DEFINITIONS
CONTENTS
LESSON 1: Five Senses of the Term "Principle." The Common Definition of Principle
LESSON 2 The Four Classes of Causes. Several Causes of the Same Effect. Causes May Be Causes of Each Other. Contraries Have the Same Cause
LESSON 3  All Causes Reduced to Four Classes
LESSON 4 The Proper Meaning of Element; Elements in Words, Natural Bodies, and Demonstrations. Transferred Usages of "Element" and Their Common Basis
LESSON 5 Five Senses of the Term Nature
LESSON 6 Four Senses of the Term Necessary. Its First and Proper Sense. Immobile Things, though Necessary, Are Exempted from Force
LESSON 7 The Kinds of Accidental Unity and of Essential Unity
LESSON 8 The Primary Sense of One. One in the Sense of Complete. One as the Principle of  Number. The Ways in Which Things Are One. The Ways in Which Things Are Many
LESSON 9 Division of Being into Accidental and Essential. The Types of Accidental and of  Essential Being
LESSON 10 Meanings of Substance
LESSON 11 The Ways in Which Things Are the Same Essentially and Accidentally
LESSON 12  Various Senses of Diverse, Different, Like, Contrary, and Diverse in Species
LESSON 13 The Ways in Which Things Are Prior and Subsequent
LESSON 14  Various Senses of the Terms Potency, Capable, Incapable, Possible and Impossible
LESSON 15 The Meaning of Quantity. Its Kinds. The Essentially and Accidentally Quantitative
LESSON 16 The Senses of Quality
LESSON 17 The Senses of Relative
LESSON 18 The Senses of Perfect
LESSON 19 The Senses of Limit, of "According to Which," of "In Itself," and of Disposition
LESSON 20 The Meanings of Disposition, of Having, of Affection, of Privation, and of "To Have"
LESSON 21 The Meanings of "To Come from Something," Part, Whole, and Mutilated
LESSON 22 The Meanings of Genus, of Falsity, and of Accident
LESSON I
Five Senses of the Term "Principle." The Common Definition of Principle
 ARISTOTLE'S TEXT Chapter 1: 1012b 34-1013a 23
 
[1012β] [34] ρχ λγεται μν θεν ν τις το πργματος [35] κινηθεη πρτον, οον το μκους κα δο ντεθεν μν ατη ρχ, ξ ναντας δ τρα: [1013α] [1] δ θεν ν κλλιστα καστον γνοιτο, οον κα μαθσεως οκ π το πρτου κα τς το πργματος ρχς νοτε ρκτον λλ θεν στ ν μθοι: δ θεν πρτον γγνεται νυπρχοντος, οον ς πλοου [5] τρπις κα οκας θεμλιος, κα τν ζων ο μν καρδαν ο δ γκφαλον ο δ τι ν τχωσι τοιοτον πολαμβνουσιν: δ θεν γγνεται πρτον μ νυπρχοντος κα θεν πρτον κνησις πφυκεν ρχεσθαι κα μεταβολ, οον τ τκνον κ το πατρς  κα τς μητρς κα μχη [10] κ τς λοιδορας: δ ο κατ προαρεσιν κινεται τ κινομενα κα μεταβλλει τ μεταβλλοντα, σπερ α  τε κατ πλεις ρχα κα α δυναστεαι κα α βασιλεαι κα τυραννδες ρχα λγονται κα α τχναι, κα τοτων α ρχιτεκτονικα μλιστα. τι θεν γνωστν τ πργμα [15] πρτον, κα ατη ρχ λγεται το πργματος, οον τν ποδεξεων α ποθσεις. σαχς δ κα τ ατια λγεται: πντα γρ τ ατια ρχα.
403. In one sense the term principle [beginning or starting point] means that from which someone first moves something; for example, in the case of a line or a
 journey, if the motion is from here, this is the principle, but if the motion is in the opposite direction, this is something different. In another sense principle means that from which a thing best comes into being, as the starting point of instruction; for sometimes it is not from what is first or from the starting point of the thing that one must begin, but from that from which one learns most readily. Again, principle means that first inherent thing from which something is brought into being, as the keel of a ship and the foundation of a house, and as some suppose the heart to be the principle in animals, and others the brain, and others anything else of the sort. In another sense it means that non-inherent first thing from which something comes into being; and that from which motion and change naturally first begins, as a child comes from its father and mother, and a fight from abusive language. In another sense principle means that according to whose will movable things are moved and changeable things are changed; in states, for example, princely, magisterial, imperial, or tyrannical power are all principles. And so also are the arts, especially the architectonic arts, called principles. And that from which a thing can first be known is also called a principle of that thing, as the postulates of  demonstrations. And causes are also spoken of in the same number of senses, for all causes are principles.
πασν μν ον κοινν τν ρχν τ πρτον εναι θεν στιν γγνεται γιγνσκεται: τοτων δ α μν νυπρχουσα εσιν α δ [20] κτς. δι τε φσις  ρχ κα τ στοιχεον κα δινοια κα προαρεσις κα οσα κα τ ο νεκα: πολλν γρ κα το γνναι κα τς κινσεως ρχ τγαθν κα τ καλν.
404. Therefore, it is common to all principles to be the first thing from which a thing either is, comes to be, or is known.
 
In praecedenti libro determinavit philosophus quid pertineat ad considerationem huius scientiae; hic incipit determinare de rebus, quas scientia ista considerat.
749. Having established in the preceding book  the things which pertain to the consideration of  this science, here the Philosopher begins to deal with the things which this science considers.
Et quia ea quae in hac scientia considerantur, sunt omnibus communia, nec dicuntur univoce, sed secundum prius et posterius de diversis, ut in quarto libro est habitum; ideo prius distinguit intentiones nominum, quae in huius scientiae consideratione cadunt. Secundo incipit determinare de rebus, quae sub consideratione huius scientiae cadunt, in sexto libro, qui incipit, ibi, principia et causae.
 And since the attributes considered in this science are common to all things, they are not predicated of various things univocally but in a prior and subsequent way, as has been stated in Book IV (535). Therefore, first (751), he distinguishes the meanings of the terms which come under the consideration of this science. Second (751), he begins to deal with the things which come under the consideration of this science. He does this in the sixth book, which begins with the words, “The principles”.
Cuiuslibet autem scientiae est considerare subiectum, et passiones, et causas; et ideo hic quintus liber dividitur in tres partes. Primo determinat distinctiones nominum quae significant causas, secundo, illorum nominum quae significant subiectum huius scientiae vel partes eius, ibi, unum dicitur aliud secundum accidens. Tertio nominum quae significant passiones entis inquantum est ens, ibi, perfectum vero dicitur et cetera.
Now since it is the office of each science to consider both its subject and the properties and causes of its subject, this fifth book is accordingly divided into three parts. First, he establishes the various senses of the terms which signify causes; second (843), the various senses of the terms which signify the subject or parts of the subject of this science (“The term one ”); and third (1034), the various senses of  the terms which signify the properties of beingas beng (“That thing”).
Prima in duas. Primo distinguit nomina significantia causas. Secundo quoddam nomen significans quoddam quod consequitur ad causam, scilicet necessarium. Nam causa est ad quam de necessitate sequitur aliud, ibi, necessarium dicitur sine quo non contingit.
The first part is divided into two members. First, he distinguishes the various senses in which the term cause   is used. Second (827), he explains the meaning of a term which signifies something associated with a cause—the term necessary ; for a cause is that on which something else follows of necessity (“Necessary  means”).
Prima dividitur in duas. Primo distinguit nomina significantia causas generaliter. Secundo distinguit quoddam nomen, quod significat quamdam causam in speciali, scilicet hoc nomen natura, ibi, natura vero dicitur et cetera.
 
