Aquatic Animals, Cognitve Ethology and Ethics

7/27/2019 Aquatic Animals, Cognitve Ethology and Ethics

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DISEASES OF AQUATIC ORGANISMS

Dis Aquat OrgVol. 75: 8798, 2007 Published May 4

HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS: JUST WHO DO

WE THINK WE ARE?

At that point I was working with squid, and I think squidare the most beautiful animals in the world. And it just

began to bother me. I began to have the feeling thatnothing I could find out was worth killing another squid.

(Ruth Hubbard, in Holloway 1995, p. 49)

The whale in the sea, like the wolf on land, constituted

not only a symbol of wildness but also a fulcrum for pro-jecting attitudes of conquest and utilitarianism and,

eventually, more contemporary perceptions of preserva-tion and protection.

(Kellert 1996, p. 112)

Humans are a curious lot, and our intrusions, inten-

tional and inadvertent, have significant impacts onother people, nonhuman animal beings (animals),

plants, water, the atmosphere, and inanimate land-

scapes. Often our influence is subtle and long-term.

There are many important and difficult issues that

demand serious consideration in discussions of the

ethics of how human beings interact with animals

(Bekoff & Jamieson 1991, 1996, Bekoff 1998). Their

complexity is compounded because highly charged

subjective personal opinions and passions run high as

one might expect. Furthermore, it is often challenging

and frustrating for us to confront ourselves when we

Inter-Research 2007 www.int-res.com*Email: [email protected]

Aquatic animals, cognitive ethology, and ethics:questions about sentience and other troublingissues that lurk in turbid water

Marc Bekoff*

Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0334, USA

ABSTRACT: In this general, strongly pro-animal, and somewhat utopian and personal essay, I argue

that we owe aquatic animals respect and moral consideration just as we owe respect and moral con-

sideration to all other animal beings, regardless of the taxonomic group to which they belong. Inmany ways it is more dif ficult to convince some people of our ethical obligations to numerous aquatic

animals because we do not identify or empathize with them as we do with animals with whom we are

more familiar or to whom we are more closely related, including those species (usually terrestrial) to

whom we refer as charismatic megafauna. Many of my examples come from animals that are morewell studied but they can be used as models for aquatic animals. I follow Darwinian notions of evolu-

tionary continuity to argue that if we feel pain, then so too do many other animals, including those

that live in aquatic environs. Recent scientific data (science sense) show clearly that many aquatic

organisms, much to some peoples surprise, likely suffer at our hands and feel their own sorts of pain.

Throughout I discuss how cognitive ethology (the study of animal minds) is the unifying science forunderstanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals because it is essential

to know what animals do, think, and feel as they go about their daily routines. Lastly, I argue thatwhen we are uncertain if we are inflicting pain due to our incessant, annoying, and frequently unnec-

essary intrusions into the lives of other animals as we go about redecorating nature (removing ani-

mals or moving them from place to place), we should err on the side of the animals and stop engag-ing in activities that cause pain and suffering.

KEY WORDS: Ethics Cognitive ethology Animal emotions Animal protection Animal welfare

Animal rights Sentience Animal pain Animal suffering

Resale or republication not permitted without written consent of the publisher

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see how destructive we are and how many other ani-

mal beings suffer and die because of what we do to

them, often intentionally. Frequently, we ignore scien-

tific data that show that we are indeed causing endur-

ing pain and suffering. Humans can also be an arro-

gant lot and it is humbling to ask with humility, ratherthan with hubris, Just who do we think we are?

Pondering questions about the ethics of our interac-

tions with other animals raises numerous big ques-

tions, many of which we would rather ignore because

the answers are not all that easy or flattering. These

questions include: Who are we in the grand scheme of

things? What role does science (science sense) play in

our understanding of the world in which we live? What

does it means to know something? Are other minds

really all thatprivate and inaccessible so as to make it

impossible to know what individuals are feeling? What

does the future hold in store if we continue to disman-

tle the only planet we live on and continue to persecutethe other animal beings with whom we are supposed to

coexist?

My essay highlights the complexity and multidimen-

sionality of many issues that center on human ethical

obligations to other species. I will focus a good deal of

attention on the study of animal minds and what is in

them (cognitive ethology) and also consider some big

and difficult questions that arise when we consider

what is called the human dimension and anthro-

pogenic assaults on the lives of other animals. Because

of this, interdisciplinary discussion is mandatory and

this special issue of Diseases of Aquatic Organismsis a

much-welcomed and forward-looking addition to the

field. It is also good to see that Inter-Research (IR) and

and publishers of other journals have a stated ethical

requirement for papers that are published in these out-

lets concerning the use of animals in research and/or

the sampling of endangered species. Professional

societies should set stringent guidelines for ethics, and

these standards should not be viewed as unnecessary

barriers to research or to curtailing the use of animals

for other human activities.

My essay is also meant to be a starting point for dis-

cussion of different perspectives. I lay out broad issues

and big questions to get the discussion going. Regard-less of differences in opinion about what we owe other

species, it is important that we all agree that ethics is

an essential element in any discussion of human inter-

actions with other animals (Nollman 1999, Bekoff

2000a, 2002b, 2006a,b, Goodall & Bekoff 2002). Scien-

tists are human beings and we all have a point of view,

and open discussions in which different perspectives

are carefully and respectfully aired are sorely needed

in the area of animal protection, which includes differ-

ent schools of thought, namely animal welfare and

animal rights.

ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ANIMAL WELFARE: THE

MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS

The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk?

but, Can they suffer?

