Appeal document final

African Union Commission Appeal for Somalia 2009

Table of Contents

ACRONYMS.......................................................................................................2

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.3

II. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................5

III. AMISOM MANDATE....................................................................6

IV. BACKGROUND...........................................................................7

V. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS..........................................................8

POLITICAL......................................................................................................8SECURITY.......................................................................................................9HUMANITARIAN.............................................................................................11INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING...............................................................12

VI. AMISOM ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES..............................13

VII. DJIBOUTI PEACE AGREEMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AMISOM 19

V111. IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES AND ACTIONS TAKEN…………………....21

IX. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE WAY FORWARD………………………………..22

X. RESOURCES REQUIREMENTS (BUDGET)…………………………………………..23

ANNEXES

1. force generation strategy2. concept of operations3. UN Security Council Resolution

4. Djibouti Peace Agreement (19 August, 2008)5. Cease Fire Agreement (25 October, 2008.)

Acronyms

ARS Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia.AU African UnionAUC African Union Commission.BN BattalionCIMICOORD Civilian Military Coordination.CONOPS Concept of Operations.CTF Coordinating Task Force.DPA Djibouti Peace Agreement.ENDF Ethiopian National Defense Forces.ECOWAS Economic Community for West Africa States.IDPs Internally Displaced Populations.HLC High Level CommitteeIGAD Intergovernmental Authority for Development.IGASOM Intergovernmental Authority for Somalia.ISF International Stabilization Force.JSC Joint Security Committee.LAS League of Arab States.NGO Non-Governmental Organization.NSSP National Security Sector Programme.OIC Organization for Islamic Conference.Quips Quick Impact Projects.PSC Peace and Security Commission.PSD Peace and Secuirty Department.PSOD Peace and Security Operation DivisionSPMU S Policy and Management Unit.SRCC Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission.SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General.TCC Troop Contributing Countries.

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TFIs Transitional Federal InstitutionsTFG Transitional Federal Government.TFP Transitional Federal Parliament.UN Unitied Nations.UNDP United Nations Development Programme.UNICEF United Nations Children Fund.UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services.UNPOS United Nations Poltical Office for Somalia.WHO World Health Organization.

I. Executive Summary

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Since March 2007, when the first peacekeepers arrived in Mogadishu, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has maintained an uninterrupted peacekeeping presence in Somalia mandated by both the African Union and the United Nations. Established by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union at its 69th meeting on 19th January 2007, AMISOM continues to carry out its mandate to support national reconciliation and dialogue; to provide protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions and to facilitate humanitarian access to the affected population. Due to the inadequate support in force generation and the required financial resources, the current AMISOM strength is comprised of two Ugandan and two Burundian battalions numbering 3,400 troops out of the 8000 authorized force.

The Somali political process remains fragile and the current momentum for peace is not guaranteed. The challenges in Somalia after almost two decades of conflict and the absence of a functional central administration can appear overwhelming. The security situation is unpredictable with continued fighting and persistent attacks on AMISOM positions by the spoilers to the process.

Despite operating with less than half of its intended troop strength and only a fraction of the civilian staff required, AMISOM has been a key contributor to an improved security situation in the capital Mogadishu and has provided security conditions enabling humanitarian organizations to deliver life-saving assistance to the Somali people. Reflecting AMISOM’s political mandate, AMISOM played an instrumental role in the negotiations between the Transitional Federal Government and the opposition forces, represented by the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia that resulted in the signing of the Djibouti Peace Agreement on 19th August 2008.

The timely implementation of this agreement is considered by the African Union and the signatories to be the best option for a durable peace in Somalia and AMISOM is participating and supporting the High Level Committee and Joint Security Committee established to implement the provisions in the Peace Agreement. The Committees established by the

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Agreement propose an expanded role of AMISOM and have raised expectations, not least among the Somali people. This is as result of AMISOM’s engagement and performance on the ground.

The humanitarian crisis is at its peak. Conflict, drought, soaring food and fuel prices and hyperinflation have resulted in 1.1 million Internally Displaced Persons and an estimated total of 3.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance country-wide. The regional ripple effect of the crisis is all too visible in large Somali refugee camps in neighbouring countries and in acts of piracy and organized crime left to fester in an environment of near-impunity.

A continued and decisively strengthened AMISOM presence will be crucial in seizing the opportunity for peace and political stability created by the Djibouti Agreement and enabling other actors to continue their vital humanitarian work. As the Djibouti Peace Agreement calls for a phased withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, the positions they vacate must be filled by AMISOM to avoid a damaging security vacuum. At the same time, capacity building and institutional support provided by AMISOM to Somalia’s National Security Stabilisation Plan and the Security Sector Reform are essential elements in a country where security structures are weak and adequately trained human resources are scarce after many years of conflict. To achieve this, AMISOM must urgently mobilise support to maintain, sustain and reinforce its peacekeeping presence by generating additional troops and the necessary logistical resources to reach the mandated level both in the theatre of operations and at Headquarters level. Budget estimates (enclosed) point to a combined additional funding of USD 190,931,560 needed to sustain the Mission for a period of 15 months from October, 2008 – December 2009.

