidence until the week following Day 2 of arbitration. My not understanding the significance of 8 out of 15 documents submitted by McGill is not "most of it". It is well within Maitre's Lavallée's mandate that she inform me, particularly, when I am requesting it, but she has steadfastly refused to communicate with me and MUNACA allowed this as they state in their letter of May 12th. Considering Maitre Lavallée's unreasonable position, I asked her to call my lawyer who could more fluently reiterate my "side of things". Twice I stated that Maitre Darren Henriet, Mclninch MacDougall was only advocating my position and I was asking her to "explain your position to my lawyer". I did not state nor imply that Maitre Henriet was representing me at arbitration. Mr. Henriet made his position clear to me on May 5, 2004 by stating he could not intervene half way through a trial which was understood by me at that time. Maitre Lavallée said "I will talk to Dot Luk first" and if MUNACA's President agreed, Maitre Lavallée would then call Maitre Henriet. Maitre Lavallée and MUNACA devised the rouse to revoke legal representation based on this telephone conversation. If Maitre Henriet had been retained to represent me at arbitration as MUNACA claimed then why hadn't Maitre Henriet requested the release of the arbitration file for his preparation when arbitration reconvened on May 26th? I posed the question I asked in my email of April 19th regarding the statement I made to my supervisor. Maitre Lavallée said "I can't tell you what you mean by your emails you sent to Mrs. Ng". That is because my legal counsel didn't even bother to ask me on the witness stand let alone off the stand or when I asked her in my email. I asked Maitre Lavallée "you are not going to let me explain?" She stated emphatically, "No." I asked her again. She replied, "No." I reminded her about the Labour Code and Article 100.5 that I must "be heard". I could sense laughter in her voice. I will stand corrected about "discussions" with Maitre Lavallée if telephone conversations with her secretary should be correctly interpreted as discussions. Maitre Lavallée wasn't even going to show up at arbitration on May 26th to address you directly about withholding legal representation from me. It was only at the insistence of Maitre Henriet that she appeared before you. Chronology of Events and Attempts for Legal Counseling: April 7 Email from Maitre Lavallée states "We know Ms Lovasik will be

available only on the third day." April 13 Day 1 of arbitration — direct examination April 16 Day 2 of arbitration - damages phase & cross-examination

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April 17 No response to email that was read by Maitre Lavallée on April 20 (copied to MUNACA)

April 18 No response to email that was read by Maitre Lavallée on April 20 (copied to MUNACA)

April 19 No response to email and attachment that was read by Maitre Lavallée on April20 (copied to MUNACA)

April 19 Called for copy of S-1 and S-7 to S-10 evidence April 20 No response to email that was read by Maitre Lavallée on April 20

(copied to MUNACA) April 20 No response to fax contained 10 documents representing new

evidence or documentation to refute or counter McGill evidence April 23 No response to phone message re prep session April 23 At MUNACA office - discovered in fax I requested that S-9 was

entered into evidence April 23 No response to phone message why S-9 entered in evidence

April 23 No response to Maitre Lavallée's secretary emailed that Maitre Lavallée will call to explain the submission of S-9

April 27 No response to phone message April 28 No response to phone message

April 29 Served legal papers by Maitre Lavallée's law firm for motion to dismiss my misrepresentation law suit.

April 29 No response to email that was read by Maitre Lavallée on April 30 April 30 Received email from Maitre Lavallée 13 days after I wrote her May 3 No response to email that was read by Maitre Lavallée on April 30

(copied to MUNACA) May 3 No response to email to Maitre Georges Marceau, Melançon,

Grenier, Marceau & Sciortino regarding his colleague Maitre Nicolas Cleroux and conflict of interest

May 5 No response to email that was read by Maitre Lavallée on May 6 (copied to MUNACA)

May 10 No response to email that was read by Maitre Lavallée on May 10 (copied to MUNACA)

May 10 No response to phone message on her voicemail May 12 Received letter from MUNACA that Maitre Lavallée's legal

strategy will stand unmodified and unchallenged, but MUNACA "takes my interests very seriously".