(Bentham 2005, p. 283; first published 1789)

In current discussions about the moral status of ani-

mals, there is an obvious progressive trend for greater

protection for wild and captive animals. This is clearly

the case for marine mammals (Kellert 1999) and let us

hope it will become the case for other aquatic animals

and animals in general. In a survey of Americans per-

ception of marine mammals most respondents were

opposed to commercial whaling, often for ethical rea-

sons. Concern was also expressed for the commercial

exploitation of seals, sea otters, walruses, and polar

bears. Most Americans also objected to commercial

whaling by native peoples or the resumption of killinggray whales. A majority of Alaskans opposed oil and

gas development if it injured or killed marine mam-

mals. There was also an unsuccessful effort prior to the

reauthorization of the Marine Mammal Protection Act

in 1988 to prohibit any invasive research involving

marine mammals unless that research would directly

benefit the subject of the research.

In recent years, philosophers and scientists have

devoted increasing attention to questions about the

moral status of animals (Regan 1983, Singer 1990,

Francione 2000). Many people support a position

called the rightsview. To say that an animal has a right

to have an interest protected means that the animal

has a claim, or entitlement, to have that interest pro-

tected even if it would benefit us to do otherwise (Fran-

cione 2000). Humans have an obligation to honor that

claim for other animals (just as they do for humans who

cannot protect their own interests). Thus, if a wild dol-

phin has a right to feed, then humans have an obliga-

tion to allow it to do so, and not do anything to interfere

with its feeding activities. Likewise, if a dolphin has a

right to life, it cannot be used in war games, actual

warfare, or other activities in which death is possible.

Animal rights advocates stress that animals lives are

valuable in and of themselves (they have inherentvalue) and their lives are not valuable because of what

they can do for humans (their utility) or because they

look or behave like us. Animals are not property or

things, but rather they are living organisms worthy of

our compassion, respect, friendship, and support. Ani-

mals are not lesser beings than or not as valuable as

human beings; they are not property that can be

abused or dominated. Human benefits are irrelevant

for determining how animals should be treated.

Many people believe that the animal rights view

and the animal welfare view are identical, but they

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Bekoff: Aquatic animals, cognitive ethology, and ethics

are not. Animal welfarists typically focus on an in-

dividuals usefulness to humans. They practice uti-

litarianism, in which the general rule of thumb is

that the right actions are those that maximize utility

summed over all those who are affected by the

actions. Often welfarists/utilitarians are called wise-users. They believe that while humans should not

abuse or exploit animals, as long as we make the

animals lives comfortable, physically and psycholo-

gically, we are taking care of them and respecting

their welfare. Welfarists are concerned with the qual-

ity of animals lives. But, welfarists do not believe

that animals lives are valuable in and of themselves.

Many conservation biologists and environmentalists

are utilitarians who are willing to trade-off indivi-

duals lives for the perceived good of higher levels

of organization such as populations, species, or eco-

systems.

The welfarists rule of thumb, and it is not a moralrule, is that it is permissible to use animals if the rela-

tionship between the costs to the animals and the

benefits to the humans is such that the costs are less

than the benefits. Welfarists believe that if animals

experience comfort, appear happy, experience some

of lifes pleasures, and are free from prolonged or

intense pain, fear, hunger and other unpleasant

states, then we are fulfilling our obligations to them. If

individuals show normal growth and reproduction,

and are free from disease, injury, malnutrition, and

other types of pain and suffering, they are doing well.

Thus, welfarists argue that using animals in experi-

ments, slaughtering them for human consumption,

and using them for treating human disorders (for

example, dolphin-assisted therapy programs) are per-

missible as long as these activities are conducted in a

humane way. Welfarists do not want animals to suffer

from any unnecessary pain, but they sometimes dis-

agree among themselves about what pain is neces-

sary and what humane care really is. Welfarists agree

that the pain and death animals experience is some-

times justified because of the benefits that humans

derive. The ends human benefits justify the means

the use of animals. Some people argue that smart

animals suffer more than do less intelligent beingsand therefore it is easier to justify the use of inverte-

brates, fish, and various rodents rather than dogs,

cats, or great apes, for example. However, intelli-

gence and suffering are not necessarily correlated

and clever animals do not suffer more than less clever

individuals (Bekoff 2006a, 2007). For the utilitarian

philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, whose quote I began

this section with and whose lead many people follow,

it really did not much matter if animals could think or

if they were smart. Rather, Bentham was concerned

with whether or not animals could suffer.

COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY, SCIENCE SENSE, AND

COMMON SENSE: MINDING ANIMALS THAT

ARE USUALLY NOT MINDED

Cognitive ethology (the study of animal minds) is the

unifying science for understanding the subjective,emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals

because it is essential to know what animals do, think,

and feel as they go about their daily routines in the

company of their friends and when they are alone

(Allen & Bekoff 1997, Bekoff 2002b, 2006a,b,c). It is

important to learn why both the similarities and differ-

ences in cognitive capacities and sentience between

humans and other animals have evolved. The more we

come to understand other animals the more we will

appreciate them as the amazing beings they are and

the more we will come to understand ourselves. We

must pay close attention to what animals do in their

worlds and recognize other animals as a way of know-ing. Scientific data, what I call science sense, is but

one way of knowing, and common sense, intuition, and

indigenous knowledge must be given serious consider-

ation (Bekoff 2006a,b).

It is important to blend science sense with common

sense. We also need to give serious consideration to

the question: What does it mean to know something?

I maintain that we knowthat some nonhuman animals

feel somethingsome of the time, just as do human ani-

mals. It is nonsense to claim that we do not know if

dogs or pigs or cows or chickens feel pain or have a

point of view about whether they like or do not like

being exposed to certain treatments. The same goes

for the live cats and dogs that are used as shark bait on

the island of Runion (Mott 2005). Who are we kid-

ding? Frankly, I think were kidding ourselves.