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II. Introduction

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union at its 69th Meeting of 19th January 2007 established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which took over from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM). Today, AMISOM is the only peacekeeping force in Somalia.According to the Peace and Security Council decision establishing AMISOM, the Mission is mandated to support national reconciliation and dialogue, provide appropriate protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions and facilitate humanitarian access to the population. Due to the lack of financial and troop support, of the 8000 troops authorized by the African Union mandate the current AMISOM contingent in Somalia comprises of only two Ugandan battalions and two Burundian battalion numbering 3400 troops. Nigeria and Ghana have pledged a battalion and half battalion respectively but are yet to deploy troops.

The mission is also authorized to provide a core of 290 civilian staff including the Special Representative of the Chair Person of the Commission (SRCC) and his staff of political affairs officers, civil affairs, communication, humanitarian, finance and administration officers as well as 270 police officers. However, due to resource constraints and other AU limitations, as at 21st October, only 8 civilian staff had been recruited for AMISOM. An additional 50 staff had been interviewed and are undergoing final recruitment formalities

This Appeal document provides an analysis of the political, security and humanitarian situation prevailing in Somalia and highlights the challenges faced by Somali authorities and various organizations engaged in Somalia’s peace process as well as reconstruction of livelihoods of the Somali people.

The African Union is currently facing multiple challenges and urgently needs to mobilize the necessary human and financial resources to translate the mandate into reality. The pledging conference which has been slated for 17 th

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-18th November at the UN conference centre in Addis aims to work towards the following objectives:

To drum up financial, technical and logistical support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for the year 2008-2009

To bring together all stakeholders and to brief them on the achievements, challenges and constraints facing AMISOM

To brief partners on the implications of the recently signed Djibouti Peace Agreement (DPA) and the consequences it will have on AMISOM’s activities including the expanded role as proposed by the DPA signatories and ultimately its budget

Appeal to AU member states and international community to further commit themselves to pledge troops in order for AMISOM to meet its authorized troop strength and beyond

Clarify the coordination mechanisms between the AU, UN and other stakeholders and demonstrate the importance of effective cooperation between all these institutions in dealing with the complexities characterizing the Somali situation

III. AMISOM’s mandate

According to the decision of the 69th Meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council held on the 19th January 2007, AMISOM is mandated to:

Provide support to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation;

Facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; Create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction

and development in Somalia.Within this mandate, AMISOM shall be adequately equipped to undertake the following tasks:

Support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders

Provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to enable them to carry out their functions.

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Assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan of Somalia, particularly the effective re-structuring and training of all inclusive Somali security forces, taking cognizance of ongoing programmes being implemented by some of Somalia’s bilateral and multilateral partners,

Provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts,

Monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation, Facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian

operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the return of IDPs, and

Protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self defense.

IV. Background

Eighteen years of anarchy, a continuing lack of an effective central government and several failed peace conferences plus millions of Somali refugees and IDP’s are what characterize present day Somalia. However, since the signing of the Djibouti Peace Agreement, on 19 August, 2008, there has been a growing momentum to achieve lasting peace and a realization by Somalis, regional actors and the broader international community that the Djibouti Agreement remains the country’s best hope.

The Djibouti Agreement therefore, constitutes a watershed in the peace process. It has provided all stakeholders the opportunity to further recommit themselves to exploring ways and means of establishing enduring peace and stability. In this regard, the establishment by the Agreement of two committees – the High Level and Joint Security Committees serves as a concrete action plan through which detailed and specific measurable actions can take place.

The security situation in Somalia remains fragile and volatile and it is fraught with persistent violence on the civilian population. Insurgent activities are

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now spreading beyond Mogadishu, which had been the epicenter of the violence. With the envisaged withdrawal of all non-peacekeeping foreign forces and the inability of the TFG forces to impact positively on the security situation and the lack of robustness of AMISOM, it is imperative that urgent measures are taken to redress the situation.

The need for the delivery of humanitarian assistance has become an integral part of a multi-dimensional nature of peacekeeping or peace support operation Owing to an insecure environment, majority of the international humanitarian agencies work out Nairobi and this has placed an enormous responsibility on AMISOM to fill the gap as an interim measure in Mogadishu including engaging in direct provision of humanitarian services. Overall, an opportunity thus exists that deserves a coordinated and sustained support by the African Union Member States, multilateral institutions and the international donor community with a view to addressing Somalia’s myriad of problems and challenges.

