Approaching the Dilemma of Modern-Day Khawarej - Religious Diplomacy

8/12/2019 Approaching the Dilemma of Modern-Day Khawarej - Religious Diplomacy

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QEH Working Paper SeriesQEHWPS197 Page 1

Working Paper Number 197

Reli gious Diplomacy:

Approaching the Dilemma of Modern-DayKhawarej

Ali Al Youha*

Following the September 11, 2001 suicide attacks, numerous Western policymakers and

scholars have socially and ideologically constructed and homogenized Islam with violent

practices of suicide-terrorism. They covertly propagate Islam as a violent religion despite its

deep moral denouncement against the criminality of such practices. This paper investigates

how and when religious diplomacy1 influences modern-day khawarej within the Islamic

world. Drawing from two case studies Taliban and Al Qaeda I argue that religious

diplomacy is an essential diplomatic instrument to effectively undermine the khawarej by

significantly improving coercive tactics if constructive diplomacy fails. By employing a

hermeneutical approach, I examine the conditions under which jihad (jus ad bellum/jus inbello) become reasonably permissible, while analysing Islamic fatawa on suicide-terrorism

and the limitation of these religious verdicts. These critical assessments are significantly

relevant, as religious ignorance, wrongful possession of modern technology, and hidden

geopolitical interests erroneously promote anti-Islamic ideologies globally.

June 2013

*This Working Paper was initially submitted in May 2012 in partial fulfillment for the degreeof Master of Science in Global Governance and Diplomacy at the University of Oxford. Theearlier version of this Working Paper can be found at the Bodleian Social Science Library University of Oxford.

1 I coined the term religious diplomacy as rational religious discourse based on the Quran and Sunnah,

employed by expert Islamic scholars in the field of Islamic jurisprudence. Given the critical importance ofreligion in the Islamic world, religious diplomacy is a pivotal tool, particularly when dealing with groups ornation-states that erroneously use and misapprehendshareeahlaw as their rule of governance.


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1INTRODUCTION

Committing suicide is considered a sin in Islam, as in Christianity and Judaism

(Atwan, 2006, p.94)

When trying to understand Islam and jihad in global discourse,it is crucial to isolatereligion from politics and avoid labelling an entire religion and its followers as very evil andvery wicked (Graham, 2002) victimized by a very, very dangerous book - the Qur'an(Adams, 2002). The suicide attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), which inflicted 2,793innocent deaths (9/11 Commission, 2004, p.552), encapsulates the global struggle anddilemma between Western and Islamic states, whereby Islam was socially and ideologicallyconstructed and homogenized as a practice of terrorism2. This particular misconception hasdirect political and policy implications, as it generates global policies and normsunconsciously built on perceived, flawed assumptions, manufacturing both covert and overt

abhorrence across the Islamic world. As a result, such anti-Islam rhetoric gradually becomesembedded within the societal fabric, propagating erroneous, miscalculated US foreign

policies that inevitably result in high casualty rates. More importantly, these real andperceived fears of Islamic fanaticisms, combined flawed assumptions about Islam, have notonly constrained the US from abandoning its traditionally militarized foreign policy stand(Operation-Enduring-Freedom, Operation-Iraqi-Freedom, 2001 and 2003 respectively), butalso captures what Mitzen (2006) coins ontological insecurity (extrapolated from the lowestlevel of individual fear) within the ideological battle between Western and Islamic states.

For the past decades, Islam has been both linked with terrorism and suicide-terroristpractices in particular to a phenomenon which is not entirely new in employing military

force (i.e., between late 19

th

and 20

th

-century anarchists and Japanese kamikaze pilots)(Horowitz, 2010, p.40)3. Even more problematic is attributing suicide-terrorist practices as apoisonous offshoot from Salafism4/Wahabism (Oliver, 2004). They erroneously link self-annihilatory acts of violence (Freamon, 2003, p.303) to Islamic law and jurisprudence(Freamon, 2003), despite Islams clear principle and ideological denouncement to such

practices. Besides clouding the lens of judgement, these misconceptions clearly reinforcefaulty foreign policies that only exacerbate the growing pandemic of terrorist-relatedactivities in the Islamic world.

To better understand suicide-terrorism, it is critical to historically trace the roots ofsuch practices within the Islamic community. From the Alamut fortress in the 11th century,Hassan-i-Sabbah, leader of the Shiite Nizari Ismalis, deployed first forms of suicide-

terrorism (Sonn, 1990; Reuter, 2004; Munir, 2008)5

to openly revolt against the Seljukleaders (Munir, 2008). The Nizari Ismali commenced a 170-year cycle, of targeted murder(Reuter, 2004, p.25), reflecting the determination of a minority, to inflict fatal blows on the

great powers (Reuter, 2004, p.25). They became the first form ofFedayeen (self-sacrificers),extensively mimicked by contemporary groups (i.e., Al-Qaeda) centuries later (Reuter, 2004).Reuter (2004) states that self-sacrifice martyrdomstems from the Shiite minority in Islam,initiated after the demise of the Fourth Islamic Caliph Ali ibn Abi-Talib (600-661 AD) a

2Practices of terrorism existed since the 1stcentury B.C.E. (Cornin, 2002/03; Ashraf, 2008).3The Kamikaze inflicted approximately 5,000 US naval deaths (Atwan, 2006).

4Derived from the word salaf, referring to the way of the prophet and his companions, simply, the first three

generations of Muslims (Ibn-Taymiyyah, 2000, p.383). Evidently, they did not utilize methods employed bycurrent Islamic terrorist groups, who claim to besalafee,but truly are not.5They were known as the hashashinthe derivation of assassins in English.


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suicide-terrorism as an Islamic practice has not only resulted from an erroneous assumptionbut also reached to a level of what Foucault coined a society of normalization (Roach,2008, p.325).

1.1Research ObjectivesThis paper investigates how and when religious diplomacy influences modern-daykhawarej. In this dissertation, khawarej are Islamic transgressors that employ fraudulent

jihad in the form of suicide-terrorism. This analysis is particularly important in a periodwhere religious ignorance and limited access (including wrongful possession) of moderntechnology could significantly inflict instabilities in our contemporary international society raison de systme (Watson, 2004). I argue that religious diplomacy is essential inundermining the khawarej by significantly improving coercion tactics if diplomacy fails. Icoined the term religious diplomacyas rational religious discourse based on the Quran andSunnah8, employed by expert Islamic scholars in the field of Islamic jurisprudence. Given thecritical importance of religion in the Islamic world, religious diplomacy is a pivotal tool,

particularly when dealing with groups or nation-states that erroneously use and misapprehend

shareeah9

law as their rule of governance. Existing Western international relation theoriesand diplomatic strategies have largely failed or ignored such religious importance, whichinevitably constrained their abilities to formulate suicide-terrorism solutions. The Westernexclusion of Islamic principles and its actors only reinforce the hidden resentment, conflictand violence within the Islamic world. By ignoring the critical importance of religiousdiplomacy, coercion alone as a first tool of engagement would inevitably fail to address theunderlying problem of global terrorism (i.e., Afghanistan). Therefore, religious diplomacyisthe basic step of engagement to bring sense to Al-Qaedas supporting cushion (i.e., Taliban)and to provide them with an opportunity to reassess their position. If this fails, then throughleveraging Islamic teachings, Muslim governments in collaboration with Western allies canemploy targeted force against the khawarej, while maintaining the boundaries governing the

use of force jus in bello in accordance with the rules of jihad similar to the Westerncriteria under the Just War Theory (JWT) (Johnson, 1999).

1.2 Research Questions and OutlineThis dissertation explored the following questions:

1. Examine the conditions under which jihad (jus ad bellum/jus in bello) becomespermissible.

2. Analyze Islamic fatawa on suicide-terrorism and the limitations of issuing suchverdicts.

3. Demonstrate the effectiveness of religious diplomacy through a possiblecounterfactual on two cases Al-Qaeda and Taliban to effectively address the

ideological gap between the Western and Islamic world, specifically on suicide-terrorism issues.