We also are quite good about making predictions

about what animals are likely to do and what they pre-

fer and do not prefer when we make inferences about

their mental states and feelings (Bekoff 2006a). For

example, Wemelsfelder & Lawrence (2001) discovered

that even people who have little experience observing

animals usually agree with one another on what an

animal is most likely feeling. Their intuitions are borne

out because their characterizations of animal emo-tional states predict future behavior quite accurately.

In another study, Wemelsfelder and her colleagues

(Wemelsfelder et al. 2001) asked 18 nave observers to

independently and in their own words describe the

behavioral expression of 20 pigs. They discovered that

the observers showed significant agreement in their

spontaneous assessment , which suggests that these

assessments were based on commonly perceived and

systematically applied criteria.

Highly accurate prediction offers one of the

strongest arguments for the existence of emotions and

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feelings in nonhuman species. Predictive ability shows

that we often know a lot more than we give ourselves

credit for. When we think dogs are having fun, we pre-

dict that they will continue playing and seek it out with

other individuals if their play partner stops. When we

see an elephant moping, e.g. walking slowly and aim-lessly, body low to the ground, trunk drooping, and tail

down, we are quite right about inferring that it is sad or

grieving. The emotional lives of many animals are not

hidden or private, but rather public.

Some will say, Oh, youre just being anthropomor-

phic. I am indeed. Among many researchers there is

less resistance to being anthropomorphic because

most people researchers and non-researchers alike

realize that careful, biocentric anthropomorphism that

takes the animals point of view into account (Bekoff

2000b,c) is a very useful heuristic. I have argued

repeatedly that we mustbe anthropomorphic because

of who we are anthropoid apes who use a spoken lan-guage to communicate our own feelings and that san-

itized reductionistic or mechanistic discussions of ani-

mal emotions and sentience are barren and do not help

us understand what other animals are feeling or think-

ing (for more detailed discussion of anthropomor-

phism, see Bekoff 2006a,b).

WHAT DO ANIMALS WANT?

Cognitive ethology can also help us gain insights

into what animals want (Carbone 2004) and it is safe to

say that they do not want to suffer, just as we do not

want to suffer. Surely a whimpering or playing dog, a

lone chimpanzee in a tiny barren and dark cage, an

elephant grieving the loss of a friend, or a baby pig

having its tail cut off docked as this horrific and

inexcusable procedure is called or having its teeth

ground down on a grindstone, feels something. Recent

data show that chronic pain is associated with docking

(Bekoff, 2006b). Is this really surprising? Cows can be

moody, hold grudges and nurture close friendships,

and sheep prefer the faces of familiar individuals

(Bekoff 2006b). Is this really surprising? Animals are

not unfeeling objects.Studies of animal preferences are replete with infor-

mation that shows clearly that individuals make

choices that maximize reward and pleasure and mini-

mize punishment and pain (Balcombe 2006, Bekoff

2006a, McMillan & Vance 2004). Animals clearly tell us

this in many ways and it is our responsibility to figure

out how they communicate their feelings to us. There

are data that indicate that reptiles, such as iguanas, try

to maximize sensory pleasure (Cabanac 1999, Ramirez

& Cabanac 2003). Iguanas choose to stay warm rather

than venture out into the cold to get food, whereas

amphibians such as frogs and fish do not show such

behavior. Cabanac (1999) postulated that the first men-

tal event to emerge into consciousness was the ability

of an individual to experience the sensations of plea-

sure or displeasure (Ramirez & Cabanac 2003). Based

on Cabanacs research, there is evidence that reptilesexperience basic emotional states, and that the ability

to have an emotional life emerged between amphib-

ians and early reptiles. Now, what about aquatic

organisms for which there are few data?

ETHICS, SENTIENCE, AND AQUATIC ANIMALS:

DEALING WITH INNUMERABLE NAMELESS AND

FACELESS INDIVIDUALS

The emotional lives of fish and other aquatic organ-

isms are difficult to study because the way in which

they might communicate their feelings is not readilyapparent to humans. Their emotions are not as public

as those of mammals, for example. This does not mean,

of course, that fish and other aquatic organisms do not

experience various emotions including pain and suf-

fering. The faces of many aquatic animals are not very

expressive, but many fish and octopuses, for example,

change colors in different social contexts, and these

changes seem to be related to how they feel about the

situation in which they find themselves (Anderson

2000). When octopuses get angry, their pearly white

skin turns red. Anderson (2000), who studies octopuses

at the Seattle Aquarium, claims that octopuses wear

their hearts on their skin for all to see. A red octopus is

likely an angry octopus that should be avoided. There

are also various chemicals that are carried in water

that indicate stress, and fish that are exposed to these

chemicals swim away as if they are afraid (Eibl-

Eibesfeldt 1975).

For a variety of reasons, writing about the ethics of

dealing with many aquatic animals is much more diffi-

cult than writing about the terrestrial vertebrates,

social carnivores and various birds, with which I am

more familiar. Because of a lack of facial expression or

expressive eyes, it is more difficult for some people to

identify with, and to understand, the social lives, cog-nitive skills, emotional experiences, and types of suf-

fering and pain that these animals endure in their

aquatic environs, habitats that are foreign to humans.

With this lack of ability to identify with individuals it

becomes more difficult to empathize with them, yet

empathy is critical in making decisions about what

other individuals are feeling (de Waal 2005, Bekoff

2006a,b) and how we should respond to them. Because

of our lack of familiarity with many aquatic animals,

we often find ourselves swimming upstream in muddy

water when we discuss our ethical obligations to them

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because it is easy to ignore what we cannot or do not

directly sense or feel. We make certain assumptions

and move on from there.

