Apprehend Industrial Risks From Past Accidents

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    IGN-ENSG-L.Dalenon

    Understand the FEYZIN Accident(France)

    Course of the accident

    Home Page

    Context :

    Refinery with in particular:

    - 4 propane spheres of 1.200 m3

    - 4 butane spheres of 2.000 m3

    - two horizontal tanks (butane and propane)

    Storage of LPG are located at 450 m of the refinery and300 m from the first houses (dwellings)

    Date of the accident : January 4, 1966

    Lessons learnt from

    FEYZIN

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    1. The Operatoropens the A valve

    2. The operator opens theB valve and tries to

    control the flow

    6. Valve A freezes in open position(effect of the expansion of gas),preventing its closing and the mitigationof the leakage

    3. A stopper of ice prevents theliquid from leaving

    4. The stopper moves underthe pressure

    5. The stopper exitsand the LPG is rejected

    into the atmosphere

    Next

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    6. Dispersion of a propane cloud (h=1m)

    8. Fire goes up to the sphere 7 A vehicle ignites the mixture of propane/airat 160 m from the leakage point

    The sphere at the origin of the leak is engulfed in flames

    Whereas the firemen try to cool the nearby tanks, the sphere explodes

    (BLEVE)

    A few moments later, a second sphere explodes causing the rupture ofpipes connected to a third sphere in a draining process.

    Three other tanks open without explosion

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    Understand the BLEVE

    Penomena

    Lessons learnt from

    FEYZIN

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    Understand the BLEVE Phenomena

    Boiling Liquid Vapour Explosion

    A BLEVE corresponds to the complete ruin of a

    pressurized tank containing a liquid stored at a higher

    temperature than its boiling point at the atmospheric

    pressure

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    Pint

    GPL

    R

    Ball of fire

    Projectiles

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    Lessons learnt from FEYZIN

    18 persons died and 84 were wounded primarily at the time of the

    first BLEVE

    On the whole, 11 tanks were destroyed

    Projectiles were found within more than 800 m away from the

    initial location of the vessels

    THERE IS NO EASY OPERATIONS

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    Understand the FLIXBOROUGHAccident (UK)

    Company NYPRO specialized in the synthesis of caprolactam, a

    component of Nylon

    In the process, the caprolactam is synthesized from cyclohexanecirculating in reactors at a temperature of 155C

    NYPRO only owns this site. Size relatively limited with a particularlyhazardous process

    NYPRO faces economic difficulties and has a sharp productivityapproach

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    Course of the accident

    Lessons s learnts from

    FLIXBOROUGH

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    1 2 34

    65

    1. A leak starts on reactor 5 (27/03/1974)

    2. Decision to by-pass n5 and linkreactors 4 & 6 by a bended pipe

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    On 1/06/1974, the link gives away, under great mecanical stresssand is detached from the bellows, releasing large quantities ofcyclohexane

    Lessons learnt from

    FLIXBOROUGH

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    Lessons learnt from Flixborough

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    An explosion followed suit, causing broad damage

    and killing 28 peopleincluding 18 in the control room

    No calculation concerning the resistance of the pipewas carried out

    No diagram of the by-pass was carried outNo test of the system was carried out

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    Understand the SEVESO

    Accident

    Constraints related to

    the TCDD

    Home Page Context :

    Company Icmesa Chemical Company specialized in particular in

    the production of 2,4,5-trichlorophenol (TCP) used in the

    manufacture of weedkillers and disinfectants

    The TCP is synthesized in a reactor in 2 stages:

    - Hydrolysis of tetrachlorobenzene (TCB) with sodium hydroxide in

    presence of glycol ethylene (solvents) at a temperature of 180C.

    - Acidification of the TCB by hydrochloric acid At the end of the first stage, 50 % of the glycol ethylene is distilled

    and the temperature in the reactor is lowered with 50-60C by

    addition of water

    Lessons learnt from

    SEVESO

    Course of the accident

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    Constraints related to the use ofTCDD

    In the process, it is impossible to avoid the formation of TCDD

    (tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin)

    TCDD: one of the most toxic substances

    Exposure by ingestion, inhalation, or cutaneous contact

    Effects: chloracnea, burns, damage to the kidneys, liver, nervoussystem...