Prima dividitur in tres. Primo distinguit hoc nomen, principium. Secundo hoc nomen, causa, ibi, causa vero dicitur. Tertio hoc nomen, elementum, ibi, elementum vero dicitur.
The first part is divided into three members. First, he gives the various meanings of the term principle ; second (763), of the term cause   (“In one sense the term cause ); and third (795), of  the term element  (The inherent principle”).
Procedit autem hoc ordine, quia hoc nomen principium communius est quam causa: aliquid enim est principium, quod non est causa; sicut principium motus dicitur terminus a quo. Et iterum causa est in plus quam elementum. Sola enim causa intrinseca potest dici elementum.
He follows this order because the term principle is more common than the term cause, for something may be a principle and not be a cause; for example, the principle of motion is said to be the point from which motion begins.
 Again, a cause is found in more things than an element is, for only an intrinsic cause can be called an element.
Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit significationes huius nominis principium. Secundo reducit omnes ad unum commune, ibi, omnium igitur principiorum.
In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the meanings of the term principle. Second (761), he reduces all of these to one common notion (“Therefore, it is common”).
Sciendum est autem, quod principium et causa licet sint idem subiecto, differunt tamen ratione. Nam hoc nomen principium ordinem quemdam importat; hoc vero nomen causa, importat influxum quemdam ad esse causati. Ordo autem prioris et posterioris invenitur in diversis; sed secundum id, quod primo est nobis notum, est ordo inventus in motu locali, eo quod ille motus est sensui manifestior. Sunt autem trium rerum ordines sese consequentes; scilicet magnitudinis, motus, et temporis. Nam secundum prius et posterius in magnitudine est prius et posterius in motu; et secundum prius et posterius in motu est prius et posterius in tempore, ut habetur quarto physicorum. Quia igitur principium dicitur quod in aliquo ordine, et ordo qui attenditur secundum prius et posterius in magnitudine, est prius nobis notus, secundum autem quod res sunt nobis notae secundum hoc a nobis nominantur, ideo hoc nomen principium secundum propriam sui inquisitionem significat id quod est primum in magnitudine, super quam transit motus. Et ideo dicit, quod principium dicitur illud unde aliquis rem primo moveat, idest aliqua pars magnitudinis, a qua incipit motus localis. Vel secundum aliam literam, unde aliquid rei primo movebitur, idest
 
ex qua parte rei aliquid incipit primo moveri. Sicut in longitudine et in via quacumque, ex illa parte est principium, unde incipit motus. Ex parte vero opposita sive contraria, est diversum vel alterum, idest finis vel terminus. Sciendum est, quod ad hunc modum pertinet principium motus et principium temporis ratione iam dicta.
for example in the case of a line and in that of  any kind of journey the principle is the point from which motion begins. But the opposite or contrary point is “something different or other,”  i.e., the end or terminus. It should also be noted that a principle of motion and a principle of time belong to this class for the reason just given.
Quia vero motus non semper incipit a principio magnitudinis, sed ab ea parte unde est unicuique in promptu magis ut moveatur, ideo ponit secundum modum, dicens, quod alio modo dicitur principium motus unde unumquodque fiet maxime optime, idest unusquisque incipit optime moveri. Et hoc manifestat per simile, in disciplinis scilicet in quibus non semper incipit aliquis addiscere ab eo quod est principium simpliciter et secundum naturam, sed ab eo unde aliquid facilius sive opportunius valet addiscere, idest ab illis, quae sunt magis nota quo ad nos, quae quandoque posteriora sunt secundum naturam.
752. But because motion does not always begin from the starting point of a continuous quantity but from that part from which the motion of  each thing begins most readily, he therefore gives a second meaning of principle, saying that we speak of a principle of motion in another way
 “as that from which a thing best comes into being,” i.e., the point from which each thing begins to be moved most easily. He makes this clear by an example; for in the disciplines one does not always begin to learn from something that is a beginning in an absolute sense and by nature, but from that from which one “is able to learn” most readily, i.e., from those things which are better known to us, even though they are sometimes more remote by their nature.
Differt autem hic modus a primo. Nam in primo modo ex principio magnitudinis designatur principium motus. Hic autem ex principio motus designatur principium in magnitudine. Et ideo etiam in illis motibus, qui sunt super magnitudines circulares non habentes principium, accipitur aliquod principium a quo optime vel opportune movetur mobile secundum suam naturam. Sicut in motu primi mobilis principium est ab oriente. In motibus etiam nostris non semper incipit homo moveri a principio viae, sed quandoque a medio, vel a quocumque termino, unde est ei opportunum primo moveri.
753. Now this sense of principle differs from the first. For in the first sense a principle of motion gets its name from the starting point of a continuous quantity, whereas here the principle of continuous quantity gets its name from the starting point of motion. Hence in the case of  those motions which are over circular continuous quantities and have no starting point, the principle is also considered to be the point from which the movable body is best or most fittingly moved according to its nature. For example, in the case of the first thing moved [the first sphere] the starting point is in the east. The same thing is true in the case of our own movements; for a man does not always start to move from the beginning of a road but sometimes from the middle or from any terminus at all from which it is convenient for him to start moving.
Ex ordine autem, qui consideratur in motu locali, fit nobis etiam notus ordo in aliis motibus; et ideo sequuntur significationes principii, quae sumuntur secundum principium in generatione vel fieri rerum. Quod quidem principium dupliciter se habet. Aut enim est
 
inexistens, idest intrinsecum; vel non est inexistens, idest extrinsecum.
Dicitur ergo primo modo principium illa pars rei, quae primo generatur, et ex qua generatio rei incipit; sicut in navi fit primo sedile vel carina, quae est quasi navis fundamentum, super quod omnia ligna navis compaginantur. Similiter quod primo in domo fit, est fundamentum. In animali vero primo fit cor secundum quosdam, et secundum alios cerebrum, aut aliud tale membrum. Animal enim distinguitur a non animali, sensu et motu. Principium autem motus apparet esse in corde. Operationes autem sensus maxime manifestantur in cerebro. Et ideo qui consideraverunt animal ex parte motus, posuerunt cor principium esse in generatione animalis. Qui autem consideraverunt animal solum ex parte sensus, posuerunt cerebrum esse principium; quamvis etiam ipsius sensus primum principium sit in corde, etsi operationes sensus perficiantur in cerebro. Qui autem consideraverunt animal inquantum agit vel secundum aliquas eius operationes, posuerunt membrum adaptatum illi operationi, ut hepar vel aliud huiusmodi, esse primam partem generatam in animali. Secundum autem philosophi sententiam, prima pars est cor, quia a corde omnes virtutes animae per corpus diffunduntur.
755. In the first way, then, a principle means that part of a thing which is first generated and from which the generation of the thing begins; for example, in the case of a ship the first thing to come into being is the base or keel, which is in a certain sense the foundation on which the whole superstructure of the ship is raised. And, similarly, in the case of a house the first thing that comes into being is the foundation. And in the case of an animal the first thing that comes into being, according to some, is the heart, and according to others, the brain or some such member of the body. For an animal is distinguished from a non-animal by reason of  sensation and motion. Now the principle of  motion appears to be in the heart, and sensory operations are most evident in the brain. Hence those who considered an animal from the viewpoint of motion held that the heart is the principle in the generation of an animal. But those who considered an animal only from the viewpoint of the senses held that the brain is this principle; yet the first principle of sensation is also in the heart even though the operations of  the senses are completed in the brain. And those who considered an animal from the viewpoint of  operation, or according to some of its activities, held that the organ which is naturally disposed for that operation, as the liver or some other such part is the first part which is generated in an animal. But according to the view of the Philosopher the first part is the heart because all of the soul’s powers are diffused throughout the body by means of the heart.
 Alio autem modo dicitur principium, unde incipit rei generatio, quod tamen est extra rem; et hoc quidem manifestatur in tribus. Primo quidem in rebus naturalibus, in quibus principium generationis dicitur, unde primum natus est motus incipere in his quae fiunt per motum, sicut in his quae acquiruntur per alterationem, vel per aliquem alium motum huiusmodi. Sicut dicitur homo fieri magnus vel albus. Vel unde incipit permutatio, sicut in his quae non per motum, sed per solam fiunt mutationem; ut patet in factione substantiarum, sicut puer est ex patre et matre qui sunt eius principium, et bellum ex convitio, quod concitat animos hominum ad bellum.
 