Many people also argue that for species for which

there are innumerable members we do not need to be

concerned with the well-being of individuals becausethe species as a whole is not in trouble or endangered.

Furthermore, it is uncommon to name the animals they

are studying, especially when there are countless indi-

viduals present. Working with numerous nameless

individuals distances people from the animals they are

interacting with (Bekoff 2002b, 2006a). As exemplars

they discuss, for example, huge schools of fish, in

which there may be millions of nameless individuals.

However, just because there are millions of unnamed

animals does not mean we do not have a responsibility

to treat individuals with respect and to avoid subject-

ing them to painful experiences. When I mention fish

to some colleagues their response is often Oh, thereare so many of them we dont need to worry about indi-

viduals. It is perfectly okay with them if individuals

are traded off for the good of their species.

Another problem is that fish and other aquatic ani-

mals find themselves as meals for innumerable

humans across cultures, and since it is unlikely that the

world will ever become totally or even predominantly

vegetarian, aquatic food animals find themselves

being taken in massive and unsustainable quantities.

We are fishing down the food web, and lower levels of

the marine food chain are being used to sustain fish

farms. The Food and Agricultural Organization of

the United Nations (FAO) noted in February 2006

that their most recent global assessment of wild fish stocks

found that out of the almost 600 major commercialspecies groups monitored by the Organization, 52% are

fully exploited while 25% are either overexploited(17%), depleted (7%) or recovering from depletion (1%).

Twenty percent are moderately exploited, with justthree percent ranked as underexploited. Wider use of

fishing rights would help address not only overfishingbut also the problem of illegal, unregulated and un-

reported (IUU) fishing as well as conflicts over access tofishing grounds

(http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/

2006/1000239/index.html)

There are also problems with non-target species

being caught due to fishing activities. For example, in

1990, about 42 million marine mammals and sea birds

were caught in drift nets as squid and tuna were being

harvested (Fox 1997). About 129 000 Olive Ridley tur-

tles have died over the past 13 yr because they suffo-

cate in the nets of fishing boats not using mandatory

turtle-excluder devices. Experts fear that the move-

ment of giant ships and artificial illumination will put

the turtles in even deeper trouble in the years ahead.

Whales also are non-target victims of fishing nets. In

2003 the World Wildlife Fund reported that nearly

1000 whales, dolphins, and porpoises drowned daily

after becoming entangled in fishing nets and other

equipment (Verrengia 2003). Annually, more than

300 000 individuals may perish because of fishing

activities. And while a global moratorium on commer-cial whaling has existed since 1986, Japan and Iceland

continue to hunt as part of what they call scientific

programs. Norway has objected to the moratorium

and runs commercial whaling operations.

So, while it may be more difficult to empathize with

a turtle, herring, crustacean, or lobster, they are heav-

ily exploited and subjected to much harassment and

suffering at the hands of humans. The problems are no

less important, nor are our ethical obligations less com-

pelling because these animals are so different from us

or from those species to which we readily grant moral

standing.

Our feelings for other animals figure heavily into thesorts of treatment we deem permissible or impermissi-

ble. We view and treat different aquatic animals differ-

ently because of what we assume about them, and this

influences how we feel about them. Most people are

familiar with the phenomenal cognitive skills and sen-

tience of animals such as cetaceans and other charis-

matic species, but it is only very recently that solid sci-

entific information has been published about pain in

fish (Sneddon 2003, Moccia & Duncan 2004, Chandroo

et al. 2004a,b), pain and suffering in cephalopods and

decapod crustaceans (see Advocates for Animals

2005), and the impressive social skills, culture, sophis-

ticated learning abilities, long-term memory, coopera-

tive behavior, and recognition skills of fish (Bshary et

al. 2002; see also EFSA 2005 for a comprehensive sum-

mary of the biology, sentience, emotional lives, and

welfare of a wide variety of taxa including aquatic ani-

mals and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2005)

report on the ethics of research involving animals).

There is evidence that fish such as rainbow trout expe-

rience fear (Moccia & Duncan 2004) and that it is

entirely reasonable to assume that many fish are sen-

tient and have the capacity to suffer (Chandroo et al.

2004a,b). Thus, Chandroo et al. (2004a) argue that the

concept of animal welfare can legitimately be appliedto fish. Octopus have been protected from invasive

experimental research in the United Kingdom under

The Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 that was

amended in 1993 to include Octopus vulgaris

(http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1993/Uksi_19932103_en_

1.htm). Octopus are protected because of their large

brains and highly developed learning skills. This

amendment occurred years before a ban on invasive

research on chimpanzees was established in the

United Kingdom (1997), New Zealand (2000), and The

Netherlands (2002).

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Another popular food item also figures into the dis-

cussion of sentience. While it remains unknown if lob-

sters feel pain, one of the worlds experts on this mat-

ter, Jelle Atema, working at the Woods Hole

Oceanographic Institute, notes, While I do not know

for certain, I believe that lobsters may feel pain. (citedin Corson 2004, p. 278) Further, Atema writes, When

we kill them for food we should do so quickly. But we

should also honor them with thoughtful appreciation

for what they have done for us. I believe we should

strive for this in all corners of our lives. It is refreshing

to hear this from a practicing scientist.

It is important that we broaden our taxonomic per-

spective when we consider the pain and suffering that

we dole out. We need to mind animals. The phrase

minding animals refers to caring for other animal

beings, respecting them for who they are, appreciating

their own world views, and wondering what and how

they feel and why. It also refers to the fact that manyanimals have very active and thoughtful minds (Bekoff

2002a). We naturally mind terrestrial and aquatic

habitats and they and all animals and people are far

better off than they would be in the absence of an ethic

that blends respect, caring, compassion, humility, gen-

erosity, kindness, grace, and love. It is obvious that

many animals have a point of view about their place in

the world and that the obvious answer to the question

Do you feel anything? is Yes, I feel a lot. Numerous

aquatic animals typically are not minded and we

need to reverse this trend.