    Substance very stable, insoluble in water and resistant to hightemperatures

    In a normal operating system, the formation of TCDD isnegligible (if T

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    Course of the SEVESO Accident

    On July the 9th, 1976: the operation of synthesis begins

    Following Stage 1, only 15 % of the glycol ethylene is distilled

    (instead of 50 %)

    No addition of water to cool the temperature in the reactor

    Operations are stopped for the weekend and the reactor is left

    without action to reduce the temperature of the mixture

    An exothermic reaction takes place in the reactor and heats the

    mixture more and more

    A few hours later, a rupture disc bursts, releasing a gas cloudcontaining a few kg of TCDD

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    Constraints related to

    the TCDD

    SEVESO Assessment

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    Lessons learnt from SEVESO

    Ten km contaminated and several hundreds of people

    had to be evacuated

    No immediate deaths associated to the TCDD but

    - Death of animals in the following days

    - Diseases catching several people

    - miscarriages

    Extremely lasting and expensive decontamination plan

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    Understand the MEXICO CITYAccident (Mexico)

    Terminal PEMEX is used for the storage and

    distribution of LPG

    The LPG is conveyed by pipelines from three refineries

    The storage capacity is 16.000 m3 with six spheres and48 horizontal rolls

    There are many dwellings near the production site

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    Course of the accident

    Mexico City Assessment

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    Course of the MEXICO CITY Accident

    On the 19/11/1984, the installation is in the course of filling, a

    200 mm pipe breaks down releasing the flammable gas

    The cloud : surface on the ground of approximately 200 X 150m and height 2 m

    It ignites on a flare. This ignition causes the destruction of

    several houses

    At 5:45, a first BLEVE occurs followed, one minute later, by the

    BLEVE of two spheres giving place to a 300 m diameter fireball

    BLEVEs occurred in series (nearly 15 explosions in 1hour 1/2)

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    Mexico City Assessment

    Understand the BLEVE

    Phenomena

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    Lessons learnt from MEXICO CITY

    In a radius of 300 m, all the people were killed or wounded

    More than 500 died, 7.000 wounded, 39.000 evacuated people

    and 6.000 people implied in the first-aid organizations. Only 4

    tanks over the 48 present remained intact

    Fragments were found at distances from of over several

    hundred meters. The most remote fragments was projected to

    1.200 m of its place of emission

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    Many people were killed or injured due to thepresence of crowded places in the vicinity of the

    plant

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    Understand the BHOPAL Accident(India)

    The company Union Carbide India Ltd is specialized in the manufacture ofpesticides

    Located in a dense urban environment

    Following the strong competition of another company, the closing of the factoryis considered by the American head office

    The activity is held thanks to drastic economies

    Qualification of the operators is lowered, the framing is reduced, work ofmaintenance reduced to bare essential. For its production, Union Carbide handlesvery dangerous products of which methyl isocyanate

    Methyl isocyanate = gas very toxic by inhalation:

    Effects : pulmonary oedemas. This gas can also set in the system to form cyanide

    Following the refitting, several accidents occurred causing nearly 50 peoplepoisoned among the workmen over one period one year

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    Course of accident

    BHOPAL Assessment

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    Course of the BHOPAL Accident

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    1. Water penetrates in a tank. Anexothermic Reaction starts with the CMI

    2. The pressure increases in the tank

    a leak is detected around the tank

    4. Decision to send the gas to the flare

    Impossibility to light the flare

    5. Opening of the valve ;discharge of gas to the atmosphere

    3. Decision to start thesoda treatment . The pump

    is faulty

    Soda

    BHOPAL Assessment

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    Lessons learnt from BHOPAL

    The leak happened in the early morning of the 3/12/1984

    At 2 km of the site, in 4 minutes, 150 died, 200

    paralysed people, 600 people lose conscience, 5.000people seriously affected.

    In the end, nearly 2.000 died and 10.000 people werepoisoned.

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    The safety level of a plant strongly relies on aefficient safety organization

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    Proximity of industrial activities and centres of

    population can be a real issue if it is not controlled

    First victims = often the operators of the plant at theorigin of the accident

    Much can be learnt from industrial accidents and

    even the incidents. Need for managing the

    experience feedback to progress

    The major industrial accidents often led to revisions

    of the regulation. Case of the SEVESO directive

    Drawing lessons from Major Accidents

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    Evaluation

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    GlossariesHome Page

    INERIS Lexic : Insitut National de lenvironnement Industriel et de

    Risques

    http://www.ineris.fr/outils/lexique.htm

    http://www.ineris.fr/outils/lexique.htmhttp://www.ineris.fr/outils/lexique.htm