V. Current Developments

Political

The recent signing of the Djibouti Peace Agreement marks a key milestone in Somalia’s political history and provides an opportunity for lasting peace in Centre/South Somalia. Tangible progress has been observed as dialogue between the warring factions – the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Alliance for Re-liberation of Somali (ARS) is gathering greater momentum. The appointment of representative members of the Joint Security Committee and the High Level Committee from both parties is another indication of genuine commitment and desire for peace and stability in Somalia. In March 2008, the African Union initiated dialogue with opposition groups in Somalia. At the most recent meeting between the AU and ARS – Nairobi, on the 2nd and 3rd of September 2008, the two sides publicly committed

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themselves to working together towards the full implementation of the Djibouti Peace Agreement.

Security

The sea-lane between Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland regions) and Yemen links Asia to Europe via the Suez Canal. It is also one of the major conduits of smuggling of illegal arms into Somalia. Since January of 2008, heavily armed Somali pirates have operated simultaneously in the Gulf of Aden and on the eastern coast of Somalia attacking more than 59 ships and holding more than 300 crew hostage. Much of this pirate activity is thought to be a major source of income for spoilers bent on subverting ongoing peace initiatives. This has sparked an outcry from the International Maritime community prompting the French to sponsor UN Council Resolution 1814 and 1816 authorizing western navies to pursue pirates into Somali territorial waters. Western countries, including Russia, Pakistan and India now monitor piracy under the Coordinating Task Force (CTF) 150 arrangements.

However, at the same time much of this piracy was initially attributed to the illegal exploitation of Somali territorial water resources by foreign fishing fleets and the dumping of dangerous waste material on Somali soil. The problems related to hostage taking and sea piracy are a reality which is likely to escalate in the foreseeable future. This must not only be condemned but tackled comprehensively and collectively. In this regard the need to put in place a continental legal framework that allows for the prosecution of Culprits apprehended in a manner that addresses the thorny issue of conflict of laws if current efforts is to be effective. This observation is amongst the backdrop of Danish Government’s decision to release apprehended pirates on account of not being able to effectively prosecute them in Denmark.

The security situation “on shore” Somalia, especially in Mogadishu, continues to be volatile and unpredictable with persistent attacks on AMISOM positions. This has led to the death of one Burundian soldier and nine from the Uganda

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contingent. The civilian population continues to constitute the majority of the victims of these insurgents’ attacks and this has resulted in increased internal displacement and suffering of the civilian population as well as heightening the refugee problem in neighboring countries. During the month of August, a roadside bomb exploded killing more than 20 women working for a local NGO engaged in cleaning the streets of Mogadishu.

The escalation of hostilities since August 2008 could be attributed to the progress in the Djibouti Peace initiatives. Radical elements in this context have issued public declarations banning the use of Mogadishu airport as a way to deny AMISOM a critical supply line. This was aimed at frustrating the international community’s efforts to rely on AMISOM in the implementation of the initial steps of the cessation of hostilities between the TFG and the ARS. Meanwhile there are indications of continued splits among the insurgents operating in Somalia. There are also differences between groups operating in the field (Al-Shaabab) and the political leadership both in Asmara and Djibouti. There is a necessity for engagement for groups inside Somalia to build support for a successful implementation of the Djibouti Peace Process.

Insurgent activities continue to spread in Centre/South Somalia with the objective of dislodging Transitional Federal Institutions and to consolidate their gains in this transitional period. The thinness of TFG forces on the ground has given opposition groups chances of temporary advantage. The recent taking over of the Kismayo port and the declaration to close the Mogadishu airport by the opposition groups is testimony to the fact that the TFG forces are not yet capable of impacting the security situation positively. Furthermore, reports coming out from the field indicate that the opposition forces led by the ARS are expanding their control in most of the regions in the Central and South of Somalia including Hiraan, the Shebelles and the Lower Juba regions. Notwithstanding these challenges, the Transitional Federal Government and the allied forces continue to counter the insurgents and AMISOM peacekeepers continue to secure their area of operations.

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To ensure the safety of the humanitarian workers and the unhindered access to the affected population, the protection for these workers needs to be sanctioned and incorporated as an integral part of the Peace Agreement.

Given the current situation on the ground, the inability of the TFG to impact positively on the security situation and the lack of robustness of AMISOM, it becomes imperative that urgent measures are taken to ensure that the current state of affairs is redressed ahead of the withdrawal of all non-peace keeping foreign troops from Somalia as provided for in the Djibouti Agreement. Therefore, the need to generate enough troops in the absence of an international stabilization force (ISF), for AMISOM to reach its authorized strength becomes a necessity.