ANIMAL PASSIONS AND BEASTLY VIRTUES:

ANIMALS WILL ALWAYS HAVE SECRETS BUT

THEIR EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES ARE PUBLIC

My starting point concerning animal emotions and

sentience is that many animals have rich and deep

emotional lives and are clearly sentient. Their passions

are public and not well hidden. It is not a matter of

ifemotions have evolved by whythey evolved in a wide

variety of species. Many animals feel emotions such as

joy, happiness, fear, anger, grief, jealousy, resentment,

and embarrassment (Bekoff 2000c, 2002b, 2006a,b, deWaal 2005, Panksepp 2005a,b; Wilhelm 2006; see

also http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/ nature/44016

95.stm). Some might also have a sense of humor or even

a sense of awe. Some might even be moral beings who

know right from wrong (Bekoff 2004, 2006a). Perhaps

some animals marvel at their surroundings and just en-

joy being out where they live. We really do not know

and should keep an open mind about these intriguing

possibilities when we cause pain and suffering. It is

likely that some people would choose alternative food

sources if they knew of the scientific data that showed

that fish and other aquatic organisms likely suffered as

do many terrestrial sources of food.

Charles Darwins idea of evolutionary continuity, in

which variations among species are differences in

degree rather than differences in kind, is very useful in

the study of animal intelligence, animal emotions, andour ethical obligations to other animals. Basically, Dar-

win argued that there are shades of gray among differ-

ent species and that the differences are not black and

white. So, if humans feel emotions and can suffer, then

so too can other animals, but their feelings are not nec-

essarily identical. However, even if they are not identi-

cal, this does not mean that they do not exist. It is pos-

sible that fish and lobster pain is different from dog,

chimpanzee, or human pain, but each individual suf-

fers his or her own pain.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUALS

In addition to broad claims about species differences,

we need to focus on individuals because all individuals

count. Caution surely is the best road to take when

offering generalizations, especially about complex

behavior patterns, animal thinking, and animal emo-

tions across species. Large individual differences

within species mean that normative claims that dol-

phins do this or cuttlefish do that discount fascinating

individual variations that make the study of animal

behavior challenging and exciting. The phrase the

dolphin is misleading and does not capture who these

amazing aquatic animals are. If we try to draw lines

concerning which species experience emotions and

experience pain and suffering, we need to be very

careful when we do it. Frankly, I think it is a waste of

time because new data are constantly adding species

to the list of those that do or most likely experience

pain and suffering. When new data are collected about

animal sentience, species that were previously

included before this information was available are

rarely removed from the list.

These list of species that suffer and feel pain usually

do not include aquatic animals other than those that

garner a lot of attention such as sharks, dolphins, andwhales. Most descriptions of dolphins and other

cetaceans picture them as highly intelligent and sen-

tient, capable of experiencing pleasure and pain, with

remarkable social and cognitive skills. Indeed, dolphins

and other marine mammals seem to fulfill some criteria

of personhood (Herzing & White 1998) in that they are

alive, aware of their surroundings, sentient, and may

have a sense of self. Why, then, do some people feel

comfortable intruding into their worlds if it will cause

pain and suffering? Frohoff (1998, p. 84) has poignantly

noted: Currently we are walking a fine line in our rela-

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tionship with cetaceans. The same attraction that moti-

vates us to protect them from harm is also what drives

us to be close to them, to have them within reach.

It is because dolphins and other marine mammals

are thought to be attractive, harmless, endowed with

mystical qualities, or to be of economic value as com-modities for show or food, that we seek them out. How-

ever, we may bring much harm to them in our efforts to

include them in our lives, even in ways that do not

involve killing them. For example, swim-with-dol-

phin and petting pool programs remain very contro-

versial. Such proffered reasons as its fun, arent the

animals cute, or its a spiritual experience are insuffi-

cient to justify these practices. Much attention has

been given to the question of whether or not human

encounters with dolphins may have negative effects on

them. Humandolphin interactions may be noisy and

stressful. The long-term effects of swim-with-dolphin

programs on dolphin behavior and well-being stillneed to be studied systematically, but there is evidence

that the stress associated with these programs may

have long-term effects on the dolphins (for further dis-

cussion see Iannuzzi & Rowan 1991, Frohoff & Packard

1995, Samuels & Spradlin 1995, Marino & Lilienfeld

1998, Nathanson 1998, Basil & Matthews 2005, and

T. G. Frohoff unpubl.).

ARGUING AGAINST SPECIESISM AND FOR

EVOLUTIONARY CONTINUITY

I have stressed the degree to which perceived animal/human differences in the brains organization of feelingand emotion are probably due to artifacts rather than to a

real gap between primates (including humans) and othermammalian orders. But that is not to say there is no real

difference at all between humans and other animals.There may indeed be a real difference in brain organi-

zation of emotion. If so, however, it is quantitative innature and moderate in degree not a qualitative or

massive difference. (Berridge 2003, p. 41)

Neural substrates of feeling and emotion are distributed

throughout the brain, from front to back, and top tobottom. The same brain structures are implicated in

affective reactions for both humans and other animals.

(Berridge 2003, p. 42)

Now, what about speciesism? Are we really the only

species in which emotions and the ability to suffer have

evolved. No. It is not a matter of them versus us.

