Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

41
presentation

description

Lecture on microeconomics under supervision of Prof. Karl Storchmann of the Whitman College, NY, USA

Transcript of Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Page 1: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

presentation

Page 2: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Source: Scitovszky (1944-45)

Back in the day, an apple was an apple.

Page 3: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Source: Scitovszky (1944-45)

Today, it‘s a bit more complicated...

Page 4: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

As a consumer you have a great information disadvantage.

Source: Akerlof (1970)

Page 5: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

How can you find out the true quality of a product?

Source: Akerlof (1970)

Page 6: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Source: Cooper (1984)

Page 7: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Source: Cooper (1984)

Page 8: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Source: Cooper (1984)

Page 9: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

SIGNALING QUALITY WITH PRICES

ALEXANDER KRAEMER | BOCHUM | AUGUST 2010Student of Management and Economics (Diplom), ID.no. 108 004 216 [email protected]

Page 10: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Theoretical Literature

Firms I Consumers

Empirical Literature

Overview I Aspects

Resumé

References

Agenda

Page 11: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Theoretical Literature

Page 12: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Why signal?

the informed the uninformedSource: Koku (1995)

Page 13: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Source: Koku (1995)

Why signal?

information gap

the informed the uninformed

Page 14: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Why signal?

Building a bridge over the information gap

Source: Koku (1995)

Page 15: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

An example: Job application

Source: Spence (1973)

Page 16: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Indices

Gender, age or race

Ex ante observable information

Signals

Work experience, education or motivation

Ex post obeserable information

Can be manipulated by applicant

Manipulation of signals might incur costs

Source: Spence (1973)

Page 17: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Price

Time

Skimming Strategy

Penetration Strategy

Costs

Source: Robinson (1975), Koku (1995)

Pricing strategies

Page 18: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Source: Cooper (1984)

Mixed qualities Non-constant costs can play important role

Average costs can rise when sales fall

Reduction of false signaling firms

Increase of information on quality

Leaving some false firms, but also good

Page 19: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

High quality firm

Low quality firm

High costs

Willing to restrict sales volume

Will lose less sales volume

Over time less costly to signal

quality

Low costs

Fakes quality

Will lose great sales volume

Over time high costs to signal

false quality

Source: Bagwell & Riordan (1991)

High and declining prices

Page 20: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Freeriding low-quality firms

Source: Alpert et al. (1993)

High information asymmetry

Nothing prevents signaling with high prices

Price does not reveal the true quality of a product

Page 21: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

The use of price as a signal depends on...

Consumers‘ ability to detect quality variation

Level of price awareness of consumers

Availability of other cues of quality

Actual quality variation

Price variation

Source: Zeithaml (1988)

Page 22: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Source: Jones & Hudson (1996)

Consumers rely on more than one signal

There is an optimum number of signals

The more expensive the product

the more signals the consumer uses

When is price relevant?

Page 23: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Source: Zeithaml (1988)

Relationship between price, quality and value

Page 24: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Source: Wolinsky (1983); Gabor & Granger (1966)

Consumers have certain quality expectancies

Consumers penalize firms who signal the wrong

quality

Existence of expectancy equilibria

Prices may serve as signals which differentiate

quality levels

Consumers have qualities they will spend money on

Prices signal true quality in every equilibrium

Page 25: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Empirical Literature

Page 26: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Price-Quality Correlations

Source: Steenkamp (1988)

Most products price and objective quality are positively correlated

Most correlations are weak and vary over time

Strength of correlation depends on two factors

Type of product (durable vs. nondurable)

Degree of price despersion in a product category

Price is a poor market signal of quality for most products

Page 27: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Price-Quality Relations

Source: Faulds & Lonial (2001)

Page 28: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Price-Quality Relations

Source: Faulds & Lonial (2001)

Page 29: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Cultural differences Prices have an allocative effect in china

No quality is transported

Low prices have same effect as high prices

Source: Erevelles et al. (2001)

Page 30: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

What Price Quality?

Source: Horowitz & Lockshin (2002)

What cues do consumers use to select wine?

Quality ratings by James Halliday as dependant variable

Analysis of Australian and New Zealand wines

Influence of cues is different for each of the wines

e.g. Regional influence on wine quality and the winery style

Some producers might be better than others

Positive relationship between price and quality

Relationship is not linear

Increase in price does not explain equal incraese in quality

Page 31: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

What Price Quality?

Source: Horowitz & Lockshin (2002)All prices in Australian Dollars(1 AUSD = 0.72 EUR as of 19.08.2010)

Consumers go into a store with a style and a price range and then

look for wines within those parameters

Page 32: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

How do consumers use signals to assess quality?

Source: Gergaud & Livat (2007)

Analysis 6,000 European wine consumers

Speciality of paper: connoisseurs & nonconnoisseurs

Do all consumers use signals in the same way?

Page 33: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

How do consumers use signals to assess quality?