In this dissertation I employ a hermeneutical approach to examine how and whenreligious diplomacy, along with Muslim jurists as an instrument in diplomatic strategy, influences the khawarej (Forster, 2007). I particularly use the Quran and Hadith (Islamsmain reference points), which have been authentically proven by many filtration processesand evidence dating back to historical times10.

8The way and guidance of Prophet Muhammad, as represented in his speech, action and tacit approval, which

have been recorded and transmitted in reports and narrations known as Hadith (Al-Fawzaan, 2005, p.319).9

The system of laws and rules that govern Islam (Al-Fawzaan, 2005).10The English Quranic verses in this paper are not the exact words of Allah, but merely close translations to therevealed Arabic words of Allah that were sent throughJebreel(Gabriel).


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2JIHAD

The Islamic concept ofjihad is critical in analyzing the ideological struggles betweenIslam and suicide-terrorism. This section analyzes the role and impact of suicide-terrorism tothe internal struggles of contemporary Islamic communities.

In a Muslims creed11,jihad is not literally mentioned or justified as portrayed by thekhawarej. This reflects that jihad in the militarized sense does not define a Muslims faithand submission, butit is, however, a self-struggle in the way of God to strive hard againstones inner self, or to defend ones property, freedom, wealth and religion, making Allahs

Word (that none is worthy of worship except him supreme) (Oliver, 2004, p.165).Despiteits clear absence and separation, the fundamental social construction of jihad has beenmisconstrued by radical Islamic groups, which have continued to severely distort the Islamicvalues and traditions globally (Al-Othman, 2010, p.121).

Cautioning his disciples from being misguided, Prophet Muhammad warned theMuslims and their leaders to uphold Islams value system, stickto the group Muslims andtheirImam(Muslim ruler). I said, If there is neither a group of Muslims nor anImam? Hesaid, Then turn away from all those sects even if you were to bite (eat) the roots of a tree tilldeath overtakes you while you are in that state(Bukhari, Hadith no.7084, Book 92, Vol.9).

The chartbelow illustrates the main components of jihad and their relevance inconceptualizing the role of religious diplomacy within its on-going ideological struggles.

Jihad (smaller jihad) is not the only form of jihad, but there is also a significantly moreimportant yet lacking greaterjihad.Situated between the greater and smallerjihad, religiousdiplomacy can play a critical role in managing Islamic transgressors through empoweringcomponents from both types ofjihad.

Defensive

fardayn

Jihad

Smallerjihad (External)

Tawheed

Greaterjihad (Internal)

Ilm

Governed by rules and

criteriasjus ad bellum/jus

in bello

Required to authorizeany form of force

Khawarej

Catalyst to fighting the

khawarej

Offensive

fard-kifayah

Fatwa

Religious

Diplomacy

11Islam has six pillars of faith and five pillars of submission that define a Muslim s creed (Bukhari, Book 2,page 56, Vol.1; Bukhari, Hadith no.8, Book 2, Vol.1).


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2.1 Components ofj ihad jus ad bell um/jus in bell oJihad is broken into two forms, not merely the narrow sense associated with harb

(war) smaller jihad. Lacking today within the Islamic world, greater jihad, whichencompasses tawheed12andjihad of the self from worldly desires (Al-Othman, 2010, p.45).Desires are fought through empowerment of knowledge (ilm) in both religious and secular

spheres. Tawheed and ilm then become enabling mechanisms, directly conforming to Godsguidelines, the Prophets teachings and the power of mind. The current dilemma comes fromthe absence of greaterjihadbut not within the Islamic teachings.

Conversely, the smaller jihad is broken into two spheres offensive and defensive(Atwan, 2006). An offensivejihad refers tothe rescue of the oppressed and [deterrence of]tyrants who might contemplate attacking Muslims (Atwan, 2006, p.69). Within this context,an offensive jihad is fard-kifayah, which is not a requirement on all Muslims: if somecapable Muslims are engaged in accomplishing the mission, others are exempted from theduty (Atwan, 2006, p.69). Alternatively, a defensivejihad isfardayn, whereby a Muslim isobliged to fight (Atwan, 2006) when a country is being invaded, the innocent are being rapedand money is being plundered.

Interestingly, rules governing jihad, were neither fabricated nor created by ProphetMuhammad to satisfy his political interests, but it is simply a divine decree. When theProphet started preaching the words of God in Mecca, he was not ordered to fight. Instead, hefollowed a passive stand for thirteen years of his mission (Ibn-Taymiyyah, 1984, vol.28,

p.349), even though the Quraish leaders in Mecca had planned to assassinate him. As theenvironment in Mecca turned hostile on both his followers and himself, they eventuallymigrated (Hijrah)to Medina in 622 AD.

In Medina, Muslims established dar al-islam, a safe shelter for the growing Muslimpopulation. The first militarized Quranic verse rendering defensivejihad jus ad bellum was revealed, which authorized Muslims to fight against the unjust oppressors that drovethem out of Mecca, reflecting a collective defensive right (Ibn Taymiyyah 1984, vol.28; Ibn-Katheer 2002, vol.6; Freamon 2003; Al-Othman 2010). The divine rule of jihad was inrepelling the unjust, restoring peace and protecting the weak in accordance with Godslegislated rules (Ibn-Katheer 2002, vol.6):

39Those who have been attacked are permitted to take up arms because they have been

wronged God has the power to help them 40

those who have been driven unjustly fromtheir homes only for saying, Our Lord is God. If God did not repel some people by means of

others, many monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, where Gods name is much

invoked, would have been destroyed (Quran, The Pilgrimage, 22:39-40).

In contrast, offensivejihad, revealed by the following Quranic verse, encourages Muslims to

save oppressed women, men and children in Mecca (Ibn-Kathir, 2003, vol.2, p.515),

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Whyshould you not fight in Gods cause and forthe oppressed men, women and children who cryout, Lord, rescue us from this town whose people are oppressors! By Your grace, give us a

protector and gives us a helper!?(Quran, Women, 4:75).Both defensive and offensive jihadcan only be initiated by the appropriate authority

and against military personnel (Al-Othman, 2010) contingent on a probability of success (i.e.,if loss is inevitable thenjihad cannot be waged). In this context, authority is reflected throughones respective government and bodies of authority in line with views of Islamic jurists (i.e.,Commission of Senior Ulema in Saudi Arabia). While Islamic thought religiously requires

permission from proper authority, the khawarej today initiate chaotic global jihad withoutrespective governments consents. In Islam, legitimate authority is a key criterion of obeying

12The foundation of Islam, the absolute belief in the oneness of Allah (Ibn-Taymiyyah, 2000, p.384).


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God and his commandments in Islam (contingent on non-sinful acts, i.e., prosecuting theinnocent, torture, etc.), He who obeys me, obeys Allah; and he who disobeys me, disobeysAllah. He who obeys a Muslim ruler, obeys me; and he who disobeys a Muslim ruler,disobeys me(Muslim, Hadith no.1223, Book 37, Vol.2). This, on the other hand, does notentail blindly following the ruler. In fact, disagreeing with views of a leader is a normal

conduct of discourse, but Islam stresses the importance of respect and appropriate means inconveying the message to the ruling authority without provoking violence or terror.

It is also evident that various groups proclaim conflicting interpretations of Islamicteachings and jihad concepts (i.e., Al-Qaeda). An Albanian Sunni scholar, SheikhMohammed Nasiruddin Al-Albani (1914-1999), in a dialogue with a jihadi supporter,contested that there is no jihad without right authority, emphasizing that religiousdisagreements among the mujahedeenexist.This raises a critical question on how can theygo to jihad without even understanding the basics of their Aqeedah13 (Al-Albani, n.d.,salafipublications(a))?

Current groups (i.e., Al-Qaeda) do not embody Islamic unity; rather only adhere totheir emotions by irrationally reacting to their violent surroundings. Evoking terror as a way

of God is not permissible under the basic tenets of Islam. The Quranparticularly stresses theimportance of justice and impartiality even towards oneself, commanding Muslims not to bemanipulated by hatred, 8You who believe, be steadfast in your devotion to God and bearwitness impartially: do not let hatred of others lead you away from justice, but adhere to

justice, for that is closer to awareness of God. Be mindful of God: God is well aware of all

that you do (Quran, The Feast, 5:8). Muslims who adhere to justice in their rules, inmatters relating to their families and in all that they undertake are awarded proximity to God

during the Day of Judgment(Muslim, Hadith no.1207, Book 37 Vol.2).