Over the years, a variety of criteria have been used to

separate them from us tool use, language, culture,

rationality, consciousness, art, rationality, a sense of

self and all have failed (Bekoff 2006a). Maybe we

are the only species that cooks food or in which sadism,

hatred, and evil have evolved. There are differences

but there are also many similarities between humans

and non-human animals. Nonetheless, Dolan (2002)

claimed, More than any other species, we are the ben-

eficiaries and victims of a wealth of emotional experi-

ence. Professor Dolan cannot know that this statement

is true. Indeed, it just might be that other animals

experience more vivid emotions than we do. This sortof speciesism humanocentrism is what plagues the

study of animal emotions. Why are we so special; why

are we such deeply feeling animals whereas other ani-

mals are not? I find it difficult to accept that we should

set the standard against which other animals should be

compared. Just look at the state of the world today.

My view of humananimal relations makes me

uneasy about claiming that any group of animals is

special. Unique yes, special no. I do not think that dol-

phins or whales are any more special than mice, great

tits, goldfish, lobsters, fish, alligators, shrimp, or ants.

Just because some animals are sentient, capable of

experiencing pain and pleasure, does not necessarilymean that their lives should be valued more than

others. Neither is being cute or warm or furry and

cuddly a sufficient reason for special consideration and

moral standing. Often, people attribute various emo-

tions and the capacity to suffer to charismatic animals

with whom they can identify and empathize (Bekoff

2006a). All life is valuable and all life should be

revered. Animals are not resources or property with

whom we can do what we please, their lives matter

very much, and they should be firmly entrenched in

our moral community (see Jamieson & Regan 1985

with respect to cetaceans).

WHAT SHOULD WE DO? DIFFICULT QUESTIONS

WITH NUANCED ANSWERS

Writing about animal ethics is bound to raise hackles

and bring ones critics out of the woodwork. Many peo-

ple are deeply passionate about the imbalance of

humananimal interactionswe get a lot and they get

very little. While some of my views are considered to

be radical, especially by my ivory-tower colleagues, I

wonder why it is considered radical to argue that we

should let other animals be, and allow them to havetheir own lives as much as is possible in this human-

dominated and anthropocentric world. I am confused,

for I am not trying to put my colleagues out of business

but rather to ask them to think more deeply about how

we impact the lives of other animals.

When many humans interact with nature, they usu-

ally wind up redecorating it. Intentionally or not, it is as

if humans have an inborn urge to reshape nature, to

expand their horizons. We just cannot stop ourselves,

and little else does, even the blatant results of our try-

ing to dominate manage, control our surround-

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ings. We move animals around as we move furniture,

we redecorate landscapes with little concern for main-

taining biological integrity, and we overfish and take

aquatic animals unsustainably. Even during strolls in

pristine forests, swims in oceans, or forays in the sky,

most humans are detached and alienated from themajesty of their surroundings. They do not seem to

love nature deeply.

Because humans have incredible power to dominate

animals, they depend on our goodwill and mercy. Ani-

mals depend on humans to have their best interests in

mind. Human impacts on other animals, intentional

and inadvertent, are universal and ubiquitous. We are

here, there, and everywhere. A major question in need

of serious debate is should we ever interfere in other

animals lives when might human interference be

permissible? Thus, should we let other animals be and

not intentionally interfere in their lives? Should we

hunt them for food whenever we so wish or should wehunt only when there are no alternative food sources?

Should we interfere in other animals lives when we

have spoiled their habitats, when they are sick, pro-

vide food when there is not enough food to go around,

provide care to young if a parent does not, stop aggres-

sive encounters, stop predators in their tracks, or relo-

cate individuals from one place to another, including

zoos, wildlife and marine theme parks, and aquariums?

Should human interests always trump those of other

animals? If not, then when should the interests of other

animals trump our own?

Some of the basic principles that underlie the use

and exploitation of aquatic animals and some of the

general questions that need to be considered apply to

human encounters with just about all other species.

Definitive answers to these and other questions are

quite elusive, but open discussion can provide guide-

lines for proactive decision-making. All too often we

are left in the position of trying to rectify messy and dif-

ficult situations that we have created; proactivity needs

to become the modus operandi for future actions. For

many questions about how animals should be treated

by humans there are no right or wrong answers, but

rather nuanced decisions that need to take into

account the specific situation at hand.

ZOOS, AQUARIUMS, MARINE THEME PARKS,

AND THE WELL-BEING OF CAPTIVE ANIMALS

The existence of aquariums and marine theme parks

raises many important and difficult ethical questions

(Jamieson 1995, Rose & Farinato 1999, Davis 1997,

National Research Council). Jamieson argues that zoos

teach us a false sense of our place in the natural order.

Because what zoos teach us is false and dangerous,

both humans and animals will be better off when they

are abolished. Be that as it may, zoos are here to stay at

least in the short term, and we need to be sure that we

recognize their limitations and strive to offer their resi-

dents the best lives possible.

Kellert (1999) found that a majority of Americansobjected to the captive display of marine mammals in

zoos and aquariums if there are no demonstrated edu-

cational and scientific benefits.

There is little evidence that people leave zoos or

aquariums with any long-lasting sentiments or knowl-

edge that benefit either the animals they have seen

or their wild relatives. Furthermore, few zoos are en-

gaged in conservation efforts for marine mammals or

for any other animals. It is important to note that the

American Association of Zoos & Aquariums (AZA)

itself has concluded in their own executive summary

(AZA Executive Summary; http://www.aza.org/ConEd/

MIRP/Documents/VisitorLearningExecutiveSummary.pdf) that Little to no systematic research has been con-

ducted on the impact of visits to zoos and aquariums on

visitor conservation knowledge, awareness, affect, or

behavior. So much for the AZAs claims that zoos are

important for purposes of education and conservation.