Source: Gergaud & Livat (2007)

Page 34: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Prices as Quality Signals

Source: Schnabel & Storchmann (2010)

Following Bagwell & Riordan (1991)

price signals respond positively to wine quality

price signals respond negatively to increasing information

Usage of two Datasets

Main Wine Trade Fair & Gault Millau wine guide for Germany

Small fraction of uninformed buyers

Page 35: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Prices as Quality Signals

Source: Schnabel & Storchmann (2010)

Page 36: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Resumé

Page 37: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Quality is signaled by prices

Theoretically:

the long run will increase the level of quality

(decrease of low quality firms due to costs)

Empirically:

Price-quality correlations are weak and vary over time

Different cultures, different price-quality perceptions

Consumers know what they want to buy

State of information matters

Resumé

Page 38: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Thank you for your attention. Questions?

Page 39: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

REFERENCES

Page 40: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Akerlof, G.A.

Almenberg, J. and Dreber, A.

Alpert, F.; Wilson, B. and Elliott, M.T.

Ashenfelter, O.Ashenfelter, O.Bagwell, K. and Riordan, M.H.

Benfratello, L.; Piacenza, M. and Sacchetto, S.

Bergemann, D. and Välimaki, J.

Caves, R.E. and Greene, D.P.

Chin, M.-C.; Weaver, R.D.Cooper, R.; Ross, T.W.

Daughety, A.F.; Reinganum, J.F.

Daughety, A.F.; Reinganum, J.F.

Daughety, A.F.; Reinganum, J.F.

Dener, E. Edwards, F.; Spawton, T.Ervelles, S.; Roy, A. and Yip, L.S.C.

Faulds, D.J. and Lonial, S.C.

Folwell, R.; Bales, T. and Edwards, C.

Gabor, A. and Granger, C.W.J.

Gergaud, O.; Livat, F. Gerstner, E.Goldstein, R; Almenberg, J.; Dreber, A.; Emerson, J.W.; Herschkowitsch, A. and Katz, J.

The Market for „Lemons“: Quality Uncertainty and Market Mechanism The Quarterly Journal of Economics1970 Vol. 84, No. 3 pp. 488-500

When does the Price affect the Taste? Results from a Wine Experiment American Association of Wine Economics2009 Working Paper No. 35pp. 1-12

Price Signaling: does it ever work? Journal of Consumer Marketing1993 Vol. 10, No. 4 pp. 4-14

Predicting the Quality and Prices of Bordeaux Wines American Association of Wine Economics2007 Working Paper No. 4pp. 1-20Predicting the Quality and Prices of fine wine The Economic Journal 2010 Vol. 5, No. 1 pp. 174-184High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality The American Economic Review1991 Vol. 81, No. 1 pp. 224-239

Taste or reputation: What drives market prices in the wine industry? Estimation of a hedonic model for Italian premium wines

Applied Economics 1009 Vol. 49 pp. 2197-2209

Dynamic pricing of new experience goods Journal of Political Economy 2006 Vol. 114 pp. 713-743

Brands' quality levels, prices, and advertising outlays: empirical evidence on signals and information costs

International Journal of Industrial Organization1996 Vol. 14 pp. 29-52

Contracting, Signalling of Uncertain Quality, and Price Volatility? Prepared for presentation at the Xth EAAE Congress2002 pp. 1-15Prices, Product Qualities and Asymmetric Information: The Competitive Case Review of Economic Studies 1984 Vol. 51, No. 2 pp. 197-207

Communicating Quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling RAND Journal of Economics 2008 Vol. 39, No. 4 pp. 973-989

Imperfect competition and quality signalling RAND Journal of Economics 2007 Vol. 39 pp. 163-183

Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly When There is Universal Private Information

Games and Economic Behavior2007 Vol. 58 pp. 94-120

Signalling Quality Through Prices in a durable Market www.ecares.org/ecaresdocuments/ws/summerschool2009/papers/dener.pdfwww.ecares.org/ecaresdocuments/ws/summerschool2009/papers/dener.pdfwww.ecares.org/ecaresdocuments/ws/summerschool2009/papers/dener.pdfwww.ecares.org/ecaresdocuments/ws/summerschool2009/papers/dener.pdfPricing in the Australian Wine Industry Emeral Backfiles 2007The universality of the signal theory for products and services Journal of Business Research 2001 Vol. 52 pp. 175-187

Price-Quality Relationships of Nundurable Consumer Products: A European and United States Perspective

Journal of Economic and Social Research2001 Vol. 3, No. 1 pp. 59-76

Cost economies and economic impacts of pricing and product mix decisions in premium table wine wineries

Journal of Wine Research 2001 Vol. 12, No. 2 pp. 111-124

Prices as an indicator of Quality: Report on an Enquiry Economica 1966 pp. 43-70

How do consumers use signals do assess quality? American Association of Wine Economics2007 Working Paper No. 3pp. 1-22Do Higher Prices Signal Higher Quality? Journal of Marketing Research1985 Vol. 22, No. 2 pp. 209-215Do More Expensive Wines Taste Better? Evidence from a Large Sample of Blind Tastings

American Association of Wine Economics2008 Working Paper No. 16pp. 1-14

Page 41: Applied Microeconomics: Wine Economics

Horowitz, I.; Lockshin, L.