which stirs the souls of men to quarrel.
Secundo etiam manifestat in rebus agibilibus sive moralibus aut politicis, in quibus dicitur principium id, ex cuius voluntate vel proposito moventur et mutantur alia; et sic dicuntur principatus in civitatibus illi qui obtinent potestates et imperia, vel etiam tyrannides in ipsis. Nam ex eorum voluntate fiunt et moventur omnia in civitatibus. Dicuntur autem potestates habere homines, qui in particularibus officiis in civitatibus praeponuntur, sicut iudices et huiusmodi. Imperia autem illi, qui universaliter quibuscumque imperant, ut reges. Tyrannides autem obtinent, qui per violentiam et praeter iuris ordinem ad suam utilitatem civitates et regnum detinent.
757. The second class in which this is made clear is that of human acts, whether ethical or political, in which that by whose will or intention others are moved or changed is called a principle. Thus those who hold civil, imperial, or even tyrannical power in states are said to have the principal places; for it is by their will that all things come to pass or are put into motion in states. Those men are said to have civil power who are put in command of particular offices in states, as judges and persons of this kind. Those are said to have imperial power who govern everyone without exception, as kings. And those hold tyrannical power who through violence and disregard for law keep royal power within their grip for their own benefit.
Tertium exemplum ponit in artificialibus, quia artes etiam simili modo principia esse dicuntur artificiatorum, quia ab arte incipit motus ad artificii constructionem. Et inter has maxime dicuntur principia architectonicae, quae a principio nomen habent, idest principales artes dictae. Dicuntur enim artes architectonicae quae aliis artibus subservientibus imperant, sicut gubernator navis imperat navifactivae, et militaris equestri.
758. He gives as the third class things made by art; for the arts too in a similar way are called principles of artificial things, because the motion necessary for producing an artifact begins from an art. And of these arts the architectonic, which
 “derive their name” from the word principle, i.e., those called principal arts, are said to be principles in the highest degree. For by architectonic arts we mean those which govern subordinate arts, as the art of the navigator governs the art of ship-building, and the military art governs the art of horsemanship.
 Ad similitudinem autem ordinis, qui in motibus exterioribus consideratur, attenditur etiam quidam ordo in rerum cognitione; et praecipue secundum quod intellectus noster quamdam similitudinem motus habet, discurrens de principiis in conclusiones. Et ideo alio modo dicitur principium, unde res primo innotescit; sicut dicimus principia demonstrationum esse suppositiones, idest dignitates et petitiones.
759. Again, in likeness to the order considered in external motions a certain order may also be observed in our apprehensions  of things, and especially insofar as our act of understanding, by proceeding from principles to conclusions, bears a certain resemblance to motion. Therefore in another way that is said to be a principle from which a thing first becomes known; for example, we say that “postulates,” i.e., axioms and assumptions, are principles of demonstrations.
His etiam modis et causae dicuntur quaedam principia. Nam omnes causae sunt quaedam principia. Ex causa enim incipit motus ad esse rei, licet non eadem ratione causa dicatur et principium, ut dictum est.
 
761. Therefore, it is (404).
Deinde cum dicit omnium igitur reducit omnes praedictos modos ad aliquid commune; et dicit quod commune in omnibus dictis modis est, ut dicatur principium illud, quod est primum, aut in esse rei, sicut prima pars rei dicitur principium, aut in fieri rei, sicut primum movens dicitur principium, aut in rei cognitione.
Then he reduces all of the abovementioned senses of principle to one that is common. He says that all of the foregoing senses have something in common inasmuch as that is said to be a principle which comes first (1) either with reference to a thing’s being  (as the first part of a thing is said to be a principle) or (2) with reference to its coming to be  (as the first mover is said to be a principle) or with reference to the knowing of it.
Sed quamvis omnia principia in hoc, ut dictum est, conveniant, differunt tamen, quia quaedam sunt intrinseca, quaedam extrinseca, ut ex praedictis patet. Et ideo natura potest esse principium et elementum, quae sunt intrinseca. Natura quidem, sicut illud a quo incipit motus: elementum autem sicut pars prima in generatione rei. Et mens, idest intellectus, et praevoluntas, idest propositum, dicuntur principia quasi extrinseca. Et iterum quasi intrinsecum dicitur principium substantia rei, idest forma quae est principium in essendo, cum secundum eam res sit in esse. Et secundum etiam praedicta, finis cuius causa fit aliquid, dicitur etiam esse principium. Bonum enim, quod habet rationem finis in prosequendo, et malum in vitando, in multis sunt principia cognitionis et motus, sicut in omnibus quae aguntur propter finem. In naturalibus enim, et moralibus et artificialibus, praecipue demonstrationes ex fine sumuntur.
762. But while all principles agree in the respect  just mentioned, they nevertheless differ, because some are intrinsic and others extrinsic, as is clear from the above. Hence nature and element, which are intrinsic, can be principles-nature as that from which motion begins, and element as the first part in a thing's generation. "And mind," i.e., intellect, and "purpose," i.e., a man's intention, are said to be principles as extrinsic ones. Again, "a thing's substance," i.e., its form, which is its principle of being, is called an intrinsic principle, since a thing has being by its form. Again, according to what has been said, that for the sake of which something comes to be is said to be one of its principles. For the good, which has the character of an end in the case of pursuing, and evil in that of shunning, are principles of the knowledge and motion of  many things; that is, all those which are done for the sake of some end. For in the realm of nature, in that of moral acts, and in that of artifacts, demonstrations make special use of the final cause.
LESSON 2
The Four Classes of Causes. Several Causes of the Same Effect. Causes May Be Causes of Each Other. Contraries Have the Same Cause
 ARISTOTLE'S TEXT Chapter 2: 1013a 24-1013b 16
ατιον λγεται να μν τρπον ξ ο γγνετα τι νυπρχοντος, [25] οον
 χαλκς το νδριντος κα ργυρος τς φιλης κα τ τοτων γνη: λλον δ τ
 
ε δος κα τ παρδειγμα, τοτο δ στν λγος το τ ν εναι κα τ τοτου γνη (οον το δι πασν τ δο πρς ν κα λως ριθμς) κα τ μρη τ ν τ λγ. τι θεν [30] ρχ τς  μεταβολς πρτη τς  ρεμσεως, οον βουλεσας  ατιος, κα πατρ το τκνου κα λως τ ποιον το ποιουμνου κα τ μεταβλητικν το μεταβλλοντος. τι ς τ τλος: τοτο δ στ τ ο νεκα, οον το περιπατεν γεια. δι τ γρ περιπατε; φαμν. να γιαν. κα [35] επντες οτως ομεθα ποδεδωκναι τ ατιον. κα σα δ κινσαντος λλου μεταξ γγνεται το τλους, [1013β] [1] οον τς γιεας σχνασα κθαρσις τ φρμακα τ ργανα: πντα γρ τατα το τλους νεκ στι, διαφρει δ λλλων ς  ντα τ μν ργανα τ δ ργα. τ μν ον ατια σχεδν τοσαυταχς λγεται,
intelligible expression of the quiddity and its genera (for example, the ratio of 2: 1 and number in general are the cause of an octave chord) and the parts which are included in the intelligible expression. Again, that from which the first beginning of  change or of rest comes is a cause; for example, an adviser is a cause, and a father is the cause of a child, and in general a maker is a cause of the thing made, and a changer a cause of the thing changed. Further, a thing is a cause inasmuch as it is an end, i.e., that for the sake of which something is done; for example, health is the cause of walking. For if we are asked why someone took a walk, we answer, "in order to be healthy"; and in saying this we think we have given the cause. And whatever occurs on the way to the end under the motion of something else is also a cause. For example, reducing, purging, drugs and instruments are causes of health; for all of these exist for the sake of the end, although they differ from each other inasmuch as some are instruments and others are processes. These, then, are nearly all the ways in which causes are spoken of.
συμβανει δ πολλαχς [5] λεγομνων τν ατων κα πολλ το ατο ατια εναι ο κατ συμβεβηκς (οον το νδριντος κα νδριαντοποιητικ κα
 χαλκς ο καθ τερν τι λλ νδρις: λλ ο τν ατν τρπον λλ τ μν ς λη τ δ ς θεν κνησις),
406. And since there are several senses in which causes are spoken of, it turns out that there are many causes of the same thing, and not in an accidental way. For example, both the maker of a statue and the bronze are causes of a statue not in any other respect but insofar as it is a statue. However, they are not causes in the same way, but the one as matter and the other as the source of motion.
κα λλλων ατια (οον τ πονεν [10] τς εεξας κα ατη το πονεν: λλ ο τν ατν τρπον λλ τ μν ς  τλος τ δ ς ρχ κινσεως).
407. And there are things which are causes of each other. Pain, for example, is a cause of health, and health is a cause of pain, although not in the same way, but one as an end and the other as a source of  motion.
τι δ τατ τν ναντων στν: γρ παρν ατιον τουδ, τοτ πν ατιμεθα νοτε το ναντου, οον τν πουσαν το κυβερντου τς  νατροπς, ο ν παρουσα
 