Many questions center on how individuals are cap-

tured, transported, and kept in various types of captive

situations. Animals often are injured and otherwise

stressed during capture and transport. Family groups

may be broken up and the social structure of popula-

tions disrupted. The effects of changing the social

structure of wild populations are little known. Well-

intentioned people often argue that the lives of captive

animals are of higher quality than those of wild rela-

tives, but available data for marine mammals suggest

that this claim is not well supported (Rose & Fari-

nato1999). From an ethical perspective, one must con-

sider whether or not this claim is even relevant, for

keeping animals in captivity radically alters numerous

behavior patterns that have evolved over millennia.

Predation, starvation, and disease are part of what it is

to be wild. Is a longer unnatural life in captivity better

than a shorter natural life in the wild?

The benefits of keeping marine mammals and other

aquatic animals in captivity, to the animals themselves,are largely unknown. Because the social and physical

environments of marine mammals are virtually impos-

sible to replicate in captivity, ethical questions arise

when these animals are maintained in unnatural envi-

ronments. There can be little doubt that the quality of

life is compromised, even though some zoo supporters

claim that their residents get free meals, protection

from predators, free health care, and a safe place to

sleep. In captivity, evolved patterns of foraging, care

giving, and migrating are lost as are natural patterns of

social organization (group size and composition). In

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captivity, for practical reasons, group sizes may be

much smaller than those observed in wild relatives.

Stereotyped behaviors often result from conditions of

captivity, as do self-mutilation and unusually high lev-

els of aggression. Furthermore, individuals often can-

not escape from the glaring eye of the public and theycannot choose when and where to rest.

Many ethical concerns are also raised because first

and foremost, zoos are businesses and their bottom line

centers on money (Davis 1997). For example, it costs an

enormous amount of money to bring marine mammals

into captivity and to keep them there. It has been sug-

gested that the money used to capture, transport, and

keep animals in captivity would be better used to do re-

search in the wild. Also, much money is spent on public

relations and not on the animals themselves. Some feel

that the images of nature that are represented to the

public are a manufactured corporate point of view that

centers more on what the public wants than what isgood for the animals. Witness the existence of numer-

ous Flippers (the prototypical dolphin) and Shamus

(the model killer whale), whose lives do not resemble

even closely the lives of free-living conspecifics or rela-

tives other than that they all live in water.

Similar questions are raised when considering

research on captive animals. Certainly, information

may be gathered about various aspects of their lives

(for example, maternal behavior, self-recognition,

social behavior, communication, and cognitive capaci-

ties). However, research on captive animals is increas-

ingly being scrutinized by some researchers, philoso-

phers, many universities, and various funding

agencies. Some relevant questions include: is it ever

permissible to keep individuals in captivity regardless

of their utility; is the knowledge that is gained by

studying captive individuals justified by keeping them

in cages or tanks; and could more reliable data be col-

lected under more natural conditions? We still know

very little about the life histories of most aquatic ani-

mals. For many people it is the benefits that the captive

individuals and other members of their (or other) spe-

cies might accrue that are central, not the benefits that

humans might gain. But rarely are the results of

research used to benefit the animals other than inlearning about medical treatments and husbandry to

make their lives in captivity better. Rarely do wild indi-

viduals benefit from work done on captive relatives.

THE FUTURE: BEING COMPASSIONATELY

PROACTIVE

Kellerts (1999) study of American perceptions of

marine mammals and their management shows clearly

that most people support the various goals of the

United States Marine Mammal Protection Act. Most

are willing to render significant sacrifices to sustain

and enhance marine mammal populations and species

These findings clearly indicate that marine mam-

mals possess considerable aesthetic, scientific, and

moral support among the great majority of Americanstoday. (Kellert 1999, p ivv)

As a scientist, I am often criticized for being anti-sci-

ence. This is not so. It is in the best traditions of science

to ask questions about ethics; it is not anti-science to

question what we do when we interact with other ani-

mals. Ethics can enrich our views of other animals in

their own worlds and in our different worlds, and help

us to see that their lives are worthy of respect, admira-

tion, and appreciation. Indeed, it is out of respect,

admiration, and appreciation that many humans seek

out the company of whales, dolphins, polar bears, and

aquatic animals. The study of ethics can also broaden

the range of possible ways in which we interact withother animals without compromising their lives. Ethi-

cal discussion can help us to see alternatives to past

actions that have disrespected other animals and, in

the end, have not served us or other animals well. In

this way, the study of ethics is enriching to other ani-

mals and to ourselves in that we may come to consider

new possibilities for how we interact with other ani-

mals. If we think ethical considerations are stifling and

create unnecessary hurdles over which we must jump

in order to get done what we want to get done, then we

will lose rich opportunities to learn more about other

animals and also ourselves. Our greatest discoveries

come when our ethical relationships with other ani-

mals are respectful and not exploitive.

Many ethical issues are extremely difficult to re-

concile and generate highly charged and deeply emo-

tional and passionate responses. Achieving a winwin

situation for animals and humans will be very dif-

ficult. However, it is clear that the increasingly de-

tailed attention being given to various sorts of

humananimal interactions is showing that there are

innumerable negative effects on the lives of the ani-

mals. While many negative influences have been

anticipated or are not surprising, the severity of

human influences has not been fully appreciated. Wemust be careful not to love these animals to their

(or our) deaths. Humans are indeed dangerous to

innumerable aquatic animals.

Allowing human interests always to trump the inter-

ests of other animals is not the best strategy if we are

to solve the numerous and complex problems at hand.