Humanitarian

The decision to include humanitarian elements in AMISOM mandate was premised on the fact that over the years, humanitarian assistance has become an integral part of the strategy to transform conflicts and as such security, political and humanitarian imperatives are inextricably interlinked. In this regard, AMISOM is supposed to assist in addressing some of the impediments to effective humanitarian assistance delivery.Access, protection of civilians and piracy are considered some of the main challenges faced by humanitarian actors in Centre/ South Somalia.

Lack of access is mainly attributed to clan rivalries, insecurity, low AMISOM force levels, continuous population movements, road infrastructure, free-lance militia, armed banditry, illegal militia checkpoints and spoiler elements within the TFG.

The humanitarian situation in Centre/South Somalia has been compounded by escalation of hostilities which has led to a considerable population displacement resulting in an increase in the beneficiary caseload requiring humanitarian assistance. There are currently 3.2 million Somalis who need humanitarian assistance. Reports from humanitarian organizations working in

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Somalia describe the general humanitarian situation as alarming with certain areas in the country experiencing critical food insecurity.

Due to insecurity, there are few aid agencies in Mogadishu and environs. Owing to an insecure environment in Mogadishu, most of the international staff of humanitarian organisations are working out of Nairobi thus leaving management of critical humanitarian interventions to national staff.

While this “remote management” programming has the advantage of allowing operations to continue, it comes with a host of administrative and security implications including less efficient service delivery, pressure from social-cultural networks, accountability and above all endangering lives of national staff.

Since January 2008, there has been a rise in the number of abductions, illegal detentions and target killings of humanitarian workers, journalists and ordinary civilians forcing several organizations to suspend or drastically scale down programs for the displaced populations in Mogadishu and environs. Downscaling of humanitarian activities has obvious dire consequences for the civilian population requiring humanitarian assistance.

Institutional Capacity Building

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) are currently operating with an absence of structures of governance. Most of the institutional arrangements have crumbled due prolonged conflict and the country’s human resource capacity is grossly inadequate following the massive brain-drain. Under the circumstances, it is imperative that the international community steps in to assist in the area of capacity building and institutional support. AMISOM aims at contributing to Somalia’s National Security Stabilization Plan through support to the Joint security Committee and within the framework of the Security Sector Reform.

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The inability of the TFG to generate its own revenue has proved to be an impediment to the TFG’s quest for strengthening its institutions and has weakened the capacity and authority of the Council of Ministers and other Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). As a result, some of the functions that are supposed to be performed by the authorities are carried out by AMISOM.

VI. AMISOM ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

The prime achievement of AMISOM has been its uninterrupted presence on the ground since March 2007. This presence has enhanced constructive engagement with various stakeholders in Mogadishu including TFG authorities, clan leaders and the civilian population.

AMISOM continues to provide health services to the civilian population especially those living in the surrounding areas of the military camps. On a daily basis AMISOM treats an average of 400 out- patients at its level I hospital and clinics in all it deployments. Given that the AMISOM level I hospital is one of the few health facilities where Somalis can go and seek medical treatment, it is imperative that the facility be provided with adequate medicines, equipment and supplies to meet the requirements of the ever increasing clientele.

AMISOM has continued to provide on daily basis at least 70,000 litres of clean water to residents close to its camps and to the IDPS in various locations around Mogadishu. In response to the community needs and appeals, AMISOM has also sponsored the repair of water wells.

In an effort to facilitate delivery of more supplies by sea, AMISOM has provided diplomatic support to back up requests by humanitarian organizations for additional maritime security.

The involvement of AMISOM in humanitarian action is an interim stop-gap measure in response to the void created by the suspension of humanitarian

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activities by key agencies for security reasons. Saving lives and building trust with the local population underpins the motivation behind this assistance.

An engineering battalion has been incorporated in the AMISOM Concept of Operations (CONOPs) to carry out repairs of roads and bridges on selected critical routes with a view to enhancing access.

Political

AMISOM has played a critical role along with the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in facilitating dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government and the Opposition which culminated in the recently signed Djibouti Peace Agreement. AMISOM today co-chairs the Joint Security Committees of the Djibouti Peace Agreement and is a member of the High Level Committee.

Last August, AMISOM contributed to breaking the impasse that existed between President Abdullahi Yusuf and the Prime Minister Nur Adde Hassan Hussein when a political rift occurred after the dismissal of the mayor of Mogadishu Mohamed Dheere.

At the local level AMISOM facilitates regular contact and consultations with the local population including elders and facilitates inter-community and inter-clan dialogue between them and the TFG.

The African Union Commission (AUC) has adopted an integrated, multi-dimensional and collaborative approach to planning taking into consideration all the different elements characterizing the Somali context. The AUC collaborates with UN agencies and non-governmental humanitarian actors to assist the Somali people create a peaceful and secure Somalia.