May 14 Received email from Maitre Lavallée to telephone her on May 17 May 18 Received email from Maitre Lavallée that "we rest our case" May 18 First and only discussion with Maitre Lavallée not "discussions"

contrary to what MUNACA maintained May 20 Received letter from MUNACA that legal representation had been

revoked after one discussion. MUNACA is claiming they are not responsible for the legal resources to defend my rights at arbitration yet on the other hand they have the resources to file a

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motion to have my misrepresentation law suit dismissed from court. Their priorities are misplaced. Further, it is inequitable and unfair of MUNACA to deny a member services it pays for through union dues. MUNACA has consistently and continually acted in bad faith. It is significant that MUNACA did not contest a single fact in my letter to you dated May 25, 2004. All of this undignified behaviour on MUNACA's part and it's president states in her May 12, 2004 letter to me that "rest assured" my rights are being protected yet I was underrepresented, misinformed and uninformed at the time the letter was drafted. MUNACA has provided legal representation from the beginning. They should be providing until the end. MUNACA is espousing self-representation at my expense because they know I don't have the financial resources to pursue arbitration further — their true motives for revoking legal representation. I must be "rest assured" yet I did not receive a single email, letter, telephone message or call from anyone at MUNACA let alone my proposed representative, Mr. Lepage — except to tell me stop contacting my legal counsel because Maitre Lavallée's position will remain unopposed no matter what. MUNACA's claim that your decision to order MUNACA's assumption of the costs of a new lawyer to represent me at arbitration is outside of your jurisdiction is only a distraction, but Article 10.04 of the Collective Agreement states that "the arbitrator must consider the spirit of the collective agreement" and he "must consider the principles of justice and fairness ... which emerge from this collective agreement". The complexity of my labour issues requires legal representation which is borne out by the fact that Maitre Lavallée has been on board since the outset of arbitration. MUNACA and Maitre Josée Lavallée are not my advocates - they are my adversaries, therefore, I am requesting that you recommend that McGill University settle the grievances before you out of court and pay damages to me which MUNACA should rightly share equally with my employer. “

[26] Puis le 27 juillet, la plaignante écrit par courriel :

“Dear Maitre Brault: I had an opportunity yesterday to review Brown and Beatty's book, Canadian Labour Arbitration. The particular chapter of interest to me was “The Arbitration Process” which relates to my current grievances before you. In a paragraph entitled "Re-examination" which I referred to in my June 4, 2004 letter as redirect examination supports the position I took in April that re-examination is not only a natural follow up to cross-examination that hopes to "clarify testimony that was weakened or obscured in cross-examination" by McGill's legal representative, Maitre Baril, but it is a vital aspect of jurisprudence to explore and develop for any person with the burden of proof. I believe I made a

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reasonable request of my legal counsel, Maitre Josée Lavallée in this regard. Thank you for your consideration.”

[27] Les lettres qui précèdent de madame Doran n’ont pas été suivies de réaction de la part du

Syndicat ou de l’Employeur. Finalement, celle-ci s’est enquise auprès de nous par écrit le 4

novembre de l’état de ce dossier.

IV

ANALYSE ET DÉCISION

[28] Il est de droit arbitral constant qu’en règle générale les seules parties à l’arbitrage d’un

grief, même formulé au profit d’un individu, sont l'employeur et le syndicat signataires de la

convention collective qui ouvre droit à grief. A cet égard, voici ce qu’écrivent Rodrigue Blouin

et Fernand Morin dans leur ouvrage Droit de l’arbitrage de grief, 5e édition : [paragraphes III-

62 et ss]