ατα τς [15] σωτηρας: μφω δ, κα παρουσα κα στρησις, ατια ς κινοντα.
the pilot whose presence is the cause of the ship's safety. And both of these—the absence and the presence—are moving causes.
COMMENTARY 
The four causes 
Hic philosophus distinguit quot modis dicitur causa. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo assignat species causarum. Secundo modos causarum, ibi, modi vero causarum.
763. Here the Philosopher distinguishes the various senses in which the term cause is used; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he enumerates the classes of causes. Second (783), he gives the modes of causes (“Now the modes”).
Circa primum duo facit. Primo enumerat diversas species causarum. Secundo reducit eas ad quatuor, ibi, omnes vero causae dictae.
In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he enumerates the various classes of  causes. Second (777), he reduces them to four (“All the causes”).
Circa primum duo facit. Primo enumerat diversas species causarum. Secundo manifestat quaedam circa species praedictas, ibi, accidit autem multoties et cetera.
In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he enumerates the different classes of  causes. Second (773), he clarifies certain things about the classes of causes (“And since”).
Dicit ergo primo, quod uno modo dicitur causa id ex quo fit aliquid, et est ei inexistens, idest intus existens. Quod quidem dicitur ad differentiam privationis, et etiam contrarii. Nam ex contrario vel privatione dicitur aliquid fieri sicut ex non inexistente, ut album ex nigro vel album ex non albo. Statua autem fit ex aere, et phiala ex argento, sicut ex inexistente. Nam cum statua fit, non tollitur ratio aeris, nec si fit phiala, tollitur ratio argenti. Et ideo aes statuae, et argentum phialae sunt causa per modum materiae. Et horum genera, quia cuiuscumque materia est species aliqua, materia est eius genus, sicut si materia statuae est aes, eius materia erit metallum, et mixtum, et corpus, et sic de aliis.
He accordingly says, first, that in one sense the term cause means that from which a thing comes to be and is “something intrinsic,” i.e., something which exists within the thing. This is said to distinguish it from a privation and also from a contrary; for a thing is said to come from a privation or from a contrary as from something which is not intrinsic; for example, white is said to come from black or from not- white. But a statue comes from bronze and a goblet from silver as from something which is intrinsic; for the nature bronze is not destroyed when a statue comes into being, nor is the nature silver destroyed when a goblet comes into being. Therefore the bronze of a statue and the silver of a goblet are causes in the sense of  matter. He adds “and the genera of these,”  because if matter is the species of anything it is also its genus. For example, if the matter of a statue is bronze, its matter will also be metal, compound and body. The same holds true of  other things.
 
et exemplum, id est exemplar; et haec est causa formalis, quae comparatur dupliciter ad rem. Uno modo sicut forma intrinseca rei; et haec dicitur species. Alio modo sicut extrinseca a re, ad cuius tamen similitudinem res fieri dicitur; et secundum hoc, exemplar rei dicitur forma. Per quem modum ponebat Plato ideas esse formas. Et, quia unumquodque consequitur naturam vel generis vel speciei per formam suam, natura autem generis vel speciei est id quod significat definitio, dicens quid est res, ideo forma est ratio ipsius quod quid erat esse, idest definitio per quam scitur quid est res. Quamvis enim in definitione ponantur aliquae partes materiales, tamen id quod est principale in definitione, oportet quod sit ex parte formae. Et ideo haec est ratio quare forma est causa, quia perficit rationem quidditatis rei. Et sicut id quod est genus materiae, est etiam materia, ita etiam genera formarum sunt formae rerum; sicut forma consonantiae diapason, est proportio duorum ad unum. Quando enim duo soni se habent adinvicem in dupla proportione, tunc est inter eos consonantia diapason, unde dualitas est forma eius. Nam proportio dupla ex dualitate rationem habet. Et, quia numerus est genus dualitatis, ideo ut universaliter loquamur, etiam numerus est forma diapason, ut scilicet dicamus quod diapason est secundum proportionem numeri ad numerum. Et non solum tota definitio comparatur ad definitum ut forma, sed etiam partes definitionis, quae scilicet ponuntur in definitione in recto. Sicut enim animal gressibile bipes est forma hominis, ita animal, et gressibile, et bipes. Ponitur autem interdum materia in definitione, sed in obliquo; ut cum dicitur, quod anima est actus corporis organici physici potentia vitam habentis.
and pattern of a thing, i.e., its exemplar. This is the formal cause, which is related to a thing in two ways. (1) In one way it stands as the intrinsic form of a thing, and in this respect it is called the formal principle of a thing. (2) In another way it stands as something which is extrinsic to a thing but is that in likeness to which it is made, and in this respect an exemplar  is also called a thing’s form. It is in this sense that Plato held the Ideas to be forms. Moreover, because it is from its form that each thing derives its nature, whether of its genus or of its species, and the nature of its genus or of  its species is what is signified by the definition, which expresses its quiddity, the form of a thing is therefore the intelligible expression of its quiddity, i.e., the formula by which its quiddity is known. For even though certain material parts are given in the definition, still it is from a thing’s form that the principal part of the definition comes. The reason why the form is a cause, then, is that it completes the intelligible expression of a thing’s quiddity. And just as the genus of a particular matter is also matter, in a similar way the genera of forms are the forms of  things; for example, the form of the octave chord is the ratio of 2:1. For when two notes stand to each other in the ratio of 2:1, the interval between them is one octave. Hence twoness is its form; for the ratio of 2:1 derives its meaning from twoness. And because number is the genus of twoness, we may therefore say in a general way that number is also the form of  the octave, inasmuch as we may say that the octave chord involves the ratio of one number to another. And not only is the whole definition related to the thing defined as its form, but so also are the parts of the definition, i.e., those which are given directly in the definition. For just as two-footed animal capable of walking is the form of man, so also are animal, capable of  walking and two-footed. But sometimes matter is given indirectly in the definition, as when the soul is said to be the actuality of a physical organic body having life potentially.
Tertio modo dicitur causa unde primum est principium permutationis et quietis; et haec est causa movens, vel efficiens. Dicit autem, motus, aut etiam quietis, quia motus naturalis et quies naturalis in eamdem causam reducuntur, et similiter quies violenta et motus violentus. Ex eadem enim causa ex qua
 