Apart fromjus ad bellum,Islam also sets boundaries that govern the use of force jusin bello. Collectively, both defensive and offensive jihad require strict adherence to certain

divine guidelines. Transgression therefore is clearly prohibited. An Islamic jurist, Hassan Al-Basri (642728 AD), refers transgression to mutilating the dead, theft (from capturedgoods), killing women, children and old people who do not participate in warfare, killing

priests and residents of houses of worship, burning down trees and killing animals withoutreal benefit (Al-Basri, cited in Ibn-Katheer, 2002, vol.1, p.528). Therefore, it is critical tohighlight thatjihad needs to align with Islamic laws as clearly prescribed by the Quran andSunnah teachings. The Quran emphasizes that even in self-defence; one must not transgressthe limits, rather maintain proportionality and prosecute the wrongdoers to restore peace and

justice:190

Fight in Gods cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the limits: God doesnot love those who overstep the limits []

193If they cease hostilities, there can be no [further]

hostility, except towards aggressors.194

So if anyone commits aggression against you, attackhim as he attacked you, but be mindful of God and know that He is with those who aremindful of Him (Quran, The Cow, 2:190, 193-194).

Islam also forbids treachery as it breaks the divine trust set by God. It is also equatedto betrayal, and thus, a traitor will be, hoisted as high as his treachery (Muslim, Hadithno.1124, Book 35, Vol.1). As Battle Gaines notes, 58And if you learn of treachery on the

part of any people, throw their treaty back at them, for God does not love the treacherous(Quran, Battle Gaines, 8:58). Nevertheless, killing women and children is an undisputedcrime. Therefore, suicide-terrorism transgresses the divine immunity of civilians, and thus

produces hypocrisy which is viewed in the Quran aspropagators of mischief and corruption(fasad) in the lands (Munir, 2008).

13The creed and beliefs of a person.


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It is true that the Messenger ofAllah(PBUH) forbade killing women and children(Muslim, Hadith no.1133, Book 35, Vol.1), but crimes also encompass killing the elderly andreligious clergy irrespective of their religion (Al-Othman, 2010; Al-Basri, cited in Ibn-Katheer, 2002, vol.1, p.528) as well as burning trees and killing animals (Al-Basri, cited inIbn-Katheer, 2002, vol.1, p.528: Al-Othman, 2010).

War, however, is not a desirable circumstance in any religion, society or culture.Many conceive Islam as a militaristic religion purely driven by the sword, yet in practice,

peace in Islam is more desirable, 61But if they incline towards peace, you [Prophet] mustalso incline towards it, and put your trust in God: He is the All hearing, the All Knowing(Quran, Battle Gaines, 8:61). To maintain peace, Islam clearly states that honouring a treatyis more of a priority14, 72[]but if they seek help from you against religious prosecution, itis your duty to help them, except against people with whom you have a treaty: God sees allthat you do(Quran, Battle Gaines, 8:72).

Given the aforementioned Islamic law and guidelines, how and why do transgressorscontinue to justify suicide-terrorism in the name of Islam? Suicide-terrorism breaks at leastfive crimes according to Islamic law, namely killing civilians, mutilating their bodies,

violating the trust of enemy soldiers and civilians, committing suicide and destroying civilianobjects or properties (Munir, 2008, p.71). Althoughjihadis an obligation in all forms, thereare stringent guidelines not to be transgressed. If such boundaries are misconceived, thewhole structure of jihad would collapse. The emergence of radical groups (i.e., Al-Qaeda)exemplifies how they leverage jihad to satisfy personal political desires masked underreligious contexts. In echoing the Prophets teachings, his first successor Abu-Bakr,commanded Yazid bin Abi-Sufyan during war:

O Yazid!...You will come across people who have secluded themselves in convents; leavethem and their seclusion. But you will also come across people on whose heads the devil hastaken his abode so strike their heads off. But do not kill any old man or woman or minor orsick person or monk. Do not devastate any population. Do not cut a tree except for someuseful purpose. Do not burn a palm-tree nor inundate it. Do not commit treachery, do notmutilate [dead bodies], do not show cowardice, and do not cheat (cited in Munir, 2008, p.86).

Conversely, jihad does not encompass war and suicide-terrorism as depicted by thekhawarej. Other forms include ethics in work, guiding ones who go astray, tolerance in frontof hardship and fighting misconceptions and temptations against worldly desires. Our actions,work, tolerance, education and strive towards religious edification and humanism are the

purposes of jihad in life. Jihad can be achieved through the tongue (fighting through thewords of God and rational argumentation similar to the Habermasian approach), heart(maintaining ones morals and ethics in front of the aggressor), money (supporting Muslimsagainst the aggressors) and hand (fighting back if attacked). Thus, how can extremists guide

youth to devastation through suicide-terrorism built on the illusion of Martyrdom, when Godclearly stated, 29Do not kill each other, for God is merciful to you. 30If any of you does thesethings, out of hostility and injustice, We shall make him suffer Fire(Quran, Women, 4:29).

Hence, jihad is not only war but a way of life. Striving to be a better Muslim bygiving charity, fasting, being good and righteous to neighbours are all forms of jihad todifferent degrees. Being a Martyr in the name of God does not necessarily cleanse one fromhis sins. What if the true purpose in life is not for the sake of God but for some worldly

benefit? How can one then become a Martyr? The way khawarej depict jihad todaytransgresses the divine decree of God and the Prophets teachings. Justice in Islam is vital,and thus hate should not be the driving force towards actions, 135You who believe, uphold

justice and bear witness to God, even if it is against yourself, your parents or your close

14For more details refer to the treaty of Hudaybiya in the work of Iqbal (1965).


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relatives. Whether the person is rich or poor, God can best take care of both. Refrain fromfollowing your own desire, so that you can act justlyif you distort or neglect justice, God isfully aware of what you do(Quran, Women, 4:135).

2.2 Limitation

As my hermeneutic empirical analysis suggests, the khawarej have successfullymobilized a flawed form of smaller jihad (external struggle), largely neglecting theimportance of attaining the greater jihad (internal struggle). For thirteen years of ProphetMuhammads life, a passive stand was maintained to help his followers master the greater

jihad. Even when smaller jihad was authorized, it was defensive in nature. After the 9/11incident, numerous nation-states have collectively and implicitly excluded Muslim scholarsfrom supporting them in developing policy solutions to extremism. To weaken the support ofradical Islamic groups, the Islamic world needs to strengthen the greater jihad in theirsocieties to empower the future Muslim generations against the khawarej within. Withoutharnessing the knowledge of Muslim jurists, the US will inevitability fail to achieve itsobjective of eradicating suicide-terrorism.

More importantly, it becomes chaotic when Islamic groups emerge waging smallerjihad without truly understanding Islam (Al-Albani, n.d., salafipublications (a)). It becomesdestructive if mixed with irrational emotions and political desires (i.e. Al-Qaeda), or when theWestern and Arabic states improperly leveraged jihad through arming Afghan and Arabmujahedeen. It is clear that they simply turned against each other after the Soviet retreat andtransgressed further when targeting the West. Addressing such a problem would require

proper authorities, through military personnel under the command of their respective state orcoalition of allies, guiding jihad. That said, has the practice of suicide-terrorism been

justified? The subsequent section highlights the role offatawain understanding the on-goingstruggle between Western and Islamic states.


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QEH Working Paper SeriesQEHWPS197 Page

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3FATAWA

The views of major Sunni jurists must be highlighted to understand the on-goinginternal struggles within Islamic States. This chapter also analyzes the verdicts of a leading

Shiite figure in Lebanon, Sayyid Mohammed Hussain Fadlallah. It further supports thatWahhabism actually has very little do with the current jihadist use of self-annihilatoryviolence (Freamon, 2003, p.306). It particularly interrogates critical discourses anddisagreements among Islamic jurists in issuing their verdicts regarding suicide-terrorism.