In this respect, the office of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of AU Commission (SRCC) for Somalia has embarked on a strategic programme aimed at forging practical and action-oriented collaboration and partnership

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with various actors in Somalia including donors, UNPOS as well as United Nations agencies, programmes and funds.

This is an on-going activity and expanding and most of the agencies approached have enthusiastically welcomed the collaboration effort and have expressed interest in having a practical partnership.

As the office of the SRCC is still new, there is room for further refining and solidifying the envisaged action-oriented partnerships. UNICEF and UNHCR have been the first two organizations to responded positively and have seconded highly qualified staff with extensive experience in complex emergencies in order to strengthen the capacity of AMISOM. It is also important to note that WHO has supplied essential drugs to AMISOM’s clinics in Mogadishu which serve the civilian population from various locations within the vicinity of the force compounds.

AMISOM’s task would be to stabilize the theatre and create an enabling environment for the return of more international staff to strengthen the presence of humanitarian organizations in Mogadishu and other locations in Centre/South Somalia.

AMISOM is also to identify local capacities on which durable peace is to be built. This is to be done through the establishment of a Civil – Military Coordination unit (CIMICOORD) at the mission headquarters and use of Quick Impact Project (QUIP) funds. The CIMICOORD unit will serve as a link between the military and civilian components of the mission plus NGOs, UN agencies and community residents. The use of “QUIP Impact funds” would avail the people of Centre/South Somalia alternative income earning opportunities to enable them reconstruct their livelihoods in a more sustainable manner and would draw some of the youth from joining the militia.

Ultimately, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, SRSG and the SRCC should jointly hold consultations with other stakeholders and develop a common

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framework governing humanitarian assistance delivery in Centre/South Somalia.

AMISOM also facilitated the successful holding of the National Reconciliation Congress in July 2007 and has come to be viewed by all stakeholders as an honest broker in the recently signed Djibouti Peace Agreement.

Challenges and recommendations

Somalia must be put at the top of the international agenda. The international community should stay politically committed to the peace process and offer increased financial and logistical support to AMISOM to enable the mission to execute its mandate.

Currently the mandate of AMISOM is restrictive, particularly with respect to successfully meeting the expectations arising from the recently signed Djibouti Agreement. It is therefore necessary to revise the Missions mandate to reflect the current realities on the ground.

The absence of requisite structures of governance and national security apparatus remains a key challenge to AMISOM in fulfilling its mandate. The international community is called upon to provide resources needed to accomplish capacity building programmes including institutional rebuilding efforts.

There is an urgent need to disseminate information on AMISOM’s role to the population. In this respect, resources are needed to establish and operate a broadcast radio station (AMISOM radio) to counter negative propaganda and carry AMISOM information to the entire population.

Due to lack of funding and AU limitations, civilian elements of AMISOM have not been adequately addressed. With only one political affairs officer in Mogadishu, the mission has a minimal civilian presence in the theatre. As a result, the mission is unable to counter negative media propaganda by spoilers.

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Security

One of AMISOM’s key activities in Somalia is the provision of security for Transitional Federal Institutions and securing access for humanitarian aid delivery in the capital.AMISOM also provides access to the outside world through its provision of security for Mogadishu’s sole seaport and airport.In addition, the mission provides essential protection to civilians in Mogadishu by clearing roadside bombs, unexploded landmines and other Explosive Remnants of War that pose a great risk to its own soldiers and civilians.


In order to stabilize Mogadishu and contain the security situation, AMISOM is faced with the following challenges:

Insufficient number of troops is the major challenge AMISOM faces in addressing the security situation in Somalia. The AMISOM mandate calls for an 8000 strong peacekeeping force. Currently only two battalions from Burundi and two from Uganda numbering 3400 troops are deployed in Mogadishu.

In order to effectively carry out its mandate and stabilize the theatre, it is necessary to urgently generate additional forces to reach the required troop level of 8,000.

Lack of adequate financial resources remains the main impediment to a smooth operation of AMISOM. This hinders its ability to generate, sustain, train, transport and equip additional troops. Furthermore, some of the equipment and accommodation facilities for AMISOM peacekeepers are substandard and require upgrading.

The inadequacy of government security forces such as the army and police force is attributed to lack of financial resources coupled with a weak command and control structure. This adversely affects AMISOM’s mission and mandate.

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The absence of sustained funding of TFG and TFIs has led to a spate of defections of trained TFG security forces to the Al-Shabab, clan militias and a multitude of other factions battling the TFG.

Piracy off the Somali coast and in the neighboring Gulf of Aden also poses a security threat to AMISOM, as some of the proceeds of acts of piracy are used to fund the insurgents in Mogadishu who are fighting Ethiopian and TFG forces as well as actively attacking AMISOM Peacekeepers.