movetur aliquid ad locum, quiescit in loco. Sicut consiliator est causa. Nam ex consiliatore incipit motus in eo, qui secundum consilium agit ad rei conservationem. Et similiter pater est causa filii. In quibus duobus exemplis duo principia motus tetigit ex quibus omnia fiunt, scilicet propositum in consiliatore, et naturam in patre. Et universaliter omne faciens est causa facti per hunc modum, et permutans permutati.
same as that by which it is made to rest there.  “An adviser” is an example of this kind of cause, for it is as a result of an adviser that motion begins in the one who acts upon his advice for the sake of safeguarding something. And in a similar way “a father is the cause of a child.” In these two examples Aristotle touches upon the, two principles of motion from which all things come to be, namely, purpose in the case of an adviser, and nature in the case of a father. And in general every maker is a cause of the thing made and every changer a cause of the thing changed.
Sciendum est autem quod secundum  Avicennam quatuor sunt modi causae efficientis; scilicet perficiens, disponens, adiuvans, et consilians.
766. Moreover, it should be noted that according to Avicenna, there are four modes of efficient cause, namely, perfective, dispositive, auxiliary and advisory.
Perficiens autem dicitur causa efficiens, quae ultimam rei perfectionem causat, sicut quod inducit formam substantialem in rebus naturalibus, vel artificialem in artificialibus, ut aedificator domus.
 An efficient cause is said to be perfective inasmuch as it causes the final perfection of a thing, as the one who induces a substantial form in natural things or artificial forms in things made by art, as a builder induces the form of a house.
Disponens autem quod non inducit ultimam formam perfectivam, sed tantummodo praeparat materiam ad formam; sicut ille, qui dolat ligna et lapides, dicitur domum facere. Et haec non proprie dicitur efficiens domus; quia id, quod ipse facit, non est domus nisi in potentiam. Magis tamen proprie erit efficiens, si inducat ultimam dispositionem ad quam sequitur de necessitate forma; sicut homo generat hominem non causans intellectum, qui est ab extrinseco.
767. An efficient cause is said to be dispositive if it does not induce the final form that perfects a thing but only prepares the matter for that form, as one who hews timbers and stones is said to build a house. This cause is not properly said to be the efficient cause of a house, because what he produces is only potentially a house. But he will be more properly an efficient cause if he induces the ultimate disposition on which the form necessarily follows; for example, man generates man without causing his intellect, which comes from an extrinsic cause.
 Adiuvans autem dicitur causa secundum quod operatur ad principalem effectum. In hoc tamen differt ab agente principali, quia principale agens agit ad finem proprium, adiuvans autem ad finem alienum; sicut qui adiuvat regem in bello, operatur ad finem regis. Et haec est dispositio causae secundariae ad primam; nam causa secunda operatur propter finem primae causae in omnibus agentibus per se ordinatis, sicut militaris propter finem civilis.
 
Consilians autem differt ab efficiente principali, inquantum dat finem et formam agendi. Et haec est habitudo primi agentis per intellectum ad omne agens secundum, sive sit naturale, sive intellectuale. Nam primum agens intellectuale in omnibus dat finem et formam agendi secundo agenti, sicut architector navis navim operanti, et primus intellectus toti naturae.
769. And an advisory  cause differs from a principal efficient cause inasmuch as it specifies the end and form of the activity. This is the way in which the first agent acting by intellect is related to every secondary agent, whether it be natural or intellectual. For in every case a first intellectual agent gives to a secondary agent its end and its form of activity; for example, the naval architect gives these to the shipwright, and the first intelligence does the same thing for everything in the natural world.
 Ad hoc autem genus causae reducitur quicquid facit aliquid quocumque modo esse, non solum secundum esse substantiale, sed secundum accidentale; quod contingit in omni motu. Et ideo non solum dicit quod faciens sit causa facti, sed etiam mutans mutati.
770. Further, to this genus of cause is reduced everything that makes anything to be in any manner whatsoever, not only as regards substantial  being, but also as regards accidental being, which occurs in every kind of  motion. Hence he says not only that the maker is the cause of the thing made, but also that the changer is the cause of the thing changed.
Quarto modo dicitur causa finis; hoc autem est cuius causa aliquid fit, sicut sanitas est causa ambulandi. Et quia de fine videbatur minus quod esset causa, propter hoc quod est ultimum in esse, unde etiam ab aliis prioribus philosophis haec causa est praetermissa, ut in primo libro praehabitum est, ideo specialiter probat de fine quod sit causa. Nam haec quaestio quare, vel propter quid, quaerit de causa: cum enim quaeritur quare, vel propter quid quis ambulat, convenienter respondentes dicimus, ut sanetur. Et sic respondentes opinamur reddere causam. Unde patet quod finis est causa. Non solum autem ultimum, propter quod efficiens operatur, dicitur finis respectu praecedentium; sed etiam omnia intermedia quae sunt inter primum agens et ultimum finem, dicuntur finis respectu praecedentium; et eodem modo dicuntur causa unde principium motus respectu sequentium: sicut inter medicinam, quae est primum agens in hoc ordine, et sanitatem quae est ultimus finis, sunt ista media: scilicet attenuatio, quae est propinquissima sanitati in his, qui superabundant in humoribus, et purgatio, per quam acquiritur attenuatio, et pharmacia, idest medicina laxativa, et ex qua purgatio causatur, et organa idest instrumenta quibus
 
medicina vel pharmacia praeparatur et ministratur. Huiusmodi etiam omnia sunt propter finem; et tamen unum eorum est finis alterius. Nam attenuatio est finis purgationis, et purgatio pharmaciae. Haec autem intermedia posita differunt adinvicem in hoc, quaedam eorum sunt organa, sicut instrumenta quibus medicina praeparatur et ministratur, et ipsa medicina ministrata qua natura utitur ut instrumento; quaedam vero sunt opera, idest operationes, sive actiones, ut purgatio et attenuatio.
prepared and administered. And all such things exist for the sake of the end, although one of  them is the end of another. For reducing is the end of purging, and purging is the end of  purgatives. However, these intermediates differ from each other in that (1) some are instruments, i.e., the instruments by means of  which medicine is prepared and administered (and the administered medicine itself is something which nature employs as an instrument); and (2) some—purging and reducing—are processes, i.e., operations or activities.
Concludit ergo quod causae toties dicuntur, idest quatuor modis. Et addit fere propter modos causarum quos infra ponet. Vel etiam ideo, quia illae eaedem species non eadem ratione in omnibus inveniuntur.
772. He concludes, then, that “these are the ways in which causes are spoken of (405),” i.e., the four ways; and he adds “nearly all” because of the modes of causes which he gives below. Or he also adds this because the same classes of  causes are not found for the same reason in all things.
773. And since  (406).
Deinde cum dicit accidit autem ponit quaedam, quae consequuntur circa causas ex praedictis; et sunt tria: quorum primum est, quod quia causa multis modis dicitur, contingit multas causas esse unius rei non secundum accidens, sed secundum se. Quod enim secundum accidens multae sint causae unius rei, hoc difficile non videbatur; quia rei, quae est causa per se alicuius effectus, multa possunt accidere, qua omnia illius effectus possunt etiam causa per accidens dici: sed, quod causae per se sint multae unius, hoc fit manifestum ex hoc, quod causae multipliciter dicuntur. Statuae enim causa per se et non per accidens est factor statuae, et aes; sed non eodem modo. Hoc enim est impossibile quod eiusdem secundum idem genus, sint multae causae per se eodem ordine; licet possint esse plures causae hoc modo, quod una sit proxima, alia remota: vel ita, quod neutrum sit causa sufficiens, sed utrumque coniunctim; sicut patet in multis, qui trahunt navem. Sed in proposito diversis modis ista duo sunt causa statuae: aes quidem ut materia, artifex vero ut efficiens.
 
774. And there are (407).
Secundum ponit ibi, et adinvicem dicit, quod etiam contingit, quod aliqua duo adinvicem sibi sunt causae: quod impossibile est in eodem genere causae. Manifestum vero fit multipliciter dictis causis. Sicut dolor ex incisione vulneris est causa sanitatis, ut efficiens sive principium motus: sanitas autem est causa illius doloris, ut finis. Secundum enim idem genus causae aliquid esse causam et causatum est impossibile. Alia litera habet melius laborare causa est euexiae, idest bonae dispositionis, quae causatur ex labore moderato, qui ad digestionem confert et superfluos humores consumit.
Then he sets down the second fact that may be drawn from the foregoing discussion. He says that it may also happen that any two things may be the cause of each other, although this is impossible in the same class of cause. But it is evident that this may happen when causes are spoken of in different senses. For example, the pain resulting from a wound is a cause of health as an efficient cause or source of motion, whereas health is the cause of pain as an end. For it is impossible, that a thing should be both a cause and something caused. Another text states this better, saying that “exercise is the cause of physical fitness,” i.e., of the good disposition caused by moderate exercise, which promotes digestion and uses up superfluous humors.
Sciendum est autem, quod cum sint quatuor causae superius positae, earum duae sibiinvicem correspondent, et aliae duae similiter. Nam efficiens et finis sibi correspondent invicem, quia efficiens est principium motus, finis autem terminus. Et similiter materia et forma: nam forma dat esse, materia autem recipit. Est igitur efficiens causa finis, finis autem causa efficientis. Efficiens est causa finis quantum ad esse quidem, quia movendo perducit efficiens ad hoc, quod sit finis. Finis autem est causa efficientis non quantum ad esse, sed quantum ad rationem causalitatis. Nam efficiens est causa inquantum agit: non autem agit nisi causa finis. Unde ex fine habet suam causalitatem efficiens. Forma autem et materia sibiinvicem sunt causa quantum ad esse. Forma quidem materiae inquantum dat ei esse actu; materia vero formae inquantum sustentat ipsam. Dico autem utrumque horum sibi invicem esse causam essendi vel simpliciter vel secundum quid. Nam forma substantialis dat esse materiae simpliciter. Forma autem accidentalis secundum quid, prout etiam forma est. Materia etiam quandoque non sustentat formam secundum esse simpliciter, sed secundum quod est forma huius, habens esse in hoc, sicut se habet corpus humanum ad animam rationalem.
 