« III.62 - L’état du droit en vigueur permet d’affirmer que le syndicat est le titulaire de tout grief bien qu’il existe quelques exceptions. Dans le cadre des prescriptions établies au Code du travail et après un constat de son caractère majoritaire, le syndicat devient le représentant exclusif de tous les salariés de l’unité de négociation. Ce n’est plus une association strictement privée et volontaire. La collectivité ne peut s’exprimer que par l’association accréditée tant pour la conclusion d’une convention collective que pour l’administration de celle-ci. La volonté collective ainsi exprimée prime, s’il y a conflit de droit, sur toute entente individuelle. S’il survient une mésentente lors de l’administration de la convention collective, cette mésentente en est une entre les parties signataires de l’acte collectif et non directement entre chacun de ses bénéficiaires ou les sujets de la convention collective et l’employeur. Le grief est nécessairement fondé sur la convention collective qui est l’œuvre exclusive du syndicat accrédité et de l’employeur. Ainsi, le syndicat est maître du grief et non les salariés considérés

comme groupe ou à titre individuel. [...] III.64 – Cette règle générale fut d’ailleurs affirmée et explicitée à quelques reprises par la Cour Suprême, la Cour d’appel, la Cour supérieure et fait aussi l’objet d’une jurisprudence arbitrale soutenue. Le syndicat accrédité est en

somme le seul titulaire de tout grief et il lui appartient exclusivement de prendre les décisions finales à ce sujet. [...]

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III.65 – Le syndicat agit pour tous les membres de l’unité d’accréditation à l’égard de tout grief, y inclus le grief individuel, le grief de groupe, ou encore collectif. Le seule réserve faite au syndicat est alors de présenter le grief conformément à la procédure particulière, s’il en est une. Il lui revient d’enclencher la procédure d’arbitrage et le renvoi en arbitrage. Il lui incombe aussi de prendre position sur un éventuel règlement, désistement ou abandon de grief, et ce, avec la même autorité, la même fonction exclusive et les mêmes effets. Enfin, toute procédure pour faire réviser la sentence arbitrale relève en principe du syndicat accrédité. En fait, tant et aussi longtemps que le syndicat respecte

son devoir de représentation juste et loyale, le salarié ne saurait prétendre

contredire valablement la position syndicale relative à l’interprétation et l’application de la convention collective. [...] III.67 - Le législateur reconnaît expressément qu’un arbitre de grief doit donner au salarié visé par un grief l’occasion d’être entendu. Par ailleurs, il peut arriver

que les parties élargissent le droit du salarié en l’impliquant dans la procédure

interne de réclamation et d’arbitrage, mais tel droit doit alors s’analyser en gardant à l’esprit que le syndicat est en principe le titulaire du grief. [Caractères gras ajoutés]

[29] Les auteurs Brown & Beatty dans Canadian Labour Arbitration, Canada Law Book,

Third Edition, abondent dans le même sens : [paragraphe 3 :1200]

“The only parties to the arbitration process contemplated by legislation are the

union and the employer. Accordingly, apart from specific provisions in the agreement, only the union and the employer can participate in grievance

procedure meetings, in selecting an arbitrator, in settling or withdrawing the grievance, in raising a preliminary objection, or in taking carriage of the

proceedings. However, the relevant labour relations legislation commonly makes awards binding on persons other than the parties, including employees in the bargaining unit and members of a council of trade unions or an employers' association. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has required that "affected persons" be given notice of arbitration proceedings and the right to participate at the hearing. This of course can lead to a conflict between a union and one or more of the members of the bargaining unit. And where persons other than the parties seek to participate, questions can arise such as whether they should be entitled to participate and if so, what conditions, if any, should attach to such participatory rights.” [Les caractères gras sont du soussigné]

Page: 27 [30] Ainsi, un salarié n’étant pas en règle générale considéré comme une partie à l’arbitrage,

il n’a donc pas individuellement la qualité pour y agir seul ni pour y mener à sa guise les

procédures. Cette responsabilité revient au Syndicat à qui incombe en revanche un devoir de

juste représentation à l’égard des salariés qu’il représente (voir Code du travail, 47.2, supra).