Hubert, S.; Storchmann, K.Janssen, M.C.W.; Roy, S.Jones, G.; Storchmann, K.Jones, P. and Hudson, J.Koku, P.S.Landon, S.; Smith, C.E.Lecocq, S. and Visser, M.Lee, L; Frederick, S. and Ariely, D.

Lima, T.Lockshin, L.S. and Rhodus, W.T.

Milgrom, P.; Roberts, J.Obermiller, C. Rao, A.R.Render, B. and O‘Connor, T.S.

Roberts, P.W. and Reagans, R.

Rosenman, R.E. and Wilson, W.W.

Rosenthal, R.W.Rothshild, M.Schmalensee, R.Scitovszky, T.Shapiro, C.Spence, M. Spence, M. Steenkamp, J.-B. E.M.Stigler, G.J.Stiglitz, J.E.

Weil, R.L.

Wolinsky, A. Yehezkel, Y.Zeithaml, V.A.

Zhao, H.

What Price Quality? An Investigation into the Prediction of Wine-quality Ratings Journal of Wine Research 2002 Vol. 13, No. 1 pp. 7-22

Prices as Quality Signals: Evidence from the Wine Market Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization2010 Vol. 8 pp. 1-21Signalling Quality Through Prices in an Oligopoly http://faculty.smu.edu/sroy/quality.pdfhttp://faculty.smu.edu/sroy/quality.pdfWine market prices and investment under uncertainty Agricultural Economics 2001 Vol. 26 pp. 115-133Signalling Product Quality: When is Price Relevant? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organisation1996 Vol. 30 pp. 257-266Price signaling: does it ever work? Journal of Consumer Marketing 1995 Vol. 12, No. 1 pp. 45-49Quality Expectations, Reputation, and Price Southern Economic Journal 1998 Vol. 64, No. 3 pp. 628-647What Determines Wine Prices: Objective vs. Sensory Characteristics Journal of Wine Economics 2006 Vol. 1, No. 1 pp. 42-56Try It, You‘ll Like It - The Influence of Expectation, Consumption, and Revelation on Preferences for Beer

Psychological Science 2006 Vol. 17, No. 12 pp. 1054-1058

Price and Quality in the California Wine Industry: An Emipiral Investigation California State University, Hayward1999 pp. 1-50The Effect of Price and Oak Falvor on Percieved Wine Quality Emeral Backfiles 2007 pp. 13-25

Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality Journal of Political Economy 1986 Vol. 94, No. 4 pp. 796-821When do Consumers infer in Quality from Price? Advances in Consumer Research1988 Vol. 15 pp. 304-310The Quality of Price as a Quality Cue Journal of Marketing Research 2005 Vol. XLII pp. 401-405The Influence of Price, Store Name, and Brand Name on Perception of Product Quality

Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science1976 Vol. 4, No. 4 pp. 722-730

Critical Exposure and Price-Quality Relationships for New World WInes in the U.S. Market

Journal of Wine Economics 2007 Vol. 2, No. 1 pp. 56-69

Quality Differentials and Prices: Are Cherries Lemons? The Journal of Industrial Economics1991 Vol. 39, No. 6 pp. 649-658

A Model in which an Increas in the Numer of Sellers LEads to a Higher Price Econometrica 1980 Vol. 48, No. 6 pp. 1575-1579Searching for the Lowest Price When the Distribution of Prices is Unknown The Journal of Political Economy1974 Vol. 82, No. 4 pp. 689-711A Model of Advertising and Product Quality The Journal of Political Economy1978 Vol. 86, No. 3 pp. 485-503Some Consequences of the Habit of Judging Quality by Price The Review of Economic Studies1945 Vol. 12, No. 2 pp. 100-105Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations The Quarterly Journal of Economics1983 Vol. 98, No. 4 pp. 659-680Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets The American Economic Review2002 Vol. 92, No. 3 pp. 434-459Job Market Signaling The Quarterly Journal of Economics1973 Vol. 87, No. 3 pp. 355-374The Relationship between Price and Quality in the Marketplace De Economist 1988 Vol. 136 pp. 491-507The Economics of Information The Journal of Political Economy1961 Vol. 69, No. 3 pp. 213-225The Contributions of the Economics of Information to the Twentieth Century Economics

The Quarterly Journal of Economics2000 pp. 1441-1478

Analysis of Reserve and Regular Bottlings: Why Pay for a Difference Only the Critics Claim to Notice?

Chance 2005 Vol. 18, No. 3 pp. 9-15

Prices as signals of product quality Review of Economic Studies 1983 Vol. 50 pp. 647-658Signaling Quality in an Oligopoly when some consumers are informed Journal of Economics & Management Strategy2008 Vol. 17, No. 4 pp. 937-972Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A Means-End Model and Synthesis of Evidence

Journal of Marketing 1988 Vol. 52 pp. 2-22

Raising Awareness and Signaling Quality to Uninformed Consumers: A Price-Advertising Model

Marketing Science 2000 Vol. 19, No. 4 pp. 390-396