thing and has being in this particular thing. This is what happens in the case of the human body in relation to the rational soul.
776. Further, the same thing  (408).
Tertium ponit ibi, amplius autem dicit, quod idem contrariorum contingit esse causam. Quod etiam difficile videbatur vel impossibile, si similiter ad utrumque referatur; sed dissimiliter est causa utriusque. Illud enim, quod per sui praesentiam est causa huius, quando est absens causamur idest accusamus ipsum de contrario, idest dicimus ipsum esse causam contrarii. Sicut patet, quod gubernator per sui praesentiam est causa salutis navis, dicimus eius absentiam esse causam perditionis. Ne autem putetur quod hoc sit referendum ad diversa genera causarum sicut et priora duo, ideo subiungit quod utrumque istorum reducitur ad idem genus causae, scilicet ad causam moventem. Eodem enim modo oppositum est causa oppositi, quo haec est causa huius.
Then he gives the third conclusion that may be drawn from the foregoing discussion. He says that the same thing can be the cause of  contraries. This would also seem to be difficult or impossible if it were related to both in the same way. But it is the cause of each in a different way. For that which when present is the cause of some particular thing, this when absent “we blame,” i.e., we hold it responsible,
 “for the contrary.” For example, it is evident that by his presence the pilot is the cause of a ship’s safety, and we say that his absence is the cause of the ship’s loss. And lest someone might think  that this is to be attributed to different classes of  causes, just as the preceding two were, he therefore adds that both of these may be reduced to the same class of cause—the moving  cause. For the opposite of a cause is the cause of an opposite effect in the same line of causality as that in which the original cause was the cause of its effect.
LESSON 3
 ARISTOTLE'S TEXT Chapter 2: 1013b 16-1014a 25
παντα δ τ νν ερημνα ατια ες ττταρας τρπους ππτει τος φανερωττους. τ μν γρ στοιχεα τν συλλαβν κα λη τν σκευαστν κα τ πρ κα γ κα τ τοιατα πντα τν σωμτων κα τ [20] μρη το λου κα α ποθσεις το συμπερσματος ς τ [21] ξ  ο ατι στιν: τοτων δ τ μν ς τ ποκεμενον, οον τ μρη, τ δ ς τ τ ν εναι, τ τε λον κα σνθεσις κα τ εδος. τ δ σπρμα κα ατρς κα βουλεσας κα λως τ ποιον, πντα θεν ρχ τς μεταβολς [25] στσεως. τ δ ς τ τλος κα
 
τγαθν τν λλων: τ γρ ο νεκα βλτιστον κα τλος τν λλων θλει εναι: διαφερτω δ μηδν ατ επεν γαθν φαινμενον γαθν. τ μν ον ατια τατα κα τοσατ στι τ εδει,
good and the end of other things. And it makes no difference whether we say that it is a good or an apparent good. These, then, are the causes, and this the number of their classes.
τρποι δ τν ατων ριθμ μν [30] εσι πολλο, κεφαλαιομενοι δ κα οτοι λττους. λγονται γρ ατια πολλαχς, κα ατν τν μοειδν προτρως κα στρως λλο λλου, οον γιεας ατρς κα τεχντης, κα το δι πασν τ διπλσιον κα ριθμς, κα ε τ περιχοντα τιον τν καθ καστα. τι δ ς τ συμβεβηκς [35] κα τ τοτων γνη, οον νδριντος λλως  Πολκλειτος κα λλως  νδριαντοποις, τι συμββηκε τ νδριαντοποι Πολυκλετ εναι: [1014α] [1] κα τ περιχοντα δ τ συμβεβηκς, οον νθρωπος ατιος  νδριντος, κα λως ζον, τι Πολκλειτος νθρωπος δ νθρωπος ζον. στι δ κα τν συμβεβηκτων λλα λλων πορρτερον κα [5] γγτερον, οον ε λευκς κα μουσικς  ατιος λγοιτο το νδριντος, λλ μ μνον Πολκλειτος νθρωπος. παρ πντα δ κα τ οκεως λεγμενα κα τ κατ συμβεβηκς, τ μν ς  δυνμενα λγεται τ δ ς  νεργοντα, οον το οκοδομεσθαι οκοδμος οκοδομν οκοδμος. [10] μοως δ λεχθσεται κα φ ν ατια τ ατια τος  ερημνοις, οον τοδε το νδριντος νδριντος λως  εκνος, κα χαλκο τοδε
 χαλκο λως λης: κα π τν συμβεβηκτων σατως. τι δ συμπλεκμενα κα τατα κκενα λεχθσεται, οον ο Πολκλειτος οδ νδριαντοποις [15] λλ Πολκλειτος νδριαντοποις. λλ μως παντ γε τατ στ
 
τ μν πλθος ξ, λεγμενα δ διχς: γρ ς τ καθ καστον ς τ γνος, ς τ συμβεβηκς ς τ γνος το συμβεβηκτος, ς  συμπλεκμενα τατα ς  πλς λεγμενα, πντα δ ς  [20] νεργοντα κατ δναμιν. διαφρει δ τοσοτον, τι τ μν νεργοντα κα τ καθ καστον μα στι κα οκ  στι κα ν ατια, οον δε ατρεων τδε τ γιαζομν κα δε οκοδμος τδε τ οκοδομουμν, τ δ κατ δναμιν οκ ε: φθερεται γρ οχ μα οκα κα [25] οκοδμος.
they are either active or potential causes. But they differ in this respect, that active causes, i.e. singular causes, exist or cease to exist simultaneously with their effects, as this particular one who is healing with this particular person who is being healed, and as this particular builder with this particular thing which is being built. But this is not always true of  potential causes; for the builder and the thing built do not cease to exist at the same time.
COMMENTARY 
Four modes of causes 
Hic philosophus reducit omnes causas in quatuor modos causarum praedictos; dicens, quod omnia quae dicuntur causae, incidunt in praedictos quatuor modos. Dicuntur enim elementa, idest literae, causae syllabarum, et materia artificialium dicitur esse causa factorum per artem, et ignis et terra et huiusmodi omnia simplicia corpora, dicuntur esse causae corporum mixtorum. Et partes dicuntur esse causa totius. Et suppositiones, idest propositiones praemissae, ex quibus propositis syllogizatur, dicuntur esse causa conclusionis. Et in omnibus istis est una ratio causae, secundum quod dicitur causa illud ex quo fit aliquid, quod est ratio causae materialis.
777. Here the philosopher reduces all causes to the classes of causes mentioned above (409), saying that all those things which are called causes fall into one of the four classes mentioned above. For
 “elements,” i.e., letters, are said to be the causes of syllables; and the matter of artificial things is said to be their cause; and fire and earth and all simple bodies of this kind are said to be the causes of compounds. And parts are said to be the causes of a whole, and “premises,” i.e., propositions previously set down from which conclusions are drawn, are said to be the causes of the conclusion.
 And in all of these cases cause has a single formal aspect according as cause means that from which a thing is produced, and this is the formal aspect of material cause.
Sciendum est autem, quod propositiones dicuntur esse materia conclusionis, non quidem secundum quod sub tali forma existunt, vel secundum virtutem earum; (sic enim magis se habent in ratione causae efficientis); sed quantum ad terminos, ex quibus componuntur. Nam ex terminis praemissarum componitur conclusio, scilicet ex
 