We need to learn as much as we can about the lives of

wild animals. Our ethical obligations also require us to

learn about the ways in which we influence animals

lives when we study them in the wild and in captivity,

and what effects captivity has on them. As we learn

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more about how we influence other animals, we will

be able to adopt proactive, rather than reactive,

strategies.

The fragility of the natural order requires that people

work harmoniously so as not to destroy natures whole-

ness, goodness, and generosity. The separation of us(humans) from them (other animals) engenders a

false dichotomy, the result of which is a distancing that

erodes, rather than enriches, the numerous possible

relationships that can develop among all animal life.

Public education is critical. To disseminate informa-

tion about what is called the human dimension,

administrators of zoos, wildlife theme parks, aquari-

ums, and areas where animals roam freely should

inform visitors of how they may influence the behavior

of animals they want to see. Tourism companies,

nature clubs and societies, and schools can do the

same. By treading lightly humans can enjoy the com-

pany of other animals without making them pay for ourinterest in their fascinating lives. Our curiosity about

other animals need not harm them.

Numerous aquatic animals are closely linked to the

wholeness of many ecosystems, and how they fare is

tightly associated with the integrity of communities

and ecosystems. By paying close attention to what we

do to them, why we do what we do, and where and

when we do it, we can help maintain the health of indi-

viduals, species, populations, and ecosystems.

TOWARD A DEEP ETHOLOGY: AQUATIC

ANIMALS ARE MORE THAN STREAMS

OF PROTEIN

We need a compassionate ethic of caring and sharing

our planet. Sensitivity and humility are essential com-

ponents of our guiding ethic. Expanding our circle of

respect and understanding can help bring us all

together. We are other animals guardians and we owe

them unconditional compassion, respect, support, and

love. We may have control and dominion over other

animals, but this does not mean that we have to exploit

and dominate them.

My views on animal use are indeed restrictive. Weare not natures keepers if this means that we keep

nature by dominating other animals using a narrow

anthropocentric agenda in which other animals are

objectified referred to by numbers and not by names,

transformed into points on a graph and their world

views discounted. This means that fish farms and cap-

ture fisheries (and slaughterhouses for terrestrial food),

for example, are not acceptable practices for producing

food. There is little doubt that fish suffer (e.g. Lambooij

et al. 2004, Moccia & Duncan 2004, Chandroo et al.

2004a,b).

The ethical problems with fish farms and aquacul-

ture go beyond the harming of individuals. There also

are serious environmental concerns (McCarthy 2002,

Midkiff 2004). For example, farm-raised salmon have

escaped from their pens and this has led to cross-

breeding and competition with native Pacific salmon.There are dead zones under pens, as feces, excess

food, and harmful additives accumulate on the sea

floor. The state of Maine has banned salmon pens from

its offshore waters and Alaska has banned salmon

pens from its waters to protect native stocks and the

Alaska fishing industry (Midkillf 2004).

I know there is a real world out there and that the

world is not going to become vegetarian any time soon,

if ever. However, if we carefully scrutinize what we do

we surely can reduce the intentional harm we cause

billions of individuals as they become our meals. Fish

and other aquatic animals are more than streams of

protein.So, where to from here? Our starting point should be

that we will not intrude on other animals lives unless

we can show that we have a right to override this

maxim and that our actions are in the best interests of

the animals irrespective of our desires. When unsure

about how we influence the lives of other animals, we

should give them the benefit of the doubt and err on

the side of the animals. It is better to be safe than sorry.

First and foremost in any deliberations about other

animals must be deep concern and respect for their

lives and the worlds within which they live, i.e. respect

for who they are in their worlds, and not respect moti-

vated by who we want them to be in our anthropocen-

tric scheme of things. As Taylor (1986, p. 313) notes, a

switch away from anthropocentrism to biocentrism, in

which human superiority comes under critical scrutiny,

may require a profound moral reorientation. That is

just fine. Can we really believe that we are the only

species with feelings, beliefs, desires, goals, expecta-

tions, the ability to think, the ability to think about

things, the ability to feel pain, or the capacity to suffer?

Surprises are always forthcoming concerning the

cognitive skills, emotional lives, and sentience of non-

human animals, and it is essential that people who

write about animal issues be cognizant of these find-ings. I do not see how any coherent thoughts about

moral and ethical aspects of animal use could be put

forth without using biological/evolutionary, ethologi-

cal, and philosophical information. Ethologists must

read philosophy and philosophers must not only read

ethology but also watch animals. And those who use

animals would do well to read about ethics and look for

more humane alternatives to the practices in which

they engage.

I believe that a deep reflective ethology is needed to

make people more aware of what they do to non-

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humans and to make them aware of their moral and

ethical obligations to animals. I use the term deep

reflective ethology to convey some of the same general

ideas that underlie the deep ecology movement

(Tobias 1985), which asks people to recognize that not

only are they an integral part of nature but also thatthey have unique responsibilities to nature.

Ethics, compassion, humility, respect, coexistence,

and sustainability are among the principles that

should guide us when we interact with other animals.

In most cases there are more humane alternatives

than the methods that we use to intrude into animals

lives. We must step lightly into the lives of animals

and into their homes. We must not leave destructive

footprints of any size.

We can always do better in our interactions with

other animal beings. Always.

Acknowledgements. Some of this essay is excerpted fromBekoff (2002a, 2003). I thank Jan Nystrom and especially

Howard Browman and Anne Berit Skiftesvik for very helpfulcomments on an older draft. I thank Jim McLaughlin for the

phrase streams of protein.

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Editorial responsibility: Anne Berit Skiftesvik,

Storeb, Norway

Submitted: January 8, 2006; Accepted: April 28, 2006

Proofs received from author(s): February 26, 2007

Aquatic Animals, Cognitve Ethology and Ethics

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