[31] Certes, il arrive, comme le soulignent Morin et Blouin ainsi que Brown & Beatty, qu’un

salarié soit « une personne intéressée » dans un arbitrage, au Québec en vertu de l'article 100.5

du Code du travail. Cela se produit par exemple lorsqu’un salarié est susceptible d’avoir des

intérêts distincts de ceux des salariés que le Syndicat opte de mettre de l’avant en arbitrage. C’est

d’ailleurs précisément dans ce sens que nous avons ordonné en début d’arbitrage qu’une collègue

de la plaignante soit formellement notifiée du présent arbitrage, ses intérêts pouvant diverger de

ceux poursuivis par le Syndicat dans les présents griefs.

[32] Rappelons les propos de l’arbitre Rodrigue Blouin dans Centre de langues

internationales Charpentier, AZ-98141245, lesquels sont pertinents ici :

« Le législateur n'identifie donc en aucun temps le salarié comme étant partie à

un arbitrage de griefs découlant d'une convention collective. Il en est ainsi

parce qu'il n'appartient pas à chaque salarié, individuellement ou

personnellement, de proposer sa propre interprétation sur la nature et les effets de l'entente collective qui le lie. Ce rôle est exclusivement dévolu aux parties qui négocient leur convention collective et qui en surveillent l'application correcte au jour le jour, c'est-à-dire généralement, en un premier temps, l'employeur, puis le syndicat qui réagit à la décision patronale. Le syndicat accrédité dispose d'un mandat représentatif légal qui l'autorise à agir sans avoir à justifier de quelque autorisation ou cession de créance; il doit exercer ce mandat sui generis en privilégiant l'intérêt collectif (i.e. l'unité d'accréditation), mais il est alors cependant tenu à un devoir de juste et loyale représentation à l'égard de chaque salarié visé par la convention collective Néanmoins, tel que susdit, le législateur exige que le salarié intéressé ait l'occasion d'être entendu, mais il faut alors que l'arbitrage soit engagé entre les véritables parties. Pour être entendu distinctement de son syndicat, un salarié

doit justifier d'un intérêt distinct de celui du syndicat. Car, ou bien le salarié

s'en remet à son syndicat et il est alors entendu par cette voie représentative, ou

bien il requiert, compte tenu des circonstances, de pouvoir exprimer

personnellement son point de vue. Lorsque le salarié a un tel intérêt distinct, il

est alors entendu non pas comme partie mais comme salarié personnellement intéressé, c'est-à-dire ayant un intérêt opposé à celui de son représentant légal;

Page: 28

il peut en être ainsi, par exemple, lorsque le syndicat prend fait et cause pour un salarié alors qu'un autre salarié est privilégié par l'employeur (promotion, etc.) ou que le syndicat s'oppose à ce qu'un salarié se voit octroyer un bénéfice ou un droit (augmentation de salaire, etc.), ou encore que le syndicat exige qu'un salarié se prête à certaines obligations (cotisation syndicale spéciale, etc.).» [Les caractères gras sont du soussigné]

[33] En l’espèce, les griefs présentés au nom de la plaignante et renvoyés à l’arbitrage par le

Syndicat allèguent des manquements à la convention collective préjudiciables à la plaignante,

certains prétendument à l’avantage d’une collègue. Autrement dit, le Syndicat a choisi de

soumettre à l’arbitre le point de vue même de la plaignante de sorte que tous les intérêts qu’on

poursuit sont une seule et même chose, même si on ne s’entend plus sur la meilleure façon d’y

arriver.

[34] Le Syndicat a en somme pris fait et cause pour la plaignante depuis le début de ces

procédures, et ce, nonobstant le différend actuel.