maiori et ex minori extremitate.
Inter ea autem ex quibus res integratur, aliquid se habet per modum subiecti, sicut partes et alia quae praedicta sunt; alia vero se habent ut quod quid erat esse, scilicet totum, et compositio, et species, quae pertinent ad rationem formae, secundum quam quidditas rei completur. Sciendum est enim, quod quandoque una res simpliciter est alicuius materia, sicut argentum phialae; et tunc forma correspondens tali materiae potest dici species. Quandoque autem plures adinvicem adunatae sunt materia alicuius rei. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Quandoque enim adunantur secundum ordinem tantum, sicut homines in exercitu, vel domus in civitate; et sic pro forma respondet totum, quod designatur nomine exercitus vel civitatis. Quandoque autem non solum adunantur ordine, sed contactu et colligatione, sicut apparet in partibus domus; et tunc respondet pro forma compositio. Quandoque autem super hoc additur alteratio componentium, quod contingit in mixtione; et tunc forma est ipsa mixtio, quae tamen est quaedam compositionis species. Ex quolibet autem trium horum sumitur quod quid est rei, scilicet ex compositione et specie et toto: sicut patet si definiretur exercitus, domus et phiala. Sic ergo habemus duos modos causae.
779. And of those things of which something is composed, some are like a subject, for example, parts and the other things mentioned above, whereas some are like the essence, for example, the whole, the composition and the species, which have the character of a form whereby a thing’s essence is made complete. For it must be borne in mind that (1) sometimes one thing is the matter of  something else in an unqualified  sense (for example, silver of a goblet), and then the form corresponding to such a matter can be called the species. (2) But sometimes many things taken together constitute the matter of a thing; and this may occur in three ways. (a) For sometimes things are united merely by their arrangement, as the men in an army or the houses in a city; and then the whole has the role of a form which is designated by the term army or city. (b) And sometimes things are united not just by arrangement alone but by contact and a bond, as is evident in the parts of a house; and then their composition has the role of a form. (c) And sometimes the alteration of the component parts is added to the above, as occurs in the case of a compound; and then the compound state itself is the form, and this is still a kind of composition.
 And a thing’s essence is derived from any one of  these three—the composition’ species, or whole— as becomes clear when an army, a house, or a goblet is defined. Thus we have two classes of  cause.
Secundum autem aliam rationem dicitur causa sperma et medicus et consiliator, et universaliter omne faciens, ex eo scilicet quod sunt principia motus et quietis. Unde iam hoc est aliud genus causae, propter aliam rationem causandi. Ponit autem sperma in hoc genere causae, quia secundum eius sententiam sperma vim habet activam, menstruum autem mulieris cedit in materiam concepti.
780. But the seed, the physician and the adviser, and in general every agent, are called causes for a different reason, namely, because they are the sources of motion and rest. Hence this is now a different class of cause because of a different formal aspect of causality. He puts seed in this class of cause because he is of the opinion that the seed has active power, whereas a woman’s menstrual fluid has the role of the matter of the offspring.
Quarta vero ratio causandi est secundum quod aliqua dicuntur
 
causae per modum finis et boni respectu aliorum. Illud enim cuius causa fit aliquid, est optimum inter alia et vult esse idest habet aptitudinem ut sit aliorum finis. Quia vero posset aliquis obiicere quod non semper bonum est finis, cum quandoque aliqui inordinate agentes malum finem sibi constituant, ideo respondet, quod nihil ad propositum differt dicere quod simpliciter sit bonum vel apparens bonum. Qui enim agit, agit per se loquendo propter bonum; hoc enim intendit; per accidens autem propter malum, inquantum accidit ei quod existimat bonum esse. Nullus enim agit propter aliquid intendens malum.
the sense of the end and good of other things. For that for the sake of which something else comes to be is the greatest good “and the end” of other things, i.e., it is naturally disposed to be their end. But because someone could raise the objection that an end is not always a good since certain agents sometimes inordinately set up an evil as their end, he therefore replies that it makes no difference to his thesis whether we speak of what is good without qualification or of an apparent good. For one who acts does so, properly speaking, because of a good, for this is what he has in mind. And one acts for the sake of an evil accidentally inasmuch as he happens to think that it is good. For no one acts for the sake of  something with evil in view.
Sciendum autem est, quod licet finis sit ultimus in esse in quibusdam, in causalitate tamen est prior semper. Unde dicitur causa causarum, quia est causa causalitatis in omnibus causis. Est enim causa causalitatis efficientis, ut iam dictum est. Efficiens autem est causa causalitatis et materiae et formae. Nam facit per suum motum materiam esse susceptivam formae, et formam inesse materiae. Et per consequens etiam finis est causa causalitatis et materiae et formae; et ideo potissimae demonstrationes sumuntur a fine, in illis in quibus agitur aliquid propter finem, sicut in naturalibus, in moralibus et artificialibus. Concludit igitur, quod praedicta sunt causae, et quod causae secundum tot species distinguuntur.
782. Moreover, it must be noted that, even though the end  is the last thing to come into being in some cases, it is always prior in causality. Hence it is called the “cause of causes”, because it is the cause of the causality of all causes. For it is the cause of efficient causality, as has already been pointed out (775); and the efficient cause is the cause of the causality of both the matter and the form, because by its motion it causes matter to be receptive of form and makes form exist in matter. Therefore the final cause is also the cause of the causality of both the matter and the form. Hence in those cases in which something is done for an end (as occurs in the realm of natural things, in that of  moral matters, and in that of art), the most forceful demonstrations are derived from the final cause. Therefore he concludes that the foregoing are causes, and that causes are distinguished into this number of classes.
783. Now the modes (410).
Deinde cum dicit modi vero distinguit modos causarum. Est autem distinctio causae per species et per modos. Nam distinctio per species est penes diversas rationes causandi; et ideo est quasi divisio per differentias essentiales species constituentes. Divisio autem per modos est penes diversas habitudines causae ad causatum. Et ideo est in his quae habent eamdem rationem causandi, sicut per se et per accidens, remotum
 
et propinquum. Unde est quasi per differentias accidentales non diversificantes speciem.
causes, and into remote and proximate causes. Therefore this division is equivalently a division based on accidental differences, which do not constitute different species.
Dicit ergo, quod multi sunt modi causarum, sed pauciores inveniuntur quando capitulatim, idest quodam compendio comprehenduntur. Per se enim et per accidens sunt duo modi; tamen reducuntur ad unum capitulum, secundum quod est eadem consideratio de utroque. Et similiter est de aliis modis oppositis. Causae enim multis modis dicuntur, non solum quantum ad diversas species causae, sed etiam quantum ad causas conspeciales, quae scilicet reducuntur ad unam speciem causae.
784. He accordingly says that there are many modes of causes, but that these are found to be fewer in number when “summarized,” i.e., when brought together under one head. For even though proper causes and accidental causes are two modes, they are still reduced to one head insofar as both may be considered from the same point of  view. The same thing is true of the other different modes. For many different modes of causes are spoken of, not only with reference to the different species of causes, but also with reference to causes of the same species, namely, those which are reduced to one class of cause.
Dicitur enim una prior, et altera posterior. Prius autem et posterius in causis invenitur dupliciter. Uno modo in causis diversis numero adinvicem ordinatis, quarum una est prima et remota, et alia secunda et propinqua; sicut in causis efficientibus homo generat hominem ut causa propinqua et posterior, sol autem ut causa prior et remota: et similiter potest considerari in aliis speciebus causarum. Alio modo in una et eadem causa numero secundum ordinem rationis qui est inter universale et particulare. Nam universale naturaliter est prius, particulare posterius.
785. (1) For one cause is said to be prior  and another subsequent; and causes are prior or subsequent in two ways: (1) In one way, when there are many distinct causes which are related to each other, one of which is primary and remote, and another secondary and proximate (as in the case of efficient causes man generates man as a proximate and subsequent cause, but the sun as a prior and remote cause); and the same thing can be considered in the case of the other classes of  causes. (2) In another way, when the cause is numerically one and the same, but is considered according to the sequence which reason sets up between the universal  and the particular; for the universal is naturally prior and the particular subsequent.
Praetermittit autem primum modum, et accipit secundum. In secundo enim modo immediate effectus ab utraque causa existit, scilicet priori et posteriori, quod in primo non convenit. Unde dicit, quod sanitatis causa est medicus et artifex in genere causae efficientis. Artifex quidem ut universale, et prius; medicus vero ut particulare, sive speciale, et posterius. Similiter etiam in causis formalibus dupliciter est causa formalis: ut diapason duplum, vel proportio dupla, vel dualitas est causa formalis, ut speciale et posterius; numerum autem, vel proportio numeri ad numerum vel ad
 