Afatwa can only be issued by well-educated scholars with a track record in the fieldof Islamic jurisprudence, particularly those that fully grasp the meanings and interpretationsof the Quran and Sunnah (Ibn-Baz, 1990). Itrequires attentiveness without neglecting detailsof differing schools of thought on controversial issues (Ibn-Baz, 1990). Therefore, negligenceis detrimental for Islamic scholars, which could result into a spread of evil, depravity andMunkar (that which is unacceptable or disapproved of by Islamic law and Muslims of soundintellect) all over the world, in Islamic countries and others (Ibn-Baz, 1990).

3.1 Islamic fatawaon suicide-terrorismAuthorized by the supreme Shiite leader Khomeini, Hezbollah targeted the American

and French forces in Beirut on October 23, 1983, which resulted in the death of 298 militarymen and women (Munir 2008, p.73). Although this was not the first suicide operation, itsmagnitude had attracted significant global media attention, expanding the influence of Shiite

jihadi movement (Horowitz, 2010). Adherence to such an unconventional method distorts thename of Islam in justifying the apparent military inequality between Israel and Hezbollah.Fadlallah argues that suicide attacks are the answer of the weak and oppressed to the

powerful aggressors (Harik, 2004, p.65, 70, cited in Munir, 2008, p.73). According toKramer (1993), Fadlallah justifies such tactics as rebellion against fear (Kramer, 1993,

p.32) rooted in grievances stemming from the Palestinian and Lebanese conflict. ToFadlallah, suicide-terrorism empowers the weak in ways that the enemy could not confrontwith its tanks and airplanes (Kramer, 1993, p.33), contingent on inflicting death equal to orgreater than the loss of life of the attacker (Kramer, 1993). By leveraging Islam, Fadlallah

justifies suicide-terrorism as a weapon to undermine imperial powers (Kramer, 1993).Unfortunately, suicide-terrorism was not limited to the boundaries of Shiite Islam. Thismethod has been exported to Palestine in retaliation of Dr. Baruch Goldsteins massacre of 29Muslim worshipers during fajr (dawn) prayer on February 25, 1994. Thus, the first suicideoperation was then employed by Hamas, targeting the Hadera bus station on April 13, 1994(Munir 2008).

As a result, Shiite scholars seem to have shown an inconsistent view in their

denouncement of the 9/11 incident, but not in their justification of suicide-terrorism againstIsraeli civilians. They argue that the Lebanese Islamic resistance targets soldiers and notIsraeli civilians. Yet no one can rationalize the slaughter of thousands of innocent lives on9/11 (Reuter, 2004). This contradicts Fadlallahs acknowledgement of the Hamasmujahedeen, stating that we dont consider the settlers who occupy the Zionist settlementscivilians, but they are an extension of occupation and they are not less aggressive and

barbaric than the Zionist soldier (cited in Munir, 2008, p.74).The disagreement among Muslim scholars is clearly apparent, concerning the

Palestinian suicide operations against Israel. A Saudi Islamic jurist, Sheikh Muhammad Al-Uthaymeen (1926-2001) contends that when one of the Palestinians blows himself up andkills six or seven people, then in retaliation, they take sixty or more. This does not produceany benefit for the Muslims (cited in Oliver, 2004, p.136). Al-Uthaymeen further maintained


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his position based on the Quran and Sunnah, deeming that such acts as plain suicide cannotbe considered martyrdom nor heroism irrespective of context. He asserts that one whocommits such a grave act shall be punished in Hell, for that which is authenticated on theauthority of the Prophet (PBUH) (Al-Uthaymeen, n.d., salafi publications). Al-Uthaymeenvalidates his claim using the following Hadith text, Indeed, whoever (intentionally) kills

himself, then certainly he will be punished in the Fire of Hell, wherein he shall dwell forever(Al-Uthaymeen, n.d., salafi publications).

Similarly, Saudis ChiefMufteeSheikh Abdulaziz Ibn-Baz (19101999) declared thatsuicide bombing is self-murder and therefore unlawful (Munir, 2008, p.74). In the words ofIbn-Baz, such attacks are not part of thejihad, and I fear that they are just suicides plain andsimple. Although the Quran allows, indeed, demands that the enemy be killed, this has tohappen in such a way that it does not run contrary to the religious laws (cited in Munir,2008, p.74). Moreover, Ibn-Baz rules that which is known to everyone who has the slightest

bit of common sense, is that hijacking airplanes and kidnapping children and the like areextremely great cries, the world over. Their evil effects are far and wide, as is the great harmand inconvenience caused to the innocent (cited in Oliver, 2004, p.137). Given the direimportance of eradicating such evil,Ibn-Baz proposes that, obligatory upon the governmentsand those responsible from amongst the scholars and others to afford these issues greatconcern and to exert themselves as much as possible in ending this evil (cited in Oliver,2004, p.137). In fact, Ibn-Baz issued a fatwa encouraging peace with Israel, contingent onIsrael being inclined to peace and that the agreement serve the interests of the Arab-Muslimcommunity. This was firmly criticised by both Hamas and Al-Qaradawi (Mishal & Sela,2000).

The Egyptian Islamic scholar, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, follows similar rhetoric asShiite scholars. Al-Qaradawi refuted Ibn-Bazsfatwa asserting that suicide-terrorism is pure

jihad on Israelsoccupation of Palestinian land (Mishal & Sela, 2000; Munir, 2008; Kelsey

2009). He further assessesjihad on Israel based on its militaristic nature whereby both menand women serve in the army and can be drafted at any momentIf a child or an elderlyperson is killed in this type of operation, he or she is not killed on purpose, but by mistake,and as a result, necessity. Necessity makes the forbidden things permitted (cited in Kelsey,2009, p.141). Hence, Al-Qaradawi uses mistake, necessityand the notion of double-effect to

justify suicide-terrorism, which Saudi jurists such as Al-Uthaymeen and Ibn-Baz stronglycondemn. Therefore Al-Qaradawis leniency on suicide-terrorism provides those engaged inresistance more latitude than would otherwise be the case (Kelsey, 2009, p.141).

Similar to Fadlallahs position, Al-Qaradawi differentiates between attacks on Israeland US embassies in East Africa (Kenya & Tanzania; 1998) echoing contradictory rhetoricsimilar to Shiite scholars. On US attacks in East Africa, he asserts that any explosion that

leads to the death of innocent women and children is a criminal act, carried out only bypeople who are base cowards and traitors. A rational person with only a small portion ofrespect and virtue refrains from such operations (cited in Kelsey, 2009, p.142). Al-Qaradawisassessment of 9/11 emphasizes that the US neither enforces military drafting noris in conflict with Palestine (Kelsey, 2009). Yet he reasoned that suicide-terrorism in Israel isdefensive jihad to protect ones land. This similarly reflects an agreement between Al-Qaradawi and Sheikh Ikrima Al-Sbri, the Muftee of Jerusalem. They both claim that USattacks are pure suicide against the innocent, yet suicide-terrorism against Israel is justifiablemartyrdom with an end goal of liberating occupied lands (Smock, 2003). Other Egyptianscholars, such as Sheikh Mohammed Tantawi, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, reflectinconsistent rulings on suicide-terrorism (Munir, 2008). Despite some discrepancies, Tantawi

eventually asserts that whoever partakes in or conducts a suicide operation is an enemy ofIslam (BBC, 2003). In Tantawis wordsextremism is the enemy of Islam (BBC, 2003).


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Other Islamic jurists like the current Muftee of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-Ashaikh assert comment on the 9/11: the recent developments in the United States constitutea form of injustice that is not tolerated by Islam, which views them as gross crimes and sinfulacts (cited in Smock, 2003, p.viii). Simply put, Al-Ashaikh issued a verdict about planehijackings and taking people hostage or killing innocent people, without just cause; this is

nothing but a manifestation of injustice, oppression and tyranny, which the Islamicshareeahdoes not sanction. Rather it is explicitly forbidden and it is amongst the greatest sins (citedin Oliver, 2004, p.138). The Chairman of the Commission of Senior Ulema in Saudi Arabia,Sheikh Salih Al-Luheidan also argues that as a human community we must be vigilant andcareful to oppose these pernicious and shameless evils, which are not justified by any sanelogic, nor by the religion of Islam (cited in Smock, 2003, p.viii). Furthermore, Sheikh SalihIbn-Fawzan Al-Fawzan, another Islamic Scholar and member of the Commission of SeniorUlema in Saudi Arabia, contested that suicide-terrorism is notjihadin the sake ofAllah, butsimply fighting for the sake of Satan (Okaz, 2009).