There is a perennial occurrence of target killings and hostage takings of, among others, humanitarian workers in Somalia. There is a need to implement, in consultation with the TFG and ARS, measures aimed at eradicating these phenomena. The leadership of the ARS should unequivocally and explicitly (publicly and privately), campaign against these crimes.

Owing to low troop levels, AMISOM was unable to train Somali security forces in line with implementation of the NSSP.

Humanitarian

AMISOM is one of the main providers of health services to the civilian population in Mogadishu. On a daily basis AMISOM health facilities attend to an average of 400-patients comprising ordinary civilians around the Medina area and those wounded by insurgent attacks. Many of these are the most vulnerable of Somali society such as women and children.AMISOM plays an important role in facilitating the delivery of international aid in Somalia by securing Mogadishu port and airport. AMISOM also provides access to clean water to the civilian population and has undertaken the rehabilitation of numerous water wells around Mogadishu in partnership with local authorities and clan elders. It also provides essential escorts to humanitarian convoys headed for distribution points in and around Mogadishu.

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AMISOM could ensure unfettered access to various locations through regular patrols along main routes traversed by humanitarian organisations (if provided with adequate technical, logistical and financial resources).


The current inability of AMISOM to provide a more robust operation is a fundamental challenge which can only be redressed by additional troop generation. In order to effectively respond to threats posed by insurgents to humanitarian assistance delivery, AMISOM needs to reach its authorized strength.

The TFG and the opposition must remove roadblocks to allow for unhindered access for humanitarian personnel and relief items.

The current spate of target killings and hostage taking need to be effectively tackled to enable humanitarian workers carry out their duties safely.

VII. DJIBOUTI PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE IMPLICATION FOR AMISOM

The Djibouti Peace Agreement and the subsequent conclusions reached by the Joint Security and the High Level Political Committees called for an expanded role for AMISOM. These are a) to monitor the phased withdrawal of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) b) to systematically occupy vacated ENDF positions c) to facilitate the implementation of the cessation of hostilities d) to provide technical support to the two committees as required and f) to ensure the security of the meetings of the two committees. This expanded role includes the already established participation of AMISOM in the High Level and Security Committees of the Djibouti Peace Agreement. However, there is urgent need for a review of the AMISOM mandate and to expedite the planned deployment of additional peacekeepers to keep the momentum created by the signing of the Peace Agreement. Both TFG and ARS count on an expanded role of AMISOM.

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The Djibouti Peace Agreement calls for a phased withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces to be replaced by an International Stabilization Force drawn from the friends of Somalia. However, any precipitous withdrawal of ENDF in an uncoordinated manner will undoubtedly create a security vacuum and a major problem for AMISOM. Furthermore, the African Union, IGAD, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the League of the Arab States {LAS} are expected to play a prominent and positive leading role in terms of troop generation, logistics and providing financial and political support to allow a proper implementation of the Peace Agreement.

Joint Security Committee

The purpose of the Joint Security Committee is to prepare a coordinated and comprehensive plan involving the TFG and the ARS with assistance of AMISOM that would ensure that an effective cessation of hostilities agreement is in place. This would invariably lead to the withdrawal of all non-peacekeeping external forces from Somalia and prepare the ground for international troop deployment. It would also allow IDPs to voluntarily return to their areas of pre-war residence or resettle.

The parties further agreed to recommend the modalities and timeframe for the phased withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces, including the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and cessation of hostilities within 30 days effective from a date to be agreed.

The High Level Political Committee

The High Level Committee (HLC) in which AU participates is mandated to establish liaison between the parties for the purpose of facilitating cooperation on political issues in a peaceful manner. The Committee is also to find appropriate peaceful solutions for the full implementation of the Djibouti Agreement, as well as establish a national mechanism for humanitarian access and assistance.

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Implications for AMISOM

The immediate implication of the Djibouti Agreement on AMISOM and its continued operation is the time bound element that it provides for. Being the only visible international presence on the ground, AMISOM stands to face the implication and consequences if the process is not carefully managed according to agreed timelines thus underscoring the need for strengthening AMISOM to its authorized strength.This implies that African Union, in the absence of a fully-fledged UN peace keeping operation, in the immediate must embark on a renewed and more vigorous troop generation effort to reach authorized levels in order to fill the gap that could be created by the withdrawal of any foreign troops currently in Somalia.To sustain an enlarged, multi-dimensional presence on the ground, considerable financial and logistical resources would be required.Finally, it is imperative that, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC) must relocate to the Mission Theatre, as soon as conditions permit in order to provide the requisite political leadership both to the Mission and Somali interlocutors on the ground. This move will have financial implications to be considered.