unum, ut universale et prius. Et ita semper ea quae continent singularia, scilicet universalia, dicuntur causae priores.
in this way too “always those classes which contain singulars,” i.e., universals, are said to be prior causes.
 Alia divisio est causarum, secundum quod aliquid dicitur esse causa per se et per accidens. Sicut enim causa per se dividitur in universale et particulare, sive in prius et posterius, ita etiam causa per accidens. Unde non solum ipsae causae accidentales dicuntur causae per accidens, sed etiam ipsarum genera. Ut statuae factor, statuae causa est per se; Polycletus autem per accidens est causa, inquantum accidit ei factorem statuae esse. Et sicut Polycletus est causa statuae per accidens, ita omnia universalia continentia accidens, idest causam per accidens, dicuntur per accidens causae; sicut homo et animal, quae sub se continent Polycletum, qui est homo et animal.
787. (2) Causes are distinguished in another way inasmuch as one thing is said to be a proper cause and another an accidental cause. For just as proper causes are divided into universal and particular, or into prior and subsequent, so also are accidental causes. Therefore, not only accidental causes themselves are called such, but so also are the classes which contain these. For example, a sculptor is the proper cause of a statue, and Polyclitus is an accidental cause inasmuch as he happens to be a sculptor. And just as Polyclitus is an accidental cause of a statue, in a similar way all universals “which contain accidents,” i.e., accidental causes, are said to be accidental causes, for example, man and animal, which contain under themselves Polyclitus, who is a man and an animal.
Et sicut causarum per se quaedam sunt propinquae, quaedam remotae, ut dictum est, ita et inter causas per accidens. Nam Polycletus est causa statuae magis propinqua quam album et musicum. Magis enim remotus modus praedicationis per accidens est, cum accidens praedicatur de accidente, quam cum accidens praedicatur de subiecto. Accidens enim non praedicatur de accidente, nisi quia ambo praedicantur de subiecto. Unde magis remotum est ut attribuatur uni accidenti quod est alterius, sicut musico quod est aedificatoris, quam quod attribuatur subiecto quod est accidentis, sicut Polycleto quod est aedificatoris.
788. And just as some proper causes are proximate and some remote, as was pointed out above, so also is this the case with accidental causes. For Polyclitus is a more proximate cause of  a statue than what is white or what is musical. For an accidental mode of predication is more remote when an accident is predicated of an accident than when an accident is predicated of a subject. For one accident is predicated of another only because both are predicated of a subject. Hence when something pertaining to one accident is predicated of another, as when something pertaining to a builder is predicated of a musician, this mode of  predication is more remote than one in which something is predicated of the subject of an accident, as when something pertaining to a builder is predicated of Polyclitus.
Sciendum autem est, quod aliquid potest dici causa per accidens alterius dupliciter. Uno modo ex parte causae; quia scilicet illud quod accidit causae, dicitur causa per accidens, sicut si album dicatur causa domus.
 Alio modo ex parte effectus; ut scilicet aliquid dicatur causa per accidens alicuius, quod accidit ei quod est effectus per se. Quod quidem potest esse tripliciter.
 
Uno modo, quia habet ordinem necessarium ad effectum, sicut remotio impedimenti habet ordinem necessarium ad effectum. Unde removens prohibens dicitur movens per accidens; sive illud accidens sit contrarium, sicut cholera prohibet frigiditatem, unde scamonaea dicitur infrigidare per accidens, non quia causet frigiditatem sed quia tollit impedimentum frigiditatis, quod est ei contrarium, scilicet choleram: sive etiam si non sit contrarium, sicut columna impedit motum lapidis, unde removens columnam dicitur per accidens movere lapidem superpositum.
The first is that the thing has a necessary connection with the effect. Thus that which removes an obstacle is said to be a mover accidentally. This is the case whether that accident is a contrary, as when bile prevents coolness (and thus scammony is said to produce coolness accidentally, not because it causes coolness, but because it removes the obstacle preventing coolness, i.e., bile, which is its contrary); or even if  it is not a contrary, as when a pillar hinders the movement of a stone which rests upon it, so that one who removes the pillar is said to move the stone accidentally.
 Alio modo, quando accidens habet ordinem ad effectum, non tamen necessarium, nec ut in pluribus, sed ut in paucioribus, sicut inventio thesauri ad fossionem in terra. Et hoc modo fortuna et casus dicuntur causae per accidens.
In a second way, something is accidental to the proper effect when the accident is connected with the effect neither necessarily nor in the majority of  cases but seldom, as the discovery of a treasure is connected with digging in the soil. It is in this way that fortune and chance are said to be accidental causes.
Tertio, quando nullum ordinem habent, nisi forte secundum existimationem; sicut si aliquis dicat se esse causam terraemotus, quia eo intrante domum accidit terraemotus.
In a third way things are accidental to the effect when they have no connection except perhaps in the mind, as when someone says that he is the cause of an earthquake because an earthquake took place when he entered the house.
Tertia distinctio est, secundum quod prae omnibus his vel praeter omnia haec, quae dicuntur esse secundum se sive per se, et secundum accidens, quaedam sunt causae in potentia, quaedam ut agentia, idest in actu. Sicut aedificationis causa est aedificator in potentia. Hoc enim sonat habitum vel officium. Vel aedificans actu.
790. [Cross-division of all] And besides the distinction of all things into causes in themselves or proper causes and accidental causes, there is a third division of causes inasmuch as some things are causes potentially  and some actually, i.e., actively. For example, the cause of building is a builder in a state of potency (for this designates his habit or office), or one who is actually building.
Et eisdem modis, quibus dividuntur causae, possunt dividi causata in quibus vel quorum causae sunt causae. Potest enim dividi causatum per prius et posterius sive particulare et universale; sicut si dicamus, quod statuae factor est causa huius statuae, quod est posterius, aut statuae, quod est universalius et prius, aut imaginis, quod est adhuc universalius. Et similiter aliquid est
 
causa formalis huius aeris, aut aeris, quod est universalius, aut materiae, quod est adhuc universalius. Et similiter potest dici in accidentalibus, scilicet in effectibus per accidens. Nam statuae factor qui est causa statuae, est etiam causa gravis vel albi vel rubei quae accidunt ex parte materiae, et non sunt ab hoc agente causata.
things can be said of accidental effects, i.e., of  things produced by accident. For a sculptor who is the cause of a statue is also the cause of the heaviness, whiteness or redness which are in it as accidents from the matter and are not caused by this agent.
Ulterius ponit quartam distinctionem causae, quae est in simplex et in compositum; ut simplex causa dicatur secundum quod accipitur causa statuae per se totum ut statuae factor, sive per accidens tantum, scilicet Polycletus. Composita autem secundum quod utrumque simul accipitur, ut dicatur causa statuae Polycletus statuae factor.
792. (3) Again, he gives a fourth division of  causes, namely, the division into simple  causes and composite causes. A cause is said to be simple (a) when, for example, in the case of a statue, the proper cause alone   is considered, as a sculptor, or when an accidental cause alone  is considered, as Polyclitus. But a cause is said to be composite when both are taken together, for example, when we say that the cause of a statue is the sculptor Polyclitus.
Est autem alius modus quo causa