Other prominent non-Saudi Islamic Sunni Scholars like Sheik Al-Albani, issued averdict that suicide-terrorism acts are not legislated (in the Shareeah), are unlawful andare absolutely non-Islamic (Al-Albani, n.d., salafipublications(b)). In 2010, SheikhMashhor Hassan Al-Salman, Sheikh Ali bin Hassan Al-Halabi and other Jordanian juristsissued a fatwa in 2010 condemning suicide-terrorism in all forms (Aljazeera, 2010). Theyargued that Islam denounces such forbidden acts against Muslims and non-Muslims alike,weather in Iraq, Egypt, Saudi, Afghanistan, Pakistan or any other part of the Islamic and non-Islamic world (Aljazeera, 2010).

Evidently, Muslim Sunni jurists, especially members of the Saudi Commission ofSenior Ulema, agree on Islamicfatwas, even before 9/11. In fact, Ibn-Baz further stresses theobligation of governments to eradicate such evil. Disagreement, however, lies between theShiite Scholars and Al-Qaradawi.

3.2 LimitationsThis chapter has shown that the non-binding element of fatwa has made these

religious opinions limited in effect15. This allows the khawarejto cherry pick thefatwainorder to satisfy their flawed jihadi cause. However, Saudi scholars remain the mostinfluential among the Sunni community and their fatwas are based on evidence stemmingfrom the Quran and Sunnah, which can be leveraged alongside policies aimed towardseradicating suicide-terrorism. This dissertation argues that fatawa by Sunni jurists can beempowered by shifting from merely providing religious opinions towards mobilizing themasses and labelling Islamic transgressors as modern-day khawarej. The fatawa couldeffectively marginalize the khawarej in the Islamic community. Unfortunately, 9/11 placed

the West in a trap of labelling Osama Bin-Laden (OBL) as Salafee/Wahhabi (Oliver, 2004).Although, Islamic transgressors claim to be Salafee, they are not in reality because trueSalafees should strongly condemn suicide-terrorism (i.e. Commission of Senior Ulema). It iscritical to highlight that the West has failed to take advantage of Islamic jurists and theiropposition to suicide-terrorism in a society where religion plays a significant role in oneslife. Interestingly, Mattson (2001) correctly observes that Saudi scholars who are Wahhabihave denounced terrorism and denounced, in particular, the acts of September 11 (CNN,2001).

15 On the other hand, the fatwa is a binding verdict issued by the Imam (Shiite religious leader) (Freamon,2003).


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Instead, suicide-terrorism is highly revered today by Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Qaedaand Al-Qaradawi. Qutbism16has significantly influenced the ideological foundations of suchmilitant transgressors (Oliver, 2004; Atwan, 2006). The Saudi Muftees, on the other hand,denounced suicide-terrorism withfatawabased purely on the Quran and Sunnah. In contrast,Fadlallah and Al-Qaradawi reflect the interplay between religion and politics, which is more

pronounced among Shiite scholars and followers of Qutb. Thus, the convergence betweenSunni and Shiite views on suicide-terrorism is specific among Al-Qaradawi, Hamas and Al-Qaeda as opposed to the general Sunni community.

This signifies that religion remains the main inspiration in discussing the morallegitimacy of the use of force (Bjola, 2009). From assessing the different fatawa regardingsuicide-terrorism, one can see that a fatwa becomes less contradictory and more powerfulwhen rooted solely in the Quran and Sunnah. However, when Islamic jurists allow theirsurrounding socio/geopolitical landscape to drive them emotionally, their fatwa becomesmore politicised, enhancing the permissible boundaries of using force outside the boundariesset by the Quran and Sunnah. The question then becomes, how can Islam justify jihadagainst Islamic transgressors?

3.3 Issuing a fatwa against the khawarejGiven thatjihad is not geared towards non-Muslims, the mechanism authorizingjihad

against Islamic transgressors falls under the justifiability of fighting the khawarej. Thekhawarej have limited understanding of true Islamic teachings but project an outward Islamicdevotion through their prayers, fasting and recital of the Quran. Ignorant Muslims and non-Muslims perceive this faade as commitment towards Islam.

When Prophet Muhammad was asked about the khawarej, he responded by sayingthat the khawarej, offer salat (prayer) in such a way that you will consider your salat(prayer) negligible in comparison to theirs and observe Saum (fast) in such a way that youwill consider your fasting (negligible in comparison) to theirs. They recite the Quran but it

does not go beyond their throats (i.e., they do not act on it) and they desert Islam (Bukhari,Hadith no.3610, Book 61, Vol.4). The khawarej misinterpret Islam and transgress itsreligious boundaries, causing baghy (injustice), disturbing peace and stability. They further

justify suicide-terrorism and takfeer (accusing Muslims of apostasy) to attain politicalobjectives through jihad that breaches all Islamic rules of warfare while terrorizing theinnocent. These acts contradict the Prophets gentle approach, 159Out of mercy from God,you [prophet] were gentle in your dealings with them had you been harsh, or hard-hearted,they would have dispersed and left you (Quran, Family of Imran, 3:159). Therefore, theProphet warns his companions from the khawarej, viewing them as foolish individuals thatabandon Islam: there will appear some young foolish people who will use (in their claim)

the best speech of all people (i.e., the Quran) and they will abandon Islam as an arrow goingout through the game(Bukhari, Hadith no.3611, Book 61, Vol.4).According to Al-Jahny (2003), khawarej are individuals who transgress the right path

agreed upon by the Islamic community. In the case of Al-Qaeda, members break from theirgoverning authorityfor a Saudi Al-Qaeda member, his governing authority is both the Kingand Commission of Senior Ulema of Saudi. This becomes problematic when such groupsdenounce the authority of their governing body by using takfeer, and instigate destructive

jihad against the whole of mankind a problem stemming from Qutbism (Oliver, 2004,p.27). Hence, they secede from the Muslim body as the Prophet stated, One who quitsobeying the ruler and separates from the main body of the Muslims, if he dies in that state, he

16 Qutbism refers to the teaching of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), founder of al-ikhwan-il-Muslimeen (MuslimBrotherhood) that emerged during Jamal Abdul-Nassers era (Oliver, 2004).


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will die a death of one belonging to the days ofJahiliyah17(i.e., would not die as a Muslim)(Muslim, Hadith 1232, Book 37, Vol. 2).

Nevertheless, Sonn (1990) argues that the khawarej employ distinct tactics,[organizing] in small bands, [striking] quickly and without warning, and [committing]

practical assassination without regards for age or gender (Sonn, 1990, p.136). Such methods

reflect strategies employed by Al-Qaeda (1992 Aden attack; 1993 World Trade Centre attack;1998 US embassy bombing in Kenya; 9/11, etc.). Thus, the Prophet authorized the use offorce against the khawarej, so wherever you meet them, kill them, for he who kills themshall get rewarded on the Day of Resurrection(Bukhari, Hadith no.3611, Book 61, Vol.4).

3.3.a. Reli gious diplomacyReligious diplomacy provides an opportunity for the misconceived to reassess their

erroneous position and improves effectiveness of coercion against the khawarej. On thereturn of Ali ibn Abi-Talib from the Battle of Siffin to Kuffa Iraq on 657 AD, approximately12,000 of his soldiers turned against him. The khawarejs misinterpretation of religiousmatters led to a false accusation of the Caliph being noncompliant to his religious duties (Al-

Shaybani, 2007, vol.3; Ibn-Katheer, 2007, vol.7-8). Consequently, the Caliph successfullyemployed religious diplomacyby sending Abdullah ibn-Abbas as a mediator to deal with thekhawarej. Ibn-Abbas opened a door of dialogue to examine and falsify their rationale throughreligious debate. Resultantly, approximately 4,000 men returned to unify their front with Aliibn Abi-Talib (Ibn-Katheer, 2007, vol.7-8, p.476), thus weakening the oppositions morale.Upon employing religious diplomacy, Ali ibn Abi-Talib fought the khawarej once theyemployed violence against the Caliph and terrorized the innocent (Al-Hilali, 2001).