[35] Corollairement, la plaignante ne revendique pas non plus de droits qui seraient distincts

de ce qu’avance le Syndicat. En fait, la plaignante affirme plutôt n’être pas représentée

correctement par son syndicat dans la mesure où elle affiche une compréhension et une vision

différentes de celles du Syndicat au sujet de la stratégie et de la méthode à suivre. Bien qu’elle se

réfère à cette disposition, elle ne prétend pas non plus devoir être entendue comme une personne

intéressée présentant une position distincte au sens de l’article 100.5 du Code du travail. En

revanche, elle demande d’être pleinement entendue, ce qui pour elle signifie, de la façon qu’elle-

même l’entend.

[36] En fait, la plaignante a déclaré ne plus partager la stratégie favorisée par le Syndicat et sa

procureure. À l’examen, la plaignante demande en définitive de pouvoir décider de la façon

ultime de mener le débat devant l’arbitre, et cela, assistée du procureur de son choix retenu aux

frais du Syndicat.

[37] Avec égards, ni la jurisprudence ni les autorités évoquées ne permettent de trouver un

fondement juridique menant à la conclusion recherchée par madame Doran. Aucun salarié

Page: 29 membre d’une unité d’accréditation ne possède le pouvoir de dicter la façon dont devrait être

mené un arbitrage; ni de retenir à son seul gré les services d’un procureur aux frais de son

syndicat.

[38] Cela dit, un différend existe bel et bien et nous devons veiller à assurer aussi bien

l’application de l’article 100.2 (précité) que de l’article 100.5 (précité) du Code.

[39] Selon notre compréhension de l’état du dossier, le Syndicat, tout en rappelant sa qualité

de titulaire ultime du grief, a devant les protestations de la plaignante retiré du dossier la

procureure qu’il avait désignée mais il ne s’oppose pas à ce que la plaignante conduise les débats

suivant la stratégie et la vision de celle-ci. Toutefois, malgré l’insatisfaction manifestée par

madame Doran, il ne consent pas à lui payer un nouveau procureur.

[40] Le Syndicat précise ainsi sa position dans son argumentation écrite :

“[…] As indicated above, MUNACA authorizes Ms. Doran to continue said grievances and to adopt the strategy she deems appropriate.”

[41] Le Syndicat ne remet toutefois pas en question sa participation à l’arbitrage ni à ses coûts,

au demeurant partagés selon la convention collective. Sommairement, il autorise la plaignante à

prendre le relais pour la suite de l’arbitrage, tout en précisant qu’il sera présent et représenté par

l’un de ses dirigeants, prêt à intervenir au besoin.

[42] Pour sa part, l’Employeur se garde prudemment d’intervenir dans ce qu’il qualifie de

« question interne » à la partie syndicale mais sans s’opposer à la façon de procéder suggérée en

face, clairement désireux toutefois que les choses aboutissent.

[43] L’arbitre est maître de la procédure selon l’article 100.2 du Code du travail et bien sûr la

conduite ordonnée et conforme des débats demeure ultimement entre les mains du tribunal.

Autrement dit, la poursuite ordonnée, équitable et rationnelle des débats incombe à l’arbitre

[44] La façon de poursuivre l’audience préconisée par madame Doran où celle-ci prendrait en

charge la conduite des choses de son côté est agréée par les deux parties. Cette façon, pour peu

Page: 30 usuelle qu’elle soit, ne viole aucune règle de droit ni l’ordre public et le Tribunal ne voit pas de

raison de s’y opposer.

[45] Reste la question de savoir si le Syndicat devrait payer les frais d’un nouvel avocat que

pourrait se constituer la plaignante, ou encore, si nous devrions intervenir au sujet du choix de la

personne que le Syndicat a désignée pour le représenter pour la suite des choses, dans la mesure

où madame Doran s’est attaquée au bien-fondé de ce choix

[46] Parlons d’abord du représentant syndical. Titulaire du grief et lui-même partie à la

convention collective, il appartient au syndicat seul de désigner son ou ses représentants pour la

poursuite des audiences, tout comme pour l’ensemble de l’accomplissement de ses attributions

en vertu du Code du travail. Le présent Tribunal n’entend pas s’ingérer dans l’exercice de ce

droit, étant acquis que tout syndicat est responsable devant la loi d’assurer la juste représentation

de ses commettants (voir Code du travail, article 47.2 précité).