VIII. WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED AND ACTION TAKEN

The African Union’s experience in Peacekeeping Operations is relatively limited; that it does not have assessed contributions for its operations; it does not have reserve or emergency funds; it depends entirely on external and erratic funding. These challenges are the root causes of a number of the African Union Commission limitations in managing effectively its peace keeping operations. However, there have been a concerted effort to address these limitations and tangible progress had been made in the following areas:

Improvement in financial and management capacity

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The Commission has identified internal weaknesses and has taken measures to address them. In this regard the Commission has begun recruiting key civilian staff to support the work of AMISOM both at Headquarters and in the field. To ensure that the new staff is made familiar with policies related to peace operations, financial and administrative rules of the Commission, all the staff will be given induction and orientation in financial rules and regulations at Headquarters. They will attend a training course to be funded and conducted jointly by African Union Commission and the South African based NGO ACCORD.The finance section at Headquarters has been strengthened by 4 additional finance officers while a full finance unit of 12 staff is being established temporally in Nairobi pending the transfer of the office of the SRCC to Mogadishu.

Improvement of procurement services

In order to avoid long delays in processing the recruitment of staff and procurement of services, the commission has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). UNOPS is expected to build AMISOM Headquarters in Mogadishu as well as a Level 2 hospital, to procure vehicles and prescreen staff applications. The Commission has recently adopted a procurement manual which pays special attention to the special requirements of peace support operations.

Improvement of internal coordination

The Commission has identified weaknesses in inter-departmental communication and coordination mechanism and has instituted regular operational meetings under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Chairperson or the Commissioner. The coordination with AU partners continues to receive high priority from the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson and the Commissioner for Peace and Security.

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IX. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE WAY FORWARD

Implementing provisions of the Djibouti Peace Agreement (DPA) remains to be a complex and daunting task. As implied in earlier sections the Somali peace process requires the commitment of both the international community and Somali stakeholders to ensure an enduring peace. There is a necessity for engagement for groups inside Somalia to build support for a successful implementation of the Djibouti Peace Process.

The Djibouti Peace Agreement calls on the phased withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, and to be replaced by an International Stabilization Force drawn from the friends of Somalia. This is central to the peace process and requires the support of the international community, and a decision from the UN Security Council.

Ultimately the continued international presence in Somalia will have to be assumed by the United Nations through the authorization of a peace keeping operation, in accordance with its responsibility for international peace and security. It is also evident that any precipitous withdrawal of the Ethiopian Forces, in an uncoordinated manner, will undoubtedly create security vacuum and insurmountable problems for AMISOM. There is therefore a need to re-visit the mandate of AMISOM, and to expedite the planned deployment of further troops in order to keep the momentum created by the signing of the Peace Agreement. Both TFG and ARS count on an expanded role of AMISOM.The IGAD, the African Union, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the League of the Arab States are equally expected to play a prominent and positive role, in terms of the generating additional peacekeepers from the Continent. AMISOM plans to reach out, directly or indirectly to factions that did not participate in the negotiations and those that are opposed to the Djibouti Peace Process.

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At the same time, there is a need to ensure matching logistical and financial support as well as commensurate political will for the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

RECOMMENDATIONS1. A clear understanding of the critical role of the African Union

Commission and AMISOM for the future of Somalia.2. Sustained financial support (directly/bilaterally or through the African

Union) for its all mission (political, civilian and military).3. Provide troops for this important Mission.4. Provide direct logistical support.

X. Resource Requirements (Required budget )

1. AMISOM Mission Headquarters Mogadishu – Salaries and Related Costs

Objectives Activities Indicators and standards Estimated Budget x 12 months

To ensure substantive political leadership to the Mission is collocated with Force HQ elements and Somali Government institutions.

Salaries, Allowances and all administrative support included travel provided to all 109 deployed Mission Headquarters Staff including recruitment and training.

Conditions of service set at appropriate levels to attractive competent staff. $ 9 554 100

2. AMISOM Mission Headquarters Mogadishu – Infrastructure


1. Expansion and provision of Office and Living Accommodation for up to 72 International

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To accommodate Mission Headquarters Staff in Mogadishu.

Staff, 30 Military Staff offices and 67 AU Police Senior management.

2. Provision of office equipment, general supply items, stationary, and consumables.

3. Construction on UN MOSS standard perimeter security.

4. Provision of camp services support including pay as you dine facility, camp maintenance, laundry, welfare etc

5. Establishment of rear logistics base Mombasa.

$ 20 487 800

3. Support to the Troops - Allowances


To ensure troops allowances continue to be paid IAW AU/TCC MOUs for 4 Bns deployed 2008 at enhanced rates.