In contemporary history, King Abdulaziz Al-Saud (Ibn-Saud) in the early 20 thcenturyemployed religious diplomacywith theIkhwan18who were intolerant to modernization (e.g.,telephone, radio, cars, aeroplanes, etc.), non-Muslims and non-Wahhabi Muslims (Silverfarb,1982), who opposed Islams tolerant approach. They viewed such modernisation asinstruments of the devil (Silverfarb, 1982, p.228). Given that theIkhwan resisted change andopposed Ibn-Sauds relation with the West, they started revolting and evoked fear across theArabian Peninsula (Silverfarb, 1982). Failing to reconcile with the Ikhwan throughemploying religious diplomacy, Islamic jurists authorized jihad against the khawarej. Ibn-Saud succeeded in winning the battle against the Ikhwan through wars that ended with the

Ikhwan leaders and many of the rebel tribesmen [surrendering] to the British forces in Iraqand Kuwait in order to avoid Ibn Sa'ud's wrath (Silverfarb, 1982, p.246).

Therefore, religious diplomacyfollows a three-tiered framework. First, Islamic juristsidentify transgressors; secondly, religious diplomacy is employed to give a window ofopportunity for the opposition and their supporters to reassess their positions; finally, and

only if necessary, a fatwa is issued by an Islamic ruling body (i.e. Saudi Commission ofSenior Ulema) proclaiming jihad against the khawarej. Although a fatwa is a non-bindingverdict among the Sunni Islamic community, labelling a group as khawarej significantlymarginalizes the group from the broader Islamic community. Moreover, force is only to beused, if military success is strongly probable within the boundaries of jus in bello.Furthermore, governments should not pressure jurists to issue verdicts on groups that opposegovernment interests. Given the differing opinions of Islamic jurists across the Islamic world,consensus requires constant dialogue among Islamic scholars (at least among the Sunnicommunity in this case). If scholars largely disagree, then labelling a group as khawarejmay

17Days of ignorance/pre-Islam.

18Has no affiliation to the Egyptian ikhwan-il-Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood).


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engender factions, turning a religious misunderstanding to violent national and internationalunrest.

4AL-QAEDA AND TALIBAN

Because of the Soviet occupation (19791989), fragmented groups were unitedenabling a unifying sense of political purpose that cut across tribal, ethnic, geographic andeconomic lines (Tanner, 2002, p.243). Afghani Mullahs employed defensive jihad tomobilize the masses against Soviet occupation. To Washington, jihad served to undermineSoviet expansion in Central Asia. Interestingly, Ronald Regan viewed them as, the moralequivalent of our Founding Fathers (Lohbeck, 1993, p.161 cited inSidky, 2007, p.850). Tothe Afghans, they were simply, the mujahedeen. One could see how different actors perceive

jihad depending on the actors interests within the region.Rashid (2000) asserts that the wounds in Afghanistan speak loudly to the years of

struggle left behind. The war consumed over 1.5 million people and devastated the country(Rashid, 2000, p.10). Flocks of Arab Muslims joined alongside the Afghan mujahedeenthrough Maktab Al-Khidamat (MAK), the service bureau that Abdullah Yusuf Azzam set upin the early 1980s to facilitate young Arabs coming from the Middle East to fight the Sovietsin Afghanistan (Shahzad, 2011, p.xv).After the assassination of Azzam in 1989, MAK wastransformed into a global terrorist network known as Al-Qaeda led by OBL. To the Arabs,war in Afghanistan was an opportunity to fight alongside with their Muslim brethren indefending Soviet-occupied lands offensive jihad was fard-kifaya, authorized by manyMuslim and Arab states (Atwan, 2006). As the Arab and Afghan mujahedeen fought theSoviet occupation, fundraising committees were formed under the Chairmanship of PrinceSalman bin Abdul Aziz (Atwan, 2006, p.44). In 1981, Regans administration increased

both its funding and military weaponry to the mujahedeen(in the total amount of at least $10US billion) to combat the Soviets (Rashid, 2000; Global Security, 2004). These were mainlydistributed to local agricultural people (Rashid, 2000).

Evidently, the Afghan mujahedeen viewed the Arabs as Muslim brothers during atime of need and desperation. The Muslim Brotherhood heavily influenced the Arabs throughAzzams MAK, who was bin Ladens mentor from his university days (Atwan, 2006,

p.73). Hence, there was an ideological interplay between the Afghan and Arab mujahedeenbefore the emergence of Taliban as a governing authority, which influenced the Afghanmujahedeenthrough their linkages to radicals, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu-Hafs al-Misiri that OBL became an integral member to their strategy of global terror (Atwan, 2006,

p76). Zawahiri, a follower of Qutb, was also extremely influential to OBL, encouraging him

to break completely with the House of Saud and to become active against it (Riedel, 2010,p.54). According to Riedel (2010), 1997 was the year the thinker (Zawahiri) found his knight(OBL) to initiate a journey of global terror.

On the television interview show Charlie Rose (2001), Barnett Rubin stated thatwith the demise of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan served no geopolitical interest toWashington. The US simply turned its back, transforming the country into a Kalashnikovculture (Sidik, 2007). It became a region with no authority, where radical anarchic groupsviolently turned the mujahedeen against each other. The Taliban then emerged when a localstrong man raped several girls in the summer of 1994 [] over the next three months theTaliban overran twelve southern provinces as its ranks swelled with thousands of volunteers,

primarily Afghan refugees or native Pashtuns (Tanner, 2002, pp.279-280). The country wastransformed to a strict unorthodox form of shareeahlaw under the Talibanadmittedly, atleast providing a sense of security. A new leadership under Mullah Omar administered as


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much as 90 percent of Afghanistan and controlled the place, it was only recognized byPakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Bhatia, 2011, p.94). That said, onCharlie Rose (2001) Sayed Rahmatullah Hashimi, Afghanistans Foreign Ministryrepresentative, argued that the Taliban were successful in, (a) unifying a fragmented countryafter the Soviet retreat; (g) eradicating the opium trade and (c) disarming the civilians.

Within Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda found refuge. The Taliban harboured and supportedthe Arab mujahedeen who politically and financially supported Afghanistan during the Sovietoccupation before the emergence of the Taliban. Although OBL had no authority in issuing a

fatwa, he declared one in February 1998 and advocated for the murder of US citizens andinitiating war against the US (Kleiner, 2006; Riedel, 2010). The US wanted Talibancommitment that Afghan soil would not be used to harbour terrorism and hoped to turn OBLin to Saudi authorities (Kleiner, 2006; Riedel, 2010). The US simply used a stick with nocarrot. Talibans Prime Minister, Mullah Rabbani claimed that Bin Laden was their guestand they would monitor his activity (Riedel, 2010, p.70).According to Hashimi on CharlieRose (2001), the Taliban offered the US State Department three proposals to help formulatea solution to the OBL case. First, OBL would be put on trial if the US provided evidence ofhis terrorist activity involvement. Second, Hashimi contested that if the US viewed OBL as athreat, they should send a monitoring group to observe OBLs activities and whereabouts. Inthe Talibans third proposal, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and a third Muslim country elected

by the US would decide on OBLs future. Thisenables the Taliban to have enough proof thatOBL presents a threat to their security. All offers were explicitly rejected by the US (CharlieRose, 2001).

The last attempt by the Taliban, which was to send Hashimi to open a door ofnegotiations with the US, only became a fruitless attempt (Charlie Rose, 2001). Hashimirecognized that the US had the right to fear its security, but the Taliban also needed alegitimate reason to prosecute OBL. Such legitimacy fails to provide the US the right to

unilaterally strike OBL on Afghan soil without coordinating with the Taliban. Hashimiasserts that unilateral decisions simply aggravate the intensity of the situation which madeOBL a hero in the eyes of many Afghans (Charlie Rose, 2001).