[47] L’existence d’un différend entre la plaignante et son syndicat sur la façon de poursuivre

le présent dossier ne justifie pas dans les circonstances de ce dossier le présent Tribunal

d’intervenir dans l’exercice de cette discrétion syndicale, si tant est qu’il le puisse, n’étant pas en

présence d’aucune atteinte perceptible au devoir de juste représentation. Un désaccord entre un

salarié et son syndicat sur la conduite d’un arbitrage, fût-il révélé au grand jour, n’est pas une

atteinte au devoir de juste représentation.

[48] Parlons maintenant des frais juridiques. En l’espèce, le Syndicat a confié au départ à une

procureure spécialisée la responsabilité de le représenter. Un différend est apparu et le Syndicat

a jugé bon à la suite des reproches faits par la plaignante de retirer Me Lavallée. Il n’avait guère

le choix. Que la plaignante n’ait pas partagé le point de vue de sa procureure est certes son droit

mais cette circonstance n’ouvre pas droit à la conclusion recherchée par madame Doran au sujet

des frais juridiques qu’elle pourrait encourir en retenant elle-même les services d’un nouveau

procureur.

[49] Par exemple, tout le débat au sujet de la question de savoir si la plaignante aurait dû, ou

devrait, être réinterrogée par sa procureure après son contre-interrogatoire nous paraît de peu de

Page: 31 conséquences. En effet, il n’est pas rare de voir une partie qui a la charge de la preuve, comme

ici la partie syndicale, choisir de réserver ce genre de riposte pour la contre-preuve, simple

affaire de tactique.

[50] Plus fondamentalement, le tribunal d’arbitrage n’est pas le forum compétent, ni le

présent litige le bon, pour décider d’une question relative au devoir syndical de juste

représentation, une matière qui relève au premier chef de la Commission des relations du travail

(voir Code du travail, article 47.5 précité). Le présent tribunal n’estime pas être en présence

d’une atteinte au devoir de représentation, éventualité qui pourrait théoriquement peut-être

justifier le cas échéant une mesure de sauvegarde, ni être en présence d’une circonstance

envisagée à l’article 100.5 du Code du travail. De faire droit dans ces circonstances à la

demande de madame Doran concernant les frais d’avocat serait excessif. Sa demande en ce sens

est donc rejetée.

[51] En revanche, étant donné l’existence de ce différend et les circonstances délicates qu’il a

révélées, le Tribunal estime à-propos au nom de la prudence et dans le meilleur intérêt de la

sauvegarde des droits de chacun, d’ordonner, en se fondant tant sur l’article 100.2 que sur

l’alinéa 100.12 g) du Code du travail, que la poursuite des audiences se fasse en ayant recours

aux services d’un sténographe judiciaire dont la traduction des notes sera remise à chaque partie

de même qu’à madame Doran. Le coût des services sténographiques sera à la charge du Syndicat

et de l’Employeur à parts égales en tant que frais d’arbitrage au sens de la convention collective.

Page: 32

[52] Le Tribunal communiquera avec les parties dans les prochains jours afin de fixer une date

en vue de la poursuite des audiences. Le Tribunal s’attend à ce que madame Doran soit consultée

par les représentants du Syndicat avant la fixation de la prochaine date d’audience. De la même

façon, si madame Doran retient les services d’un procureur, cette personne devra en informer le

Tribunal ainsi que le Syndicat et l’Employeur sans délai.

MONTRÉAL, le 2 décembre 2004.

_____________________________________ Serge Brault, avocat Arbitre

Adjudex inc. 301-1202-QP S/A 468-04