To ensure troops allowances for a further 5 Bns

To ensure redeployment costs are available to TCC member states

Payment of allowances to the troops or $ 750 per soldier per month (3450 troops) for 12 months

Payment of allowances for are averaged 6 months

Payment to TCC of $2000 per troop to be deployed

Timely payments and no disruptions

Prorated against an expected 12 mths deployment.

$ 79 205 000

4. Support to the Troops - Sustainment


To ensure troop self sustainment requirements are meet 4 Bns deployed for 12 months and a further 5 Bns deployed averaged to 6 mths.

1. All military equipment, including personal equipment, required to meet the mandated tasks is

All equipment is maintained in working order. Contingent owned Equipment is reimbursed at UN equivalent standard

If provided at Standard UN re-imbursement rates

$164 202 254

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available in theatre.

2. Rations provided to all troops

rates.Note: Currently all sustainment provided under Bi-Lateral arrangements at unknown cost ratios.

5. Support to the AU no-executive Police Advisers.


To ensure partial deployment of AU Police Advisers

AU Police Advisers are placed in the Mogadishu Police Head Quarters to capacity build police science disciplines and police oversight UNDP developmental initiatives.

$17 650 000

6. AMISOM Medical Support


To provide suitable medical cover to all AMISOM Civilian, Police and Military personnel.

To ensure current Military Field Hospital is upgraded to UN Level II standard and maintained through oncoming service contracts.

To provide responsible Medivac capability to Level IV facility in Nairobi.

$ 5 738 650

7. AMISOM Surface Transport


To provide surface transport requirements in support of Internationals and Police.

Purchase and maintenance of Armoured ( Nato B-6) 4X4, and airfield and mission support vehicle to include fire trucks, MHE and buses.

$ 5 128 170

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8. AMISOM Air Operations


To provide air bridge between Logistics Base Mombasa, Nairobi Rear HQ and Mogadishu.

Establish long term air charters for 3 fixed wing aircraft.

$13 900 000

9. Communications


On ensure self sufficiency in Mission Communications

Provision of VOICE and DATA communications to all Mission HQ staff and down to BN HQs

Provision of suitable IT equipment with support to all Mission HQ staff

$5 100 000

10. AMISOM Fuel


Provision of Diesel and Aviation fuel in support of all Mission Activities

1. Provision of fuel to 4 Bn 12 mths & 5 Bn 6 months TCC Vehicles and Generators. (Provided under Bi-Lateral arrangements during 2008)

2. Provision of fuel to Mission HQ to support HQ and Civilian / Police Vehicles

3. Provision of Aviation Fuel

$21 830 160

$20 947 840

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11. AMISOM Operation Initiatives


Coordinated Initiatives with UNDP/UNPOS/Other UN agencies

SSR/DDR

Civil Affairs

Quick Impact Projects

$69 130 000

12. AMISOM Sundry Financial Reserve


$ 720 000

13. AMISOM Financial Contingency @ 7%


$ 13 000 000

GRAND TOTAL


Not including Bi-lateral TCC Support and Operational initaives

$ 190 931 560

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ANNEX 1

Force Generation Strategy

The initial AU force generation strategy has not yielded the desired result. Consequently, one year after AMISOM operations in Somalia, troop levels are still below 45% of the approved nine battalions. Poor response from potential troop contributing countries could be attributed to the peculiar geopolitics and other dynamics that come to play in the Somalia situation in addition to the disparities in emoluments between AU and UN peacekeepers. Delays in raising troop levels to the approved strength have significantly impacted on AMISOM's capacity to execute its mandate.

In an effort to mobilize the needed troops for AMISOM, the Peace and Security Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU Commission has developed a more innovative force generation strategy. Under the new strategy, the AU Commission will adopt a double pronged approach where the AU political leadership will engage heads of governments of member states while technical missions are fielded to potential troop contributing countries.

The political level will be made up of AUC leadership, selected Members of the Military Committee and AU partners. This level will identify and bring their influence to bear on the Member States on the need to contribute troops for AMISOM. At the Political level, the Chairperson or his representative is to engage the Regional Blocks (ECOWAS, SADC and East African Community), heads of governments, Defence Attaches, Strategic Partners and Potential TCCs to buy into the work plan in order to facilitate the technical working group to follow up on the troops and logistics support for AMISOM at the national level.

The technical team will be composed of head PSOD, SPMU military planners and designated staff from the AMISOM Force headquarters.The technical team will focus on the operational matters related to force generation and will travel to potential Troop Contributing ountries to engage in the technical and operational requirements of the mission.

Planning Assumptions There is Cessation of Hostilities Agreement International Stabilization Force is not deployed within 120 days

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AMISOM mandate is broadened to cover other stakeholders such as the ARS

Two additional battalions are deployed by January 2009 The political and security situation will be permissive

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Appeal document final

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