Pakistan, on the other hand, shares 1,560 km of borders with Afghanistan, yetpositions most of its military capability on the Indian border (Riedel, 2010). Maintaininggood diplomatic terms with the Taliban politically serve their internal security interests.Pakistan did not exert pressure on Taliban to hand over OBL to Saudi authorities. But whatfurther weakened Mullah Omars position was the strategically timed Al-Qaeda assassinationof Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Northern Alliance leader days before 9/11. This act ensuredthat if a counter-attack were to ensue, the threat from the Northern Alliance would beremoved, and Al-Qaeda would have one enemy to deal with (US). This interplay between Al-

Qaeda and Taliban stems from historical experiences that viewed members of Al-Qaeda assupporters of the Afghan cause during the Soviet occupation, which could not be overturnedovernight without continuous negotiations.

4.2 What if

After 9/11, a delegation from Pakistan headed by General Fiaz Gilani from the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) was sent to convince Omar to give up bin Laden and his Al-Qaedaassociates (Tanner, 2002, p.292). This was an opportunity for Taliban to negotiate and

bargain diplomatic recognition, cessation of foreign support for the Northern Alliance and a

resumption of foreign aid (Tanner, 2002, p.292). The 9/11 created the proper ripeness(Wilkenfeld, 2005) to diffuse growing tension between Taliban and Washington through

exerting diplomatic pressure to achieve outcomes yet to be realized by Operation-Enduring-Freedom. A delegation of mediators should have been headed by a mix of diplomatic experts


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within its own Pashtun-dominated borders. When Pakistan aligned itself with the Bushadministration, Pakistan faced further issues in maintaining, control over the restive tribalregions along the Afghan border, where Taliban-linked militants became firmly entrenched(BBC, 2012(b)). In fact, sending Punjabi soldiers into Pashtun territory to fight jihadists

pushes the country ever closer to an ethnically defined civil war (TWP, 2009). Sixth, and

extremely critical, within Afghanistan resides a form of assembly of founders (Taizi, 2007)known as Loya Jirga in which tribal and religious leaders and scholars discuss, nationallyvital issues, general guidelines, domestic and foreign policies of the state and elect leadershipof the country (Taizi, 2007). In fact, on Charlie Rose (2001), Hashimi contested that thecouncil of scholars pressured Mullah Omar to destroy the Buddhas of Bamiyan, which

provides evidence that a form of religious diplomacy through the council of scholars wouldhave placed pressure on the Taliban to sever their ties with OBL.

Therefore, a delegation of mediators, coupled with jurists from the Saudi Commissionof Senior Ulema employing Islamic reasoning through religious diplomacy, would haveopened communication to find acceptable agreements between Taliban and Washington. Byissuing afatwaupon 9/11 explicitly targeting members of Al-Qaeda as modern-day khawarej(for the inhumane attack on the US), it is then possible to mobilize the Muslim massesagainst Al-Qaeda. Given that the term khawarej is not utilized often, due to fears ofmistakenly labelling Islamic groups as such, the term would seriously denounce Al-Qaeda isa full-fledged Islamic transgressor. Al-Qaeda failed to adhere to the Islamic teachingsregardingjihad, and they explicitly rejected international agreements by disobeying the rulerIslamic scholars. In that regard, by utilizing religious diplomacy directly with the Taliban andindirectly through the Loya Jirga to exert further pressure on Taliban in a similar manneremployed by Ali ibn Abi-Talib against the khawarej of his time. Therefore, the delegationwould convey to the Taliban and Loya Jigra that Al-Qaeda embodies characteristics ofmodern-day khawarej. If this first form of soft offense fails to break Al-Qaedas first line of

defence (Taliban), targeted coercion would follow.The Taliban are considered an extreme authority utilizing unorthodox forms ofshareeahlaw. However, labelling them as khawarej without employing religious diplomacyand giving them a window of opportunity along theLoya Jirgato reassess their position doesnot eradicate the root influence on their ideological and religious views (Al-Qaeda).

Nonetheless, Taliban are not a small, easily eradicable force. They are backed by a sizable38% of the Afghan population (CNN, 2009). Therefore, coercion becomes ineffectivewithout employing religious diplomacy as a first step, or else, war on terror becomes mereturkey-shoot (Ignatieff, 2000, p.161).

Evidently, the US views OBL as a threat to its security, while the Taliban viewsinternal security, diplomatic recognition and future prosperity of Afghanistan as their key

concerns. OBL might have been the carrot keeping the US interested in Afghanistan, but theUS could have first resorted to soft-power tactics, the ability to affect others to obtain theoutcome one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A countrys soft

power rests on its resources of culture, values and policies (Nye, 2008, p.94). The US wouldhave indirectly spread democratic values through leveraging countries such as Saudi Arabia,Pakistan, and UAE to act as a bridge between the Taliban and Washington. Simply,democracy cannot be achieved overnight; it requires constant dialogue, persuasion,communication and effective mediation tactics beyond an ideological war as a first step toeradicate Al-Qaedas global terror. However, it would probably be more effective and lesscostly to employ religious diplomacy, followed by, if necessary, targeted coercion.Becausethe US bypassed the crucial step of religious diplomacy against the khawarej, a decade of war

on terror failed to eradicate Al-Qaeda and the roots of suicide-terrorism. Instead itstrengthened the grip of the khawarej on their supporters globally. Hence, between 2000 and


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2007, the number of attacks rose steadily each year, from 54 in 2001 to 71 in 2002, 81 in2003, 104 in 2004, 348 in 2005, 353 in 2006, and 535 in 2007 (Moghadam, 2008, p.33).

The brutality of war increased the support of terrorism in the region, a by-product ofone-sided foreign policy not tailored to the Islamic world. The militarized US foreign policystand towards Afghanistan solidified the position of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The lack of

soft power (Nye, 2008) and the brutality of war worked against US efforts in bringingdemocracy to and eradicating terrorism in the region. Simply, it proved to the Afghans thatthe West has no interest in the safety of Afghanistan and the Islamic world in general.

Furthermore, the problem in US policy stems from homogenizing Al-Qaeda andTaliban. The Taliban are predominately from the Pashtun tribe, thus associating Al-Qaedawith the Taliban manifests itself as a war on Islam, and not a war on terror. Muslim countriesfound difficulty waging war against the Taliban before initiating religious diplomacyfollowed by targeted force against the khawarej. Resultantly, this approach would encouragecountries of the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) including Pakistan to support eradicatingAl-Qaeda as opposed to initiating a full-fledged war on everyone!

And most importantly, Al-Qaeda should not be the driving force behind instigatingIslamophobic feelings across the world. Such fear results in inappropriate policy formulationstowards the Islamic world (Amr & Singer, 2008). Eradicating terrorism in the Islamic worldshould be achieved through a process of inclusion and leveraging contributions from Islam.Interestingly, this paper shows that Islam holds a possible solution to eradicating Islamicgroups utilizing suicide-terrorism tactics. However, this is only possible if the West does notshun Muslim jurists, specifically from Saudi Arabia. By utilizing their fatwas regardingsuicide-terrorism and cooperating against Al-Qaeda,the outcome of the US effort to eradicateterrorism would probably differ.

Moreover, the US has failed in finding the roots of influence on Al-Qaeda members.Although OBL and 15 of the 19 hijackers of the 9/11 incident come from Saudi Arabia, this

does not mean that the problem stems from what the West inappropriately labels asSalafee/Wahhabi (Oliver, 2004). Instead, OBL and other members of Al-Qaeda are heavilyinfluenced by Qutbism (Oliver, 2004). In fact, OBL strongly ties himself to Qutb and hisideologies, formulated through teachings of Marx, Lenin and the French Revolution (Oliver,2004). Those views were planted in his reform principles strongly covered by his religiousradical belief. As Qutbism first emerged in Egypt, it became a sign of religious struggle dueto the ignorance of Islamic knowledge, which provided an opportunity for such radicalideologies to be accepted by the marginalized. As the struggles in Palestine, Lebanon and theIslamic world became daily routine in the lives of many Muslims, ignorance about Islammade such movements extremely appealing. Their views in respect tojihad, however, are notmorally, ethically nor Islamicly acceptable.

The solution to fight Al-Qaeda resides within religion itself, and stabilizingAfghanistan cannot be solely achieved coercively without religious diplomacy with theTaliban. Today the Taliban are re-emerging as a strong force once again, sadly, with strongerties to Al-Qaeda, and even stronger support to suicide-terrorism (NYT, 2009; BBC, 2012(a)).Islamic transgressors are now emerging at a point where the Western world is facing extremeeconomic fragility. Three factors could lead to a successful application of religiousdiplomacy. First both time andripeness are required (Wilkenfeld, 2005). The effectivenessof religiousdiplomacy would be undermined because of their conflicting ideological tensions

between the West and Islamic world. What exacerbates these ideological tensions is theunilateral imposition of Western norms and values on the Islamic world. Second, a genuinemultilateral cooperation between Western and Islamic states is crucial. Finally, with the

current US economic difficulties and (particularly) with US over stretched federal budget, apull back from overseas commitments (MacDonald & Parent, 2011, p.7) would be


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inevitable due to its costly nature. Thus, religious diplomacy is the diplomatic mechanismthat could multilaterally bridge what is considered an ideological gap between the West andIslamic world. Although there were attempts to open channels of communication between theTaliban and Washington through Qatar (TWT, 2012), the attempt was curtailed due todecades of fruitless war that undermined the American image among average Afghans. A

step in the right direction after 9/11 was the General Assembly and Security Councilsadoption of a series of binding resolutions setting out policies and strategies for counteringterrorism (Ramcharan, 2008, p.187). However, what the international community needs is to

adopt a mechanism to embrace different religious principles, consider a religious approachand leverage mainstream Islamic scholars especially when dealing with the Islamic world.JWT has been a guiding principle in the formation of the UN charter (Chapter VIII20), but asthe world becomes more globalized and the wave of decolonization and independenceincreases the number of states within the UN (Lauren, 1994), Western Christian powers nolonger carry the white mans burden.Understanding differing value systems is essential inaddressing future problems of our time. The key to tackling Islamic extremism is not throughmarginalizing Islam, but through finding a solution within Islam to justify using force againstIslamic extremism. Simply, the answer resides not in ignoring religious underpinnings, butinstead, in approaching them headfirstas we should our deepest fears.

20Action With Respect to Threats of The Peace, Breaches of The Peace, and Acts of Aggression.


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5CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined how and when Islamic teachings influence thekhawarej through religious diplomacy. This method justifies the use of force, contingent on

diplomacy failing against the khawarej. They instigate destructive jihad (Oliver, 2004)against the innocent while perpetuating Western views that equate terrorism with Islam. Theanalysis further shows that the problem with suicide-terrorism does not reside within Islam

per se, but with ignorance in religion and political desires masked under religiousconnotations. If Islamic jurists from the Saudi Commission of Senior Ulema had issued averdict immediately after 9/11, not only denouncing the attacks, but also stressing the fatwa

by asserting that Al-Qaeda embodies modern-day khawarej, they could have marginalized thekhawarejwithin the Islamic community. More importantly, leveraging religious diplomacy asa first form of soft offense against Al-Qaeda would have effectively undermined theirsupportive cushion (Taliban). Furthermore, Operation-Enduring-Freedom has failed toliberate the Islamic world from the bondage of suicide-terrorism, a by-product of a flawed

one-sided foreign policy. Unfortunately, the West misguidedly linked suicide-terrorism toSalafee/Wahhabi Islam (Oliver, 2004) without properly understanding (a) the true force ofideological influence on Al-Qaeda, (b) the Islamic view on suicide-terrorism or (c) how thesocio/geopolitical landscape in the Islamic world both fostered and normalized such a

poisonous social construct. This dissertation has shed light on the historical roots of suicide-terrorism in Islam, the differing fatawa regarding suicide-terrorism and the limitations ofissuing such verdicts. Although jurists differ on suicide-terrorism against Israel, theymaintained consistency in denouncing the 9/11 incident. In particular, Saudi jurists from theCommission of Senior Ulema have been the strongest condemners of suicide-terrorism even

before 9/11. They oppose suicide-terrorism universally, whether against Israel or any otherperceived target, and call for nation-states to contain such evil.

The question becomes, wasreligious diplomacy to the best interest of the Americanforeign policy in the region a decade earlier? Given the sophisticated US intelligence forces,it is reasonable to doubt if the administration lacked the understanding of the internalstruggles and discourse within the Islamic community. As my empirical assessment suggests,an internal approach to suicide-terrorism within the Islamic community could aid thelimitations to some aspects of Western ideologies. Furthermore, the closer the proximity of

jurists to conflict-ridden regions with apparent military inequality, the more they becomesupportive of suicide-terrorism as a means to defeating a perceived enemy (i.e., Hezbollah,Al-Qaeda). Consequently, when religion is fused with politics, the restrictions on the use offorce weaken (Bjola, 2009). Although Al-Qaradawi is not directly in a warzone, his religiousopinions have been politicized by Qutbs revolutionary and radical Islamic views. Such viewsact as foundations to Al-Qaedas destructive global jihad (Oliver, 2004). Instead, thecounterterror attack altered the positive development of an evolving diplomatic culture thatwas part of an American political life (Wiseman, 2005). Evidently, there was a shift fromdiplomacy as a means of attaining political ends towards immediate untargeted use of force.The use of force reflected an ideological turn under President George W. Bush in theaftermath of terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Wiseman, 2005, p.415). Subsequently,the US administration resorted to hard power, as oppose to soft power as a diplomaticmethod (Nye, 2004; 2008). That said, the US was justified in waging war against Al-Qaeda,

but success requires cooperation with the Islamic world and the use of Islamic reasoning ongroups such as Taliban.

As a result of the unfocused coercive approach against Al-Qaeda and Taliban,justice has significantly inflicted more pain on innocent civilians than the initial war


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objectives. Therefore, the counterterror attacks transgressed beyond-proportionate means onone hand and failed to discriminate between combatant and non-combatants on another(Crawford, 2003). As Hartigan notes, it is not permitted to employ unjust means in order towin even a just war (1967, p.204). Additionally, Burke (2004) argues that, Moraldiscourses have been used to brush aside concerns about the disproportionately high level of

civilian casualties incurred during US and Northern Alliance operations against Taliban andAl-Qaeda (Burke, 2004, p.330). Hence, the problem is not in the moral framework andguidelines advised by JWT, but the fusion of morality into politically driven agendas, whichdilutes the moral basis of such arguments.

Nevertheless, the lack of Islamic knowledge increased dependence of Muslims onpersonal value systems. The unjust situations witnessed in the Muslim world have all led tothis flawed concept of a violent jihad. This movement was fuelled by emotions and desiresrather than by divine orders. In Islam, blindly following anyone is a serious crime. Muslimsare compelled to verify Islamic facts by researching its source to avoid misguidance,6Belivers, if a troublemaker brings you news, check it first, in case you wrong othersunwittingly and later regret what you have done(Quran, The Dwellings, 49:6).

Therefore, Islamic and Western states need to acknowledge and utilize knowledgeablescholars who can spread this awareness and propagate the correct understanding of thereligion. Muslims need preachers who can effectively convey the importance of religion andthe mentality of seeking knowledge to refine oneself, 9How can those who know be equal tothose who do not know? Only those who have understanding will take heed (Quran, TheThrongs, 39:9).

At present, the core competency of the Islamic belief system, which is steadfastness toGods orders through documented evidence of the Quran, Sunnah and the understanding ofthe Prophetsdisciples, is often completely disregarded in order to achieve personal goals orworldly benefits. God has mentioned in his holy book that the religion he sent down is

complete and that there will be no further changes, no additions nor deletions. This is thelight by which he guides his finest creation, mankind. So why do the khawarejthen still insiston adhering to their imperfect minds and biased desires?, 71but if the truth were inaccordance with their desires, the heavens, the earth, and everyone in them woulddisintegrate(Quran, The Believers, 23:71).

Thus, given that Islamic extremism will remain a problem for the foreseeable future,religious diplomacy becomes critically essential in dealing with countries using unorthodoxforms of shareeah law in one hand, and leveraging non-Islamic means of warfare onanother. Resultantly, religious diplomacy gives the misconceived an opportunity to reassesstheir position, and therefore, it improves the effectiveness of coercion against Islamictransgressors.


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Approaching the Dilemma of Modern-Day Khawarej - Religious Diplomacy

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